the dissertation
-
Upload
andrew-sutherland -
Category
Documents
-
view
20 -
download
2
Transcript of the dissertation
‘After the Genocide:
An Evaluation of Sustainable Security in Paul Kagame’s
Rwanda’
Andrew Sutherland
200067525
Submitted in accordance with the requirements of
MA Conflict, Development and Security
School of Politics and International Studies
University of Leeds
September 2009
Word Count: 12576
Dissertation Supervisor: Dr. David Hall-Matthews
Background
The Rwandan Genocide of 1994 is one of the darkest episodes in
recent world history. Around one million ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus
were slaughtered by extremist Hutu militia in less than one hundred days.
The killing campaign was characterised by methodical planning and
organisation, directed through mass media and propaganda and driven by
the political elite, resulting in countless acts of unspeakable brutality. It
has been argued that the genocide was facilitated by a combination of
French financial and military support and the failure of the international
community and the United Nations to recognise and act upon the
macabre end product of European colonial-era classification and division
of people along racial lines.1
The genocide was ultimately brought to an end by the invasion of
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), an army of exiled Tutsi rebels led by
Major-General Paul Kagame. After the new regime had consolidated power
Kagame ruled from behind the scenes, eventually becoming President,
and sought to rebuild a devastated Rwanda through a series of ambitious
social, political and economic measures unveiled as the ‘Vision 2020’
1 Rwanda was colonised by Germany in 1880. It was governed by Belgium in a League of Nations mandate following WW1. The Belgians are particularly responsible for introducing a system of identification and classification along racial lines that previously did not exist in the country, although this process was also started by German colonialism. Perhaps the most complete account of the origins and evolution of the Rwandan Genocide comes from Pruniér ‘The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide’ (Hurst & Co 1995). Alison Des Forges provides a highly detailed empirical account of how the genocide was orchestrated in ‘Leave none to tell the Story’ (Human Rights Watch, 1999). The complicity of France, China, Egypt, the international community and the United Nations is best explored in Linda Melvern’s excellent ‘A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide’ (Zed Books, 2009 rev ed). The French role is examined in even greater detail in Wallis ‘Silent Accomplice: The Untold story of France’s role in the Rwanda Genocide’ (IB Tauris, 2007).
development strategy2. Some of these measures will be evaluated below
in terms of the contribution they have made to sustainable security,
particularly Kagame’s attempts to transform Rwanda into a regional trade
and technology hub whilst breaking from French influence and gravitating
toward American and British investment.
Kagame sought to move allegiances towards the US and UK and
away from France as revenge for the Mitterrand administration’s financial
and military support for the Habyirimana and Bagosora regimes that
culminated in ‘Operation Turquoise’ which has been described as a
‘rescue mission for the perpetrators of the genocide.’3 This decision saw
an upsurge in DFID/USAID funding for his economic stimulus, educational
and healthcare programmes as well as an enhanced political relationship
with both states and improved access to, particularly American, corporate
investment.
Kagame also consolidated power in a manner seen in many other
African states, retaining a personalised control of the security apparatus
and state bureaucratic-administrative functions, with a widespread and
secretive intelligence network. The administration is dominated by Tutsi
and ex-RPF. While explicitly pledging to remove ethnic divisions and bring
prosperity a continuing state of inequality where Hutus are discriminated
against in education, commerce and the military exists. An increasing
amount of disaffected Hutu males are fleeing the country to join Hutu
2 For an account of power relations in Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide and details of Kagame’s socioeconomic and political objectives see Kinzer ‘A Thousand Hills: Rwanda’s Rebirth and the Man who Dreamed it’ (Wiley, 2007). Although Kinzer’s work is illuminating it is also hagiographical and based on interviews with Kagame and therefore should be qualified by a reading of Waugh’s more tempered ‘Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front’ (McFarland & Co, 2004). 3 See Kinzer chapter 10 or Gen. Roméo Dallaire’s memoir ‘Shake Hands with the Devil’ (Random House, 2003).
rebel groups in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), made up of
the remnants of the génocidaires. This has led to a series of conflicts and
a state of insecurity in the region, exacerbated by the presence of
valuable natural resources such as gold and diamonds in the DRC. While
an understanding of regional conflict dynamics and resource exploitation
is essential in addressing the question of Hutu-Tutsi coexistence in East
Africa and is an important facet for a complete analysis of the
sustainability of Kagame’s project, this focus of this dissertation will be on
the internal political dimension, the lifespan of donor support and
international perceptions and attitudes towards Kagame and Rwanda4. As
will be expanded upon below, the involvement of Rwanda and its proxies
in the eastern DRC can be viewed as a product of the culture of political
tolerance that up until this point has been seemingly related to direct
financial assistance and the need for African examples to support western
‘Good Governance’ agendas5.
This dissertation will also explore Kagame, his methods and his
vision, posing and answering questions about the extent to which the
4 For a detailed analysis of Rwanda’s relationship with its neighbours and a history of regional conflicts see Turner ‘The Congo Wars, Conflict, Myth and Reality’ (Zed Books, 2005), Adelman and Suhrke’s ‘The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire’ (Transaction, 2000) or Prendergast and Smock ‘Reconstructing Peace in the Congo’ (USIP, 1999). For empirical accounts of Rwandan complicity in and profiteering from the illegal exploitation of minerals in the Eastern DRC see the special edition of The Review of African Political Economy 93/94 (2002), particularly the article by Jackson which is frank about Kagame’s sponsorship of rebel army CNDP and controversial General Laurent Nkunda and meticulously details the methods used by his administration to export resources. Also Samset’s article on Rwandan involvement in the diamond trade is highly useful. Finally, The United Nations ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC’ (UN, 2008 ed) contains vehement accusations against Kagame and his administration regarding military involvement in the area, theft, looting and controlling of mines which the government has yet to provide a satisfactory response to, and have led to cessations in aid which will be examined towards the end of chapter 1. 5 The Good Governance Agenda refers to a qualification of the neoliberal institutional approach of the 80s and early 90s in which African countries are to be rewarded with aid, trade and debt relief if they are determined to have a government that is moving towards Western liberal-democratic standards on issues including corruption, democratisation, peace building/reintegration and welfare. The argument is that governmental aid organisations such as DFID are struggling to find examples that fit all of the criteria they ask for, but need to reconcile this with the huge amount of expenditure on ODA and therefore are willing to compromise on some of the points, which describes the relationship with Rwanda and will be discussed in chapter 1.
reconstruction of Rwandan society is built around a single man and,
indeed, whether this can be described as sustainable. It will also discuss
what characteristics Kagame shares with certain other contemporary
African patrimonialists, and the extent to which he is unique, which will
highlight the plausibility of Kagame’s authoritarian development strategy
by comparing it to the variously unsuccessful economic plans of other
leaders in the region, again examining the differences for Rwanda.
Aims, Objectives and Chapter Description
Analysis of post-genocide Rwanda is important because it can
provide information about the manner in which authoritarian systems of
government emerge in response to conflict, reconstruction and ethnic
divides. Rwanda also holds data relating to the way in which regimes akin
to Kagame’s are supported and develop, but also on the potential ways
that they can collapse into renewed chaos. Examining the contemporary
Rwandan scenario in this way can offer perspective on the persistence of
one-party regimes and strongmen in wider African political economies and
also the recurrence of conflict. A critique of international attitudes toward
an authoritarian response to genocide, and of the response itself
contextualised within the problematic history of authoritarianism and
conflict within post-independence Africa is therefore necessary. It can help
to identify improved methods in which donors and recipient states can
work together to create participatory, prosperous and therefore
sustainable and secure political economies in the region, bringing a
reduction in conflict, tension and aid profligacy.
The hypothesis of this dissertation is that ‘’Security created by
Kagame’s regime is not Sustainable.’’ It argues that the manner in
which Kagame has rebuilt Rwandan society in the post-genocide years has
led to an improved but ultimately unsustainable security situation, as the
reconstruction of security and stability remains dependent on overseas
assistance and is built around Kagame’s elite.
It tests this hypothesis through addressing two main research areas.
Chapter one discusses the extent to which stability is based on a move
towards US/UK overseas assistance and international tolerance of
Kagame’s authoritarian tendencies which have undeniably brought short-
term economic recovery and political stability. It touches on the problems
of criticising Rwanda which are related to Western ‘guilt’ over its inaction
in 1994, and whether Kagame has been able to exploit this. It then
focuses on the changing nature of international assistance and the
possibility and consequences of a reduction or cessation of aid on
security. This chapter reviews caveats on aid and precedents for its
cessation. It also examines the viability of the President’s declared aim to
phase out international assistance altogether, replacing it with an attempt
to become ‘the Switzerland of Africa’, a regional finance, trade and
technology hub with a multi-ethnic and stable society despite the absence
of natural capital to finance this. It will show that despite overtures to the
abolition of aid dependence, Kagame operates in a climate of international
support, or at least indifference. The dissertation argues that this
ultimately cannot be reconciled with DFID and USAID’s good governance
agenda and therefore it is probable that memories of inaction during the
genocide subside and questions and more stringent conditionalities on
support arise which will cause problems for Kagame’s regime. Can
Kagame reduce aid dependence, stimulate economic growth and improve
security?
The second chapter discusses the extent to which Rwandan society
and security is built around Paul Kagame himself. This area examines the
extent to which Kagame is a neo-patrimonial leader in the tradition of
post-colonial Africa and looks at the advantages, dangers and inherent
fragility of (re)structuring a society around the vision of a single leader. It
will include a focused biography of Kagame which illuminates his thought
and motivations and discusses the problems associated with having a
‘pole in the centre of the tent.’ It briefly looks at Tutsi consciousness and
the discourse of persecution before focusing on the extent to which
Kagame has reconstructed Rwanda along ethnic lines whilst
simultaneously preaching a dialogue of inclusion. While the first chapter
focuses more on the potential consequences of the capricious nature of
international aid, the second is concerned with the reality of Rwanda as an
authoritarian state and builds a picture of the variety of reasons for
Kagame’s predilection towards authoritarianism.
