The Contentiousness of Markets (1)

SO36CH12-King ARI 7 June 2010 22:59

The Contentiousness ofMarkets: Politics, SocialMovements, and InstitutionalChange in MarketsBrayden G King and Nicholas A. PearceKellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208;email: [email protected], [email protected]

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2010. 36:249–67

First published online as a Review in Advance onFebruary 25, 2010

The Annual Review of Sociology is online atsoc.annualreviews.org

This article’s doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.012809.102606

Copyright c© 2010 by Annual Reviews.All rights reserved

0360-0572/10/0811-0249$20.00

Key Words

economic sociology, private regulation, corporate social responsibility,resource mobilization, framing, oppositional identities, institutionalentrepreneurship

Abstract

While much of economic sociology focuses on the stabilizing aspectsof markets, the social movement perspective emphasizes the role thatcontentiousness plays in bringing institutional change and innovationto markets. Markets are inherently political, both because of their ties tothe regulatory functions of the state and because markets are contestedby actors who are dissatisfied with market outcomes and who use themarket as a platform for social change. Research in this area focuses onthe pathways to market change pursued by social movements, includingdirect challenges to corporations, the institutionalization of systems ofprivate regulation, and the creation of new market categories throughinstitutional entrepreneurship. Much contentiousness, while initiallydisruptive, works within the market system by producing innovationand restraining capitalism from destroying the resources it depends onfor survival.

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INTRODUCTIONSociological depictions of economic life em-phasize the interdependence of actors engagedin ongoing exchanges within larger structuresof constraints and opportunities (Granovetter2002). Much of economic sociology providesa static view of markets, however, focusingon stability-inducing mechanisms such as rolesand social networks (e.g., White 1981) or thelegitimacy-enhancing function of market cate-gories (e.g., Zuckerman 1999). In the forma-tive years of the new economic sociology, therewas considerably less theoretical developmentabout the nature of market change. Market re-lationships and institutions were viewed as sta-bilizing forces that enabled the reproductionof markets. We lacked an understanding ofhow actors might change those relationships ortransform constraining categories.

In recent years, a new stream of research hasemerged that focuses on the destabilizing ele-ments of markets. The focus of this research ison social movements and other change agentsthat bring contentiousness to markets (Daviset al. 2005). The literature reflects an empiricalreality of markets: For markets to survive, theymust be able to connect people and organiza-tions, as well as satisfy the needs that each bringsto the exchange; however, because markets tendto centralize resources and power, because notevery member of society has equal access to allmarkets, and because markets sometimes pro-duce harmful externalities, markets frequentlybecome locations of contestation and disrup-tion. One need only turn on the evening newsto see the contentiousness of markets. Marketsare at the center of controversial issues such asglobal warming, exploitation of child labor, dis-crimination, and health care inequities.

Theoretically, this new research area isspurred by the success of social movementtheory in political sociology and by an interestin understanding the sources of agency andidentity mobilization in sociological accountsof markets. Social movement scholars havechallenged the narrow conception that pol-itics are limited to the state, arguing that

contentiousness often spills into other institu-tional domains, such as the market (Vogel 1978,Van Dyke et al. 2004, Snow 2004, Armstrong& Bernstein 2008, Soule 2009). Institutionaltheorists have simultaneously taken up socialmovement theory as an actor-driven account ofinstitutional transformation (McAdam & Scott2005). Relatedly, population ecologists haveused social movement theory to conceptualizeidentity mobilization as underlying new mar-ket emergence (e.g., Carroll & Swaminathan2000).

Integrating social movement theory witheconomic sociology provides a dynamic viewof markets. A fundamental premise of this viewis that markets are locations of “negotiatedsettlements and institution-building projectsthat arise out of conflicts” (Bartley 2007,p. 299; Campbell 2004). Political competitionfor control of the institutional structures ofsociety shapes market behavior (Carruthers1996). Thus, market categories and institu-tions, while making exchange more stable,predictable, and calculable, are also objects ofpower struggles and thus subject to conflictand contentiousness.

Markets are dominated by powerful incum-bents that benefit from current market arrange-ments (Fligstein 1996) and are constituted bycategories and institutional logics that legiti-mate the status quo (Friedland & Alford 1991).Incumbents resist efforts to change market con-ditions inasmuch as they benefit from currentarrangements, and logics and categories cre-ate inertia through taken-for-granted conven-tions, beliefs, and practices. Because of thesepowerful incumbent interests and cultural an-chors, markets do not change by themselves.Actors must mobilize resources and promotechange-oriented collective action to generatelasting institutional change. Such changes of-ten entail reconstructing the power relationsand cultural infrastructure of a field. Even whennot successful in creating favorable institutionalchange, activism of this type may result in theproliferation of new institutional logics, cat-egories, or organizing templates (Schneiberg

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2007). As we demonstrate in this review,social movement theory has become a pow-erful explanation for the emergence of mar-ket heterogeneity (Schneiberg & Lounsbury2008).

