The effect of self-attribute relevance on how self-esteem moderates attitude change in dissonance...

Journal ofExperimental

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003) 508–515

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Social Psychology

The effect of self-attribute relevance on how self-esteemmoderates attitude change in dissonance processesq

Jeff Stonea,* and Joel Cooperb

a Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85715, USAb Department of Psychology, Green Hall, Princeton University, Princeton , NJ 08544, USA

Received 10 May 2002; revised 3 September 2002

Abstract

An experiment was conducted to examine the conditions under which self-esteem operates as an expectancy, as a resource, or

does not influence cognitive dissonance processes. Based on the self-standards model of dissonance (Stone & Cooper, 2001), it was

predicted that following a high-choice counter-attitudinal behavior: (a) priming positive self-attributes that were relevant to the

discrepant behavior would cause participants with high self-esteem to report more attitude change as compared to participants with

low self-esteem, (b) priming positive self-attributes that were irrelevant to the behavior would cause participants with high self-

esteem to report less attitude change as compared to participants with low self-esteem, and (c) priming neutral self-attributes would

eliminate self-esteem moderation of attitude change. The results of the attitude change measure supported the predictions. The

discussion explores different processes by which the accessibility of cognitions about the self mediate dissonance arousal and

reduction.

� 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

Keywords: Cognitive dissonance; Attitude change; Self-esteem; Self-affirmation; Self-consistency; Self-standards

Since the introduction of the theory of cognitive

dissonance (Festinger, 1957), several theories have been

proposed to explain how self-esteem and cognitions

about the self influence the arousal and reduction ofcognitive dissonance. One contemporary theory pro-

poses that cognitions about the self function as re-

sources for dissonance reduction (e.g., Aronson, Cohen,

& Nail, 1999; Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993; Tesser,

2000). Resource models maintain that for self-relevant

thought to reduce psychological discomfort, people

must bring to mind more positive than negative self-

attributes following a discrepant act (Steele & Lui, 1983;Tesser & Cornell, 1991). Resource models further as-

sume that people with high self-esteem possess more

positive attributes in their self-concept than people with

low self-esteem (Spencer, Josephs, & Steele, 1993). Thus,

qWe thank John Bargh for his insightful comments about the

priming manipulations used in this research. We also gratefully

acknowledge Jason Chism, Jeremey Baver, Jaymonde Errico, and Erin

Atkinson for their help in collecting the data reported in this paper.* Corresponding author. Fax: 1-520-621-9306.

E-mail address: [email protected] (J. Stone).

0022-1031/$ - see front matter � 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights resdoi:10.1016/S0022-1031(03)00018-0

self-relevant thought can provide more affirmational

resources to people with high self-esteem relative to

people with low self-esteem, suggesting that positive

cognitions about the self cause people to be less vul-nerable to dissonance processes following a discrepant

behavior.

Other theory and research, however, indicates that

positive cognitions about the self makes people with

high self-esteem more vulnerable to dissonance pro-

cesses. According to self-consistency theory (Aronson,

1968; Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992), cognitions about

the self can represent standards or expectancies for be-havior. Following a counter-attitudinal behavior, people

with high self-esteem, who hold more positive expec-

tancies for themselves, are more likely to perceive a

discrepancy between their behavior and their self-ex-

pectancies. They are subsequently more likely to feel

discomfort and be motivated to use a self-justification

strategy. In contrast, people with low self-esteem, who

presumably hold less positive expectancies for their be-havior, may not perceive the same behavior to be dis-

crepant from their negative self-expectancies. As a

erved.

mail to: [email protected]

J. Stone, J. Cooper / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003) 508–515 509

result, they should experience less discomfort followinga discrepant act. Research in support of the self-con-

sistency prediction shows that following a discrepant

behavior, people with positive self-expectancies (Aron-

son & Carlsmith, 1962; Brockner, Wiesenfeld, & Ras-

kas, 1993), or high self-esteem (Gibbons, Eggleston, &

Benthin, 1997; Glass, 1964; Maracek & Mettee, 1972;

Stone, 1999) reported more attitude or behavior change

than people with negative expectancies or low self-es-teem. This suggests that, under some conditions, posi-

tive cognitions about the self can also exacerbate the

discomfort some people feel when they commit a dis-

crepant act.

