The Concept of Unified Agency in Nietzsche Plato and Schiller

7/30/2019 The Concept of Unified Agency in Nietzsche Plato and Schiller

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The Concept of Unified Agency in Nietzsche, Plato, and Schiller

Paul Katsafanas

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 49, Number 1, January

2011, pp. 87-113 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: 10.1353/hph.2011.0016

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Journal o the History o Philosophy, vo. 49, no. 1 (2011) 87113

[87]

The Concept o Unied Agencyin Nietzsche, Pato, and Schier

P A U l K A T S A A N A S

lately, there has been a profusion of work discussing Nietzsches views o

unity o the se, reedom, and agency.1 A widespread consensus on three points

has emerged: (1) Nietzsches notion o unity is meant to be an anaysis o reedom;

(2) unity reers to a reation between the agents drives2 or motivationa states;

and (3) unity obtains when one drive predominates and imposes order on the

other drives.

In this essay, I argue that these three caims are phiosophicay and textuay

indeensibe. The caims are phiosophicay indeensibe because they ai to

characterize correcty certain paradigmatic cases o agency and its absence. The

caims are textuay indeensibe because there are passages indicating that Nietz-

sche rejects each o them. In contrast to the standard interpretations, I argue that

(1) Nietzschean unity is an account o the distinction between genuine actionsand mere behaviors, rather than between ree and unree actions; (2) unity reers

to a reation between drives and conscious thought; and (3) unity obtains when

Paul Katsafanas is Assistant Proessor o Phiosophy at Boston University.

1Many o the reevant essays are contained in Ken Gemes and Simon May, ed., Nietzsche on Freedom

and Autonomy(New York: Oxord University Press, 2009). Important earier works incude Amy Mu-

in, Nietzsches ree Spirit,Journal o the History o Philosophy38 (2000): 382405; Brian leiter, The

Paradox o ataism and Se-Creation in Nietzsche, in Nietzsche,ed. John Richardson and Brian leiter

(New York: Oxord University Press, 2001); Robert Guay, Nietzsche on reedom, European Journal

o Philosophy10 (2002): 30227; Bernard Reginster, What is a ree Spirit? Nietzsche on anaticism,

Archiv r Geschichte der Philosophie85 (2003): 5185; John Richardson, Nietzschean and Kantianreedoms, International Studies in Philosophy37 (2005): 14962; and Mathias Risse, Nietzsche and

Korsgaards Kant on the Unity o Agency, in Nietzsche and Morality, ed. Brian leiter and Nei Sinhababu

(New York: Oxord University Press, 2007).2Drive [Trieb, Instinkt] is a term o art or Nietzsche. A Nietzschean drive is a non-conscious

disposition toward some characteristic type o behavior; this disposition maniests itse by generating

conscious aects and desires. or exampe, the sex drive is a non-conscious disposition toward sexua

activity; it maniests itse by generating emotions such as ust, attraction, sexua desire, desires to

be with particuar peope, and so orth. or an extended anaysis o Nietzsches notion o drive, see

Pau Katsaanas, Nietzsches Phiosophica Psychoogy, in The Oxord Handbook on Nietzsche, ed.John

Richardson and Ken Gemes (Oxord: Oxord University Press, orthcoming).


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88 journal of the history of philosophy 49:1 january 2011

the agents attitude toward her own action is stabe under the reveation o ur-

ther inormation about the actions etioogy. I show that Nietzsche deveops this

account o unity by drawing on Patos and Schiers modes o unied agency.

Nietzsches theory incorporates eements o both Patos and Schiers modes, butgoes beyond them in emphasizing the roes o non-conscious motivation and the

ubiquitous orms o se-ignorance in agency. Accordingy, the account o unied

agency that emerges rom Nietzsches works is consideraby more sophisticated,

and potentiay more phiosophicay ruitu, than has yet been appreciated.

The essay proceeds in ve sections. Section 1 introduces Nietzsches criticisms

o traditiona modes o agency, and argues that he aims to repace these accounts

with a mode o unied agency that overcomes their faws. Section 2 examines

Nietzsches critique o Patonic unity, and argues against the standard interpre-

tations o Nietzschean unity. Section 3 expicates Schiers notion o unity, and

suggests that Nietzsche draws on Schiers ideas in deveoping his own conception

o unity. Section 4 deends this reading by examining a paradigm case o disunity,

the Genealogysascetic priest, and drawing rom it an account o what unity must

be. Section 5 examines the broader signicance o Nietzsches notion o unity.

1 . t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l r o l e o ft h e c o n c e p t o f u n i t y

1.1 Nietzsches critiques

Nietzsches critiques o agency take two main orms. irst, he argues that traditiona

accounts o agency overestimate the roe o refective, se-conscious phenomena in

the production o action. In this vein, he argues that an agent who se-consciousy

deiberates about what to do is sti secrety guided and channeed by his non-

conscious drives and motives (BGE3).3 In addition, he caims that whenever an

agent steps back rom and refects upon a motive, the agents inteect is ony the

bind instrument o another drive (D109). These passages pay a debunking roe:

whie certain accounts o agency rey on a distinction between acts produced by

refective, se-conscious episodes o deiberation, and acts brought about indepen-

denty o deiberation, Nietzsche argues that no such distinction is avaiabe: everyrefective activity contains an admixture o infuence by the non-conscious.4

Second, Nietzsche argues that traditiona accounts o deiberative or se-

conscious agency may rey on a probematic conception o the agent. Consider a

ew descriptions o deiberative agency. Christine Korsgaard describes the Kantian

3I cite Nietzsches texts using the standard Engish abbreviations o their tites: Ais The Antichrist;

BGEis Beyond Good and Evil; CWis The Case o Wagner;DisDaybreak;EHisEcce Homo; GMis On the Ge-

nealogy o Morality; GSis The Gay Science; HCis Homers Contest; HHis Human, All Too Human; TIis

Twilight o the Idols; UMis Untimely Meditations; WPis The Will to Power; Zis Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Thenumbers oowing the abbreviations reer to section numbers (as we as part numbers, i appicabe).

I use the Kaumann and Hoingdae transations, though I have sometimes made minor modications

to their transations.4Nietzsche interprets Kants and Patos accounts o agency as reying on this distinction.

Whether they actuay do rey on any such distinction is controversia, but wi not be reevant or our

purposes.


