The Confusions of KripkeAuthor(s): Jonathan HarrisonReviewed work(s):Source: Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol. 27, No. 2 (Sep., 1987), pp. 283-290Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20012114 .Accessed: 24/10/2012 21:00

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JONATHAN HARRISON

THE CONFUSIONS OF KRIPKE

It is shaped, sir, like itself, and it is as broad as it hath

breadth; it is just so high as it is, and moves with its

own organs; it lives by that which nourisheth it; and

the elements once out of it, it transmigrates. (Shakes?

peare: Antony and Cleopatra)

Professor Putnam has recently argued1 that if there were brains in

vats, what they would be saying when they said that they were brains

in vats would be false, and so that there were brains in vats would

imply its own falsity, and so be false ((p-+ ?p)? ?p). In a recent article in Erkenntnis2 I argued that, even if what a brain

in a vat would be saying when (he, she or) it said that it was a brain in a vat were false (which it would not necessarily be) this would not

show that it was both true and false that it was a brain in a vat. This is

because, if the proposition that a brain in a vat is asserting when it says that it is a brain in a vat is the proposition that it is an image brain in an image vat, this proposition is not the contradictory of the pro?

position I am asserting when I say that it is a brain in a vat. There is therefore not one proposition, asserted both by me and by a brain in a

vat, which is such as to be false if it is true.

Putnam's mistake arises from confusing a brain in a vat's uttering the sentence T am a brain in a vat' with its asserting the position that it is a brain in a vat. It would not be asserting this proposition, if

Putnam is right in thinking that by 'brain' it meant 'image brain' and

by 'vat' it meant 'image vat'.

Professor Kripke has maintained3 that there is a class of contingent propositions that may be known a priori. For example, the metre rod in Paris might have been shorter than it is. Hence that the metre rod in

Paris is a metre long is a contingent proposition. We know a priori that it is a metre long, however, because the word 'metre' is a name for that length which, it so happens, is the length of the metre rod in Paris.

I agree with Kripke that the metre rod in Paris might have been shorter than it is. If the hand of the craftsman who made it had

slipped, as it might have done, then it probably would have been less than a metre long. I do not agree with Kripke, however, that we know a priori that it is a metre long.

Erkenntnis 27 (1987) 283-290. ? 1987 by D. Reidel Publishing Company

284 JONATHAN HARRISON

Since the metre rod in Paris is 39.37 inches, the word 'metre' is a

name for a length which is 39.37 inches. We cannot know a priori that

the metre rod in Paris is 39.37 inches. Hence we cannot know a priori what length, measured in inches, the word 'metre' names. What I have

just said is true of any other unit of measurement one cares to think of,

e.g., ells.

If the metre rod is (as it is) 39.37 inches long, 'metre' will be a name

for a length which is 39.37 inches. If, as might have been the case, the

metre rod was 40 inches long, 'metre' would be a name for a length which was 40 inches. In either event, if we were to say that the metre

rod in Paris was a metre long, we would have to be saying what was

true. But what we would be saying in the two cases would be different.

In the first case (because 'metre' would refer to a length which was

39.37 inches) we would be saying that the metre was a length which was in fact (though we would not be saying this) 39.37 inches. In the

second case, we would be saying that it was a length which was in fact

40 inches. (There would not be one statement, expressed in the words

'The metre rod in Paris is 39.37 inches long', but two.

We would not know either of these statements a priori, for it is just an empirical fact that the metre rod in Paris is a length which is 39.37

inches, and it would be just an empirical fact that it was 40 inches, if it

were 40 inches. Hence what we are saying, when we say that the metre

rod is a metre long in the event of the metre being 39.37 inches long, is an empirical discovery, and what we would be saying, if we said that

the metre rod was a metre long in the event of the metre's being 40

inches long, would also be an empirical discovery. A similar example is this. A tribe might introduce the numeral

'umpteen' into their language as a name for that number which is the

number of grains of rice in their medicine man's bowl. If there were

1003 grains of rice in the bowl, 'umpteen' would be a word for the

number 1003, and what they say when they say that there are umpteen

grains of rice in the bowl will be true. If there are 1083 grains of rice

in the bowl, 'umpteen' will be a word for 1083, but it will still be true

to say that there are umpteen grains of rice in the bowl. But the

propositions they were using the sentence 'There are umpteen grains of rice in the medicine man's bowl' to assert will be different. If there

are 1003 grains of rice in the bowl, anyone uttering the sentence

'There are umpteen grains of rice in the bowl' will be asserting that there are 1003 grains of rice in the bowl. If there are 1083 grains of

THE CONFUSIONS OF KRIPKE 285

rice in the bowl, anyone uttering the sentence 'There are umpteen

grains of rice in the bowl' will be asserting the proposition that there

are 1083 grains of rice in the bowl. Neither of these will be a priori

propositions. Because of the way the word 'umpteen' is introduced into their

language, their sentence 'There are umpteen grains of rice in the

bowl' can be known a priori to express a true proposition. But it does

not follow from this that they can know a priori that the proposition it

does express is true.

