The Democratic Front

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The Democratic Front for theLiberation of Palestine (DFLP)

EMERGENCE AND ITINERARY1969 - 2007

Qais Abdel Karim

Member of the Political

Bureau

DFLP

Fahed Suleiman

Member of the Political

Bureau

DFLP

First Edition:

January 2010

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The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine

(DFLP)

Emergence and Itinerary

1. Beginning and Foundation3

2. The Foundation Phase (1969 1971)..6

3. The Foundation Phase: Review and Evaluation11

4. Under the Banner of the Transitional Program - The

Systematic Construction of a Revolutionary Mass Party(1972 - 1982) .15

5. Towards a Vanguard Mass Party...20

6. The First and Second General National Congress (1970 and

1981) - The First General National Conference (1971)

..22

7. Confronting Divisions: Defending the Unity of the PLO(1983-1987)

.....................................................................25

8. The Great Intifada - National and Party Obligations (1987 -1991)

27

9. Programmatic and Structural Renovation (1991- 1994)...30

10. The Second General National Conference (1991) - The

Third General National Congress (1994)

...33

11. Restoring the Initiative to Overcome the Oslo

Stalemate (1998)..37

12. Negotiations at a Deadlock (1998 2000)............39

13. The Intifada of Independence and the Negative Impact

of Division (2000 - 2007)...............................................42

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14. Two Milestones: 2005 & 2007 - the Fourth General National

Conference & the Fifth General National Congress .47

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(1)

Beginning and Foundation

1. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) was

founded on February 22, 1969 as an independent political leftist wing ofthe Palestinian resistance movement. .The emergence of the DFLPoccurred within the framework of the great setbacks which the Arabnational project had undergone after the June 1967 war. According to left-wing progressive groups, these setbacks uncovered the predicament ofthe Arab national project and showed the deep crisis which plagued allnational movements in general, and the Palestinian-Jordanian arena, inparticular. The extent of the crisis affected both programs and leadershipon the level of class, concept and politics.

The crisis, and the resultant predicament, pushed many cadres from

different national parties and national political entities, towards the left andled them to adopt a national program with a democratic revolutionarycontent under the banner of a new class vision. Many were seeking analternative to the traditional Arab national project, but were not attracted tothe Fatah Movement which, in launching its historic armed struggle,represented the spontaneous populist approach to resistance, and wasguided by the ideology of the national bourgeoisie.. Nor were theyattracted by the traditional communist left which throughout its history hadnot grasped the characteristics of the Palestinian national issue andconsequently lost grip of the political initiative. Furthermore, the traditionalcommunist left could not keep up with the national struggle at the criticalmoment of Palestinian history. It also did not understand the role of armedstruggle in resurrecting Palestinian national identity, and in reviving thePalestinian National Movement after the June War in 1967. In addition, ithad replaced its "Palestinian" appellation with a "Jordanian" one after the1948 Nakbah and had abandoned the program of reviving the special roleof the Palestinian people, and failed to link together dialectically thenational, regional and international dimensions.

It was against this background that the DFLP came into existencebelieving that there should be a new class and ideological leadership for

the national revolution holding a practical political vision and adopting a"scientific socialist" orientation based on the particularities of thePalestinian and Arab situation. With this in mind, the DFLP's intention wasto develop a program that would lay down successful solutions based onits own vision of that time. Thus, the DFLP was born as a distinctive groupwithin the context of the Palestinian revolution.

2. The emergence of the DFLP on February 22, 1969 was, in its largepart, also associated with the leftist transformations witnessed by thepopular national movements with its Nasserite and Baathist components,including the various branches of the Arab Nationalist Movement that

emerged in the sixties in several Arab countries.

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In this context the emergence of the DFLP is linked to the ideological andpolitical conflicts that occurred at the regional levels of the Arab NationalistMovement in all Arab Mashreq countries which was aggravated after theJune 1967 war especially in the Palestinian Jordanian context. This

eventually culminated with the different branches of the Arab NationalistMovement establishing independent party frameworks within their owncountries, including the Palestinian branch (comprising a democraticrevolutionary wing and a traditional wing); that operated since December11, 1967, under the name of the "Popular Front for the Liberation ofPalestine" (PFLP).

The birth of the DFLP was also connected to the basic political reportissued by PFLP Congress in August 1968. This report presented by NayefHawatmeh became the foundation on which the DFLP built its conceptual,political and organizational independence. The report was supported by

the leftist wing, which managed to rally the majority of the conferenceattendees behind the issues addressed by the report.

3. During the first years of its formation, the DFLP was called "the PopularDemocratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine "(PDFLP) but, later, itchanged its name to the "Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation ofPalestine" (DPFLP). The new name reflected the heritage of continuousstruggle among its activists who contributed to the establishment of thePFLP and struggled side by side with the Arab Nationalist Movement andthe Palestinian National Movement in the West Bank, the Gaza strip,Jordan, and the refugee camps in exile. However, the DPFLP maintainedits ideological (democratic and popular) identity which formed itsframework as a leftist, independent, popular armed organization.

The DFLP continued to operate under the name DPFLP until 1975 whenits Second Central Committee adopted a new political program for "theDemocratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine" (DFLP). The newprogram reflected a programmatic and structural (social and ideological)shift in orientation. It combined democratic leftist ideas with the specialcharacteristics of the Palestinian cause and national rights during thephase of national liberation. These rights, in the group's opinion, required

the alliance of all political classes and factions within a broad nationalcoalition governed by common denominators.

From the very beginning, the DFLP presented itself as a united leftist frontand called for a democratic revolutionary alliance between workers, thedestitute and revolutionary intellectuals. Soon, it managed to polarizedemocratic and leftist activists of different orientations who did not belongto a particular organization. It also attracted activists from within the ranksof democratic and youth movements in general.

Because of this policy, a few months after its foundation, two leftist

organizations the "Palestinian Revolutionary League"and the"Palestine

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Popular Liberation Organization"merged into the DFLP. in June 1969 andwere later joined in 1972, by factions ofthe "Popular Revolutionary Front".

Since its foundation, the DFLP has endeavored to proffer a leftistmovement, able to incorporate the national characteristics of the

Palestinian cause with the problems of the struggle against evictionistsettler colonialism in order to create the conditions to accomplish theinitial phases of the national democratic revolution which encompasses thewhole of the Arab national liberation movement

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(2)

The Foundation Phase1969 1971

1. Neither the criticism of the programs of Arab regimes (mistakenlydubbed "petty bourgeois") nor the big slogans about "Marxism Leninism", "Leadership of the Proletariat", "armed struggle" and "radicaldemocratic solution to the National Question"., regardless of theirimportance, constituted a sufficient base to build a true revolutionaryorganization. It was necessary to conduct a concrete analysis of the actualPalestinian situation and the relevant intertwined Arab and regionalrelations (including Israeli) ,to formulate tangible and specific programsthat can thrust forward the national revolution and stimulate therevolutionary energy of the working class and its allies to implement thisprogram and support the DFLPs vanguard role in the National Movement.

However, this mission whom the DFLP adopted, seemed in the earlyyears, to be highly confused and extremely difficult. The DFLP was at thetime the receptacle of heated interaction and internal debate, between acombination of leftist ideas and trends.

2. At the conceptual level, along with the loud proclamation of Marxist-Leninist views, the discourse adopted by DFLP leaders at that time washighly critical of "soviet bureaucracy", with a vocabulary and contentapproaching Maoism and Guevarism. In analyzing Arab reality, thediscourse focused on the idea of "the fall of petty bourgeois programs";this was a distorted ideological expression of an evident fact that thenational bourgeoisie was afflicted by the obstruction of its historicprospects due to the hegemony of monopolist capital over the globalcapitalist system, which was also at the threshold of globalization. It wasimpossible for the national bourgeoisie to make inroads towardsindependent capitalist development as a means of extricating theircountries from dependency and backwardness. Therefore, it was unable tolead the Arab national liberation movement towards the nationaldemocratic revolution including the achievement of " Arab Unity". Thisobjectively requires a new class realignment within the revolutionary

camp, placing workers at the forefront of the national alliance.