This new wave of research has also empir-ically shown that contentiousness is a sourceof market dynamism, both by encouraging in-novation and by transforming what is seen asacceptable market practice (Rao 2009). For ex-ample, social movements have helped createnew markets by legitimating the role of en-trepreneurs and creating consumer audiencesfor once ignored products, such as grass-fedbeef and dairy (Weber et al. 2008); have en-couraged businesses to create corporate so-cial responsibility programs (Baron 2001, Soule2009); and have successfully halted efforts toproduce otherwise profitable goods, such as ge-netically modified foods (Schurman & Munro2009) or biotechnology (Weber et al. 2009).Contentiousness also subdues the destructivetendencies of markets. Markets generate whatPolanyi refers to as a “double movement”—as “the market expanded continuously. . .thismovement was met by a countermovementchecking this expansion in definite directions”(Polanyi 1944, p. 130). Thus, the survival ofmarkets depends, in part, on intervention whenthe public cries against the societal strains pro-duced by markets. Public grievances, in thissense, restrain capitalism from getting over-heated and destroying the very resources thatmarket actors depend on for survival and ongo-ing exchange.

In this review, we examine research that fo-cuses on the role of social movements in alteringmarkets. We begin by discussing the reasonsthat contentiousness erupts in market settings.We then identify three prominent pathwaysthat movements have taken to instigate change:challenging corporations directly, creatingtransnational systems of private regulation,and creating market alternatives through in-stitutional entrepreneurship. Finally, we assesshow studying the contentiousness of marketshas contributed to economic sociology.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTSIN MARKETSSocial movements represent change-orientedstruggles by groups who have unequal ac-cess to power or who oppose the status quo(McAdam et al. 1996, p. 21). Traditionally, so-cial movement scholars have focused on oppo-sition to the state (McAdam et al. 2001), andindeed many market-oriented movements havesought state intervention to prevent marketsfrom causing harmful social or economic out-comes. Movements often turn to the state be-cause of its capacity to regulate the industries’competitive dynamics and the social and moralconsequences of market growth (e.g., Dobbin1994). For example, nineteenth-century reli-gious movements seeking more state interven-tion in markets were partly spurred by theregional expansion of markets and their per-ceived threat to local customs, values, and moralorders (see Gusfield 1986 on the temperancemovement). Young (2006) argues that evangel-ical Christianity thrived as markets expandedacross regional boundaries, posing a threat tolocal religious identities, traditions, and au-thority. Religion not only provided the moralpredisposition to see sin in the market, butalso provoked individuals to organize collec-tively around their common religious experi-ence (King & Haveman 2008). Much of the so-cial and environmental regulation introducedin the latter half of the twentieth century wasa direct consequence of social movement agita-tion (e.g., Vogel 1995).

Much of the new research on social move-ments in markets focuses on movements’ di-rect interventions in markets rather than onattempts to get more government regulation.This new wave of scholarship continues to rec-ognize the interrelatedness of governments andmarkets (e.g., Bartley 2003, Ingram & Rao2004), but the state figures less prominently. Al-though movements sometimes agitate directlyfor public regulation, social movements fre-quently bypass the state altogether. Accordingto a recent study of all protests reported in TheNew York Times from 1960 to 1990, nearly 40%

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were directed at nonstate organizations, manytargeting businesses (Walker et al. 2008; alsosee Van Dyke et al. 2004, Soule 2009 for simi-lar figures).

Taking direct action against businesseshas been a strategy, for example, of labormovements that lack state-mandated collectivebargaining agreements, such as the movementinitiated by Cesar Chavez’s Farm Workers As-sociation ( Jenkins & Perrow 1977, Ganz 2000).Organizers of the farm worker movement mo-bilized participants using resources indigenousto the worker population and developed themovement’s strategic capacity before attempt-ing to unionize. This case illustrates howmovements constituted by relatively powerlessgroups need not rely exclusively on the benevo-lence of the state to combat abusive conditions.

Markets may provide political opportunitiesfor change when the opportunity structure ofthe state is perceived to be closed. Powerlessgroups seeking economic justice may believethat the state is designed to “defend wealthypeople against poor people” (Chasin 2000,p. 7). When states become more responsive topowerful elites and business interests and pro-vide fewer opportunities for the disadvantaged(Piven & Cloward 1971, Poulantzas 1972, Offe1974), movements may look for entry pointsin the market. The state’s repressive capacity,such as the ability to deploy police forces withviolent capabilities, may deter movements fromtaking action against the state (Soule 2009). Inaddition, owing to reputational concerns andstakeholder commitments, corporations are of-ten more responsive to new types of social ac-tivism than is the government. For example, inthe United States, the gay rights movement hasbeen more successful in securing domestic part-nership benefits for employees of Fortune 500companies than for employees of the federalgovernment (Raeburn 2004, Briscoe & Safford2008). Therefore, the market offers a uniqueset of political opportunities that has made ita focal venue for many aggrieved populations(for more about economic or corporate oppor-tunity structures, see Schurman 2004, King2008b).

Some have argued that the influence be-tween market and state has begun to swaymore to the former, causing a decline in theability of states to regulate markets effectively.Historically, government regulation of marketshas been a primary means whereby the lessprivileged could alter the rules of the game(Schneiberg & Bartley 2008). But in recentyears, economic globalization and the domi-nance of neoliberal ideology have changed theimpact of regulatory powers. The liberaliza-tion of markets and technological advances thatmake transnational trade possible have madeit more difficult for states to regulate laborstandards and the flow of capital (Campbell &Pedersen 2001). These conditions enhance in-ternational competition for capital investment.Multinational corporations can shift their op-erations to nations that have low labor costs,less stringent regulation, and lower taxes, whichfurther encourages states to reduce their gripover markets. Market flight or even the threat offlight has made nations increasingly beholdento the demands of corporations, encouragingstates to deregulate markets. Seidman (2007,p. 26) observes that “[g]lobal competition seemsto ‘thin’ the national state, limiting states’ abil-ity to tax corporate profits, regulate corporatebehavior, or protect workers from unfair laborpractices.” In fact, the gradual shift to neolib-eral economic policies and the privatization ofstate activities are themselves contested pro-cesses in which social movements have been ac-tively involved (Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb2002, Prasad 2006).

