The design and functions of natural language...The design and functions of natural language How...

The design and functions of natural

language

The design and functions of natural language

How general questions of language relate to foreign language teaching (FLT)

2

1 Some general questions of language from a

biolinguistic perspective

1 Language design — The way language is. What is language?

2 Faculty of language (FL) — What is FL? Its internal structure discussed

separately elsewhere

3 Natural language (NL) – unique — How is FL/NL unique to humans?

4 Formal properties of grammar and language acquisition

5 Functions(!) of language — More than one function! Communication is

secondary!

6 Language and communication — How is language put to use?

7 Language and thought — How does language relate to thought?

Discussed separately elsewhere

8 Evolution of FL — How did FL evolve? Discussed separately elsewhere



3

2 How general questions of language relate to

foreign language teaching (FLT)

1 FLT and Questions of (1) Language design (The way language

is. What is language?) and Questions of (6) Communication

A “foreign language” (FL) is a natural language. Everything that applies to an FL

student’s first language (L1) also applies to FL (L2). For example,

Language ≠ speech.

Language ≠ communication. L ≠ use of L. And Communication ≠ Language.

Verbal communication presupposes knowledge of a language.

FLT ≠ teaching communication.

The dominant FLT doctrine of “Communicative” language teaching (CLT) does

not appear to understand that.

CLT “sets as its goal the teaching of communicative competence” (Richards

2006:2). If so, then the goal of CLT is based on a fundamental misunderstanding

of both language and communication, and FLT.



4

2 FLT and Questions of (2) The faculty of language (FL) and (4)

Language acquisition

The acquisition of any natural language presupposes an innate Universal Grammar

(UG), a component of FL. If it wasn’t for innate FL, the acquisition of both L1 and

L2 would be impossible.

An important difference between the acquisition of L1 and the acquisition of L2 in

FLT is that a student of L2 possesses a linguistic system, L1, which is both

structurally and functionally complete.

FLT needs to reckon with a functionally complete L1 in students of L2.

positive and negative transfer

virtually complete and almost entirely positive transfer of “communicative

competence” acquired in the use of L1 to the use of L2

How aware is CLT of such important facts???



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3 The notion of language in FLT and Language Pedagogy

The term language is used in several different senses in both informal and in

technical usage.

Informal usage:

‘Language is a means of communication’

‘Language is communication’

‘Language is verbal behavior’

‘Language = speech’

“A language… is something essentially social, a practice in which people

engage” (Dummett 1976, cited in Chomsky 2005a (TFLD):117)

‘Language is a social institution’ (Miller 2011)

In technical usage, by contrast, language is never identified with performance, use

of language, verbal behavior, communication, or speech; nor is it regarded as a

“social institution,” which is incoherent even within sociology (Miller 2011).



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In technical usage, a distinction is made between competence and performance:

competence ≠ performance

performance = use of language (in communication)

competence = knowledge of language

In technical usage, language may denote:

a speaker’s mental grammar (MG), or competence, sometimes called his I-

language

the set of all and only the linguistic expressions that MG can construct and

interpret, an infinite set

the innate faculty of language (FL), containing a Universal Grammar (UG)

natural language (NL), a universal system, realized in the form of particular

languages as its variants; in this usage, NL is a close synonym of UG or FL

What concept of language is adopted in FLT/LP?

What can you expect if one or another notion of language is adopted?

One of these is the common-sense notion of language, which is incoherent!


Language from the biolinguistic perspective

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3 Language from the biolinguistic perspective “Language” is a mental organ of a biological organism

Faculty of language (FL)

Acquisition of language and use of language are made possible by “a component

of human biology,” FL, essential to “the human intellectual capacity” (TFLD 2, 3).

“Language” is I-language: a person’s internal language, a state of FL

“… language, is a state of the faculty of language, an I-language, in technical

usage” (TFLD 2).

“Linguistics as I see it at least is a part of cognitive psychology, which in turn is a

part of biology” (Chomsky 2002:42).

Linguistics is indeed a natural science (É. Kiss 2007)


Functions of language

8

4 Functions of language

4.1 Symbolizing, “symbolic thought” – primary function

NL symbols vs. animal signals – Do they relate to the external world?

