Humanitarian Practitioner: Some NewColours for an Endangered Chameleon

The Continuing Metamorphosis of the

HUGO SLIM, Oxford Brookes University

In this article I set out an agenda of good practice for today 's humanitarianpractitioner. I first outline the distinctive political and conflict-related features oftoday 's complex political emergencies, and the new interventionis t strateg ies of theinternational community and the United Nations in responding to them. From thisdescri ption of the new operating environment faced by humanitarian practitioners sincethe end of the Cold War , I go on to identify a range of key skills required by today 'srelief workers. These include: informed political analysis; negotiation skills; conflictanalysis management and resolution; propaganda monitoring and humanitarian broad-casting; a broader understanding of vulnerability to include notions of political, ethnic,gender and class based vulnerability ; human ri ghts monitoring and reporting; militaryliaison; and personal security and staff welfare. Finally , the article focuses on themoral skills required by today 's humanitarian practitioners if they are to work out anew model of humanitarian identity and positioning which supersedes the traditionalbut devalued notion of neutrali ty .

In 1985, Susan George gave a satiricaldescription of the ideal relief worker . Theresult was a ludicrously well-qualified andsuperhuman character type, able to adaptto any situation :

First they must take graduate degrees insocial anthropology, geography, economics,a dozen or so difficult and unrelated lan-guages, medicine and business administ-ration. Second , at a sliehtly more practical

level they must demonstrate competence inagronomy , hydrology , practical nursing,accounting, psychology, automotive mecha-nics and civil engineering. In addition, theymust learn to give a credible imitation ofsaintliness, and it would be well if they

DISASTERS VOLUME 19 NUMBER 2 '= • Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1995, 108 Cowley Road , Oxford 0X4 1]F , UKand 238 Main Street , Cambridge, MA 02142, USA.

could leam sleight-of-hand as well , sincethey will often be called upon to performfeats of magic. (George, 1990, p. 50.)

Like all good satire, George's spoof of anidentikit relief worker contained an ele-ment of truth. But George was designingher superhuman relief worker in 1985 andconfining his or her role primarily to thefood emergencies and natural disasters oftinaY time. Yn this paper, want to suggestthat the majority of today 's humanitarianemergencies require relief workers to haveeven more skills than this parody of theireighties predecessors. Today 's emergen-cies — described variously as complex

emergencies, political emergencies or per-manent emergencies — have seen reliefworkers working in radically new opera-tional and policy environments. The classi-cal set-piece relief operation of previousdecades is often unworkable in many ofthese situations (Slim, 1994), while thenew options for international interventionhave set precedents for increasingly politi-cized humanitarian action (Slim and Pen-rose, 1994).

This paper describes a number offeatures which are distinctive to this newoperating environment and identifies newareas of work which are essential to copewith them. I argue that for relief workersto adapt successfully to their new environ-ment requires re-skilling in certain keyareas — yet more colours for thischameleon profession. But more than re-skilling, today's emergencies also require afundamental reappraisal of the reliefworker's essential identity. In particular, itis necessary to examine that precioussaintliness alluded to by George. Of all thecolours in their camouflage, this saintli-ness has been the one which ultimatelyprotects relief workers from attack in theirenvironment. It is this aura of neutralitywhich has allowed them to be perceived asbeing in the world of conflict but not of it.But is such positioning possible in today 'semergencies? Is the best form of protectionnow to be found in taking sides? Today 'semergency practitioner, therefore, mustalso be something of a moral philosopher.He or she often has to decide between theScylla and Charybdis of what has beendescribed as the choice between neutralityor solidarity (Duffield, 1994a; AfricanRights, 1994b).

The stereotyp ical media image of arelief worker in most western countries isthat of a dynamic and rather harassedwhite medic or administrator breathlesslyquantif ying the terrible scale of the latestexample of man's inhumanity to man.Needless to say, this is an over-simplified

© Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1995 DISASTERS VOLUME 19 NUMBER 2

image of the different groups who actuallymanage today 's relief programmes. Inbroad terms, there are three categories ofhumanitarian practitioner . In this paper Iseek to address them all and use thephrase humanitarian practitioner toencompass all three categories.

First there are the members of the'international relief elite ' (African Rights ,1994b, p. 9). These are the civil servantsand employees of the government, UNand NGO organizations who dominate therelief and development business and formthe humanitarian establishment . Secondly,there are the many thousands of nationalemployees of these organizations (knownsomewhat patronisingly as 'local staff bythe establishment) who manage the greatbulk of relief programmes and frequentl yput themselves and their families at risk ofintimidation and death . These nationalemployees who work in international UNagendes and NGOs are often confrontedwith a very effective glass ceiling whichseverely limits their professional advance-ment . This prevents them from rising to themost senior positions in these organizationsand having any real policy influence . Theydo, however, tend to form a national reliefelite, a kind of development bourgeoisewithin their own societies. Thirdly, thereare the founders, members and employeesof national NGOs or community-basedorganizations (CBOs) whose organizationsare (equally patronisingly) referred to as'local NGOs'. These practitioners and theirorganizations may start off as independentand radical self-help groups working withtheir own communities in emergencies , butcan also be co-opted by the internationalrelief elite over time.

THE NEW ENVIRONMENT

In the last four years, the radically differ-ent nature of many humanitarian emer-gencies has combined with equall y radicalnew humanitarian policies by the more

powerful members of the internationalcommunity to create a new operatingenvironment for humanitarian practi-tioners . Duffield has led the way in analys-ing the distinctive features of complex orpolitical emergencies, and has traced theaccompany ing evolution of donor andNGO policy and practice (Duffield , 1990,1994b and 1994c).

