Journal of Family Violence, Vol. 20, No. 1, February 2005 ( C© 2005)DOI: 10.1007/s10896-005-1508-0

The Effects of a Police/Victim Assistance Crisis TeamApproach to Domestic Violence

Jacqueline Corcoran1,3 and Shannon Allen2

A police/victim assistance crisis intervention program was evaluated over a 6-month period for itseffect on police-related outcomes. Police report data on crisis team cases (N = 96) were comparedto a random selection of family violence cases (N = 80) that were not served by the crisis team. Thecrisis team cases generated more arrests; however, victim cooperation was lower than in noncrisisintervention cases. Implications for work with family violence and victim assistance are discussed,as well as needs for future research.

KEY WORDS: domestic violence; family violence; crisis intervention; crisis team; victim services.

According to the U.S. Department of Justice, almostone-third of crimes perpetrated on women from 1992 to1993 was committed by intimate partners or former part-ners (U.S. Department of Justice, 1995). A much higherpercentage of female homicide victims (28% or 1,414women) were killed by their current or former partners incomparison to only 3% (637) of male homicide victims(U.S. Department of Justice, 1995). Family violence, alsoreferred to as domestic violence, spousal assault, and part-ner abuse, incurs an estimated cost in the United Statesranging from 5 to 10 billion dollars annually in termsof medical treatment, police and court costs, shelters andfoster care, sick leave, absenteeism, and nonproductivity(Teske, 1995). These costs fail to take into account the highrates of depression, low self-esteem, and posttraumaticstress for battered women (Rhodes et al., 1998). Jolin andMoose (1997) report that the costs increase to 164 billionwhen the effects on children are included. Child witnessesto abuse may experience an array of symptoms, such asanger, sadness, guilt, self-blame, withdrawal, posttrau-matic stress, and lack of social skills (Jaffe et al., 1990;Kolbo et al., 1996). If effective intervention is not offered,the abuse may continue to be perpetuated from genera-

1Virginia Commonwealth University, School of Social Work, Richmond,Virginia.

2Federal Bureau of Prisons, Fort Worth, Texas.3To whom correspondence should be addressed at e-mail: jcorcora@saturn.vsu.edu.

tion to generation (Horton & Williamson, 1988; Jolin &Moose, 1997).

HISTORICAL RESPONSESTO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

As gatekeepers to the criminal justice system, policeofficers are usually the first point of contact for victimsof domestic violence (Barnett et al., 1997). Family distur-bance calls account for between 15 and 40% of all callsreceived by police departments nationwide; the police,therefore, play a crucial role in determining how a domes-tic disturbance is resolved (Hendricks, 1991). Domesticviolence calls, however, pose a challenge to law enforce-ment. First, the calls require more time than other policematters because victims often have many questions andcomplicated needs that require attention, some of whichmay not be in the officer’s area of expertise (Oppenlander,1982). The extra time spent on these emergencies thenreduces the number of officers available to respond toother calls. Second, the low prosecution rate and highnumber of dismissed cases also may lead police officersto view as wasted the time and efforts they spend onfamily violence cases. Third, many victims contact thepolice so the violence will stop; once the violence is overthey may not want to arrest or prosecute the perpetrator(Davis & Smith, 1995). An additional factor associatedwith family violence is the perception of danger police

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40 Corcoran and Allen

encounter (Carr, 1982; Ford, 1983; Hirschel et al., 1992;Ohlin & Tonry, 1989).

The response by law enforcement to family violencehas changed considerably over the past 50 years. In theearly 1950s and 1960s, the traditional response was toallow family members to resolve their own affairs (Stalans& Lurigio, 1995). Prior to 1966, no United States policedepartments provided training on domestic disturbances,and only a handful had written policies or procedureson the subject (Hendricks, 1991). In most cases, policechose not to get involved in what they viewed as “familymatters.”