NL symbols—concepts(—?)the mind-independent external world!

mind-internal external to the mind

“… even the most elementary concepts [or items] of human language do not

relate to mind-independent objects by means of some reference-like relation

between symbols and identifiable physical features of the external world, as seems

to be universal in animal communication systems” (TFLD 4). “[English] words

don’t refer; English people refer; it’s an act” (Chomsky 2002:43).

“mental creation of possible worlds” (Jacob 1982:59, cited in TFLD 3–4).

“language is primarily an instrument of thought” (Chomsky 2013b:36)

For an even more radical, “Un-Cartesian,” view, on which, roughly, language is

thought, see Hinzen (2007, 2013, 2014) and Hinzen & Sheehan (2013).



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The “projected world”

NL symbols—concepts—mental/possible worlds—the external world

mind-internal mind-independent

projection

intentionality

(or grammar, cf. Hinzen)



10

4.2 Communication — secondary function of language

The “externalization” of “the infinite variety of internal structures that enter into

thought, interpretation, planning, and other human mental acts” is “a secondary

process” (TFLD 4).

4.3 Five interrelated problems of language

1 The “apparently human-specific conceptual-lexical apparatus”

2 The “principles that allow infinite combinations of symbols”

3 The “referential apparatus that is used to talk about the world” in absence of (!) a

direct ‘mind–world interface’

+1= 4 How linguistic expressions (the “combinations of symbols”) are mapped

onto thought (i.e., combinations of concepts manufactured by LOT, cf. Fodor

1975, 1998, 2008, or by “Mentalese,” cf. Pinker 1994). For Hinzen, the question is

meaningless, because there is no LOT or Mentalese, or any mapping onto it (cf.

Hinzen 2013, 2014 and Hinzen and Sheehan 2013).

+1= 5 How language is put to use in communication; how language is usable in

communication at all


The three factors of I-language acquisition

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5 The three factors of I-language acquisition 1. The faculty of language. Genetic endowment. Universal, species-specific.

Enables the individual to interpret part of the environment as linguistic

experience.

2. Experience – Filtered/interpreted/constructed by FL

Data are “preanalyzed in terms of principles specific to the language faculty”

(TFLD 7).

3. Principles not specific to the faculty of language

Principles of data analysis

Principles of efficient computation

Principles of structural architecture

The “burden of explanation” of the “biology of language, its nature and use, and

perhaps even its evolution” must shift “from the first factor, the genetic

endowment [i.e. UG], to the third factor, language-independent principles of

data processing, structural architecture, and computational efficiency” (TFLD

9).


The logical problem of language acquisition (LPLA)

12

6 The logical problem of language acquisition

(LPLA) LPLA: the “ease, rapidity and uniformity of language acquisition in the face of

impoverished data” (Chomsky 1955).

The poverty of stimulus problem “is just a special case of basic issues that arise

universally” (TFLD 7).

Plato’s problem (in Bertrand Russell’s (1948/2009:xiv) paraphrase):

“How comes it that human beings, whose contacts with the world are brief and

personal and limited, are nevertheless able to know as much as they do know?”


Tension between descriptive and explanatory adequacy

13

7 Tension between descriptive and explanatory

adequacy

7.1 Introduction

(1) Descriptive adequacy (DA)

G of L is a model of MG

(2) Explanatory adequacy (EA)

General rules and principles of G must be derived from UG

The tension between DA and EA

(1) + (2) UG is overloaded the explanatory power of UG is lost



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7.2 UG & Gs, NL & Ls

“Even to achieve a very limited approximation to descriptive adequacy” (TFLD 7)

led to having to assume a rich and heavy UG sufficiently richly articulated for it

to be able to “impose narrow constraints on possible outcomes,” the

attainable I-languages (TFLD 7).

UG NL

G L



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7.3 Creativity of language and its implication for linguistic

theory

Observed fact of language use (OFLU) Generative mental grammars

a. Creative use of L G is a generative rule system – 1st generative revolution

b. Knowledge of L MG – 2nd generative revolution/cognitive revolution:

Goal of linguistic theory: account for MG (and its acquisition)



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7.4 Limited variation across Ls and its implication for linguistics

Striking similarities

Differences follow a “pattern”

UG

Observed differences are variation: Ls are variants of NL

Natural languages may not differ from one another in unpredictable ways



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7.5 The poverty of stimulus problem and its implication for

linguistic theory

Poverty of stimulus

No negative evidence

No evidence for many rules of grammar

Fragmentary sample of L

(Very short period of time)

(Early age, children)

Problem: How is LA possible at all?