The overriding feature of complexemergencies is their thorough politicalnessand their domination by conflict . Duffieldargues that today 's complex emergenciesare wholly different to natural disasters.Alth ough the latter are recognized ascomplicated social and political pheno-mena , th ey do not have the wider wrec-king power of a political emergency (Duf-field , 1994a) . The maj ority of conflicts intoday 's world are internal conflicts. Nolong er the socially cohesive wars of libe-ration in the Cold War period , many oftoday 's wars are 'resource wars ' in whichviolence is used as a rational strategy forsurvival within the context of limitedenvironmental resources and increasingmarginalization from the world economy.Their most significant feature is thereforeto wreck and destroy national, govern-mental , social , civil and trading structures(Macrae and Zwi et al. , 1994). It is thisstate of aff airs above all others whichdictates the conditions in which reliefworkers now work and which is determin-ing a new agenda for humanitarian prac-tice. While these types of conflict are by nomeans new — Cambodia under Pol Potand Uganda under Amin are examplesfrom the Cold War — they are distinctfrom the proxy wars of the Cold War .

The second new feature of today 's

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intern ational intervention which hasemerged since the end of the Cold War,and which has been increasingly forma-lized in the new strategies of the currentUN Secretary General 's Agenda for Peace(Boutros-Ghali, 1992) . The UN's new poli-

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cies of peacekeeping, peacemaking andpeace-building strateg ies are founded onthe increased deployment of UN militaryforces in complex emergencies . And thisnew form of interventionist militaryhumanitarianism has been a majo r newingredient in many of today 's emergen-cies, and one which has radically changedthe operational landscape for civilianhumanitarian practitioners.

THE NEW SKILLS

The distinctiveness of complex emergen-cies and the more interventionist sty le of'new world order' humanitarianismmakes it essential to understand the imp li-cations of these changes for practitioners.In doing so, it should be possible toidentif y new skills which will allow themto operate effectively . Needless to say,many practitioners are already engaged inthese new areas, but recognition of themas part of the expanded parameters ofhumanitarian work will help to formalizethem as essential elements of goodpractice .

Political analysis

In today 's emergencies , the relief workeris faced with conditions of byzantinepolitical complexity . Sophisticated politicalanalysis and negotiation are now a maj orelement of humanitarian practice in com-plex emergencies . In the past, a certainnaivety was considered a useful asset torelief workers, and political ignorance wasthe bliss in which they thrived on thefringes of many wars and dictatorships.But today , political ignorance can be fatalawi <gaoA W&CTMA.VW. '& cwc-vat to •5>w;vwalin their new environment . A great part ofagency 'sitreps' are now taken up withdetailed reports on local patterns of con-flict and alliance, and with politicalmanoeuvring at the international level .The need to keep pace with the changing

political and military configurations of

events is vital to the safe and effective

operation of a relief agency.Because an increasing amount of

emergency aid is now delivered on the

principle of negotiated access (Duffield,

1994c), collecting information in complexemergencies is more akin to intelligence

gathering. Agencies need to know which

faction is in control where, who will be

amenable to negotiation and on whatterms. With relief supplies increasinglyrecognized as a weapon of war, sophisti-

cated analysis of who is benefiting andwho is losing out from an agency's reliefprogramme must be at the heart of respon-

sible good practice (Keen and Wilson,

1994). Humanitarian workers frequentlyhave to handle this kind of analysis and

negotiation themselves. They can learn

these skills on the job, but relief agencies

are recognizing that their staff are becom-

ing political analysts, intelligence gath-

erers and front-line negotiators. They need

to value these skills and develop them

in-house.

Negotiation

Negotiation is a particular area in which

increasing demands are being made on

relief workers. In many of today's emer-

gencies, the days of having a signed andsealed operational agreement with a

central government authority are over.

Likewise, the new generation of umbrellaagreements through the UN — e.g . the

Memorandum of Understanding in Iraq,Lifeline in Sudan and with UNHCR inBosnia — are also proving less and lessattractive to a number of large NGOs.

They are frequently criticized as inappro-priate international compromises whichfunction more as palliatives to competingfactions than providers of targeted andneeds-related aid. If NGOs want to deve-

lop creative and long-term relief pro-

grammes, therefore, they may increas

© Blackwell Publishers Ltd . 1995 DISASTERS VOLUME 19 NUMBER 2

ingly need to go it alone . This involves adhoc patterns of alliance and co-operation

with different factions on the ground,which must be constantly monitored and

renegotiated.This operational style, with its web of

relationships, requires a constant supplyof deft negotiators, and negotiation is

another complicated and exasperating skill

which needs to be added to the 'person

spec' of today 's relief workers . If they areto thrive in the politicized and multi-factional environment of complex emer-

gencies, the mass of negotiating exper-

ience and theory in the commercial , diplo-

matic and military communities mightusefully be applied to training reliefworkers in the art of negotiation.

Conflict analysis and management

The environment of today 's complexemergencies is above all one of continuing

conflict. Consequently, conflict analysisand management represents a major new

area of practice for relief workers. A whole

cluster of skills are involved here aroundthe core areas of conflict analysis; conflict

early warning; mediation; and conflict

resolution. They represent an increasingpart of sound humanitarian practice,essential to the effectiveness of relief pro-

grammes and to the creation of new peace-building rehabilitation and development

programmes.Skills relating to conflict prediction

and management have become an essen-

tial part of working in conflict . A plethoraof NGO workshops have taken place inthe last two years on this subject in anattempt to understand the dynamics ofconflict and train staff accordingly (e.g.,

Oxfam/ACORD, 1993; Bradbury, 1994a,

pp. 125-44). In particular , conflict earlywarning is now a major preoccupation of

NGOs and the UN system alike. In itsmost recent human development report,

UNDP is now monitoring 'human secur-

ity and numan distress through indi-cators of personal , community and politi-cal security (UNDP, 1992, ch . 2) . In thisfield , a whole new range of NGOs con-cerned with conflict and peace, like Inter-national Alert , have discovered a commonagenda with relief agencies and are nowattempting to work together, during andin advance of , complex emergencies(Rupesinghe, 1994).