These two areas form the basis of the chapterisation of the piece,
followed by an extended conclusion which introduces prospects for
Rwanda and draws conclusions on sustainable security through a
comparison with other incumbent sub-Saharan African leaders, within a
theoretical context. This final area expands on the discussion of Kagame
as an authoritarian ‘strongman’ and Rwanda as an archetypal post-conflict
authoritarian state. It works with other examples across the region in
order to formulate a discussion of what a reading of Kagame’s regime can
give about authoritarianism in sub-Saharan Africa. This area implies a
critique of the effect of neo-patrimonialism on development strategies in
sub-Saharan Africa and assimilates into reflections within the conclusion
which critiques authoritarian responses to conflict as a provider of long-
term sustainable security, and particularly the Rwandan example of an
authoritarian response to genocide.
Finally, the dissertation will revisit the hypothesis and aims in order
to comment on what has been proven and finishes by identifying areas for
further research. The conclusion highlights what issues are peculiar to
Rwanda and to Kagame and summarises the approach that Rwanda is
dependent on aid, but at the same time has much dynamism and
foresight for removing this dependence, especially in comparison to its
peers. It also finds that the personality cult of Kagame is an obstacle to
long-term security. Whilst Kagame is a proven and visionary leader, it is
argued that this has been the case with a pattern of other African leaders
who have ultimately stagnated and compromised to remain in power.
Whilst a discussion of the lack of democracy in Rwanda is covered briefly
in the article’s first chapter, It is perhaps more important to highlight the
lack of viable alternatives to Kagame, the lack of opposition and the
failure to deal with ethnic grievances such as the complicity of the RPF in
war crimes, or the perceived leniency of the gacaca system as
potentialities for renewed conflict in a Rwanda after Kagame has gone.
One question is if Kagame himself was removed from the scenario
tomorrow, would security prevail and, if not, how can this be described as
sustainable?
The conclusion poses questions about the motivations for western
support of authoritarian regimes and asks whether the ‘Good Governance’
agenda, as an instrument of the neoliberal project, really rewards
economic stability and growth at all costs and even constitutes a
tolerance of repressive authoritarianism. It also discusses the example of
Burundi as a postscript, which from a broadly similar starting position to
Rwanda in the mid-nineties has created a constitutionally-enshrined
power-sharing democracy between Hutu and Tutsi, asking whether this
form of democratisation and admission of ethnic differences is an
alternative approach for Rwanda that could bring about the sustainable
security that authoritarian governments in sub-Saharan Africa have a
history of failing to deliver.
Chapter One
Going Anglophone: The Importance of Aid and ‘Tolerance’ for
Kagame’s Strategy.
The Role of Aid
This first chapter discusses Rwanda’s continuing Anglicisation as an
aspect of Kagame’s vision. It maps out the extent of Rwanda’s
dependence on aid and situates these financial relationships within the
context of the evolving global academic debate on the impact that aid is
having. The chapter looks at examples of cessation of aid to Rwanda and
discusses what action Kagame is taking in light of the uncertainties that
increasingly surround international aid flows. It also defines and discusses
‘Tolerance’ of Kagame, in relation to military interventions, human rights,
the justice system, free press and the difficulties of criticising Kagame.
This chapter argues that tolerance is another form of assistance that
Kagame is reliant on. This primary area of the essay finds that Kagame’s
regime remains heavily reliant on international allies and their money,
which has helped to create security but that this assistance may end or be
reduced for several reasons. However, it also recognises that Kagame has
already realised the pitfalls of aid dependence and is making attempts to
wean Rwanda’s economy from aid. Highlighting some of the ways in which
the administration is attempting to do this the chapter concludes by
proposing that should Kagame be successful in his vision of an
economically independent Rwanda, the effect on long-term stability could
in fact be very positive, although this strategy will be exceptionally
difficult to achieve.
Following Kagame’s accession to power after the genocide, mutual
enmity between the RPF and France rapidly increased, with actions
including the severance of diplomatic relations, direct accusations of
French support for the genocidal regime and French responses such as
the cessation of aid to Rwanda and the implication of Kagame and other
figures in the 1994 assassination of Habyirimana culminating in the 2008
detention of presidential aide Rose Kabuye6. Kagame sought to fill the
void left by French assistance for Rwanda by capitalising on traditional
Anglo-French rivalry in Sub-Saharan Africa and soliciting new support from
the UK, amongst other nations. The UK is now Rwanda’s biggest provider
of bilateral development assistance, totalling some £380m since 1998.
This figure is set to rise to £55m per annum over the next four years7.
Following the UK the biggest donors to Rwanda are currently Belgium, the
Netherlands and the US, which is also greatly increasing the volume of its
ODA.8 Currently, Rwanda is seeking to deepen its association with the UK
through promoting English as the official language and applying for
6 See, for example BBC News ‘New Thaw in Franco-Rwandan relations’ (news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7011047.stm 24.09.07 accessed 25.07.09) and BBC News ‘France releases Rwandan official’ (news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7797024.stm 23.12.08 accessed 225.07.09). 7 See DFID-Rwanda (http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Africa-West--Central/Rwanda/ accessed 25.07.09), and ‘The UK Government’s programme of work to fight poverty in Rwanda’ (DFID, 2008 available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/cnty-plan-rw-2008-2012.pdf accessed 25.07.09) 8 See USAID/Rwanda Annual Report 2007.
membership of the Commonwealth which is voted upon in November
20099.
This influx of aid has been instrumental in Rwanda’s staggering
improvement in education, healthcare, access to water and general
economic performance, according to DFID and USAID.10 Whilst working
with these overseas agencies, Kagame’s government has created a
development strategy known as ‘Vision 2020’ which seeks to reduce the
proportion of the workforce involved in agriculture, improve transport and
communication links, promote gender equality, foster private investment
and increase accountability and transparency.11Specific goals include a
50% reduction in poverty and infant mortality by 2020, an increase in
average income to $900 per annum, 100% literacy and targets on
electricity, clean water and access to doctors. The overarching aim is to
move toward a knowledge-based economy and reduce dependence on aid
through creating macroeconomic stability, embodied in Kagame’s oft-
quoted dream to turn Rwanda into ‘the Switzerland of Africa.12’
However, there is a lot of work to be done to achieve these goals
especially if they are to coincide with a reduction in aid leading to a
complete phase-out. Today, Rwanda is one of the most aid-dependent
9 See The Guardian ‘Rwanda’s Commonwealth hopes dented by Human Rights criticism (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jul/19/rwanda-commonwealth-human-rights-criticism 19.07.09 accessed 25.07.09)10 See DFID (2008)11 See Kinzer p227, or USAID/Rwanda 2005 report p4. 12 See Kinzer p242-3. From ‘Rwanda Vision 2020’ (Government of Rwanda 2000). The entire Vision 2020 document is available at http://www.devpartners.gov.rw/docs/H%20&%20A/H%20&%20A%20Local/?dir=&download=Rwanda_Vision_2020.pdf . This government document details in full the utopian vision of Kagame and states his explicit economic goals and the pathway to aid independence. What requires scrutiny is the ability of the government to achieve the development goals set out, which require increased spending at the same time as reducing dependence on international aid.
countries in the world with aid at around 20% of GDP.13It currently
receives around $350m per annum in aid. Economist Jeffrey Sachs
recently pointed out that Rwanda’s imports are currently at $800m, with
export earnings languishing at $250m. The difference is accounted for
mainly through aid and for Sachs, ‘’without foreign aid, Rwanda's path
breaking public health successes and strong current economic growth
would collapse14.’’Rwanda’s own governmental policy documents in no
way contradict this finding. The white paper on development of aid policy
throws out some interesting figures. 69% of all government expenditures
are financed externally. Domestic revenue can only account for 80% of
total fixed expenditure, which is the expenditure the government is legally
obliged to make and unable to cut, such as salaries. Aid is equivalent to
77% of imports15. Currently, by all accounts and by its own admission,
Rwanda would not be able to continue to function without aid. Clearly, the
concomitant effects on stability and therefore security if a government is
unable to pay the bills are grave.
