The Dissident's Toolkit
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Transcript of The Dissident's Toolkit
4/28/2014 The Dissident's Toolkit
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/24/the_dissidents_toolkit 1/9
BY
The Dissident's ToolkitWant to topple an autocrat? Street demonstrations are just one tool among many.
ERICA CH EN OWET H
Over the past few years we've grown used to the iconography of protest. In the
wake of the Arab Spring, images of angry young street demonstrators
shouting slogans, wielding signs, and confronting security forces have become
almost commonplace. But just as often we've seen campaigns of public protest
flounder or go into reverse: just look at Egypt and Libya, to name the most
prominent cases. The recent surge of street demonstrations in Sudan once again
confronts us with a fundamental question: How does public protest undermine
authoritarian governments? Are demonstrations really the key to toppling
autocrats?
Research shows, in fact, that demonstrations are just one of many tools that civil
resistance movements can use to effect change. Successful movements are those
that use a wide array of methods to pressure their state opponents while keeping
their activists safe. The demonstration tactic we're used to seeing is just one of
many hundreds of tactics available to civilians seeking change -- and successful
campaigns for change must use more than just a single tactic.
Maria Stephan and I conducted research on a related but broader question: "When
does civil resistance work?" The results of our research show that opposition
campaigns are successful when they manage to do three key things: (1) attract
widespread and diverse participation; (2) develop a strategy that allows them to
maneuver around repression; and (3) provoke defections, loyalty shifts, or
disobedience among regime elites and/or security forces.
4/28/2014 The Dissident's Toolkit
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Attracting participation is perhaps the most important of these tasks, since the
ability to provoke defections and outmaneuver opponents often depends on
whether the movement enjoys large and broad-based support. The most important
singular factor for a successful campaign is its participation rate. According to the
NAVCO data set, which identifies the outcomes of over 300 nonviolent and violent
campaigns worldwide from 1900-2006, none of the cases failed after achieving the
active and sustained participation of just 3.5 percent of the population -- and some
of them succeeded with far less than that. Of course, 3.5 percent is nothing to
sneeze at. In the United States today, this constitutes over 11 million people. But
how do movements get this large in the first place, especially in countries where
overt participation in a mass movement is highly risky?
One way organizers can grow their movement is by including tactics that are safer
and therefore more attractive to risk-averse participants. For example, instead of
relying solely on demonstrations or protests, many movements will allow people to
participate through "electricity strikes" where people shut off their electricity at a
coordinated time of day, or by banging on pots and pans in the middle of the night
to signal the power in numbers. Engaging in these types of actions may draw in
more ambivalent people while also allowing them the opportunity to develop a
sense of identity with the movement and its goals. In Chile under Pinochet, for
example, outright demonstrations against the dictator were far too dangerous. In
one instance, Pinochet was so threatened by the subtext of some popular songs
that he banned public singing; it didn't take much. But when people began to bang
on pots and pans, it let them demonstrate their defiance anonymously in the
safety of their own homes. As the people's metallic clamor for change became
louder and louder, anti-Pinochet organizers and their supporters became
emboldened to press for more disruptive and overt action.
4/28/2014 The Dissident's Toolkit
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/24/the_dissidents_toolkit 3/9
A similar movement is underway in Egypt today, where the "Masmou" movement
has led thousands of people to bang on pots and pans inside their homes at 9 p.m.
each night to signal that there are viable alternatives to both the al-Sisi government
and the Muslim Brotherhood. In highly repressive environments there is, indeed,
safety in numbers. And actions like this can signal that one is not alone, while
making it quite difficult for the government to crack down on participants.
Once people do begin to mobilize, the effects on the internal politics of a tyrannical
regime can be intense. As Gene Sharp rightly argued, no regime is monolithic.
Every leader is 100 percent dependent on the cooperation, obedience, and help of
the people that form the regime's pillars of support: security forces, the state
media, business or educational elites, religious authorities, and civilian
bureaucrats. And when such people begin to reevaluate the regime's role in their
long-term interests, they can actually be pulled away from supporting the leader.
This is much more likely to happen the more people are mobilized against the
opponent.