UG must be innate.

Content and structure of UG

Explanatory adequacy



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7.6 To summarize

Descriptive adequacy (DA)

G of L is a theory of L; L = MG ; G is a model of MG

Explanatory adequacy (EA)

Language acquisition: MG UG

7.7 Descriptive and explanatory adequacy

7.7.1 OA forces DA

OA: all and only the sentences of L; infinite G: model of MG, a generative

mental rule system



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7.7.2 LA EA UG G, a theory of MG

Creative use of L generative mechanism – OA; MG–DA

LA innate UG. (EA)

MG UG. (EA)

Content & structure of UG?

7.7.3 The content and structure of UG

Content & structure of MG

MG (of L) G, a generative theory

(meets OA)

Innateness Hypothesis

creative use of L

LA, poverty of stimulus

UG (of NL), innate

Descriptive Adequacy

Explanatory Adequacy

of

observation:

observation:



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7.7.4 The content and structure of MG (in the “format framework”, TFLD)

MG is richly articulated; structural principles; constraints; categories;

structural configurations/operations: (LA) UG format of G OA & DA

“If [language] acquisition is a matter of selection among options made available by

the format provided by UG, then the format must be rich and highly

articulated allowing relatively few options; otherwise, explanatory adequacy [=

an account of LA] is out of reach” (TFLD 8).

For example: Coordinate Structure Constraint (CSC)

(3) * Who did you divide the cake between John and _____?

(1) * Ki között osztottad fel a tortát János és _____?



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7.7.5 Content & structure of MGs content & structure of UG

CSC holds universally reduce CSC to a principle in UG assume CSC is a

principle of UG

Desirable consequences:

1. CSC –a universal property of NL.

2. Prediction: CSC may not be violated in any language.

3. Prediction: CSC is not learned; enhances explanatory adequacy of G.

4. CSC eliminated from G; simpler G; Occam’s Razor.

Generally:

Gs of Ls get smaller and smaller. – Parsimony; LA: learnability of L

Addition of a principle P to UG enhances EA – LA: No need to learn P



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7.7.6 UG: Undesirable consequences of the “format framework”

UG grows fatter and fatter EA – Parsimony

Sophisticated architecture involves redundancies – Parsimony

UG becomes more and more complex; – Innate UG highly articulated?

UG is quickly overloaded EA

What seems “the best theory of language” turns out to be “a very

unsatisfactory” theory “from other points of view” (TFLD 8).

Some of these “other points of view”:

Parsimony – size, redundancies

Evolution of FL

Use of language. How is language usable at all?



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7.7.6.1 UG in EST: 5 levels of representation, each with its own cyclic

operations — redundancy (hurting parsimony)

Two interface levels:

“SOUND” (Phonetic Form PF, Sensorimotor System SM)

“MEANING” (Semantic Representation, Conceptual-Intentional System CI)

Three language-internal levels: LF (Logical Form)

S-Structure (Surface Structure)

D-Structure (Deep Structure)

Can the “internal levels, not forced by interface conditions… be eliminated, and

the five cycles reduced to one” (TFLD 11)? (Yes: phases, Chomsky 2005b.)



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7.7.6.2 Islands

Wh-extraction

(2) a. What are you looking at?

b. What are you looking at ____?

c. you are looking at what

Wh-islands — CSC

(3) a. * Who did you divide the cake between John and?

b. * Who did you divide the cake between John and _____?



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7.7.7 Tension between DA and EA “the format framework” of UG:

Format of UG (rich and highly articulated) EA

DAEA

1. DA: G – construction-based structural rules – format of G

2. EA: rules of G reduced to principles in UG – “format of UG”

7.7.8 Evolution of FL: Is FL isolated?

Principles of UG entirely specific to language

FL is isolated ?

Evolution of FL: independent ?