There is a growing debate in academia surrounding the efficacy of
aid, particularly to Sub-Saharan Africa. The dominant paradigm in the
post-cold war years has been that massive increases in aid are a
necessary prerequisite to stimulate economic development. The idea is
that if political economies are injected with vast sums of money to
13 The UN places Rwanda within the top 10 most aid-dependent countries on earth (Javno.com ‘Sweden halts $15m in development aid to Rwanda http://www.javno.com/en-world/sweden-halts-usd15-mln-aid-to-rwanda-over-un-charge_215890 17.12.08 accessed 25.07.09). Nationmaster.com ranks Rwanda as the 13th most aid-dependent state, with aid as 17.9% of GDP (http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_aid_as_of_gdp-economy-aid-as-of-gdp accessed 25.07.09) , whilst Rwanda’s own government policy puts aid as 21% of GDP (See ‘Development of the Government of Rwanda aid policy’ (Government of Rwanda, 2006)) 14 Jeffrey Sachs ‘Aid Ironies’ in Huffington Post 24.05.09 (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeffrey-sachs/aid-ironies_b_207181.html accessed 25.07.09)15 See ‘Development of the Government of Rwanda aid policy’ (Government of Rwanda, 2006)
provoke government spending in conjunction with other neoliberal
economic processes such as privatization and removal of barriers to trade,
socioeconomic development will follow in the shortest possible space of
time16. It is in the climate created by this paradigm that Rwanda and many
nations like it have been able to access increasing sums of aid,
purportedly for development projects but too often misappropriated to
fund conflict or the lifestyles of corrupt officials. Recently, several
controversial texts have been published from perhaps surprising sources
which are adding to the growing clamour that aid to Africa, in fact, causes
more damage than good. Ex-World Bank economist Robert Calderisi, for
instance, argues that the root cause of African underdevelopment and
economic exceptionalism is misgovernance. In ‘The Trouble with Africa’,
he advocates forcing greater transparency on recipient governments at
the same time as an instantaneous 50% reduction in aid. Arguing that
only five African countries have demonstrated any real improvement as a
result of aid and therefore are the only ones who should continue to be
supported17 and also rebuking the influence of colonialism on the present
day, Calderisi blames corruption and lack of accountable governance for
Africa’s devastated economies and believes donors should cease support,
16 For an academic discussion of this see, for example, any of Jeffrey Sach’s texts, particularly ‘The End of Poverty’ (Penguin 2005). For policy responses to this theory, see ‘Our Common Interest: The Report of the Commission for Africa’ (2005) which continues the ‘aid as a panacea’ tack which is also promoted by a range of international humanitarian organizations, the well-known ‘Make Poverty History’ campaign and the IMF and World Bank. Critiques of the ‘holy triumvirate’ of aid, trade and debt relief are abundant, with a multitude of academics on the left arguing that these neoliberal measures are ultimately a means of deepening the incorporation of developing countries into the global capitalist economic system on unequal terms. Excellent examples of this viewpoint with specific reference to Africa can be found in Bond ‘Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation’ (Zed books 2006) and Bush ‘Poverty and Neoliberalism: Persistence and Reproduction in the Global South’ (Pluto 2007). 17 Rwanda is not one of Calderisi’s five countries. They are Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, Ghana and Mali. Calderisi somewhat tenuously argues that better governance is the reason for their success, arguing that issues of corruption and conflict can effectively be cast aside in these cases because of their economic performance.
a minimal amount of which reaches its intended targets in any case.18 In
‘The Trouble with Aid: Why Less could mean More for Africa’, Christian
Aid’s Jonathan Glennie delivers an argument that has broadly similar
conclusions to Calderisi; Less Aid is required and needs to be targeted in a
more accountable manner.19
Most recently, renowned Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo has
published a bestseller which calls for all aid to be removed within 5 years.
In ‘Dead Aid’, Moyo argues that high-level governmental aid has resulted
in dependency, corruption, further poor governance and the reproduction
of extreme and widespread poverty20. The fact that Moyo and Calderisi are
both respected pro-market neoliberal economists bursting with credentials
and direct experience of Africa makes their mutual rebuttal of current aid
policy more surprising, more creditworthy and more interesting for
policymakers in governments who don’t like to hear that their money may
not be having the desired effect or that their policies could be failing.
Perhaps it is still too early to say whether this represents a turning point in
aid policy, but a furious debate is certainly underway and attitudes
towards aid are changing and moving toward a search for other solutions.
For governments such as Rwanda’s that has a development strategy
which, as demonstrated above is wholly reliant on aid, any international
movements towards a reduction or cessation of aid represent a concern
and require a response.
18 See Calderisi ‘The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid isn’t Working’ (Yale 2007). Calderisi’s policy prescriptions make up Part IV, chapters 12 and 13 whilst his scathing criticisms of African governance are found throughout but summarized in Part 1, particularly Chapter 1. 19 See Glennie ‘ The Trouble with Aid: Why Less Could Mean more for Africa’ (Zed Books 2008)20 See Moyo ‘Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is Another Way for Africa’ (Farrar, Strauss and Giroux 2009). Moyo is at pains to distinguish between governmental assistance and humanitarianism and/or emergency aid which a) dwindles in comparison and b) is reacting to a crisis, not planning for development.
Interestingly, Kagame recently invited Moyo to Kigali to discuss
ways in which her recommendations could be implemented to help
Rwanda achieve aid independence. His support for Moyo’s ideas show a
recognition of the necessity of the need for economic independence, but
also a recognition of the very real possibility that this theoretical
perspective on aid could soon become reality and constitutes an
admission that a solution must be found as the cessation of foreign aid
will threaten Kagame’s project and stability in Rwanda21.
The Role of Tolerance
The discussion of the importance of international assistance as a
vehicle for the preservation of stability and security in Rwanda now moves
to consider the role of ‘Tolerance.’ This is to be defined as extra-financial,
public or implicit support for Kagame, and can also include inaction.
‘Tolerating’ Kagame implies that international allies will disagree with
aspects of government policy and may find certain actions incompatible
with their own policy, but continue to support Kagame for other reasons,
examples of which will be discussed below. ‘Tolerating’ something also
implies that some force is being withheld, which could have negative or
destructive consequences if tolerance ends. In this case, the argument is
21 See Paul Kagame ‘Africa has to find its own road to prosperity’ in Financial Times 07.05.09 (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0d1218c8-3b35-11de-ba91-00144 accessed 26.07.09). Sach’s article referenced above also contains a virulent criticism of both Kagame and Moyo.
that the donors examined (the US and the UK), tolerate repressive,
divisive and authoritarian domestic policies in Rwanda and
interventionism regionally. This tolerance is based on a desire for a need
for African role models to display to their electorates that expensive aid
policies in the region are having some effect and also because of a sense
of guilt stemming from the sickening inaction during the genocide. This
discussion shows that tolerance is another facet of aid, the consequences
of its removal being again detrimental to Kagame’s project and Rwanda’s
internal security.
Recognising a link between Conflict, Security and Development is a
fundamental found throughout DFID’s policy documents. On its website,
DFID has a wide range of development goals which it seeks to achieve but
for the purpose of this argument let us consider the following statements:
‘’ Long-term, sustainable peace depends on a number of factors: a
political settlement that includes all groups and regions of a country; a
government that is representative of the population, is able to provide
security and justice for all, regardless of their status, ethnicity or religion,
and can ensure that the basic needs of all the population - for a decent
living, healthcare and education - are met.22
Whilst what DFID describes can be seen as effectively a utopia that
exists in few places on earth, it is also a model, an ideal that it seeks to
use its resources and political influence to move toward for the benefit of
22 DFID ‘Building Peace’ (http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Global-Issues/How-we-fight-Poverty/Conflict-and-Security/Building-peace/ accessed 26.07.09)
the countries that it works with. Elsewhere on the website, DFID claims
that:
‘’ Poor governance is a cause of poverty. People suffer when
governments don’t allow participation in political life, provide access to
justice, deliver adequate public services or control corruption23.
USAID has a similar, if slightly less stringent set of conditions for
African partners:
‘’ U.S. foreign assistance supports the overall goal of
transformational diplomacy: to help build sustained and well-governed
states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread
poverty, and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.
USAID assistance to Africa works to help African
governments...incorporate good governance principles and innovative
approaches to health, education, economic growth, agriculture, and the
environment24.’’
Paul Kagame has presided over an era of greatly enhanced
economic performance in Rwanda and his policy of allying with the US and
UK has improved its international relations. But in light of the statements
above it should be pointed out that he is first and foremost a military
23 DFID Rwanda: Major Challenges (http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Africa-West--Central/Rwanda/Major-challenges/ accessed 26.07.09) 24 USAID in Sub-Saharan Africa (http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/ accessed 26.07.09 emphasis added)
leader. Kagame stood virtually unopposed in two presidential elections
most recently obtaining 95% of the vote, which was not accepted by his
Hutu opponent and has been described as ‘not free and fair.25 This type of
election result generally warrants international suspicion and often
condemnation but in the case of Rwanda donors were much more
diplomatic in their response26. This would therefore imply that DFID is
contravening its policy supporting a government that may not be elected
and representative.
Continuing to examine how the excerpt of DFID policy applies to
Rwanda we can see that the Tutsi ethnic group constitutes around 15% of
Rwanda’s population, with Hutu accompanying for the 85% majority.
Kagame’s cabinets have been based around political appointments and
contain very few Hutus. This cannot be described as ethnically
representative. In internal politics there are widespread concerns
surrounding justice and the gacaca court system set up to deal with the
vast amount of genocide suspects which human rights groups argue is
open to manipulation and score-settling in villages and can often deliver
unfair verdicts.27Kagame is consistently accused of not allowing free press
and of maintaining a widespread and secretive domestic intelligence
network, two hallmarks of repressive authoritarianism. Various groups
criticise the one-sided (ethnic) nature of justice systems. A widespread 25 See BBC News ‘Rwandan poll not entirely fair’ 27.08.03 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3183051.stm accessed 26.07.09)26 Reyntjens explores the manner in which the election was ‘supervised’ by RPF elements, the complexity of the registration system and the use of fingerprints which removes anonymity and therefore makes votes against the RPF traceable. One only needs to think of the international uproar provoked by accusations of election rigging in Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Kenya and Iran. But when similar accusations are levelled at UK recipient countries such as Rwanda, Uganda or Zambia the response seems to differ greatly. See ‘Rwanda Ten Years On: From Genocide to dictatorship’ in African Affairs 103 (2004) p177-210.27 See, for example, Amnesty International ‘Prisoner of Conscience: Francois-Xavier Byumba (http://www.amnestyusa.org/all-countries/rwanda/page.do?id=1011229 accessed 26.07.09.)
grievance amongst the Hutu population is that RPF revenge killing
campaigns after the genocide have never been dealt with publically or
satisfactorily. There are arbitrary arrests and detentions, even
disappearances are common and Freedom House has reported a
‘downward trend’ in respect for civil liberties. Reporters without Borders
rates Rwanda as the fourth-worst country on earth for press freedom.28
The 2008 UN Development report places Rwanda below a large majority
of African countries in terms of GINI index, which measures social
inequality.29
Regionally, Rwanda has been accused of natural resource
exploitation on an industrial scale in Eastern DRC, sponsoring proxy Tutsi
militia, playing a role in overthrowing the government of DRC and aiding
resistance movements in Uganda and Sudan30. Clearly this cannot be
reconciled with USAID’s criterion of responsible conduct in the
international system. As detailed above, DFID and USAID continue to
increase financial support for Rwanda in direct opposition to their stated
policy. Therefore it can be concluded that the US and the UK exercise a
tolerance of Kagame’s activities. As tolerance is directly related to the
provision of aid, it is also a facilitating factor for the activities of the
government. The discussion now considers briefly why this tolerance is
applied in order to argue that it is possible that it could be removed and
that this removal could also have a detrimental effect on sustainable
security in Rwanda.
