The Creation of the Intelligence Community

7/31/2019 The Creation of the Intelligence Community

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TheCreationoftheIntelligence Community:


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For sale by the Superintendent o Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

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ISBN 978-0-16-090937-5


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Table of Contents

Mission Statements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

The Founding of the Post-WWII US Intelligence

Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Cornerstone Box. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution. . . . . . . . 5

Milestones in the Creation of the USIntelligence Community. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Selected Intelligence Documents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22


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Mission Statements i

The History Staff in the CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence

fosters understanding of the Agencys history and its relationship

to todays intelligence challenges by communicating instructive

historical insights to the CIA workforce, other US Government agen-

cies, and the public. CIA historians research topics on all aspects

of Agency activities and disseminate their knowledge through pub-

lications, courses, briefings and web-based products. They also

work with other Intelligence Community historians on publication

and education projects that highlight interagency approaches to

intelligence issues. Lastly, the CIA History Staff conducts an am-

bitious program of oral history interviews that are invaluable for

preserving institutional memories that are not captured in the

documentary record.

The Historical Collections Division (HCD) of CIAs Information

Management Services is responsible for executing the Agencys

Historical Review Program. This program seeks to identify and de-

classify collections of documents that detail the Agencys analysis

and activities relating to historically significant topics and events.

HCDs goals include increasing the usability and accessibility of

historical collections. HCD also develops release events and part-

nerships to highlight each collection and make it available to the

broadest audience possible.

The mission of HCD is to:

nPromote an accurate, objective understanding of the information

and intelligence that has helped shape major US foreign policy

decisions.

nBroaden access to lessons-learned, presenting historical mate-

rial that gives greater understanding to the scope and context of

past actions.

nImprove current decision-making and analysis by facilitating

reflection on the impacts and effects arising from past foreign

policy decisions.

n Showcase CIAs contributions to national security and provide

the American public with valuable insight into the workings of

its government.

nDemonstrate the CIAs commitment to the Open Government Ini-

tiative and its three core values: Transparency, Participation, and

Collaboration.


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The VC-54C Sacred Cow

When President Franklin D. Roosevelt flew to the Casablanca Conference in 1943 on board a

commercial Boeing 314 Clipper Ship, he became the first U.S. president to fly while in office. Concerned

about relying upon commercial airlines to transport the president, the USAAF leaders ordered the

conversion of a military aircraft to accommodate the special needs of the Commander in Chief.

After encountering difficulties with converting a C-87A transport , the USAAF arranged with Douglas

Aircraft to construct a new transport aircraft specifically for presidential use. Nicknamed the Sacred

Cow, this VC-54C became the first military aircraft to transport a U.S. president when President

Roosevelt took it to the USSR for the Yalta Conference in February 1945.

On 26 July 1947, President Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947 while on board the

Sacred Cow. This act established the Air Force as an independent service, making the Sacred Cowthe

birthplace of the USAF.

Extracted and quoted from: The National Museum of the US Air Force


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Introduction 1

Its ortuous Creation Initially Revealed in Eight Hundred Newly Declassified

Documents Released by CIA's Inormation Management Services/Historical Collections

Division at a special Release Event at Culver Academies, Culver, Indiana, 14 May 2009

Elizabeth Bancroft

A W W II , General Wil-

liam Donovan, head o the Office o Strategic Services the

wartime intelligence agency run by the War Department

put orth a plan to continue intelligence activities as an

independent agency reporting directly to the President. Te

need was recognized, but his proposal as presented, met a

cautious, chilly reception. Other senior US officials began

debating the closing, restructuring, and creation o new

agencies or internal intelligence-gathering divisions within

existing arms o the government (ofen their own agenciesor military branches), to orm a new, centralized, post-war

US Intelligence Agency.

Tese plans aced a major obstacle: a skeptical Harry

ruman, as an unenthusiastic new President distrustul o

post-war secret intelligence activities becoming a perma-

nent government unction. As his first decision, ruman had

little hesitation in marshaling support or shuttering OSS at

wars end. But in its absence, the State Department, the Navy,

and the War Department recognized that a secret inorma-

tion vacuum loomed, triggering calls and discussions or the

creation o something to replace a wartime intelligence ser-vicesomething different rom OSSto take over in 1946.

Showing the need or a new, centralized capability, and

arriving at its creation, was not easy. It required skillul di-

plomacy, awareness o openly or secretly coveted activities

or interests by existing military, FBI, State, and other enti-

ties, and the desire to shape any new agency so it would work

seamlessly with, and support, existing military capabilities

and enterprises. Tese previously released documents alert

researchers to some o the plans and suggestions that were

colored by political expediency, conflicting goals, personal

antipathy to all orms o intelligence, and tur battles among

existing Intelligence Community playersall o it overlaid

by the widespread recognition that an expanded, permanent,

centralized intelligence group was urgently needed to ace

the post-War world.

Tis rich mix o declassified historic material weaves a

ascinating story o the twists and turns in communicationsand events that culminated in CIAs creation. Tey were thus

the perect tools or a public symposium jointly sponsored by

CIAs Historical Collections Division and the Culver Acad-

emies Global Studies Institute on 14 May 2009. Tis release

event hosted more than 300 students, aculty, and guests at

the Academies Indiana campus. Te symposium, titled Cre-

ating Global Intelligence: Te Creation o the US Intelligence

Community and Lessons or the 21st Century, spotlighted the

public release o more than 800 declassified documents rom

the late 1940s to the early 1950s. Te documents are a mon-

tage o notes, letters, memoranda, radio bulletins, briefings,minutes, routing slips, drafs, reports, speech transcripts, di-

rectives and executive orders. Tey display the considerable

political and legal finesse required to assess the plans, sug-

gestions, maneuvers, and actions that ultimately led to the

establishment o the Central Intelligence Agency and other

national security entities possessing special saeguards to

protect civil liberties.


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2 The Creation of the Intelligence Community: Founding Documents

It was the intent o Congress in establishing CIA to

establish an independent agency which would be the

ocal point o all oreign intelligence inormation, to

correlate and evaluate all such inormation and to

disseminate the product to the necessary Govern-

ment officials. Te Congress elt it had conerred the

statutory authority necessary or CIA to perorm

these unctions, even though it lef broad direction

largely to the NSC and the President. We believe

there is ample authority latent in the law, and that

adequate directives will permit CIA to ulfill the role

which, even now, the Congress believes the Agency is

playing as an essential element in the national de-

ense and security.

Lawrence R. Houston/2/

Walter L. Porzheimer

Memorandum From the General Counsel (Houston) and the Leg-

islative Liaison Officer o the Central Intelligence Agency (Porzheim-

er) to the Executive o the Central Intelligence Agency (Shannon)

Washington, 27 September 1949.

Tis symposium was particularly important because it

provided two beginnings. For scholars, the public, and the

students, the event presented the first beginning the many

steps that led to the ounding o CIA, highlighted through

declassified documents, one convoluted step afer another.

Te second beginning ell to the young symposium partici-

pants, or whom this was the first time they had heard officialgovernment and academic experts discuss the creation o the

modern intelligence establishment, and the first time they had

seen or worked with newly declassified national security and

intelligence documents. It also provided exposure to some o

the existing, and occasionally bewildering, intelligence war

year acronyms and entities: FBIS, CIG, ICAPS, IAC, CIA,

SSU, OSO, OSS, NIA, DCID, NSCID, IAB.1Symposium par-

ticipants were able to glimpse the give-and-take required by

military branches, government agencies, Congress, and the

White House, to establish duties, responsibilities, personnel,

leadership, reporting, unding, and physical locations or anentirely new agencytodays independent CIA.