3. On the level of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the DFLP raised theslogan of the "Popular Democratic State" which differs from the"Democratic State" raised by the Fatah movement. "Democratic State"implied that the conflict was of a religious-ethnic nature and could besolved by providing citizens with equal rights regardless of religion orlanguage. Thus, behind the orientation adopted by the DFLP, was an earlyrecognition that besides the "Palestinian Question", there was also a"Jewish Question" that must inevitably be dealt with to provide ademocratic solution to the conflict.

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However, this recognition was conditional on the abandonment of the"Zionist Project" and on the establishment of peaceful coexistence withArab Palestinians on equal terms within a "Popular Democratic State"which should replace the existing "Israeli Zionist State". But, how couldthis goal be achieved in light of Israels overwhelming superiority and its

alliance with the United States? The answer was "by launching a long-termpopular liberation war over the entire Palestinian and Arab territories".

4. According to the DFLP, the majority of Palestinians was displaced fromtheir homes and was, thus, forced "to build their main resistance forces inthe Arab countries that border on Palestine. Therefore, the success orfailure of these resistance forces would depend on the conditionsprevailing in these countries." On the other hand, the DFLP believed that"the military superiority of the Imperialist enemy should be encountered byhuman superiority in quantitative and qualitative terms", as a majorcomponent of the long-term popular war. But, according to the DFLP, this

goal could not be achieved unless the Palestinian resistance movementsucceeded in thrusting the Arab peoples "to contribute daily in the directfight"; a matter which required the existence of a wide support base for thePalestinian revolution in one or several Arab countries, so that thesecountries could assume the same position held by "Democratic Vietnam"in support of the struggle for the people of "Southern Vietnam". Therefore,turning the Palestinian feda'ee (commando) actions into guerilla warfarewithin the occupied Palestinian territories and consequently into a longterm popular liberation war, would move the revolution from its purePalestinian framework to a more comprehensive Arab context.

The DFLP realized that the potentialities of the "Palestinian People" wereinsufficient to confront alone the superiority of the Imperialist-Zionistalliance to liberate Palestine and to establish the "Popular DemocraticState". It was necessary to include the Arab peoples in the battle. In spiteof stressing the importance of the Palestinian armed struggle, it was notviewed as the decisive factor in defeating the enemy. Rather, it wasconsidered to be the spark that would trigger a popular war encompassingthe entire Arab peoples. Obviously, this view was influenced by theVietnamese experience but, though oversimplified, it revealed two earlymature conclusions:

First, strong criticism was openly directed at the flashy and attention-grabbing operations outside Palestinian territory, as they not onlystigmatized the Palestinian struggle with terrorism, but also were seen asreplacing the popular struggle with individual heroism while victory canonly be achieved by enlisting and mobilizing the masses.

Secondly, the popular war not only meant carrying weapons by avanguard but, rather, organizing the people and mobilizing their fullpotential in the battle. This idea constituted the seed which, in recentyears, has grown into the "comprehensive national uprising" (Al-Intifada).

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From the beginning, this idea stimulated selective empirical exploration, ,for the appropriate formula to frame and organize the masses; a matterwhich was at the forefront of DFLP concerns. In fact, the desire to developa method for organizing the wide masses explains why the DFLP hasdefined itself in its first statute as "a united leftist front led by a leftist

revolutionary nucleus looking to build a vanguard party. Indeed, this partywas generally seen as a vague entity, because it was both " distinctive"from the DFLP and integrated within it.

5. In spite of the fierce criticism addressed against the politics of thePalestinian right wing, which was seen as a manifestation of the "pettybourgeoisie" within the Palestinian resistance, the DFLP adopted a maturestance regarding the issue of national unity and assumed an effective rolein all the united structures of the revolution and the "Palestine LiberationOrganization" (PLO). In doing so, the DFLP was completely aware of theimportance of the national alliance on the basis of "unity and struggle" (or

"struggle under the umbrella of unity" or "alliance with criticism") whichaddressed the following issues:

A revolution in the national liberation phase, places the issue ofnational unity at the top of its priorities in order to achieve victory.Building a "united front" that brings together all national classes is amajor revolutionary requirement.

A policy of"alliance with criticism" should be adopted withregard to the current dominant national leaderships. This policy is

reflected in the slogan of "building a national front" including all factionsof the resistance on an equal footing and on the basis of agreementover a joint action plan as a minimum requirement. However, eachfaction would maintain its ideological, political and organizationalindependence and the right to practice freely its position in the case ofdisputed issues. This is the other face of the "alliance with criticism",which ensures that the policy of alliance will not turn into a tool forentrenching or praising current leaderships and strengthening theirposition towards the masses.

In this context, "parity" should be understood as a slogan for

struggle and not as a precondition for any national alliance. Practicalrecognition of this "parity" depends on the situation of the existingpower ratio in real terms. Hence, achieving "parity" gives way tostruggle for strengthening the organizational, popular and militaryposition of the left wing. Raising the "parity" slogan will facilitate thestruggle and clarify objectives to the masses instead of restricting it byimposing preconditions.

6. The DFLP, thus, has steadily joined various forms of national alliancesand entered all joint action agreements that do not restrict itsorganizational independence. From within these structures, the DFLP

sought to broaden the minimum scope of agreement and joint action andto adjust relationships within the framework of these entities in order to

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achieve parity in policy-making. Soon after its formation, the DFLP joinedthe "Armed Struggle Command" which was established with the objectiveof escalating the armed struggle against Israeli occupation. Later, theDFLP sought to broaden the scope of agreement to adopt a joint actionprogram (August 1969).

With the emergence of "the United Command of the ResistanceMovement", following the crisis of February 10 19701 in Jordan, the DFLPbecame an active member and pressed for the establishment of JointCoordination Committees at all levels and in all areas of activity. It alsoparticipated in the Central Committee which was created by the SeventhPalestinian National Council (PNC) held in Cairo on May 30, 1970 tosupervise the implementation of the Council's resolutions and approve allemergent political and military situations during the interval between PNCsessions..

When the issue of the DFLP's position towards the PLO was raised in thebeginning of the discussions on establishing the Sixth PNC in September1969, the DFLP agreed to join the PLO's structures. This was nottriggered only by tensions between the PLO and the Jordanian authorities,which required that Palestinian factions join ranks in the face of Jordanianthreats, but it was also in response to the significant change that tookplace in the PLO after the Fifth PNC (February 1-4, 1969) and theemergence of opportunities for developing the PLO as a broad frameworkfor national unity.

Indeed, the Fifth PNC gave birth to a new PLO leadership mostlyconsisting of resistance factions (Fatah and Saiqa, in particular, along withindependent factions). It replaced the traditional leadership that wasunable to contribute to the Palestinian national struggle as newdevelopments placed the armed struggle at the forefront.

Meanwhile, a shift took place in the relationship between the PLO andArab regimes wresting broader independence for the PLO from officialArab guardianship. This led to a positive transformation in the image of thePLO due to the political standing and militancy of its new leadership. Italso raised the expectations of the Palestinian masses that national unity

will be realized.

While recognizing this shift in PLO standing, the DFLP continued to stressthat the PLO could become a suitable frame for a "United PalestinianFront" only after introducing a series of changes. These included thedemocratization of its institutions and internal relationships, changing itsbureaucratic structures into democratic ones engaged in popular war,turning the "Palestinian Liberation Army" (PLA) into a guerrilla army by

1 This crisis, and the conflicts it sparked, erupted after the Jordanian government imposed a

curfew on carrying arms in Amman with other restrictions on Palestinian resistancemovements, who in their turn considered these measures an attempt to encircle them and limit

their freedom of movement .

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canceling its privileges, intensifying political activity within its ranks,dissolving and restructuring PLO bureaucratic organs on volunteers..