Even when states’ regulatory standards havetightened, firms often influence this processas they hope to moderate market competitionand force a leveling of the global playing field(Braithwaite & Drahos 2000, Murphy 2004).The increasingly global nature of regulatoryoversight has expanded the political concernsof corporations and stakeholders beyond theconfines of a single nation (Drezner 2007).Movements therefore have shifted their gazeto international institutions (Smith 2001). Ineffect, the same transformations that enablecorporations to transcend national boundaries

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have also aided in the rise of transnationalmovements (Smith et al. 1997, Guidry et al.2000). One challenge for these rooted cos-mopolitans is to bring local concerns to a globalarena and construct international governanceregimes that may normatively and coercivelydisrupt the hegemony of the market (Evans2005) and contest the solidified political powerof corporations (Bowman 1996).

A final reason that social movements electto bypass the state is that many movements’goals are tangential to government regulation.Movements frequently mobilize to contest par-ticular values, beliefs, or identities (Bernstein1997, Armstrong & Bernstein 2008). Althoughmoral crusades often venture into policymakingdomains, many social movements of this typeprefer to confront corporations directly or ag-itate for alternative market offerings, as whenProhibitionists supported the soft drink indus-try as an alternative to alcohol consumption(Hiatt et al. 2009). Moreover, identity move-ments may be especially common in postindus-trial society, when expressions of personal au-tonomy through consumption become effectivemeans to resist social control by dominant insti-tutions (Touraine 1981). For example, the goalof radical consumer movements is “not onlythe changing of principles, practices, and poli-cies but also a fundamental change to the ide-ology and culture of consumerism” (Kozinets& Handelman 2004). Consumer movementsdo not seek simply to regulate corporationsbut rather to produce a new sort of citizen-consumer with preferences and consumptionhabits independent of mainstream society (Holt2002, Arnould & Thompson 2005). Move-ments seek to construct new corporate practicesand alternative market offerings that are alignedwith their vision of how the world should be.

CHANGING THECORPORATE MACHINE

Because large corporations accumulate wealthand power (Berle & Means 1932 [1968], Per-row 2002, Mizruchi 2004) and exert inordinateinfluence over the rules defining how markets

operate (Fligstein 1996), they receive a greatdeal of attention from agitators (Manheim2001, Fleming & Spicer 2007). Althoughcorporations are not uniformly ideologicaland their interests sometimes diverge (e.g.,Quadagno 1984), they share common inter-ests in maintaining low-cost labor markets andlow regulatory and tax burdens. When corpo-rations can act in a united front, the ability ofrelatively powerless outsiders to change mar-kets is greatly hampered. However, researchershave identified several countervailing mecha-nisms that help activists undermine the powerof corporations (Soule 2009).

Social Movements withinOrganizations

The study of politics within organizations aptlydraws on the conceptualization of the organiza-tion as a separate kind of political entity analo-gous to the nation-state (Zald & Berger 1978).Taking the corporation as a special kind of po-litical entity, we may reasonably assume thatpolitics in markets is often revealed in the poli-tics of organizations (Morrill et al. 2003). Mar-ket contentiousness becomes manifest withinorganizations as unconventional opposition todominant organizational elites and current or-ganizational policy (Zald & Berger 1978).

Fighting against one’s employer is notwithout complications. The corporation, as thedominant actor in the employee-employer re-lationship, inherently sets the conditions of thecontest and shapes the forms of contestationavailable to intraorganizational movements.Political action and the expression of conflictvary depending on the organizing logic of theinternal polity (Morrill 1995, Bies & Tripp1998). The powerless may conform to scriptsof confrontation that make their conflict withsuperiors covert and ritualized (Martin &Meyerson 1998). Workers, managers, or evenexecutives fighting for policy changes do sounder threat of demotion or of losing their jobs.Organizational members who are also membersof activist communities must traverse the some-times thin line of being perceived as advocating


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for change that is both good for the life ofthe organization and also consistent with theirpassionate political views. Meyerson & Scully(1995, p. 586) referred to these change agentsas “tempered radicals”—“individuals whoidentify with and are committed to their orga-nizations, but are also committed to a cause,community, or ideology that is fundamentallydifferent from, and possibly at odds with thedominant culture of their organization.”

Social movements within organizations,then, must be less contentious and less politi-cized in order to bring about desired changes.Movements seeking legitimacy often reframetheir rhetoric to align their cause with thedemands of investors and consumers (Creedet al. 2002, Lounsbury et al. 2003). Hoffman(2001) demonstrates that activists, regulators,and corporate representatives worked togetherto change the perception of environmental re-sponsibility from that of a corporate liabilityin the 1960s to a proactive strategy or sustain-able practice today. Similarly, gay rights ac-tivists helped initiate a trend of corporationsoffering domestic partnership benefits to theiremployees by emphasizing the potential com-petitive advantages in signaling a commitmentto a human capital–rich workforce (Raeburn2004) and by pointing to other corporationsthat had adopted similar policies (Creed &Scully 2000, Scully & Segal 2002). As com-panies with reputations for being resistant toactivist influence adopted domestic partnershipbenefits, the practice gradually became less con-tentious and diffused among the largest corpo-rations in the United States (Briscoe & Safford2008). These studies emphasize the importanceof framing contentious issues according to mar-ket logics and of using social comparison amongpeer organizations as legitimating and conflict-reducing strategies (Lounsbury 2001).

