The costs of judicial review proceedings - 39 Essex Chambers · been accepted, they will probably...
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Transcript of The costs of judicial review proceedings - 39 Essex Chambers · been accepted, they will probably...
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A: Introduction 2
1. The costs of litigation are a critical aspect of judicial review and raise fundamental issues like access
to justice and the ability to call public authorities to account for misuse of power. Yet despite their
importance, costs can often be dealt with, in relative haste, at the end of proceedings.
2. This paper covers:
a. General principles
b. Costs at permission stage
c. Costs where there is no substantive hearing
d. Costs capping/protective costs
B: General principles
3. Costs orders are at the discretion of the Court and subject to broad judicial control - section 51 of
the Supreme Court Act 1981:
“(1) ..the costs of and incidental to ..proceedings ..shall be in the discretion of the Court
(3) The court shall have full power to determine by whom and to what extent the costs are to
be paid
4. There are however general principles3
:
a. It is normal for the losing party to be ordered to pay the winning party’s costs (i.e costs follow
the event)
b. A split costs order may be appropriate where a winning party has lost on cost generating
issues
c. It is not normal for a victorious third party/ interested party to secure their own costs award
unless there was some separate issue or interest requiring attendance
d. Costs orders are not normally made against those types of tribunal (such as magistrates)
which do not normally appear to defend their decisions (unless they have chosen to appeal
and do so in a non –neutral role).
2 I am grateful for the assistance of Kate Grange, Ben Williams, Judith Ayling and Parishil Patel, also at 39 Essex Street, in the preparation of this paper. 3 See Fordham Judicial Review Handbook Fourth Edition page 356 and onwards
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5. Part 44 of the Civil Procedure Rules sets out key costs rules. The material parts of Part 44 are set
out in Annex 1.
6. Annex 2 of this paper contains a glossary of some of the common costs awards.
Costs follow the event
7. As mentioned above, the general starting point is that costs follow the event. CPR 44 makes this
clear, but, at the same time, it indicates the wide range of considerations which could result in the
Court making different orders as to costs. The rule that costs follow the event is therefore the
starting point from which a court can readily depart. The circumstances in which the court may
make ‘some other order’ are many, but particularly significant factors will include:
a. Where the ostensibly unsuccessful party has made an effective offer to settle;
b. Where the successful party has been guilty of misconduct in the proceedings;
c. Where the ostensibly successful party has nevertheless been exposed as greatly overstating
its case (this plainly overlaps with the next factor); and
d. Where the party that was successful overall has nevertheless failed on particular points or
issues.
8. Offers to settle usually, of course, take the form of offers of money, which will not usually be apt in
public law cases. But non-monetary offers can made, and if the court holds that they should have
been accepted, they will probably reverse the usual incidence of costs, just as in money claims.
9. The underlying rationale for encouraging, where appropriate, a departure from the rule that costs
follow the event, is that too robust an application of the principle encourages litigants to increase the
costs of litigation since it discourages litigants from being selective as to the points they take (ie
‘kitchen sink’ litigation).
Split/partial/issue based costs awards
“The orders which the Court may make ..include an order that a party must pay:
(a) a proportion of another party’s costs
(b) a stated amount in respect of another party’s costs
(c) costs from or until a certain date only
(d) costs incurred before proceedings have begun
(e) costs relating to particular steps taken in the proceedings
(f) costs relating only to a distinct part of the proceedings.
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(CPR rule 44.3(6))
10. CPR Rule 44 gives greater encouragement to the Courts to make split, partial or issue based costs
awards than was previously the case before 1999 and was a particular innovation of the CPR. The
rationale is the same as for the move away from the costs follow the event rule; namely that too
robust an application of the latter rule discourages litigants from being selective about the points
they take, which in turn increases the cost of litigation (i.e to discourage kitchen sink litigation).
11. In contrast to the former regime, there is no threshold requiring a point to be taken unreasonably
before the successful party’s right to costs is abated (the so-called Re Elgindata (No 2) rule ([1992]
1 WLR 1207 (CA)). It is sufficient simply for the successful party to have been unsuccessful on
certain points which themselves caused costs to be incurred (Phonographic Performance v AEI
Rediffusion Ltd [1999] 2 All ER 299 (CA), 312-2).
Examples and guidance
12. If there are a number of issues on which a successful party did not succeed, the Court should
consider whether the successful party should be deprived of some of its costs. Relevant factors
include:
a. The reasonableness of the party taking the point (see CPR 44.3(5)(b))
b. The manner in which the point was taken
c. The reasonableness of the point
d. The extra costs and court time arising from the point
e. The extent to which the point was interlinked with the other issues of the trial
f. Looking at the matter globally, to what extent is it reasonable to deprive the successful party
of his costs
(Neuberger J in Atonelli v Allen (no 2) The Times 8 December 2000)
13. Such an order may not merely entail the successful party’s costs being reduced; it may actually be
ordered to pay the costs of the opposing party on the issues on which it failed.
14. For good, practical reasons, the rule is that where possible the court should reduce issues based
orders to percentages. In practice, it is very difficult at the assessment stage to allocate costs to
particular issues. Therefore, the trial judge should (rough and ready as it may be) use his judgment
of the ‘shape’ of the case to alight on an appropriate division of the costs (CPR 44.3(7); see also
English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] 3 All ER 385 (CA), [115]).
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15. Given the special nature of public law proceedings, the issues based costs jurisdiction has been
used to award costs even to unsuccessful applicants, where they have nevertheless established
some important issue or principle en route to failure. Thus in R (Watts) v Bedford Primary Health
Care [2003] EWHC 2401 (Admin), Munby J awarded a claimant 35 pc of her costs, where she had
won on the issue of principle, but failed to ‘come home’ on the facts. The judge said that the
principle established by the claimant might not avail her, but would benefit those that came after her.
Costs awards to third/interested parties who oppose an unsuccessful challenge
16. Guidance on this was given in a planning case (Bolton Metropolitan District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment (Costs) [1995] 1 WLR 1176, but has been applied to other judicial
review cases. Lord Lloyd stated the position in circumstances where a decision by the Secretary of
State to grant planning permission was upheld in the face of an unsuccessful challenge:
“(1) The Secretary of State, when successful in defending his decision, will normally be
entitled to the whole of his costs. He should not be required to share his award of costs by
apportionment…
(2) The developer will not normally be entitled to his costs unless he can show that there was
likely to be a separate issue on which he was entitled to be heard..or unless he has an
interest which requires separate representation…
(3) A second set of costs is more likely to be awarded at first instance, than in the Court of
Appeal or House of Lords…
(4) An award of a third set of costs will rarely be justified, even if there are in theory three or
more separate interests
No award of costs
17. Where the losing party is found by the Court to have acted responsibly and appropriately in bringing
the public law challenge, on a question involving a clear public interest, the Court might in its
discretion, and after the event, decide not to award any costs to the successful party: see e.g. New
Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General of New Zealand [1994] 1 AC 466, PC.