Based on this logic, the DFLP did not neglect the programmatic andorganizational requirements arising from the ambition to transform the

PLO into a framework for national unity. It submitted an integral project forbuilding a "Unified National Liberation Front" to the sixth session of thePalestine National Council although it realized that rallying the neededsupport would require patient determination. By this approach, it clearlydistinguished itself from isolationist tendencies that opposed joint nationalaction It was necessary to transfer the issue of national unity away fromthe demands (useless and unrealizable) for amalgamation into "oneorganization" based on "annexation and appropriation" towards a contextrecognizing the existence of democratic unity based on plurality andunderstanding its objective reasons.. This orientation was summed up inthe DFLP's call for all resistance factions to agree on joint political

denominators and to ground their unity on democratic internalrelationships

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(3)

The Foundation PhaseReview and Evaluation

1. In the early years of its formation, the DFLP committed a serious error;by becoming involved in the conflict raging between the Palestinianresistance and the Jordanian regime on Jordanian territory. This was acompound mistake:

On the one hand, it reflected leftist excess by miscalculating in itsinterpretation of the local and regional balance of power which tiltedtowards maintaining the Jordanian regime whose main function was toensure regional balance within the context of Cold War polarization ;

On the other hand, it reflected methodological deficiency in

understanding the role and function of the Palestinian resistance in Jordanby turning it into a main actor in the struggle for power within the country.Practically, the Palestinian resistance became an alternative to the"Jordanian National Movement" (JNM) as a tool for introducing nationaldemocratic change in Jordan. This mistake, besides being an error inmethodology, ignored the complex composition of Jordanian society. .Under this sensitive fabric, extremist slogans such as "the resistanceauthority" angered the Jordanian masses and made it easy for rightistforces in the country to arouse panic through the idea of "the alternativehomeland" (meaning Jordan is the homeland for Palestinians).

2. In September 1970, the resistance received a big shock when it wasdefeated and, later, its open existence on Jordanian territory liquidatedfollowing the Jarash-Ajloun events in the summer of 1971. With thisdefeat, the so-called "secure base" collapsed and high hopes for "a long-term popular war" were discredited. The defeat sparked a comprehensivereview process starting with open criticism of the policy pursued by thePalestinian resistance movement including the DFLP on Jordanianterritory until September 1970. There was an attempt to analyze in depththe complicated reality of Jordanian-Palestinian relations, particularly, thedivisions in Jordanian society which can be traced to the unique position of

Jordan on the map of imperial interests in the region and the function itassumes within this context.

This critical review (whose first conclusions were documented in the report"September Campaign- Lessons and Findings" published late in 1970)was the first step in an intensive discussion which gradually led to whatbecame known as "the Transitional Program". The final features of thisprogram were formulated in August 1973 but its early features begancrystallizing in July 1971 in the report "The Current Functions of thePalestinian Resistance Movement" which the DFLP submitted to the ninthsession of thePalestine National Council held in Cairo.

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the components of the Palestinian National Movement on the basis ofproportional representation and needed more organized and strongerfoundations. This formula was presented in the detailed project submittedby the DFLP to the Ninth PNC held in July 1971 under the banner:"towards entrenched Palestinian national unity.towards a united popular

liberation army" for building a united Palestinian national liberation front.

It was within this context that the DFLP aimed to become a party guidedby the theory and practice of scientific socialism and to assume aleading role in the united national front based on the influence of itssupporters and on proportional representation. To this end, the DFLP,admitting openly its shortcomings, recognized that, it had not yet becomea revolutionary leftist party. Rather, it was a revolutionary democraticorganization seeking to turn into a vanguard political party guided by thetheory and practice of scientific socialism.

Avoiding revolutionary affectations, the DFLP also stressed that thevanguard party it intended to create would only be a segment of thedesired united vanguard party of the Palestinian working class in light ofthe weak proletarian base in diaspora communities who were, at thattime, the main organizational pillars of the DFLP as well as of the overallresistance movement. At the same time the process of proletariantransformation had not yet been completed in the occupied territories..

Here a question arose: how can the process of transformation into aproletarian party be reconciled with the creation of an influential grassrootsorganization? This question stirred debate about formulas of revolutionarydemocratic alliance between workers,,other laborers and the revolutionaryintelligentsia. This led to the emergence of the formula of democraticgrassroots mass organizations.

4. The results of this internal debate, including the daring critical openreviews it entailed at different planning and organizational levels, wereenshrined in the significant decisions and orientations that were adoptedby the first Party General National Conference First General NationalConference held in November 1971.

Conference members were not elected but, rather, consisted of all DFLPcadres and leaders or their representatives. An earlier conference held inAugust 1970 on the eve of the September events had elected theFounding General National Congress (First General National Congress)and crowned the formation phase of the DFLP as we know it today.

The First General National Conference realized that its decisions andorientations did not constitute a new program or new statute but, rather, alaunching pad for their elaboration based on the lessons and conclusionsof the critical review of the previous experience. It also realized thatmaterializing this program and statute would not be a pure mental exercise

but, rather, an accumulated process in which dialogue would interact withpractice. Therefore, the Second Central Committee, which the Conference

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elected, was assigned to draft these two documents, and confer theConference's power to adopt them.

Thus, the First General National Conference was just the beginning of adifficult journey on an unbending road towards building a revolutionary

party. It had to go through a difficult phase marked by revolutionarysetbacks following the September defeat in 1970 and its negativerepercussions in the occupied territories and in exile. The suppression ofthe armed uprising in Gaza in 1971 by the Israeli occupation forces furthercomplicated the situation and reinforced Israels earlier success inquashing the organized national movement in the Palestinian West Bankin 1969

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(4)

Under the Banner of the Transitional Program:the Systematic Construction of a Revolutionary Mass Party

1972-1982

1. The key questions that arose from the September defeat, thepossibilities of an Arab-Israeli settlement, and the resultant debateincluding the Transitional Program were discussed not only in the DFLPbut in several circles of the Palestinian National Movement. However, thedialogue in the DFLP was marked by two distinguishing characteristics:First, it touched in depth the main pillars of Palestinian resistance politicalthought current at that time. Secondly, it was closely linked to the processof building a deep rooted popular revolutionary organization.

As a matter of fact, prevailing conditions during the foundation years led to

the awareness that building a revolutionary party required a concreteaction plan/ program based on an objective analysis of the prevailingsituation and an accurate estimation of power relations governing theconflict and the options available to transform them. . It also required anaccurate diagnosis of the interests of the various social forces. in order toidentify the appropriate objectives, forms of organization, and methods ofstruggle that will mobilize them and motivate their struggle in defense oftheir interests, which are in conflict with those of the enemy, and, thus,linked to the general national struggle.

The questions that should be answered in this action plan/ program wereformulated by the DFLP's Central Committee in its thirdmeeting of August1972. A debate was launched and culminated with the adoption of themain Transitional Program guidelines at the Fourth Central Committeemeeting in 1973.

The Transitional Program is, generally, perceived as a mere declarationfor the establishment of an independent "Palestinian State" in the WestBank and Gaza Strip (WB&G). This is undoubtedly one of its mostprominent elements. In fact, the Transitional Program, as adopted by theCentral Committee in August 1973, is an integrated struggle platform. It is

based on the fact that the central link in the Palestinian struggle duringthe current historical stage, is the struggle to end the occupation ofPalestinian territory (West Bank and Gaza) which Israel occupied in 1967and the struggle to regain the Palestinian right for self-determination onthese territories including the right to establish an independent state in theWest Bank and Gaza.

This aim is seen as crowning the struggle of the people's different classesand groups in defense of their interests vis--vis the main pillars ofoccupation policies; namely, settlement, land usurpation, merger andeconomic domination, repression, deprivation of freedoms and human

rights, the obliteration of national culture, the desecration of holy placesand the denial of an independent Palestinian identity,

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The program, as later developed, analyzes the destructive repercussionsof Israeli policies on the interests of all classes and social sectors and thecontradictions they generate. It, then, deduces the objectives andproposes organizational structures for mobilizing and developing the

popular struggle towards a comprehensive confrontation with theoccupying forces.

It is worth mentioning that the program puts forward, for the first time, theidea of the comprehensive popularintifada as a distinctive form of popularwar for the Palestinian struggle. This was an embryonic concept raised ata time when the popular movement in the occupied territories wasstagnating, prior to the outbreak of successive popular uprisings thatstarted in the autumn of 1974.

2. Although the Transitional Program focused on the West Bank and

Gaza as the central link in the Palestinian national struggle, it did notneglect the role and function of other communities of the Palestinianpeople inside the borders of 1948, in Jordan, and in the other countrieswhere Palestinian refugees (the Diaspora) live.

It is important, in this context, to refer briefly to the new vision articulated inthis program regarding the Palestinian struggle in Jordan and theJordanian-Palestinian relationship. It proceeds from the premise that thesuccess of the Palestinian people in obtaining independence and buildinga state in the West Bank and Gaza will open the door towards resumingunity between the two peoples on the basis of equality, democracy, andfree choice. In this context, removing the factors of tension in Jordanian-Palestinian relationships and establishing them on healthy and correctfoundations requires, first, recognition that the PLO is the sole legitimaterepresentative of the Palestinian people and its only spokesperson in anydiscussions and resolutions related to the national cause. Secondly, thePalestinian people have the right to sovereignty over national land in theWest Bank, as well as Gaza, and the right to establish an independentstate thereon.

