The Direction of Causation

Mind Association

The Direction of CausationAuthor(s): Erik BrownSource: Mind, New Series, Vol. 88, No. 351 (Jul., 1979), pp. 334-350Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2253140 .

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The Direction of Causation

ERIK BROWN

The problem of the direction of causation can be discussed on two levels. We can wonder if it is in every sense necessary that a cause precedes its effects. But we can also-on a more uncom- mitted level-ask the following question: Whether or not retroactive causes are real or conceivable phenomena, can we put into brackets the temporal order of two events and still decide which one is cause and which one is effect? Now, evidently, if one answers the first question in the negative one has to face the second one. But this one could also be put forward in its own right. Even if it should be a necessary truth that a cause precedes its effect(s), it might be possible-and clarifying-to explore other ways of making sense of the cause-effect distinction. It is in this perspective that this article primarily should be read, since I will make no positive case for the possibility of retroactive causes. On the other hand, since I contend that a clarifying account can be given of the cause-effect distinction, independently of relying on the temporal order of two events, the article might also be read as a prolegomenon to a discussion of the possibility of retroactive causes.

To accept that a causal process has a direction seems tanta- mount to accepting that it uniformly flows from cause to effect. It could not possibly flow in the opposite direction. One way of giving an initial precision to this idea of an asymmetrical causal direction is to say that it is the cause which by necessity explains the occurrence of its effect-in the sense that we would never consider a the cause of b if we maintained that b explained the occurrence of a. But of course, connecting the distinction between cause and effect with that between explanans and ex- planandum cannot be of any great help in really clarifying the first distinction. That an event explains the occurrence of another event amounts to little more than a mere verbal paraphrase of saying that the first one is the cause of the second one. Let us, however, ask a somewhat different question: How do we explain

334



THE DIRECTION OF CAUSATION 335

the occurrence of a pair of events exemplifying a certain type of causal process? Evidently, the cause-event explains the occurrence of the effect-event. And this is exactly half of the answer to the question I just mentioned. The other half is answered when we have pointed to the cause of the cause in our original pair. For naturally, we do not now have to ask: Which event is caused by the effect in the original pair? But couldn't we then formulate the following hypothesis? That event of a causal pair which must be connected with a neighbouring event outside the pair, if the occurrence of both of its members should be explained, is for that reason demarcated as the cause of this pair. So the difference between cause and effect which will serve as the starting point of my analysis may bluntly be stated thus: we expect a cause qua cause to be caused, while we do not expect an effect qua effect to be the cause of a further effect. If this is correct, we could also say that the cause-effect distinction divides the world into segments which are ontologically loaded in a non-symmetrical manner. rTo the extent that we suppose that a causal pair can be inserted into the total causal history of the world, its cause is necessarily expected to connect with events on both temporal 'sides'; it is expected to have both a prehistory and an aftermath. Its effect- qua effect-need only have a prehistory. As long as we view it as an effect of another event, we are permitted to put its own eventual effects into brackets.

So far we have just the outlines of an analysis which may look hopelessly question-begging. I have stated the distinction between cause and effect in the following way: considered as a cause, but not as an effect, an event is expected to have both a causal prehistory and a causal sequel. And that of course implies that we are still presupposing the distinction between cause and effect. Moreover, one might question whether it is a necessary truth that a cause qua cause is itself caused. It does not seem impossible that something should crop up quite spontaneously without any antecedent causes and still be the cause of another event.

I shall return to these problems after having tried to divide the sum total of the world's states of affairs into different ontological types meant to transform the above sketch into a more fundamental and non-circular analysis. What I want to do is to provide a de re background of the above de dicto characterization (described as a cause an event is expected to be caused...) by



336 ERIK BROWN:

pointing to intrinsic differences between events inside a causal sequence.

Before embarking on that project I want to consider two other conceptions of the distinction between cause and effect, which have affinities with my own, but to which I am also critical.

The first conception I shall deal with is an attempt made by J. L. Mackie in his book The Cement of the Universe-a Study of Causation to analyse causal priority in terms of a distinction between fixed and unfixed events.' The upshot of his analysis seems to be this: If an event a is epistemically fixed before another event b, this precludes b being the cause of a. Mackie sums up his reasons for accepting this principle in the following passage:

Although we may be able to infer a cause from a previously known effect this would only show that the cause occurred: it would smooth the way to our knowledge of the cause, but not to its existence, whereas if we explain the effect by reference to the cause we show how the way was smoothed to the existence of the effect. And above all, if the effect was unfixed when the cause was fixed we cannot explain the cause's actually being there by reference to something which still might not have happened: what is explained must depend upon what explains it, so the latter cannot have been less ontologically solid than the former (ibid. p. I85).