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89age ncy in n ie tz s che , p l ato , and s chil l e r

mode o agency as oows: When you deiberate, it is as i there were something

over and above a o your desires, something which is you, and which chooses

which desire to act on.5 Other writers put the point dierenty, but agree with

the underying idea. or exampe, Michae Bratman writes,When a person acts because o what she desires, or intends, or the ike, we sometimes

do not want to say simpy that the pro-attitude eads to the action. In some cases, we

suppose, urther, that the agent is the source o, determines, directs, governs the action

and is not merey the ocus o a series o happenings, o causa pushes and pus.6

Bratman here caims that we need to distinguish the operations o the agent

rom the operations o the agents attitudes. These phiosophers invoke the idea

o an agent or a se, who serves as something more than a mere container or

the various desires and aects that cause acts. In cases o genuine action, the

agent is somehow the source o the act. Yet Nietzsche denies that there is any

se over and above the drives. The se, Nietzsche tes us, is just a reation or

socia structure o drives and aects (BGE12). Accordingy, it is dicut to see

how we coud draw a distinction between acts caused by agents and acts caused

by drives and aects.

Nietzsche thus seems deepy skeptica both o the idea that refective choice is

anything more than a precipitate o drives, and o the notion o sehood typicay

empoyed in accounts o agency. However, it woud be a mistake to concude that

Nietzsche rejects the distinction between genuine agency and mere undergoing.7

On the contrary, Nietzsche is expicit about his reiance on such a distinction.

Not ony does Nietzsche te us that activity [Aktivitt] is one o his oundationaconcepts [Grundbegrie] (GMII.12), he aso repeatedy reies upon a distinction

between genuine actions and their degenerate reatives. Thus, he praises the sov-

ereign or autonomous individua, who is distinguished by the act that he has

his own independent, protracted wi (GMII.2). Whie the acts o non-sovereign

individuas are simpy determined by whatever impuse happens to arise, the acts

o sovereign individuas are controed by the agent herse. or the sovereign

individua is strong enough to maintain [her commitments] even in the ace o

accidents, even in the ace o ate. By contrast, the non-sovereign individua is

short-wied and unreiabe; he breaks his word even at the moment he uttersit. or the non-sovereign individua is incapabe o hoding himse to a course

o action in the ace o accidents and temptations. Unabe to reguate his own

behavior, the non-sovereign individua wi ony u his projects and goas i,

through sheer uck, he encounters no temptations.

Esewhere, Nietzsche deveops these ideas, caiming that some agents have the

power not to react at once to a stimuus, but to gain contro o a the inhibiting,

excuding instincts. [T]he essentia eature is precisey not to wi, to be abe

to suspend decision. A unspirituaity, a vugar commonness, depend on an in-

5Christine Korsgaard, The Sources o Normativity(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),

100.6Michae Bratman, Structures o Agency(New York: Oxord University Press, 2007), 91.7or the moment, I want to remain vague on what exacty genuine agency is. I expicate this

notion in the next section.


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abiity to resist a stimuus: one must react, one oows every impuse (TIVIII.6).

In the same work, Nietzsche denes weakness as the inabiity not to respond to

a stimuus (TIV.2). The weak individuas actions are determined by whatever

impuse or stimuus happens to arise; she possesses no capacity to direct her ownbehavior. By contrast, the strong individua is abe to check her impuses and

resist stimui.8

In these passages, Nietzsche caims that some individuas have the capacity to

contro their behavior. Moreover, these characterizations o agency seem to invoke

the very images that Nietzsche esewhere rejects: they suggest a se that stands apart

rom the drives and impuses, and exerts a controing infuence over them.

Nietzsches characterizations o strong, sovereign agents controing their ac-

tions suggest that there is something correct in our ordinary distinction between

acts activey produced by the agent and acts in which the agent is a mere vesse

or orces within. At the same time, Nietzsche critiques the way in which agency

is normay understood. So he must have some aternative way o characterizing

agency.

Is there a way o drawing a distinction between genuine agency and its esser

reatives, without reying on the idea o a se independent rom the drives, and

without denying that drives exert a pervasive infuence on choice? I wi argue

that there is. Contemporary phiosophers who attempt to distinguish genuine ac-

tions rom their esser reatives sometimes appea to a distinction between being

a genuine agent and being a mere ocus o orces. Nietzsche does not accept the

distinction between being an agent and being a ocus o orces; this is part o whathe means to deny in passages such as BGE12 (quoted above). However, Nietzsche

does distinguish between dierent kindso oci o orces.

In particuar, Nietzsche tes us that some agents are disunied oci o orces,

whereas other agents are unied. Thus, Nietzsche argues that agents are typicay

mutipe and ragmented. He notes that human beings have in their bodies the

heritage o mutipe origins, that is, opposite, and oten not merey opposite, drives

and vaue standards that ght each other and rarey permit each other any rest

(BGE200). As a resut, our drives now run back everywhere; we ourseves are a

kind o chaos (BGE224

). Thus, the beie which regards the sou as a monad,as an atomon:this beie ought to be expeed rom science! [T]he way is open

or new versions and renements o the sou-hypothesis; and such conceptions as

morta sou, and sou as subject-mutipicity [Subjekts-Vielheit], and sou as socia

structure o the drives and aects, want henceorth to have citizens rights in sci-

8There are a number o simiar passages. Consider a ew passages rom Nietzsches notebooks. In

WP95, Nietzsche condemns nineteenth-century thinkers or being deepy convinced o the rue o

cravings. (Schopenhauer spoke o wi; but nothing is more characteristic o his phiosophy than the

absence o a genuine wiing). WP928 speaks o great individuas controing their aects: Greatness

o character does not consist in not possessing these aectson the contrary, one possesses them tothe highest degreebut in having them under contro. WP933 makes a simiar point: In summa:

domination o the passions, not their weakening or extirpation!The greater the dominating power

o a wi, the more reedom may the passions be aowed. The great man is great owing to the ree

pay and scope o his desires and to the yet greater power than knows how to press these magnicent

monsters into service. WP962 caims that a great individua has the abiity to extend his wi across

great stretches o his ie. C. GMII.3 and WP705.


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ence (BGE12). These sections have a common theme: they deny that there is a

unitaryse, and assert that the se shoud be understood as a reation, compex,

or socia structure o drives.9

However, Nietzsche makes it cear that this is a contingent state. Whie mostindividuas are disunied, attaining a unied se is possibe: Nietzsche caims that

modern individuas can be made whoe or unied (TIIX.41), and he presents

Goethe as an exampe o someone who discipined himse to whoeness (TI

IX.49). Thus, athough the se is typicay disunied, it is possibe to attain a

unied se.