The purpose of the research in this paper was to test a

new model designed to address the seemingly paradoxi-

cal role of self-esteem and cognitions about the self in

dissonance processes. In recent papers describing theSelf-Standards Model of cognitive dissonance (SSM, see

Stone, 2001; Stone & Cooper, 2001), we proposed that

the different theoretical perspectives on cognitive disso-

nance essentially describe a variety of processes by which

people interpret and evaluate their behavior. The various

perspectives differ, however, because each makes a spe-

cific assumption about the type of information people

use to interpret and evaluate a given act. Theories likeself-affirmation (Steele, 1988) and self-consistency

(Aronson, 1968) assume that cognitions about the self

represent the default criteria for judgment, whereas other

theories assume that non-self related cognitions, such as

specific attitudes (Harmon-Jones, Brehm, Greenberg,

Simon, & Nelson, 1996) or behavioral consequences

(Cooper & Fazio, 1984) represent the default informa-

tion used in the assessment of behavior. Consequently,each theory makes different predictions regarding the

role of self-esteem (and the cognitions about the self that

it represents) in the dissonance process, because each

assumes that different types of information are regularly

brought to mind when people assess their behavior and

then attempt to cope with their discomfort.

Our new theoretical model proposes that the assess-

ment of behavior is more malleable than has been pre-viously recognized. The SSM holds that people can use

important attitudes, beliefs, or self-knowledge to un-

derstand the meaning of their behavior, but which cri-

teria people use depends upon the type of information

that is brought to mind by cues in the situation. Once

they have acted, people evaluate their behavior against a

standard of judgment, and that standard of judgment

may or may not relate to a cognitive representation ofthe self. For example, the evaluation of behavior may be

based on its relationship to a specific attitude or belief

(Harmon-Jones et al., 1996), or the assessment of be-

havior may be based on generally shared, normative

considerations of what is foolish or immoral (Cooper &

Fazio, 1984). However, the assessment of behavior may

also be based on personal, idiographically held consid-

erations of what is foolish or immoral—standards thatare connected to individual representations of the self.

The SSM maintains that only the use of personal stan-

dards in the assessment of behavior—those that relate to

idiosyncratic self-expectancies—will cause self-esteem

differences in dissonance arousal. Furthermore, once

dissonance is aroused, the SSM predicts that bringing to

mind certain aspects of the self can influence the need

to justify behavior, or use self-knowledge as a resourceto reduce discomfort. The moderating role of self-esteem

in dissonance reduction depends upon whether the

cognitions about the self are positive, self-descriptive,

and related to the behavioral discrepancy. Thus, the

SSM provides a framework from which to predict when

and how cognitions about the self will moderate disso-

nance processes (Stone & Cooper, 2001).

Recent research testing the SSM indicates that thestandards people use to interpret and evaluate a dis-

crepant act influences when self-esteem moderates dis-

sonance processes (Stone, in press). For example, in one

experiment, participants with high versus low self-es-

teem wrote a counter-attitudinal essay. To prime self-

standards, participants then examined a list of positive,

negative, and neutral traits (e.g., competent, irrational,

and average). Some participants were directed to circlethe traits that represented their personal standards for

behavior, whereas others circled the traits that repre-

sented the normative standards for behavior (partici-

pants in a high- and low-choice control condition did

not view the trait lists). The attitude change measure

showed that in the low-choice control condition, high-

and low-self-esteem participants showed less attitude

change compared to high and low self-esteem partici-pants in the high-choice control condition. Moreover,

when normative standards were primed, high self-esteem

and low self-esteem participants showed equal levels of

attitude change. However, when primed for their per-

sonal standards for behavior, participants with high self-

esteem showed significantly more attitude change than

participants with low self-esteem, whose attitude change

scores were not significantly different than the low-choice control groups. Thus, as predicted by the SSM,