Why? Because no regime loyalists in any country live entirely isolated from the
population itself. They have friends, they have family, and they have existing
relationships that will bring with them in the long term, regardless of whether the
leader stays or goes. As the literary critic Robert Inchausti is credited as saying,
"Nonviolence is a wager -- not so much on the goodness of humanity as on its
infinite complexity." Take an example from the so-called "Bulldozer Revolution," a
Serbian people power revolution against Slobodan Milosevic that toppled him in
October 2000. In this case, once it became clear that hundreds of thousands of
4/28/2014 The Dissident's Toolkit
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Serbs were descending on Belgrade to demand that Milosevic leave office,
policemen ignored the order to shoot on demonstrators. When asked why he did
so, one of them said: "I knew my kids were in the crowd."
This policeman wasn't alone in Serbia or elsewhere. We find that, in general,
security forces tend to defect much more often when they face nonviolent
campaigns (as compared to armed uprisings), particularly as the numbers rise.
Controlling for other factors, security forces are about 60 percent likely to defect
when confronted with the largest nonviolent campaigns and over 30 percent likely
with the average-sized nonviolent campaign. The defection of security forces
occurred within the ranks of the Iranian armed forces during the anti-Shah
resistance, within Filipino armed forces during the anti-Marcos uprising, and
within the Israeli military during the first Palestinian Intifada, to name but a few
examples. And these loyalty shifts can be crucial for the outcomes of these
campaigns: They increase their chances of success by over 60 percent.
Of course, demonstrations -- and people power movements in general -- tend to
fail as often as they succeed. But when we look at outright failures -- such as
Tiananmen Square, the 1956 Hungarian uprising, or the 2007 Saffron Revolution in
Burma -- a few patterns become evident. The failed campaigns never spread to
include vast proportions of the population, and failed to shift between highly risky
tactics and safer ones. But they also failed to establish a long-term strategy to
make the campaigns sustainable, which was especially important given the
brutality of state repression. The average duration of a nonviolent campaign was
between two-and-a-half and three years, but few of these campaigns had a long-
term strategy, besides the wishful hope that tactical victories might make the
regime comply with their demands.
4/28/2014 The Dissident's Toolkit
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Campaigns of civil resistance are underway in many countries around the world,
from Bahrain to Maldives, from Turkey to Bulgaria. In all of these cases, movement
planners must carefully analyze the political effects that tactics like
demonstrations have. If these tactics fail to increase sympathy for the campaign at
home or abroad, diversify the base of participants, and encourage defections
among regime elites, then they are not helping the movement's chances of
succeeding. But rather than abandoning the struggle because demonstrations stop
working, movement leaders would do well to appreciate the many other
nonviolent methods of protest and noncooperation they can bring to bear against
their opponents. The campaigns that ultimately succeed will be the ones that fully
embrace Sun Tzu's warning that "tactics without strategy is the noise before
defeat."
MAHMOUD ZAYYAT/AFP/Getty Images
BY
Economic Experiments and theBattle for East AsiaWhy the race for dominance in East Asia is about economic strength, not military
power.
ELY RAT N ER
After a last minute budget deal on Wednesday, Oct. 16, the United States
government is back in business. Among the casualties of the 16-day
shutdown, which resulted in at least $24 billion in U.S. economic losses, was a
presidential trip to Southeast Asia.
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Stuck in Washington in early October, media coverage, and even President Barack
Obama himself, described how presidential absence from Asia benefited Beijing.
Adding insult to injury, a group photo from a regional forum that Obama was
supposed to have attended showed Chinese President Xi Jinping smiling front and
center, while protocol banished Secretary of State John Kerry -- filling in for
Obama -- to a back corner. "Obama cancels Asia trip. Is the US 'pivot' in jeopardy?"
ran a headline from The Christian Science Monitor.
While China emerged victorious from this latest round of diplo-drama, the
handwringing in Washington misses the point: The contest for influence in Asia
will not be settled in multilateral meetings. Instead, the region will be shaped by
whichever major powers have the best prospects for long-term sustainable growth.
Simply put, power costs money. As the economic heavyweight of the 20th century,
the United States has had the resources to build a system of military alliances in
Asia and to advance U.S. interests in democracy and free markets. But today, the
region is up for grabs. Over the next four months, the United States, China, and
Japan -- the world's three largest economies -- are all potentially instituting game-
changing economic reforms, whose outcomes could determine who leads Asia.