In sum, whie Nietzsche rejects the distinction between being an agent and being

a ocus o orces, he introduces a distinction between disunied and unied oci

o orces. I wi argue that Nietzsches account o unity is an account o genuine

agency: what it is or an agent to pay an active roe in producing her action is or

the agent to be unied in acting.

1.2 Three distinctions among doings

Beore proceeding, though, it wi be necessary to cariy what exacty Nietzsches

account o unied agents is meant to be an accounto. Phiosophers o action

typicay draw at east three distinctions between the movements issuing rom an

agent: mere behavior, action, and autonomous (or ree) action. On most accounts

o agency, autonomous action and action can come apart: when I give the mugger

my waet, or when I act unrefectivey out o mere custom or habit, I am acting,

but I may not be actingreely.10 So we can distinguish, among the set o actions,between the ree and unree ones.

However, we can aso distinguish, among the set o movements that issue rom

the agent, between mere behaviorsand genuine actions. Consider the distinction be-

tween movements such as sneezing, coughing, aing aseep, and binking, on the

one hand, and reading, conducting conversations, getting married, and deciding

to go to Bermuda, on the other. Each o these events counts as something that a

person does, in a sense, but there seem to be important dierences between, say,

sneezing and getting married. The ormer is a refex, something that happens

to me, something that is not entirey under my contro; the atter is a product ochoice, something that I do, something that is to some extent under my contro.

We can mark this distinction by caing the sneeze and its ik mere behaviors, and

the marriage and its ik actions.

Many phiosophers beieve that the cass o mere behaviors incudes not ony

refex behaviors o the sort mentioned above, but aso a variety o behaviors that

seem to be brought about independenty o the agents refective thought or de-

iberation. or exampe, David Veeman caims that any case in which an agent is

ignoranto her action, or in which she discovers what she is doing only by observing

9or a hepu discussion o these points, see Ken Gemes, Post-Modernisms Use and Abuse o

Nietzsche, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research52 (2001): 33760.10Here I am assuming that coercion and habitua action are exampes o unreedom. O course,

not a accounts o reedom wi cassiy these as unree actions. Readers who preer an aternative

account o reedom can substitute exampes o their own.


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hersel doing it, counts as a mere behavior. Harry rankurt argues that any case

in which the agent is notidentifed withhis motives is a mere behavior.11 The idea,

here, is that u-fedged actions require the agent to pay an active roe in the

production o her own activity; anything ess counts as mere behavior.Nietzsche seems to have something ike this distinction in mind when he writes,

Nothing is rarer than apersonalaction. A cass, a rank, a race, an environment, an

accidenteverything expresses itse sooner in a work or deed, than a person

(WP866). Here, Nietzsche caims that what appears to be a case o a person ac-

tivey bringing about an action is better described as some orce acting through

the person. Or, to put the point in contemporary terminoogy, what ooks ike

action is reay mere behavior.12

In sum, we have three distinctions: mere behaviors, actions, and ree actions.

So we shoud ask which o these distinctions Nietzsches concepts o unity and

disunity are meant to mark. Does the disunied/unied distinction correspond

to the mere behavior/action distinction, or to the unree action/ree action

distinction?13

Commentators on Nietzsche have assumed that his remarks on unity are

meant to distinguish ree actions rom unree actions: an act is ree i the agent is

unied, otherwise the act is unree.14 However, I wi argue that this is a mistake.

Nietzsches remarks on unity are meant to distinguish actions rom mere behav-

iors: what makes something an action, as opposed to a mere behavior, is that the

agent is unied. On this reading, there is a urther question concerning whether

a unied actions are ree actions: given that reedom is more demanding thanunity, an agent coud be unied without being ree.

I think there is unambiguous textua evidence estabishing that this is Nietzsches

view: unity is a necessary, but not a sucient, condition or reedom.15 To see this,

11See David Veeman, The Possibility o Practical Reason(Oxord: Oxord University Press, 2000),

and Harry rankurt, The Reasons o Love(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). Veeman actu-

ay uses the term mere activity, rather than mere behavior, to describe these cases.12D38 makes a simiar distinction.13O course, a third possibiity is that the remarks on unity and disunity do not correspond to any

o these categories. The evidence in the oowing sections counts against this reading.14The oowing works endorse this view: Aexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Lie as Literature(Cam-

bridge: Harvard University Press, 1985); Reginster, What is a ree Spirit?; Risse, Nietzsche and

Korsgaards Kant on the Unity o Agency; and lesie Thiee,Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics o the

Soul(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). Ken Gemes aso reads Nietzsche as identiy-

ing reedom with unity; see his Nietzsche on ree Wi, Autonomy, and the Sovereign Individua, in

Gemes and May, Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy. However, Gemes distinguishes agency ree wi

rom deserts ree wi. Whereas deserts ree wi ocuses on the questions o desert, punishment, and

responsibiity, agency ree wi ocuses on the question o what constitutes an action as opposed to

a mere doing. Thus, what Gemes is caing agency ree wi is cose to what I am caing the distinc-

tion between action and mere behavior. Gemes caims that Nietzsche is interested in agency ree wi,

not deserts ree wi. My interpretation is in agreement with most o these points. However, Gemes

approach coapses the threeod distinction between mere behavior, action, and ree action into atwood distinction between non-action and action. I think Nietzsche does have a threeod distinc-

tion, as I wi argue beow.15John Richardson and Simon May accept versions o this view. Richardson argues that reedom

requires both unity and geneaogica insight, whereas May argues that reedom requires both unity

and the overcoming o nihiism. See Richardson, Nietzsches reedoms, and May, Nihiism and the

ree Se, both in Gemes and May, Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy.