Christine Burke, a Culver Academies Global Scholar,

opened the event by saying that reading the declassified

documents was like watching history come to lie. She

commended CIA or making the documents available to

the Culver students, noting that reading first-hand accounts

o historical events is a lot more intriguing than just read-

ing out o a textbook. CIA Chie Historian David Robarge

kicked off the event by describing how the United States in-

telligence requirements afer World War II interacted with

political, legal, and institutional orces leading to the over-

haul o the US national security apparatus. Tese activities

ushered the passage o the National Security Act o 1947,

which created a National Security Council, a Secretary o

Deense, a statutory Joint Chies o Staff, the Department o

the Air Force, and a Central Intelligence Agency.

Other speakers included NSA Chie Historian Dr. David

Hatch, who provided a presentation on how inter-service

rivalries in the field o communications intelligence cre-

ated the underpinnings or the creation o the National

Security Agency. Dr. David Barrett, Proessor o Political

Science, Villanova University, described how the relation-

ship between Congress and the Intelligence Community

has evolved since 1947; and Eugene Poteat, President o the

Association o Former Intelligence Officers, gave a personal

perspective o the role o intelligence in inorming senior

US policymakers.

Dr. John Buggeln, Director o the Global Studies Institute

and host or the symposium, closed the event noting that

the program contributed to the schools goal o providingstudents a orum or learning about significant events that

shaped the country, and our relations worldwide.

Each symposium attendee received a CD-ROM containing

the released documentsproviding detailed insight into the

complex issues senior US Government officials grappled with

in establishing the Intelligence Community.

1FBIS Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service; CIG Central Intelligence Group; ICAPS - Interagency Coordinating and Planning Staff ; IAC

Intelligence Advisory Committee; CIA Central Intelligence Agency; SSU Strategic S ervices Unit, War Department; OSO Office o Special Opera-

tions; OSS Office o Strategic Services; NIA National Intelligence Authority; DCID Director o Central Intelligence Directive; NSCID National

Security Council Intelligence Directive; and IAB Intelligence Advisory Board.


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Introduction 3

L-R: David Robarge, CIA Historian; David Hatch, NSA Historian; Eugene Poteat, President, AFIO; David

Barrett, Prof. of Pol. Sci., Villanova Univ.; John Buggeln, Director, Global Studies Institute.

History balances the rustration o how ar we have to go with the satisaction o how ar

we have come. It teaches us tolerance or the human shortcomings and imperections which are

not uniquely o our generation, but o all time.

Lewis F. Powell, Jr. US Supreme Court Justice


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President Dwight D.

Eisenhower at the

cornerstone laying

ceremony and installation

of a copper-covered steel

time capsule at the new

CIA Headquarters Building,

Langley, Virginia,

3 November 1959.

nA Text and Explanation of Statutes and Executive Orders

relating specifically to the Central Intelligence Agency, including

Enabling and Appropriations Acts for the construction of the

new CIA Building.

n Reproduction of the CIA seal and its official description.

n William J. Donovan and the National Security. A speech by

Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, to the Erie

County Bar Association, Buffalo, New York, 4 May 1959.

nAn aerial photograph of the area of the CIA Building site.

n Drawings of the CIA Building as it will appear when completed.

n The Program, a recording, and photographs of the Cornerstone

Ceremony.

n Microfilm copies of daily and weekly newspapers of

3 November 1959.



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Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution 5

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

...what have appeared to be the most striking successes have

ofen, i they are not rightly used, brought the most overwhelm-

ing disasters in their train, and conversely the most terrible ca-

lamities have, i bravely endured, actually turned out to benefit

the sufferers.

Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, Book III, 7

P H still echoed in Washing-

ton when President Harry ruman and Congressional lead-

ers passed the National Security Act o 1947. A joint Congres-sional investigation just a year earlier had concluded that the

Pearl Harbor disaster illustrated Americas need or a unified

command structure and a better intelligence system.1Indeed,

the President and many o his aides rightly believed that the

surprise attack could have been blunted i the various com-

manders and departments had coordinated their actions and

shared their intelligence. With that thought in mind, the cre-

ators o the National Security Act attempted to implement

the principles o unity o command and unity o intelligence,

ashioning a National Security Council, a Secretary o De-

ense, a statutory Joint Chies o Staff and a Central Intelli-gence Agency.

In almost the next breath, however, the National Security

Act made important concessions to the traditional Ameri-

can distrust o large military establishments and centralized

power. Te Act (among other qualifications) ensured that

the Joint Chies would not become a Prussian-style Gen-

eral Staff, created an independent air orce, and insisted

that the new Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) would have

no law enorcement powers. Te Act also decreed that the

intelligence divisions in the armed services and the civilian

departments (what came to be called the Intelligence Com-

munity) would remain independent o the CIA.

Since 1947, Directors o Central Intelligence (DCIs) have

served within the bounds o this ambiguous mandate. Tey

have had the responsibility o coordinating national intel-

ligence collection and production without a ull measure

o the authority they needed to do so. Many Presidents andCongressesnot to mention DCIshave expressed their

rustration with this ambiguity and have assumed that the

solution to the dilemmas it created lay in concentrating more

power in the office o the Director o Central Intelligence.

Tis centralizing impulse has prompted various reorms to

increase the Directors ability to lead the Intelligence Com-

munity. For years these attempts were made by the National

Security Council (NSC) through a series o NSC Intelligence

Directives. In the wake o the time o troubles or the Intel-

ligence Community in the mid-1970smarked by investiga-

tions into questions about excesses and accountabilitythreePresidents issued successive executive orders aimed at one

goal: rationalizing American intelligence and increasing the

DCIs power. Since the end o the Cold War, Congress itsel

has taken up the task, repeatedly amending the intelligence

sections o the National Security Act.

Te various regulations and amendments, however, have not

undamentally altered the ederalist intelligence structure


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created in 1947. Strong centriugal orces remain, particularly

in the Department o Deense and its Congressional allies. In-

deed, the case or centralization seems to be countered by his-

torical illustrations o the perils o excessive concentration. In

actual practice, the successul end to the Cold War and the lack

o any national intelligence disasters since then seem to mili-

tate in avor o keeping the existing structure until some crisis

proves it to be in dire need o repair.

REFORM AFTER WORLD WAR II

Te Agency began its statutory existence in September

1947its creation ratiying, in a sense, a series o decisions

taken soon afer the end o the Second World War.2 Tat

conflict ended in the summer o 1945 with Washington deci-

sionmakers in broad agreement that the United States need-

ed to reorm the intelligence establishment that had grown

so rapidly and haphazardly during the national emergency.

Nevertheless, when President ruman dissolved the wartime

Office o Strategic Services (OSS) in September 1945, he had

no clear plan or constructing the peacetime intelligence

structure that he and his advisers believed they needed in an

atomic age. President ruman wanted the reorms to be part

and parcel o the unification o the armed services, but the

overhaul o the military that the President wanted would take

time to push through Congress.3 In the interim, he created

a Central Intelligence Group (CIG) to screen his incoming

cables and supervise activities lef over rom the ormer OSS.

In early 1946, the White House authorized CIG to evaluateintelligence rom all parts o the government, and to absorb

the remnants o OSSs espionage and counterintelligence op-

erations.4Initially these disparate components o the new CIG

shared little in common except an interest in oreign secrets

and a sense that both strategic warning and clandestine ac-

tivities abroad required central coordination. Indeed, these

two missions came together in CIG almost by accident. Under

the first two Directors o Central Intelligence, however, CIG

and the ruman administration came to realize how strategic

warning and clandestine activities complemented one another.