China's economy could become roughly the same size as the United States in
purchasing power parity (PPP) terms as early as 2016, according to the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). And the
National Intelligence Council, the U.S. intelligence community's center for long-
term analysis, has estimated that China's economy will be the world's largest in
aggregate terms before 2030. Already the second largest or largest trading partner
to every major country in Asia, China uses its economic leverage to garner support
on issues like Taiwan while muting international criticism over continued human
4/28/2014 The Dissident's Toolkit
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rights abuses. And in March, China announced its military budget would expand
by 10.7 percent in 2013, continuing two decades of double-digit growth and buying
increasing capability to contest disputed territories in the South and East China
Seas.
But China is simultaneously in the midst of its longest economic slowdown since
the introduction of market reforms in the late 1970s. After enjoying double-digit
growth for much of the past three decades, its gross domestic product (GDP) is
expected to expand at roughly 7.5 percent in 2013. With China facing rising labor
costs, an aging population, endemic corruption, pollution, and the consequences
of transitioning from a low- to middle-income country, Peking University
professor Michael Pettis believes its annual GDP growth could drop as low as 3
percent over the next decade. The 2009 financial crisis further exacerbated these
vulnerabilities by decreasing overseas demand and spooking Beijing into enacting
a $570 billion stimulus. While that program temporarily propped up the economy,
it also contributed to a serious local debt problem, now estimated at $3.28 trillion,
nearly 39 percent of GDP.
Communist Party leaders, aware that China's current growth model is
unsustainable, have been unequivocal about their desire to replace overreliance
on debt and investment with greater household consumption. With that in mind,
China's official news agency Xinhua billed the Third Plenum, a major party
conference in November, as "a springboard for major national reform." But it
remains to be seen whether the Party has the will or the wherewithal to take on the
vested interests that profit so handsomely from the existing system. It is looking
increasingly likely, for example, that the Party will defer reform of state-owned
4/28/2014 The Dissident's Toolkit
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enterprises, seen by many as the linchpin to revitalizing China's economy. If China
gets bogged down in domestic economic problems, it will be less able to project
power overseas.
Meanwhile, across the Pacific, Japan has been plagued by two decades of abysmal
economic growth.
In January, a month after taking office, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
announced "three arrows" of monetary, fiscal, and structural reform. The first two
are already underway: In February, Abe launched an unprecedented program of
monetary easing by the central bank, which quickly resulted in a doubling of the
monetary base. This was accompanied by the second arrow, a massive $116 billion
fiscal stimulus program to drive demand.
Early results have been promising -- the economy grew at 3.8 percent in the second
quarter of 2013 -- but the long-term success of Abenomics lies with the third arrow,
structural reform. Japan's economy remains over-regulated, inflexible, and
unfriendly to foreign firms. (The tariff on imported rice, for example, is a whopping
778 percent.) And the reforms may not be able to overcome the extraordinary
weight of Japan's increasingly aged population and debilitating debt-- expected to
hit 230 percent by 2014 (the highest debt-to-GDP ratio in the world).
Abe has already visited Southeast Asia, where Japan is a leading donor and
investor, four times since December. But visits alone will not suffice. The more Abe
is able to put Japan on a solid economic footing, the more the country will be able
to play a decisive role in the region. If Abe's reforms succeed, he may accrue
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enough economic and political capital to beef up Japan's military and amend its
pacifist constitution. This could become increasingly important to supplement
reductions in U.S. defense budgets.
Obama faces the daunting task of jumpstarting the U.S. economy while addressing
the longer-term challenge of curbing the federal debt, which exploded from 32
percent of GDP in 2001 to 72 percent in 2012. Over the next decade, the United
States faces a total projected deficit of $6.3 trillion as the spending pressures
associated with an aging population, rising health care costs and growing interest
payments continue to outpace revenue.
A United States suffering prolonged economic woes will find it increasingly
difficult to maintain the diplomatic, economic and military power it has sustained
in Asia since the end of World War II. Smaller defense budgets will corrode the U.S.
military presence in the region. Despite sound fundamentals for growth, the
failure to break the gridlock in Washington and put the United States on a
sustainable fiscal footing could imperil its ability to patrol and pacify East Asia.
The isolationism that often accompanies tough economic times would further
reinforce the erosion of American influence.
Kicking off the U.S. pivot to Asia in November 2011, President Obama told the
Australian Parliament that, "let there be no doubt: In the Asia Pacific in the 21st
century, the United States of America is all in." Maybe so, but current reform
efforts in Beijing, Tokyo, and Washington will help to determine who's playing the
strongest hand.
STR/AFP/Getty Images