28 Kinzer p32829 UN Human Development Report 2007/8 (UNDP 2008 available online at www.undp.org accessed 26.07.09.) 30 This dissertation focuses mainly on internal issues in Rwanda, and largely discounts the Rwanda-DRC relationship. This is for reasons of focus, clarity and economy. Recommended reading on Rwanda and the DRC is mentioned in reference 4.
The Fragility of Aid
There are several reasons that the US and UK would continue to
contravene their declared criteria for financial and political support in the
case of Rwanda. Some of these are unique to the country, and some are
not. The UK government, for example, spent £5.3bn on aid in 2007/831. As
a growing amount of humanitarian organisations, pressure groups and the
public become more frustrated about the perceived inertia in Sub-Saharan
African development, governments need to increasingly be able to justify
why expensive aid policies have a positive effect. This is going to be put
under increasing scrutiny as the global economic downturn becomes a
greater factor, and with a strongly-placed Conservative opposition on the
record as saying it will increase caveats on aid such as more transparency
and accountability, DFID is in need of examples to continue its mandate32.
This is where Kagame and his economic resurgence based on aid steps in.
DFID needs models like Kagame and Rwanda to show that aid programs
can be effective and it is willing to overlook some of the ‘flaws’ in
Kagame’s style of governance in order to achieve this. However, this
contradiction cannot be permanent and with a Conservative government
31 DFID ’Who we are and what we do’ (http://www.dfid.gov.uk/About-DFID/Quick-guide-to-DFID/Who-we-are-and-what-we-do/ accessed 27.07.09)32See http://www.conservatives.com/Policy/Where_we_stand/International_Development.aspx for details of introducing a watchdog on DFID and other conditionalities, despite stating that aid will also increase. Also see BBC News ‘Cameron Defends Foreign Aid Plan’ 13.07.09 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8147024.stm accessed 27.07.09)
pledging to introduce a watchdog for DFID expenditure and introduce
measures that will tie large amounts of aid to governments working with
indigenous NGOs, DFID’s aid relationship with Rwanda is subject to
change.
There is the idea that the US, UK and other countries continue to
support Rwanda, ‘no questions asked’, because of guilt stemming from
the inaction during the genocide. The US government was one of the most
evasive when pressed to take action in 1994, refusing to use the word
‘genocide’ as this creates a legal duty to intervene militarily. The UK
ambassador to the UN was instrumental in delaying action being taken.
Although they sent peacekeeping troops, Belgium and the Netherlands
were quick to withdraw them. It is widely accepted that these acts amount
to complicity and unconditional aid to Rwanda can perhaps be seen as an
admission of this.33Again, this is not a permanent arrangement. Concerns
about Rwanda’s growing authoritarianism and militarism regionally will
become more important to donors who are, as detailed above, keen to be
seen to be rewarding good governance and democracy and discouraging
dictators and conflicts. Indeed, the Netherlands set a precedent for this
very viewpoint last year by withdrawing financial support to Rwanda in
light of the UN allegations surrounding mining in the DRC, as well as
33 Tolerance is what Reyntjens has called ‘The Genocide Credit’ and his similar idea can be examined in ‘Rwanda Ten Years On: From Genocide to dictatorship’ in African Affairs 103 (2004) p177-210. The idea that Rwanda is tolerated or somehow exceptional has also been explored by Van Leeuwen who argues that ‘Rwanda has succeeded in promoting a ‘narrative of difference.’ See M. van Leeuwen, ‘Rwanda’s Imidugudu programme and earlier experiences with villagisation and resettlement in East Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies 39 (2001),pp. 623–44.For more details on specific country roles see Melvern (2009). For articles arguing that donor tolerance is motivated by guilt see, for example, Declan Walsh ‘Exploiting our Guilt over Rwanda’s Genocide’ in The Independent 07.04.09 (http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/declan-walsh-exploiting-our-guilt-over-rwandas-genocide-559156.html) accessed 27.07.09 or The Economist ‘Rwanda: A Flawed Hero’ 21.08.08 (http://www.economist.com/books/displaystory.cfm?STORY_ID=11959125) accessed 27.07.09
domestic governance concerns.34In 2000, the Bush administration
threatened to withdraw its support for IMF aid to Rwanda unless it
withdrew its troops from the DRC. Kagame subsequently agreed to this
demand with the qualification that Rwanda would reserve the right to
invade again if Hutu militia threatened its security. IMF aid was granted as
well as a $1.4bn debt write-off under the HIPC initiative35. This shows that
while donors tolerate actions such as Kagame’s threats or chiding, the
withdrawal of aid and tolerance is not without precedent and the
argument is that further tensions will arise as international politics moves
on from the genocide.
This chapter has shown that Rwanda is dependent on aid and
tolerance to continue with its ambitious project to lift itself out of poverty
within a generation. It has shown that this assistance contradicts some
donor policy, but continues in spite of this. It has also shown that this
assistance is fragile, affected by potential changes in theoretical
approaches to and debates surrounding aid as well as more stringent
monitoring of where aid goes. Finally it has displayed how there are
precedents for the cessation of aid to Rwanda. Larger-scale cessation by
the UK, for example, would undoubtedly contribute towards economic and
political instability in the country and would have a consequent effect on
security in Rwanda; therefore security is not considered sustainable whilst
stability is reliant in a large part on international aid.
34 See, for example, The Independent “Rwanda seeks alternative to Aid’ 15.01.09 (http://www.independent.co.ug/index.php/news/regional-news/471-rwanda-seeks-alternatives-to-aid) accessed 27.07.09. Sweden followed suit suspending all aid to Rwanda over the same concerns. This move prompted scorn and condemnation from Kagame who galvanised his public statements regarding the goal of aid independence. 35 See http://www.javno.com/en-world/sweden-halts-usd15-mln-aid-to-rwanda-over-un-charge_215890 accessed 27.07.09
As a postscript to the chapter, it is worth briefly looking at Kagame’s
attitude. This dissertation is not designed to be a total attack on Kagame’s
administration. There are arguably valid reasons for many of the
authoritarian tendencies described and this will be considered later, and
in the aftermath of the genocide with comparatively little international
assistance the policies and vision of Kagame have meant that Rwanda has
been able to achieve quite exceptional progress in comparison to other
post-conflict states, say Somalia or Sierra Leone.36
Paul Kagame is unusual amongst African leaders in the sense that
he has repeatedly called for aid to be reduced and alternative forms of
income to be sourced. “Aid is bad as it is. It is something they will give
you when they want and take away when they don’t want to give it to
you.37” This attitude comes from a distrust of the international community
after the genocide and from personal traits as a military leader who is
used to being in control, has struggled for independence and dislikes
operating in a climate of external constraint or insecurity38. In a bid to
improve entrepreneurship and investment in Rwanda and move away
from aid dependence, Kagame can often be found in the US courting
support from influential Christian groups and International Corporations
alike. Kagame sends fact-finding missions to Asian Tiger economies in the
search for transferable policy, and he keeps personal friendships with
influential people such as Tony Blair, Rick Warren, Google CEO Eric
36 One of Kagame’s most vitriolic criticisms of the UN was that most aid went to Hutu refugees, in camps which housed the remnants of the génocidaires after the RPF seized power, and not to the government to rebuild the country. Rwanda is considered one of Africa’s fastest-growing economies. 37 See The Independent “Rwanda seeks alternative to Aid’ 15.01.09 (http://www.independent.co.ug/index.php/news/regional-news/471-rwanda-seeks-alternatives-to-aid) accessed 27.07.0938 See Kagame ‘Africa has to find its own road to prosperity’ in Financial Times
Schmidt, Starbucks CEO Howard Schultz and Costco CEO Jim Sinegal39. In
fact, Schultz has recently reached a deal whereby his corporation will
commit to purchasing a majority of Rwanda’s coffee crop as part of its
fair-trade initiative and has set up a $250,000 resource centre in
Kigali.40Rwanda’s dependence on aid could, therefore, possibly be partially
reduced as a consequence of these dealings and they certainly feed into
Kagame’s strategy of aid reduction. For the time being, however, Rwanda
remains heavily dependent on international support despite these
developments and it should also be noted that non-extractive industries
such as Starbucks or Google require a climate of security to facilitate
investment. Kagame is selling Rwanda to these organisations as an
example of positive transformation and of African renaissance. As detailed
above, this idea is nonetheless strongly related to the politics of aid and
tolerance.
39 See Kinzer chapter 17 and Jeff Chu ‘Rwanda Rising: A New Model of Economic Development’ on fastcompany.com 18.03.09 (http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/134/special-report-rwanda-rising.html?page=0%2C2 accessed 27.07.09)40 See Tim Adams ‘Starbucks founder spreads gospel of hope in Rwanda’ The Guardian 19.07.09 (http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/jul/19/starbucks-howard-schultz-fairtrade) accessed 27.07.09.