Three factors have been influential in forcing changein the police response to domestic violence. The women’smovement has greatly increased awareness to the plightof abused women, and for encouraging law enforcementto begin treating domestic violence like a serious crime(Stalans & Lurigio, 1995). Another factor responsible forchanges in policies and procedures was the increasingnumber of lawsuits filed against police departments forfailing to protect victims of domestic violence (Roberts,1996). Finally, a national study on the deterrent effect ofarrest influenced many police departments to change theirarrest policies in cases of domestic violence (Sherman,1992).

CRISIS INTERVENTION

The first real innovation in changing the traditionallaw enforcement response to domestic violence came in1967 with a program designed by Bard and Berkowitz(Buzawa & Buzawa, 1996). Officers were trained in me-diation and crisis intervention and were instructed to me-diate disputes and make referrals to clinical psychologists;arrest was to occur only as a last resort. Although results ofthe Bard and Berkowitz program were mixed (Buchanan& Perry, 1985; Buzawa & Buzawa, 1996; Liebman &Schwartz, 1973), other police departments embraced theconcept. In 1971, at least 14 police departments adoptedthe crisis intervention model and created specialized offi-cers whose primary role was to mediate disputes (Liebman& Schwartz, 1973). The officers’ options included order-ing the batterer to leave the home and discouraging thevictim from pressing charges (Barnett et al., 1997). Thesuccess of these efforts was somewhat limited. Oppenlan-der (1982) concluded from his analysis of a police servicesstudy that police officers were more concerned with theabuser than the victim, and that only a few officers whowere utilizing mediation or counseling had been trained.He also reported that while 90% were familiar with thesocial service agencies in the area, only 4% made referrals(Oppenlander, 1982).

Perhaps because of the difficulties of police officersutilizing techniques, trained victim assistance workers andvolunteers were brought in to assist police officers at thescene. The Pawtucket, Rhode Island Police Departmentcreated a crisis team in January of 1974 composed of avictim assistance team member and an armed police offi-cer in order to back-up uniformed patrol officers on familydisturbance calls; the team also received follow-up refer-rals from other officers (Carr, 1982). A survey conductedby the Pawtucket Mayor’s office in 1975 revealed that79% of the families who received the services of the crisisteam described these services as helpful (Carr, 1982).

Another crisis team, developed in 1975 in Tuscon,Arizona, through the District Attorney’s office and withfunding from the Law Enforcement Assistance Admin-istration, has served as a model for other cities (Horton& Williamson, 1988; Roberts, 1990). The crisis team pa-trols every night from 6:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. and consistsof one male and 1 female working in a marked patrolcar equipped with a police radio. The team arrives onscene to relieve patrol officers once they have concludedlaw enforcement duties. The goal of the program is toprovide battered women with immediate crisis counsel-ing, advocacy, transportation to shelters, and referrals tocommunity resources (Horton & Williamson, 1988). Sim-ilar “coordinated” approaches in which victim assistanceworkers collaborate with police officers to serve domesticviolence victims have increased with support from thefederal government (Caputo, 1988; Jolin & Moose, 1997;National Institute of Justice, 1996).

Unfortunately, evaluation of these coordinated ap-proaches have been minimal. One study examined the“Family Options” program created in Illinois underthe umbrella of the Domestic Violence Reduction Act(Caputo, 1988). Effectiveness was based on a reductionin 911 calls, which may not have necessarily reflectedany particular effects of the crisis intervention programon family violence. A coordinated response program inSan Diego reportedly was responsible for decreasing thedomestic violence-related homicide rate by 87% between1991 and 1992 (Pence, 1989). However, since homiciderates tend to be low, a small numeric change may translateinto large percentage changes. In addition, the amount oftime needed to measure homicide rates calls into ques-tion the results. Still other programs have been imple-mented nationwide; however, the empirical studies eval-uating such programs are few in number.

