The consequences of Israel’s territorial gains from the Six Day War for peace with Egypt
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Transcript of The consequences of Israel’s territorial gains from the Six Day War for peace with Egypt
The consequences of Israel’s territorial gains from the Six Day War for peace with Egypt
Christopher Haynes
27/7/09
Introduction
“Peace,” Shimon Peres once wrote, “like a tree, is a process of growth; it demands great
patience, continuous nurturing and the surmounting of many obstacles.” (Peres, 887)
Peace between Egypt and Israel was certainly a process of growth: a step-by-step process
with various mediators over more than ten years. The peace struck between the two
former rivals was long in coming, suffered setbacks and hurt the pride of many, but one
thing is for certain: it has held. How did Egypt and Israel manage to secure a lasting
peace?
One possibility is that Israeli leaders felt that withdrawal from the Sinai was an
insignificant price to pay for peace. But given the strong public sentiment in favour of
annexing the territories won in the Six Day War, the settler movement and the Greater
Israel movement, it is unlikely many Israelis were nonchalant about the land.
Arab leaders, in general, felt a responsibility to the Palestinians, and demanded their
rights or independence. They also demanded a resolution of the Palestinian refugee crisis.
Egypt’s government addressed these issues as well. However, judging by the Egyptian
government’s actions and results, some of its demands for Palestinian rights were mere
lip service, and the underlying issue was the Sinai and the Suez.
My contention is that the formerly Egyptian territory Israel gained in the Six Day War
was the key motivation in Egypt’s signing of the Camp David Accord with Israel, the
hardest negotiated concession Israel made and as such, was the principal factor for peace
between the two countries. This essay seeks to understand the role Israel’s territorial
gains of the Sinai Peninsula and the waterways around it played in securing its peace with
Egypt. It will examine Israeli and Egyptian leadership, their decisions, the external
influences on their decisions, and the importance of territory in peace negotiations and
the Camp David Accord between Israel and Egypt. It will focus on the time between the
end of the war and the signing of peace treaties, and will not consider ancient Arab and
Jewish territorial claims.
Decisions made by Israel’s cabinet in the wake of the Six Day War related to the newly
occupied territories have influenced all subsequent territorial negotiation with Egypt.
Land-for-peace accords could have been struck with Egypt earlier, but because of the
Israeli cabinet’s decisions, territorial concessions could not be attained until later. Minds
changed because, as it became clearer that Egypt was willing to offer lasting peace, the
prospect of losing the Sinai seemed an increasingly small price to pay.
On the other side, Gamal Abdel Nasser’s intransigence precluded a peace treaty. Nasser
was seen as the leader of the pan-Arab movement and thus the figurehead for Arab pride.
It had been damaged and thus so had he. While some concessions could have been made,
simply opening negotiations over territory would have been so damaging to Nasser that
he would have lost everything.
Nasser’s successor, Anwar al-Sadat, started the Yom Kippur War to regain territory to
show Israel land-for-peace was in its interest and force it to the bargaining table. Had
Sadat waited, there could have been more settlers, more raids on Israel and more desire to
gain new territory for more secure borders. Territory was also the biggest factor in the
peace talks after the Yom Kippur War.
Israel’s Leadership
When the dust settled and the guns went silent on June 10, 1967, Israel had quadrupled in
size. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) had captured the Golan Heights, the West Bank,
East Jerusalem and the Sinai. How did Israel’s cabinet react to this unexpected but highly
welcome victory over their Arab rivals?
Many government ministers were initially ready to trade new land for peace. But
returning territory to its neighbours was never an easy decision. Moshe Dayan wrote that,
since 1948, Jewish population centres had been attacked from the hills. How could they
be guaranteed these attacks would not happen again? Territory like the Sinai and the
Golan Heights made good security buffers. How could Israeli ships be ensured free
passage through the Red Sea? Would the new settlers of the Sinai and elsewhere be
subject to Arab rule? (Dayan, 50) These questions were on the minds of Israeli statesmen
in June of 1967.