In parallel the Transitional Program diagnoses the unique and distinct

position of Palestinians in Jordan who are part of the Palestinian nationalentity and, enjoy the right to retain their Palestinian national identity and toexpress it through the Palestinian national movement under theleadership of the PLO which represents the totality of their national rightsin Palestine. Likewise, they are a part of the Jordanian social fabric , arecitizens of the Jordanian state and, as such, enjoy rights and interests thatdictate active participation in defense of that country and in its political life..

However, the program underlined that this participation must come fromwithin the "Jordanian National Movement" itself which is solely concernedwith the issues and tasks of national and democratic liberation in Jordan.

Thus, the program rejects any attempt to replace the Jordanian National

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Movement with the "Palestinian Resistance" or to assign the latter as acustodian over the former in this respect.

It is also worth noting that the Transitional Program raises the tasks ofdefending the civil and social rights of Palestinians in the Diaspora

although at the time this was considered a departure from the acceptednorm and of lesser importance than the armed struggle. These include theright to work, freedom of movement, and the right to improved livingconditions, to be achieved under the responsibility of Palestinian nationalfactions.

3. The Transitional Program is commonly viewed as a program forpolitical settlement and that its timing was linked to the pace of effortstowards a settlement. The DFLP campaigned, to clarify the program'ssignificance which was above all a program for struggle,, a program for thepreparation of the comprehensive popular uprising, which is the distinctive

Palestinian form of peoples war. Certainly, its formulation did not excludeor rule out a political settlement and the possibility of an Arab-Israelisettlement was certainly one of its motivating factors. This was based onthe necessity to protect the achievements of the Palestinian struggleagainst the threats of a potential compromise deal between the Arabregimes and Israel. .

After the October 1973 war, in particular, when negotiations betweenIsrael and all Arab fronts were under preparation, and arrangements forthe Geneva Conference were underway, the DFLP had developed itsposition on this matter. It called for a negotiated political settlement whichguarantees at the minimum the end of Israeli occupation of land capturedin 1967 as well as the right of the Palestinian people to establish anindependent state in the West Bank and Gaza. It also stressed that thePLO was the sole legitimate representative and only spokesperson for thePalestinian people in any discussion or event concerning its nationalcause. To this end, 70,000 signatures were collected for a petition to theUN Secretary General denouncing the exclusion of the Palestinian people,represented by the PLO, from participation as an equal party at theGeneva Conference which intended to discuss the destiny of [Palestinian]lands and rights in the absence of its legitimate representative. This

position exposed the illusion underlying the dichotomy between "armedstruggle" and "settlement", and between "resistance" and "negotiations".Settlement does not necessarily mean compromise and surrender. Nor donegotiations necessarily mean the abandonment of militancy and armedstruggle.

The special commando operations launched by the armed wing of theDFLP inside Israeli territories especially in 1974 (and in following years)were the practical application of this concept which at that time seemed tocontradict prevailing Palestinian political thought. Just as the TransitionalProgram was a pioneering project at the conceptual and political levels,

these operations were ground-breaking at the military level andrepresented a distinctive approach in the Palestinian armed struggle

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leading to intense competition among the armed wings of Palestinianfactions to implement similar operations which continued to highlight thespecial military role of the DLFP.

However, the DFLP launched a persistent ideological struggle against

adventurous terrorist tendencies which consecrate armed struggle,substitute it for popular struggle, and belittle all forms of political,economic, and unionist struggle. It was always stressed that armedstruggle was one of the most prominent forms of struggle againstoccupation, complementing other forms rather than replacing them..Armed struggle cannot achieve its goals in isolation of popular strugglewhose most advanced form is the comprehensive popular uprising. Thus,armed struggle was seen as the spark that rekindles popular insurrection .Here again, the DFLP was swimming against the prevailing tide ofPalestinian political thought to catch up with the movement of history.

The DFLP, waged a fierce ideological struggle to popularize theTransitional Program and entrench it as a salvation raft for the revolutionand the PLO. In June 1974, after long difficult months, which witnessedarmed friction with some rejectionist factions, the Palestine NationalCouncil adopted the core of this program though in extremely hard-linewording in the so-called "10 Point Program". One of the points called forthe establishment of "a combative national authority on any Palestinianland liberated from occupation (the words "national authority" were usedbecause the term "Palestinian State at the time was stamped with theaccusation of treason. However, everyone knew that the talk was onestablishing an independent state).

4. With this program, the PLO emerged from the bottle neck in which itwas trapped before and following the October 1973 war. It moved into theArab and international space announcing that, since the Palestinianpeople were a key party to the conflict, so should they be a key party tothe solution. There could be no settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflictwithout solving the Palestinian issue based on ensuring the right of thePalestinian people to self-determination and to the materialization of itsnational entity on its own land.

This position became an Arab commitment at the Rabat Summit ofOctober 1974,whose resolutions affirmed comprehensive Arab recognitionof the PLO as the sole legitimate representative and only spokesperson forthe Palestinian people. From the podium of this recognition the PLOproceeded to the United Nations to place Palestine forcefully and for thefirst time on the international scene.

This coincided with the first popular uprising in the autumn of 1974 in theoccupied territories which lasted for ten days and spontaneously adoptedthe demands of the Transitional Program, thus, testifying to the programsaccuracy in diagnosing the interests and ambitions of the different national

classes of the Palestinian people.

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The brilliant political victories, which the PLO achieved in Rabat and at theUN, contributed to giving momentum to the popular uprising. But, from thebeginning, the DFLP considered that this factor played only a supportiverole and that the principal causes of the uprising were rooted in theescalating and intensifying objective contradiction of interests between the

Palestinian people in all its national classes, and the Israeli occupation andits policies. Meanwhile, the uprising gave momentum to an intensivedebate inside the DFLP which sought to analyze and derive lessons fromthe uprising in order to develop the popular movement and to update theTransitional Program in light of the demands raised by the masses.

5. .The adoption by the PLO of the Transitional Program and the RabatArab Summit resolutions, granting official Arab recognition of the PLO asthe sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, caused aqualitative shift in the relationship between the PLO and the Soviet Unionas well as other Socialist countries and opened channels for establishing

official relations between the two sides. It was in this context that, for thefirst time, official relations were established with the Soviet CommunistParty and a number of other parties of the socialist bloc. Realizing theimportance of this alliance for the PLO and the DFLP itself and of theresultant political and practical support, the DFLP stopped criticizing the"Soviet Experience". This development was also encouraged by thefluctuation in Chinese policy due to the emergence of the Chinese-Vietnamese conflict.

The DFLP's discourse stressed more and more the importance of thealliance between the "three international revolutionary powers" (includingthe proletariat in advanced capitalist countries), particularly, the alliancebetween the Soviet Union-led socialist camp and the national liberationmovements in the Third World. This attitude was, from the objectiveperspective, correct, regardless of the evaluation of the "SovietExperience". In spite of the DFLP's public silence on the gaps of the"Soviet Experience", it did not consider it at any time a model to emulate.There is no doubt that, within the context of establishing strongrelationships with the Soviet,Union a minority emerged within the ranks ofthe DFLP seeking to adopt the Soviet model and positions inspired by theso-called "advice of Soviet friends". But, the majority in the DFLP firmly

adopted an independent position rejecting any intervention to direct itspolicy,.The silence about the deficiency in the "Soviet Experience" did not extendto the desperate theories produced by Soviet theorists on the globalsituation, which were officially adopted at Soviet Party conferences. TheDFLP continued to criticize publicly these theories, especially, the path to"non-capitalist development" which had direct repercussion on the policiesand orientations of Arab leftist powers in their relationship with the nationalbourgeoisie in their countries. This alliance by the DFLP with the SovietUnion, in which the DFLP remained independent while criticizing the

"Soviet Experience", later strengthened the DFLP's immunity against thePerestroika fever which led to ideological confusion and chaos to the

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extent that some movements sustained ideological desertion and collapse

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(5)

Towards a Vanguard Mass Party

1. These developments in DFLP's concepts and program did not come all

at once but accumulated through continuing internal debate, which wasalways characterized by energy, depth and richness, especially at the topof the organization's hierarchy. They also resulted from practice andprecise critical evaluation of the lessons learned from the field. Among themost remarkable milestones on this road was the approval by the CentralCommittee in November 1974 of the "DFLPs Organizational Program inOccupied Territory".