Meanwhile, the military unification issue overshadowed

intelligence reorm in Congressional and White House de-

liberations. In mid-1946 President ruman called again on

Congress to uniy the armed services. Tat April, the Senates

Military Affairs committee had approved a unification bill

that provided or a central intelligence agency, but the draf

legislation had snagged in the hostile Naval Affairs commit-

tee.5Perhaps with that bill in mind, Secretary o War Robert

Patterson and Secretary o the Navy James Forrestal in May

agreed among themselves that a deense reorganization bill

should also provide or a central intelligence agency. President

ruman the ollowing month sent Congress the result o the

Secretaries accord (with modifications o his own), repeating

his call or lawmakers to send him a unification bill to sign.6

Te administrations judgment that a central intelligence

agency was needed soon firmed into a consensus that the new

Central Intelligence Group ought to orm the basis o this new

intelligence agency. Indeed, CIG continued to accrue missions

and capabilities. Oversight o the CIG was perormed by a

committee called the National Intelligence Authority (NIA),

comprising the Secretaries o State, War, and Navy, joined by

the Presidents chie military adviser, Admiral William Leahy.

National Intelligence Authority Directive 5, issued on 8 July

1946, provided the DCI with the basic implementation plan

or the broad scope o powers envisioned in President ru-

mans charter or CIG. Indeed, it was NIAD-5 that createdthe real difference between OSSan operations office with a

sophisticated analytical capabilityand CIG, a truly (albeit

fledgling) national intelligence service authorized to perorm

strategic analysis and to conduct, coordinate, and control clan-

destine activities abroad.

NIAD-5 represented perhaps the most expansive charter

ever granted to a Director o Central Intelligence. It allowed

13June:PresidentFranklinD.Rooseveltsignsamilitary

order establishingtheOfficeofStrategicServices(OSS)

andnamingWilliamJ. DonovanasitsDirector. Donovan

remainedacivilian until24March1943, whenhe was

appointedbrigadiergeneral.Headvancedtothe rank of

major generalon10November1944.


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CIG to centralize research and analysis in fields o national

security intelligence that are not being presently perormed

or are not being adequately perormed.7NIAD-5 also direct-

ed the DCI to coordinate all US oreign intelligence activities

to ensure that the over-all policies and objectives established

by this Authority are properly implemented and executed.

Te National Intelligence Authority through this directive

ordered the DCI to conduct all organized Federal espionage

and counter-espionage operations outside the United States

and its possessions or the collection o oreign intelligence

inormation required or the national security.

In NIAD-5, the National Intelligence Authority determined

that many oreign intelligence missions could be more effi-

ciently accomplished centrally and gave CIG he authority to

accomplish them. Tis in effect elevated CIG to the status o

being the primary oreign intelligence arm o the US govern-

ment. Tis mandate did not, however, give CIG the control-

ling role in intelligence analysis that DCI Hoyt Vandenberg

had sought. Te NIAs authorization was careully phrased to

allay ears that the DCI would take control o departmental

intelligence offices; the Cabinet departments were not about to

subordinate their own limited analytical capabilities to an up-

start organization. In addition, NIAD-5 did not orce a consol-

idation o clandestine activities under CIG control. Indeed, the

Army deended the independence o its Intelligence Divisions

own collection operations by arguing that NIAD-5 gave CIG

control only over organized oreign intelligence operations.

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

Congress initially paid scant attention to the new Central

Intelligence Group. Indeed, CIG had been established with

no appropriations and authority o its own precisely to keep

it beneath Congressional scrutiny. As CIG gained new au-

thority in 1946 and the White House gained confidence in

its potential, however, a consensus emerged in Congress that

postwar military reorms would not be complete without a

simultaneous modernization o American intelligence capa-

bilities.

Te budding consensus even survived the death o theruman administrations cherished unification bill in 1946.

Ironically, prospects or unification only brightened when

the opposition Republicans subsequently swept into control

o the Congress in that years elections, taking over the com-

mittee chairmanships and displacing powerul Democrats

who had made themselves (in Harry rumans words) the

principal stumbling blocks to unification.8With the Presi-

dents goal o military modernization suddenly in sight, the

White House firmly told DCI Vandenberg that enabling leg-

islation or CIG would remain a small part o the deense re-

orm bill then being re-drafed by the Presidents aides, and

that the intelligence section would be kept as brie as possible

in order to ensure that none o its details hampered the pros-

pects or unification.9

Tis tactic almost backfired. When President ruman senthis new bill orward in February 1947, the brevity o its intel-

ligence provisions had the effect o attractingnot deflect-

ingCongressional scrutiny. Members o Congress eventu-

ally debated almost every word o the intelligence section,

and made various adjustments. Ultimately, however, Con-

gress passed what was essentially the White Houses draf

with important sections transerred (and clarified in the pro-

cess) rom rumans 22 January 1946 directive establishing

CIGthus ratiying the major provisions o that directive.

Tus the Central Intelligence Agency would be an indepen-

dent agency under the supervision o the National SecurityCouncil; it would conduct both analysis and clandestine

activities, but would have no policymaking role and no law

enorcement powers; its Director would be confirmed by the

Senate and could be either a civilian or a military officer.

What did Congress believe the new CIA would do? esti-

mony and debates over the draf bill unmistakably show that

the lawmakers above all wanted CIA to provide the proposed

Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles at Cornerstone Box

ceremony for new CIA building, Langley, Virginia, 3 November 1959.


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National Security Councilthe new organization that would

coordinate and guide American oreign and deense poli-

cieswith the best possible inormation on developments

abroad. Members o Congress described the inormation

they expected CIA to provide as ull, accurate, and skillully

analyzed; coordinated, adequate and sound. Senior mili-

tary commanders testiying on the bills behal used similar

adjectives, saying the CIAs inormation should be authen-

ticated and evaluated; correct and based on complete

coverage. When CIA provided such inormation, it was be-

lieved, the NSC would be able to assess accurately the relative

strengths and weaknesses o Americas overseas posture and

adjust policies accordingly.10

Congress guaranteed CIAs independence and its access to

departmental files in order to give it the best chance to pro-

duce authoritative inormation or the nations policymakers.

CIA was to stand outside the policymaking departments o

the government, the better to correlate and evaluate intel-

ligence relating to the national security.11 Although other

departments and agencies would continue to handle intelli-

gence o national importance, the Agency was the only entity

specifically charged by the Act with the duty o producing

it. o assist in the perormance o this duty, the DCI had the

right to inspect all oreign intelligence held by other agen-

cies, as well as the right to disseminate it as appropriate. I the

DCI happened to be a military officer, then he was to be out-

side the chain o command o his home service; this would

help him resist any temptation to shade his reports to please

his superiors.12Finally, the Agency was to provide or the US

Government such services o common concern that the

NSC would determine could more efficiently be conducted

centrally. In practice, this meant espionage and other clan-

destine activities, as well as the collection o valuable inor-

mation rom open sources and American citizens.

Having approved the placement o these authorities and

activities under one head, Congress in 1947 expected that

CIA would provide the best possible intelligence and would

coordinate clandestine operations abroad. Congress also

implicitly assumed that the executive branch would manage

CIA and the Intelligence Community with these purposes in

mind.13Afer fixing this course in the statute books, Congress

stepped back and lef the White House and CIA to meet these

expectations. Tis was how Congress resolved the apparent

contradiction o creating central intelligence that was not

centrally controlled. Te institution o central intelligence

would henceorth steer between the two poles o centraliza-

tion and departmental autonomy.