The ministers’ general opinion was that Israel would not relinquish territory without a
peace treaty. (Segev, 502) But they did not agree on everything. Some of the decision
makers were what one might call “doves”: leaders who favoured far-reaching
concessions with regard to territory. Though there were no simple answers, returning
occupied territory for peace seemed reasonable to the doves. Others, which we will call
“hawks” (1) (and which Abba Eban called “security men”), felt Arabs were not willing to
negotiate, and for “strategic and ideological reasons”, insisted Israel retain most of the
territories. (Oren, 314)
While there were relative doves among IDF leaders, the “security” school had a greater
impact on Israeli policy. David Elazar (“Dado”), later IDF chief of staff, “was adamant
about retaining the Golan Heights which he had lobbied so hard to capture.” (Oren, 315)
However, other Israeli leaders who were hawks became more dovish during the 1970s.
Menachem Begin and his party, for instance, rejected the very idea of territorial
concessions. (Oren, 314; Smith, 307) Ezer Weizman, in 1967 IDF chief of operations,
was also opposed to territorial concessions. But he later changed his mind and agreed to
Israel’s total withdrawal from the Sinai. Finally, Ariel Sharon during the war was a
commander on the Sinai front, against any concessions at first, promoter of dozens of
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and later uprooted Israeli settlements in Sinai so
that it could be returned to Egypt. (Oren, 315) The “hawks” may have found that their
initial responses were mistaken. As cabinet ministers, they may have felt a need to be
more pragmatic. Nonetheless, in 1967, there was a consensus that the land captured by
the IDF would be fundamental to security and peace.
The cabinet deliberated until June 19. They decided secretly to exchange the Sinai and
the Golan Heights for peace treaties with Egypt and Syria. Some areas of the territories
would be demilitarised and free passage through the Strait of Tiran would be guaranteed.
Of the territory captured from Egypt, Israel would only keep the Gaza Strip. (Ibid., 313)
This is not to say that the Sinai and the Heights were unimportant to Israelis. They were
still Eretz Israel. But the ministers, or at least the doves, involved in the decision, valued
peace over irredentism, and giving up the least important of the newly occupied territory
was the obvious solution.
In his memoirs, Abba Eban, then Israel’s foreign minister, wrote that, “even if we built a
wall against attack or intimidation, we should have a door in the wall in case the attrition
was successful and our neighbours came to seek accommodation.” (Shlaim, 224) In the
end, the Sinai was that door.
Israel offered a withdrawal from the Sinai and the Golan in return for direct negotiations
for a peace treaty. Egypt and Syria rejected the offer. This suited Israel: it could now
claim it had been reasonable; the Arabs were rejectionists and Israel would keep the
territories. It did not have peace, but the territories provided a security buffer. According
to Tom Segev, however, under the June 19th proposal, Egypt would not have recovered
all its losses, and it would have needed to accept a demilitarised Sinai. (Segev, 500-1)
Had Nasser accepted this proposal, he would likely have lost even more face than he had
for losing the war and been accused of selling out his people.
How does Israeli public opinion correlate with the June 19 decision? Polls indicated that
almost sixty percent of (Jewish) Israelis believed that some of the Occupied Territories
could have been returned for peace. Only one in three felt all territories should be
annexed. Nearly three quarters were against giving back Sharm el-Sheikh, and about half
said the same about the Sinai. (Segev, 551) A return of all of Egypt’s former territory
would not have sat well with Israeli voters.
The Six Day War polarised opinion in Israel to the effect that there were two major
ideological movements: the Greater Israel school and the peace school. The former
proposed annexation of all territories gained in the Six Day War. The latter advocated the
return of most occupied land and accommodation with Arabs. Golda Meir, soon to
become prime minister, was of the Greater Israel movement. However, her party
consisted mostly of doves. (Shlaim, 286) In the Fall 1969 election, Meir’s Labour Party
committed itself to returning Golan, Sharm, Gaza and parts of the West Bank (though
Jerusalem was still not negotiable). (Smith, 319) Meir avoided political risk by
maintaining the status quo (Shlaim, 287), while her party could continue to score votes
among the peace school of Israeli society.