The race to find these and other earlyindicators of emergent conflict is to the1990s what the race for the magic formulaof famine early warning indicators was tothe 1970s and 1980s. While it is hoped thatth e quest for conflict indicators will makerapid progress, the translation of suchefforts into conflict prevention and resolu-t ion will no doubt run into many of thesame obstacles encountered by famineprevention efforts. Those managingfamine early warning systems in the 1980ssoon discovered the vast chasm which laybetween information and response — achasm which could only be bridged byconcerted political will and public action(Buchanan-Smith et al ., 1992; Dreze andSen, 1989) . Conflict prevention initiativesmay reach a similar threshold of impo-tence if th e necessary political leaders andhumanitarian policy makers are notprepared to act for peace. From the start,therefore , all conflict prevention and reso-lution programmes will need to incorpor-ate or generate a critical mass of politicalwill.

Initial examp les of successful conflictresolution and peace-building strategiesby NGOs in Somaliland have shown that ,appropriate structures permitting, this canbe done from the bottom-up by working

wYA\ '(epteswApAwe wmWiWAv); teaAevsand negotiating for a. The long view andcommi tment of the NGO concerned wasalso recognized as critical (Bradbury,1994b) . But conflict analysis, managementand resolution is a skilled and complicatedtask , and not one for the impatient or faint

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hearted . If emergency practitioners con-tinue to take it on as part of their long-termhumanitarian role in complex emergen-cies, they will need further training along-side the fiery baptism of experience.

Propaganda and humanitarianbroadcasting

Recent events in Somalia, Rwanda andFormer Yugoslavia have shown the crucialpart played by media-based propaganda inthe escalation of conflict . In Rwanda, forexample, the notorious Hutu radio station'Mille Collines' encouraged the mostextreme forms of violence against Tutsis,and then terrorized Hutus into fleeing toZaire in the face of RPF victories (Afr icanRights, 1994a). Relief agencies and theirstaff will need to develop skills in monitor-ing this kind of propaganda in future ifthey are to be able to monitor the escala-tion of conflict and its consequences . Butmore than just monitoring it, they willneed to develop the ability to counter suchpropaganda with information broadcast-ing of their own in which voices of dissentfrom within the affected communities cancounter the dominant propaganda offens-ives. The fact that the very first flight of theUS military response to the Rwandanrefugee emergency in Zaire included radiojamming equipment may be the shape ofthings to come. Counter-propaganda, itseems, is now a first-line relief responsealong with oral rehydration solution.

Faced with the propaganda and misin-formation inherent to political emergen-cies, the relief establishment will have tobecome a powerful communicator itself.Concerted peace broadcasting 'upstream'

w advance oi mayat (xwftvct, combmedwith humanitarian information broadcasts'downstream' in the heat and aftermath ofcomplex emergencies, w ill becomeincreasingly important (Loizos 1994) .Lewis has shown how critical radio is toeven the most isolated Somali com-

munities (Lewis, 1994) as a source ofinformation on which to base their survi-val strategies. UN agencies have alreadyexperimented with this type of broadcast-ing in cooperation with the BBC WorldService in Afghanistan and Cambodia(Loizos, 1994), while in Rwanda the BBChas teamed up with the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to setup a daily fifteen minute 'emergency radiolifeline' as part of a five-country familytracing effort (Crosslines, 1994, p. 49).Such techniques of peace broadcastingand humanitarian information broadcast-ing will need to be developed even furtheras the political aspects of complex emer-gencies demand that humanitarian practi-tioners operate within the contested infor-mation space surrounding today'semergencies. In doing so, the principles ofaccuracy and genuine representation willbe essential to creating the credibility uponwhich such broadcasting depends.

Accepting a new urban terrain

Another distinctive feature of political andconflict-driven emergencies is the emer-gence of the urban setting as an increasinglocus of crisis and humanitarian relief. Incomplex emergencies, the UN agency orNGO no longer journeys into the country-side on 'field trips' from its head office inthe national or regional capital . Very oftentoday, the capital city ;s the field.

Cities are frequently the epicentres oftoday's political emergencies. The foodemergencies of the 1970s and 1980s tookplace mainly in the countryside, with citiesbeing well protected from them by govern-ments who feared the displeasure andproximity of an urban mob. In contrast,because today's emergencies are political,they focus on cities as the centres ofregional or national power. It is in placeslike Mogadishu, Kigali, Sarajevo, Gorazdeand Huambo where the wrecking powerof resource wars and their conflict is

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concentrated. Agencies have seen deathand destruction from the doorstep of theirhead office in the capital , and seen conflictbreak out inside that office amongst theirown staff . A relief system which used tocoordinate from, and relax in, cities hasnow had to learn how to survey , registerand distribute in them . It has also had tolearn how to be besieged in cities and howto flee from them .

At an operational level, this meanslearning the ways of the city as well as thecountryside. The process of urban liveli-hood is a new phenomenon to many of therelief workers who have not worked inearthquakes, hurricanes or floods. Assetsare different in the city and the importanceof cash, constant trade and labour is moremarked. Because of this, strategies forcoping and surviving are also different andmust be understood by relief workers andtargeted accordingly . In times of war andcrisis, rural people also use cities as arefuge and resource, and the interactionbetween the two communities needsunderstanding, as does the consequentcongestion in and around such citieswhich, in cases like Juba and Khartoum,may last for several years.