7.7.9 How is language usable at all?

Use of L for communication: externalization of linguistic expressions

Expressions: constructed in MG

Thoughts: constructed in Conceptual Structure CS

Linguistic expressions paired up with thought may be externalized as sound.

thought—expression—sound



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7.7.10 Use of language — Grammar: some of it is wasted, some of it keeps

getting in the way

Discrete infinity

When was the last time you constructed an infinitely long sentence?

Grammar gets in the way; partially unsuited to communication.

(4) a. John tried to persuade Mary to marry him

b. John tried [John to persuade Mary [Mary to marry John]]

c. Johni tried [PROi to persuade Maryw [PROw to marry himi/j]]

Computational efficiency/easy interpretation dictates (4b): represent every

“understood” argument. Communicative efficiency/easy externalization dictates

(4a): do not pronounce each “understood” argument. How is the meaning of (4a)

or (5a) understood (when there’s a lot that is not pronounced)?

(5) a. Who did John try to persuade Mary to marry?

b. Who did John try [John to persuade Mary [Mary to marry Who]]

c. Whoz did Johni try [PROi to persuade Maryw [PROw to marry tz]]

Nobody understands the meaning of (4a) or (5a) unless they know that each is a

funny (or indeed natural) way of expressing (4b) and (5b), respectively.



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Clash between syntactic structure and communicative structure

(6) A dog stole my purse.

Subject Object – Syntactic structure

Agent Patient – Thematic structure

Old New – Information structure

(7) $ My purse stole a dog.

Subject Object – Syntactic structure

Agent Patient – Thematic structure


(8) My purse was stolen by a dog.

Subject – Syntactic structure

Patient Agent – Thematic structure


Grammar: never quite suited to communication.

Grammatical structure: hierarchic (two-dimensional)

Communicative (information) structure: flat (one-dimensional)

How does language resolve these conflicts?



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7.8 Tension between DA & EA in the “format framework”–

summary and conclusions

DA achieved at the expense of seriously compromising EA

Format of a G apparently required by DA:

Gs of Ls are “complex and varied rule-systems” (TFLD 7) formulated in terms of

structural configurations and operations (and restrictions on operations) on

structural configurations, involving

a total of five levels of representation (sound, meaning, LF, SS, DS),

each with its own set of cyclic operations.

EA rules removed from Gs of Ls into UG, in order that UG can account for

LA by imposing “narrow constraints on possible outcomes” (i.e. MGs of Ls),

leaving few choices for the child (TFLD 7). UG (over)loaded with categories,

configurations, etc. jeopardizes account of LA EA & biological evolution

of FL fall out of reach.

Some new technology is called for.

A radically different approach, i.e., a conceptual change is called for.



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7.9 Rethinking FL

beyond UG (and EA) “more principled” explanation of FL.

CI

MG

SM

MG—CI (conceptual domain): Expressions are meaningful.

MG— SM (sensorimotor domain): Speech.

FL not isolated from other cognitive domains; evolution of FL ~ evolution of

other cognitive faculties Account of FL “more explanatory”

7.10 The Faculty of Language

The Faculty of Language in the broad sense (FLB)

The Faculty of Language in the narrow sense (FLN)

(Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch 2002)



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(Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch 2002:1570)


On explanations (a short digression)

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8 On explanations (a short digression)

8.1 What constitutes a (principled) explanation?

A (principled) explanation — a deductive argument: phenomenon to be

explained (explanandum) logically follows as a conclusion from a set of premises

(explanans); initial assumption: general principle (ideally a “law of nature”)

All genuine explanations are principled.

“explanation”:

(1) an attempt at an explanation (regardless of its success)

(2) a genuine explanation (a successful principled explanation)

A theory is a principled explanation

A theory of language is a principled explanatory hypothesis, based on general

assumptions deductively lead to a major conclusion about the explanandum



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8.2 How can an explanation be “more principled” than another?

E.g., how can a theory of language offer a “more principled explanation of

linguistic phenomena” than another (TFLD 1)?

A more principled explanation EM vs. a less principled explanation EL:

An assumption AM in EM may be used to derive (as a conclusion) what serves as a

basic assumption AL in EL (AL is reduced to AM).

Chomsky: “We can regard an explanation of properties of language as principled

insofar as it can be reduced to properties of the interface systems and general

considerations of computational efficiency and the like” (TFLD 10).