C: Costs of Permission Hearings
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18. In general terms; the following rules apply:
19. Permission granted: costs will tend to be costs in the case (unless a different order is made).
(Practice Statement (Judicial Review: Costs) [2004] 2 All ER 994).
20. Permission refused: Where the claimant is refused permission, whether on paper or orally, he will
generally have to pay his own costs.
21. Permission refused: As to the costs of the respondent, see R (Mount Cook Ltd) v Westminster
CC [2003] EWCA Civ 1346:
a. CPR 54.8 entitles the defendant to file an acknowledgement of service if he wishes to take
part; and PD 8.5 gives him the right to attend at any oral renewal hearing. But it provides that
he need not attend unless the court so orders and that where he does the court will not
generally make a costs order against the claimant (PD 8.6)
b. The defendant is entitled to the costs of filing the acknowledgement of service if it complied
with the Pre-Action Protocol whether or not it attends any permission hearing.
c. The Defendant may recover its costs if the circumstances were exceptional. Such a situation
might include:
(i) The hopelessness of the claim. (ii) The claimant’s persistence having been alerted to the facts and law
showing that the case was hopeless. (iii) The claimant seeking to abuse the process for collateral ends (as
was the case in Mount Cook, [79]) (iv) There has in effect been an early substantive hearing.
d. A relevant factor may be the extent to which the claimant had substantial
resources, and has used them to pursue the claim.
e. The Court of Appeal should be slow to interfere with the broad discretion by the
first instance judge as to what are exceptional circumstances.
22. Interested party: The White Book suggests that even if there are exceptional
circumstances justifying the award of costs in favour of a defendant the court will not
generally order the unsuccessful claimant to pay the costs of an interested party unless
there was some separate issue or separate interest requiring it to attend. Bolton MDC v
Secretary of State for the Environment (Costs) [1995] 1 WLR 1176. Everything will
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depend on the circumstances. Was separate representation justified? (Bolton, 1177).
(see above, general principles)
23. Procedure: Further Guidance was given by the Court of Appeal on the award of costs at
the permission stage of judicial review proceedings in Ewing v Office of the Deputy Prime Minister [2005] EWCA Civ 1683, [2006] 1 WLR 1260. Carnwath LJ opined that a
rule or practice direction should be introduced to regulate the procedure for costs
applications at the permission stage. In the meantime, the following procedure was
prescribed:
a. Where a proposed defendant or interested party wished to seek costs at the
permission stage, the acknowledgement of service should include an application
for costs, and be accompanied by a costs schedule;
b. On refusing permission, the judge should include in his refusal a decision as to
whether to award costs, and if so an indication of the amount he proposes to
assess summarily;
c. The claimant should be given 14 days to respond in writing, and should serve a
copy of any reply on the defendant;
d. The defendant thereafter would have seven days in writing to respond, and to
make submissions on the amount proposed by the judge;
e. The judge will then make a decision, and if affirmative an award, on the papers
24. Recent Cases include: R Roudham and Larling Parish Council v Breckland Council4 the Court of Appeal considered the proper approach to the award of costs where the
defendant was entitled to its costs of preparing the acknowledgement of service i.e.
“acknowledgement costs”. At first instance Burton J had encouraged the preparation of a
very detailed acknowledgement of service and awarded an interim payment in respect of
these costs of £12,500 (with the rest being the subject of detailed assessment - some
£17,000 being claimed in total). Burton J indicated that he found it helpful to have
acknowledgements of service which went well beyond summary grounds. However, on
appeal, the Court of Appeal held that on the authority of CPR 54.8(a)(i) and of Ewing v
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister5, the acknowledgement should contain only a
summary of the grounds on which the claim is resisted and if a party wishes to go further
than that at the permission stage, he does so at his own expense. The Court of Appeal
approved the approach in Davey v Aylesbury Vale (see further below) and held that it
4 [2008] EWCA Civ 714 5 [2005] All ER (D) 315 at [53]
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would be a matter for the permission hearing judge to decide what need reasonably be
said in a response to a claim. On the facts of the case the Court of Appeal awarded
£5,000 as the appropriate amount for the preparation of the acknowledgement of service.
25. Pre permission stage costs. The Court of Appeal in Davey v Aylesbury Vale DC considered the
issue of whether an order for costs made in favour of a successful defendant included costs prior to
the grant of permission unless these are expressly excluded. The Court of Appeal held that an
order that a defendant was to recover its costs of judicial review proceedings which had gone to a
full hearing embraced all costs reasonably incurred by it before the grant of permission. It will
however be for the successful defendant to justify any pre-permission “preparation” (as opposed to
“acknowledgement”) costs and show that it was reasonable and proportionate to incur such costs
[30].
a. (Sedley LJ) On the conclusion of full judicial review proceedings in a defendant's favour, the
nature and purpose of the particular claim is relevant to the exercise of the judge's discretion
as to costs. In contrast to a judicial review claim brought wholly or mainly for commercial or
proprietary reasons, a claim brought partly or wholly in the public interest, albeit unsuccessful,
may properly result in a restricted or no order for costs.
b. If awarding costs against the claimant, the judge should consider whether they are to include
preparation costs in addition to acknowledgment costs. It will be for the defendant to justify
these. There may be no sufficient reason why such costs, if incurred, should be recoverable.
c. It is highly desirable that these questions should be dealt with by the trial judge and left to the
costs judge only in relation to the reasonableness of individual items.
d. If at the conclusion of such proceedings the judge makes an undifferentiated order for costs
in a defendant's favour
(i) the order has to be regarded as including any reasonably incurred preparation
costs; but
(ii) Practice Statement (Judicial Review: Costs) [2004] 1 WLR 1760 should be
read so as to exclude any costs of opposing the grant of permission in open
court, which should be dealt with on the Mount Cook Land Ltd
principles.
D: Costs where there is no substantive hearing
26. The general principles and applicable test in this circumstance were set out by Scott Baker J in
Boxall v The Mayor and Burgesses of Waltham Forest LBC (2001) 4CCLR 258 which has been
approved by the Court of Appeal on a number of occasions.
a. The court has power to make a costs order where the substantive proceedings have been
resolved without the need for a trial but the parties have not agreed about costs.