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notice that Nietzsches exempars o unity are, in genera, the members o certain

castes in ancient societies. Throughout his works, Nietzsche emphasizes that these

individuas were ree rom the kinds o inner confict that pague modern human

beings: They were more wholehuman beings (BGE257

). Nietzsche caims thatcertain orms o socia organization and certain systems o moraitythe ones that

were dominant in Homeric Greece, or exampeare conducive to the produc-

tion o unied individuas; other orms o socia organization and mora systems,

such as the ones dominant today, are conducive to the production o ragmented,

conficted persons. Accordingy, the Greeks o the Homeric erawere, in genera,

unied individuas, whereas moderns are, in genera, disunied individuas.16

However, when Nietzsche is discussingreedom, he oten singes out traits that

seem entirey absent in the Greek nobiity. The discussions o reedom ocus on

evauating on ones own, revauating, creating new vaues, questioning tradi-

tiona vaues, and activey inquiring into the history and the eects o vaues.17

These are not the traits that spring to mind when we consider an Achies or an

Agamemnon. The Homeric nobes are paradigms o physica strength, heath,

se-assertion, and se-certainty. But they are ceary not exampes o individu-

as strugging to gain independence rom traditiona vaues, or to win truth or

se-understanding. Indeed, Nietzsche expicity states that the critica stance

invoved in the pursuit o truth and the questioning o tradition is a distinctivey

modern achievement. As he puts it, The abiity to contradict, the attainment o

a good conscience when one ees hostie to what is accustomed, traditiona, and

haowedthat is sti more exceent and constitutes what is reay great, new, andamazing in our cuture (GS297). Accordingy, whie gures such as Achies are

unied, they do not seem to beree.

Thus, Nietzsches exempars o unity do not seem to possess the traits that are

characteristic o ree individuas. This suggests that unity and reedom are distinct.

And in act this point becomes cear when we consider one trait in particuar: the

ree individua is said to be liberated romor independent omoraity. As Nietzsche

puts it in the Genealogy,

The ripest ruit is the sovereign individual, ike ony to himse, iberated again rom

the moraity o custom [Sittlichkeit der Sitte], autonomous and supramora [bersittliche](or autonomous and mora are mutuay excusive), in short, the man who has

his own independent, protracted wi. (GMII.2)

The sovereign individua is liberated rom the morality o custom; he is autonomous, and

thereore, Nietzsche caims, supramora. But Nietzsche beieves that the ancient

Greeks are precisey those who embracedthe moraity o custom. A ew ines beore

the passage quoted above, Nietzsche reers the reader to his discussions o the

moraity o custom inDaybreak. Turning to the reevant passages inDaybreak,we

earn that a the communities o mankind up to the present day have ived

under the moraity o custom (D14). Moreover, Nietzsche notes that Socrates

16or discussions o the way in which ancient societies tended to produce unied individuas,

whereas modern societies tend to produce disunied individuas, see BGE257, the whoe oGM, and

HC.17See HHPreace 3, HH225;D9; GS347; GMII.2; BGE44, 211, 227; A54;EHIV.1.


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was one o the rst to attempt to step beyond the moraity o custom (D9). This

impies that, on Nietzsches view, the pre-Socratic Greek nobes ived under the

moraity o custom. Whie they were unied individuas, they coud not have been

ree individuas.Nietzsche must, then, distinguish between unity and reedom. One can be uni-

ed without being ree: unity is compatibe with uncritica, unrefective government

by certain orms o moraity, whereas reedom is not.18 So unity is at best a necessary

condition or reedom. or this reason, I take it that Nietzsches distinction between

unity and disunity is meant to capture the distinction between mere behavior and

action, rather than the distinction between action and ree action.

2 . n i e t z s c h e a n d p l a t o o n t h e u n i f i e d a g e n t

At this point, we know what phiosophica roe the concept o unity is meant to

pay: it marks the distinction between genuine action and mere behavior. However,

we sti need to determine what unityis.

The caim that the se is initiay mutipe, and that unication is an achieve-

ment, has a distinguished phiosophica pedigree: we nd it aready in Pato. It wi

be useu to begin by contrasting the Patonic mode with the Nietzschean mode,

or two reasons. irst, Nietzsche se-consciousy opposes his mode to the Patonic

mode. Second, I wi argue that many commentators have aied to recognize

crucia respects in which Nietzschean unity diers rom Patonic unity.

2.1 Nietzsches departures rom Plato

To begin, we wi ask two questions about the Patonic and Nietzschean modes.

irst, what are the parts into which the se is divided? Second, what kind o rea-

tion among these parts is required in order or unity to be achieved?

In the Republic, Pato caims that the sou has three parts: Reason, Appetite,

and Spirit (Republic580d581d). Certain reations among these parts render the

agent disunied, whereas others render the agent unied. In particuar, the agent

is unied when Reason exerts a controing infuence over the agents action, and

disunied when Appetite or Spirit reigns. As Pato puts it, it is appropriate or

the rationa part to rue, since it is reay wise and exercises oresight on beha othe whoe sou (Republic441e; c. 442d).19

Much more coud be said about Patos view, but or our purposes this spare

characterization wi suce. We can view Patos account as consisting o two

caims:

(1) Patonic Parts: The se is divided into three parts: Reason, Appetite, and

Spirit.

(2) Patonic Reation: The se is unied when one o these parts, Reason,

dominates the other parts.

18I take it that Nietzsche woud not caim that, or any evauative system, one can embrace that

evauative system and be unied. Rather, he caims that there are certain evauative systems the adop-

tion o which is compatibe with unity. or exampe, he suggests that the evauative systems o certain

cassica societies were compatibe with unity, whereas Judeo-Christian evauative systems are not

compatibe with unity.19John Cooper, ed., Plato: Complete Works(Indianapois: Hackett, 1997), 1073.


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Does Nietzsche agree with Pato? We, one dierence is immediatey obvious.

Whereas Pato thinks the sou has three parts, Nietzsche is much more profigate:

throughout his corpus he names over one hundred distinct drives.20 Some com-

mentators beieve that this is the primary dierence between the Patonic souand the Nietzschean se: the Nietzschean se has moreparts. or exampe, Thiee

writes, Patonic opposition between reason and passion is ractured into the op-

position between mutipe passions, each with its own capacity or reason and wi

to dominate.21 On this reading, Nietzsche basicay agrees with Pato, diering

ony on the numbero parts.

Thus, on Thiees interpretation, Nietzsche modies caim (1) in the oow-

ing way:

(1) Nietzschean Parts: The se is divided into more than three parts. These

parts are drives.

Caim (1) is a common interpretation o Nietzsche, shared by Mathias Risse,

Ken Gemes, and others.22 Sections 3 and 4 wi argue that (1) is ase: the parts

into which Nietzsche divides the se incude more than just drives. Whie the

drives jointy compose one part o the se, there is another part: the agents se-

conscious thought. or now, though, et us proceed to caim (2).