In situations when the countrysideitself is unsafe and inaccessible to reliefagencies, information gathered fromurban markets and the displaced ruralcommunity in urban areas becomes a vitalsource of information about wider con-ditions and the targeting of relief ope-rations (Nathanail and Nur, 1993). Theparticular dynamics and priorities of reliefwork in cities under siege also need to beunderstood to develop good practice inthese increasingly common conditions(Cuny, 1994).

Extending the horizons of vulnerability

The high impact of complex emergencieson urban communities is just one exampleof a new vulnerable group in today 's

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emergencies. But there are many others .Conflict and political emergencies havetransformed the traditional 80s and 90sconcept of vulnerability and vulnerablegroups (Duffield , 1994b, pp. 95-107) .Most classical food emergencies have con-centrated on responding to and under-standing the vulnerability of the poor. Butvulnerability in complex emergencies is norespecter of the rich . Relief workers arehaving to come to terms with politicalvulnerability related to political allegiance,ethnic group and class in conflict situa-tions (Keen, 1994). The particular vulnera-bilities of gender in emergencies of thiskind are also increasingly recognized andmust inform all relief strategies. The use ofrape and sexual violence against women isoften used as a deliberate military strategy.This exposes women to terrible abusewithin the private sphere of their livesalongside the additional burdens on theirpublic roles in wartime (El Bushra andPiza-Lopez, 1994). Poverty is therefore nolonger th e key determinant of vulnerabi-lity . A defining feature of the wreckingpower of internal conflict , terror and politi-cal aggression is that it can make vulner-able a whole cross-section of society, bothrich and poor .

If vulnerability is no longer a respecterof wealth , it is also no respecter of time.The timeframe of vulnerability has alsoproved to be radically different in complexemergencies . In contrast to the creepingand escalating vulnerability of food emer-gencies, vulnerability in political emergen-cies comes like a thief in the night.Destitution happens in hours and days,instead of weeks and months. The mas-sive, widespread and extremely rapidflig hts of Iraqi Kurds , Bosnians and Rwan-dans are obvious examples of the speedand comprehensive social impact of suchvulnerability .

There are important skills implicationsfrom this expansion of vulnerability . Itrequires sophisticated understandings of

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political, ethnic and class relations. It alsoinvolves relief workers extending thenotion of their traditional constituencyfrom the rural and urban poor to includethe middle class. At a practical programmelevel, this means a new effort to under-stand and support the different copingand survival strategies of these groups. Ata cultural and interpersonal level, theexperience of finding middle class peopleas 'beneficiaries' may j ar with the traditio-nal and essentially patronizing dynamic ofthe agency -beneficiary relationship. Towork with an articulate community ofpeople used to power themselves can besomething of a shock to relief workers whoare seldom used to feeling inferior inemergencies.

Human rights monitoring

The political and conflict-related nature oftoday 's emergencies requires a mergerbetween the humanitarian and humanrights agendas — two traditionally uncer-tain partners who have avoided each otherat great cost. In situations like Somalia,Rwanda, Bosnia and Angola, humanrights monitoring and reporting is now afront-line humanitarian task. Gatheringaccurate information about massacres,rape and other war crimes is now rightlyrecognized by the UN and others as anessential part of humanitarian work. Andidentif ying alleged perpetrators and bring-ing them to justice is a crucial part of long-term healing and rehabilitation during andafter such an emergency . In this respect,the work of the UN Secretary General insetting up Commissions of Experts toinvestigate and collect information onhuman rights abuses and war crimes inFormer Yugoslavia (UN, 1992) and inRwanda (UN, 1994a) is an essential initia-tive to which humanitarian staff can con-tribute in the field. The role of the UNCommission on Human Rights in report-ing on the Rwandan emergency (UN,

1994b) has further established humanrights work as an integral part of rapidresponse in complex emergencies. Manyparts of the international relief system areincreasingly recognizing human rightswork as a key part of the humanitarianassistance package in such situations.

We should expect human rightsworkers — so-called 'white helmets' — tobecome an increasing part of the operatio-nal landscape in complex emergencies. Butalso, we should hope that relief workersthemselves take on the task of humanrights monitoring as part of their humani-tarian mandate. A traditional relief agencyveiw has persistently seen human rightswork as 'political' and not 'humanitarian'.This position stems from an operationalpragmatism which seeks to avoid confron-tation with the various authorities withwhom they have formed working relation-ships. African Rights has criticized thisform of 'fieldcraft' and 'discretion '

because it tolerates a certain amount ofcorruption and keeps silent in the face ofhuman rights abuses (African Rights,1994b). In political emergencies, suchpragmatism is indeed increasingly imprac-tical and unethical . Instead, the collectionof information about human rights abusesand war crimes is to complex emergencieswhat the collection of rainfall data andmarket prices is to a traditional foodemergency. It is now beyond doubt thathumanitarian professionals need essentialtraining in international humanitarian andhuman rights law. They also need theskills to report, or at least draw attentionto, human rights abuses and so work inpartnership with the designated humanrights agencies in such matters. In situa-tions in which this will bring them intoconfrontation with government authoritiesor factions and so put their programmes atrisk, agencies have a choice between stra-tegies of disguise or transparency in howthey release such information. Either theymust develop distancing tactics which

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allow them to release such informationthrough a third party which disguisesthem as the source, or they must acttransparently and publicly in concert withinternational human rights authorities insuch a way as to find safety in numbersand under the spotlight of publicity .