Another factor shaping intraorganizationalmovements is the presence of elite allies( Jenkins & Perrow 1977). Movements withinorganizations rely heavily on influential alliesthat understand the local bureaucratic structure(Binder 2002). Raeburn (2004) notes that gayrights employee groups that had champions

in upper-level management were more ableto communicate the need to have domesticpartner benefits. Weber et al. (2009) showthat contestation of biotechnology innovationsby German pharmaceutical companies helpedwin allies among the professional elites ofthe dominant firms, which undermined thecompanies’ commitments to the technology.

If movements lack allies, corporations havesome legitimate channels, like shareholder res-olutions, that agitators can utilize to publiclyvoice their concerns (e.g., Rao & Sivakumar1999). But these channels provide limited ac-cess and may be most responsive to elites orinstitutional investors. Despite the limited ac-cess, Davis & Thompson (1994) argue, ac-tivist shareholder organizations tried in theearly 1990s to wrest control of the corporationfrom management and demand certain share-holder rights. As issues such as excessive execu-tive pay became politicized, shareholder groupsbegan pressuring corporations to change theircompensation structures. The growing share ofownership by institutional investors and the riseof economic theories and financial instrumentsfavorable to market control helped shareholdermovements assert more influence over corpo-rate governance in the 1980s and 1990s.

Extrainstitutional Tactics

Tilly (1999) argues that social movements aredistinguishable from other forms of politicalexpression in that they consist of contentiousgroups’ “repeated public displays” (Tilly 1999,p. 257) against elite powerholders (Taylor &Van Dyke 2004). Subversive and confronta-tional tactics, such as protests, are a mech-anism by which otherwise powerless actorscan contest institutional authority (Snow 2004,Rojas 2006). These tactics are especially usefulwhen movements lack control over “the meansof producing wealth” or when their voiceshave been muffled by the very authorities theywish to rebuke (Piven & Cloward 1977, p. 1).Moreover, those same corporations generallyprovide few “conventional access channels” tothe nonshareholder public (Weber et al. 2009,

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p. 122). Lacking insider influence, social move-ments may respond by using extrainstitutionaltactics.

When effective, extrainstitutional tacticsgenerate influence in at least two different ways.As Andrews (2001) argues, movement tacticsare both persuasive and disruptive. Persuasivetactics communicate a movement’s message toa broad audience, make claims that politicizeand vilify a practice, and convince third partiesof the need for immediate change. As Lipsky(1968, p. 1146) argues, if A wants to convince Bto change some practice or policy, but A hasnothing to offer B in return for the change,A must “create political resources by activat-ing other groups to enter the conflict.” Thesepotentially active reference publics can coerceB on behalf of A, but A must first do somethingto grab their attention and frame the issue ina way that convinces others of the rightness oftheir cause.

One way that protests and other tactics bringin reference publics is by drawing media atten-tion. Activists rely on the media to create publicinterest and support for their cause (e.g., Oliver& Maney 2000, Koopmans 2004). The media isthe “link between public events and the publicsphere” (Oliver & Myers 1999, p. 38), trans-mitting movement frames and messages to thelarger public and framing contentious issues asproblematic for broader society (Hilgartner &Bosk 1988). Media coverage of a protest alsobrings negative information about its target tolight and potentially damages the public imageof the target through “naming and shaming”(Baron 2003, O’Rourke 2005, Schurman 2004,Bartley & Child 2008). Inasmuch as the me-dia is a medium for communicating (and evenshaping) norms that constrain market behavior(Gamson et al. 1992, Hoffman & Ocasio 2001),corporations that get too much negative mediaattention because of the spotlight shone by ex-trainstitutional tactics potentially face the lossof both legitimacy and reputation.

Disruption is another mechanism thatmakes tactics influential (Piven & Cloward1977, Gamson & Schmeidler 1984, Gamson1990). Subversive tactics such as boycotts or

protests destabilize elites, alter the target’s abil-ity to carry out its own goals and use resourceseffectively, and impose significant costs on thetarget (Luders 2006). Inasmuch as tactics suc-cessfully disrupt the target organization andkeep it from functioning effectively, protestsand other extrainstitutional tactics are a po-tent threat to the authority of powerful marketactors.

In practice, extrainstitutional tactics may beboth persuasive and disruptive. The two mech-anisms are mutually reinforcing (King 2009).Highly disruptive tactics generate more mediaattention and help bring third parties into theconflict. Tactics that generate a lot of mediaattention and are rhetorically convincing aremore successful at bringing new participants tothe cause’s side. Tactics that generate a lot ofattention can also inflict more damage on a tar-get’s reputation, which may cause other actorsto distance themselves from the target, with-holding potentially valuable resources. If a com-pany loses clients or suppliers because a tacticdraws unwanted negative attention, persuasionand its aftereffects can be very disruptive.