Chapter Two
Only Rwandans: The Personality Cult and the Reformation of
a Tutsi Elite
This second chapter moves the focus of the dissertation to discuss
authoritarian tendencies considered earlier more fully. It examines the
extent to which Rwanda’s resurgence under Kagame is dependent on
Kagame himself and asks questions relating to the extent of the
centralisation of power in terms of government, intelligence, the military,
media and commerce in the hands of a new Tutsi elite personally loyal to
Kagame. Drawing on theoretical arguments which critique authoritarian
responses to armed conflict, the chapter assesses the sustainability of a
security environment that has been created through the leadership of a
small group of stakeholders loyal to the vision of an individual. After
reflecting on post-genocide Tutsi consciousness and its role in Kagame’s
politics, the chapter considers reasons why this centralised reconstruction
is both necessary and problematic before evaluating its sustainability. The
chapter concludes by arguing that certain actions must be taken
regarding processes of representation, inclusion and peaceable dissent in
order to diffuse the build-up of grievances which can lead to renewed
conflict and/or further repression both of which are detrimental to
security. The dissertation then moves into an extended conclusion which
critiques the record of visionary militant revolutionaries in contemporary
African conflict and raises questions about whether the examples of these
figures can be related to the Rwandan scenario, before raising further
questions and identifying areas for continued research.
Kagame, a Rebel Leader
This first section of the chapter briefly looks at the events in
Kagame’s career prior to government which can be seen to have formed
his authoritarian outlook and his motivation to reconstruct Rwanda in this
manner. It discusses the idea of a Tutsi consciousness with reference to
the work of Mamdani and examines the influence of a discourse of
persecution and the desire to establish a homeland on the actions of
Kagame and the RPF. The chapter then moves to analyse how these
beliefs have subsequently been implemented in the policies of the RPF
government and its response to genocide. It shows that these policies
have led to a reproduction of ethnic division, grievance and a state of
inequality which runs parallel to the economic resurgence and
stabilisation of the society. Displaying that this centralised system is
effectively built on the strong, authoritarian leadership of the individual,
the chapter then questions the efficacy of this as a long-term solution in
relation to sustainable security in Rwanda whilst considering why
authoritarianism is simultaneously problematic and, perhaps, necessary.
After escaping the anti-Tutsi violence in 1959 as a child, Kagame
became one of the many Rwandan refugees who settled in camps in
Uganda. Treated like second-class citizens and exiled from their
homeland, a sense of loss and of resentment developed which was fuelled
by the failure of early Tutsi attempts to reinvade Rwanda and was built
upon the myth creation of the homeland and a homecoming which
gloamed throughout the squalid camps.41 Paul Kagame was among a
group of disaffected Rwandan youth who went on to join Yoweri
Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda, receiving military
training and taking part in the successful 1986 rebellion in which the NRA
overthrew the dictatorship of Milton Obote. Museveni rewarded Kagame
and his Rwandan counterparts with high-level positions in the NRA, which
Kagame was later to exploit for further training in the US and, eventually,
for using NRA resources to fuel the abortive 1990 RPF invasion. Close ties
with Museveni meant that the Ugandan leader also tolerated the presence
of Kagame’s rebel army and allowed free flow of arms, resources and
manpower between Uganda and Kagame’s enclave in the months and
years preceding the eventual RPF takeover. In his biography of Kagame,
Kinzer shows how a sense of persecution and alienation manifested
themselves in the young Kagame in malevolence and a distrust of others.
During military training in the Ugandan bush, Kagame was often sent on
lengthy solo reconnaissance missions and later drew on the skills he had
developed to clandestinely enter Rwanda alone and examine the country
41 For a discussion of Kagame’s early life in Ugandan IDP camps and the effect of the power of myth on the exiled youth see both Kinzer chapter 2 and Mamdani ‘When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda’ (James Currey 2001.)
from the inside. Kinzer believes that these experiences, in conjunction
with a lifelong sense of injustice and the competitive discipline that comes
from being a military practitioner who has spent most of his career living
with the hardships of a guerrilla lifestyle, have formed Kagame’s thought.
This is arguably reflected in discourses of self-reliance and attitudes
towards leadership, social discipline and crime and punishment that
permeate Rwandan government today. 42
As an ethnic Tutsi who grew up with enduring memories of
communal violence and racism, Kagame is driven by what Mamdani has
called ‘Victor’s Justice.’ In ‘When Victims become Killers’, he argues that
Tutsis have been consistently branded an ‘alien settler race’ throughout
colonial transformation, and this ‘race branding’ allowed the other ethnic
group to set the Tutsi apart and exterminate them with a clear
conscience, seeing themselves as ‘sons and daughters of the soil…their
mission is one of clearing the soil of a threatening and alien presence.43’
He argues that ‘Victor’s Justice’ is the mentality that has developed in
Tutsi and in Kagame that believes that Tutsi must have power and their
own state in order to survive, the welfare of Tutsi must be paramount,
armed peace is the only viable peace and the doctrine of ‘Never Again’
legitimates any action for the perseverance of Tutsi power, including
repression, ethnism and authoritarianism. Mamdani and other writers
have interestingly compared this mentality to Israeli Zionism, arguing that
the myths of a homecoming, the discourse of persecution, the perceived
international exclusion, the suffering of genocide, the diasporic nature of
42 See Kinzer chp 643 Mamdani p13
the ethnic group and the creation of a militaristic state on the ashes of
this violence are common to both experiences44.
The difference, however, comes in from the fact that following the
holocaust, the Jews were relocated in Israel, away from the perpetrators of
their genocide but no divorce of Hutu and Tutsi has taken place. It is this
fact, in combination with ‘Victor’s Justice’ that leads Mamdani to conclude
that a resurgence of ethnic conflict is likely or in other words that the
security situation is not sustainable45. This is echoed by former President
Pasteur Bizimungu, whose abdication paved the way for Kagame’s
accession to President in circumstances that have been seen as a forced
abdication from the real power behind the scenes, and which signified the
end of the ‘multi-ethnic’ experiment in the aftermath of the
genocide.46Bizimungu, a preacher and moderate Hutu installed as
President by the RPF after the genocide and designed to act as a unifying
figurehead argued from his Kagame-imposed house arrest in 1999 that;
‘We are convinced that if the current state of affairs continues the
Hutus will prepare for war and in 15 or 20 years they will have driven out
the Tutsi with all the foreseeable consequences that this would entail.
Mechanisms need to be set up so that each community can genuinely
participate in the government, until we have forged a national identity
44 This paragraph draws on the argument from Mamdani p271-3. See also Waugh p97-99 who, perhaps sarcastically, also remarks that Kagame renamed Rwanda’s Army ‘Rwandan Defence Force’, echoing Israel’s IDF. 45 Mamdani p27246 See Waugh p153
that transcends the Hutu-Tutsi divisions. If the situation does not change,
the only possible outcome is violence. The War of 1990 is not over.47’
Kagame, an Authoritarian Leader
Continuing with Mamdani’s thought; the central problem Kagame
was faced with following the RPF’s seizure of power was how to
‘incorporate a guilty majority with a fearful and aggrieved minority.’ The
Tutsi demand justice, the Hutu want democracy. Due to their minority
status and the nature of ‘Victor’s Justice’ discussed above, Tutsi were
immediately inclined to see a democratic transition as threat, rather than
‘a form of improvement.48’In order to prevent a repeat of the 1994
disaster, Kagame was therefore motivated to centralize power within RPF
ranks and those that could be trusted, which effectively would result in
the retention of power and influence within a new Tutsi elite with token
Hutu moderates such as Bizimungu in place to maintain a perception of a
post-ethnic revolution. How, then, was power centralized within this elite
and was this a necessary action in order to stabilize and to create and
preserve security?
‘’While it officially rejected ethnic discrimination and even the notion
of ethnicity, the RPF rapidly reserved access to power, wealth and
47 Quoted from Waugh p15548 Mamdani p280
knowledge to Tutsi. The only exception was the Cabinet, where a number
of Hutu served as ministers in order to give a symbolic expression of
national unity. The RPF vigorously and categorically denied any ethnic
factor, a denial which was an essential element of the hegemonic
strategies of small Tutsi élites, such as that powerful in Rwanda during the
1950s and in Burundi between 1965 and 1988… this ‘Tutsization’, which
was also a means of consolidating the hold of the RPF on the system, was
quite spectacular at most levels of the state: by 1996, the majority of MPs,
four of the six Supreme Court presiding judges, over 80 percent of
mayors, most permanent secretaries and university teachers and
students, almost the entire army command structure and the intelligence
services were Tutsi.49’’
Reyntjens argues that creeping authoritarianism has occurred in
Rwanda throughout the post-genocide period. He cites incidents such as
two mass exoduses of previous RPF supporters in 1995 and 2000, mainly
complaining that the RPF has banned political parties and used the tag of
‘divisionism’ to criminalize dissent. The staff of Imboni newspaper, in the
first issue from exile sarcastically ‘apologized’ for ‘having publicly
expressed our indignation at the spirit of sycophancy, the deliberate
process of impoverishment of society and public opinion to vassaldom.50’
In 2007, International Crisis Group stated that the political parties that
49 Reyntjens (2004) p187 and p188 50 Ibid p184
exist today in Rwanda are only tolerated if they agree not to question the
definition of political life drawn up by the RPF.51’
During the reconstruction process, Kagame was quick to identify the
ethnic divisions of the past as a cause of the violence and the government
outlawed ‘divisionism’, which included using ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ as means
of identification and campaigning that was based on or played on ethnicity
but the term also came to incorporate further actions such as denial or
questioning of genocide, or any actions that could detract from stability
including any criticism of government policies. Bradol & Guibert argue
that ‘political discourse opposed to ethnism attempts to hide the
domination of society by the self-proclaimed representatives of the Tutsi
community’ and therefore whilst ‘the elimination of ethnicity is a
worthwhile goal, shared by many Rwandans, the cynical manipulation of
this objective as a tool for the monopolization of power in the hands of a
small group is something quite different.52’
What it constitutes is a classic strategy of authoritarian governance.