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b. LSC funding of a claimant is usually irrelevant.
c. The overriding objective is to do justice between the parties, without consuming unnecessary
court time or disproportionate further costs.
d. At each end of the spectrum will be cases where it is obvious which party would have won. In
between will be cases which will be less clear. How far the court will investigate the
substantive issues will depend on the circumstances (e.g. the amount of costs; the conduct of
the parties).
e. In the absence of a good reason to do otherwise the fallback is no order as to costs. The
court should take care to ensure that it does not discourage the parties from settling e.g. a
local authority may wish to make a concession at an early stage.
27. More often than not the court concludes that the fallback position should apply. See (eg) R (KW) v
Avon and Wiltshire Mental Health Partnership NHS Trust [2003] EWHC 919 Admin, where Silber J
concluded that in the absence of good reason he would make no order as to costs. Courts are
reluctant to investigate the substance of the challenge when the challenge itself is no longer alive.
28. This operates for/against both claimant and defendant. Thus where a claimant acted reasonably in
issuing proceedings and obtained a significant benefit (e.g. the defendant has agreed to re-visit the
decision or even to quash it) does not mean that the court will award the claimant her costs.
29. Even where a claim surmounts the Boxall threshold it does not mean that the Court will order the
defendant to pay the costs of the whole proceedings. It may only order costs up to a certain point in
time or in relation to a certain issue. In Boxall the court ordered the defendant to pay the costs up
until December 1999 when it produced a care plan. The outcome was only obvious until that point in
time.
30. The court may review the merits of an aborted judicial review, and make a costs order, even where
it has become otiose as the result of the act of a non-party. In R v Bassetlaw DC ex p Aldergate
Estates Ltd (Admin, 17th April 2000), judicial review proceedings proved abortive because of a
concession by a non-party builder, who withdrew the planning proposal which was subject to review.
The court (Jackson J) allowed the discontinuing applicant to recover costs against the respondent,
forming the view that the review would have succeeded, and that it was probably the likely success
of the review which caused the non-party’s concession.
E: Costs protection
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31. Access to the Courts can be restricted if litigants are deterred in bringing challenges because of
the potential costs liability if the case is lost. Protective Costs Orders (PCOs) are a mechanism by
which these problems can be overcome. In recent times this area of the law has undergone
significant development, culminating in the leading decision of R (Corner House) v Trade &
Industry Secretary [2005] 1 WLR 2600 (CA) and followed recently by a further look at PCO’s by
the Court of Appeal in R(Compton) v Wiltshire Primary Care Trust [2008] EWCA Civ 749.
The Cornerhouse decision:
32. The facts were as follows. The Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) of the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) provided finance or security to UK exporters in
international trade. One of its purported aims was to help eradicate or minimise bribery
and corruption. Between March and November 2004 it carried out a consultation process
and then altered its procedures and forms. The applicant, Corner House, was an NGO
interested in issues concerning bribery and corruption. It brought proceedings for judicial
review on the ground that the failure by the ECGD to consult on measures appropriate to
prevent corruption and bribery breached public law standards of fairness and the DTI’s
own published consultation policy. It complained that the consultation process had been
one-sided and that the changes all weakened anti-bribery and anti-corruption protection.
The applicant made an interlocutory application for a PCO limiting its exposure to costs
whatever the result. At first instance Davis J declined to make an order. The Court of
Appeal disagreed.
33. The court concluded that there were features of public law litigation which distinguished it
from private law civil and family litigation. In particular:
a. The appellate courts have jurisdiction to consider appeals involving a public
authority as to a question of public law even when the dispute between the parties
has ended and
b. There was often a public interest in the elucidation of public law by the higher
courts in addition to the interests of individual parties (see paragraph 69 and 70)).
34. Consequently the court took the view that those differences justified a different approach
to the question of costs in public law cases.
35. Having considered the previous circumstances in which PCO’s had been ordered, the
Court of Appeal concluded that, although the case brought by the Refugee Legal Centre
had ultimately failed, nevertheless it was “a good example of the way in which PCOs can
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be harnessed in cases of general public importance where it is in the public interest for
the courts to review the legality of novel acts by the executive in a context where it is
unreasonable to expect that anyone would be willing to bear the financial risks inherent in
a challenge” (paragraph 52).
36. When considering whether to make a PCO, the Court of Appeal offered the following
guidance:
a. It was correct to state that the jurisdiction to make a PCO should be exercised only
in the “most exceptional cases” as stated by Dyson J in Child Poverty Action
Group; however the Court of Appeal took the view that this statement did not
assist in identifying when those circumstances were likely to occur (paragraph 72).
b. No PCO should be granted unless the judge considered that the application for
judicial review has a real prospect of success and that it is in the public interest to
make the order. The Court of Appeal took the view that Dyson J’s requirement in
Child Poverty Action Group that the courts should have a sufficient appreciation of
the merits of the claim after hearing ‘short argument’ (such that it was more than
merely arguable) tended to preclude the making of a PCO in a case of any
complexity. Consequently the court had to do not more than conclude that the
case was “properly arguable” or had a real (as opposed to a fanciful) prospect of
success (paragraph 73).
c. A PCO may be made at any stage and on such conditions as the court thinks fit
provided that:
(i) the issues raised are of general importance;
(ii) the public interest requires that those issues be resolved;
(iii) the applicant has no private interest in the outcome of the case;
(iv) having regard to the financial resources of both parties and to the
amount of costs involved it is fair and just to make the order;
(v) if the order is not made the applicant will probably discontinue and
will be acting reasonably in so doing (paragraph 74).
d. If those acting for the applicant are doing so pro bono it is likely that this will
enhance the merits of the application (paragraph 74).
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e. It was for the Court, in its discretion, to decide whether it is fair and just to make
the order in light of the above (paragraph 74).
37. The Court of Appeal further explained that a PCO can take a variety of forms, including:
a. An order that the defendant only can recover no costs.
b. An order that the defendant can recover only a maximum sum in costs (as in the
£25,000 suggested in the CND case).
c. An order that neither party can recover costs (see paragraph 76).
38. The Court of Appeal stated that there was room for considerable variation, depending on
what was appropriate and fair in each of the “rare” cases in which the question may arise.
39. Where a PCO was made against a defendant and the claimant was not represented pro
bono, then the costs of the claimant would probably be capped to a modest amount. The
Court of Appeal stated:
(i) When making any PCO where the applicant is seeking an order for costs in its favour if it wins, the court should prescribe by way of a capping order a total amount of the recoverable costs which will be inclusive, so far as a CFA-funded party is concerned, of any additional liability. (ii) The purpose of the PCO will be to limit or extinguish the liability of the applicant if it loses, and as a balancing factor the liability of the defendant for the applicant's costs if the defendant loses will thus be restricted to a reasonably modest amount. The applicant should expect the capping order to restrict it to solicitors' fees and a fee for a single advocate of junior counsel status that are no more than modest. (iii) The overriding purpose of exercising this jurisdiction is to enable the applicant to present its case to the court with a reasonably competent advocate without being exposed to such serious financial risks that would deter it from advancing a case of general public importance at all, where the court considers that it is in the public interest that an order should be made. The beneficiary of a PCO must not expect the capping order that will accompany the PCO to permit anything other than modest representation, and must arrange its legal representation (when its lawyers are not willing to act pro bono) accordingly (paragraph 76).