Late in 1975, the DFLP's Central Committee ratified two documents; "thepolitical program" and the "statute". Developments that are worthy ofmention in the new statute was the endorsement of the independence of

the Democratic Front Organization in Jordan (MAJD) as an organic part ofthe "Jordanian National Movement" and its right to have its own politicalprogram and statute. MAJD actually approved its own political programand statute in the summer of 1978.

The Central Committee conducted, in each of its sessions, a meticulousanalysis of the development of the popular movement in the West Bankand Gaza and the lessons drawn from the successive phases of itsstruggle which was approaching development into a popular uprising. Thereview process reached its climax in the report approved by the DFLP'sSecond General National Congress held in May 1981, which included ananalysis of the Arab situation, a diagnosis of the problems confrontingArab national liberation movements as well as proposals to revitalize them.It also included an in-depth analysis of economic and social conditions inthe West Bank and Gaza under occupation and an overview of the popularmovement's trajectory and challenges. An integrated working programwas proposed to prepare for the outbreak of the popular uprising. Inaddition, the report, included a critical analysis of the DFLPs internalorganizational structure and the outstanding tasks for its futuredevelopment.

The report reflected the level of conceptual and political maturity the DFLPhad reached due to its realistic revolutionary approach, and deep-rootedawareness of reality in its various manifestations and complications. Thisconstituted the programmatic base for the process of building anorganizational structure as a precursor to transforming the DFLP into a"Mass Party". It was an overwhelming and ever-present ambition for whichconsiderable effort was exerted at the central level and in all fields. Fromthe beginning, it was emphasized that the vanguard attribute of the partydid not signify elitism or disregarding and isolating the popular movement.To the contrary, a revolutionary party could not be a real Vanguard unlessit was a Mass party.

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2. The development of the DFLPs program and its vision weremanifested on the organizational level through the adoption ofDemocraticCentralism as a regulator of inner party relationships as well as therelationship with its mass organizations. Democratic Centralism is notmerely a set of by-laws and procedural rules applied in isolation of their

social class content. From the perspective of capitalist evolutionDemocratic Centralism basically reflects the rising tendency of the workingclass to achieve unity and cohesion in order to wrest collective ownershipof the means of production, since it is deprived of property and is obligedto sell its labor..The objective and material characteristics gained by the working class

from its mode of life and role in society and its role in production includecollectivity, division of labor, growing unity of ultimate class interests,internal cohesion , discipline, perseverance, forbearance, and the ability touphold the interests of the entire population, as well as conduct a precise

evaluation of prevailing power relations, etc.

While the enhanced unity of the organization through DemocraticCentralism is necessary, it is however not sufficient. It could lead tobureaucratic practice and elitism, as well as isolated and opportunisticconsequences unless it is associated with sound relationships between theorganization and the people again based on Democratic Centralism . Thissound relationship should be derived from the fact that the national andrevolutionary process is the outcome of the struggle of the masses toeliminate injustice, oppression and exploitation. The role of a party restson leading the popular movement towards organization, unity andawareness.

3. Throughout the ten-year period between the Conference held inNovember 1971 to the Second General National Congress held in May1981,it was stressed that building a revolutionary and grassrootsorganization required a resolute leadership with broad powers. Throughsuch powers, it could rapidly develop organizational forms and operationalmodes and methods which are adapted to the pace of the buildingprocess.

The significant successes achieved by this process prepared thefoundations for starting democratic practice within DFLP organizations byconvening its conferences and congresses and by the election of itsleadership from the base to the top. The process culminated with theelection of the Third Central Committee at the Second General NationalCongress on May 1981). through free individual nominations and secretballot, bypassing the list system proposed at the central level. The listsystem was practiced at that time by many centralist democratic parties

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(6)

The First and Second General NationalCongress(1970 and 1981)

The First General NationalConference (1971)

Between August 1970 and May 1981, the DFLP held two Congresses andone Conference; namely, the Founding Congress, the First GeneralNational Conference, and the Second General National Congress.

1. The Founding Congress (which was called then "the First GeneralNationalCongress") was held in August 1970 at the peak of a state ofmobilization and discontent, preceding the bloody September events inJordan. The Congress discussed a political and military report. At theoutset of the report, the Arab and international situations were analyzed inrelation to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to the resistance movements

composition and objective relationships. The report covered in its threesections the DFLP's strategies and tasks in the Jordanian-Palestiniancontext, at the Arab level and at the international level.

The FirstGeneral National Congress approved a political documententitled "the General Program". It also ratified "the Provisional Statute",elected the DFLP's First Central Committee and vested it with the powersof the General National Congress. It also authorized the CentralCommittee to "introduce amendments to the provisional statute andprepare one which would strengthen the vanguard character of the DFLPwhile taking practical steps to officially establish the party and strengthenits position within the leftist Front as the mainstay of the DFLPs identify.

2.The First General NationalConference was held in November 1971, inthe aftermath of the Jarash - Ajloun events in Jordan in July 1971, whichended three years of overt national action in Jordan and led to moving thebases of the Palestinian Revolution to Syria and Lebanon , Theconference approved the first statute in the DFLPs history which becameoperational early in 1972. The DFLP had developed ideologically,politically and organizationally. It had also reached a level of internalharmony and unity which characterized it as a unified leftist front (i.e., a

unified revolutionary democratic organization) and enabled it to identifyitself as such.

The Conference also approved a political document "the Political Thesis",containing the general direction for engaging in alliances at thePalestinian, Arab and international levels and guiding the DFLPs dailypolicy. Although it did not meet the specifications of a political program,the document performed this function in practice, to a certain degree. TheFirst General National Conference, meanwhile, elected the SecondCentral Committee and conferred upon it the powers of the GeneralNational Congress.

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3. The Second Central Committee (November 1971 - May 1981) playeda crucial role in the life of the DFLP on different ideological and politicallevels. It also had contributed to the development of organizational massand military directives

Within this framework, the Fourth session of the Second CentralCommittee approved in August 1973 (i.e. before the outbreak of theOctober 1973 war) the outlines of the Transitional Program in a documententitled "Ten Thesis on the General Outline of the Transitional Program inthe Occupied Territories and Jordan". The program (particularly during the12th session of the PNC in June 1974) later became known as "the Ten-Point Program" and became the PLOs national consensus program in1979, on the eve of convening the 14th session of the PNC.

After this decisive development, the elements of drafting a completepolitical program for the DFLP were objectively at hand. The Fifth session

of the Central Committee, held in October 1974, approved a groundworkpaper to draft the political program and amend the internal statute. Thiswas achieved in the last quarter of 1975.

By approving these two documents, the DFLP completed the conceptual,programmatic, political and organizational foundations to transform itselfinto a democratic revolutionary party. The purpose of these documentswas to organize the Front's internal activity and relationship with themasses on the solid ground of Democratic Centralism, reinforce itsideological and organizational unity, proceed on the road of solidconstruction of democratic and military organizations at an acceleratedpace and with firm strides, and advance its influence in the national andpopular movement inside and outside the occupied Palestinian territory.

The geographic dispersal of the Palestinian people, and the differingconditions that governed their struggle formed the basic elements of theTransitional Program The DFLP / Central Committee ratified the text of thepolitical program and the statute late in 1975, granting local organizationsa degree of autonomy in elaborating their local militant programs, oncondition of compliance with the unified strategy and the general politicalline of the DFLP as a whole.

The statute also highlighted the independent and distinct character of theDemocratic Front Organization in Jordan (MAJD) as a democraticrevolutionary organization, which constitutes a vanguard faction of theworking class and the rest of the Jordanian and Palestinian working classin Jordan. It was also considered as an integral part of the unified nationalmovement of the two peoples in the country. The statute authorized MAJDto develop its own political program and internal statute in accordance withthe requirements of the national democratic struggle in Jordan and incompliance with the main principles of the DFLPs general program. Thiswas achieved in August 1978.