But human rights monitoring is alsorequired at the heart of the relief systemitself , to monitor the behaviour of differentagencies, particularly as new forms ofmilitary intervention are explored . Todate, this type of monitoring has beentaken on by independent human rightsNGOs like African Rights (e.g., AfricanRights, 1993a and 1993b) . The internatio-nal relief system is still self-regulating andhas no real public accountability . Butmany concerned parties now recognizethat a more independent and powerfulform of accountability and transparency isrequired at the international level if thehumanitarian profession and its ope-rations are to be accountable in any realsense to affected populations and donorsalike. The creation of some form of inde-pendent commission on humanitarianoperations is increasingly being put for-ward as a means to monitor the humani-tarian system and its actions, or indeed itslack of action (Save the Children, 1994) .

Armed guards and protection

The arming of the international reliefsystem is one of the most outstandingfeatures of changing humanitarian practicein the last three years. An increasinglycommon, if rather bizarre, skill required byrelief workers in today 's complex emer-gencies is the ability to select, manage andcoordinate armed guards . Relief ope-rations in Somalia and Iraqi Kurdistanhave seen relief agencies, including ICRCand NGOs like Save the Children UK,using and paying armed guards to protectrelief convoys, stores and offices . In parti-cular situations where relief workers them-

selves have become targets, they too areaccompanied round the clock by personalbodyguards. With individual NGOs hav-ing as many as 300 armed guards inparticular countries, it is no exaggerationto describe some NGOs as employ ingsmall private armies in some of today 'srelief operations. In such situations, reliefworkers must make critical judgementsabout the individuals or group theyemploy to provide protection, and theprice (financial and political) at which theydo so. These decisions rely heavily on thekind of informed political analysis des-cribed above.

The armed protection of relief convoysis by no means a new phenomenon in thehistory of humanitarianism — armedescorts were used by western relief agen-cies during the Russian famine in the 1920s(Breen , 1994) . What is perhaps unprece-dented and alarming is the nature of theprotection offered. With its mafia-likeresonance, the notion of protection has asinister double meaning. Frequently,physical protection has indeed been sup-plied as part of a wider financial protectionracket , or soon developed into such aracket (African Rights , 1993a). Where nogovernment authority is in control, armedprotection has become a permanentfeature of the political and financial arbi-trage of the resource wars which underliecomplex emergencies . Winning and main-taining the contract to protect a westernrelief agency is big business and wellworth fighting for. Agencies have littlechoice but to enter the protection marketto operate in such situations. Abiding bythe rules of some form of protection nowappears to be essential practice in complexemergencies. Negotiating in this danger-ous area, and keeping a watching brief onany changes in the nature of protectionservices, is now a major preoccupation formany relief managers. In many cases,armed guards have 'turned nasty ' to thepoint of robbery and murder, particularly

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as operations are scaled down and redun-dancy looms (Visman, 1993).

Working with the UN military

Locally recruited armed guards by nomeans represent the only militarization ofthe international relief system . Since 1991,military intervention by international andUN forces has become an increasingfeature of humanitarian relief. The confla-tion of traditional UN peacekeeping roleswith humanitarian protection and peaceenforcement has been a major policy of thecurrent UN Secretary General and themore powerful members of the internatio-nal community in the last three years(Boutros-Ghali, 1992). The result has beena huge increase in so-called militaryhumanitarianism where international UNmilitary forces (or national forces respond-ing to a UN request) have escorted reliefconvoys, protected designated safe areas,enforced peace and security , and provideddirect relief . There are currently some80,000 UN military personnel deployedaround the world, compared to a mere12,000 in early 1992 (International Institutefor Strateg ic Studies, 1994). For the civilianhumanitarian practitioner, this representsthe arrival of a major new player in today 'shumanitarian operations .

New relationships between civilianand military humanitarian organizationshave had to be formed under intensepressure . These relationships are stillmarked by a certain ambivalence. Mostrecent comment by NGOs and the civilianrelief establishment on military involve-ment is a barrage of mixed messages. Thisis perhaps unsurprising from such adiverse community, but also serves toillustrate the civilian dilemma with mili-tary humanitarianism. In Somalia andRwanda, NGOs in particular called for andwelcomed military involvement and thencriticized and distanced themselves fromit . The current tension in the relationship

seems to exist at four levels: a professionallevel relating to matters of good practice; acultural level; a political level, and acompetitive level .

At a professional level, NGOs havefrequently criticized military humanitari-anism as insensitive and ill-informed(Bradbury, 1994a; Slim and Visman, inpress). Once the military role goes beyondmoving supplies and standing guard, theyare seen by 'professional' humanitariansas a liability . The military sledgehammer isreckoned as ultimately inappropriate forthe many small nuts of today's complexemergencies. This criticism has beenespecially levelled at UN military effortsrelating to the reconstruction of civilsociety in the aftermath of complex emer-gencies in Somalia and Cambodia.

Also at a professional level, the issueof association is a major concern to civilianUN agencies and NGOs, and one whichmakes them wary of working closely withthe military. In most military interventionsto date, there has come a point where theUN forces enter into direct conflict of somekind or become extremely unpopular withthe affected community, as in Somalia andFormer Yugoslavia. This may be the resultof its being given an unworkable mandate,as in the case of UNISOM II (Slim andVisman, in press) and UNPROFOR (Duf-field, 1994d), or when it seems to beresponding to a covert political agenda ofits own, as in the case of the French'Operation Turqoise' in Rwanda (McGreal,1994). At such a point, it appears that the

UN military have taken sides or madeenemies. In these situations, NGOs and UNagencies often fear that their efforts will bedoomed to 'fail by association' with the UNmilitary. They make great efforts to distancethemselves from the UN military and arguestrongly for a definite delineation betweenthe humanitarian agenda and the politico-military agenda (Save the Children, 1994;Oxfam, 1993). They regard this as essentialto their sense of neutrality and the preser-

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vation of long-term partnerships in thecountry in question.