40. At paragraph 77 of the judgment the Court of Appeal concluded that in this jurisdiction
there was no power to make an order which required the defendant to finance the
claimant’s costs (paragraph 77).
41. At paragraphs 78-79 detailed procedural guidance was given:
78 We consider that a PCO should in normal circumstances be sought on the face of the initiating claim form, with the application supported by the requisite evidence, which should
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include a schedule of the claimant's future costs of and incidental to the full judicial review application. If the defendant wishes to resist the making of the PCO, or any of the sums set out in the claimant's schedule, it should set out its reasons in the acknowledgment of service filed pursuant to CPR r 54.8. The claimant will of course be liable for the court fee(s) for pursuing the claim, and it will also be liable for the defendant's costs incurred in a successful resistance to an application for a PCO: compare R (Mount Cook Land Ltd) v Westminster City Council [2003] EWCA Civ 1346 at [76(1)]. The costs incurred in resisting a PCO should have regard to the overriding objective in the peculiar circumstances of such an application, and recoverability will depend on the normal tests of proportionality and, where appropriate, necessity. We would not normally expect a defendant to be able to demonstrate that proportionate costs exceeded £1,000. These liabilities should provide an appropriate financial disincentive for those who believe that they can apply for a PCO as a matter of course or that contesting a PCO may be a profitable exercise. So long as the initial liability is reasonably foreseeable, we see no reason why the court should handle an application for a PCO at no financial risk to the claimant at all.
79 The judge will then consider whether to make the PCO on the papers and if so, in what terms, and the size of the cap he should place on the claimant's recoverable costs, when he considers whether to grant permission to proceed. If he refuses to grant the PCO and the claimant requests that his decision is reconsidered at a hearing, the hearing should be limited to an hour and the claimant will face a liability for costs if the PCO is again refused. The considerations as to costs which we have set out in para 78 above will also apply at this stage: we would not expect a respondent to be able to demonstrate that proportionate costs exceeded £2,500. Although CPR r 54.13 does not in terms apply to the making of a PCO, the defendant will have had the opportunity of providing reasoned written argument before the order is made, and by analogy with CPR r 52.9(2) the court should not set a PCO aside unless there is a compelling reason for doing so. The PCO made by the judge on paper will provide its beneficiary with costs protection if any such application is made. An unmeritorious application to set aside a PCO should be met with an order for indemnity costs, to which any cap imposed by the PCO should not apply. Once the judge has made an order which includes the caps on costs to which we have referred, this will be an order to which anyone subsequently concerned with the assessment of costs will be bound to give effect: see CPR r 44.5(2).
42. As to the position of parties other than the defendant, interested parties may also be
heard on PCO applications, although the judge should not normally allow more than one
set of additional costs because he will expect different interested parties to make
common cause on the issue (see paragraph 80).
43. On the facts of the case before them, the Court of Appeal decided to award a PCO. On
the question of the public interest test, the Court of Appeal stated:
137 We had no hesitation in concluding for two quite different reasons that the case raised issues of general public importance. The first reason was that it relates to the way in which major British companies, supported by credit guarantees backed by the taxpayer in accordance with a statutory scheme, do business abroad. Obtaining contracts by bribery is an evil which offends against the public policy of this country. When the interests of the taxpayer are involved, the question whether or not companies are obliged to provide details of money paid to middlemen, such as were required by ECGD with the strong endorsement
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of the relevant minister before the changes were made, is a matter of general public importance.
138 The second reason is that the case raised important issues arising out of the implementation or non-implementation of ECGD's published consultation policy… The judge was influenced by the consideration that Corner House's challenge related to procedural unfairness and not to any alleged irrationality in the eventual outcome, and he took note of the fact that the issue in the centre of the case was whether or not ECGD should have consulted Corner House in the circumstances of this particular case.
140 Procedural issues, however, are often of greater importance than issues of substantive law. It is in our judgment a matter of general public importance if a division of a department of state publishes and adopts an open consultation policy of general application and then reverts to a timeworn practice of privileged access, particularly on an issue as obviously sensitive as measures to combat bribery and corruption in connection with the attainment of major contracts abroad.
44. As to the prospects of success, the Court of Appeal decided that, using its substituted
test, Corner House had a real prospect of success in the sense that that phrase is used
in CPR Pts 24 and 52.
45. Further as to the remaining aspects of the test, the Court of Appeal concluded:
144 Finally, we considered that the public interest required that these issues should be litigated, and since Corner House had no private interest in the outcome of the case, and since our fourth and fifth principles (see para 74 above) were both satisfied, we considered in the exercise of our discretion that it was appropriate to permit Corner House to proceed with the benefit of a PCO, and that this was one of those exceptional cases in which such an order should be made. Corner House had a real prospect of showing that they had been wronged. Whether ECGD's procedural principles promised them consultation or dialogue, they had received neither. In 2003 they had been promised a substantive response to their report, and they never received it. In 2004 they were offered a meeting with the minister, and the offer ran into the sand. ECGD told them (and TI) that it regarded them as their primary NGO partners on the topic of bribery and corruption, yet what occurred in the spring, summer and early autumn of 2004 was the antithesis of partnership. And all through 2004 ECGD was affording privileged access to the representatives of commerce and banking which it wholly denied to Corner House, despite its acknowledged expertise in the topic and in the face of ECGD's own consultation policy. 145 In R v Somerset County Council, Ex p Dixon [1998] Env LR 111, 121 Sedley J said: "Public law … is not about rights, even though abuses of power may and often do invade private rights; it is about wrongs-that is to say misuses of public power." In the present case Corner House asserted that it had been wronged, and if all the criteria for the grant of a PCO were otherwise met, we were satisfied that it was necessary in the interests of justice that it should be permitted to continue with the proceedings with the protection of a PCO. If we had not taken that course, the issues of public importance that arose in the case would have been stifled at
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the outset, and the courts would have been powerless to grant this small company the relief that it sought.
46. As to the appropriate PCO to be made on the facts of the case, it is apparent that the
Court of Appeal ran out of time to debate this issue as fully as it would have liked. At
paragraph 146 it stated:
146 If we had not been under such time pressures we would no doubt have explored with the parties the possibility of making a PCO which had the effect, say, of requiring Corner House to meet the first £10,000 of the defendants' costs if its substantive application had been dismissed in due course. In general a PCO in that form, or in the form in which one was made in R (Refugee Legal Centre) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1296 (in which the claimants undertook to seek no order for costs from the defendants if they won) are preferable to a PCO in the form in which we made it on the evening of 22 December.