In order to evaluate Mackie's principle I first want to distinguish between three senses in which one event a can be fixed when another event b is yet unfixed: (i) a is observed to occur at a time when b is not yet observable; (ii) the occurrence of a can be inferred at a time To when b cannot yet be inferentially fixed, and neither a nor b has yet occurred at To; (iii) a can be observed to occur at To when b is yet unobservable; however, at To b can be inferred to occur from the occurrence of a, while a is still inferentially unfixed, this having the implication that a lacks any pre-observational fixation.

Do all these senses in which a can be fixed before b preclude b being the cause of a? Clearly, the first sense in itself should not

Cf. 'The Cement of the Universe', ch. 7-'The direction of causation',




rule out this.' For our belief in a nomic tie between cause and effect is no greater than our willingness to overlook a temporary observation gap between the two events. So, if we rule out that b can be the cause of a, just because b was unobservable when a is observed we would rule out more than the possibility of retroactive causes. We would exclude any justification of there being a nomic tie between any kind of cause and effect.

Concerning sense (ii) two points can be made. (i) In this sense it is true that b cannot be the cause of a if a is fixed before b. The events constituting sufficient reasons for the occurrence of a must themselves be fixed inferentially, if they have not already materialized. But by hypothesis, b does not satisfy either of these requirements. (2) Although the criterion yields a correct result on this interpretation it leaves numerous cases undecided. As Mackie also recognizes, the inferential fixation of one event very often includes the inferential fixation of another event, the most obvious example being the case where a is a sufficient condition of b.

Sense (iii) obviously brings in the most problematic cases. It can be argued that from an inferential point of view the distinction between fixed and unfixed events can no longer be operative. a lacks any pre-observational fixation, but can at the same time be observed to occur before b. If so, however, it cannot matter whether the existence of a can be inferentially secured alongside the existence of b. Such a guarantee of a's existence is now by necessity superfluous, since a already is there to be seen. This consequence is a much more serious one than the fact that we cannot apply the proposed criterion of the cause-effect distinction when a and b are simultaneously fixed and neither a nor b has yet occurred. For in the case we are now discussing the problem is that the distinction between fixed and unfixed events is inapplicable whether or not either of the following two possibilities is realized: the existence of a is inferentially secured alongside that of b (supposing b is a necessary and sufficient condition of a) or the existence of a is not inferentially secured alongside that of b (supposing b is only a necessary condition of a). Moreover, since a now lacks any detectable causal predecessors, one might wonder whether b could be considered a retroactive cause of a. I I am not suggesting that Mackie is of another opinion. For one thing he

accepts the possibility of a causal process turning retroactive at second remove: a at To causing b to occur at T2, which occurrence is a retroactive cause of c taking place at TI.



338 ERIK BROWN:

So, if the distinction between fixed and unfixed events now is logically inapplicable, a very crucial kind of case will be left out. The only way to solve this problem would be to have recourse to the observation sense of a being fixed before b. But we have seen this solution to be inadmissible.

We seem then to be landed in a dilemma: The distinction between fixed and unfixed events will either be inapplicable to crucial cases, where we are in need of a clearer understanding of how to distinguish between cause and effect, or it must be used at the cost of undermining any justification of there being a nomic tie between cause and effect. If we want to avoid the former consequence, we must face the latter, and if we should keep clear of the latter, we must accept the former.

Still, I think Mackie's analysis contains an important challenge. There seems to be an ontological difference between cause and effect in the sense that causes smooth the way to the existence of their effects, while effects do not relate in the same manner to their causes. This ontological primacy of causes has to be taken account of, even if it is not possible to match it by an epistemic analysis. Let me now pass to the other analysis of the cause-effect distinction which I want to contrast with my own analysis.

In his book Explanation and Understanding' von Wright explores the possibility of tying this distinction to our ability to handle events through human action:

. . . to think of the relation between causal events as causal is to think of it under the aspect of (possible) action. It is therefore true, but at the same time a little misleading to say that if p is a (sufficient) cause of q, then, if I could produce p, I could bring about q. For that p is the cause of q, I have endeavored to say here, means that I could bring about q, if I could do (so that) p (p. 74).