Research supports the idea that tactics exertreal influence on corporations and market pro-cesses. King & Soule (2007), using a data setof all protests reported by The New York Timesfrom 1962 to 1990, demonstrate that protestsagainst a corporation can cause its stock priceto decline by 0.4–1.0%. The more informationcontent generated by a protest, the bigger theimpact on the stock price. Thus, protests areprimarily effective because of their ability tocommunicate to a company’s reference publicor audience and because of the subsequentresource disruption this causes. Boycotts, bycomparison, are thought to be influentialbecause they directly disrupt a company’sresource flow by convincing consumers notto buy its products or services (Garrett 1987,Friedman 1999). Boycotts that get at leastsome national media attention have a relativelyhigh 25% rate of successfully influencing thecompany in the way the boycott organizersintended (Friedman 1985, King 2008a). Thehigh success rate is surprising given that most


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research shows that boycotts do not actuallyshape consumer preferences or constrain salesrevenue effectively (Miller & Sturdivant 1977,Vogel 2005, Seidman 2007; although seeLuders 2006). Rather than working primarilythrough disruption, King (2008a) shows thatboycotts create public image crises for corpo-rations. Past reputational declines amplify themedia attention effect of boycotts, suggestingthat reputational concerns motivate firms toconcede to boycotters.

Extrainstitutional tactics may also have indi-rect effects on firm behavior and financial per-formance. Fearing potential threats from ac-tivist groups, firms may choose to take strategicactions, such as introducing green policies, toimprove their image in the eyes of key stake-holders. Baron (2001; also Baron & Diermeier2007) notes that corporate social responsibilityprograms, if initiated prior to tactical attacksfrom activists, may have strategic benefits bybuffering firms from potential activist criticism;however, firms that initiate social responsibilityprograms in response to boycotts or other tacti-cal threats do not gain any advantage. The linkbetween strategic timing of the adoption of cor-porate social responsibility policies and activistthreats may explain some of the variance in thelink between corporate social performance andfinancial performance. Although a substantialliterature has accumulated examining the linkbetween social and environmental performance(e.g., Waddock & Graves 1997, Mackey et al.2007), there is little research that examines howmovement activism might affect variance in thisrelationship (although see Baron et al. 2009).Still, the evidence suggests that firms’ policiesare partially endogenous to the tactical displaysof social movements.

Thus, research indicates that contentious-ness plays out on a stage and that the pri-mary actors in the conflict are acutely awareof their audiences as well as of the stakes of giv-ing a bad performance. Firms, of course, aresensitive to the investors, press, and analystswho give feedback about their performance, butsavvy activists are also aware of the strategic im-plications of their ability to manage multiple

audiences, including the media (Rohlinger2002). The media platform may accentuate cer-tain identity characteristics over others or evenradicalize the nature of their grievances whenjournalists choose to portray them stereotyp-ically (Gitlin 1980). Activists, for their part,may try to maximize media exposure by target-ing the most shamable companies, i.e., thosewith strong public images, good reputations,and positive past performance (Bartley & Child2008). This dynamic of targeting shamablecompanies suggests that firms’ development ofintangible assets like reputation and legitimacymay become a source of vulnerability. Once anaudience emerges that expects firms to adhereto certain standards, as has happened with thecreation of ranking systems such as Fortune’sMost Admired Companies, firms are at risk ofbeing exposed as violators of those standards.Thus, another way that social movements shapemarkets is through the creation of private reg-ulatory bodies that enforce higher standards ofcorporate responsibility.

TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATEREGULATION

Private solutions to public problems arise tofill the void of the weakened state. Nongovern-mental organizations (NGOs) seeking to rem-edy the erosion of national labor standardshave offered “market-oriented, nongovern-mental standards and monitoring systems asa supplement to state regulation” (O’Rourke2003, p. 5). Transnational private regulationreflects the ongoing political contestation bysocial movement campaigns seeking to legiti-mate universal market standards (Bartley 2007).Some international certification associations,for example, promote responsible corporate be-havior by certifying companies that adhere tohigher standards embraced by the activist com-munity (Bartley 2003, 2005).

Anticorporate campaigns that use tacticssuch as boycotts sometimes evolve into systemsof private regulation. Bartley (2003, 2007) ex-plains how social movement campaigns in theapparel and forest products industries emerged

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in response to ongoing political contestation ofthe fields by activist groups. The initial name-and-shame campaigns were meant to tarnishthe images and reputations of firms in theseindustries. Private regulatory systems, such asthe Forest Stewardship Council established in1993, gave activists a voice in defining appropri-ate corporate behavior by allowing them to in-spect forest industry production quality and bygiving a stamp of approval to products that ad-hered to these higher standards. The certifica-tion systems created a consumer audience thatdesired socially and environmentally respon-sible goods, thus providing a direct incentiveto corporations to adhere to the standards andavoid defection. Bartley’s studies suggest thatthe origin of these private regulatory bodies andtheir consequent effects on corporate behaviorwere not merely the outcome of a changing con-sumer base; rather, contentious political actioncreated the conditions in which corporate socialresponsibility standards would be seen as viablesolutions to collective action problems amongfirms (Bartley 2010).

Private regulation can also take the form ofsocially responsible investment funds (SRIs)—stock indices created by investors who sharesimilar values and want investment portfoliosmade up of companies that adhere to thosevalues (Cowton 1999). SRIs create a link be-tween shareholder activism and the external po-litical environment. A primary function of SRImanagers is to measure desirable corporate be-havior systematically, collect information aboutcompanies, and use the measurement systemto create corporate ratings. Although the rat-ings systems are designed to educate potentialinvestors to make better-informed decisions,they also influence the rated firms to respondby implementing practices that will improvetheir standing as socially responsible companies(Chatterji & Toffel 2010). SRIs, thus, have beenable to discipline corporations through mea-suring and quantifying good and bad behaviors(Dejean et al. 2004).