A more explanatory theory of language is a “principled explanation in terms of

interface conditions and general principles” (TFLD 11), therefore a “principled

explanation [of linguistic phenomena is one] that addresses fundamental

questions of the biology of language” (TFLD 19, bold mine throughout, Cs Cz).



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8.3 How are axioms in a more principled explanation of language

more general than others?

Formulated in terms of conditions imposed upon expressions of language by

(properties of) the interface systems and the general principle of computational

efficiency, both external to language.

(This is the conceptual change mentioned earlier: look beyond language to

better understand FL.)



34

8.4 Major stages in the development of linguistic theory

(1) Shifts in the explanandum, (2) fundamental assumptions increasingly

general, (3) yielding previous assumptions as logical consequences

8.4.1 Traditional Grammar

Description without explanation – no deductive arguments, no theory, little

consistency, description arbitrary (rather than derived from general assumptions)

8.4.2 Historicism

“Linguistics = history of a language”

“Theory = Chronological and causal explanation” — (a misunderstanding!)



35

8.4.3 Structuralism

Explanation: structural patterns (inductive generalizations about the structure of

expressions)

Assumption: Language = set of sentences (the explanandum)

Grammar = taxonomy of structural patterns (the explanation)

Not understood: the set of sentences of L is infinite

no taxonomy can account for an infinite number of objects

Ls have universal properties

Misunderstanding: “Ls may differ in unpredictable ways” “each L is

unique” its grammar needs to be “worked out” inductively from the data

(observed “facts” of language use) by discovery techniques the ultimate goal of

linguistics: a manual of “discovery procedures”



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8.4.4 Generative Grammar

Stage 1 (Observational Adequacy)

Understood (Assumption): the set of sentences of L is an infinite set (the

explanandum)

Conclusion (conceptual change = (1st) generative revolution): A grammar of L

must be a generative rule system (= the explanation)

A generative rule system that accounts for all and only the sentences of L is said to

be observationally adequate. (Chomsky 1957)

Stage 2 (Descriptive Adequacy)

General assumption: sentences of L are the product of mental grammars. The

generative rule system is mental (2nd generative revolution/cognitive turn).

A grammar of L is a generative mental grammar.

A theory L that takes L to be a generative rule system (the explanandum) in its

speakers’ minds, and accounts for expressions of L as structures generated by a

mental grammar, is descriptively adequate. (Chomsky 1965, 2006)



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Stage 3 (Explanatory Adequacy)

Assumption (understood): mental grammars (languages) are acquired.

Language acquisition (LA) yields mental grammars in speakers’ minds.

A theory of L/MG (MG, the explanandum) must account for that.

The explanation: account of LA (“innate UG MG”)

Central assumption: UG (LAD) is innate in children.

Rules in MGs of Ls “originate” in UG.

Rules in theories of MGs of Ls must be derived from (= reduced to) general

principles in UG (= the condition of explanatory adequacy).

A grammar that meets this condition is explanatorily adequate. (Chomsky 1965)

Innateness of UG – the central idea in the explanation of MGs and their

acquisition



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Stage 4 (“Beyond Explanatory Adequacy”, Chomsky 1993, 2004a)

1 Account of FL in terms of language-independent principles

Assumption: interface conditions imposed on expressions of L by SM and CI,

embedded in a system of cognitive domains

Assumption: language-independent principle of efficient computation

Explanation: a theory of language formulated in terms of interface conditions,

general language-independent principles of computational efficiency, & innate

UG.

2 New questions arise: evolution of FL

LA: acquisition of (MG of) L in an individual – an ontogenetic process

Evolution of FL: development of FL in the species – a phylogenetic process

Biology of language involves its evolution (the explanandum).

Explanation: account of the evolution of FL.



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8.5 Explanation and understanding: a brief summary

explanation = theory = understanding.

Understanding: You understand some phenomena P just in case you have an

explanation for P.

An explanation for P: a deductive system of arguments, i.e., a theory, which leads

to P as its logical consequence (or conclusion).

The theory predicts P. = P is derived.