But beyond the professional reservewith which the civilian relief communityview military humanitarianism lies a fardeeper political suspicion about the realmotives of each UN military intervention.There is a strong sense that increasingmilitary humanitarian intervention is anew and cynical development in interna-tional realpolitik, whereby powerfulmember states of the internationalcommunity invest in last minute andtelegenic intervention at the expense oflong-term commitment. It is argued thatthe late and undevelopmental sty le of thisnew form of very melodramatic relief givesa misleading impression of action andengagement with the problem to westernpublic opinion (de Waal, 1994) . Duffieldhas argued that military humanitarianismis not increased intervention at all , butshould be read instead as a clear sign thatthe west is more disengaged and disinter-ested in Africa than ever (Duffield, 1994a) .After all, the international community'ssafe haven operation in Iraqi Kurdistanrevealed that military humanitarianismcan be withdrawn more quickly thandevelopment aid (Keen, in press). Thisview suggests that, in military interven-tion, the leading members of the interna-tional community have now discoveredthe ideal way to engage with a problem asand when public opinion demands withmilitary resources which they are pay ingfor anyway . Suspicions of this kindaccount for the political tension whichoften exists between the civilian and mili-tary humanitarian communities at a policylevel.

At a cultural level, there is also a cer-tain mismatch between the civilian reliefcommunity and the military. Previousgenerations of relief workers, especially inBritain, included many retired soldiers .More recently, however, since develop-ment became radicalized in the 1960s,

most relief workers see themselves asbelonging to organizations which are partof a movement for an alternative society ,in opposition to the establishment andstatus quo . In such a context , many reliefworkers have ambivalent feelings aboutseeing military forces as allies andpartners . In their eyes , the khaki andweapons of the state are akin to the forcesof reaction, and they find it hard to acceptthat soldiers may be enlightened likethem . But alongside this resistance sits anelement of admiration. Relief workers alsopride themselves as embodying certainvalues like logistical skill , courage andendurance which are perhaps exemplifiedmore in the army than anywhere else . Atone level , therefore , relief workers alsofind themselves in awe of certain militarycapacity and skills . Although seldomvoiced in public, there is perhaps both afascination with and a resistance to themilitary amongst many civilian humanitar-ian practitioners which may account forsome of the mixed messages.

In addition to this culture clash and itsambiv alence, there may also lurk someserious turf issues . Having benefited fromexponential growth in recent years (Bor-ton , 1994), the civilian relief establishmentmay fear the military is increasinglybecoming the organization of choice forthe international community in complexemergencies. Although the military can inno way take over the day-to-day work ofUN and NGO relief agencies, they maywell take over an increasing share of thepower, authority and leadership in huma-nitari an emergencies. The organizationalstructure of UNOSOM II in Somalia, withits total priority of military decision-making, ha s alarmed many NGOs and UNagency staff as the possible shape of thingsto come in complex emergencies .

In terms of fund-raising and publicimage among the western public, themilitary has also displaced some traditio-nal civilian humanitarian icons. The

DISASTERS VOLUME 19 NUMBER 2 © Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1995

telegenic image of the compassionatewhite nurse has found competition for thefirst time, in the khaki bulk of the com-passionate soldier with the light blueberet.

An impossible marriage?

How should today 's civilian humanitarianpractitioner manage this relationship withthe military ? The art of military liaison andcooperation will need to be developed asyet another talent in the skills base of thenew emergency practitioner . In the light ofincreasing military involvement in huma-nitarian emergencies, civilian reliefworkers have to develop creative workingrelationships with the military . They mustfind a common language with which totalk to the military in these situations.They must constantly identif y respectiveareas of distinctive competence and com-parative advantage in humanitarian work,and develop operational partnershipsaccordingly . The civilian relief communitymust also make clear its need to distanceitself from the military community onoccasion, and ways must be found to dothis which are acceptable to both groups.

Much of this process will continue tobe fashioned out of personal workingrelationships. But at a strategic level, bothcommunities need to engage at the policyand training levels too. NGOs describe amaj or part of their work as advocacy orinfluencing . The next couple of years maywell witness a chance to influence a majornew player in the field in its formativestages . The civilian relief communityshould not miss the chance to close withits military counterparts and have a go attheir hearts and minds. Only by talking tothe military will NGOs be able to sharetheir concerns about military humanitarianpractice to date, test their suspicions aboutthe military 's political intent and create aworking relationship with their new defacto partner .

Longevity and a developmental

paradigm

If conflict and politics are the two most

distinctive features of complex emergen-

cies, then longevity, or even permanence,

is the third. The reassuring cycle of natural

disasters which used to appear on the first

overhead in every disaster management

training workshop no longer applies. Its

merry-go-round phases from disaster at

the top through rescue and relief , torehabilitation, development, prevention

and preparedness, look increasingly

meaningless as a means of analysingcomplex emergencies. The comforting idea

of a return to normality at the top of the

flipchart is an abstraction. Instead, practi-

tioners in complex emergencies talk ofcoming to terms with the chronic and

ongoing nature of these emergencies. Duf-

field has referred to them as 'permanentemergencies ' in which war economies

develop and winning groups have a vital

interest in sustaining conflict above all else

(Duffield, 1994c). Recognition of the longe-

vity of these emergencies has led agencies

to seek new models of long-term relief

practice which develop the principle of'operationality in turbulence ' (ACORD,

1992).Here, perhaps, is a paradigm shift

required of humanitarian professionals —

one which they have long been groping for

in the mysterious zone of the 'relief —

development continuum ', but which hasnow been forced upon them by events.