SRIs have also shaped the extent to whichshareholder activism is focused on contentioussocial and political issues. In the 1980s and

1990s, antiapartheid, the environment, humanrights, and diversity were among the most pop-ular social policy issues championed in share-holder resolutions (Graves et al. 2001). In abroader sample covering the years from 1969to 2003, Proffitt & Spicer (2006) show that reli-gious organizations were central to shareholdermovements and were a source of issue innova-tion. They were often the first groups to intro-duce resolutions related to contentious politicalissues, such as the antiapartheid campaign. TheInterfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility,founded in 1971, helped coordinate the actionsof Christian groups with SRIs. This coordi-nated effort helped movement activists trans-late their moral and political concerns into a po-tent market signal that the corporate elite wouldunderstand.

Private regulation is seemingly most effec-tive when corporate actors see the link betweensocial performance and financial performance,especially in cases in which nonfinancial stan-dards are seen as contentious. Etzion & Ferraro(2010) find that the Global Reporting Initiative,an NGO created to develop guidelines for thereporting of economic, environmental, and so-cial performance, gained legitimacy to the ex-tent that it analogized sustainability reportingto financial reporting. Once the guidelines wereaccepted by the business community, however,the organization became less dependent on thefinancial analogy. The study demonstrates thatprivate regulatory bodies are slowly gaining le-gitimacy in the business world, but also that asprivate regulation gains legitimacy it may be be-coming decoupled from market assessments offirm performance.

Although the literature shows that many so-cial movements focus on entities other than thestate, there are good reasons to expect that theeffectiveness of movement actions and privateregulation shaping corporate behavior dependson the state. The threat of public regulationmay cause firms to seek private solutions to aperceived social injustice, and this may be espe-cially likely when social movements apply pres-sure (Bartley 2003, 2007; Soule 2009). Baronet al. (2009) also recognize that the looming


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threat of public regulation (i.e., public politics)may shape corporate efforts to become moresocially responsible and that private and publicpolitics may be fundamentally interactive. Pri-vate regulation is frequently “intertwined withlegal standards of responsibility” (Bartley 2005,p. 233).

One concern with private regulation is thatNGOs, although effective at encouraging adop-tion of certification standards, have weak mon-itoring capabilities and are thus unable to as-sure the implementation of these standards atthe ground level. Seidman (2007) maintains thatthe certification systems, for example, would bemore influential if coupled with stronger statemonitoring and strengthened organized labor.Contentious politics may translate into funda-mental social and institutional change when oc-curring on multiple fronts and using a diverseinstitutional repertoire.

CREATING NEW MARKETSAND CATEGORIES

Rather than voicing their dissatisfaction withincumbents, contentious actors may also chooseto exit dominant organizations altogether andcreate new market alternatives (Hirschman1970). The creation of new market choices isone avenue for exit. The ultimate goal of theseinstitutional entrepreneurs is to “deinstitution-alize existing beliefs, norms, and values embod-ied in extant social structures and establish newstructures that instantiate new beliefs, norms,and values” (Rao & Giorgi 2006, p. 271). Re-search on social movements and on the creationof new organizational forms suggests that insti-tutional entrepreneurs rely on collective actionand oppositional identities to disrupt the statusquo and legitimate new organizational activities(Rao et al. 2000, 2003; Hargrave & Van de Ven2006; Haveman et al. 2007; Schneiberg et al.2008).

The production of a new market or orga-nizational form involves reimagining the pos-sibilities to which markets may be put to use.Moreover, because new organizational formsare often resisted by dominant incumbents and

may rely on different institutional logics, en-trepreneurs must organize collectively and mo-bilize their shared resources to establish therhetorical and material infrastructure of new or-ganizational forms. For example, Schneiberg’s(2002; 2007, p. 74) research on the emergenceand diffusion of cooperatives and mutual formsemphasizes how the “the production and diffu-sion of alternatives to corporations in Amer-ican capitalism were fundamentally politicalprocesses, resting at each point on contestationand collective action, institutional projects, andsocial movement mobilization against corpo-rate dominance.” This change process is po-litically charged from beneath (i.e., by thosesupporting alternatives) and politically con-tested from above (i.e., by powerful incum-bents). Their success rests on the ability of en-trepreneurs to mobilize collective resources andidentities and legitimate new categories.

Mobilizing Resources and Identities

The early years of an industry resemble a so-cial movement as actors mobilize resources, de-velop oppositional identities that will sustaintheir commitment to the cause, break downold boundaries and beliefs, and begin creatinga consumer audience that understands the corefeatures of a new organizational form (Hannanet al. 2007). Carroll (1997, p. 129) describes thismobilized resistance as being organized by “in-dividuals and organizations devoted to causes,lifestyles and visions of a better future for all(rather than profit-maximizing entrepreneursengaged in competitive battles based primarilyon self-interest).”

This definition highlights that institutionalentrepreneurs are at least partially motivatedby a social change agenda (for example, seeMiller’s 2006 study of independent book-stores). Rindova et al. (2009, p. 477) defineentrepreneurship, more generally, as “efforts tobring about new economic, social, institutional,and cultural environments through the actionsof an individual or group of individuals,” en-compassing “a wide variety of change-orientedactivities and projects.” Change-oriented

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efforts of any kind involve emotional andpsychological commitments to ideas that lieoutside self-interest (Baker & Pollock 2007,p. 300). Individuals do not always arrive atchange-oriented values by themselves; rather,social movements actively socialize individualsand create communities of entrepreneurscommitted to social change (Sine & Lee 2009).