self-esteem moderated dissonance-induced attitude

change only when personal self-standards were primed

in the context of the discrepant act. When primed to

consider the normative standards for their behavior, or

when no standard was directly primed, both self-esteem

groups showed the same level of dissonance-induced

attitude change.The research in this paper was designed to further test

SSM predictions concerning how self-esteem moderates

dissonance processes. According to the model, once

people perceive that their behavior deviates from an

important personal or normative standard, they will

experience discomfort and be motivated to reduce it. But

how they reduce their discomfort depends upon the

510 J. Stone, J. Cooper / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 39 (2003) 508–515

cognitions about the self that are accessible in the con-text. If no further self-relevant thought occurs, the dis-

crepancy will remain salient and people will seek

justification of their behavior (e.g., attitude change).

However, if new positive cognitions about the self are

made accessible in the context, then the strategy for

dissonance reduction turns on the relevance of the self-

attributes to the behavioral discrepancy.

The SSM predictions concerning how the relevanceof positive cognitions moderates the role of self-esteem

in dissonance reduction derives from research by

Aronson, Blanton, and Cooper (1995) and Blanton,

Cooper, Skurnik, and Aronson (1997) in which partici-

pants wrote an ‘‘uncompassionate’’ essay. In one ex-

periment (Aronson et al., 1995), when subsequently

allowed the opportunity to read positive feedback on

self-attributes that were related (e.g., ‘‘compassion’’)and unrelated (e.g., ‘‘creative’’) to the essay, participants

chose to avoid the positive feedback about attributes

that were relevant to the discrepant behavior; they fo-

cused instead on the positive feedback that was unre-

lated to their discrepant behavior. Another study

(Blanton et al., 1997) provided participants with either

positive relevant or irrelevant feedback following an

uncompassionate advocacy. When told they were‘‘highly compassionate’’ individuals, participants

showed significantly more attitude change relative to

participants in a no feedback high-choice control con-

dition. In contrast, when told they were ‘‘highly crea-

tive’’ individuals, participants showed significantly less

attitude change compared to high-choice control par-

ticipants. These data suggest that in order for positive

self-attributes to serve as resources for dissonance re-duction, they must shift processing away from the rele-

vant standards for behavior. Otherwise, thinking about

positive self-attributes that are relevant to the discrep-

ancy exacerbates the need to justify behavior (Stone &

Cooper, 2001).

The SSM further proposes that the effects of relevant

versus irrelevant positive self-attributes on dissonance

reduction can be moderated by self-esteem. Specifically,when relevant positive attributes are salient, people with

high self-esteem will experience more dissonance, and

report more attitude change, than people with low self-

esteem. The model assumes that because of their rela-

tionship to the discrepant behavior, relevant positive

attributes bring to mind self-expectancies—the cognitive

representation of how well an individual upholds the

conventional standards for behavior. Based on self-consistency theory (Aronson, 1968), people with high

self-esteem, who think they typically match the conven-

tional standards for behavior, should perceive that their

behavior is discrepant from their positive expectancy.

The perceived discrepancy should then cause discomfort

and motivate dissonance reduction via attitude change.

In contrast, people with low self-esteem, who tend to

view themselves as falling short of the conventionalstandards for behavior, should perceive that the same

behavior is more consistent with their negative expecta-

tions, and this congruous information will reduce their

need to justify the discrepancy. Thus, when the salience

of relevant self-attributes activate self-expectancies, self-

esteem will moderate dissonance reduction via self-con-

sistency processes.

Conversely, if cues in the situation make accessiblepositive attributes that are irrelevant to the discrepant

act, the SSM predicts that people with high self-esteem

will report less attitude change than people with low

self-esteem. This prediction is based on the resource

model assumption that people with high self-esteem

possess more positive attributes in their self-concept

than people with low self-esteem (Spencer et al., 1993).