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4. The SecondGeneralNationalCongress was held in May 1981 at theheight of the Palestinian revolution's influence in the Diaspora before themassive Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. The Congress approvedan amended version of the political program and statute, which did notdiffer much from the framework of the two documents of 1975

The Congress was held amid growing national political influence for theDFLP and amid the upsurge of its organizational energy and militanteffectiveness in various national action arenas. The Congress also electedthe DFLPs Third Central Committee.

An important political and organizational document was issued on theactivities of the Congress, which is justly considered an outstandingcontribution to deeper analysis and diagnosis of the Palestinian nationalissue, the transitional program for national struggle, and the problems ofthe Arab national liberation movement. The document proposed a

Palestinian and Arab action plan to realize national liberation and thenational democratic revolution at the Palestinian and Arab levels

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(7)

Confronting Divisions.. Defending the Unity of the PLO1983-1987

1. The DFLP consolidated its national asset and popular influence bythe distinguished, responsible and balanced stance it adopted after thePLO's exit from Beirut, in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in1982. Following these events, rifts arose within PLO ranks and bloodyfighting erupted between its various wings throughout 1983. During thiscrisis, the DFLP firmly opposed the Palestinian rightist wing policy whichtended both to harmonize with the Reagan plan and to take sides in theconfrontation and contradictions between the various Arab regional blocs,by supporting the rightist reactionary wing in the region . The DFLP waskeen on preserving the unity of the PLO, defend the legitimacy of itsinstitutions and the independence of its national decision against divisive

plans, internecine fighting, and the attempts to contain the PLO and imposeguardianship over it by any of the conflicting regional rivals.

In order to preserve the unity of Palestinian institutions and reaffirm theirlegitimacy, the DFLP played a leading role in drafting the Aden document,which constituted the basis for the resolutions of the Sixteenth Session ofthe Palestine National Council held in February 1983 the first meeting heldafter the exit from Beirut.. Unfortunately, the achievements of the meeting,collapsed due to rifts in the Fatah movement which led to bloodyinternecine fighting in the Beqa'a valley of Lebanon and in the north at theend of 1983. This prompted the formation of a Joint Command between theDFLP and the PFLP on the basis of a program entitled: "Towards Unity andDemocratic Reform of the PLO".

At that time a Democratic Alliance had been established between the theDFLP and the PFLP on the one hand, and the Communist Party and thePalestinian Liberation Front (PLF) on the other. The alliance was based onan initiative for a national dialogue condemning splits and internal fighting,rejecting containment and the policy of yielding to the Reaganadministrations plans. It also called for regaining the unity of the PLO on thebasis of respecting the resolutions of the sixteenth session of the Palestinian

National Council and introducing wide democratic reforms in PLOinstitutions.

This initiative built a basis for the dialogue held between the DemocraticAlliance on the one hand and Fatah movement on the other, which wascrowned by the Aden-Algiers agreement of June 1984. The pact outlined themilestones for implementing a principled and transparent national policyand for the implementation of tangible steps to democratize PLO institutions.It called for restoring the PLO's unity and ending the paralysis in itsinstitutions in the aftermath of the bloody events of north of Lebanon .However this pact was never implemented and collapsed under Arab

regional pressure aiming to divide and contain the PLO.

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2. After the collapse of the Aden-Algiers agreement, the Joint Commanddisintegrated and the Democratic Alliance fell apart. Fatah called for ameeting of the Palestine National Council (Session 17), which was held inAmman on November 1984, and on 11/2/1985 conclude the Ammanagreement with the Jordanian government on sharing Palestinian

representation, a matter which undermined the PLO as sole legitimaterepresentative of the Palestinian people.

For the DFLP this was a fundamental and significant breach of Palestiniannational consensus. It suspended its participation in institutions that cameout of the Amman PNC, while rejecting at the same time any attempt toundermine the PNCs legitimacy, which would only serve to weaken andfragment the PLO as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinianpeople, thus facilitating its containment by regional powers.

With the collapse of the Democratic Alliance, and the defection of the PFLP

and PLF to the "Salvation Front", polarization attempts reached their peak.From 1984 to 1987 the DFLP faced three difficult years without Palestinianalliances, but remained steadfast against various forms of intense pressureand provocations, including security assaults as well as financial andpolitical obstructions. It was also weighed down by the bloody " war againstthe camps" in Lebanon, which erupted in May 1985.

3. Despite these difficulties the DFLP's continued to grow and itsinfluence on the masses increased in different areas, especially inside theoccupied territories, where its presence on the ascendance during thisperiod.

The political stance taken by the DFLP helped consolidate its image andinfluence, and deepened its respect amongst broad circles of the masses.This respect was reinforced further when the DFLP succeeded in launchingan initiative to resume dialogue with the Fatah movement following the "war against the camps ", and following the decision of the Jordaniangovernment to suspend coordination with the PLO on 13/2/1986. Theinitiative soon gained momentum and paved the way for the unifying PNCmeeting (Session 18) held in Algiers in April 1987, with the participation ofmost of the major national forces including the PFLP and the PLF who had

withdrawn from the "Salvation Front".

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(8)

The Great Intifada.. National and Party obligations1987-1991

1. The turbulent events experienced by the Palestinian NationalMovement along with the growth of the DFLP's role, size and influence onthe masses, had shown the need to systemize the democratic practicewithin the party's ranks, and its relationship with the other democratic massorganizations, especially as the DFLPs position was witnessing aqualitative transition within the Palestinian National Movement. Thistransition was described in the report submitted to the Second GeneralNational Conference in August 1991.

The report recommended that the party "should develop its position in the

national and popular movement from mere lobbying for decision making toacting as an actual partner in the national decision making process." Thetransition also required a basic development in the DFLP's platforms, andthe mode of its relationship with the masses. This was no longer possiblethrough initiatives at the leadership level, but rather through extendedpartnership in the decision making process, by developing and enriching theparty's platforms and in the monitoring its policies by party grassroots whoare closer to the people and more representative of their concerns andinterests.

This necessity was contradicted by an excessively centralized leadershipthat was beginning to shake internal harmony under pressure of violentrightist transformations during the 1980's within the structure of thePalestinian National Movement and on the Arab and international scene.This led some elements of this leadership to gradually move closer towardsthe political and tactical stance of the influential national bourgeois wing inthe PLO leadership. With the buildup of pressure towards thesetransformations along with unwillingness and reluctance to develop DFLPorganizations and programs, the conditions ripened for the defection ofthese leading elements to the positions of the national bourgeoisie. Duringthe course of the internal conflict this group became an organized minority

block in a number of DFLP organizations.

2. This difference led to the gradual growth of an internal crisis, whichaccelerated with the rise of the popular Intifada in the West Bank and Gazaon 9/12/1987. In fact, the Intifadahad been predicted by the DFLP since1973. Over 15 years, its literature had never ceased to monitor andanalyze the indicators of an imminent uprising and had prepared therequired program and organizational structures.

Thus, the DFLP was ready to take the initiative in leading the Intifada andensuring its durability. This was perfectly put into effect by the DFLP's

command and organizations inside the occupied territories, where theyplayed a leading role in drafting the Intifada's program, forming its unified

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national leadership, and elaborating the struggle's tactics, especially inrelation to destroying the local bases of the occupation authority,strengthening the tools of popular power and taking advantage of thelessons derived from analyzing the preliminary development stages of thepopular movement within the Intifada. Indeed, the DFLP had assumed a

guiding and leading role in the Intifada's sustainability and escalation,especially during the first half of 1988.

However, the outbreak of the Intifada also signalled with insistance theneed for a renewal in the DFLPs programs and structure. The nature of thechange was identified by the Second General National Conference's reportas a development process of the Front's platform, turning it from a programof preparation and groundwork for the imminent popular uprising into aprogram for the ongoing Intifada, to crystallyze its concepts and moreconcretely shaping its victory. The Intifada caused a fundamental change inthe Palestinian National Movement, by shifting the weight of national

resistance to the internal front in the West Bank and Gaza. There was aneed to renew the organizational structure of the DFLP and re-shape theinternal and external relationships between the Diaspora and the OccupiedPalestinian Territory.

3. The Intifada caused decisive repercussions at the Arab-Palestinianlevel, as expressed by the resolutions of the extraordinary "Arab Summit"that was held in Algiers on 7-9 June 1988 to support the Intifada.