But territorial questions continued to plague ministers. In 1967 and 1975, “Israeli
cabinets were often paralysed by differences over what territories should be retained and
what should be offered in return for peace.” (Smith, 307) In 1973, religious members of
government showed solidarity with settlers, (Zertal and Eldar, 31) part of the Greater
Israel movement. However, Jimmy Carter, visiting the Holy Land before the Yom Kippur
War, says that “the prevailing attitude” at the time, at least among Israeli leaders if not
the public as well, was that Israel should trade them for peace. (Carter, 23) The settlers
surely had an influence on public opinion and thus made leaders reluctant to return
territory. However, they were probably not as big a concern as those Israelis with a desire
for peace with their neighbours (which included some of the settlers (BBC)). To fulfill
the terms of the peace accord, the Israeli authorities set about uprooting Sinai settlements
in March 1982. (Zertal and Eldar, 48)
In 1973, the Labour Party was shifting toward annexing the territories, even though
previously it had said they could be negotiated and some of them returned. (Smith, 326)
For example, Israeli political and military leaders took it as a matter of course in the
1970s that Sharm el-Sheikh should remain under their control. (McPeak, 430) How, then,
did they ever reach the decision to relinquish control? The answer lies in the work of
international actors—such as Henry Kissinger and the United Nations—and Anwar al-
Sadat. Before we consider them, however, let us go back in time somewhat to the policies
of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Arab League.
The Reactions of Nasser and the Arab League
Defeat was a fist in the face of Nasser and the Arab nationalism he represented, and
losing a big piece of Egypt to Israel was the most visible loss. Nasser demanded on
several occasions that the territories be remand unconditionally (Segev, 563-5); and his
anger culminated in the Khartoum conference of August 1967.
The key resolution of the conference stated in one sentence that there could be a political
solution “to eliminate the effects of aggression”; in the following sentence negated the
possibility of a political solution by stating that there would be “no peace with Israel, no
recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it”; and as a kind of afterthought, “and
insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country.” The text made it
clear that the Arab states would work indirectly with Israel through international
diplomatic channels to get Israel to return to its prewar borders. (Smith, 309) The Arabs’
focus had shifted from liberating Palestine to liberating the areas occupied in the war.
(Oren, 322)
It is likely that the Arab leaders felt that the Palestinians were not as important as the
land. The first sentence spoke bitterly of ensuring “the withdrawal of the aggressive
Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the aggression of 5
June.” (My italics.) By contrast, reference to the Palestinians abiding in the occupied
territories was the final phrase of the paragraph and said nothing of granting them
independence. The Khartoum conference was built on bitterness and was an attempt to
regain “Arab pride” deeply wounded by the Six Day War.
After the Yom Kippur War, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states raised oil prices, demanding
Israel withdraw from the territories and restore the legal rights of the Palestinians.
(Morris, 435) Both requirements were made, at least in large part, out of collective
sentiment for Arabs and Muslims. Though places that felt sympathy for the Palestinians
continued to press the issue, Egypt did not feel pressure to address issues of Palestinian
rights in the way other Arab states did. For the countries that actually lost territory in the
Six Day War, it was the territory that really mattered. The Arab League’s influence over
Egypt, and thus peace talks, dwindled, while that of the United States rose.
External Actors: Kissinger and 242
Henry Kissinger spent, according to Edward Sheehan, thousands of hours negotiating on
over a dozen missions to the Middle East. His work was based largely on UN Security
Council Resolution 242, approved in the wake of the Six Day War. This section will
reflect on the two most significant influences on territorial negotiations that were external
to the conflict: Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” and Resolution 242.
Post-1973 relations between Egypt and Israel were tense and Kissinger took things
slowly. To bring them to the table, Kissinger promised different things to different
parties. To the Israelis, he promised that partial peace agreements were worth signing
because, by giving up a little initially, international pressure on territorial concessions
would subside. Kissinger led the Arabs to believe that partial agreements were a step
closer to a full Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and the Golan Heights. Through
“extremely hard bargaining”, Kissinger secured partial agreements between Israel and
Egypt (Smith, 331): a Disengagement Agreement with Egypt (and one with Syria) in
1974, and an Interim Agreement in 1975.