Many of today's emergencies are longterm. As a state of conflict and emergency

persists in places like Angola, SouthSudan, Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda, tra-

ditional relief packages and staff intensive

programmes are often not feasible, orappropriate . Instead, more flexible , long-

term and innovative programmes are

being employed. These rely on a sophisti-

cated understanding of the emergency and

aim to support communities in chronic

© Blackwell Publishers Ltd . 1995 DISASTERS VOLUME 19 NUMBER 2

crisis. This new relief paradigm accepts a

state of 'turbulence' as the norm, and ahigh degree of agency powerlessness as

inevitable. It does not see its task as a hugeand massive effort to re-supply a commun-

ity and 'get it back to normal'. Instead, it

feels its way to supporting a community

through chronic crisis over the long term,

often at a distance and through third

parties. Its programme style is more like

the slow administration of a drip than an

inj ection, a catalyst rather than a solution .

This type of creeping and opportunistic

relief model requires a majo r shift in the

mindset and approach of most relief

workers. And its lateral thinking may

often be a major challenge to the more

linear minded relief professional. It is in

many ways much more the terrain of the

development worker and might be calleddevelopmental relief .

Country specialism

Such an approach is also the province of

the country or regional specialist. As

witnessed by the experience of the Upp-sala Group in the Somalia emergency , theinternational relief establishment needs

seasoned experts more than ever before

(Lewis, 1994). The generic relief worker

who moves from one emergency to the

next is no longer sufficient, if ever she or

he was. Humanitarian agencies need spe-

cialists who understand the history, cul-

ture and fast-moving politics of a place,

and can communicate them to policy

makers. In many cases, relief agencies

need to break the glass ceilings in their

organizational structures and let national

staff members take control.Unfortunately, this involves bucking

the current trend of an emerging class of

international humanitarian professionals.

Today's international relief professional is

like the multinational executive who feels

able to operate in any part of the world

because she knows the way the firm

works . However, she very seldom knowsthe way the country works. Similarly, thehumanitarian establishment is developinga tendency towards the generic pro-fessional at the expense of the expert. Thismirrors a similar trend in both the interna-tional media and the world's diplomaticcommunity . Gone are the days of theexpert reporter and diplomat in Africa atleast. The international media now preferthe extremely mobile cult reporter ratherth an the resident expert (Hesmondhaigh,1993). And so it seems do the reliefagencies. But both types are required —the one to know the country , the other toknow the agency and the internationalsystem. In the face of permanent emergen-cies, relief agencies must continue todevelop people like the 'old Sudan hand'

and ensure the sufficient promotion andinvolvement of national staff at seniorlevels . Country and regional specialismwill prove a vital asset in sustainingoperations in long-term emergencies .

Peace-building as rehabilitation

In the aftermath of political and conflict-related emergencies, rehabilitation meansmore than seeds and tools . It requires theregeneration and reconciliation of civilsociety itself . Peace-building programmeshave emerged as a maj or part of aftermathstrategies in complex emergencies . Thehumanitarian professional is likely to findherself concerned with community-basedpeacemaking, supporting the revival of ajudiciary and the creation of nationalpolice forces. These new areas are nowhigh on the agendas of NGOs and maj ordonor agencies as part of the mechanicsrequired to reconstitute a 'failed state'.

The rehabilitation of the body-politic isno simple task. It requires commitment, along view and a great deal more subtletythan traditional infrastructure-related re-habilitation packages. The lessons fromCambodia, Iraqi Kurdistan, Mozambique

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and Somalia need to be learnt, and agen-cies need to ensure that an essentiallydevelopmental approach is taken to thistype of rehabilitation. Once again, thetraditional relief worker is not best placedto lead such programmes, but it seemslikely that a whole new range of specialistagency units and NGOs may develop tofill this gap . USAID's new Office ofTransition Initiatives in the Bureau ofHumanitarian Response is perhaps first offthe blocks with its concern for demobiliza-tion, de-mining, policing and consti-tutional development. Once again , in-depth political, social and cultural under-standing of a society will be essential to thetask.

Personal security and emotional health

For a profession which was used to feelingand exercising such power, complex emer-gencies have given many relief agenciesand their staff intense experiences ofpowerlessness. The environment is suchthat they are often unable to work. Worsestill, they are often robbed, attacked andeven killed. More so than ever before,their own professional frustration,personal security and emotional healthhave become major concerns for today 'srelief workers .

In order to protect themselves in thetangled war zones in which they work,relief workers have had to becomeacquainted with the weapons and tacticsof war and to be experts in their ownpersonal security. The use of armedguards (described above) is complementedwith a range of personal measures whichneed to be adopted at work and at home.The plethora of these procedures andguidelines is now produced and regularlyupdated in manual form by many agen-cies, including ICRC and Save the Chil-dren . For example, the Mines AdvisoryGroup and Oxfam have recently publisheda manual for development workers specifi-

cally on landmines and 'mines awareness'(McGrath, 1994).