The texts make it cear that Nietzsche disagrees with (2). Throughout his

works, Nietzsche inveighs against Patos caim that Reason shoud dominate the

other parts: Pato turn[ed] reasoninto a tyrant (TIII.10).23 Athough Nietzsche

repeatedy caims that Pato is mistaken in endorsing Reasons dominance over

the other parts, Nietzsche is not as expicit as one woud ike aboutwhythis is amistake. However, commentators generay agree on two points.

irst, Nietzsche argues that Reason cannot be disentanged rom Appetite.

As Section 1 mentioned, Nietzsche argues that the agents rationa acuties are

pervasivey infuenced by drives and aects. Nietzsche thereore concudes that

the dominance o Reason, as Pato understands it, is impossibe (or, at best, van-

ishingy rare). This act renders caims about Reasons dominance probematic:

i we cannot disentange Reason and Appetite, then the caim that Reason shoud

dominate Appetite seems untenabe.24

Second, Pato caims that there is onyoneway to achieve unity: Reason mustpredominate. Nietzsche suggests that there are manydierent ways to attain unity.

There is no one drive that must dominate, in order or the agent to be unied.

Rather, commentators oten interpret Nietzsche as arguing that unity obtains

when one driveanydriveexerts a dominant infuence. or exampe, Gemes

caims that it is when a strong wi [i.e. drive] takes command, orders and orga-

nizes esser drives that a person maniests genuine agency.25 Richardson suggests

20or a discussion o this point, as we as an extended anaysis o Nietzsches concept o drive,

see Katsaanas, Nietzsches Phiosophica Psychoogy.21

Thiee,Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics o the Soul, 56.22See Risse, Nietzsche and Korsgaards Kant on the Unity o Agency, and Gemes, Nietzsche on

ree Wi, Autonomy, and the Sovereign Individua.23or urther remarks to this eect, see TIII.112, TIV.1, BGE191, and WP848.24or an extended discussion o this point, see Katsaanas, Nietzsches Phiosophica Psycho-

ogy.25Gemes, Nietzsche on ree Wi, Autonomy, and the Sovereign Individua, 42.


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that Nietzsche associates unity with the emergence o a singe dominant drive,

or perhaps a ruing committee o drives.26 Thiee caims that unity is achieved

through the harnessing o vioent and varied passions, and their pacement under

the rue o a predominant drive.

27

Thus, a number o commentators assume that whie Nietzsche disagrees with

the detais o Patos account, he accepts Patos basic caim that the se is unied

when one part dominates and imposes order on the other parts. Suppose we break

Patos caim into two parts:

(2a) Patonic Reation: The se is unied when one part dominates, and

(2b) This part must be Reason.

On the standard reading o Nietzschean unity, Nietzsche accepts (2a) and

rejects (2b).

However, I think this is a mistake. Nietzsches departure rom Pato is more

radica, or he aso rejects (2a). He denies the idea that unity is achieved via one

parts dominance over the other parts. Whie Nietzsche does think that dominance

o one partrequently causesunity, he denies that dominance is the same thing as

unity. Beow, I argue or this point. I wi rst consider textua evidence in avor o

the standard reading o Nietzschean unity, which caims that unity obtains when

any drive exerts a dominant infuence on the other drives. I wi then oer some

phiosophica and textua reasons or rejecting this interpretation.

2.2 Textual evidence or the claim that unity is the predominance o one part

Consider two passages rom Nietzsches Nachlass:

The mutitude and disgregation o drives and the ack o any systematic organization

among them resuts in a weak wi; their coordination under a singe predominant

drive resuts in a strong wi; in the rst case it is the osciation and ack o gravity;

in the atter, the precision and carity o direction. (WP46)

The antagonism o the passions: two, three, a mutipicity o sous in one breast:

very unheathy, inner ruin, disintegration, betraying and increasing an inner confict

and anarchismuness one passion at ast becomes master. Return to heath. (WP

778)

In the rst passage, Nietzsche tes us that the wi is strong when one drive pre-

dominates and coordinates the other drives. I we assume that Nietzsches tak

o strong wis is meant to reer to unied wis, then Nietzsche seems to be o-

ering a straightorward anaysis o unity: an agent is unied i one o his drives

coordinates the other drives. The second passage makes a simiar point: an agent is

unheathy and experiences inner confict when there is no drive that has become

master (i.e. no drive that is dominant).

This seems pausibe. The predominance o one drive seems to provide op-

portunities or ocating the agent in the production o action. In particuar,

(a) We coud identiy the agents acts with the acts caused by the dominantdrive.

26Richardson, Nietzsches reedoms, 13435.27Thiee,Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics o the Soul,63.


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(b) Aternativey, i the agents wi were identied with the whoe set o drives,

then the agents wi woud be unied.

By contrast, consider an individua whose drives exhibit anarchy: the drives are

inconsistent, at odds with one another, and no one drive is predominant. Such anindividua woud ack both o the conditions described above:

(a) There is no onedrive whose operations coud be regarded as expressive o

the agent. or no drive enjoys predominance over the others.

(b) I the agents wi were identied with the whoe set o drives, then the

agents wi woud be disunied, a chaotic mix o warring ragments.

So we can see why it is tempting to think that predominance o one drive

constitutes unity.

There is, however, a compication. Nietzsche requenty praises individuas who

harbor diverse, inconsistent, conficting drives:

In contrast to the animas, man has cutivated an abundance o contrarydrives and

impuses within himse: thanks to this synthesis, he is master o the earth. The

highest man woud have the greatest mutipicity o drives, in the reativey greatest

strength that can be endured. Indeed, where the pant man shows himse strongest

one nds instincts that confict poweruy (e.g. in Shakespeare) but are controed.

(WP966)

A phiosopheri today there coud be phiosopherswoud be compeed to nd

the greatness o man, the concept o greatness, precisey in his range and mutipic-

ity, in his whoeness in maniodness. Precisey this sha be caed greatness:being

capabe o being as maniod as whoe, as ampe as u [ebenso vielach als ganz, ebensoweit als voll sein knnen]. (BGE212)

On the ace o things, these passages count against the idea that unity consists in

dominance o one drive. Nietzsches exempars o unied sehoodabove he

mentions Shakespeare, and esewhere Goethe, Napoeon, and Nietzsche himse

are the paradigmsare praised precisey because they have diverse, poweru, and

inconsistent drives, but are in some other sense unifed.