The deals saw Israel disengage the west side of the Suez Canal, which it had occupied
since the Yom Kippur War, and demarcated where Egyptian forces could be stationed on
the east side. (Ibid, 331) Kissinger could not have obtained such agreements without
giving all sides assurances as to territorial concessions. To the Israelis, he stressed how
little territory would be given up, and to Egypt and Syria how much they would get back.
Territorial concessions were key to the partial withdrawal agreements.
Since Lyndon Johnson, American presidents have championed Resolution 242 and the
land-for-peace principle. (Oren, 327; Carter, 38) The resolution makes clear that territory
must not be acquired by force and that Israel must withdraw from territories occupied in
the Six Day War. It demands “freedom of navigation through international waterways”
(such as the Suez) and “territorial inviolability” for states concerned. (2) Land and peace
are the central issues. The resolution makes only indirect references to the Palestinians,
referring only to “the refugee problem”.
Diplomats argued endlessly over the word “the”. The question was, would the Security
Council demand that Israel withdraw from (all) “the territories” captured in the war, or
merely from “territories”. They finally agreed on the latter. (Segev, 564; Oren, 326) The
international powers either knew and acknowledged that Israel would not withdraw from
all the territories, or did not want to pressure Israel to do so. Both are possible, though
given Israel’s official stance, the former is more significant.
With or without a definite article, the land clauses of the resolution are significant for
three reasons.
a) They put legal pressure on Israel to return occupied territories, which meant Egypt
had something to refer to in negotiations;
b) They formed the position of the US government, which, to this day, continues to
acknowledge the resolution;
c) They provided a basis for a peace treaty.
As we shall see, matters of territory were at least as important in the Camp David Accord,
more than ten years after the Six Day War.
Sadat’s Moves
Before discussing the accord itself however, we must look more closely at the actions of
a major player in negotiations: Egypt’s president, Anwar al-Sadat. Without his bold
moves and conciliatory gestures, peace would not have been possible. But if Sadat
wanted peace, why did he wage the Yom Kippur War?
Benny Morris lists Sadat’s motivations.
a) Control the Suez Canal;
b) Appear courageous and restore Arab pride;
c) Popularity, legitimacy and longevity for his regime;
d) Possible contributions from the oil kingdoms;
e) Break the political deadlock. (Morris, 387)
When they withdrew soon after the end of the war, the peace talks with Egypt began.
(Morris, 437) Sadat realised Egypt would not recover all the territory it lost to Israel in
battle. Sadat and Begin signed the Camp David Accord in 1978. The state of conflict
between Egypt and Israel halted, territory was given up and Israeli settlements in the
Sinai were dismantled. Diplomatic and trade relations were established as well.
(Edwards, 126) Egypt’s economic and security situations could begin to improve.
Were there economic reasons for recovering the Sinai? Charles Smith writes that “[m]uch
of Sadat’s movitation was economic.” (Smith, 323) If Sadat could work with the US to
secure peace with Israel, it could gain US government aid. As a governmental concern,
economy was intertwined with “Arab pride”: both were causes of unrest. If even just one
of them could improve, Sadat’s domestic popularity would improve. But the Sinai itself
was not important for the economy. Economics could not have been the only reason to
push for peace.
What about the Palestinian cause? Though the status of the Palestinians was part of peace
negotiations, the results of negotiations indicate Sadat was more concerned about
territory and Egypt’s economy. “The Palestinian chapter in the Camp David Accord
served primarily to provide Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat with an ideological fig
leaf to defend himself against Arab rage over his perceived betrayal of the Palestinian
cause.” (Ben-Yishai, 43) As a result, for Palestinians in the West Bank, the Camp David
Accord tore apart their hopes for help from Egypt. (Smith, 355) A continued state of war
between Egypt and Israel could have meant an eventual end to occupation, because even
if the Egyptian government did not care about the Palestinians, the occupation of the
West Bank could have been used as a bargaining chip. Sadat could have stipulated
freedom or rights for the Palestinians, but adding a Palestinian clause would have
distracted too much from the main issues of peace and territory, and Israel would have
been far less likely to sign the end agreement. Instead, he opted for territory.
Sadat was assassinated in 1981 and Egypt was isolated from other Arab states until the
1990s. And yet, his legacy remains. How did territorial concessions figure at Camp
David?