ARREST POLICIES

Prior to 1980, police were not permitted to arrest incases of misdemeanor domestic assault (Davis & Smith,

Crisis Team for Domestic Violence 41

1995). The International Association of Chiefs of Policespecified in their training materials that arrest should beavoided (Ohlin & Tonry, 1989). If the batterer was ar-rested, it was because he had committed a felony (Barnettet al., 1997) or shown disrespect to the police officer(Stanko, 1994). Beginning in the 1970s, however, law-suits were filed pertaining to this issue (Hanmer et al.,1989; Roberts, 1996). The United States Supreme Courtfound the city guilty of violating Thurman’s 14th amend-ment right to fair and equal treatment under the law(Barnett et al., 1997). Partly as a result of these law-suits, by the 1980s, 47 states had revised their legisla-tion on domestic violence and had enacted changes toprotect battered women (Davis & Smith, 1995). Thesechanges in legislation redefined domestic violence as acrime.

During this time period, two national reports on do-mestic violence were published. The first, from the UnitedStates Commission on Civil Rights in January of 1982,specified the need to provide funding to develop servicesfor battered women and advocated for a federal agencyto oversee domestic violence research and activity (Davis& Hagen, 1992). The second, the final report from theAttorney General’s Task Force on Family Violence inSeptember of 1984, defined domestic violence as a crim-inal problem. It also endorsed the findings of a nationalstudy, the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment,on the deterrent effect of arrest, and provided fundingaimed at ameliorating family violence (Davis et al., 1997;Roberts, 1996).

The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experimenttested the following three different police officer responseconditions with randomization to groups: arrest of thesuspect; separation of the victim and offender; and medi-ation or crisis intervention (Sherman, 1992). Arrest of thesuspect was found to yield fewer repeat incidents of vio-lence within 6 months after the initial police intervention(Sherman, 1992).

In replication studies, however, Berk et al. (1992)found that arrest actually could increase the likeli-hood of future violence for those suspects who wereunemployed. Despite the mixed findings, the state ofOregon, under the Abuse Prevention Act of 1977, be-came the first state to enact mandatory arrest. By 1986,47 police departments in large cities across the UnitedStates had adopted a mandatory or presumptive ar-rest policy (Ferraro, 1989). In addition, the number ofdepartments implementing a proarrest policy increasedfrom 10 to 46% between 1984 and 1986 (Jaffe et al.,1996; Roberts, 1996), taking away a great deal of dis-cretion from the patrol officer (Buzawa & Buzawa,1996).

STUDY

The two approaches discussed in the literature, crisisintervention and arrest policies, were combined and eval-uated in the present study. The theoretical framework ofthe program under study first will be described, followedby a description of the program. Objectives, hypotheses,and methodology will then be provided.

The theoretical framework for the program is crisistheory. According to this theory, intervention at the cru-cial period of crisis helps individuals with almost over-whelming stress to eventually return to their previouslevel of functioning (Parad & Caplan, 1960). Becausecrisis destabilizes normal coping responses, people aremore amenable to learning other coping methods.

DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM

With coordination from the local emergency shelterfor battered women, the police department in this studycreated the Crisis Team. The central purposes were todecrease future domestic violence and to increase theamount of services available to victims. The team con-sisted of one uniformed detective from the Family Vio-lence Unit of the police department and a crisis interven-tion volunteer.

Volunteers were recruited through the domestic vio-lence shelter. All volunteers went through a screening in-terview and a criminal history check and completed 16 hrof training on the dynamics of domestic violence, lawsinvolving domestic violence, crisis intervention methods,and the resources and services available in the community.As part of their training, volunteers were required to do an8-hr patrol ride with a police officer. The majority of thevolunteers were Caucasian females and many were work-ing on advanced degrees in social work, counseling, andpsychology. Approximately one-third of the volunteershad previously been victims of domestic violence.

The team was implemented in a high-crime sector ofa mid-size, southwestern city in February 1997. Operat-ing 32 hr per week, the crisis intervention team rode ina marked patrol unit and was available at the request ofpatrol officers. The unit was made aware of a disturbancevia radio and dispatched to meet the patrol officer at thescene. The police detective was responsible for gatheringevidence and investigating the case. If appropriate, thedetective then referred the case to the District Attorney’soffice. Once the police officer had ensured the scene wassafe (i.e., the perpetrator was in custody and/or had leftthe scene), then the volunteers provided the victims withcrisis intervention services. These included encouraging

42 Corcoran and Allen

ventilation from victims, validating victims’ concerns, ed-ucating victims about the criminal justice system, pro-viding information on the dynamics of family violence,and giving referrals for social and legal services. Trans-portation to the battered women’s shelter was provided,if needed, and follow-up information was recorded forfuture contact of the victim. Staff at the domestic violenceshelter provided follow-up services, which included ac-companiment to court hearings and trials and assistance infiling for Crime Victims Compensation and Protective Or-ders. In addition to the on-site services provided, the teampatrolled addresses where people with protective ordersresided.