As a result, self-relevant thought provides more affir-mational resources to people with high self-esteem.

People with low self-esteem, in contrast, do not perceive

positive attributes to be as highly self-descriptive (see

Brown, 1998). If they are less likely to perceive positive

attributes as applying to them, then making irrelevant

positive attributes salient in the context should not

provide them with resources to use for dissonance re-

duction. As a result, people with low self-esteem shoulduse attitude change to reduce their discomfort (Steele

et al., 1993). This leads to the prediction that when

irrelevant attributes are salient in the situation, self-es-

teem will moderate dissonance reduction through self-

affirmation processes.

The present experiment was designed to test the

predicted interaction between self-esteem and self-attri-

bute relevance on dissonance induced attitude change.In some conditions of the experiment, participants with

high or low self-esteem completed a counter-attitudinal

essay under conditions of high choice. They then com-

pleted a task designed to prime either positive self-at-

tributes that were relevant to the discrepant essay, or

positive self-attributes that were irrelevant to the dis-

crepant essay. Also included in the design were high-

and low-choice control conditions in which participantswere primed for neutral self-attributes. After the prim-

ing task, participants then reported their attitudes to-

ward the essay topic. It was predicted that choice, and

not self-esteem, would moderate attitude change in the

neutral prime conditions (Cooper & Duncan, 1971), but

that self-esteem would interact with the priming ma-

nipulation to influence attitude change when self-attri-

bute relevance was varied.

Method

Participants. Participants were 155 undergraduates

at the University of Arizona who participated in the

experiment for course credit. All had been pretested for


their level of self-esteem using the Rosenberg self-esteemmeasure (1979) during a mass pretest session of the

participant pool. As in previous research on self-esteem

and dissonance (Maracek & Mettee, 1972; Steele et al.,

1993), self-esteem was treated as a categorical variable in

the design and analysis, and only those with scores

falling in the upper (i.e., scores greater than 34) and

lower (i.e., scores less than 30) 30th percentile of the

Rosenberg scale were recruited. In addition, attitudestoward the essay topic (see below) were measured in the

pretest session using a 10 pt scale with the endpoints

‘‘strongly disagree’’ (1) and ‘‘strongly agree’’ (10). Only

those who reported negative attitudes toward the topic

(those who scored less than or equal to 5 on the scale)

were recruited (Elliot & Devine, 1994). A total of 82

with high self-esteem and 73 with low self-esteem com-

pleted the procedures described below.1

Procedure. Participants were contacted by phone and

invited to participate in two short studies on language

and cognition. They participated in groups of 1–3 but

completed the materials individually in a private cubicle.

The experimenter (who was unaware of the hypothesis

and level of self-esteem) explained that the first study

was designed to measure ‘‘how people think about po-

litical policy issues.’’ Participants were then assigned toa cubicle and provided with the study packet. The

written instructions in the packet explained that the

study intended to measure the relationship between

cognition and evaluation of political policy by having

participants express their opinions and beliefs about

different campus policy issues. The instructions in-

formed participants that the issue currently under in-

vestigation concerned a proposed decrease in fundingfor handicapped services at the university for the next

academic year (Blanton et al., 1997). Ostensibly, previ-

1 The assumption that participants with high and low self-esteem

would have different underlying self-views was tested in the current

participant sample. In a mass pretest, 1487 introductory psychology

students at the University of Arizona completed the Rosenberg self-

esteem scale (1979) and the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (or