In addition to their physical security,relief workers also need to know how tolook after themselves emotionally. Therecruitment of a 'stable character' is oftenno longer sufficient , as relief workers arebeing put through ordeals of fear andstrain which would test anyone. Fendingoff frustration is another skill they need.When there can be so many long periodsof evacuation, or confinement to the teamhouse, relief workers have to learnpatience and rely on other interests to seethem through . Unfortunately for some,relief operations are no longer the refugefor the workaholic which they used to be.Instead, agency staff need to know how tooccupy themselves indefinitely, often inconditions similar to siege. If every soldierhas a field marshal's baton in his knap-sack, perhaps every relief worker shouldcarry a copy of Tolstoy 's 'War and Peace'.Long enough to keep them occupied, italso shares a theme in common with thesituation in which they find themselves.

IS THE CHAMELEON STILL A PROTECTEDSPECIES?

The new areas of work and their respectiveskills outlined above offer today's reliefworkers a new array of professionalismwith which to adapt to their new sur-roundings. But are they enough? Is therelief worker actually welcome in this newhabitat? What if, with all the colours in theworld, the oxygen of respect and immu-nity which he or she needs to survive is nolonger present in the hostile atmosphere oftoday's emergencies? If the halo of saintli-ness to which Susan George alluded hasslipped, then what hope is there for thehumanitarian species?

In the last three years, more reliefworkers (national and international) havebeen killed than ever before. This may be aresult of the increasing risk of relief

© Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1995 DISASTERS VOLUME 19 NUMBER 2

workers being caught in the crossfireaccidentally. But it may also be a sign thatan open season has been declared onhumanitarian workers . The evidencewould seem to suggest that there is not yetan open season, but that attacking huma-nitarian workers is now an option forvarious groups in complex emergencies .And here, once again, the chameleon 'scolours seem to be important. Traditio-nally, humanitarian practitioners haverelied on two types of colour to ensuretheir protection . First there are the variouscolours of their protective emblems, or'heraldic coats of arms' as Benthalldescribes them (Benthall , 1993, p. 174).Red Crosses and Crescents and light bluelaurel wreaths have acted powerfully asprotective emblems to mark out humani-tarian workers as sacrosanct. Secondly,the international humanitarian practi-tioner's best protective colouring wasperhaps its whiteness. Not all interna-tional relief workers are white, but a lotare, and the abiding image of the humani-tarian worker is that of an American orEuropean. But it seems increasingly clearthat the protection afforded to reliefworkers by these colours is not what itused to be.

In Former Yugoslavia, these colourscut no ice. In Somalia, with an eye perhapsto Lebanon, greedy and unaccountablefactions realized that relief workers mightprove profitable if taken hostage. Moresignificantly still, many of the rival factionswhich are fighting over Bosnia, Somaliaand Rwanda have no vested interest inrelating to the international politicalsystem and respecting its codes. Unlikethe governments and dictatorships beforethem, they are marginalized from the newworld order and have nothing to gain byplaying by its rules. Suddenly, therefore,in many emergencies it was realized thatthe humanitarian emperor had no clothes.Indeed, those emblems which he or shedid have were the badges of a world order

from which most warring factions areexcluded. To some groups, humanitarianworkers are therefore not j ust naked, butwear the insignia of the enemy. In attac-king them, you attack the internationalcommunity from which you are ostra-cized . In the process you also probablyacquire some valuable local political kudosas well as some lucrative material commo-dities . This all means that to kill a memberof a UN agency over a pay disputesuddenly has many advantages if you area member of a Somali faction dependenton surviving in a local war economy ratherthan in the international world order .

Questions of neutrality and positioning

The last great skill which today 's humani-tarian practitioners have to master, there-fore , is a moral one. How do they reaffirmtheir saintliness, their aura of inviolabilityand their commitment to equity in situa-tions such as these? This is perhaps themost puzzling and the most urgent of allthe questions facing the humanitarianprofession today .

The crisis of neutrality which facesrelief agencies in so many of today 'semergencies is one of identity and posit-ioning . When relief aid and its manipula-tion by political elites is now so clearlyrecognized as part of war economies, canrelief agencies really claim to be operatingneutrally ? And when humanitarian aid isso identified with a political world orderfrom which so many people feel excluded,how can relief agencies avoid associationwith the international powers of this worldorder, who are, after all, their donors andthe architects of international humanitar-ian policy?

These are the questions which arebeing hotly debated within many reliefagencies, and from which may wellemerge new principles of humanitarianpositioning and identity . A rigorouslyhuman right s-based approach to humani-

DISASTERS VOLUME 19 NUMBER 2 © Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1995

tarian relief , as advocated by AfricanRights , which focuses on solidarity ratherthan neutrality , may well emerge as theposition of choice for many NGOs (AfricanRights, 1994b). But such an approach is ahigh-risk strategy. It requires a very exactand well-informed analysis of who is rightand who is wrong, and the subsequentidentification of good groups and badgroups. In one sense, this is just anotherform of triage. And j ust as currentattempts at neutrality err on the side ofrewarding the powerful, a solidarityapproach may err by punishing the weakwho are caught up in the grip of thepowerful. If the folly of neutrality lies inignoring the lines of conflict within socie-ties, the folly of solidarity may lie inbelieving them to be so clearly drawn.

CONCLUSION

This paper has sought to show the distinc-tive features of the operational environ-ment of today 's humanitarian practitioner .It is an extremely complex one, both at theintra-state and international level. Whiletoday 's relief workers, like those of SusanGeorge's parody, must remain dis-tinguished by their breadth of skill andfunction, the overriding characteristic ofgood humanitarian practice must be adepth of commitment to and understand-ing of the communities with which theywork . In long-term emergencies , suchpractice is best described as one of partner-ship with the vulnerable in each situationand across the lines drawn by politicalfactions and conflict. From such a commit-ment it is hoped that a new model ofhumanitarian positioning will emerge toreplace or enhance the currently devaluednotion of neutrality .

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