147 Our order as drawn provided:
"4. The court directs that the defendant is not permitted to recover its costs of the judicial review proceedings from the claimant.
"5. The claimant's costs are to be capped applying the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of King v Telegraph Group Ltd (Practice Note) [2005] 1 WLR 2282, paras 101-102.
"6. The claimant to apply to the senior costs judge to set the level of the court's cap."
Key points emerging from Corner House
47. Whilst the Corner House decision provides useful guidance as to the making of PCOs, it
has given rise to considerable discussion particularly in the following areas:
a. The scope of the public interest test. In Corner House the Court of Appeal took a
“broad brush” approach to the public interest test. Both reasons given by the
Court of Appeal as to why the case was a matter of public importance (i.e. (1)
because of the importance of corruption/bribery to the taxpayer and as an “evil”
which offends public policy and (2) the wider interest in ensuring that public bodies
stand by their commitment of open consultation), demonstrate that a wide and
lateral approach to the public interest test is permissible.
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b. Private Interest. The need for a claimant to have no “private interest” in the
outcome of the judicial review has been doubted in subsequent cases. This is
discussed in more detail below.
c. Impact of lawyers acting pro bono – As set out above the Court of Appeal stated
that if those acting for the applicant are doing so pro bono (as opposed to under
some other form of funding arrangement such as a CFA), it is likely that this will
enhance the merits of the application (paragraph 74). No reasons are provided as
to why this is the case and this ignores the practical difficulty of securing legal
representation on this basis. It is however of interest that in Corner House itself a
PCO was awarded despite the fact that the legal representatives were acting
under a CFA.
d. Costs capping – the impact of the guidance on costs capping has the effect that, in
cases of general public importance, there is no role for a silk unless he or she is
acting pro bono. It is of note that this would have precluded the legal team acting
in Corner House itself.
e. Costs protection guidelines – Despite the fact that the Court of Appeal limited the
costs of making the PCO to £1,000 for a paper application and £2,500 for a
hearing, this ignores the fact that many small NGOs would not have this sort of
sum available and therefore would be deterred in making an application on that
basis (particularly in cases where there may be multiple defendants). In such
situations it may be that the issue has to be canvassed carefully in any letter
before action and costs exposure minimised by attempting to engage in a dialogue
pre-proceedings.
General Importance and Public Interest
48. Given the Court of Appeal’s comments in Corner House, it is, of course, key that an
applicant for a PCO is able to satisfy the court that the issues which he or she seeks to
bring to the court are of (i) general importance and (ii) in the public interest. There has
been a lot of debate as to what suffices. It is agreed that it is not enough that the case
raises public law issues, even significant ones, as this would bring most, if not all, judicial
review challenges within the definition. However, it is difficult to be more prescriptive. As
17
Clayton observed6, “it may well be that [it] is easier to recognise in practice than to define
in theory”. Although various tests were suggested within the Working Group on
Facilitating Public Interest Litigation (chaired by Sir Maurice Kay)(15th June 2006)7, the
Report declined to lay down any more precise definition but concluded that a broad
purposive interpretation ought to be given and the definition ought not to become unduly
restrictive (see paragraphs 75 and 76).
49. It is therefore instructive to consider what approach has been adopted in subsequent
cases. The case of R(Compton) v Wiltshire Primary Care Trust8 considered below
provides guidance. The Compton case suggests a move away from the approach taken
in R (Bullmore) v. West Hertfordshire Hospitals NHS Trust [2007] EWCA Civ. 609, where
the Court refused to make a PCO in respect of a claim brought by members of a local
hospital action or pressure group challenging the Trust’s decision to close certain hospital
services at Hemel Hempstead hospital. On the application for permission to appeal,
Hughes LJ concluded that Lloyd Jones J was entitled to conclude that the case did not
raise sufficient issues of general public importance so as to require, in the public interest,
that they should be litigated at the expense of the defendants whether they succeeded or
not.
Private Interest
50. The requirement that the applicant for a PCO does not have a private interest in the
outcome has been subject to much criticism9:
a. It is a false dichotomy to assume that “personal” or “private” interest and the notion
of “public” interest are necessarily mutually exclusive. “Many interested parties
would fall at this hurdle, serving as they inevitably do, planned agendas, however
benign, such as environmental or human rights protection”. “... that the only
worthy public interest litigant is an altruistic stranger to the cause is nonsensical”;
b. The requirement is in direct conflict with the standing principles and the “victim”
test under section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998. A person with no private
6 See PL [2006] 429 at 441 7 See paragraph 70, “the case should raise a serious issue which affects or may affect the public or section of it; the case should raise issues which transcend the interests of the person bringing the case; the case should raise issues which it is teh collective interest to resolve” 8 [2008] EWCA 749 9 See Charakabati & ors [2003] PL 697 at 702, Stein & Beagent [2005] JR 206 and Clayton QC [2006] PL 4
18
interest will almost certainly not satisfy a Court that he is directly affected so as to
be a victim within the HRA. It is difficult to imagine how there can be an alleged
human rights violation without a specific victim. Alternatively, a pressure group
which might qualify for costs protection as a public interest litigant would almost
certainly fail the victim test and not be able to bring a human rights challenge;
c. The need for the requirement is inadequately reasoned. It is not clear why a
private individual who is affected by a public decision (and who cannot obtain legal
aid) should not be able to obtain a PCO to ensure that the decision which may be
unlawful or flawed can be subject to scrutiny by the courts. If the other
requirements are satisfied (general importance/public interest), it is far from
obvious why the fact that the individual is personally affected should bar him from
obtaining a PCO.
51. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal in Goodson not only maintained that it was a
requirement which needed to be established before a PCO could be obtained but
interpreted the requirement narrowly. In that case, the Claimant contended that it was
sufficient that the public interest in having the issue decided transcended10 or wholly
outweighed the interest of the particular litigant and if an applicant for a PCO had to
demonstrate that he had no private interest it would be “all but impossible to obtain an
order of that kind”11. The Court of Appeal rejected that submission on two grounds:
a. Having considered the relevant authorities, the Court in Corner House was “well-
placed to decide where to draw the line in terms of private interest. The
requirement that the applicant must have no private interest in the outcome of the
case is expressed in unqualified terms, although the court could easily have
formulated this part of the guidelines in more qualified terms corresponding to the
submission of [the Claimant] if it thought it appropriate to do so”12;
b. The requirement “may also be regarded as consistent with the rules relating to
standing for the purposes of applying for judicial review”. The Claimant has a
private interest in the outcome because this is the way in which she can obtain a
fresh enquiry into the death of her father. “It is her relationship with her father that
gives her both the interest in seeking relief by way of judicial review and sufficient
standing in law to pursue her claim. As [she] was constrained to accept, it is
10 This was wording and approach adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Board (2003) 114 CRR 2d 108 11 [26] of the judgment 12 [27] of the judgment
19
unlikely that she would have been entitled to take similar action to challenge the
verdict resulting from an inquest on a stranger whose death occurred at the same
hospital”
52. Neither of the two reasons given withstands proper scrutiny. The first because the issue
(and the arguments) were not canvassed by the Court of Appeal in Corner House. It is
arguable that the Court of Appeal’s comments in this respect were obiter. Nor were they
directly in issue in Child Poverty Action Group. In addition, it is clear from the judgment
in Corner House that the Court was giving guidance to be considered rather than, as the
Court in Goodson seems to have interpreted it, laying down binding requirements.
53. The second because it ignores the fact that “public” and “private” interests are not
necessarily mutually exclusive and that the essential purpose of a PCO to provide
equality of arms and to ensure that “public interest” litigation is not “stifled” at the outset.
54. The requirement that an applicant have no private interest was doubted by Sir Mark
Potter P in Wilkinson v. Kitzinger. He stated at [54],
“I find the requirement that the applicant should have ‘no private interest in the outcome’ a somewhat elusive concept to apply in any case in which the applicant, either in private or public law proceedings is pursuing a personal remedy, albeit his or her purpose is essentially representative of a number of persons with a similar interest. In such a case, it is difficult to see why, if a PCO is otherwise appropriate, the existence of the applicant’s private and personal interest should disqualify him or her from the benefit of such an order. I consider that, the nature and extent of the ‘private interest’ and its weight or importance in the overall context should be treated as a flexible element in the court’s consideration of the question whether it is fair and just to make the order. Were I to be persuaded that the remaining criteria are satisfied, I would not regard the requirement ... as to fatal to this application.”
55. Those doubts were shared by the Court of Appeal (on an application for permission to
appeal) in R (England) v. London Borough of Tower Hamlets & ors. [2006] EWCA Civ.
1742 at [14].
56. These concerns were shared by the Working Group on Facilitating Public Interest
Litigation (chaired by Sir Maurice Kay)(15th June 2006): see paragraphs 79 and 80 of the
Report. The Report also expressed concern as to the lack of clarity as to “what
constitutes a private interest” so as to disqualify consideration for a PCO (see paragraph
82). In the circumstances, the Report concluded (with unanimous support of the Group)
that the lack of private interest should not be a condition for obtaining a PCO (paragraph
20
83) but, that, instead the “nature and extent” of the private interest is relevant to the
court’s discretion as whether it is fair and just to grant a PCO.
57. In the circumstances, the Court is likely to re-examine the issue and adopt the approach
of Sir Mark Potter P in Wilkinson v. Kitzinger and the Working Group on Facilitating
Public Interest Litigation, i.e. to determine whether the public interest in the case points
towards the making of a PCO notwithstanding the existence of a private interest. This
approach also better explains the view taken by Munby J in A (Disputed Children) where
he concluded that the Claimant retained a private interest (the ring-fencing of any
damages due to him) which was the “driver” behind the application for a PCO and in the
circumstances a PCO would not be granted (notwithstanding that the issues in the case
were of general public importance)13.
Impact of lawyers acting pro bono
58. The Court of Appeal in Corner House was of the view that an application for a PCO
would be enhanced if the applicant’s lawyers were acting pro bono (as opposed to acting
under a CFA). There is no proper basis for this reasoning. It ignores the purpose of the
PCO – which is to provide costs protection against the other side’s costs. It is that
potential barrier to accessing the courts which the PCO is designed to remove. The fact
that the applicant has secured representation on a pro bono basisis a matter which more
properly goes to the form of the order which is made.
59. Further, the Court of Appeal’s remarks ignore the practical realities. As the Working
Group on Facilitating Public Interest Litigation Report notes14, such a requirement would
unduly restrict the pool of lawyers who might be willing to act in a public interest
challenge.
Costs protection guidelines
60. The Court of Appeal in Corner House indicated that, if an application for PCO failed, the
applicant could expect to pay the costs of the Defendant and interested parties15. If the
application were considered on paper, the Court indicated that no more than £1,000
would normally be recoverable and, if the application was considered at a hearing, no
13 See [36]. 14 See paragraph 96 15 See [79]
21
more than £2,50016. Interested parties could also expect to recover their costs in those
sums, albeit that there would be only one set of costs ordered.
61. Thus, an applicant could be faced with a bill of £7,000 if unsuccessful in his or her
application for a PCO.
62. The risks of such an adverse order are in themselves a powerful deterrent to bring an
application17. This issue ought to be revisited. The Working Group on Facilitating Public
Interest Litigation Report recommended that there should be no order as to costs save
where a party has acted unreasonably18. This solution is more satisfactory than the
present position. It provides a balance between, on the one hand, not deterring
meritorious applications for PCO on grounds of cost and, on other hand, deterring
abusive and wholly unmeritorious applications.
The Compton decision
63. In Compton the Court of Appeal (Waller LJ, Buxton LJ, Smith LJ) considered three
appeals relating to the grant of PCOs.
a. The first appeal was from a decision of McCombe J under which he refused to
reconsider an order for a PCO made by Simon J on paper in judicial review
proceedings relating to the day hospital at Savernake Hospital (the day hospital);
b. The second and third appeals were from the decision of Holman J granting a PCO
in relation to judicial review proceedings relating to the Minor Injuries Unit (the
MIU) at the same hospital.
64. Consequently the appeals arose from two separate judicial review proceedings in which
Mrs Compton, on behalf of “Community Action for Savernake Hospital” challenged the
closure of the day hospital facility and the MIU. Separate grounds for judicial review
arose in the two different claims.
65. Waller LJ and Smith LJ (Buxton LJ dissenting) upheld the decisions of the first instance
judges and dismissed the appeals. The judgments highlight widely differing views as to
the proper interpretation of the Corner House decision.
16 The Court of Appeal was aware of the problems caused by applying for a PCO. It made an interim order to cover the costs of the application. 17 See Stein & Beagent [2005] JR 206 18 See paragraph 99.
22
General public importance
66. Perhaps the key issue in the case was whether Holman J was correct to conclude that
the judicial review challenge brought by Mrs Compton in respect of the MIU met the first
criteria outlined in Corner House i.e. did it raise issues of “general public importance”.