Principles and parameters (P&P)

40

9 Principles and parameters (P&P) UG: innate set of parameters (e.g., head-first, as English, or head-last, as

Hungarian; [lexical-] configurational, as English, or discourse-configurational

[“non-configurational”], as Hungarian, etc.).

Language acquisition: setting innate parameters in UG.

9.1 P&P formulated in terms specific to language (Chomsky and

Lasnik’s (1993) construction-based approach to UG)

Principles and parameters formulated in concepts specific to language (e.g.,

islands, filters, constraints on structural operations, such as movement).

Prediction: Linguistic computation is unlike any other computation.

9.2 P&P formulated in terms of language-independent principles

Abandoning the format-framework for UG.

Chomsky: “shifting the burden of explanation from the first factor, the genetic

endowment, to the third factor, language-independent principles” (TFLD 9).


Principles and parameters (P&P)

41

9.3 “Levels of explanatory adequacy”

Level I — explanation for language is derived from principles of UG, a genetic

endowment specific to language, which accounts for LA.

Level II — “beyond explanatory adequacy”: linguistic rules and principles derived

partly from language-independent principles apparently imposed upon language

by systems that are external to FL(N) and interact with it: CI (conceptual-

intentional domain) and SM (sensorimotor domain).


Optimal design

42

10 Optimal design

10.1 I-language (IL) optimally designed?

Interface levels CI and SM impose (conflicting!) conditions on linguistic

expressions (LE).

CI: LE paired up with thought – hierarchic (or 3D)

SM: LE assigned phonetic form (PF) – linear (1D!)

“one of the most fundamental questions of the biology of language: to what

extent does language approximate an optimal solution that it must satisfy to be

usable at all, given extralinguistic structural architecture?” (TFLD 9–10).


Optimal design

43

10.2 The Strong Minimalist Thesis (SMT)

Language (=I-language, a state of FL!) is optimally designed for the computation

of LEs that meet interface conditions.

Language is optimally designed for the expression of thought; “language is an

optimal solution to interface conditions that FL must satisfy” (Chomsky 2005b). –

A heuristic and a research program, rather than a “fact.”

SMT is almost certainly wrong: “no one expects” SMT to hold fully (Chomsky

2005b).

The interface systems CI and SM appear to contribute to language design

asymmetrically (Chomsky 2005b). CI conditions appear to dominate; SM

conditions dictated by communicative efficiency are secondary. “language is in

many ways “poorly designed” for communicative efficiency: … ambiguity, garden

paths” etc. (Chomsky 2005b). (See section 4 on functions of language.)

Ambiguity: Flying planes can be dangerous.

Garden path: Le szoktam az italról kaparni a zárjegyet. (Pléh–Lukács 2014:748)


Optimal design

44

10.3 Conflicting interface conditions

10.3.1 Duality of semantics (cf. Chomsky 2005b & TFLD 13-14)

Structure of LE:

Argument/Thematic structure (AS) – ‘who did what to whom’

Discourse-semantic structure (DS) – old vs. new information, topic–comment

AS DS

AS Hierarchically structured LE Linearized LE DS


Optimal design

45

10.3.2 Resolutions of the AS DS conflict

10.3.2.1 “Format based” solution: (multiple levels of structure)

D-structure (AS) Transformations S-structure (DS)

10.3.2.2 Minimalist solution: (No D-structure, no S-structure, no LF)

External Merge AS ( mapping to the “conceptual” interface CI)

Internal Merge DS ( mapping to the “phonetic” interface SM)

“Single representation” of LE — contains all information for further computation

at CI & SM: no ordering in AS ( External Merge)

“edge” properties (DS) ( Internal Merge = “movement”)

Linearization only when LE mapped to SM (no linearization at CI, TFLD 15)


Optimal design

46

10.4 Conflict resolutions: Hungarian and English

The conflict between conditions imposed by AS (CI) and DS (SM) is real.

AS is hierarchic (but purportedly unordered).

DS is flat & ordered (“linearized”).

English is a “configurational” language: syntactic “base structure” is AS (from

top to bottom).

Hungarian is a “discourse-configurational” language: (the “top” of) syntactic

structure is DS (cf. É. Kiss 1987, 1995, 2003).