PAQ, Pelham & Swann, 1989). They rated the self-descriptiveness of

the attributes of compassion and creativity on a 10 pt scale ranging

from 1 (exceptionally low) to 10 (exceptionally high). They also used

the same scale to rate the certainty and importance of their self-

descriptions. Participants were classified into high ((N ¼ 836) and lowself-esteem (N ¼ 418) groups using the upper and lower 30th percen-tiles. MANOVA analyses showed that participants with high self-

esteem rated compassion (M ¼ 7:87) and creativity (M ¼ 6:98) assignificantly more self-descriptive compared to participants with low

self-esteem (Ms ¼ 7:62 and 6.56, respectively), F ð2; 1251Þ ¼ 8:04,p < :0003. Furthermore, those with high self-esteem were significantly

more certain of their ratings on these traits (Ms ¼ 7:39 and 6.94,respectively) than participants with low self-esteem (Ms ¼ 6:86 and6.42), F ð2; 1251Þ ¼ 16:60, p < :0001. However, both groups rated the

traits as important to possess (high self-esteem Ms ¼ 7:53 and 6.48,respectively; low self-esteem Ms ¼ 7:34 and 6.56, respectively),F ð2; 1251Þ ¼ 2:02, p < :11. Thus, the self-knowledge structure of

participants with high and low self-esteem differed as assumed by the

SSM.

ous research had shown that a good way to collectopinions and beliefs about a topic was to instruct peo-

ple, no matter how they felt personally, to make argu-

ments on only one side of the issue. At this point, the

instructions for executing the uncompassionate behavior

varied as a function of the choice manipulation.

Choice manipulation. Participants randomly assigned

to the high-choice conditions were told that the decision

to argue for the decrease was up to them, but the re-search currently needed ‘‘strong forceful arguments’’ in

favor of the decrease. Participants in the low-choice

condition were told that in order to complete the study,

they needed to write ‘‘strong forceful arguments’’ in

favor of the decrease.

On the next page of the packet was a letter ostensibly

from the Committee for Undergraduate Education. The

letter stated that the committee might read their essay inorder to gauge student opinion about potential cuts in

the university budget for the next academic year (Coo-

per & Fazio, 1984). The final page provided the space

for them to write their essay and instructed them to

begin with the statement ‘‘The U of A should decrease

funding toward facilities and services for people with

physical disabilities on campus because. . .’’ When theycompleted the essay, they were instructed to place it inan envelop and alert the experimenter.

Priming manipulation. After they completed their

uncompassionate essay, the experimenter announced

that the first study was over and that they would now

complete the second study on language and cognition.

He then introduced a modified scrambled sentence test

designed to prime relevant, irrelevant, or neutral self-

attributes (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). In eachcondition, the task consisted of eight blocks of words,

with each block containing one distracter word and the

target words. Participants were told the task consisted of

a group of words that could be unscrambled to form a

grammatically correct sentence. However, one word did

not belong in the word group and should be omitted

from the sentence they would form. The experimenter

then showed them an example at the top of the page.Participants were told their goal was to complete the

sentence scrambles as quickly as possible.

The relevant self-attribute prime condition was de-

signed to make accessible self-cognitions that were rel-

evant to the uncompassionate essay. The target

sentences were ‘‘I am a compassionate person,’’ ‘‘I try to

be thoughtful,’’ ‘‘Helping people is important (to prime

�helpful�),’’ and ‘‘I want to be considerate.’’ In the ir-relevant self-attribute prime condition, the target sen-

tences were ‘‘I am a creative person,’’ ‘‘I try to be

imaginative,’’ ‘‘Teaching people is important (to prime

�intelligent�),’’ and ‘‘I want to be flexible.’’ In the neutralself-attribute prime condition the sentences were ‘‘I am a

punctual person,’’ ‘‘I try to be quiet,’’ ‘‘Believing people

is important (to prime �trusting�),’’ and ‘‘I want to be

Fig. 1. The effects of self-esteem and experimental condition on atti-

tude change. LC, low choice and HC, high choice. Higher scores in-

dicate more change in the direction of support for a decrease in

funding for handicapped services. Means with different superscripts

differ significantly at p < :05 using Fisher�s LSD test.


cautious.’’ All priming conditions contained four fillersentences like ‘‘Sharpen a pencil’’ and ‘‘A phone rings.’’