Now, this seems to have the consequence that we should be prepared to look upon every cause in the universe as potentially a direct object of manipulation for conscious subjects; we should allow for the logical possibility of this being the case. Whether or not this is logically possible, could such an extravagant thought function as a pivotal idea in an analysis of the distinction between cause and effect? The distinction just could not turn out to be so anthropocentric.

Cf. ch. II, 'Causality and causal explanation'.




I think we can back up that intuitive feeling by at least one argument. Suppose a is a sufficient cause of b, and b is a sufficient cause of c. Now, if we consider a the cause of b, we can by the same token regard only a as directly accessible to human intervention: Since a in itself is a sufficient cause of b, it is on this hypothesis logically impossible to intervene once more to further this causal chain. So, von Wright's criterion serves very well to single out the cause-factor of the first causal pair of this chain. But for the same reason it cannot be a criterion for pinning down b as the cause of c (and not vice versa). For given that the chain starts with a, both b and c are for purely logical reasons outside the scope of direct manipulation. We can therefore say: The mere fact of transitive causal chains renders the intervention criterion inadequate for an analysis of the cause-effect distinction. As long as our analysis is meant to include worlds containing transitive causal chains, it is impossible even to think of every cause as potentially an object of direct manipulation.

It seems then, that our concept of causality has an objective pull which even shows through when our explicit point of departure is its relatedness to our concept of human action. This does not imply that there is no tie at all between the two concepts. But as I see it, what is essential to our present concept of causality is the inter-changeability of animate beings and purely material phenomena in their functions as causes. As von Wright himself puts it: 'Causes do their job whenever they happen, and whether they "just" happen or we "make them happen" is accidental to their nature as causes' (ibid. pp. 73-74). This implies that for some causal processes we must see an equivalence between a human agent producing a certain effect and a purely material phenomenon triggering off the same effect. When I, by shaking an apple tree, make some apples fall down, I think in the name of causal objectivity of the wind as something which could have done the same causal job. On the other hand, when the wind is actually blowing through the tree and apples fall to the ground I can for the same reason think of this effect as something I could have brought about by shaking the tree.

This interchangeability between animate and non-animate causes is equally essential to our concept of objective causality as to our concept of a human agent. When I conceive of myself as a human agent, I think of myself as extending my grip on the world through my actions. And then I must be prepared to



340 ERIK BROWN:

replace the causal functions of inanimate things and thus to conceive myself as an object among other objects. Conversely, when I make inanimate things replace some of my causal functions, I increase my factual detachment from my material surroundings. This I can only achieve in virtue of the conceptual inter- dependence between myself as an agent and these same material surroundings.

At the same time it is essential that this interchangeability between human actions and inanimate causes should only be thought to cover some causal jobs. If mastering this kind of equivalence is a criterion of our mastering the idea of causal objectivity, then we should not cease to regard the two kinds of causes as being in many respects essentially different. The point is that in spite of their difference it does not matter whether an effect has been brought about by a human agent or an inanimate phenomenon. But then, if we inflated our concept of human agents to the extent of thinking that human actions in principle could have replaced any kind of cause, we would precisely have changed beyond recognition one of the terms figuring in this equivalence-idea. This equivalence-principle must be counter- balanced by an acceptance of there being a necessary comple- mentarity between the two kinds of causes. If not, the point of departure of the equivalence-principle is not our normal concept of necessarily limited human agents.

Given this background I think the following conclusion is justified. It is true that there is a connection between the concept of cause and that of action. But this connection cannot be considered the very foundation of our distinction between cause and effect. When we view human actions and purely material events as equivalent causal triggers, we have already taken for granted this distinction. We are now just considering human actions and material events as capable of doing the same kind of causal job.

Even if I am critical of the two conceptions of the cause-effect distinction which I have commented on, they contain one idea each which in my opinion any adequate analysis must take into consideration: the ontological primacy of causes and the connection between the concept of cause and that of agency. In the account of the cause-effect distinction to which I am now returning I hope to do justice to both these ideas.