67. Holman J decided that this criterion was marginally satisfied. In essence his conclusion
boiled down to the following:“I am satisfied that the ultimate issue in this case…is an
important and not a trivial one; and that it is of importance to a sufficiently large section of
the public namely the 30,000 to 50,000 people in the affected catchment area, as to be
an issue of general public importance…”
68. He did however conclude that the issues in the case did not raise legal or other issues of
importance to the general public or nation as a whole. The case was not a ‘test’ case
and it did not involve any elucidation of public law in the higher courts. As to the
separate requirement whether the public interest requires that such issues are resolved,
Holman J thought that this was even more marginal. Whilst the issue had engaged the
national media, the public at large had no direct interest in it and of all of the people
affected by the decision only Mrs Compton had commenced judicial review proceedings.
69. When considering this question Waller LJ concluded that:
“21. It seems to me that when considering whether a PCO should be granted the two
stage tests of general public importance and the public interest in the issue being
resolved are difficult to separate……
23. Where someone in the position of Mrs Compton is bringing an action to obtain
resolution of issues as to the closure of parts of a hospital which affects a wide
community, and where that community has a real interest in the issues that arise being
resolved, my view is that it is certainly open to a judge to hold that there is a public
interest in resolution of the issues and that the issues are ones of general public
importance. The paragraphs in Corner House are not, in my view, to be read as
statutory provisions, nor to be read in an over-restrictive way. Indeed, it seems to me
there is already support for a non-rigorous approach exemplified by paragraph 19 of
Lloyd Jones J’s judgment in Bullmore where he said in relation to the criteria of “no
private interest”:-
“19. This particular requirement as formulated in Corner House has been
diluted in the later case law. I have in mind particularly Wilkinson v Kitzinger
23
[2006] EWHC 835 (Fam), [2006] 2 FCR 537, [2006] 2 FLR 397 (Fam), where Sir
Mark Potter P said at para 54:“As to (1)(iii), I find the requirement that the
Applicant should have 'no private interest in the outcome' a somewhat elusive
concept to apply in any case in which the Applicant, either in private or public law
proceedings is pursuing a personal remedy, albeit his or her purpose is essentially
representative of a number of persons with a similar interest. In such a case, it is
difficult to see why, if a PCO is otherwise appropriate, the existence of the
Applicant's private or personal interest should disqualify him or her from the benefit
of such an order. I consider that, the nature and extent of the 'private interest' and
its weight or importance in the overall context should be treated as a flexible
element in the court's consideration of the question whether it is fair and just to
make the order. Were I to be persuaded that the remaining criteria are satisfied, I
would not regard requirement 1(iii) as fatal to this application.I note that passage
was approved by the Court of Appeal in R (England) (?) v London Borough of
Tower Hamlets and others at para 14.”
70. Smith LJ agreed with Waller LJ and held that:
a. There is no absolute standard by which to define what amounts to an issue of
general public importance [75].
b. There are degrees to which the requirement may be satisfied; some issues may
be of the first rank of general public importance, others of lesser rank although still
of general public importance [75].
c. Making the judgment is an exercise in which two judges might legitimately reach a
different view without either being wrong [75].
d. Corner House does not say that only issues of national importance will qualify
[76].
e. If the issue is of public importance and affects only a section of the population, it
does not follow that it is not of general public importance, although it will not be in
the first rank of public importance [77].
f. The question of importance must be left to the evaluation of the judge without
restrictive rules as to what is important and what is general [77].
71. It should be noted that Buxton LJ strongly dissented on this issue, highlighting the very
different types of case referred to in Corner House when addressing this criterion. In
addition he commented that the effect of the majority decision was
24
“very greatly to extend the types of cases in which, if other requirements are fulfilled, a
PCO can be made.” [70]
72. Despite Smith LJ’s protestations to the contrary (see [89]) it is apparent that the decision
does indeed broaden out the circumstances in which the “general public interest” test will
be satisfied. It is, on its face, a decision which runs directly contrary to the conclusion
reached by Lloyd Jones J in R (Bullmore) v West Hertfordshire Hospitals NHS Trust19
Decisions on hospital provision, school reorganisation or any aspect of local government
services which affect a significant catchment area may now fall within the Court’s
jurisdiction to make a PCO.
73. The decision also endorses those cases in which the need for a claimant to have no
“private interest” in the outcome of the case has been doubted20.
Exceptionality
74. As to the question whether Corner House imposed a separate and distinct
“exceptionality” test, aside from the five criteria identified in paragraph 74 of Corner House, both Waller LJ and Smith LJ decided that it did not. In practice once all five
requirements were satisfied and the court thinks it right to exercise its discretion, nothing
more is required and exceptionality has implicitly been satisfied [82]. Again Buxton LJ
strongly dissented [64]-[66].
Compelling reasons
75. Both Waller LJ and Smith LJ held that, once a PCO had been granted on the papers, the
defendant did need to show “compelling reasons” on any application to set aside the
order21. They concluded that the court in Corner House:
“was anxious to impose a procedure that would avoid drawn out preliminary skirmishes
and for that reason intended, with justification, to impose a difficult hurdle (compelling
reasons) on a defendant who seeks to set aside an order made on consideration of the
papers.” [90]
19 [2007] EWHC 1350 (Admin) 20 Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2006] EWHC 835 (Fam), [2006] 2 FCR 537, [2006] 2 FLR 397 (Fam) 21 see in particular [42] and [90]
25
76. However a complete failure by the judge at the paper stage to provide any reasons for
the decision will amount to a “compelling reason” why the decision should be reviewed
on its merits [93]. Consequently a note from the judge explaining his reasoning (in two or
three sentences) was “essential” in all cases [93].
PCOs in the Court of Appeal
77. Finally the Court of Appeal laid down guidance as to the proper procedure to be followed
when dealing with the question of PCOs in the Court of Appeal. That guidance is to be
found at paragraphs [47] to [49] of the judgment of Waller LJ.
78. It was anticipated that, following Corner House, the courts would be more willing to grant
PCOs in “public interest litigation”. This has not significantly proved to be the case22.
This is probably a consequence of the Court of Appeal’s retention of the “lack of private
interest” criterion and the risks which many public interest litigants perceive in an adverse
costs order being made against them in simply applying for a PCO. Although the Court
of Appeal in Goodson perpetuated the difficulties by restrictively applying the “private
interest” requirement, subsequent Courts have doubted whether that is the proper
approach.