The Accord
The territories Egypt and Israel were negotiating were the Sinai Peninsula and the Suez
Canal, including Sharm el-Sheikh, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran. Having been
a factor in the outbreak of the Six Day War, this area was an essential part of Israel’s new
conquests. How did Sadat and Begin make their decision to sign the Camp David
Accord?
According to Yitzhak Shamir, “the obstacles to peace were finally removed when Egypt
broke away from the PLO-rejectionist platform on the Palestinian issue.” (Shamir, 793)
When Egyptian negotiators realised that Israel was not about to negotiate away the West
Bank, they gave up and focused on what they really wanted: peace and the Sinai. They
could have given up negotiations on principle and returned to the state of conflict. But
instead, Sadat went for the Sinai and got it.
One might consider that, if land was so important to Egypt, why have Israel and Syria not
reached a peace accord? The simple answer is, neither state has been willing to pay the
price. In some cases of conflict resolution, the interests of the parties involved are so
drastically opposed that resolution seems impossible. In the case of Israel and Syria, both
parties realise continued deadlock is dangerous, but demands are as yet irreconcilable.
Syria desires the Golan Heights back, Israel wants security guarantees. Concessions have
not been made because Israel considers the Heights more important than a nonaggression
pledge, possibly because of its military strength relative to Syria; and Syria deems such a
pledge too high a price to pay for the Heights. (Ross, 27) Egypt and Israel did not face the
same barriers at Camp David
How important are land clauses to the final accord?
Paragraph 2 of Article 1 regards the transfer of sovereignty of the Sinai from
Israel to Egypt, right after the cessation of hostilities;
Article 2 recognises borders, territorial waters and airspace;
Paragraph 1 of Article 3 mentions territorial integrity, as well as sovereignty,
which in this case may be one and the same;
Article 5 grants free passage through the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aqaba and the
Strait of Tiran;
Annexes 1 and 2 detail the rules between Egypt and Israel concerning sovereign
territory. (3)
Both Security Council Resolution 242 and the Camp David Accord strongly emphasise
territory: freedom of movement over international waterways, and land as the price of
peace. Though written eleven years apart, territory was equally important in both treaties.
Conclusion
Though it may be fragile or “cold”, Egypt and Israel are at peace with one another. The
peace depended on Israel’s eventual willingness to give up the territory it won in the Six
Day War. The Israeli government decided peace was more valuable than the Sinai, and
that Egypt was willing to grant freedom of the seas as well. Nasser’s refusal to negotiate,
and all his demands, aimed to recover lost territory. Sadat’s Yom Kippur War was
designed to break the political deadlock, and led, in time, to the signing of land-centered
nonbelligerency agreements. Henry Kissinger, the shrewd mediator, knew that appealing
to territory would keep Egypt at the bargaining table. His model was Resolution 242, as it
was of the Camp David Accord.
Israel has also signed a peace agreement with Jordan. But Israel’s troubles are not over.
“[F]or all its military conquests, Israel was still incapable of imposing the peace it
craved…. The status of territories could be negotiated but the essential issues—Israel’s
right to exist, the demand for Palestinian repatriation and statehood—remained.” (Oren,
327) Territory remains a key obstacle to peace for a country so full of hope after the Six
Day War.
Notes
1. Shlaim, 286-7, neatly divides the ministers into doves and hawks: Abba Eban,
Zalman Aran, Pinhas Sapir, Ze’ev Sharef, Yaacov Shimson Shapira and
Eliahu Sasson were doves; Golda Meir, Yisrael Galili, Yigal Allon, Moshe
Carmel, Moshe Dayan, Yosef Almogi, Menachem Begin and Yosef Sapir
were hawks.
2. The full text of Resolution 242 can be found here:
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/240/94/IMG/NR0240
94.pdf
3. The full text of the Camp David Accord can be found here:
http://www.mfa.gov.eg/MFA_Portal/en-GB/Foreign_Policy/Treaties/
Treaty+of+Peace+between+the+Arab+Republic+of+Egypt+and+the+State+of
+Israel+26+March+1979.htm
and here:
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace
%20Process/Israel-Egypt%20Peace%20Treaty
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