If we turn from a priority to necessity, we must distinguish between

saying that a sentence expresses a necessary truth (('5' expresses

p). Lp), and saying that it necessarily expresses a truth (L(('5'

expresses p)?-?p)). The proposition that the sentence 'There are

umpteen grains of rice in the bowl' necessarily expresses a truth, will

be true. The truth this sentence does express, however, will not be

necessarily true.

Similarly, let us suppose that, having four children, I decide to call

my fifth child 'Tracey', and, when it arrives, do so.4 It does not follow

that I know a priori the truth of the proposition that I now express when I say 'Tracey is my fifth child'. For, if Tracey, who is in fact a

boy, were a girl, the word 'Tracey' would have named a different child

from the child this word does name. Then, though what I would be

saying (the proposition I would be asserting) would still be true, it

would not be the same proposition that I am asserting, given that

Tracey is a girl. A parallel case may help still more to make this clear. If I say T am

here', I am bound to be expressing a truth. But it is just a contingent fact, known empirically, that I am here in my department and not

somewhere else (e.g., at home). If I were at home, however, the

sentence T am here' would still express a truth, but a different truth

(the truth that I am here at home). It is an interesting fact about the

sentence T am here' that wherever I am, it must express a truth. It

does not follow from this, however, that it ever expresses a necessary truth, for none of the truths it does express, e.g., that I am here in my

department, that I am here at home, and so on, are necessary truths. It

is important to distinguish the statement that a sentence must express a truth from the statement that a sentence expresses a necessary truth. It is confusing that in the English language either statement can be put in exactly the same words.

286 JONATHAN HARRISON

Putnam, when he claims5 that it is a logical truth that 'cows' is the

word for cows, is also confusing a sentence that expresses a necessary truth with a sentence that necessarily expresses a truth. Since cows did

not have to be called 'cows', but might have been called 'sheep', it is

not a logical truth that this is what cows are called. But if 'cows' did

mean sheep, the sentence '"Cows" is a word for cows' would still

express a truth, but a truth about sheep, and not the truth about cows

that it now expresses.

Again, it is not a logical truth that Henry is called 'Henry'. If he had

been a girl, he might have been called 'Henrietta', and not 'Henry'. If

he had been called 'Henrietta', then we could not use the sentence

'Henry is not called "Henry", but "Henrietta"' to express this fact. If

Henry had been called 'Henrietta', we could not use the word 'Henry' to refer to him: but we need to be able to do this in order to use this

sentence to say that his name is not 'Henry'. Hence anyone using the

sentence 'Henry is not called "Henry"' is attempting to do something which it would be impossible to do if what he said were true. What he

asserted would not be contradictory, but there is a pragmatic in?

consistency involved in his uttering it, because he would not be able to

succeed in what he is attempting to do if the proposition that he were

attempting to assert were true.

It looks as if it follows from this that there is a class of possibilities which could not be truly asserted to be realised if they were realised.

(All that may in fact follow, however, is that they could not be

asserted to be realised in the words in which the fact that they were

possibilities was originally expressed.) For example, though it is pos? sible that I might not have been here, if I had not been here, I could

not have asserted the realisation of this possibility in the words T am

not here'.

It would also follow that there is a class of unfulfilled conditional

propositions, for example, the proposition that if Henry was not called

'Henry', Henry would have been called 'Henrietta', whose antecedents

could not be truly asserted if they were fulfilled. And though it may be

true that, if I were not here, I would be happier than I am, it is not

possible for me truly to say 'I am not here, and I am happier than I

am'. The possibility of 'cows' not meaning cows belongs to this class.

Though cows might perfectly well not have been called 'cows', anyone

saying 'Cows are not called "cows'" cannot be saying what is true.