Once participants completed the priming task, they

alerted the experimenter who then collected the primary

dependent measures.2

Dependent measures. The experimenter returned and

claimed that he forgot to give them a questionnaire

during the essay task. He handed participants a ques-

tionnaire with the statement ‘‘The U of A should de-crease funding toward facilities and services for people

with physical disabilities on campus.’’ Participants re-

sponded by circling a number on a 10 pt scale with the

endpoints ‘‘Strongly agree’’ (1) to ‘‘Strongly disagree’’

(10). On the next page, participants were asked to

complete a check of the choice manipulation by indi-

cating their agreement with the statement, ‘‘I felt free to

decline to write an essay for the opinion survey today’’on an 10 pt scale ranging from ‘‘strongly disagree’’ (1) to

‘‘strongly agree’’ (10). The experimenter left participants

alone to complete each questionnaire, and once they

alerted him, he collected the materials and announced

that the study was complete. All participants were then

fully debriefed about the purposes for the study.

Results

Choice manipulation check. To test the effectiveness of

the choice manipulation, a planned interaction contrast

was conducted that compared the perception of choice

reported by participants with high or low self-esteem in

the three high-choice conditions against the low-choice

control condition. The analysis showed a significantmain effect for condition, F ð1; 151Þ ¼ 5:98, p < :01,and no main or interaction effects for self-esteem (both

F ’s < 1). Participants in the high-choice conditions ex-perienced greater choice (M ¼ 7:19) than did partici-pants in the low-choice condition (M ¼ 5:85).Attitude change. The degree of attitude change was

computed by subtracting the attitude scores collected

during the pretest session from those collected after theessay task. The change scores were then subjected to a 2

(Self-esteem)� 4 (Experimental Condition: low-choiceneutral prime, high-choice neutral prime, high-choice

relevant prime, and high-choice irrelevant prime) AN-

OVA. The analysis revealed a significant main effect for

Condition, F ð3; 147Þ ¼ 2:88, p < :04, and a significantSelf-esteem�Condition interaction, F ð3; 147Þ ¼ 3:18,p < :03. Planned comparisons of the attitude changescores displayed in Fig. 1 were conducted to unpack the

2 Based on the trait list provided by Anderson (1968), valence

ratings were assigned to each self-attribute used in the priming

manipulations. With higher scores indicating more positively valenced

traits, the average for the set of relevant traits was 5.07, the average for

the set of irrelevant traits was 4.93, and the average for the set of

neutral attributes was 4.02.

meaning of the omnibus interaction between self-esteem

and the experimental conditions.

As expected, an ANOVA conducted on the attitude

change data in the neutral self-attributes prime condi-

tion revealed a significant main effect for choice,

F ð1; 147Þ ¼ 8:15, p < :005 but no main or interactioneffect for self-esteem, both F s < 1. When neutral self-attributes were primed, high-choice participants tendedto justify their advocacy more (M ¼ 2:64, SD ¼ 2:27)than did low-choice control participants (M ¼ 1:25,SD ¼ 1:85) and the effect was not moderated by self-esteem (Cooper & Duncan, 1971).

A planned interaction contrast between self-esteem

and the relevant versus irrelevant priming conditions on

the attitude change scores showed that attitude change

was significantly moderated by self-esteem when therelevance of the self-attributes was varied, simple inter-

action F ð1; 147Þ ¼ 9:10, p < :005. As seen in Fig. 1, aplanned comparison showed that as predicted, when

relevant attributes were primed, those with low self-es-

teem reported less attitude change (M ¼ 1:42, SD ¼ 1:98)compared to participants with high self-esteem (M ¼2:71, SD ¼ 1:74), F ð1; 147Þ ¼ 3:99, p < :05. In con-trast, when irrelevant positive attributes were primed,participants with high self-esteem reported significantly

less attitude change (M ¼ 1:39, SD ¼ 1:78) compared toparticipants with low self-esteem (M ¼ 2:87, SD ¼ 1:74),F ð1; 147Þ ¼ 5:63, p < :02. Thus, both the expectancyand resource role of self-esteem in dissonance emerged as

a function of the type of self-relevant thought invoked by

the priming manipulations.