Swaminathan & Wade (2001) argue thatsocial movements underlie the creation of newmarkets by helping entrepreneurs mobilize re-sources and by providing them with existing in-frastructure, potent collective action frames andidentities, and alternative organizational mod-els. The importance of collective action andoppositional identities for creating new organi-zational forms is prominent in the resource par-titioning perspective (Swaminathan & Carroll1995, Carroll 1997, Carroll & Swaminathan2000, Dobrev et al. 2001, Swaminathan 2001).This perspective posits that when a marketbecomes sufficiently concentrated, dominantincumbent firms adopt generalist identities.Generalists’ shift to the market’s center opensspace at the periphery of the market for anti–mass production specialist organizations, as, forexample, when microbreweries emerged in re-sponse to the increasing concentration of massbeer producers (Carroll & Swaminathan 2000).One outcome of this partitioning is the creationof unique specialist identities that oppose thegeneralists and cultivate an enthusiast audience.Specialists cooperate with one another ratherthan engage in cutthroat competition. Thissymbiotic relationship among specialists andthe construction of an oppositional identityfacilitates the survival of this new form in theface of competition with generalists.

Greve et al. (2006) demonstrate that con-centration of market share in the FM radio in-dustry helped facilitate the creation of a move-ment opposed to corporate chain radio. Themovement framed corporate radio as less au-thentic and helped entrepreneurs mobilize re-sources to create independent, low-power FMradio stations. The mobilization of this oppo-sitional identity and reaction to the concentra-tion of power held by corporate chains created

the political opportunity for the emergence ofa new market niche.

Legitimating New Categories

Contentiousness is also fundamental to the le-gitimation of new market categories (e.g., in-dustries, technologies). Industry innovations ornew technologies often disrupt the status quo,threatening to displace powerful incumbentsand promoting competing institutional logics.In addition, new market categories lack cogni-tive legitimacy and thus may fail to take holdbecause an audience for the industry or tech-nology has yet to emerge. Thus, radical changesin markets are often preceded by movementsadvocating alternative conceptions of exchangeor cooperation, as was true with the emer-gence of cooperatives and developmental asso-ciations (Schneiberg 2002, Berk & Schneiberg2005), the thrift industry (Haveman & Rao1997, Haveman et al. 2007), the life insuranceindustry (Zelizer 1979), or consumer watchdogorganizations (Rao 1998). When an audienceemerges to support the new form and domi-nant incumbents no longer have the ability toresist the innovation, new categories and or-ganizational forms may become viable vehiclesfor actors to realize their political and/or eco-nomic interests. Social movements matter in allaspects of this institutionalization process.

Legitimating new categories involves fram-ing processes that imbue new categories withcultural resonance and the construction of newpractices associated with the categories. Socialmovements’ framing of a new category helpsbreak down cognitive barriers. Ruef (2000)shows how social movements brought legiti-macy to new forms in the medical field throughdiscursive tactics. Based on a study of thecreation of grass-fed beef and dairy markets,Weber et al. (2008) show that social movementsmobilize “broad cultural codes” to create newproducers, form collective identities aroundwhich new markets are formed, and create theconditions for market exchange in these new in-dustries. Cultural work of this type, includingthe use of collective action frames and alliances,


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helps legitimate new, potentially risky ventures(Lounsbury & Glynn 2001, Sine et al. 2005).

Along the same lines, Sine & Lee (2009)demonstrate that social movement organi-zations (SMOs) such as the Sierra Club andthe Audubon Society shaped the marketopportunities for the emergence of the windpower industry. SMOs, which had broaderenvironmental and social change missions,provided cultural and material resources for en-trepreneurs in the burgeoning industry. Theseresources helped entrepreneurs to articulate topotential investors the need for alternative en-ergy resources, helped them win governmentalsupport, and initiated normative changes thatfacilitated the spread of wind power. Move-ments, thus, have both direct effects (by provid-ing resources) and indirect effects (by shapingthe normative and cultural environment) onthe creation of new markets (Hiatt et al. 2009).

Another way in which movements legit-imate new market categories is through theintroduction of innovative practices and tech-nology. Lounsbury & Crumley (2007) arguethat institutional change is often preceded bythe introduction of radically new practicesthat undermine the positions of the old guard.Practice variation creates contentiousness in amarket by providing new ways of doing thingsthat challenge taken-for-granted assumptionsabout the field. Movements sustain the useof a challenging practice and help redrawcategory boundaries that make those practicesendure. The idea that practice innovationunderlies category innovation is also supportedby research in the social studies of technology,which shows that innovative technology isnot readily adopted without mobilizationamong its supporters (e.g., Pinch & Bijker1984). Institutional entrepreneurs retheorizemarket categories to make space for innovativetechnologies (Munir & Phillips 2005).

BRIDGING THE POLITICAL ANDECONOMIC IN SOCIOLOGY

Sociologists have always conceptualized a linkbetween the political and economic spheres

(Weber 1922 [1968]); however, this link hastypically been seen as a regulatory relationshipbetween the state and the market. Economicsociology largely ignored the informal, emer-gent ways in which markets become politicized.Social movement theory has in recent yearsbecome an important tool for organizationalscholars and economic sociologists interestedin the bottom-up processes that drive funda-mental changes to markets.