Another sentence of the type we are considering is '"Brutus killed

THE CONFUSIONS OF KRIPKE 287

Caesar" means that Brutus killed Caesar'. 'Brutus killed Caesar' does

not have to mean that Brutus killed Caesar, and would have meant

something else if 'killed' had meant begat. But, if 'killed' had meant

begat, anyone saying '"Brutus killed Caesar" does not mean that

Brutus killed Caesar' would have been asserting the proposition (which would then be false) that 'Brutus killed Caesar' did not mean

that Brutus begat Caesar. The sentence '"Brutus killed Ceasar" means that Brutus killed Caesar' is just another sentence that neces?

sarily expresses a truth (as opposed to expressing a necessary truth).

Probably the most important possibility of this kind is the possibility that the sentence 'Snow is white' should be false, while snow remained

white.6 It is a mistake to think that it is impossible for 'Snow is white' to be false (or, as I would prefer to say, express a falsehood) in English

while snow was white. It is, indeed, rather obvious that this is possible, for changing the meaning of the word 'white' could hardly affect the

whiteness of snow. So the sentence 'Snow is white' would be (or express what is) false, though snow was white, if 'white' meant black.

But, though it is perfectly possible for 'Snow is white' to be false (or to

express what is false) while snow remained white, if this possibility were realised, it could not be said to be realised in the words in which the original possibility was expressed. For, if 'white' were to mean

black anyone saying '"Snow is white" is (or expresses what is) false,

although snow is white', would not be expressing this possibility. For, if 'white' did mean black, anyone uttering the sentence 'Snow is white',

would be using this sentence not to say that snow was white, but to say that snow was black.

The sentence '"Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white', therefore, though it is customary to say that it is a trivial truth, is not a sentence that expresses a necessary truth at all. If 'white' meant black, the sentence '"Snow is white" if and only if snow is white' would still

express a truth, but the truth that would be expressed, if 'Snow is white' were to be the way of asserting that snow is black, would be a different truth from that which is now expressed in those words.

It follows that, though it is possible to say such things as 'Once upon a time "cows" did not mean cows', and 'There will be a time in the future when "cows" no longer means cows' and 'There is a language other than English in which 'cows" does not mean cows', and 'It is

possible for "cows" not to mean cows', and 'If "cows" did not mean cows, the English would probably have had another word for them', it

288 JONATHAN HARRISON

is not possible to say, in English, such things as '"Cows" does not

mean cows'. This, again, is because if 'cows' did not mean cows, it

would be impossible to use the word 'cows' to refer to cows, in order

to say that they were not called 'cows'.

It also follows that, though I have not always been here, and a time

will come when I am not here, and though it is perfectly possible for

me not to be here, and it is possible to assert unfulfilled conditional

propositions whose antecedents are expressed in the words 'If I were

not here', if I say T am not here', I must be using this sentence to

express a proposition that is false.

Again, 'Snow is white' has not been (or expressed what is) true

nearly as long as snow has been white, and snow will be white for

much longer than the sentence 'Snow is white' will be true, and it is

perfectly possible for the sentence 'Snow is white' to be false, without

snow's ceasing to be white. It is possible for remarks such as 'If "Snow

is white" were false, while snow remained white, this must be either

because "Snow" does not mean snow or "white" does not mean

white', to be (or express what is) true. It is not possible, however, for

the remark, made in the present tense, '"Snow is white" is true, but

snow is not white' to be (or express) what is true.

An interesting example of the same kind of impossiblity7 is that

'plus' should not mean plus, but quus. Though 'plus' might have meant

quus, if it had meant quus anyone saying '"Plus" means quus' would

have been saying what is false (at any rate, if you assume that if 'plus' had meant quus, then 'quus' would not also have meant quus). If you have to use the word 'quus' to refer to what 'plus' means, it follows

that 'plus' cannot mean it. One is again trying to do something that

would not be possible if what one were trying to assert were true. The

sentence '"plus" means plus' is as much a sentence that necessarily expresses a truth as the sentence '"Cows" means cows'. ('"Plus"

means quus' is as much a sentence that necessarily expresses a

falsehood as is the sentence '"Cows" means sheep'). It follows from this that, though one might consider the possibility

of 'plus' not meaning plus, and think that once upon a time 'plus' did

not mean plus, and that in the future 'plus' might not mean plus, and

that 'plus' might not mean plus to other people, and consider the truth

of hypothetical propositions about what might be the case if 'plus' did mean plus, one cannot consider the possibility that 'plus' does not

mean plus, to me, now.