In the majority of cases, victims were willing to en-gage in crisis intervention services. In the occasional casein which the victim was Spanish-speaking, police officerswere available to translate, and some of the volunteerswere also bilingual. Services were provided to male, aswell as female, victims. If a male victim needed a safeplace to stay, the shelter would arrange for a hotel room.

OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES

The purpose of the study was to examine the effectsof the implementation of the crisis team on family violencefrom the police perspective. The following objectives andhypotheses were formulated:

Objective 1: What effect does the intervention by the crisisteam have on the victim’s willingness to cooperate withthe police department?

Hypothesis 1: Victims of family violence will be morelikely to cooperate with the police when they receivecrisis team services than when they do not.

Objective 2: Does the number of women transported tothe battered women’s shelter increase after the crisisteam has responded?

Hypothesis 2: The number of victims transported to theshelter following a response by the crisis team willincrease.

Objective 3: Is the police department more likely to filecharges on cases of family violence as a result of thecrisis team being implemented?

Hypothesis 3: After the mobilization of the crisis team, thepolice department will be more likely to file charges onfamily violence cases compared to cases with no crisisteam implementation.

METHOD

Police data on family violence calls from a 6-monthperiod from April, 1997 to September, 1997 were col-

lected. Crisis team cases then were compared with ran-domly selected cases from the same high-crime sector ofthe city which did not have the crisis team response.

Measurement

Each family violence offense report was reviewedand the following information detailed: (1) offense num-ber, (2) report date, (3) time, (4) officer identificationnumber/detective identification number, (5) beat, (6) rela-tionship of victim/suspect, (7) race/gender/age of victim,(8) race/gender/age of suspect, (9) whether crisis teamresponded to the scene, (10) whether an arrest was madeat the scene, (11) whether the victim went to the shelter/was transported by police, (12) victim’s willingness tocooperate with the police case, and (13) disposition ofpolice case. The disposition category included: assault byoffensive contact, assault bodily injury, aggravated assaultwith a deadly weapon, criminal attempt of murder, crim-inal mischief/trespass, terroristic threat, and aggravatedsexual assault.

Data Analysis

Data analysis involved first, frequency counts. Thenchi-square analyses were conducted to examine group dif-ferences between crisis team and noncrisis team familyviolence cases. Comparisons were made on the demo-graphics of the victims and suspects served, the number ofvictims that went to shelters, victim cooperation, numberof arrests made, and types of charges filed.

RESULTS

All crisis team cases between April, 1997 andSeptember, 1997 were selected (N = 96) and comparedagainst 80 randomly selected noncrisis team cases fromthe same time period. This study had .80 power, a mediumeffect size of .45, and a significance level of .05 (Lipsey,1990).

Demographic Information

Please see Table I for demographic information forboth the crisis team and noncrisis team cases served overthis same 6-month time frame. The majority of victimswere African-American (68% for crisis team cases, 76%for noncrisis team cases) and female (75% for crisis team

Crisis Team for Domestic Violence 43

Table I. Demographic Characteristics of Victims and Suspects

Noncrisis Crisis

team N = 80 team N = 96

VictimGender

Male 14 (17.5%) 24 (25.0%)Female 66 (82.5%) 72 (75.0%)

RaceWhite 17 (21.3%) 23 (24.0%)African-American 61 (76.3%) 65 (67.7%)Hispanic 2 (2.5%) 8 (8.3%)Asian