Incorporation of a company to avoid costs liability
79. The Courts have accepted that a company can be formed for the purpose of bringing judicial review
proceedings . See R v Leicestershire County Council ex p Blackfordby and Boothorpe Action
Group23
In my view the incorporation of a local action group ought not to be a bar to the bringing of an
application for judicial review. Technically, it may be said, the company does not have a
relevant interest of its own; but in substance it represents the interests of local residents who,
or many of whom, do have a relevant interest. Incorporation has a number of advantages,
some of which motivated incorporation of the action group in this case. It is true that another
advantage is the avoidance of substantial personal liability of members for the costs of
unsuccessful legal proceedings. But that should not preclude the use of a corporate vehicle,
at least where incorporation is not for the sole purpose of escaping the direct impact of an
adverse costs order (and possibly even where it is for that purpose). The costs position can
22 A list of the cases in which a PCO has been considered since Corner House is set out at footnote 6 of Clayton QC [2006] PL 429 and paragraphs 56-64. In addition to those, there have been (i) Bullmore (see paragraph 31 above (ii) A (Disputed Children) (see paragraph 32) (iii) England (see paragraph 43). 23 [2001] Env LR 2.
26
be dealt with adequately by requiring the provision of security for costs in a realistically large
sum. In the present case security was ordered in the sum of £15,000. Whether that was
sufficient may be open to doubt, given the sheer size of the case (with a large number of
documents and a full two-day hearing). It is, however, the right approach in principle.”
80. In a number of other cases the standing of recently formed companies has been accepted
(R(Wembley Fields Limited) v London Borough of Brent24, R(Kings Cross Railway Lands Group
Limited) v London Borough of Camden). R(Residents Against Waste Services Limited) v
Lancashire County Council.25
81. A defendant can apply for security for costs, on the basis that the claimant ‘is a company… and
there is reason to believe that it will be unable to pay the [Council’s] costs if ordered to do so’, CPR
25.13(2)(c). As already mentioned above, security for costs of £15,000 was ordered in Blackfordby.
In Wembley Fields a consent order for security for costs was made in the defendant council’s favour
for £11,000. Under the order the council had possession of a cheque. During the RAWS case the
council had asked for security for costs of £60,000. The council though decided not to make an
application for security, unless circumstances changed, as the claimant’s solicitors confirmed they
were holding £25,000 towards costs liabilities.
Conclusion
82. It is perhaps worth concluding a paper on costs with the celebrated observation of Lord Lloyd of
Berwick:
“in all questions to do with costs the fundamental rule is that there are no rules. Costs are
always in the discretion of the court and a practice, however widespread and longstanding
must never be allowed to harden into a rule” (Lord Lloyd Bolton MDC v Sec of State for the
Environment (Practice Note) [1995] 1 WLR 1176, 1178F
24 [2005] EWHC 2978 (Admin), [2006] J.P.L. 1216. 25 [2007] EWHC 2558 (Admin).
27
ANNEX 1
Court’s discretion and circumstances to be taken into account when exercising its discretion as to costs
44.3
(1) The court has discretion as to –
(a) whether costs are payable by one party to another;
(b) the amount of those costs; and
(c) when they are to be paid.
(2) If the court decides to make an order about costs –
(a) the general rule is that the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful party; but
(b) the court may make a different order.
(3) The general rule does not apply to the following proceedings –
(a) proceedings in the Court of Appeal on an application or appeal made in connection with proceedings in the Family Division; or
(b) proceedings in the Court of Appeal from a judgment, direction, decision or order given or made in probate proceedings or family proceedings.
(4) In deciding what order (if any) to make about costs, the court must have regard to all the circumstances, including –
(a) the conduct of all the parties;
(b) whether a party has succeeded on part of his case, even if he has not been wholly successful; and
(c) any payment into court or admissible offer to settle made by a party which is drawn to the court’s attention, and which is not an offer to which costs consequences under Part 36 apply.
(5) The conduct of the parties includes –
(a) conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings and in particular the extent to which the parties followed any relevant pre-action protocol;
(b) whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest a particular allegation or issue;
(c) the manner in which a party has pursued or defended his case or a particular
28
allegation or issue; and
(d) whether a claimant who has succeeded in his claim, in whole or in part, exaggerated his claim.
(6) The orders which the court may make under this rule include an order that a party must pay –
(a) a proportion of another party’s costs;
(b) a stated amount in respect of another party’s costs;
(c) costs from or until a certain date only;
(d) costs incurred before proceedings have begun;
(e) costs relating to particular steps taken in the proceedings;
(f) costs relating only to a distinct part of the proceedings; and
(g) interest on costs from or until a certain date, including a date before judgment.
(7) Where the court would otherwise consider making an order under paragraph (6)(f), it must instead, if practicable, make an order under paragraph (6)(a) or (c).
(8) Where the court has ordered a party to pay costs, it may order an amount to be paid on account before the costs are assessed.
ANNEX 2 COSTS GLOSSARY
There are certain costs orders which the court will commonly make in proceedings before trial. The following table sets out the general effect of these orders. The table is not an exhaustive list of the orders which the court may make.
Term Effect
Costs
Costs in any event
The party in whose favour the order is made is entitled to the costs in respect of the part of the proceedings to which the order relates, whatever other costs orders are made in the proceedings.
Costs in the case
Costs in the application
The party in whose favour the court makes an order for costs at the end of the proceedings is entitled to his costs of the part of the proceedings to which the order relates.
29
Costs reserved The decision about costs is deferred to a later
occasion, but if no later order is made the costs will be costs in the case.
Claimant’s/Defendant’s costs in case/application
If the party in whose favour the costs order is made is awarded costs at the end the proceedings, that party is entitled to his costs of the part of the proceedings to which the order relates. If any other party is awarded costs at the end of the proceedings, the party in whose favour the final costs order is made is not liable to pay the costs of any other party in respect of the part of the proceedings to which the order relates.
Costs thrown away Where, for example, a judgment or order is set aside,
the party in whose favour the costs order is made is entitled to the costs which have been incurred as a consequence. This includes the costs of – (a) preparing for and attending any hearing at which
the judgment or order which has been set aside was made;
(b) preparing for and attending any hearing to set aside the judgment or order in question;
(c) preparing for and attending any hearing at which the court orders the proceedings or the part in question to be adjourned;
(d) any steps taken to enforce a judgment or order which has subsequently been set aside.
Costs of and caused by Where, for example, the court makes this order on an
application to amend a statement of case, the party in whose favour the costs order is made is entitled to the costs of preparing for and attending the application and the costs of any consequential amendment to his own statement of case.
Costs here and below The party in whose favour the costs order is made is
entitled not only to his costs in respect of the proceedings in which the court makes the order but also to his costs of the proceedings in any lower court. In the case of an appeal from a Divisional Court the party is not entitled to any costs incurred in any court below the Divisional Court.
No order as to costs
Each party to pay his own costs
Each party is to bear his own costs of the part of the proceedings to which the order relates whatever costs order the court makes