Optimal design

47

10.5 Conflict resolution: “Configurationality parameter”

New UG parameter: (“thematic-”)configurational/discourse-configurational;

subject-prominent/topic-prominent (É. Kiss 1995)

Configurational (subject-prominent): English

Discourse-configurational languages (É. Kiss 1995)

In Europe: Hungarian, Basque, Catalan, Bulgarian, Russian, Greek, Finnish,

Romanian, Turkish, Armenian.

In Asia: Nepali, Hindi, Korean (Japanese, Chinese).

In Africa: Somali, Chadic, Aghem and Kikuyu (Bantu family), Yoruba, Berber.

American Indian languages: Haida, Omaha, Mayan languages, Quechua.

Austronesian languages: Ilonggo.

Topic-prominent languages: one-to-one correspondence between syntactic and

notional predication structures.


Structure and interpretation of linguistic expressions: Principle of minimal structural distance vs. minimal linear distance (Chomsky 2013a,b 2015)

48

11 Structure and interpretation of linguistic

expressions: Principle of minimal structural

distance vs. minimal linear distance (Chomsky

2013a,b 2015)

“Language is beautiful but unusable” (Chomsky 2013a). “It’s great for talking to

yourself, but not so much for talking to others” (Chomsky 2013c).

“Aristotle’s dictum should be modified: language is not sound with meaning [as

Aristotle proposed], but rather meaning with sound (or some other

externalization)… language is primarily an instrument of thought” (Chomsky

2013b:36).

“Rather than being useless but perfect, language is useful but imperfect, just like

other biological systems” (Pinker & Jackendoff 2004:229).


Structure and interpretation of linguistic expressions: Principle of minimal structural distance vs. minimal linear distance (Chomsky 2013a,b 2015)

49

Principle of minimal structural distance (Chomsky 2013a,b

2015)

Linear proximity is ignored in processing linguistic expressions; the interpretation

of linguistic expressions is structure-dependent; what matters is not linear distance

but structural distance, the proximity of elements in a hierarchic structure.

(4) a. Can eagles that fly swim?

b. Instinctively, eagles that fly swim. (Chomsky 2013b)

The auxiliary in (a) and the adverb in (b) are both associated with swim, the

element farthest away linearly — but not structurally.

(5) Le szoktam az italról kaparni a zárjegyet. (Pléh–Lukács 2014:748)

If interpretation was based entirely on linear arrangement, (5) would not be a

garden path sentence (but half bad and the rest different in meaning). But (5) has a

“correct” interpretation, on which the preverb le is structurally united with the verb

kaparni, half a sentence away if you regard its linear position.


Summary and final conclusions

50


Language

Language is I-language, a system of computational, conceptual-interpretive, and

“externalizing” mechanisms, internal to the mind.

The traditional notion of language (“mind-independent language,” some

“linguistic system external to the mind”) is incoherent.


Symbolizing thought. A “language of thought” – primary

“Communication” — secondary. Externalized LE



51

An explanatory model of language

A principled explanatory theory of language is one that “addresses fundamental

questions of the biology of language” (TFLD 19) and is formulated in terms of

“properties of the interface systems” (TFLD 10) and “language-independent

principles of data processing, structural architecture, and computational

efficiency,” “the third factor,” (TFLD 9).

The CONCEPTUAL CHANGE: to better understand FL, look beyond

language and consider mental domains external to and in interaction with it, a

system of subsystems in which language is embedded.

The ontogeny of language: its development or growth in the individual.

The phylogeny of language: its evolution in the species.

A principled explanation of language accounts for both.



52

Optimal design

Language is torn between CI and SM

Linguistic expressions (LE) cannot do justice both to the conditions imposed upon

them by CI and to the conditions imposed by SM.

Conceptual structures may (at least) be two-dimensional, i.e. hierarchic.

Spoken utterances are one-dimensional, i.e., flat.

Hierarchic conceptual structures need not (in addition) be linearly arranged.

Externalized utterances must have a linear structure (their only structure).

If LE were to satisfy one set of conditions, they must violate the other. What

preferences are made by the computational system—meet CI, or meet SM?

Language appears to favor CI (structure of LE is hierarchic). Its primary

function

Communication, the externalization of LE, is secondary. “[Language] is great for

talking to yourself, but not so much for talking to others” (Chomsky 2013c).


References

53

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