Whilst alluding towards democratic reforms and participation to placate
mass rebellion, dissent is increasingly restricted and punished through the
creation of crimes ostensibly designed to portray the perpetrator as linked
to the widely-despised previous regime or its ideology but surreptitiously,
the regime uses the elastic definition of sedition to deal with obstacles to
the reinforcement of its hegemony and ideology and the reproduction of
its own power. The regime then can restrict and discredit opponents to
51 International Crisis Group, ‘Consensual Democracy’ in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Evaluatingthe March 2001 district elections (October 2001), p. 35.
52 Bradol & Guibert cited in Reyntjens.
the extent that a viable alternative cannot possibly exist which, in turn,
deepens the authoritarian system.53
In the case of Rwanda, Reyntjens sees the fear of a ‘Burundi
Syndrome’, in which large-scale manipulation of the political process and
rigging of elections is seen as necessary by the minority Tutsi to protect
against the danger that the predominantly Hutu electorate could refuse to
vote with the government, however unlikely. Therefore, the move to
include high profile Hutus in cabinet in conjunction with the manner in
which the electoral process was manipulated is seen as a mechanism for
the centralization of power within the Tutsi elite loyal to Kagame. An overt
politics of ethnicity and repression could be met with widespread rebellion
in a society still riddled with related grievances, therefore Kagame the
ruler saw it necessary to criminalize divisionism and be seen to create a
post-ethnic society at the same time as using these policies to effectively
do the opposite, centralizing power in a loyal, ethnocentric and all-
powerful elite54.
Kagame, the ‘Strongman’
Kagame’s argument is that restriction of opposition is necessary in
an environment in which security and stability are still being formed. A
53 For a useful discussion of how authoritarianism works see, for example, Vestal ‘Ethiopia: A Post-Cold War State’ (Greenwood 1999) 54 Further discussion can be found in Reyntjens (2004), Lemarchand ‘The Politics of Memory in Post-Genocide Rwanda’ in Clark (ed) 2008 or The Economist ‘A Flawed Hero’ 21.08.08.
strong military and intelligence network is essential in order to protect the
state against domestic and foreign belligerents, of which there are
numerous examples. In the economic sense, Kagame also subscribes to
the theory that authoritarian governments have a history of delivering
economic progress, reflected in his strong interest in the Asian ‘Tiger’
economies in which much of the population has arguably accepted an
authoritarian reduction in civil liberties in return for improvements in
living conditions with the assumption that participation can follow once
stability, then prosperity have been achieved. It is in the confluence of
threat and opportunity that Kagame and the RPF seem to be arguing that
an authoritarian response to the genocide can be validated. It ‘makes
sense’ that a military leader who has ostensibly fought to liberate the
Tutsi from genocide should play a central role in the reconstruction effort,
as if it something that is ‘earned.’ A breakdown in security and stability
linked, in one way, to ethnic categorization of society must be resolved
through focusing on regaining control, instilling a narrative of
reconciliation, post-ethnicity, nationalism and progress.
Therefore, debate surrounding democratization, government policy,
Tutsization, military interventions, discrimination and justice are all
dismissed as detracting from socioeconomic progress. It is this obsession
with securitization, self-reliance and progress combined with the
personality described above that wields immense power yet feels
threatened and persecuted that creates the conditions for the politics of
authoritarianism in Rwanda.
Having detailed some examples of the authoritarian nature of the
regime in Rwanda and used both pro and anti-Kagame sources to explain
why this was deemed the correct response it is also essential to
summarize a critique of the alternative avenue that this authoritarian
system could take in the future. Criticisms of authoritarianism tend to also
be endorsements of democratization. An abundance of literature argues
that liberal democracy is the only progressive form of governance as the
repression of individual rights in order to achieve collective goals neglects
the immediate and egocentric instincts of the human being55 or, again, as
DFID phrases it (ironically on its Rwanda homepage), ‘People suffer when
governments don’t allow participation in political life, provide access to
justice, deliver adequate public services or control corruption.’56
Critics of authoritarian regimes point towards a multitude of socio-
economic reasons why autocracy is damaging for societies. These include
studies finding, variously, poorer indicators of health, life expectancy,
education, nutrition and happiness in autocracies. In his studies on
famine, Sen has argued that famine, and certain other humanitarian
catastrophes are avoidable and tend not to occur in systems that involve
democratic participation and representation.57
55 The most famous example of this viewpoint is Fukuyama ‘The End of History and the Last Man’ (Penguin 1993). Written in the aftermath of the collapse of authoritarian communist regimes after the Cold War, Fukuyama delivers a detailed and widely criticised eulogy of authoritarianism, arguing that liberal democracy is the only system of governance that can incorporate individual instincts towards competition and fulfilling potential, and that authoritarianism is likely to be fully and globally discredited in the 21st century. The Kantian theory of democratic peace, on which Fukuyama builds much of his theory has been explored empirically notably by Hegre et al in ‘Toward a Democratic Civil Peace: Democracy, Political Change and Civil War’ (Cambridge 2002) in which they find that authoritarian regimes are more likely to cause interstate and civil wars and with higher casualty rates. 56 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Africa-West--Central/Rwanda/Major-challenges/ accessed 14.08.0957 See, for example, Sen ‘Development as Freedom’ (Oxford 2004)
Authoritarian regimes repress political freedom by their nature, but
this also manifests in higher potential for state-sponsored violent
repression, the legitimization of violence and the current buzz-word;
‘state-sponsored terrorism.’ By removing grounds for debate,
disagreement, participation and individual expression of discontent in
government, authoritarianism manufactures political grievance.
Theoretically, if mass grievances are left unaddressed and are allowed to
become organized or worse still, militarized, the effects on regime
survival, security and stability in the state can become highly
destructive.58
Applying this outlook to Kagame’s Rwanda provokes thoughts. In
terms of development indicators, Rwanda is progressing better than most
of the states in the region and has shown improvements in economic
performance, healthcare, education, gender equality and combating
pandemic diseases as well as the obvious decrease in violence and crime.
While it still has many problems and a long way to go, there is unlikely to
be a humanitarian crisis such as a famine under the current
administration, particularly if Kagame’s anti-corruption drive, nation-
building and financial projects continue apace.
Unless there is renewed conflict. Kagame’s belligerence has found
him new enemies to join the French and the génocidaires who wait in
exile. Kagame has broken from his alliance with Museveni over the DRC.
Despite recent co-operation, the government in Kinshasa continues to
58 On State Collapse, see Zartman ‘Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority’ (Lynne Rienner 1995). This theory is widely employed by exponents of the democratisation agenda as evidence that authoritarian regimes in Africa should not be funded as, statistically, they increase the likelihood of conflict. For a discussion of this see Collier et al ‘Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy’ (World Bank 2003).
deliberately obfuscate the location of FDLR commanders. A growing
amount of disaffected young Hutus flee to the DRC to join the FDLR, who
claim to have 20,000 men under arms, or other exiled rebel groups.
Domestically, the twin exoduses of members of his own cabinet have
diminished Kagame’s ability to portray his government as a post-ethnic,
inclusive, participatory force and the voices of those who have joined the
diaspora are added to a clamor of grievance. It has also stripped away
much of the pretence that Kagame was not the central powerbroker in the
cabinet, which has heightened the perception, falsely or not, that Rwanda
is another African country being run according to the direction of a
‘Strongman.’ Dissenting voices are repressed but still prevalent. One must
only consider the run-up to the previous elections in which all manners of
parties attempted to challenge Kagame running on platforms of, to quote
one manifesto ‘mobilizing the Rwandan people of all ethnic groups to put
an end to the autocratic regime of President Paul Kagame.59Another party,
the ADRN, threatened ‘‘…the armed forces of the political-military
organizations shall all be put at the disposal of the Alliance for the
accomplishment of its mission60, referring to its willingness to exploit its
links to the FDLR army and therefore claiming a military capacity, if its
campaign was restricted by the RPF. Kagame still retains a firm hold on
power, dictatorially or not, but these are worrying developments and
theory and experience tell us that despite socio-economic performance,
authoritarianism in Sub-Saharan Africa has a history of failing to deliver
what it promises as, ultimately, it regularly has a destructive effect on
59 Reyntjens (2004) p192.60 Ibid
long-term sustainable security and stability. The following conclusion
looks briefly at some other cases that this theory can be applied to before
remarking on what can be drawn from the two chapters, revisiting the
hypothesis and identifying some areas for further investigation.
Conclusion: Kagame in a Regional Context
There are many examples of authoritarian strongmen coming to
power following successful insurgencies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Whilst their
reasons for fighting have been different, the events following their
accession to power often bear similarities. The purpose of the following
remarks is to situate Rwanda within the context of the experience of some
of its neighboring countries in order to more fully address the hypothesis
of this dissertation. A good starting point is Rwanda’s neighbor ran by
Kagame’s historical ally. Similarities within the Ugandan scenario include
a history of recurrent conflict in the post-colonial period, and an
incumbent government which seized power through a guerilla insurgency
run from the bush. After winning control some 23 years ago, Museveni laid
out a vision of a ‘No-Party state’ as a means to reduce the ethnic discord
that had led to conflict, as part of a wider development strategy that was
generally praised and lavishly funded by Western donor organizations.