The Algiers Summit resolutions underlined the demand for an independentPalestinian state and supported the right of PLO as sole legitimaterepresentative of the Palestinian people to attend the internationalconference to be held under UN auspices, on the basis of PLO resolutionsinsisting on the right to self-determination, the right of and the right to anindependent state.

It is worth mentioning that the previous Arab summit that was held inAmman on November 1987 sought to curtail the position of the Palestiniancause as the core of Arab concerns, and to undermine the representativerole of the PLO and Palestinian national rights in a blatant attempt torenege on the Rabat summit resolutions of 1974.

It was against this background that the Algiers Summit acquired exceptionalsignificance in the history of Arab summits and the position towards thePalestinian question, a matter which made it the most important Arabmilestone in this regard since the Rabat Summit. With the failure of itsattempts at the Algiers Summit to prevent the reversal of the AmmanSummit, Jordan came to the correct conclusion and declared on 28 July1988 the cancellation of its development plan for the occupied territories. On30 July 1988, Jordan dissolved the Jordanian House of Representativeswhich had embraced representatives from the West Bank.. Finally, on 31July 1988, Jordan announced its legal and administrative disengagement

from the West Bank, a resolution which opened the door for tangible steps

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by the PLO to assert the principle of Palestinian sovereignty over the WestBank and Gaza (including East Jerusalem) with respect to international law.

4.The decisive repercussions of the Intifada at the Arab-Palestinian level,gave rise to two main priorities:

The first was the need to shape up the Intifada and the PLO program todeal with the new situation in order to reinforce the achievements Intifadaon the ground, and at the Arab and international levels and turn them intotangible political gains. The second was the need to re-evaluate theJordanian-Palestinian relationship in light of the new developments, whichmeant the need to reformulate the program of Palestinian national action inJordan, with its impact on the DFLP structure, composition and itsrelationship with its Jordanian twin organization "the Democratic FrontOrganization" in Jordan (MAJD).

These critical turning points in the Intifada's course of action and thenational movement as well as the questions they raised and the greatmissions they involved, came while the world was about to stand on thedoors of decisive dramatic transformations late in the 1980's. At that time,the Soviet Union and, with it, the socialist camp started to fall apart.Perestroika gave way to the growth of ambitions by counter-revolutionaryforces to return to capitalism and retreat from the socialist course. Thesedevelopments caused a severe crisis in the leftist camp worldwide and ledto a state of ideological uncertainty, disintegration and collapse of many ofits forces and parties.

All these factors exacerbated and complicated the DFLPs internal crisis .which flared up in the Political Bureau . The conflict started as a disputeover the position that should have been taken by the PLO in the wake ofJordan's disengagement from the WB. But, soon it turned into a conflictbetween two opinions extending over ideology, politics and organization.The conflict continued for three years and ended with the withdrawal of theminority early in 1991 from the DFLP to establish its own party

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(9)

Programmatic and Structural Renewal1991-1994

1. The split was the result of a shift away from the conceptual and politicalpositions of the DFLP. Were it not for that, internal differences could havebeen resolved through dialogue and debate within the ranks of theorganization without reaching the point of separation. However, assubsequent developments revealed this relatively extended disagreement,was in reality of an ideological, political and programmatic nature and couldnot have been resolved within a single party. This was the reason that ledthe dissenting group to withdraw from the DFLP and adopt the rightist policyof the national bourgeoisie at the leadership of the PLO.

The disagreement and the resultant tactical and conflictual impeded theresolution of the crisis and distorted the party's understanding of itsconstituents. It also disseminated confusion and complexities over theinternal dialogue seeking to elaborate responses to the immensechallenges raised by the Intifada, and by the dramatic global shift towardsthe right, and towards capitalist systems as well as the collapse of the "ArabSteadfastness and Solidarity Front" after a series of setbacks, the mostsignificant of which were the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement and the firstand second Gulf wars.

Consequently, the required process of programmatic and structural renewalbecame distorted and confused. However, the DFLP was aware thatrenewal was the way out of the crisis through encouraging democraticpractice within its ranks, including activating the role of the party'sgrassroots in decision making and in laying down programs and policies.

For the Democratic Front, as well as for all or most national groups,programmatic renewal required the provision of concrete answers to anumber of crucial issues that emerged forcefully. when the Palestinianmovement entered the Intifada phase as a peoples movement seeking toattain national rights, with the resultant repercussions on the Arab world,

especially at the Palestinian-Jordanian level. All this occurred while theworld witnessed accelerating transformations which brought to an endbilateral global polarization in favor of a unilateral American role, followingthe collapse of the socialist bloc and the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

From the beginning it was evident that programmatic and structuralrenewal hinged upon the depth of internal dialogue on these issues, and itsoutreach within the party at large in order to unite around a program basedon options that can illuminate the road ahead and enable the party to bettershoulder its national role. Hence, the renewal process was linked to thedevelopment of democratic practice within the DFLP, as the principle means

of resuming an effective role amongst the people and within the Palestinianmovement.

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2. In this regard, it was always stressed that democracy within the partywas fundamentally the process of stimulating the role of the grassroots. Itensured their participation in the decision making process and inelaborating programs and policies culminating with the election, from the

base to the top, of the leadership entrusted with translating these programsand policies into practice through specific practical steps.

Therefore, the 1990s witnessed concrete developments in this direction.Over a period of seven years, four conferences and congresses, wereconvened with members elected in this manner, from the base to the top..,

This included the Second General National Conference in 1991, the ThirdGeneral National Congress in 1994, the Third General National Conferencein 1998, and the Fourth General National Congress in 1998. based onreports and documents these meetings Intense internal dialogue preceded .

All levels of the organization, particularly the base participated, actively anddynamically in these meetings.

Through this widespread internal dialogue and the Conferences andCongresses, the DFLP completed its programmatic responses to the mainissues facing the national movement and the DFLP itself, This included itspolitical program, the consequent course of action, and the derivative tacticsof struggle including the appropriate organizational forms. These weredocumented in reports endorsed by conferences, congresses and meetingsof the Central Committee and the Political Bureau, as well as by regionalconferences., They were subsequently translated into action plans andpractical directions by the organization and its allies. However, this processhas experienced, and continues to experience, a number of alterationsduring the course of a slow and winding road which has not yet reached itsfinal stages..

In this context, we refer to two important milestones which the DFLPsurmounted during the course of programmatic renewal:

The first milestone occurred in the context of the Second General NationalConference in 1991, when the consequences of the internal crisis were

addressed, and directives drawn on internal mobilization to meet theimmense obligations raised by the launch of the political negotiationprocess in the region at the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference onOctober 30, 1991.

The secondmilestone was embodied by the Third General NationalCongress in 1994, which reviewed and developed in depth the results of theSecond General National Conference, specifically on the following issues:

a) The prospects posed by the great Intifada following the AlgiersSummit,, Jordanian disengagement from the West Bank and signing

the Oslo Accords.

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b) Palestinian - Jordanian relations.c) The results and repercussions of the deep internal transformations

following the collapse of the socialist bloc and the disintegration ofthe Soviet Union.

d) Renewal of the political program and internal statutes, and theconsequent recommendations and directives at the political andorganizational levels

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(10)

The Second General NationalConference & the ThirdGeneralNational Congress1991 and 1994

1. The first station on the road toward programmatic renewal wasembodied by the DFLP's Second General NationalConference on July23-27, 1991. It was entitled "Conference", instead of "Congress", becauseits dense agenda could not include all topics under discussion including thedraft political program and draft internal statutes as well as thereassessment of the DFLPs experience in building socialism and therenewal of its connection with scientific socialism (methodology and vision)following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless theConfererence was in practical terms a democratically elected Congressthrough regional and sub-regional congresses, which in their turn had been

elected upwards from grassroots organizations throughout 1990. For thefirst time it was a complete electoral process since it included DFLPorganizations in occupied Palestinian territory, despite the prevailingunderground work conditions, allowing for comprehensive organizationalrepresentation at the Conference. Participants debated and voted on alldocuments and draft resolutions as well as elected the Fourth DFLP CentralCommittee..

The Conference was met after the first Gulf war and as the United Stateswas conducting rapid preparations to complete the conditions required forconvening the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference (October 31, 1991).The General National Conference discussed a political report whichincluded an analysis on the development of the Intifada, the surroundingArab and international conditions, the repercussions of the second Gulf war,the development of political efforts to reach a settlement to the Arab-Israeliconflict and the Palestinian question, and United States formulas andproposals for convening a peace conference on the Middle East. ..