Age18-under 10 (12.5%) 11 (11.5%)19–25 18 (22.5%) 14 (14.6%)26–34 28 (35.0%) 44 (45.8%)35–45 12 (15.0%) 19 (19.8%)46–55 7 (8.8%) 7 (7.3%)56–over 5 (6.3%) 1 (1.0%)

Relationship of victim to suspectMarried 25 (31.3%) 24 (25.0%)Divorced 0 3 (3.1%)Girlfriend/boyfriend 23 (28.8%) 43 (44.8%)Ex girlfriend/boyfriend and 9 (11.3%) 7 (7.3%)have child together

Parent/child 10 (12.5%) 8 (8.3%)Other relative 8 (10.0%) 6 (6.3%)Unknown 5 (6.3%) 5 (5.2%)

SuspectGender

Male 70 (87.5%) 79 (82.3%)Female 10 (12.5%) 17 (17.7%)

RaceWhite 12 (15.0%) 20 (20.8%)African-American 66 (82.5%) 70 (72.9%)Hispanic 2 (2.5%) 6 (6.3%)Asian

Age18-under 7 (8.8%) 8 (8.3%)19–25 20 (25.0%) 15 (15.6%)26–34 23 (28.8%) 32 (33.3%)35–45 19 (23.8%) 28 (29.2%)46–55 8 (10.0%) 12 (12.5%)56–over 3 (3.8%) 1 (1.0%)

cases, 83% for noncrisis team cases). The modal age ofvictims was between 26 and 34. The majority of suspectswere African-American (73% for crisis team cases, 83%for noncrisis team cases), male (82% for crisis team cases,88% for noncrisis team cases), and had a modal age of26–34. The relationship of victim to suspect was mostoften identified as a current girlfriend/boyfriend (45%for crisis team cases, 29% for noncrisis team cases).No significant differences were found between groupson any demographic variables according to chi-squareanalyses.

Arrests

Arrests were made in 79 (82%) of the crisis teamcases and 39 (49%) of the noncrisis team cases (χ2[1, N =176] = 35.30, p < .01). Similar patterns were found be-tween groups on the types of family violence-related ar-rests: assault by offensive contact (14% of crisis teamcases, 23% of noncrisis cases); assault bodily injury (61%of crisis team cases, 64% of noncrisis team cases); aggra-vated assault with a deadly weapon (10% of crisis teamcases, 5% of noncrisis team cases); criminal attempt-murder (1% of crisis team cases, 3% of noncrisis teamcases); criminal mischief/trespassing (0% of crisis teamcases; 3% of noncrisis team cases); terroristic threat (0%of crisis team cases, 3% of noncrisis team cases); andaggravated sexual assault (3% for crisis team cases, 0%for noncrisis team cases). Six percent of crisis team arrestsinvolved mutual combat. It is unknown for which type ofcharge suspects were arrested for 5% of crisis team cases.

Reasons given for nonarrest were as follows: sus-pect left the scene (8% for crisis team cases, 38% fornoncrisis team cases); insufficient evidence (3% for cri-sis team, 9% for noncrisis team); victim uncooperative(0% for crisis team, 1% for noncrisis team); suspectagreed to leave (6% for crisis team, 9% for noncrisisteam); and unknown (1% for crisis team, 1% for noncrisisteam). Chi-square analysis showed that there was a signif-icant difference between groups on reasons for nonarrest(χ2[5, N = 176] = 34.00, p = .01).

Shelter Services

Very few women in cases involving police responsewent to the shelter (7% of crisis team cases, 1% of non-crisis team cases). Out of the seven crisis team cases, fourof the women were transported to the shelter by the crisisteam.

Cooperation with the Police

Noncooperation was higher in the crisis team cases:15% of crisis team cases vs. 4% of noncrisis team cases(χ2[1, N = 176] = 5.87, p = .05).

DISCUSSION

This study examined outcomes deemed importantfrom the police perspective, specifically, the numbers andtypes of family violence arrests and degree of victim

44 Corcoran and Allen

cooperation. It is important to study police-related out-comes since police department personnel have to see thebenefits of alternative in-house programs in order to con-tinue to fund them. However, future studies should addressvictim satisfaction with the police response and the im-pact on victim adjustment and decision making about therelationship.