Borrowing insights from political sociologyhas changed our understanding of markets.Rather than conceiving of politics in markets asa source of drag and inefficiency, this researchhighlights the role that contentiousness playsin moving markets forward by encouraginginnovation and helping entrepreneurs over-come inertia. Incumbents resist new ideas andtechnologies because they potentially threatenthe rules of the game that favor their elite statusand their sources of competitive advantage.Contentious action facilitates the deteriorationof these positional advantages by giving chal-lengers models for resistance, by mobilizingcultural and material resources for the desta-bilization of markets, and by enhancing theability to get moral support from third partiesand build legitimacy for the new cause. Thisinsight builds on ideas in economic sociologythat emphasize the importance of audiences,legitimacy, and valuation (Zuckerman 1999).Movements in markets challenge preexistingcategorical constraints and seek to constructnew categories and standards of accountability.Moreover, movements create alternativemodels and templates for organizing, thusenriching the possible paths that institu-tional entrepreneurs may take in the future(Schneiberg 2007). This process of challengingand presenting alternatives is present in the ef-forts to create new certification systems or SRIsand to construct new organizational forms,such as cooperatives. These efforts involveassembling new audiences and constructing aset of expectations with which to assess marketaccountability. Thus, rather than replace mar-kets with states, the new political sociology ofmarkets emphasized here focuses on the role of

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collective action in enhancing existing marketsor creating new markets. Contentiousness pro-vides the energy for this reassembling of marketresources.

This burgeoning literature also emphasizesthe inherently political nature of everyday mar-ket exchange. Politically motivated ideologies,beliefs, and values seep into most kinds ofmarket exchange. The latent political mean-ing in consumption, investing, and other mar-ket transactions is activated by contentious col-lective action. These political sparks (and the

conflict that ensues) underlie many instances ofdramatic institutional change. Over time, a newmarket practice may become legitimated andlose its initial contentiousness, as is now truewith recycling programs; nevertheless, it wasthe initial conflict between the powerless andthe powerful that set the wave of change in mo-tion. That institutional changes in the marketdo not normally occur without a push from ac-tors at the margin is perhaps the central insightof research examining the contentiousness ofmarkets.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The authors are not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings thatmight be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank Mike Lounsbury, Mayer Zald, Sarah Soule, Tim Bartley, Dan Hirschman, Steve Kahl,Klaus Weber, and Ezra Zuckerman for valuable feedback on an earlier draft of this paper.

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Annual Reviewof Sociology

Volume 36, 2010Contents

FrontispieceJohn W. Meyer � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � xiv

Prefatory Chapter

World Society, Institutional Theories, and the ActorJohn W. Meyer � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1

Theory and Methods

Causal Inference in Sociological ResearchMarkus Gangl � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �21

Causal Mechanisms in the Social SciencesPeter Hedstrom and Petri Ylikoski � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �49

Social Processes

A World of Standards but not a Standard World: Toward a Sociologyof Standards and StandardizationStefan Timmermans and Steven Epstein � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �69

Dynamics of Dyads in Social Networks: Assortative, Relational,and Proximity MechanismsMark T. Rivera, Sara B. Soderstrom, and Brian Uzzi � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �91

From the Sociology of Intellectuals to the Sociology of InterventionsGil Eyal and Larissa Buchholz � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 117

Social Relationships and Health Behavior Across the Life CourseDebra Umberson, Robert Crosnoe, and Corinne Reczek � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 139

Partiality of Memberships in Categories and AudiencesMichael T. Hannan � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 159

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Institutions and Culture

What Is Sociological about Music?William G. Roy and Timothy J. Dowd � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 183

Cultural Holes: Beyond Relationality in Social Networks and CultureMark A. Pachucki and Ronald L. Breiger � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 205

Formal Organizations

Organizational Approaches to Inequality: Inertia, Relative Power,and EnvironmentsKevin Stainback, Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, and Sheryl Skaggs � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 225

Political and Economic Sociology

The Contentiousness of Markets: Politics, Social Movements,and Institutional Change in MarketsBrayden G King and Nicholas A. Pearce � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 249

Conservative and Right-Wing MovementsKathleen M. Blee and Kimberly A. Creasap � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 269

The Political Consequences of Social MovementsEdwin Amenta, Neal Caren, Elizabeth Chiarello, and Yang Su � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 287

Comparative Analyses of Public Attitudes Toward Immigrantsand Immigration Using Multinational Survey Data: A Reviewof Theories and ResearchAlin M. Ceobanu and Xavier Escandell � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 309

Differentiation and Stratification

Income Inequality: New Trends and Research DirectionsLeslie McCall and Christine Percheski � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 329

Socioeconomic Disparities in Health BehaviorsFred C. Pampel, Patrick M. Krueger, and Justin T. Denney � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 349

Gender and Health InequalityJen’nan Ghazal Read and Bridget K. Gorman � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 371

Incarceration and StratificationSara Wakefield and Christopher Uggen � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 387

Achievement Inequality and the Institutional Structure of EducationalSystems: A Comparative PerspectiveHerman G. Van de Werfhorst and Jonathan J.B. Mijs � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 407

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Historical Studies of Social Mobility and StratificationMarco H.D. van Leeuwen and Ineke Maas � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 429

Individual and Society

Race and TrustSandra Susan Smith � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 453

Three Faces of IdentityTimothy J. Owens, Dawn T. Robinson, and Lynn Smith-Lovin � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 477

Policy

The New Homelessness RevisitedBarrett A. Lee, Kimberly A. Tyler, and James D. Wright � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 501

The Decline of Cash Welfare and Implications for Social Policyand PovertySandra K. Danziger � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 523

Indexes

Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 27–36 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 547

Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 27–36 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 551

Errata

An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Sociology articles may be found athttp://soc.annualreviews.org/errata.shtml

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The Contentiousness of Markets (1)

Documents

Transcript of The Contentiousness of Markets (1)