NOT ONLY NATIONAL BUT CENTRAL

Congress passed the National Security Act on 26 July 1947

and President ruman immediately signed it into law. Te

act gave America something new in the annals o intelligencehistory; no other nation had structured its oreign intelligence

establishment in quite the same way. CIA would be an inde-

pendent, central agency, but not a controlling one; it would

both rival and complement the efforts o the departmental

intelligence organizations.14 Tis prescription o coordina-

tion without control guaranteed riction and duplication o

intelligence efforts as the CIA and the departmental agencies

pursued common targets, but it also ostered a potentially

healthy competition o views and abilities.

Te National Security Council guided the Intelligence

Community by means o a series o directives dubbedNSCIDs (the acronym stands or National Security Council

Intelligence Directive). Te original NSCIDs were issued in

the months afer the passage o the National Security Act.

Foremost was NSCID 1, titled Duties and Responsibilities,

which replaced NIAD-5 and established the basic responsi-

bilities o the DCI and the interagency workings o the Intel-

ligence Community.15

The National Security Act was amended on 10 August 1949, to put

the service secretaries under the aegis of the defense secretary. At

the same time, the National Military Establishment was renamed the

Department of Defense.


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NSCID 1 did not re-write NIAD-5, but instead started

aresh in the light o the debate over the National Security Act

and the experience recently gained by the new CIA. Where

the earlier document had authorized the DCI to coordinate

all Federal oreign intelligence activities and sketched the

initial outlines o his powers, NSCID 1 had to work within

the lines already drawn by Congress and precedent. Te Di-

rector who emerged rom NSCID 1 was more circumscribed

in his role and authority than previously. He was now to

make such surveys and inspections as he needed in giv-

ing the NSC his recommendations or the coordination o

intelligence activities. Nonetheless, the DCI wasin keep-

ing with Congress implicit intent in the National Security

Acta substantial presence in the intelligence establishment.

NSCID 1 gave the DCI an advisory committee comprising

the heads o the departmental intelligence offices, and told

him to produce intelligence (but to avoid duplicating de-

partmental unctions in doing so). Te type o intelligence

expected o him and his Agency was national intelligence, a

new term or the inormation that the National Security Act

called intelligence relating to the national security.16 Te

DCI was also to perorm or the benefit o the existing agen-

cies such services o common concern as the NSC deemed

could best be provided centrally. Te NSC lef the particu-

lars o these responsibilities to be specified in accompanying

NSCIDs (which eventually numbered 2 through 15 by the

end o the ruman administration in 1953).17

Under this regime, DCIs were aced with contradictory

mandates: they couldcoordinate intelligence, but they mustnot control it. Since the prohibitions in the statute and the

NSCIDs were so much clearer than the permissions, every

DCI naturally tended to steer on the side o looser rather

than tighter oversight o common Intelligence Community

issues. Because o this tendency to emphasize coordination

instead o control, CIA never quite became the integrator o

US intelligence that its presidential and congressional parents

had envisioned. Te DCI never became the manager o the

Intelligence Community, his Agency never won the power

to inspect the departments operational plans or to extract

community-wide consensus on disputed analytical issues,

and CIA never had authority over all clandestine operations

o the US Government.

REVISIONS AND OVERSIGHT

Tis ederalized intelligence structure did not satisy the

White House. Indeed, presidents rom Dwight Eisenhower

through Richard Nixon sought to adjust the NSCIDs to im-

prove the unctioning o the Intelligence Community, pri-

marily by pushing successive DCIs to exert more controlover common community issues and programs. President

Eisenhower paid particular attention to this issue, approving

in 1958 the first major revisions o NSCID 1. Te Septem-

ber 1958 version o the revised directive added a preamble

stressing the need or efficiency across the entire national in-

telligence effort, and began its first section by declaring Te

Director o Central Intelligence shall coordinate the oreign

intelligence activities o the United States.

Te September 1958 version o NSCID 1 also added a sec-

tion on community responsibilities that listed the duties o

1 October:President Harry S. Trumans Executive

Order 9621 abolishes the OSS and transfers its

functions to the State and War Departments.

CIA office workers, circa 1950.


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equidistant between the executive and legislative branches.21

Not until the 1990s, however, did these changes significantly

affect the duties and responsibilities o the DCI and the In-

telligence Community.

INTO A NEW ERA

For the duration o the Cold War, the White House kept nudg-

ing successive Directors o Central Intelligence to do more to

lead the Intelligence Community. DCIs more or less tried to

comply. Te statutory and institutional obstacles to centraliza-

tion, however, proved daunting. Each DCI held budgetary and

administrative sway only over the Central Intelligence Agency;the much larger budgets and staffs o the intelligence agencies

in the Department o Deense (and their smaller cousins in

other departments) remained firmly under cabinet-level offi-

cials who saw no reason to cede power to a DCI. Faced with

this reality, DCIs had tended to let their community coordina-

tion duties suffer and to concentrate on the management o the

CIA. Congress had intended a different course, however, and

in the 1990s the legislative branch began its own campaign to

encourage greater coordination in the Intelligence Community.

Te end o the Cold War saw a subtle shif in Congressio-

nal attitudes toward intelligence. With the political need or a

peace dividend acutely elt, Congress and the White House

oversaw a gradual decline in real deense spending that a-

ected the Intelligence Community as well. Declining deense

budgets soon meant relatively declining intelligence budgets,

which in turn put a premium on cost-cutting, consolidation

and efficiency. Similar concerns had suraced during the de-

bate over the creation o CIA (when demobilization, not the

incipient Cold War, was still the primary consideration in de-

ense budgeting).22o many members o Congress in 1992as

in 1947the answer seemed to lie in increased authority or

the DCI, who in turn could motivate a leaner, more agile Intel-

ligence Community.

Congress in the 1990s partially supplanted E.O. 12333

with a series o amendments to the National Security Act.

Tose amendments were occasionally proscriptive (like the

prohibitions added in the 1980s), but ofen they mandated

various acts by the DCI. Te intelligence-related passages o

the National Security Actwhich had hardly been amended

at all beore 1980grew rom 22 pages o text in the 1990

edition o the House Permanent Select Committee on Intel-

ligences Compilation o Intelligence Laws to 48 pages in the

2000 version.23

Foremost among these amendments was the Intelligence

Organization Act o 1992.24Inspired by the reorms o the Joint

Chies o Staff accomplished in the 1986 Goldwater-NicholsAct, the legislationor the first time in a statutespecified

the roles (as opposed to the duties) o the Director o Central

Intelligence.25Te DCI was to serve as head o the Intelligence

Community, as principal intelligence adviser to the president,

and as head o the CIA. As principal intelligence adviser he

was to provide the nations senior policymakers, commanders,

and lawmakers with national intelligence that was timely,

objective, independent o political considerations, and based

on all sources. As head o the Agency he was to collect and

evaluate intelligence (particularly rom human sources), and

to perorm services o common concern and such other unc-tions and duties as had been suggested since 1947. As head

o the Intelligence Community he was to develop the Com-

munitys budget, to advise the Secretary o Deense in the ap-

pointments o chies or the militarys joint intelligence agen-

cies, to set collection requirements and priorities, to eliminate

unneeded duplication, and to coordinate the communitys re-

lationships with oreign intelligence services.

After the bills House passage, floor leader Representative James

W. Wadsworth of New York remarked, It [the CIA] will be a gather-

ing point for information coming from all over the world through all

channels concerning the potential strength of other nations and theirpolitical intentions. Wadsworth continued, There is no secret every

nation in the world is doing the same thing.