The point of departure of the analysis I am going to defend I have stated as follows. In so far as we think it possible to explain



THE DIRECTION OF CAUSATION 34I

the occurrence of a single causal pair, we have to view the cause as in turn caused by another state of affair, while the effect need not be the cause of another effect. This makes the cause of a causal pair its main ontological relay; if we are to insert a causal pair into the world's total causal history, this insertion must be effectuated by means of connecting the cause with this history. This makes an event stand out as a cause.

In order to expand and add depth to this analysis I first want to make a distinction between four ontological types:

(I) Events which are sufficiently shortlived to make a prediction that they will terminate in a certain manner more or less instantane- ously verified once they are occurring. Examples will be: the fact that a tree is falling, that ripples are expanding in the water. As a limiting case such a prediction can be considered logically superfluous, as when a glass breaks, since it does not make sense (from our perceptual point of view) to speak of a glass starting to break. This ontological type I will call 'delimited events'.

(2) States which can continue for indefinitely long, there being no precise causal limitations to how long they can last, at least from a common sense point of view. In addition they do not constitute a series of observable shortlived events. I will call such states 'static states'. Examples will be: that a number of words are assembled on this sheet of paper, that a burnt match is lying in this ashtray.

(3) States which themselves may be a concatenation of shortlived events but which nevertheless are conceived as integrated states, the events being strung together in virtue of their similarity or the gradual character of their qualitative changes. If a shortlived event is to be conceived as a delimited event it must possess features which strike us as different from those of its adjoining states of affairs. States of type (3) may, however, appear completely eventless from one moment to the next. Even so, they can clearly be distinguished from static states, there being much more precise causal limitations to their duration. This ontological type I will call 'progressive states'. We ought, however, to distinguish between 'progressive states with a definite origin' and progressive states lacking that type of origin. States of the first kind are immediately preceded by characteristic delimited events. Examples of this subtype will be the fact that a candle is burning, that a motor is rotating. Progressive states which lack such a definite origin are instead integrated directly into a whole



342 ERIK BROWN:

system of progressive states, as for instance the fact that blood is pumping through my body, the growth of a plant, the fact that it is raining, that the field is covered by snow, that I'm working on this article. I will call this subgroup 'cyclic progressive states'. Each one of them is a phase of a greater whole of com- parable or identical progressive states.

Let me now try to show the importance of these four ontological types for the distinction between cause and effect. I want to mark them by the following symbols. /\ will represent type (i), that is-delimited events. will stand for static states. / will mark progressive states originating directly in an event

of type (i). Finally () will represent cyclic progressive states.

Now, nothing prevents neither causes nor effects from belonging to any of these categories. Still, even when one considers a single causal pair in isolation states of type (2) stand apart from the other types. Such static states can only be considered insufficient causes. When someone for instance cuts himself on a piece of broken glass, this can only be partly due to the fact that this piece of glass is in this state. And although states of affairs belonging to the other types in particular contexts can be considered only necessary causes, it is not the case that they are by necessity insufficient ones, that this fact sets them apart as an ontological type. But this seems to hold of static states, as I have characterized them; for if they by definition can continue as completely eventless states for indefinitely long, this implies that from the very fact that they have come into existence no specific events can be deduced to follow in their wake. For if they caused another state of affairs to occur, this would count as an event breaking up their own static existence. It must be stressed, however, that this contention is only valid, when static states have already come into existence. At the moment pieces of glass are landing on the floor, they can of course bring about other effects on their own. But from that moment on this is no longer possible. This is not disproved by the fact that if I place a very heavy object on this table, the object falls through after a while, crushing the table. For if an object is that heavy, the fact that it stands on the table will not count as a static state, but as a progressive one, its duration being subject to a concise causal limitation.

Given this background the causal direction of any of the following sequences seems unambiguously decided, although




both x and y in themselves might as well have been causes as effects:

(a) //x\' (b)x (c) x y\/ (d) x

I suppose that y in each of the above sequences can be correlated with nothing but static states at its right hand junction. Then we cannot consider y the cause of x, since y itself is only followed by an instance of an ontological type which unaided by other ontological types cannot function as a cause at all; on their own static states can be nothing more than just necessary causes.

At the same time it is evident that we often come across causal chains of a denser kind, where an original effect gives rise to a whole series of new effects. And how can we in such cases distinguish between cause and effect by means of the ontological distinctions I have proposed? I think that is possible because the distinctions I have pointed to can also serve as criteria for the individuation or segmentation which we-as limited subjects- must expect causal processes to permit.