However, proponents o the predominance mode caim that we can account or

this point by distinguishing dierent orms o predominance by one drive. Chie

among these are tyranny and mastery.28

Tyranny consists o one drives achievinga predominant status by suppressing or extirpating other drives (HHI.228, GS

347). In other words, drive Atyrannizes drives Band Cwhen Abecomes stronger

than Band Cby weakening or eiminating Band C. Nietzsche oers asceticism as

a paradigmatic orm o tyranny. Mastery, by contrast, consists o one drives being

predominant, but sti aowing other drives expression. In other words, drive A

masters drives Band Cwhen Abecomes stronger than Band C, and moduates

the expression oBand C, yet does not weaken or eiminate Band C. An exampe

might be a dominant drive toward inteectua activity moduating the expression

o, say, the hunger drive and the sex drive; the inteectua drive might master

these drives in the sense that the agent aows the atter drives expression ony

when doing so does not interere with the expression o the inteectua drive. The

28Again, the connection to Pato shoud be cear. Pato distinguished ve dierent types o unity

and disunity: aristocracy, timocracy, oigarchy, democracy, and tyranny.


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idea, then, woud be that Shakespeare, Goethe, and Nietzsches other exempars

harbor a drive that predominates through mastery.29

Thus, we seem to have an account o unity. The se is unied when one drive

predominates, and exerts a coordinating infuence on the other drives. Confictamong drives does not have to be eliminated; it just has to be managed.

2.3 Textual and philosophical reasons or rejecting the reading o unity as predomi-nance

The predominance mode seems to provide a tidy answer to the question o

what Nietzsches account o unity is. However, I think that upon examination this

account becomes ar ess pausibe, or two reasons.

irst, there is an obvious phiosophica probem with the view that unity is domi-

nance by one part o the se: it assumes that the dominant part o the se has some

specia caim to being expressive o the se. But this assumption is unwarranted,

or we oten distinguish actions produced by the agent rom acts caused by the

agents dominant motive. or exampe, imagine an acohoic who ardenty craves a

drink, but judges that he shoud resist. Suppose the craving eventuay overpowers

the agents resistance. Here, the craving or acoho is the strongest motivationa

orce, but it woud be perverse to say that when the agent acts on that craving, he

maniests agentia contro. On the contrary, the voice o the agent seems to reside

in the weak, overpowered eement o resistance. It is or good reason, then, that

we distinguish acts that are expressive o the agent rom acts that are expressive

o the strongest motivationa orce.A proponent o the unity-as-predominance mode might respond to this objec-

tion by caiming that the acohoic urges shoud be regarded as operating through

tyranny rather than mastery. That is, i unity requires predominance in the orm

o mastery, and i acohoics exhibit predominance ony in the orm o tyranny,

then acohoics woud not serve as counterexampes to the unity-as-predominance

mode.30

However, this response on beha o the predominance mode does not seem

promising. In order or the response to succeed, one woud have to show that

there are nocases in which acohoism operates via mastery. This is impausibe.Reca that mastery simpy requires that one drive moduates, but does not weaken

or extirpate, other drives. A number o acohoics seem to t this description. or

exampe, high-unctioning acohoics are dened as those who maintain stabe

and successu ives, oten or many decades, despite an addiction to acoho. Many

o these agents have rich arrays o passions and drives that are subordinated to,

but not weakened or extirpated by, their craving or acoho.31 Thus, the aco-

29Reginsters What is a ree Spirit? discusses the notions o anarchy, tyranny, and mastery in

detai. See aso Ken Gemes, reud and Nietzsche on Subimation, Journal o Nietzsche Studies38(2009): 3859. Gemes uses the terms subimation and repression to pick out conditions simiar to

those that Reginster abes mastery and tyranny. Empoying these notions, Gemes provides a very

hepu discussion o the possibe congurations o drives.30Thanks to an anonymous reeree or asking me to address this point.31Ernest Hemingway is sometimes cited as an exampe o a high-unctioning acohoic. Hemingway

reportedy drank a quart o iquor per day or most o his adut ie. Sometimes he drank even more:


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hoic urges shoud count as mastering the other drives. I the proponent o the

predominance mode insists that these high-unctioning acohoics, despite their

maniod accompishments and varied activities, are tyrannized by their drive or

acoho, then one starts to ose any grip on what the distinction between tyrannyand mastery is supposed to be.

(In urther support o this point, notice that high-unctioning acohoism usu-

ay does not ast or the individuas whoe ie. In typica cases, the acohoics

condition asts or severa years and sometimes even severa decades, but eventuay

deteriorates. The acohoic becomes incapabe o maintaining his usua routines:

he oses his job, his other passions, his riends, and so on. Ater this coapse in

unctioning, the craving or acoho operates in a very dierent way: the craving

extirpates or severey weakens competing drives, and becomes a-consuming.

Given the denitions o mastery and tyranny, the correct characterization seems

to be this: prior to the coapse in unctioning, the acohoic craving operates via

mastery; ater the coapse, it operates via tyranny.)

I concude that certain acohoics do indeed serve as counterexampes to the

unity-as-predominance mode. Acohoics who are mastered by their acohoic

urges woud count as unied according to the predominance mode, and yet it

seems perverse to caim that when such an acohoic succumbs to his addiction

he is maniesting agentia contro.

So the rst probem with the predominance mode is that we oten distinguish

acts caused by the agents strongest motive rom acts produced by the agent

herse. But there is aso a second probem with the predominance mode: thereis textua evidence that Nietzsche dissociates unity and dominance. Ater a,

he derides those o us who, ike the acohoic, become as a whoe the victim o

some part o us [als Ganzes das Oper irgend einer Einzelheit an uns werden] (BGE

41). More decisivey, one o Nietzsches paradigms o dominance by one drive is

alsoa paradigm o disunity. Nietzsche caims that Richard Wagners personaity is

controed by one drive:

The dramatic eement in Wagners deveopment is quite unmistakabe rom the

moment when his ruing passion became aware o itse and took his nature in its

charge: rom that time on there was an end to umbing, straying, to the proiera-

tion o secondary shoots, and within the most convouted courses and oten daring

over one sixth-month period in the eary sixties, he seems to have consumed eighteen bottes o iquor

and 660 bottes o wine. Aside rom the sheer amount that he drank, the signs o acohoism were

cear: he was unabe to stop drinking when his doctors advised him to do so, and he seemed highy

dependent on acohowitness his caim that You wake up in the night and things are unbearabe

and you take a drink and make them bearabe (quoted in Jerey Meyers, Hemingway: A Biography

[New York: De Capo, 1999], 539). This intense drinking seems to have begun in the 1920s. The

physioogica eects started to appear in the 1950s, and progressivey worsened unti Hemingways

suicide in 1961a reporter who interviewed Hemingway in 1958 noted that Hemingways iver was

bad. You coud see the buge o it stand out rom his body ike a ong, at eech (Meyers, Hemingway,539). Nevertheess, or many decades Hemingway maintained a rich, varied, and productive ie. By

any pausibe standard, we must concude that his acohoism aowed his other drives expressionater

a, he maintained an active socia ie, he fourished as a writer, he had diverse inteectua interests,

he traveed extensivey, and so on. Hemingway thus seems to be a paradigmatic case o an individua

whose acohoic cravings master, rather than tyrannize, the other drives. Nonetheess, Hemingway

seems passive in the ace o his acohoism.