Until the early part of this decade, the NRM government was widely
credited as an African example of good governance. However, Museveni’s
no-party state has been criticized as a means of outlawing political
opposition in a manner that echoes Kagame’s ‘divisionism.’ Northern
Uganda has one of the most acute humanitarian crises on earth, the result
of decades of brutal insurgency and ethnically based violence. It is
generally accepted that the national bias towards the Buganda region,
where Museveni originates from and draws his political constituency, has
resulted in a localized increase in prosperity that Museveni can use to
appease the donors on whom he remains dependent at the same time as
preventing opposition from other ethnic groups consolidating due to
chronic impoverishment and through his use of clientelism and patronage
systems for redistributing international assistance. Again echoing Rwanda,
the West largely ignores this domestic discrimination, inability to resolve
low level conflict despite massive amounts of military assistance,
reformation of an elite loyal to the Presidency and regional
interventionism and looting in the DRC as Uganda can point to adherence
to neoliberal structural adjustment programs and improvements in various
development indicators61.
Like Kagame, Museveni pledged to increase prosperity and embark
upon a nation-building exercise that would free Uganda from ethnic
conflict and impoverishment but has continued to reproduce corruption,
grievance and aid dependence through his policies. Internal conflicts
continue in the North and East and dissent is increasing in the country.
The NRM has not been able to bring security and stability to the entire
country and Uganda remains a non-hegemonic state with security forces
personally loyal to the Presidency. Museveni’s regime has survived for so
long due to his strategy of pandering to one region of the country whilst
courting massive donor support. These two options are unavailable to
Kagame unless he alters his ‘vision’, the argument being that if he
61 See, for example Allen ‘Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance Army’ (Zed Books 2006) chapter 2, Mwenda ‘Foreign Aid and the weakening of Democratic Accountability in Uganda’ (Cato Institute Policy Briefing #88 12.07.06, or Tangri & Mwenda ‘Politics, Donors and the Ineffectiveness of Anti-Corruption Institutions in Uganda’ Journal of Modern African Studies 44.1 (2006)
continues to show similarities to Museveni’s political path it is likely to
affect security in Rwanda.
In Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe has been in power for even longer
than Museveni. While Mugabe’s accession to power as the leader of an
armed rebel group was an anti-colonial independence struggle, once
power had been obtained Mugabe was quick to install a one-party regime,
firing members of the cabinet from the Ndebele-speaking South and
consistently favouring figures from his Shona-speaking northern homeland
in a campaign that culminated in the infamous massacres in Matabeleland
which brought security and stability to Mugabe’s strongman authoritarian
rule. Mugabe’s development strategy saw him revered as an African hero
and parallels with Rwanda can also be seen in the subsequent
(temporary) improvements in development indicators and Mugabe’s
consistent and vehement criticisms of the colonial power, the UK.
Mugabe’s withdrawal from the IMF and belligerent rejection of
international conditions on assistance have resulted in Zimbabwe
currently suffering one of the most economically precarious situations in
Africa. Widespread condemnation followed multiple incidences of election
rigging as his security forces increased repression of dissent at an
alarming rate. Mugabe still leads government but with greatly reduced
power in an effective admission that democratic reform, power-sharing
and a reconciliation with international assistance was necessary in order
to attempt to alleviate the instability and insecurity that was created
through decades of clientelist, ethnist, authoritarian misrule62.
62 See, for example. Chan ‘Robert Mugabe: A Life of Power and Violence’ (IB Tauris 2003) or Holland ‘Dinner with Mugabe’ (Penguin 2008), as well as an abundance of articles from BBC News and IRIN news on
Clearly, each example will be different but Mugabe represents a
precedent for what can result from a militaristic African strongman’s
strategy of ethnically based rule that involves a violent discourse of
rejecting international multilateral assistance. While neither the Ugandan
nor Zimbabwean scenarios will necessarily take place in Kagame’s
Rwanda, the argument is to display that there are many examples of the
destruction of security and stability occurring involving broadly similar
starting points and development strategies but, also, strategies of political
power reproduction. Other examples from the region abound, Obiang
exporting natural resources in Equatorial Guinea in order to finance his
repression of minority and opposition groups, international donors
tolerating this dictatorship in order to deal with his regime. Or Hastings
Banda’s ability to counter international condemnation of his corrupt and
repressive one-party Nyasaland with improved development indicators in
a 33-year presidency that eventually made way for widespread
democratic reforms. Or, most controversially, with the rule of Habyirimana
in Rwanda itself in the years preceding the genocide, a corrupted
authoritarian strongman dependent on French financial and military
support who played on European power games in Central Africa to escape
wider condemnation for the discrimination against ethnic minorities, which
ended in the state-sponsored genocide of 1994; the ultimate
disintegration of security and stability, created through the reaction built
on the state’s own fear of the retaliation of the ethnic group it had
violently excluded63.
authoritarianism in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe. 63 See Reyntjens (2004)
Findings: Aid, Authoritarianism and Sustainable Security
The first research area of the piece aimed to show that Kagame’s
regime is heavily dependent on aid. It has been able to do this through
using a wealth of figures from donor organizations but, tellingly, also
through widely available official government documents which is a
significant admission. It has also shown that this aid contravenes official
donor policy on the kind of development partners that it works with,
describing in brief some of the authoritarian tendencies being shown by
the Kigali administration which are expanded upon in chapter two. It goes
on to show that a growing amount of debate is taking place on the
effectiveness of aid to African regimes and also describes precedents for
aid cessation to Rwanda and to other states. The conclusion that can be
drawn from this is simply that in spite of the government strategy of
reducing aid dependence, combined with an at times vitriolic criticism of
the effects of aid itself, by his own admission the stability of Kagame’s
government still relies on aid flows which are being increasingly called
into question not only in an empirical, case-by-case basis to Rwanda but
also in a theoretical sense by leading academics. Reductions and
Cessations on aid, or increases in conditionalities in order to reconcile
funding with the good governance agenda are perfectly possible near-
future actions which would undoubtedly have a detrimental effect on
Rwanda’s nascent stability and the security situation in the country.
An interesting, if slightly conspiratorial perspective is that the good
governance agenda and indeed, the great neoliberal economic
restructuring project more broadly argues to have interests of
democratization and poverty alleviation at heart but demonstrates with its
approach to Rwanda, and also for example Uganda and Nigeria, that it is
willing to compromise some of its declared objectives in reward for sheer
economic output and adherence to command. Further research that
examines the argument for an, in reality, lower than professed level of
evolution in aid policy since the Cold War and the era of unconditional
reward for ideological support on the part of recipient countries would be
useful.
The second research area of the piece aimed to show that Rwanda
has descended increasingly into authoritarian politics in the post-genocide
years. It has sketched out a description of the motivations of the
authoritarian leader in the format of a biography of his time in the
military. It references many texts that can be examined in order to gain a
fuller picture of the undisputable horror of the Rwandan Genocide that
Kagame will always have at the centre of his politics and experience.
Using Mamdani’s research on Tutsi discourses of persecution it has drawn
these ideas together and shown how they converged under Kagame’s
leadership, manifesting a ‘Tutsization’ of Rwandan politics and a
repression of dissent which has been encapsulated in the new crime of
‘Divisionism’. Detailing how this authoritarian structure has led to the
breakdown of relationships with Hutu politicians, the formation of armed
and exiled rebel groups and ethnic exclusion, thanks mainly to the works
of Reyntjens and Lemarchand, the chapter has shown how ethnism and
authoritarianism reproduce political grievance which, time and again,
leads to increased repression and renewed conflict. The discussion then
continues to reinforce these points with various theoretical criticisms of
authoritarianism all of which share the common view that whilst
authoritarianism can produce various short-term security solutions and
stabilization, it also sows seeds of discord which over the months, years or
even decades repeatedly fails to deliver a sustainable, prosperous and
secure political economy. If he follows his role models in the Far East,
Kagame’s authoritarianism and protectionism must gradually be replaced
by increased levels of participation if prosperity is delivered and poverty is
truly alleviated.
This, however, is a big ‘If.’ The dissertation continues by showing
that the early and formative years of Kagame’s presidency bear many
similarities to African regimes that have degenerated into corruption,
instability and even ethnic conflict, all of which Kagame is adamant is not
the path that his ‘Switzerland of Africa’ is going to embark upon. If long-
term sustainable security for the duration of Kagame’s presidency and the
years to come after him is to be achieved in Rwanda the President would
do well to distance himself from examples from history which show that
an aid-dependent, regionally belligerent, repressive and ethnically divided
country with an authoritarian centralization of the state’s functions of
coercion must address grievances, deliver prosperity and become more
inclusive or risk degenerating into corruption, repression and farcical
compromise of its political ideals in order to retain control over a political
economy that it is simultaneously severely damaging.
To Summarize, the tested hypothesis of this dissertation has argued
that security in Rwanda is not sustainable, or lasting under present
circumstances. Kagame’s overtures regarding reducing aid dependence
must be implemented to guard against the increasing possibility that aid
will become reduced or more altered and tied to his relinquishment of
authoritarianism. At the same time, the security created by repression,
exile, ethnocentrism and strongman politics must be tempered with
addressing fomenting grievances if it is to endure. Otherwise, Kagame’s
Rwanda could find itself identified more with the ethnic patronage and
conflict of Uganda, the economic farce and international isolation of
Zimbabwe or, worse still, its own history of Hobbesian level uncontrollable
violence and less with the Security, Prosperity and Socio-Economic
Development of Switzerland64.