19/45


Te Intelligence Organization Act also codified the DCIs

budgetary powers as described in E.O. 12333, considerably

strengthening their provisions. Te Act decreed that the

budgets o the various components o the Intelligence Com-

munity could not be incorporated into the annual National

Foreign Intelligence Program until approved by the DCI, and

required all agencies to obtain DCI approval beore repro-

gramming any NFIP unds. In addition, the Act gave the Di-

rector something new: a careully limited authority to shif

unds and personnel rom one NFIP project to another (pro-

vided he obtained approvals rom the White House, Con-

gress, and the affected agencys head).

Events at mid-decade lent new urgency to the unfinished

task o modernizing the Intelligence Community. At CIA,

the arrest o Aldrich Ames and the spy scandal that en-

sued led to bipartisan calls or reorm o the Agency. Te

subsequent Republican takeover o Congress in the 1994

elections seemed to provide an opportunity or sweeping

changes in the community as a whole. Finally, the re-order-

ing o national priorities afer the end o the Cold War had

meant substantial budget cuts or the US military, result-

ing in reduced budgets and lower personnel ceilings or the

Intelligence Community.26While military and intelligence

resources had been reduced in early 1990s, however, Wash-

ington committed American orces to several, major over-

seas deployments in Arica, the Balkans, the Middle East,

and the Caribbean.

Te White House responded to the new situation by re-

ordering intelligence priorities. Te burgeoning militarydeployments demanded ever more tactical intelligence sup-

port, and President William Clinton issued a 1995 presiden-

tial order (PDD-35) instructing the Intelligence Community

to provide it. Explaining his directive at CIA headquarters a

ew months later, he emphasized that the Communitys first

priority was to support the intelligence needs o our mili-

tary during an operation. Commanders in the field needed

prompt, thorough intelligence to ully inorm their deci-

sions and maximize the security o our troops.27Since the

military spent most o the 1990s deployed in one peacekeep-

ing operation afer another (ofen with more than one tak-

ing place at a time), the result o the commitment in PDD-35

was a diversion o shrinking national, strategic intelligence

resources to growing, tactical missions.

Congress took a little longer to respond. In 1995 Con-

gressional and outside critics coalesced in no ewer than six

separate panels to study the US intelligence effort and recom-

mend reorms.28Almost all o the reports published by these

groups endorsed a greater degree o centralization and en-

hanced authority or the Director o Central Intelligence. 29

Te wide variance in the size and scope o the study groups

which ranged in stature rom academic colloquia to the pres-

identially-appointed Brown-Aspin commissionseemed

to highlight their basic agreement on this issue. Te Brown-

Aspin commission report perhaps expressed the eeling best.

Afer considering arguments or decentralization, the report

cited President rumans disgust with the bureaucratic rival-

ry that contributed to the disaster at Pearl Harbor and con-

cluded that returning to a more decentralized system would

be a step in the wrong direction. Te report declined to sug-

gest alterations in the undamental relationship between the

DCI and the Secretary o Deense, but nonetheless urged

a strengthening o the DCIs ability to provide centralized

management o the Intell igence Community.30

Congress heeded the conclusions and the recommenda-

tions o these several reports when it drafed the Intelli-

gence Renewal and Reorm Act o 1996. Tat Act, among its

other provisions, required the Secretary o Deense to win

the concurrence o the DCI in appointing directors or theNational Security Agency, the new National Imagery and

Mapping Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office.

Under the Act, the DCI would also write (or the NSC) an-

nual perormance appraisals o these three agencies.31Te

Act also gave the DCI several new aides (nominated by the

President and confirmed by the Senate) to assist in man-

aging the Intelligence Community: a Deputy Director o

Central Intelligence or Community Management, as well

as Assistant Directors o Central Intelligence or Collection,

Analysis and Production, and Administration. It also en-

18 September:The National Security Act of 1947

establishes the National Security Council and the

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to replace the

National Intelligence Authority and the Central

Intelligence Group.


20/45


hanced the DCIs role as an adviser to the Pentagons tac-

tical and inter-service intelligence programs, strengthened

his limited ability to reprogram money and personnel

between national intelligence programs and created a sub-

committee o the NSC to establish annual priorities or the

Intelligence Community.

Congress did not, however, resist the shif o national

means to tactical ends. Te shif o intelligence resources

toward support or military operations worried officials and

observers o the Intelligence Community. Indeed, DCI Rob-

ert Gates complained as early as 1992 that cuts in the deense

budget were orcing the military to trim tactical intelligence

programs and pass their work on to the national intelli-

gence services.32PDD-35 seemed to make the situation even

more acute. More than one appraisal in the year afer its issu-

ance warned that support to the warfighter could demand

a disproportionate share o intelligence efforts; a Congres-

sional study even blamed PDD-35, in part, or this develop-

ment.33Nevertheless, these worries remained on the margins

o the debate or several more years.

CONTRADICTORY IMPULSES

Te net effect o the changes made both by the White House

and by Congress under both Republican and Democratic

majorities was to urge the DCI to exercise more control over

the Intelligence Community while limiting his reedom to

allocate national intelligence resources among competing

priorities. Members o Congress collectively seemed impa-tient with executive branch implementation o reorms to

streamline and motivate the community during a long de-

cade o shrinking real deense budgets. At the same time,

however, no Congress seriously considered orcing the

various civi lian and military agencies into a unitary sys-

tem with a Director o Central Intelligence (or whatever the

title) transormed into a true intelligence czar. Te execu-

tive branch neither assisted nor resisted this congressional

impulse to enhance the DCIs authority and the centraliza-

tion o the Intelligence Community. In effect, however, the

White Houses aorementioned actions with regard to intel-ligence were anything but neutral.

Te contradictory impulses affecting the Intelligence

Community showed in the way the executive and legislative

branches together crafed a 1996 law, the National Imagery

and Mapping Agency (NIMA) Act, which created the De-

partment o Deense agency o that name out o components

rom CIA and Deense. While this marked a diminution o

the DCIs direct control over imagery analysis, the NIMA

Act took pains to preserve DCI authority to prioritize assign-

ments or national imagery collection assets and to resolve

conflicts among competing priorities.34 Te net effect was

ambiguous; the DCI and the CIA lost actual, day-to-day con-

trol over an important component o the Intelligence Com-

munity, but gained a statutory voice in the nations employ-

ment o that component.

In 1998 DCI George enet issued a reconstituted series o

Director o Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs), led by a

new DCID-1/1, titled Te Authorities and Responsibilities o

the Director o Central Intelligence as Head o the US Intelli-

gence Community. DCIDs had traditionally not been issued

as policy statements; they had essentially been implementing

documents or the policies established in the NSCIDs (and

later in the executive orders). DCID 1/1 stayed well within

this tradition, but provided an important reerence or the

entire community by arranging and citing in one document

the key passages o Executive Order 12333 and the amended

National Security Act.

Te preace to DCID 1/1 stated that it was only intended

to be illustrative. Indeed, readers were directed to the cita-

tions or controlling language. Tis spare ormat perhapsconveyed a message more powerul than its authors realized.

Te DCIs new-ound ability to cite so many passages o the

United States Code to buttress his authority meant that his

powers had grown substantially since its meager beginnings

in January 1946. Te act that a DCI elt the need to cite all

those passages or the edification o Intelligence Community

colleagues, however, suggests that his authority still had ar

to go.

Te blurring o the divide between national and tactical

intelligence seemed at decades end to provide unclear por-

tents or the uture o the DCIs authority. By 2000, the earlierwarnings were widely seen to have been accurate. A high-level

20 June: The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 provides special

legal and administrative authorities and responsibilities for the

Agency and the DCI.