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trajectories assumed by his artistic pans there rues a singe inner aw, a wi by which

they can be expained. (UMIII.2)

Nietzsche here caims that Wagners rich and diverse personaity, with maniod

interests and passions, was dominated by one ruing passion or drive.32

Yet Nietz-sche treats Wagner as a paradigm odisunity: he is the most instructivecase or a

phiosopher interested in a diagnosis o the modern soul(CW, Epiogue; itaics in

origina). As we saw above, Nietzsche denes the modern sou as the disunied

sou. I Wagner is supposed to be an exempar both o one drives dominance and

o disunity, then unity cannot be identica with one drives dominance.33

Thus, there are compeing phiosophica and textua reasons or distinguishing

unity and the predominance o one drive. So we need a new account o unity.34

3 . s c h i l l e r o n u n i t y a s h a r m o n y

On Patos account, the acohoic individua woud be regarded as dominated by

Appetite, rather than by Reason. Thus, Pato woud have good reason to judge the

acohoic deective as an agent. This seems to be the right resut. The suggested

reading o Nietzsche, above, was supposed to be neutra on which drive dominated;

unity was supposed to consist o domination byanydrive. So the suggested reading

cannot judge the acohoic agent to be deective.

What Patos mode is capabe o capturing, and the predominance mode is

not, is the act that when the agents refective judgments confict with the agents

predominant motive, we regard the agent as overpowered by a part o himse.

Nietzsche himse woud agree with Pato on this much. or, as we saw in Section

1, Nietzsche associates genuine agency with the abiity to contro ones behavior

via choice. We are sti attempting to expain exacty how Nietzsche understands

these notions, but the unity as predominance mode simpy ignores them. So we

need a dierent mode.

At this point, it wi be hepu to introduce another mode o unity, which

woud have oomed arge in Nietzsches mind. riedrich Schier proposed a mode

o unied agency, which he conceived as an aternative to the Kantian mode o

32The caim that Wagner is dominated by one drive is present not ony in eary works such as

UM, but aso in some o Nietzsches very ast works. or exampe, in CWNietzsche repeatedy states or

impies that Wagner is dominated by one drive. Nietzsche writes that one cannot gure out Wagner

unti one gures outhis dominant drive (CW8; c. CW11). He expains, One does not understand a

thing about Wagner as ong as one nds in him merey an arbitrary pay o nature, a whim, an accident.

He was no ragmentary, hapess, or contradictory genius, as peope have said. I anything in

Wagner is interesting it is the ogic with which a physioogica deect makes move upon move and

takes step upon step in practice and procedure, as innovation in principes, as crisis in taste ( CW

7). Nietzsches suggestion, then, is that some drive or physioogica deect dominated Wagner and

imposed an overa order on his ie.33See aso GMIII.4, where Nietzsche caims that Wagner experienced a deep, thorough, and

even rightu identication with and descent into medieva sou-conficts.34I do not deny that Nietzsche is interested in the psychic conditions o predominance. My caim

is simpy that Nietzsche does not identiy the condition o predominance with the unity that is neces-

sary in order or the agent to pay an active roe in producing the action. The account o mastery is

nothing more than what Nietzsche expicity says: it is an account o strong or heathy wis (WP

46, WP778). But a wi can be strong, in this sense, without the agentpaying any roe in the produc-

tion o the action.


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agency.35,36 Nietzsche was amiiar with Schiers work, and, ike Schier, took Kants

mode o agency as a target and a point o departure. So it stands to reason that

Nietzsche drew rom Schiers mode.

Schier begins by accepting a version o the Kantian distinction betweenreason and sensibiity. The individua, Schier tes us, has two aspects: a rationa

nature, maniest in judgment and se-conscious thought, and a sensibe nature,

maniest in sense perception and aects.37 These two aspects o human nature

can be reated in three dierent ways.38

irst, the individua might be dominated by his sensibe nature, merey acting on

whatever incination happens to arise. Prey to desire, he ets natura impuse rue

him unrestrainedy (NA280/147). Schier terms such an individua ochlocratic

(i.e. rued by a mob). Schier denounces this type o individua, caiming that he

is anaogous to a aied state in which citizens do not acknowedge the egitimacy

o their sovereign (NA282/148).

Second, the individua might be dominated by his rationa nature. Schier

takes Kant to endorse this state o the sou (NA28285/14850). Schier terms

such an individua monarchic; his rationa nature rues his sensibe nature with

strict surveiance (NA28182/148). Schier caims that the monarchic agent

is better o than the ochocratic agent, or his actions wi be in accordance with

the baance o reasons, and wi have mora worth.

Athough the monarchic agent is superior to the ochocratic agent, Schier

nds something probematic aboutbotho these agents: namey, the act that one

parto the individua dominates the other part. This much is cear: that neitherthe wi nor the aect ought to useorce (NA279/146). He endorses a third

state: harmony between the rationa and sensibe parts o the sou. A harmonious

individua woud have aects that incine her to pursue the very same ends that

rationa thought incines her to pursue. like the monarchic agent, her actions

woud be in accordance with the baance o reasons. But unike the monarchic

agent, there woud be no strugge, no antagonism, in the sou o this agent. Her

whoe being woud incine her in one direction:

It is ony when he gathers, so to speak, his entire humanitytogether, and his ethica way

o thinking becomes the resut o the united eect o both principes [e.g. Reason

35Schier deveops these ideas in severa works, incuding his essay On Grace and Dignity and

the Letters on the Aesthetic Education o Man. or the sake o brevity, I wi conne my discussion to On

Grace and Dignity. Reerences to this essay are in the oowing ormat: NA oowed by page number

reers to the pagination in Schiers Nationalausgabe; the second page number reers to the Engish

transation o the essay in Jane Curran and Christopher ricker, Schillers On Grace and Dignity in Its

Cultural Context(Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2005), 12370.36Kant responds to Schier in a ootnote to Religion within the Limits o Mere Reason(6:2324n).

or a hepu discussion o what is at issue in the debate between Schier and Kant, see A.M. Baxey,

The Beautiu Sou and the Autocratic Agent: Schiers and Kants Chidren o the House,Journalo the History o Philosophy41 (2003): 493514.37Schier caims that the human beings purey inteectua nature is accompanied by a sensuous

one (NA284/149). He discusses this point at NA257/12829, NA262/132, NA266/13536, NA

27273/14041, and NA27678/14445.38One can think o three ways atogether in which a human can reate to himse, that is, in which

the sensuous part can reate to the rationa (NA280/147).