Discussion

The results of the experiment provided support for

the hypotheses regarding the role of self-attribute rele-

vance on how self-esteem moderates attitude change

following a counter-attitudinal behavior. As predicted


by the processing assumptions of the Self-StandardsModel (SSM, Stone & Cooper, 2001), self-esteem

moderated attitude change following a counter-attitu-

dinal behavior, but only when cognitions about the self

were primed following the discrepant act. Moreover,

whether self-esteem functioned as a resource or as an

expectancy depended upon the type of self-relevant

thought induced by the priming manipulation. Overall,

the data indicate that the role of cognitions about theself and self-esteem in dissonance is a function of if and

how people think about themselves in the context of a

discrepant behavior.

When self-attributes that were irrelevant to the dis-

crepant act were primed, participants with high self-es-

teem showed less attitude change as compared to

participants with low self-esteem. This pattern supports

the perspective that high self-esteem, and the wealth ofpositive attributes it represents, can serve as a buffer or

resource against the discomfort people typically feel

following a discrepant behavior (Steele et al., 1993).

Participants with low self-esteem, in contrast, were

motivated to change their attitudes, presumably because

the primed self-attributes were less self-descriptive, and

therefore, less capable of serving as an affirmational

(Steele et al., 1993) or affective resource (Tesser, 2000).As predicted by the resource models, the more positive

self-attributes individuals have at their disposal, the less

they need to rely on self-justification to resolve behav-

ioral discrepancies.

The data also show that there are constraints on the

ability of people to use their positive self-attributes as

resources for dissonance reduction. In the high- and

low-choice control conditions in which neutral self-at-tributes were primed, participants with high and low

self-esteem reported the same levels of attitude change,

which was significantly moderated by perceptions of

choice, and not by the self-cognitions underlying their

level of self-esteem. This finding conceptually replicates

previous research on the relative importance of self-es-

teem and perceptions of responsibility for behavioral

outcomes in dissonance (Cooper & Duncan, 1971). Thefact that both self-esteem groups showed significant at-

titude change in the high-choice-neutral prime control

condition is compatible with the assumption that both

groups were focused on the inconsistency between spe-

cific attitudes or beliefs and their behavior (e.g., Fest-

inger, 1957; Harmon-Jones et al., 1996) or on the

aversive consequence of their behavior (Cooper & Fa-

zio, 1984). The lack of self-esteem differences in thecontrol conditions suggests that for self-esteem to

moderate dissonance, something in the context of a

discrepant behavior must make cognitions about the self

accessible. Otherwise, the cover story or procedure itself

may focus people primarily on specific attitudes or be-

liefs, and on the situational antecedents of the act (e.g.,

choice and forseeability), and dissonance processes may

proceed without the influence of idiosyncratic self-knowledge (Stone, in press; Stone & Cooper, 2001).

Furthermore, not just any positive self-relevant

thought will provide resources for dissonance reduction;

when positive self-attributes that were relevant to the

topic of the discrepant essay were primed, participants

with high self-esteem reported more attitude change

compared to participants with low self-esteem. This

pattern of self-esteem moderation reflects self-consis-tency for people with low self-esteem in the process of

dissonance, a phenomenon that has proved difficult to

replicate in past dissonance research (e.g., Ward &

Sandvold, 1963; see Swann, 1990). The data suggest that

when relevant positive attributes were primed following

the discrepant act, they activated the different self-ex-

pectancies for behavior held by participants with high

and low self-esteem (Aronson, 1999). For those withhigh self-esteem, the behavior was perceived as incon-

sistent with their self-expectancies for compassion,

which increased the need to change attitudes. This

supports the SSM assumption that in order for positive

self-attributes to provide resources for dissonance re-

duction, they must shift attention away from the dis-

crepancy; otherwise, the accessibility of positive

cognitions about the self may sustain or enhance dis-comfort and the motivation to change attitudes (Stone

& Cooper, 2001). In contrast, for participants with low

self-esteem, the relevant prime may have activated neg-

ative self-expectancies for compassionate behavior,

which reduced the perception of a discrepancy and the

need for attitude change.