21/45


study commission recently has complained that declining in-

telligence resources, combined with increased demands or

warning and crisis management, have resulted in:

an Intelligence Community that is more demand-

driven. Tat demand is also more driven by mili-

tary consumers and, thereore, what the Intelligence

Community is doing is narrower and more short-term than it was two decades ago. 35

Another commission, reporting its findings on the Nation-

al Reconnaissance Office, ound in PDD-35 a lightning rod

or its criticism:

Tere appears to be no effective mechanism to alert

policy-makers to the negative impact on strategic re-

quirements that may result rom strict adherence to

the current Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-35)

assigning top priority to military orce protection.Tat Directive has not been reviewed recently to de-

termine whether it has been properly applied and

should remain in effect.36

THE ELUSIVE VISION OF CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

oday, intelligence remains the only area o highly

complex government activity where overall manage-ment across departmental and agency lines is seri-

ously attempted.37

en years past the end o the Cold War and five since the

spate o reorm proposals in 1996, this observation by the

Brown-Aspin commission seems to remain valid. Te Direc-

tor o Central Intelligence is nominally stronger now; new

laws and amendments have augmented his power to lead

the Intelligence Community. Nevertheless, the community

remains a conederated system, in which the DCI has lead-

ership responsibilities greater than his responsibilities. Tesystem seems roughly balanced between the need or central

CIA South Building in what

was called the E Street Com-

plex, circa 1960. Located

in the citys Foggy Bottom

neighborhood at 2430 E

St. NW, it was the original

CIA Headquarters, a site it

took over from its wartime

predecessor, the Office ofStrategic Services.

1 December: TheDirectorate ofAdministration is established.


22/45


direction and the imperative to preserve departmental intel-

ligence autonomy. I that balance perhaps appears to be less

than optimal, there nevertheless is no obvious imperative to

correct it in any undamental way. Indeed, the 2001 report

o the blue-ribbon Commission on National Security/21st

Century (the Hart-Rudman commission) recommended

no major structural changes in the management o the

Intelligence Community and noted that current efforts to

strengthen community management while maintaining the

ongoing relationship between the DCI and the Secretary o

Deense are bearing ruit.38

Te members o Congress who passed the National Securi-

ty Act o 1947 had wanted the new Central Intelligence Agen-

cy to provide policymakers the best possible inormation and

to coordinate clandestine operations. Tey assumed that the

Presidents intelligence officerthe Director o Central Intel-

ligencewould accomplish these objectives, and lef the ex-

ecutive branch to its own initiative or the next our decades.

Tis was how Congress resolved the dilemma o having a na-

tional intelligence system that was not centrally controlled.

Succeeding presidents oversaw the Intelligence Community

through a series o National Security Council Intelligence

Directives and executive orders, which recognized the gap

between coordination and control and encouraged DCIs to

do more to bridge it and to manage Americas intelligence e-

orts. Afer the Cold War ended, however, Democratic and

Republican Congresses grew impatient with the executive

branch and urged that intelligence be done centrally. None-

theless, no Congress grasped the nettle o sweeping reorm,

either to decentralize the system or to give the DCI command

authority over military intelligence and the departmental in-

telligence offices. At the same time, the executive branchs

insistence on using declining resources first and oremost to

support military operations effectively blunted the Congres-

sional emphasis on centralization by limiting the wherewith-

al that DCIs and agency heads could devote to national and

strategic objectives.

Tis ambiguity is likely to endure or the same reasons it

arose in the first place: no one can agree on what should re-

place it. Reorm aces the same obstacles that Harry ruman

and his aides encountered in 1945. Everyone has a notion o

how reorm should be implemented, but everyone also has a

specific list o changes they will not tolerate. Te mix o pre-

erences and objections produces a veto to almost every pro-

posal, until the one that survives is the one policymakers and

legislators dislike the least. Ambiguity is also likely to keep

alive the durable ideaborn rom the Pearl Harbor disas-

terthat the axiomatic principles o unity o command and

unity o intelligence can best be served through an increased

centralization o US intelligence efforts.

Americas national security ramework orces such ambi-

guities on policymakers and commanders or good reasons

as well as bad. Te great economic and military strength o

America and the comparative material wealth o its Intelli-

gence Community has provided a certain latitude or experi-

mentationand even duplication o effortin the service

o higher, political goals. In such a context, a decentralizedIntelligence Community may be the only kind o system that

can maintain public and military support or an indepen-

dent, civilian oreign intelligence arm in Americas non-par-

liamentary orm o government, where it is possible or the

two major political parties to split control over the executive

and legislative branches o government. Decentralization as-

sures the Pentagon o military control over its tactical and

joint intelligence programs. It also assures members o Con-

gress o both parties that the Presidents chie intelligence ad-

viser cannot acquire a dangerous concentration o domestic

political power or monopolize the oreign policy advice flow-ing into the White House. Tus we are likely to live with the

de-centralized intelligence systemand the impulse toward

centralizationuntil a crisis re-aligns the political and bu-

reaucratic players or compels them to cooperate in new ways.

Reorm [o the intelligence community]

aces the same obstacles that Harry ruman

and his aides encountered in 1945. Everyone

has a notion o how reorm should be

implemented, but everyone also has a

specific list o changes they will not tolerate.

Te mixproduces a veto to almost every

proposal


23/45


endnotes

1 Joint Committee on the Investigation o the Pearl Harbor Attack,

Investigation o the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Congress, 2nd Session,

1946, pp. 252-253. (U)2Shorthand reerence to the Agency is commonly used, and is used

herein, as synonymous with CIA. Community has long been used,

and is herein, to denote the totality o US executive branch organiza-

tions that produce and provide oreign intelligence to US policymakers

and military commanders.3ext o the Presidents Message to Congress Asking Unification o

the Army and Navy, New York imes, 20 December 1945, p. 14.4 President rumans 22 January 1946 directive establishing CIG is

reprinted in US Department o State, Foreign Relations o the United

States, 1945-1950, Emergence o the Intelligence Establishment (Wash-

ington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1996) [herea-

ter cited as FRUS], pp. 178-179. Te first DCI, Sidney Souers, recalled

in 1954 that he had been part o the collective effort (leading to CIGs

establishment) to create a central intelligence agency that would en-

sure that national security policymakers all would get the same intel-

ligencein contrast to the system that had prevailed, where the OSSwould give one bit o intelligence to the President and not any to the sec-

retaries o the military depar tments and the State Department, who had

some responsibility to advise the President. Quoted in Ralph E. Weber,

ed., Spymasters: en CIA Officers in Teir Own Words (Wilmington, DE:

Scholarly Resources, 1999), p. 3.5David F. Rudgers, Creating the Secret State: Te Origins o the Cen-

tral Intelligence Agency, 1943-1947(Lawrence, KS: University o Kansas

Press, 2000), p. 107.6 Anthony Leviero, ruman Offers Congress 12-Point Program to

Uniy Armed Services o Nation, New York imes, 16 June 1946. For

the Patterson-Forrestal accord in May 1946, see Walter Millis, ed., Te

Forrestal Diaries(New York: Viking, 1951), p. 163.

7National Intelligence Authority Directive number 5, 8 July 1946, re-printed in FRUS, pp. 391-392.