Let me in this context first appeal to the following fact. We can consider an event as an effect without knowing any of its precise causes; we just rely on the principle that every event has a cause. But in order to view something x as a cause of something else, we have at least considered hypotheses concerning which specific events x is the cause of. It seems strange to ask, 'Which event(s) does x cause?' prior to being able to mention a specific set of alternatives on which our uncertainty already concentrates.

I take this to imply that we are disposed to think of the world as containing, more effects than causes, and this again accords with the fact that we do not consider the world we live in to be a causal 'plenum'. That is, we do not expect to have to come to grips with causal chains to which another event is added at every moment and is therefore growing into a more and more compact mass of new causal chains. If a series of occurrences can be delimited as an individual process in the world's history, this implies that, instead of constantly branching off into new side- effects, it is sooner or later extinguished. And this means that it has to end up in a static state.

But if the world's history can be segmented into different substories, we must also be able to trace their origin within the limits set by our cognitive perspective. This means that when



344 ERIK BROWN:

we turn our gaze in the temporal direction opposite to the one where a static state marks the extinction of an individual causal chain, we can no more expect it to consist of an indefinitely long series of delimited events. For such a series would provide no natural division lines between different sequences. Neither could static states alone mark a boundary between the end of one sequence and the beginning of another one, for then we would have to suppose that the latter lacked any original cause.

We shall therefore have to suppose that a causal chain is sooner or later adjoined by progressive states in the temporal direction opposite to the one where the sequence is extinguished by a static state. But there are two kinds: cyc]ic progressive states and progressive states with a different origin. The latter are by definition preceded by a delimited event, such as lighting a candle. And this means that they are already within an individual sequence, its beginning being indicated by the delimited event preceding the progressive state. Now, it may be that this event in turn is immediately preceded by another individual process with a definite origin, as would be the case if a burning candle toppled and caused a fire. But we can no more expect a progressive state with a definite origin to be preceded by an indefinitely long sequence of pairs of delimited events and progressive states, than we can expect it to originate in an unending chain of just delimited events. It is true that in the former case we would have criteria for distinguishing between different sequences within the same causal story by pointing to the contrast between delimited events and progressive states. But we would still always experience ourselves as catching a causal story in the middle of its unfolding. Since every progressive state now is supposed to be preceded by a delimited event, every pair of such events and states would be added to an already ongoing story. Contrasting with its adjoining occurrences, every delimited event justifies the transition to a new sentence in a causal narrative.

In this way cyclic progressive states remain as the kind of state of affairs from which individual causal chains ultimately take off. The repetitive nature of the system they constitute contrasts with the shortlived heterogenous events which constantly take off from them, this contrast being a criterion of an individual sequence having cut loose from a stable, anonymous causal background. At the same time cyclic states provide individual chains with as solid a causal ancestry as an infinite chain




of delimited events would have done, being themselves integrated into ever-widening circles of cyclic states.

We can therefore say that cyclic progressive states delimit a causal sequence in one temporal direction, being their natural point of departure, while static states mark their extinction. And by way of locating an observed fragment of a causal sequence in relation to those kinds of causal extremities, we have a key for subdividing this fragment into causes and effects. Suppose we are observing the following fragment of a causal chain, the dotted line representing its inferential completion:

I _,aiAb\ c-d e

We are now supposed to have pinned down by direct observation just one state of affairs constituting a natural boundary of a causal chain. But it seems obvious that this chain could not have started with e, since we are now within a static segment of the world. Therefore we locate the origin of this chain by going backward from the temporal junction where e connects with d. And once we in this way have pinned down the main direction of a chain, a direct transitivity is forced upon every one of its elements. In the above chain it is not possible to imagine the direction taken from o onwards being turned when we arrive at the b-c junction, and to say that b is caused by c, unless we suddenly break the principle that a causal event cannot be triggered off by delimited events which in the final account just grow out of static states.