A primary finding in this study is that arrests weremade in a significantly greater number of family violencecases when the crisis team was called. This may relateto why the crisis team was initially called, that is, anarrest could be made. Cases in which a suspect had leftthe scene (38% of the noncrisis team cases) or the policeofficer determined there was insufficient evidence to makean arrest (9% of the noncrisis team cases) were less likelyto result in a police officer calling in the crisis team. Incases where an arrest can be made, it is more efficient tohave the detective at the scene so that the case can be filedimmediately.

A second hypothesis was that victim cooperationwould be higher in the crisis team cases since a trainedvolunteer would be present to help the victim processfeelings and to provide information and referral. However,noncooperation was significantly higher in the crisis teamcases (15% of crisis team cases vs. 4% of noncrisis teamcases), although only a small proportion of victims werenoncooperative overall. Apparently, in crisis team cases,when there was more likelihood for an arrest to be made,some of the victims may not have wanted their partnerstaken to jail (police might have been called only in orderto get the violence to stop) and may have been uncoop-erative as a result. Another possibility for this finding isthat police officers who had difficulty handling a victim’sreaction might be more likely to call the crisis team asback-up. Therefore, selection bias may be present in thetypes of cases to which the crisis team responded.

This urban police department specifically targeted ahigh-crime area of the city for the implementation of thecrisis team. The majority of both victims and suspectswere African-American, a population which has beenunder-studied in terms of social services interventionsand, specifically, crisis intervention. This study seems toindicate that the community was responsive to the cri-sis team approach to domestic violence, although neededin future study is follow-up on recidivism rates in thesepartners and information on the psychosocial impact forvictims.

Few women in this study elected to go to the batteredwomen’s shelter. Hutchinson and Hirschel (1998) foundfrom interviews with 419 primarily African-Americanwomen who called the police for partner violence, thatfew of these women utilized battered women’s shelters.

Hines and Boyd-Franklin (1996) describe that an African-American cultural value may be to rely on extended familyand kin in times of crisis rather than formal support sys-tems. This perhaps accounted for why the women in thisstudy did not rely on battered women’s shelters.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This study posed a number of limitations. Sources ofdata for this research were police offense reports. Relyingsolely on police data excludes those victims of family vi-olence who have not made a report to the police. Further,police report data do not capture the possible psychoso-cial benefits to victims. Future work should address thislimitation by surveying victims on their change scores forstress, depression, or other indicators of adjustment, as aresult of programmatic influence.

Additionally, the current program is a new interven-tion that began in February 1997, and there may have beena time lag before the intervention was implemented fully.For this reason, the current 6-month comparison may nothave captured the true effects of the intervention. Anotherissue is the unit’s availability to respond to calls. Thecrisis team is available a total of 32 hr a week to respondat the request of patrol officers. Consequently, only a smallpercentage of the total number of domestic violence callsare eligible for crisis team services. Relatedly, it remainsto be studied whether the cost of the program justifiesits impact. Future work in this area should examine thesavings in terms of reduced patrol officer time for familyviolence calls and recidivism rates for arrests, with thecommensurate criminal justice costs.

Other limitations of the study possibly involve theuse of volunteers. Perhaps volunteers were not able to in-tervene as effectively as counselors with advanced degreesand training. The qualification level of the volunteers wasnot tracked in this study, but it seems logical to assumethat the more qualified a volunteer, the more effective shemight have been on the scene of a domestic violence call.

The effect of race was also not assessed in this study.Most of the victims were African-American, while vol-unteers tended to be Caucasian. The race of the volunteerwas not tracked and related to outcome of the case. Fu-ture research on crisis intervention with domestic violencemight address this issue of race effects in the delivery ofservices.

CONCLUSION

Combining the efforts of law enforcement and socialservice agencies within the community is an innovative

Crisis Team for Domestic Violence 45

approach that appears promising in theory. More researchin the field of family violence is necessary to determinehow best to intervene at the point of crisis with victimsand perpetrators in order to break the pattern of violence.

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