THE CONFUSIONS OF KRIPKE 289

To do this would be like considering that perhaps 'cows' does not

mean cows, or that perhaps I am not here. Since the sentence T am

here' necessarily expresses a contingent truth, it is quite inappropriate to say that perhaps I am not here. (Saying 'Perhaps I am not here' is

not at all to say that I might not have been here, which is a sensible

thing to say. For it is appropriate to say 'Perhaps p' of a necessary truth (e.g., 'Perhaps there is some even number which is not the sum

of two primes'), and inappropriate to say it of a contingent truth which

there is no real reason to doubt. And there can be no real reason to

doubt that I am here, for we use the sentence T am here' so that it

cannot be that it expresses anything that is false.) When I say 'The metre rod in Paris is a metre long', I am also using

a sentence that necessarily expresses a truth, not a sentence that

expresses a necessary truth. If 'metre' is introduced into the language as a name for that length which, it so happens, the metre rod in Paris

has, then, whatever length that is, that length is the length that I am

saying it is, just as, if 'here' is a name for the place I am, whatever the

place I am when I say T am here', that is the place at which I am

saying that I am. I am not, however, saying the same thing (asserting the same proposition), when I use the sentence 'The metre rod is a

metre long' however long the metre rod is. For, if the rod is one

length, I am referring to that length and saying the rod is that length, and, if it is another length, I am referring that that other length, and

saying that it is that other length. It will also follow that the statement that the metre rod in Paris is a

metre long will resemble the statements that Henry is called 'Henry', that 'cows' means cows, that 'plus' means plus, that 'Snow is white'

means that snow is white, and that '"Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white' in that (1) it cannot be sensible to say such a thing as

'Perhaps the metre rod in Paris is not a metre long'; in that (2) there would be a pragmatic contradiction in asserting that the metre rod in

Paris was not a meter long and in that (3) though we can entertain the

possibility (which is a genuine one) of the metre rod in Paris's not

being a metre long, we could not say that this possibility was realised, if it were realised, or not, at any rate, in the words 'The metre rod in

Paris is not a metre long'. This is due to the fact that (4) the sentence

'The metre rod in Paris is a metre long' is a sentence that necessarily expresses some contingent truth.

I suspect that the reason why Kripke thinks that he has produced

290 JONATHAN HARRISON

an example of a contingent proposition that is known a priori is

that, by ignoring the last of these four distinctions he has conflated two

propositions, (i) There is the categorical proposition expressed by the

sentence 'The metre rod in Paris is a metre long'. This proposition is

contingent, but is known to be true a posteriori, (ii) There is the

hypothetical proposition that if any proposition is that which is

expressed by the sentence 'The metre rod in Paris is a metre long' it

must (assuming, of course, that the English language is being used

correctly) be a true proposition. This proposition is known a priori, but

it is a necessarily true proposition, not a contingent one.

Manuscript received 9 April 1986

Dept of Philosophy The University of Notthingham

GB-Nottingham NG7 2RD

England

NOTES

1 In Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge University Press, 1981, especially p. 14f.

2 In 'Professor Putnam on Brains in Vats', Erkenntnis (1985) pp. 55-57.

3 In Naming and Necessity, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1980, especially p. 54 f. 4

See 'Dthat', by David Kaplan, in Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of

Language, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., Howard K. Wettstein,

University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1979. 5

In 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences', Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, page 136). 6

See 'The Concept of Truth in Formalised Languages', in Logic, Semantics and

Metamathematics, Oxford University Press, 1956. 7

Discussed by Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Blackwell, 1982. 8 It has been drawn to my attention that a similar criticism of Kripke's argument has

been made by Professor Keith Donellan in his article ('The Contingent A Priori and

Rigid Designator's, also in Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language).

There he expresses the view that sentences like 'The metre rod in Paris' are stipulatively defined as being true, from which he thinks it follows that what they assert must be true.

I have difficulty in seeing how you can stipulate that a sentence shall express a truth. My own view is that it is because of the way in which some words (such as 'this' or 'means')

are used that some sentences containing that word come necessarily to express a truth,

and that it as a result of such a definition of 'metre' that the sentence 'The metre rod in

Paris is a metre long' must necessarily express a truth.

It has also been drawn to my attention that a not dissimilar argument against Frege has been put forward by Professor Michael Dummett in Frege: Philosophy of Language,

Duckworth, second edition 1981, especially p. 120f.