64 As a final Postscript, the situation in Burundi will be highlighted. Suffering its own genocide, with Tutsi massacring Hutu in 1993, Burundi continued to be plagued by chronic impoverishment and a series of rebel offensives leaving the countryside in ruins, the cities filled with refugees and the population decimated and terrified. From a broadly similar starting point to Rwanda in the sense that a genocide had taken place and society was largely destroyed, but also as a biethnic, Francophone, Belgium-administered, landlocked, under-reported and chronically impoverished state of similar size, geography, population and low natural resource endowment, Burundi tackled political reforms in an altogether different manner. South-African brokered peace talks throughout the early 21st century resulted in a constitutionally-enshrined and landmark power-sharing agreement between Hutu and Tutsi. A Hutu President and Tutsi Prime Minister preside over an elected cabinet constituting relative numbers of both ethnic groups and including previous rebels at the same time. The military and security forces are also divided equally. This has brought a tentative peace to the country that has held up over the last few years. Whilst it would be wrong to hold up Burundi as a ‘beacon of hope’ for conflict-ridden fragile states in Africa, nevertheless it represents an alternative, opposite, democratic approach to that of Kagame’s authoritarianism. Whilst its lower level of economic recovery compared to Rwanda can arguably be put down to Rwanda’s greater visibility due to the genocide and the resulting international interest, the potential for sustainable security can be compared favorably and the similarities and differences between the two responses to genocide in Rwanda and Burundi is definitely an area of research which this dissertation could expand into. Further information on Burundi is scarce, but Lemarchand’s article ‘Consocionationalism and Power-Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo’ African Affairs 106/422 p1-20 (2006) examines this to an extent and Uvin’s recent ‘Life after Violence: A People’s History of Burundi’ (Zed Books 2008) gives empirical accounts of the violence and restructuring project as well as discussing some of the theoretical questions.
Bibliography
Texts
Adelman & Shurke ‘The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from
Uganda to Zaire’ Transaction (2000)
Allen ‘Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s
Resistance Army’ Zed Books (2006)
Bond ‘Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation’ Zed Books (2006)
Bush ‘Poverty and Neoliberalism: Persistence and Reproduction in the
Global South’ Pluto (2007)
Calderisi ‘The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid isn’t Working’ Yale
(2007)
Chan ‘Robert Mugabe: A Life of Power and Violence’ IB Tauris (2003)
Clark & Kaufman (eds) ‘After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-
Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond’ Hurst &
Co (2009)
Collier (ed) ‘Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development
Policy’ World Bank (2003)
Dallaire ‘Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda’
Random House (2003)
Des Forges ‘Leave None to Tell the Story’ Human Rights Watch (1999)
Fukuyama ‘The End of History and the Last Man’ Penguin (1993)
Glennie ‘The Trouble with Aid: Why Less could Mean More for Africa’ Zed
Books (2008)
Hegre et al ‘Toward a Democratic Civil Peace: Democracy, Political
Change and Civil War’ Cambridge (2002)
Holland ‘Dinner with Mugabe’ Penguin (2008)
Kinzer ‘A Thousand Hills: Rwanda’s Rebirth and the Man who dreamed it’
Wiley (2007)
Mamdani ‘When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the
Genocide in Rwanda’ James Currey (2001)
Melvern ‘A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide’
Zed Books (2nd ed 2009)
Moyo ‘Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is Another Way
for Africa’ Farrar, Strauss and Giroux (2009)
Prendergast & Smock ‘Reconstructing Peace in the Congo’ USIP (1999)
Prunier ‘The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of a Genocide’ Hurst &
Co. (1995)
Sachs ‘The End of Poverty’ Penguin (2005)
Sen ‘Development as Freedom’ Zed Books (2004)
Turner ‘The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality’ Zed Books (2005)
Uvin ‘Life after Violence: A People’s History of Burundi’ Zed Books (2008)
Vestal ‘Ethiopia: A Post-Cold War State’ Greenwood (1999)
Wallis ‘Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France’s Role in the
Rwandan Genocide’ IB Tauris (2007)
Waugh ‘Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power Genocide and the Rwandan
Patriotic Front’ McFarland & Co. (2004)
Zartman ‘Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of
Legitimate Authority’ Lynne Rienner (1995)
Journal Articles
Jackson ‘Making a Killing: Coping and Criminality in the Kivu War
Economy’ Review of African Political Economy 93/94 (2002) pp517-536
Lemarchand ‘Consocionationalism and Power-Sharing in Africa: Rwanda,
Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo’ African Affairs 106/422
(2006) p1-20
Mwenda ‘Foreign Aid and the Weakening of Democratic Accountability in
Uganda’ Cato Institute Policy Briefing #88 12.07.06
Reyntjens ‘Rwanda Ten Years On: From Genocide to dictatorship’ African
Affairs 103 (2004) p177-210
Samset ‘Conflict of Interests or Interest in Conflict: Diamonds and War in
the DRC’ Review of African Political Economy 93/94 (2002)
Tangri & Mwenda ‘Politics, Donors and the Ineffectiveness of Anti-
Corruption Institutions in Uganda’ Journal of Modern African Studies 44.1
(2006)
Van Leeuwen ‘Rwanda’s Imidugudu Programme and Earlier Experiences
with Villagisation and Resettlement in East Africa’ Journal of Modern
African Studies 39 (2001) p623–44.
Reports, News Articles, Policy Documents and Websites
Adams ‘Starbucks founder spreads gospel of hope in Rwanda’ The
Guardian 19.07.09
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/jul/19/starbucks-howard-
schultz-fairtrade) accessed 27.07.09.
Amnesty International ‘Prisoner of Conscience: Francois-Xavier
Byumba (http://www.amnestyusa.org/all-countries/rwanda/page.do?
id=1011229 accessed 26.07.09.)
BBC News ‘Cameron Defends Foreign Aid Plan’ 13.07.09
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8147024.stm accessed 27.07.09)
BBC News ‘France releases Rwandan official’
(news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7797024.stm 23.12.08 accessed
225.07.09)
BBC News ‘New Thaw in Franco-Rwandan relations’
(news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7011047.stm 24.09.07 accessed
25.07.09)
BBC News ‘Rwandan poll not entirely fair’ 27.08.03
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3183051.stm accessed 26.07.09)
Chu ‘Rwanda Rising: A New Model of Economic Development’
fastcompany.com 18.03.09
(http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/134/special-report-rwanda-
rising.html?page=0%2C2 accessed 27.07.09)
Commission for Africa ‘Our Common Interest: The Report of the
Commission for Africa’ (2005)
Conservatives.Com ‘Where we Stand on International Development’
http://www.conservatives.com/Policy/Where_we_stand/International_Devel
opment.aspx accessed 26.07.09)
DFID ‘Building Peace’ (http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Global-Issues/How-we-
fight-Poverty/Conflict-and-Security/Building-peace/ accessed 26.07.09)
DFID ‘DFID-Rwanda’ (http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Africa-
West--Central/Rwanda/ accessed 25.07.09)
DFID ‘The UK Government’s programme of work to fight poverty in
Rwanda’ (DFID, 2008 available at
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/cnty-plan-rw-2008-
2012.pdf accessed 25.07.09)
DFID ‘Rwanda: Major Challenges’ (http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-
work/Africa-West--Central/Rwanda/Major-challenges/ accessed 26.07.09)
DFID ‘Who we are and what we do’
(http://www.dfid.gov.uk/About-DFID/Quick-guide-to-DFID/Who-we-are-and-
what-we-do/ accessed 27.07.09)
The Economist ‘Rwanda: A Flawed Hero’ 21.08.08
(http://www.economist.com/books/displaystory.cfm?STORY_ID=11959125)
accessed 27.07.09
Government of Rwanda ‘Development of the Government of Rwanda
Aid Policy’
Government of Rwanda ‘Rwanda Vision 2020’
http://www.devpartners.gov.rw/docs/H%20&%20A/H%20&%20A
%20Local/?dir=&download=Rwanda_Vision_2020.pdf accessed 25.07.09
The Guardian ‘Rwanda’s Commonwealth hopes dented by Human Rights
criticism (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jul/19/rwanda-
commonwealth-human-rights-criticism 19.07.09 accessed 25.07.09)
The Independent ‘Rwanda seeks alternative to Aid’ 15.01.09
(http://www.independent.co.ug/index.php/news/regional-news/471-
rwanda-seeks-alternatives-to-aid) accessed 27.07.09
International Crisis Group ‘Consensual Democracy in Post-Genocide
Rwanda: Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections’ (October 2001)
p35.
IRINnews.org
Javno.Com ‘Sweden halts $15m in development aid to Rwanda
http://www.javno.com/en-world/sweden-halts-usd15-mln-aid-to-rwanda-
over-un-charge_215890 17.12.08 accessed 25.07.09
Kagame ‘Africa has to find its own way to Prosperity’ Financial Times
07.05.09 (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0d1218c8-3b35-11de-ba91-00144
accessed 26.07.09)
Makepovertyhistory.org
Nationmaster.Com ‘Sub-Saharan African Development Indicators’
http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_aid_as_of_gdp-economy-aid-as-
of-gdp accessed 25.07.09)
Sachs ‘Aid Ironies’ Huffington Post 24.05.09
(http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeffrey-sachs/aid-ironies_b_207181.html
accessed 25.07.09)
United Nations Development Program ‘Human Development Report
2007/08’ (2008)
United Nations ‘Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC’ (2008
ed)
USAID ‘USAID/Rwanda Annual Report’ (2005)
USAID ‘USAID/Rwanda Annual Report’ (2007)
USAID ‘USAID in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-
saharan_africa/ accessed 26.07.09)
Walsh ‘Exploiting our Guilt over Rwanda’s Genocide’ The Independent
07.04.09 (http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/declan-
walsh-exploiting-our-guilt-over-rwandas-genocide-559156.html accessed
26.07.09)