The General National Conference called for the escalation of the Intifadaand enhancing the methods for its support and reinforcement, as well asadherence to the right of independent Palestinian representation with

insistence on the right of the PLO alone to represent the Palestinian peopleand speak on its behalf in accordance with the Palestinian Peace Initiativeissued at the Nineteenth session of the Palestine National Council onNovember 15, 1988, and to look forward to a comprehensive and balancedpeace based on the implementation of international resolutions on thePalestinian question.

2. The Second General National Conference examined the CentralCommittee 's report on the internal crisis which began in the middle of1988. The report included an objective analysis of its roots andcomponents, the most significant lessons learned as well as, the directions

for achieving democratic renewal within the party and in its relationship withthe masses. Chapter four of the report contained a series of broad

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4. The Third General National Congress approved the new version of theinternal statutes based on the renewal of central democratic contents bydeepening internal democratic practice in the party's activity and itsrelationship with the masses. Thus, new mechanisms of internal democratic

practice were developed, the most significant of which were a) annulment ofthe right to automatic membership in conferences for members of leadingbodies; b) adoption of the principle of election by lower organizations; c)adoption of a mechanism for the evaluation of candidates for membershipof the Central Committee through primary elections held by representativesfrom their regions; and d) upgrading the party's review process by formingregional and sub-regional oversight committees.

possess the characteristics of a people or a nation. In this context attention should be

drawn to two points:Distinction should be made between the recognition of the existenceof an Israeli people in the formation process, and already formed nationally, and the

recognition of the so-called "right of Israel to exist". The first is a de facto recognition,

and no revolutionary party can build its platform based on ignoring a fait accompli,

even if this has occurred due to an aggressive forcible process that caused a historic

injustice to the Palestinian people. However, recognition of the so-called " right of Israel

to exist" is a different matter. It is an ideological and political stance which implies

acceptance of one of the principal foundations of the Zionist Project and Zionist

ideology, "the right of Jews to immigrate and settle in Palestine, and establish a closed

Hebrew State, declaring it a home for all Jews in the world on Palestinian soil".

Moreover, it implies support of Zionist aggression and usurpation, as well as recognition

of its legitimacy.

The DFLP political program proceeds from an implicit distinction, however obvious,

between these two positions , and the awareness that there is an Israeli nationality in the

state of formation, and that its formation is a result of an aggressive, imperialist, settler

and usurping process at the expense of the national rights and national entity of the

Palestinian people, a matter which casts on this nationality a usurping attribute,

practicing oppression against another people.

In this context, the political platform asserts that "stripping off the national formation

process of the Israeli people of its imperialist-settler, aggressive and usurping

characteristics, freeing it from permanent dependence on imperialist support and

providing conditions for its normal development requires overcoming the Zionist project

and reaching a radical democratic solution that guarantees the restoration of national

equality for the Palestinian people's in a unified democratic Palestine".Recognition of the existence of an Israeli people in the state of formation, and its

already formed nation, does not mean adopting the reactionary slogan calling for "the

right of self-determination for the two peoples". For Marxists, the slogan for self-

determination is a democratic one applicable to nations that suffer from colonial

oppression and imperialist hegemony. It aims to struggle to free them from oppression

in the context of the general anti-imperialist struggle. It is not applicable to aggressive

nationalities which practice oppression against another people in alliance with world

imperialism. The right of self-determination for the two peoples involves implicit and

erroneous acceptance of the so-called " right of Israel to exist". Therefore, the DFLP

political program recommends the adoption of the principle of "national equalitybetween the two peoples" instead of this reactionary slogan consistent with Zionist

ideology.

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The Third General National Conference defined the principles andmechanism for the election of the Sixth Central Committee. In conductingthese elections, a democratic mechanism was used in evaluating thecandidates based on pre-determined description of responsibilities andevaluation criteria in accordance with the nominations made at the primaries

where the candidates were located.

3. On April 24 and 26 and May 8, 1998, the DFLP held its FourthGeneral NationalCongress in three sessions.covering the West Bankincluding Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, ,and for Palestinians in exile. Itendorsed the organizational results of the Third General NationalConference.

The Fourth General National Conference discussed the political report andapproved the comprehensive national initiative to extend the sovereignty ofthe Palestine state over all Palestinian territory occupied in the wake of the

1967 Israeli aggression. In this regard, the Conference examined at lengththe prospects facing the Palestinian question once the transitional period ofthe Oslo Accord ends on May 4, 1999. With the end of this phase, decisivehistoric duties and tasks will be required at the national level in order toliberate the national issue from the dictates of Oslo. leading to theestablishment of a joint national program..

As a result, the Conference elaborated a comprehensive national politicalinitiative to confront this historic challenge, embodied by the establishmentof an independent Palestinian State, with Jerusalem as its capital. throughextending national sovereignty over the entire Palestinian territory occupiedafter the June 1967 aggression. The Conference also approved thecomponents of this political initiative, the fundamental conditions for itssuccess, and the immediate steps required for its implementation

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Negotiations at a Deadlock1998-2000

1. With more settlements built, the already stumbling negotiation processreached a clear deadlock after the Likud Bloc, led by Netanyahu, won theKnesset elections on May 30, 1996 and formed an overt rightist coalitiongovernment opposing the Oslo Accords. Soon, Netanyahu's governmentclashed with the "Habat el-Nafaq" (the Tunnel Uprising) in September1996. Netanyahu was forced to renegotiate also under foreign pressure the Hebron issue, in which an agreement had been previously reached withthe former government (led by Shimon Perez, leader of the Labor Party),but the implementation of the agreement was postponed for considerationsrelated to the elections in Israel. The Hebron Protocol was signed, later, onJanuary 17, 1997. The part on dividing the city between the Palestinians

and the settlers was put into force, while the part on redeployment in theWB remained suspended.

In this climate, the DFLP launched in February 1997 an initiative for"national dialogue and restoration of national unity within the framework ofthe PLO". With Israel pulling back from its commitments concerning thetransitional phase, the DFLP launched in 1989 as previously mentioned the initiative to extend the sovereignty of the State of Palestine to the entirePalestinian territories occupied in 1967. However, it was received withapathy, reservation and sometimes hostility from many political forces bothwithin the Palestinian Authority and within the opposition. This situationcompelled the Democratic Front to launch an extended political campaign inorder to turn the "initiative" into a national confrontation and mobilize thepeople to overstep the Oslo Accords with their restrictions and injunctions.

The Israeli government did not meet its commitments for redeployment inthe West Bank as provided in the Hebron Protocol. Hence, thecommitments in favor of the Palestinians in the Oslo Accords were put onhold for nearly two years. On November 23rd, 1998 the Wye Rivermemorandum was reached at the end of difficult negotiations which createdan optimistic climate in some circles, but it soon faded as the memorandum

shelved in line with preceding agreements.

2. Against this background, there was widespread belief that it wasimpossible to reach an agreement through negotiations. In this climate, callsfor extending Palestinian sovereignty over the whole of the occupiedterritory gained momentum. When the Central Council of the PLO met onApril 27th, 1999, one year after the launch of the Democratic Front'sinitiative, the majority of the Council supported terminating the transitionalphase and opted for extending Palestinian sovereignty. However, theinfluential minority at the leadership of the Palestinian Authority and thePLO called implicitly for the extension of the transitional phase upon

direct request from Washington (Clinton's message to Yasser Arafat onApril 26th, 1999) and it was their opinion that prevailed.

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Thus, the option of extending sovereignty was excluded and, instead, theOslo mechanisms with regard to the transitional phase were adopted (i.e.pressuring to implement the Wye River memorandum). It was assumed thatif the Labor Party led by Barak would win the Knesset elections on May 15th,

1999 and lead the government, it would resume negotiations with thePalestinians.

3. But, Barak, who has basically opposed the Oslo Accords since he wasa member of the Rabin-led government, reemphasized his hawkish positionfrom the first moment of his election. He pushed for freezing the Wye Riveraccord in favor of rescheduling redeployment, postponing the obligations ofthe transitional period (i.e. the largest part of redeployment) until aframework agreement on permanent status is reached. This was whathappened in the Taba memorandum reached on September 4, 1999, whichremained unimplemented like precedi

The Democratic Front

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