In the same way the causal direction seems determined, if we are facing the following configuration:

/a/ \/by <\-c \d\ J e

We are still supposed to observe only one of the extremities of this causal chain, this time a cyclic progressive state. But since such states are expected to join with states of the same type at one temporal junction at least, we have excluded the possibility that o, at the temporal junction opposite to the one where it faces a, connects with a static state. Therefore we have ruled out o's being without causal ancestors, which in turn permits o's being the cause of a. And this not only permits one to draw that conclusion. As long as we expect that this chain is approaching a marked phase of extinction we must think in this manner. For we enter a causal 'plenum' where one cyclic state grows out of



346 ERIK BROWN:

another, if we imagine the causal direction to follow a route from a, through o and so on. Therefore we would have to wait for an indefinitely long time if we searched for an extinction-phase on this side of o.

A main point of my analysis has been to show that the cause- effect distinction can be justified by reference to the specific content of our experience of causal sequences. It is more than specific nomothetic correlations which can be justified on this basis. In addition we experience causal processes to have an uneven rhythmic pulse which divides the world into limited causal sequences. They take off from a system of cyclic progressive states and burst into short-lived configurations of delimited events in order to flatten out in static states. So we live in a world where there exist a number of main causal arteries, a series of cyclic progressive states from which causal blind alleys are taking off, their being blind alleys constituting their individuality as causal sequences. The distinction between cause and effect is on this view coupled to the possibility of dividing the world's history into manageable substories. The two kinds of state of affairs which serve as our main criteria for delimiting causal chains also serve as criteria for determining the causal direction of those chains, cyclic states being their natural causal ancestors and static states their natural causal extinction. In this way a direction is infused into a causal sequence either by way of our catching it the moment it cuts loose from a main causal artery or by way of observing it as it approaches a dead end, a static state.

If I am right it should therefore be possible to regard the distinction between cause and effect as being modelled on the uneven pulse of causal events themselves in contradistinction to the completely even rhythm of temporal succession. Perhaps we can add: this is not only a possible view, but an essential one. This would be the case, if we can argue in the following manner. That there should be cyclic progressive states and static states is essential to our conception of a world of individual substories. If the world just contained delimited events and progressive states directly connected with such events, we would be faced with a causal plenum which would not permit any natural segmentation of causal processes. But perhaps it would then be misleading to speak of causal processes in the plural. Perhaps we would only watch the whole development of the world as one




indefinite causal unfolding. And this would make the whole concept of recurring instances of the saine causal pattern a very tenuous one. If so, an important element in our concept of causality would be endangered.

Let me now try to relate the analysis to two central aspects of the concept of cause, its connection with the concept of agency and the ontological primacy of a cause compared to the ontological status of its effect. I think both these aspects can be clarified by the above analysis at the same time as it brings forth that they have a common root, the privileged connection between causes and cyclic progressive states.

The ontological primacy of a cause I have already stated in the following manner. It is the cause of a single causal pair-and not the effect-which is expected to insert it into the history of the world, if such an insertion is possible at all. This ontological difference can now be expressed in the following manner. That event (or state) of a causal pair which most directly can be connected with an unbroken chain of states of affairs, containing no static states, is for that reason demarcated as the cause of this pair. This means that a cause is either itself a member of a main causal artery-a cyclic system-or is one step closer to one than its effect. Conversely, the effect of a causal pair has by necessity reduced the distance to the extinction point of a sequence-a static state-by one step, if it is not already itself a state of that kind.

The connection between the concept of cause and that of agency can be clarified in the following manner. To be an agent- in a fairly neutral sense in which both persons and purely material phenomena can be considered agents-is just to be a system of cyclic progressive states. Such a system is a common reservoir from which a number of individual causal chains cut loose, and to be this kind of causal substrate of individual sequences is what personal agents have in common with impersonal ones. Or to put it in a somewhat different manner: this is a common trait of both persons and quite impersonal phenomena, which justifies us in viewing both as agents in a wide sense. This analysis should therefore cohere with the view I have presented of persons and material phenomena as being essentially interchangeable initiators of individual causal sequences. There are privileged kinds of causal substrate, among which we can count persons, but which also include types of being of quite different kinds. It is not only



348 ERIK BROWN:

biological phenomena in general that are integrated systems of cyclic states, but also purely physical states of affairs such as meteorological conditions.

Let me now try to formulate two objections to the analysis which I have proposed.