It is important to acknowledge that whereas the data

are consistent with the processing assumptions of theSSM, no mediational data were gathered in the present

study that addresses alternatives to the processes speci-

fied in the model. For example, research indicates that

when self-attributes are primed, they may reduce the

need for attitude change by inducing trivialization of the

behavioral discrepancy (Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm,

1995). However, a trivialization explanation may be

hard pressed to account for the cross-over interactionbetween self-esteem and the relevance of the primed self-

attributes on attitude change. According to Simon et al.

(1995), trivialization only occurs when people are able to

bring to mind highly important cognitions, such as those

related to the self, prior to being offered the opportunity

to change attitudes. In the current study, not only were

the self-attributes chosen because they were rated in

previous research as equally desirable to possess (An-derson, 1968; Blanton et al., 1997), but during the pre-

test session, participants in the current study with high

or low self-esteem also rated the attributes as equally

important to their self-concepts. Thus, the manipulation

brought to mind equally important cognitions in each of

the self-attribute priming conditions, but attitude

change was still moderated by the interplay between


self-esteem and the relevance of the attributes to thebehavioral discrepancy.

It is also important to consider other processes by

which relevant attributes reduce the need for self-justi-

fication among people with low self-esteem. For exam-

ple, when self-expectancies were made accessible by the

relevant prime, it is possible that participants with low

self-esteem showed less need for attitude change because

they were relatively less certain of whether the behaviorwas inconsistent with their self-view of compassion.

However, other research has shown that self-consistency

for people with low self-esteem is more likely to occur

among those who are especially certain of their negative

self-views (e.g., Maracek & Mettee, 1972; Stone, in

press). Another possibility is that the observed self-

consistency effect for people with low self-esteem was a

function of how the attribute primes influenced the wayin which they labeled their arousal (Cooper & Fazio,

1984). The relevant primes may have caused participants

with low self-esteem to perceive a discrepancy between

their expectancies and behavior, but they labeled their

arousal as emotions like dejection or depression, which

reduced the motivation for attitude change, whereas

participants with high self-esteem labeled their negative

emotions as discomfort, tension, or guilt, which moti-vated attitude change to reduce their arousal (Galinsky,

Stone, & Cooper, 2000; Harmon-Jones, 2000; Higgins,

1987). Investigating the mediators of the observed in-

teraction between self-esteem and the accessibility of

self-attributes in the context of a discrepant act is an

important direction for future research.

Conclusions

Over 40 years after its initial publication (Festinger,

1957), the role of cognitions about the self in dissonance

continues to intrigue researchers. The research in this

paper found support for predictions made by both the

self-resource and the self-consistency perspectives on

how self-esteem moderates dissonance induced attitudechange. However, the present research also demon-

strated that cognitions about the self and self-esteem are

not always invoked by a discrepant act. This suggests, as

predicted by the self-standards model (Stone & Cooper,

2001), that people are capable of using their self-

knowledge to interpret and evaluate their behavior, but

whether they use cognitions about the self, specific at-

titudes, or norms to interpret behavior is a function ofwhich criterion is made salient in the situation. How

cognitions about the self influence the arousal and re-

duction of dissonance depends upon the type of self-

attributes and self-standards brought to mind when

people make a counter-attitudinal statement, a difficult

decision, or engage in other established dissonance

arousing behavior, including hypocrisy (Stone, Wie-

gand, Cooper, & Aronson, 1997). The process by whichpeople interpret their behavior, conclude it represents a

discrepancy, experience discomfort, and seek a way to

reduce it, may be more malleable than has been recog-

nized in previous revisions of dissonance theory.

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psychology (pp. 71–99). Washington, DC: American Psychological

Association.

Harmon-Jones, E., & Mills, J. (1999). Cognitive dissonance: Progress

on a pivotal theory in social psychology. Washington, DC: American

Psychological Association.

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