8Harry S ruman,Memoirs, Volume II, Years o rial and Hope(Gar-

den City, N Y, Doubleday, 1956), pp. 46-47.9Admiral Forrest Sherman, a member o the White House team that

drafed the bill, later told the House Committee on Expenditures that

he and his colleagues eared that a deta iled CIA section would prompt

Congress to seek similar levels o detail in the armed services sections

o the bill, orcing a re-opening o the drafing process and possibly en-

cumbering the draf with controversial specifics. See Lyle Millers de-

classified draf, Legislative History o the Central Intelligence Agen-

cyNational Security Act o 1947, Central Intelligence Agency (Office

o Legislative Council), 25 July 1967, p. 72.10Quoted in Miller, Legislative History, pp. 40, 45, 47, 48, 50.11Sec. 102(d)3. Te phrase came rom President rumans 22 January

1946 directive establishing CIG; see FRUS, p 178. Te original pages o

the intelligence section o the National Security Act o 1947 are repro-

duced in Michael Warner, ed., Te CIA under Harry ruman(Washing-

ton: Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), pp. 131-135.12Te Act was amended in 1953 to provide or a Deputy Director o

Central Intelligence (DDCI) with the stipulation (since removed) that

the positions o DCI and DDCI must not be occupied simultaneously

by commissioned officers o the armed services, whether in an active or

retired status.13 Ludwell Montague believed the term Intelligence Community

made its earliest documented appearance in the minutes o a 1952 meet-

ing o the Intelligence Advisory Committee. For the sake o consistency

the term Intelligence Community is used throughout this essay, even

though the size and composition o the community has changed and

now includes several large entities that did not exist when the NationalSecurity Act was passed in 1947. For example, o todays 13 intelligence

organizations in the community, the National Security Agency, the De-

ense Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office and the

National Imagery and Mapping Agency are among the eight intelligence

organizations that come under the Department o Deense. Te only in-

dependent agency (that is, not part o a policy department) is CIA. For

the 1952 usage o the term, see Ludwell Lee Montague, General Walter

Bedell Smith as Director o Central Intelligence: October 1950February

1953 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992),

p. 74.14At the time the Act went into effect, the intelligence agencies o the

US government comprised the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal

Bureau o Investigation, the Office o Intelligence Research (State), the

Intelligence Division (Army), the Office o Naval Intelligence, the Di-

rectorate o Intelligence (Air Force), and associated militar y signals i n-

telligence offices, principally the Army Securit y Agency and t he Navys

OP-20-G.15All versions o NSCID 1 have been declassified and are available at

the National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 263

(CIA), NN3-263-91-004, box 4, HS/HC-500.16 NSCID 3 (13 January 1948) defined national intelligence as in-

tegrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects o

national policy and national security, is o concern to more than one

Department or Agency, and transcends the exclusive competence o a

single Department or Agency or the Military Establishment. Its oppo-

site was departmental intelligence, which NSCID 3 defined as intel-

ligence needed by a department or agency to execute its mission and

discharge its lawul responsibilities; see FRUS, p. 1109. Executive Order

11905 in 1976 retained national intelligence but changed its opposite

to a phrase used in President Nixons 1971 letter, tactical intelligence

(which the executive order did not urther define, apart rom saying that

the DCI shall not have responsibility or it). E.O. 11905 also added the

overarching term oreign intelligence, defining it as inormation on

the capabilities, intentions, and activities o oreign powers, organiza-

tions or their agents.17 It bears noting that the NSCIDs endorsed the NIAs 1946 assign-

ment o the two main missions (strategic warning and the coordination

o clandestine activities abroad) to the DCI and his Central IntelligenceGroup. In particular, NSCID 5 (12 December 1947) reaffirmed NIAD-5

in directing t hat the DCI shall conduct all organized Federal espionage

operations outside the United Statesexcept or certain agreed activi-

ties by other Departments and Agencies. See FRUS, p. 1106.18Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., Te US Intelligence Community: Foreign

Policy and Domestic Activities(New York: Hi ll & Wang, 1973), p. 39.


24/45


19Richard Nixon to the Secretary o State et al., Organization and

Management o the US Foreign Intelligence Community, 5 November

1971.20Te panel had been created by E.O. 11905, which titled it the Com-

mittee on Foreign Intelligence; it comprised the DCI (chairman), the

Deputy Secretary o Deense or Intelligence, and the Deputy Assistant

to the President or National Security Affairs.21Robert M. Gates, Te CIA and American Foreign Policy, Foreign

Affairs66 (Winter 1987/88), p. 225.22 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, Why Was the CIA Established in 1947?,

Intelligence and National Security12 (January 1997), p. 30.23Unless otherwise noted, all amendments to the National Security

Act cited herein are published in the several editions (1993, 1998, or

2000) o the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligences Com-

pilation o Intelligence Laws.24Te Intelligence Organization Act was passed as part o the Intel-

ligence Authorization Act or FY 1993. Much o its text came rom S.

2198, introduced by Sen. David L. Boren (D-OK) and titled the Intel-

ligence Reorganization Act o 1992. S. 2198 proposed a Director o Na-

tional Intelligence to head the Intelligence Community; subordinate

to this new officer would be the newly-styled Director o the Central

Intelligence Agency. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, S. 2198

and S. 421 to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community,

102d Congress, 2d Session, 1992, p. 2. Te companion bill in the House

o Representatives was HR. 4165, which offered a milder version o the

DNI proposal. See also Frank J. Smist, Jr., Congress Oversees the United

States Intelligence Community, 1947-1994(Knoxville: University o en-

nessee Press, 1994 [2d ed.]), pp. 286-287.25Te Goldwater-Nichols Act is widely credited with adding coher-

ence to the Joint Chies o Staff str uctureanother creation o the Na-

tional Security Act o 1947which had long been viewed as ragmented

and less effective than it should have been in advising the commander-

in-chie. Among other reorms, Goldwater-Nichols strengthened the

Chairman o the Joint Chies, naming him (as opposed to the Joint

Chies as a body) the principal military adviser to the President, clari-

ying his place in the national chain o command, giving him a Vice

Chairman and improving the Joint Staff. See Ronald H. Cole et al., Te

Chairmanship o the Joint Chies o Staff (Washington: Office o the

Chairman o the Joint Chies o Staff [Joint History Office], 1995), pp.

25-38.26Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map or Na-

tional Security: Imperative or Change(Washington: United States Gov-

ernment Printing Office, 2001), p. 82.27President William J. Clinton, address to the US Intelligence Com-

munity, delivered at the Central Intelligence Agencys headquarters, 14

July 1995.28

Te six panels reports were: Commission on the Roles and Mis-sions o the United States Intelligence Community [the Brown-Aspin

commission], Preparing or the 21st Century: An Appraisal o US Intel-

ligence(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996);

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, IC21: Intelligence

Community in the 21st Century, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 1996; Richard

N. Haass, Project Director or the Independent ask Force, Making In-

telligence Smarter: Te Future o US Intelligence (New York: Council

on Foreign Relations, 1996); Working Group on Intelligence Reorm

[Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt, authors], Te Future o US Intelli-

gence(Washington: Consortium or the Study o Intelligence, 1996); the

wentieth Century Fund ask Force on the Future o US Intelligence

[Stephen Bosworth, chairman], In From the Cold(New York: wentieth

Century Fund Press, 1996), and Georgetown Universitys Institute or

the Study o Diplomacy [John Hollister Hedley, author], Checklist or the

Future o Intelligence(Washington: Institute or the Study o Diplomacy,

1995).

29 Te lone dissenter was the Consortium or the Study o Intelli-gences report, overseen by Georgetown political scientist Roy Godson

and Harvard historian Ernest May. Its authors concluded:

. . .the ailure o centralization efforts can be seen as reflecting the

reasonable needs o the various components o the national security

bureaucracy. In any case, the centralized model was probably better

suited to the Cold War, with its emphasis on national level intel-

ligence about the Soviet strategic nuclear threat, than to the present

period when departmental, regional, and tactical intelligence re-

quirements have exploded and gained new urgency. [See pp. xiv-xv.]

