The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective? Axel Dreher (Georg-August...

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The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective? Axel Dreher (Georg-August University Göttingen, KOF, CESifo, IZA) Stephan Klasen (Georg-August University Göttingen) James Raymond Vreeland (Georgetown University) Eric Werker (Harvard Business School) Presentation by James Raymond Vreeland For The Political Economy Seminar Series at Princeton University October 26, 2009

Transcript of The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective? Axel Dreher (Georg-August...

The costs of favoritism:Is politically-driven aid less effective?

Axel Dreher (Georg-August University Göttingen, KOF, CESifo, IZA)Stephan Klasen (Georg-August University Göttingen)James Raymond Vreeland (Georgetown University)Eric Werker (Harvard Business School)

Presentation by James Raymond Vreeland For The Political Economy Seminar Series at Princeton UniversityOctober 26, 2009

Work in progress: Since the draft…

• New theory!

• New data!

• New results!

• Even a New co-author!

• All of this for just the price of an Amtrak ticket from Washington, DC!

The plan:

• The question

• The debate

• The approach

• The analysis

• Conclusion

The question:

• Is politically motivated aid less effective?

The debate:

• Critics argue aid (e.g., World Bank lending) has failed (e.g., Easterly)

• Some say the problem is politics (e.g., Stone)

• Others argue political motivations have faded (e.g., Bermeo)

• Still others say that multi-lateral sources are less influenced by politics (e.g., Tobin)

Do international politics matter for lending?

World Bank, FAQ, www.worldbank.org

• “It is true that during the Cold War years aid was politically motivated.

• “Now however aid is being delivered to countries most in need,

• “and to those who show they are determined to use it well.”

World Bank projects & UNSC membership

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

avg=1.29

std=1.95

avg=2.13

std=2.93

avg=1.28 avg=1.30

std=1.96 std=1.93

avg=2.15 avg=2.10

std=2.96 std=2.92

avg=2.06 avg=2.19

std=2.75 std=3.11

n=176 n=181

Non-

n=5333 n=357

member Member

Total sample

avg=1.29

std=1.95

n=5333

Non-member

1st.yearmember

2nd yearmember

Over time

n=2638 n=183 n=2695 n=174

Non-member

Member Non-member

Member

During the cold war After the cold war

Source: Dreher, Sturm, Vreeland (2008)

So politics are important…

• … but so what?

• Are there any costs of this favoritism?

The approach:

• Dependent variable:– World Bank project evaluations– Better than other outcome variables (e.g., economic

growth) – less noisy– Independent (Independent Evaluation

Group/Operations Evaluation Department)

• Independent variables:– (Elected) United Nation Security Council Membership– “Seat” on the World Bank Executive Board

The data analysis

Data on World Bank project quality

• World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (2009): – Discrete performance measure generated by

World Bank project managers and evaluators

• 8,405 projects from 152 countries

– First project approved in 1956, last in 2006

– First project ends in 1964, last in 2007

– Average project takes 6 years, longest 22 years

• 73% of the projects rated “satisfactory” (27% “unsatisfactory”)

Empirical setup

• Model: Logit (with fixed effects)

• Dependent variable: indicator for successful evaluation

• Project-level panel: 1975-2003

• Control variables follow Dollar & Svensson (2000)

– time in office & squared term– ethnic fractionalization & squared term– “instability”– democracy

Satisfactory Project Evaluation, Logit

Satisfactory Project Evaluation, Logit

(t-stats in parentheses)

Accounting for the Cold War

(Bermeo 2008)

Satisfactory Project Evaluation, Logit, Cold War period (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

UNSC, approval time -0.477 -0.601 -0.473(2.25)** (2.38)** (1.72)*

UNSC, evaluation time -0.193 -0.323 -0.155(0.79) (1.37) (0.66)

WB Executive Board member 0.265 0.114 -0.126 approval time (1.05) (0.30) (0.57)WB Executive Board member -0.068 -0.440 -0.060 evaluation time (0.20) (1.60) (0.22)Short-term debt -0.005 0.001 -0.004 -0.006 -0.017 -0.005

(0.53) (0.13) (0.56) (0.75) (1.47) (0.56)Time in office -0.001 -0.028 -0.002 -0.007 -0.037 -0.008

(0.02) (0.71) (0.04) (0.15) (0.51) (0.17)Time in office, squared 0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.001

(0.97) (1.98)** (0.68) (1.03) (1.16) (0.49)Ethnic fractionalization 0.026 0.007 0.030 0.027

(1.64) (0.46) (1.89)* (1.44)Ethnic fractionalization, squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000

(2.08)** (1.50) (2.29)** (2.08)**Instability 0.325 0.312 0.339 0.292 0.383 0.319

(1.95)* (1.90)* (1.80)* (1.71)* (1.58) (1.63)Democracy 0.023 0.005 -0.016 0.014 0.020 -0.023

(1.32) (0.33) (0.54) (0.76) (0.80) (0.91)(log) GDP p.c. -0.185 0.111

(1.24) (0.39)(log) Population 0.038 0.069

(0.49) (0.67)East Asia, dummy 0.625 0.475

(1.83)* (1.05)Latin America, dummy -0.463 -0.907

(1.93)* (2.97)***Middle East, dummy -0.105 0.188

(0.22) (0.38)South Asia, dummy 0.421 0.410

(0.96) (0.83)Sub Saharan Africa, dummy -0.348 0.106

(0.75) (0.18)Constant 0.810 2.028 0.711 -0.716

(2.56)** (1.10) (2.12)** (0.23)Country fixed effects no no yes no no yesPeriod <1991 <1991 <1991 <1991 <1991 <1991Number of observations 1387 1314 1352 1390 515 1355log likelihood -813.88 -741.25 -626.83 -816.29 -290.95 -629.06Pseudo R2 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.01approval = evaluation (Prob>chi2) 0.38 0.43 0.41 0.45 0.26 0.86

Satisfactory Project Evaluation, Logit, Cold War period

Satisfactory Project Evaluation, Logit, Post-Cold War period

Satisfactory Project Evaluation, Logit, Post-Cold War period

Accounting for “vulnerability” (Stone, 2008)

• Strategic interests only matter if financing is a high priority for the borrower

• From a borrower’s perspective, influence is a valuable resource, used only when the stakes are high

"The effects of the borrower’s strategic importance should be conditional on the borrower’s external vulnerability"

• Stone suggests:– Short-term debt– Debt service

Table 5: Satisfactory Project Evaluation, Interaction with vulnerability

Summary

• UNSC membership reduces the probability of successful evaluation by about 0.11 during the Cold War period

• With extreme short-term debt (around 40 short-term/total), UNSC membership reduces the probability of a satisfactory evaluation by about 0.2 (whole period)

• With debt service of 15% (GNI), UNSC membership reduces the probability of a satisfactory evaluation by about 0.2 (whole period)

• Otherwise, no effects– UNSC membership during post-Cold War not facing extenuating

circumstances– World Bank Executive Board membership

• Conclusion:– The World Bank may be doing a good job administering

political aid in all but the most challenging circumstances

Thank youWE ARE GLOBAL GEORGETOWN!