The concept of static states has been a key concept in my attempt to spell out the difference between cause and effect, static states being the natural terminus of an individual causal sequence. But how should we in effect characterize such states? Can we avoid characterizations of the following kind? Static states stand apart as an ontological type, because it is an open question what specific kinds of occurrence, if any, will follow in their wake. And is not this only a verbal paraphrase of the following sentence? 'It is an open question whether static states are causes of other states of affairs'. If so, the whole project seems to founder on circularity, the cause-effect distinction being presupposed in the analysis of this distinction. I do not believe this objection to be a fatal one. We can characterize static states in a way which circumvents such circular locutions. Static states are distinguished from other ontological types not only by never being more than just a necessary cause of any other states of affairs. What in addition is peculiar to them is that they can never be considered an actual nomothetic condition of adjoining states of affairs on both temporal sides, unless they concur with occurrences of other ontological types. True, they permit precise inferences to other states of affairs in one temporal direction, in that direction where we enter a dense sequence ending up in a cyclic progressive state. But if we are able to infer the occurrence of other states of affairs at the opposite temporal junction, then we must also take into account occurrences of ontological kinds different from static states. Just in virtue of having occurred they do not now permit any kind of inference concerning other states of affairs. At the same time the three remaining ontological types do permit such inferences in both temporal directions, this being a consequence of the fact that they on their own can further the continuation of a causal chain.

Let me now pass to a more serious objection. It is true that we normally expect the occurrence of a single causal pair to be inserted into the total history of the world. Perhaps it is also true that the present analysis clarifies what this means. But it seems perfectly possible that a causal sequence should emerge




in the following way: '\ b Xa - . Let us now suppose that this represents a recurring causal pattern with the following peculiari- ties: b's are always and only preceded by a's and b's are likewise a necessary and sufficient condition of c's. However, there is no uniform time-interval between the coming into existence of a's and b's: sometimes b-events crop up a minute or so after the coming into existence of a's, sometimes this time-gap is signifi- cantly greater. Perhaps, given this background, we would regard a-states as a peculiar kind of random cause of b-events, while b-events would be considered quite normal causes of c's, the latter being perfectly normal static states. But it might be the case that we would instead consider b-events to be uncaused, a-states just being taken for a mystical announcement of the fact that b-events sooner or later will turn up and cause c-states. In any case it seems obvious that the only feature of this abnormal sequence which would enable us to confer a causal direction upon it, would be the temporal order of these occurrences. If we did not rely on this order then we could with equal right consider c-states a queer cause or precursor of b-events, such that a-states would appear quite normal static states, brought into existence by b-events. If we disregarded this temporal order, we would be left with a delimited event encircled by static states in both temporal directions. True, one of them would come out as a quite normal static state following in the wake of b, and the other would appear a mystical precursor of b. But which one should be regarded in the former perspective and which one in the latter could only be settled when we took into account the temporal order of these states of affairs. In any case, there would be no point in trying to settle this question by having recourse to retroactive causes, since b-events on both temporal sides are encircled by static states. If, on the other hand, we came across the following kind of sequence: a b d such a hypothesis might be suggested, since this chain in a temporal sense would be monving from an extinction point to a system of progressisc states. But this possibility-if it is one-cannot alter the fact that there might be cases where we would have to rely on temporal priority in order to distinguish between causes and effects. This in itself does not, however, show that temporal order is the most deep-rooted and essential criterion of the cause-effect distinction. If this were the case, we should also have to rely on temporal



350 ERIK BROWN: THE DIRECTION OF CAUSATION

priority in distinguishing between cause and effect when our normal causal expectations were fulfilled. But this is not the case, if I am right. The example I have just discussed seems to necessi- tate a reliance on temporal order for the determination of the causal direction. But it would at the same time be an example of our normal expectations being thwarted. It would at least conflict with the weak principle of causal determinism, which I have stated thus: a cause qua cause is itself caused, while an effect qua effect need not be the cause of further effects.

Given this background I think the following conclusion is justified. There are criteria other than the temporal order between causal events (or states) for the distinction between cause and effect, criteria which are tied to a weak deterministic postulate: every event has a cause, without itself by necessity being a cause. This postulate in turn seems to be connected with our experiencing a world of manageable causal sequences. It is only if this postulate is given up that we have by necessity to rely on the temporal order to determine the causal direction of an individual sequence. So, even if temporal order were the only criterion which could cover all subdivision into cause and effect of any actual and any imaginable causal sequence-supposing retroactive causes are impossible-the alternative criterion I have tried to explore would still be an important one in view of the light it seems to shed on our total causal picture of the world.

UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN



The Direction of Causation

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