Te wentieth Century Funds report did not discuss the DCIs re-

sponsibilities or the centralization issue, although a Background Pa-per by Allan E . Goodman (bound with the report) implicitly endorsed

greater powers or the DCI; see p. 78.30Commission on Roles and Missions, Preparing or the 21st Century,

pp. xix, 51-52.31See Sections 808 and 815 o the Intelligence Authorization Act or

Fiscal Year 1997; Compilation o Intelligence Laws(1998).32estimony o Robert Gates on 1 April 1992 at the Joint Hearing,

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select

Committee on Intelligence, S. 2198 and S. 421 to Reorganize the United

States Intelligence Community, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1992, p. 108.33For expressions o official and outside concern, see House Perma-

nent Select Committee on Intelligence, IC21: Intelligence Community

in the 21st Century, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 1996, p. 245. See also thejoint comment by Mor ton I. Abramowitz and R ichard Kerr in Richa rd

N. Haass, Project Director or the Independent ask Force, Making In-

telligence Smarter: Te Future o US Intelligence(New York: Council on

Foreign Relations, 1996), p. 38.34See Section 1112 o the National Imagery and Mapping Agency Act,

which was passed as part o the National Deense Authorization Act or

Fiscal Year 1997; Compilation o Intelligence Laws(2000).35Commission on National Security, Road Map or National Security,

p. 82.36 National Commission or the Review o the National Reconnais-

sance Office, Final Report (Washington: United States Government

Printing Office, 2000), p. 51.37Commission on Roles and Missions, Preparing or the 21st Century,

p. 47.38Commission on National Security, Road Map or National Security,

p. 83.


25/45

Milestones in the Creation of the US Intelligence Community 19

1941

11 July William Donovan is

named Coordinator of Information

(COI), making him responsible for

coordination of intelligence from the

Army, Navy, FBI, Department of State,

and other intelligence-gathering

entities; jurisdictional battles

quickly followed.

October Donovan establishes the COIs

New York headquarters in Room 3603 of

Rockefeller Center (a former British

MI6 office), and asks Allen Dulles to

head it.

1942

13 June President Franklin D.

Roosevelt signs a military order

establishing the Office of Strategic

Services (OSS) and naming WilliamJ. Donovan as its Director. Donovan

remained a civilian until 24 March

1943, when he was appointed brigadier

general. He advanced to the rank of

major general on 10 November 1944.

1944

18 November William Donovan submits

Memorandum for the President

to President Truman, suggesting

continuation of a comprehensive post-

war intelligence entity which will

procure intelligence both by overt and

covert methods and will at the same

time provide intelligence guidance,

determine national intelligenceobjectives, and correlate the

intelligence material collected by all

government agencies.1

1945

3 July US Army Signal Security

Agency establishes Cryptographic

Security Board.

15 September US Army Signal Security

Agency renamed Army Security Agency(ASA).

1 October President Harry S. Trumans

Executive Order 9621 abolishes the OSS

and transfers its functions to the

State and War Departments.


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1946

22 January President Truman signs

an executive order establishing the

Central Intelligence Group (CIG) to

operate under the direction of the

National Intelligence Authority (NIA).

Truman names the first Director ofCentral Intelligence, Rear Admiral

Sidney W. Souers, USNR, who is sworn in

on the following day.

1 August The Atomic Energy Act

(McMahon Act) is signed into law,

making the FBI responsible for

investigating the backgrounds of

persons able to access restricted

nuclear data.

1947

26 July President Truman signs the

National Security Act of 1947 aboard

the VC-54C presidential aircraft

Sacred Cow, the first aircraft used for

the role of Air Force One.

18 September The National Security

Act of 1947 is implemented upon the

confirmation of James Forrestal as

first Secretary of Defense. It merges

the Department of War and Department

of Navy into the National Military

Establishment (NME) and establishes a

Department of the Air Force separate

from existing Army Air Forces. It also

creates the National Security Council

(NSC) and the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA) the first peacetime

intelligence agency to replace the

National Intelligence Authority (NIA)

and the Central Intelligence Group

(CIG).

1948

20 October The Air Force Security

Group is renamed Air Force Security

Service.

1949

The Central Intelligence Agency Act

(also called Public Law 110) is

passed permitting confidential fiscal

and administrative procedures.

20 May The Armed Forces SecurityAgency (AFSA) is established.

10 August The National Security Act

Amendments of 1949 subordinate the

three service secretaries to the new

Secretary of Defense.

20 August Further National Security

Act Amendments of 1949 rename the

National Military Establishment (NME)

the Department of Defense, and amend

the duties of the National SecurityCouncil (NSC) and further, place the

NSC in the Executive Office of the

President.

1950

19 July By directive of President

Harry S. Truman, the National Security

Council staff is reorganized to have

a more representative mix of agencies,

Congress, and groups.

1952

2 January Creation of the Directorate

of Intelligence (DI) at CIA.

1 August Creation of the Directorate

of Plans (DP) at CIA.

4 November The National Security

Agency (NSA) is established


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Milestones in the Creation of the US Intelligence Community 21

1953

2 September- The Operations

Coordinating Board (OCB) is established

by EO 10483 as an independent

agency. It reports to the NSC on the

development, by appropriate Executive

branch agencies, of operational plansfor national security policies.

1955

4 August President Dwight D.

Eisenhower signs a bill authorizing

$46 million for construction of a CIA

Headquarters Building.

1957

1 July The Operations CoordinatingBoard (OCB) is incorporated into the

National Security Council (NSC) by EO

10700.

1959

3 November Laying of the cornerstone

of the CIA Headquarters Building,

Langley, Virginia.

1960

25 August The National

Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is

established based on a recommendation

by President Dwight D. Eisenhower

during a special National Security

Council meeting. NRO is to coordinate

the USAF and CIAs reconnaissance

activities.

1961

1 January- President Dwight D.

Eisenhower authorizes creation

of the National Photographic

Interpretation Center (NPIC) a part

of CIAs Directorate of Science and

Technology (DS&T) - combining CentralIntelligence Agency (CIA), Army, Navy,

and Air Force assets to solve imagery

analysis problems.

1 February The Operations

Coordinating Board (OCB) is abolished

by EO 10920.

1 October The Defense Intelligence

Agency (DIA) is born. It was designated

in 1986 as a Defense Department combat

support agency, but is made separateby Secretary of Defense Robert S.

McNamara, under President John F.

Kennedy, through Directive 5105.21.

1963

5 August The Directorate of Science

and Technology at CIA is created.

1964

1 December President Lyndon B.

Johnson receives the first Presidents

Daily Brief (PDB), supplied by CIA.

1From OSS raining in the National Parks and Service Abroad in World War IIby John Whiteclay Chambers II, 2008, U.S. National Park Service,

Washington, D.C., in Chapter 10, is the ollowing: On Donovans 18 November 1944 plan or a permanent central intelligence agency, see Richard

Dunlop, Donovan: Americas Master Spy(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1982), 458-459; Smith, OSS: Te Secret History, 363, both o whom claim Roosevelt

had requested it. But the much more detailed account in Tomas F. roy, Donovan and the CIA: A History o the Establishment o the Central Intel-

ligence Agency(Frederick, Md.: University Publications o America, 1981), 218-222, indicates that the impetus came rom Donovan rather than the

President. Donovans first recorded statement o his goal o a permanent OSS is in a question and answer period ollowing a talk to an audience o

Army officers in Washington in May 1943; he later put such a recommendation in a memorandum to General Eisenhower on 17 September 1943.


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Disclaimer

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the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or

present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US

Government endorsement o an articles actual statements and interpretations.

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Tese collections, centered on a theme or event, are joined with supporting

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The Creation of the Intelligence Community

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