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and Sensibiity], when ithas become his nature, it is then ony that it is secure. (NA

284/150)39

The human being has been set the task o promoting a sincere accord between his

two natures, o aways being a harmonious whoe, and o acting with his whoe har-monious humanity. (NA289/154)

Schier cas the harmonious individua the beautiu sou. Her actions have not

ony dignity, butgrace(Anmut).

Thus, Schier hods that an agent is unied when the two aspects o the sou

rationa nature and aective natureare harmonious, directing the agent toward

the same ends. Disunity arises when there is a confict between the rationa and

the aective, which takes the orm o reason being out o accordance with the

aects. In short: unity obtains when the agents refective judgments and aects

incine her in the same direction. Thus,- Schiers Parts: The se is divided into two parts: the rationa and the sen-

sibe

- Schiers Reation: The se is unied when the rationa and sensibe parts

incine the agent toward the same ends.

There are two interesting paraes between Schiers account and Nietzsches

account. like Nietzsche, Schier denies that unity can be achieved via one parts

dominance o the other part(s). Moreover, Nietzsche describes his paradigm o

unity (Goethe) in terms that are reminiscent o Schier:

What [Goethe] wanted was totality; he ought against the separationo reason, sensa-tion, eeing, and wi [das Auseinander von Venunt, Sinnlichkeit, Gehl, Wille] (preached

with the most abhorrent schoasticism byKant, Goethes antipode); he discipined

himse to whoeness. (TIIX.49)

Nietzsche tes us that Goethe ought against the separation [das Auseinander] o

reason, sensation, eeing, and wi. The reerence to Kant suggests that Nietzsche

is making Schiers point: Kant aegedy thought that reason shoud dominate

passion. Nietzsche, with Schier, conceives a harmony between the various aspects

o the sou. Goethe exempies that state.

So Nietzsche seems to accept a version o Schiers idea, that unity is attainedwhen the parts reate to each other in a harmonious way, rather than when one

part dominates the other parts. In addition, I wi suggest that Nietzsche accepts

and deveops Schiers basic point: the agent is unied when there is a harmoni-

ous reationship between the agents refective thought and the agents aects.

Notice that, in the passage quoted above, Nietzsche is notreerring to a unity

among drives aone. Rather, he speaks o attaining unity among reason, sensation,

eeling, and will. Now, I think it woud be a mistake to put too much weight on the

particuar terms that Nietzsche is using. or exampe, we shoud not interpret

Nietzsche as caiming that the se has exacty our discrete parts that must be uni-

ed, or Nietzsche esewhere rejects caims o this orm. However, it is interesting

that Nietzsche speaks o a unity not among drives aone, but among drives and

39Here I have departed rom the transation in Curran and ricker, which seems to me to obscure

Schiers point. In the next passage, I have aso made some minor modications to the transation.


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4.1 The character type priest

The irst Essay o the Genealogyintroduces three character types: the save, the

nobe, and the priest. Athough my goa is simpy to characterize the psychic state

o the priest, describing this psychic state requires a brie reconstruction o themain argument in the irst Essay.43,44 I shoud note that the irst Essays argument

is highy compex, and there are a number o controversies surrounding the

structure o the argument. or our purposes, nothing important hangs on the

precise way in which the pieces o the argument t together, so I wi pass over

these controversies, simpy mentioning them in the ootnotes.

Nietzsche begins by juxtaposing two types o individuas: the heroic, strong,

heathy nobes, and the weak, craven, downtrodden saves. Initiay, both types o

individuas accept a system o vaues that posits heath, strength, and beauty as the

chie goods, and sickness, weakness, and uginess as the chie orms o badness. Bythe ight o these vaues, the saves are bad, and the nobes good. Thus, the saves

are committed to regarding themseves as bad, unortunate wretches. Moreover,

they do not see this as a temporary or surmountabe state o aairs; rather, they

view themseves as irredeemaby bad (GMI.6).

Nietzsche next introduces a thirdtype o individua, the priest (GMI.67, I.16).

like the saves, the priests are weak and unheathy. Unike the saves, the priests

are not content to resign themseves to this state o aairs. On the contrary, the

priests have a ust to rue, an ardent desire to occupy positions o power and

infuence (GMI.6). Thus, they are engaged in a strugge or dominance with the

nobes (GMI.610). However, the priests have none o the traits that are regarded

as vauabe: they are not physicay strong, heathy, and so orth (GMI.67).

rustrated by their inabiity to attain dominance, the priests come to bear an

intensey negative aect toward the nobes, an aect that Nietzsche cas ressenti-

ment. Ressentimenthas severa distinctive eatures. irst, and most obviousy, ressenti-

mentinvoves a negative aect o hatred and vengeuness (GMI.10, III.14). This

hatred is directed at the nobes (GMI.10). It is crucia that the priesthates the

nobe or a particuar reason: he wants to possess the characteristic traits o the

nobehe wants to be beautiu, strong, weathy, and heathybut nds himse

competey incapabe o doing so. In other words, the priest nds himse unabeto reaize the orm o ie that he regards as most vauabe, and is abe to ive ony

in ways that he regards as disvauabe. Conronted with those who enjoy the orm

o ie that he vaues and ardenty desires, the priest comes to hate the nobes. But

notice that this intense hatred is directed at those who, by the priests own ights,

are iving the good ie; moreover, the priest hates them preciseybecausethey are

eading the good ie.

So the priest has an odd response to the nobe: he vaues their way o ie, and

or that reason it woud make sense or him to regard the nobes with admiration

43The save aso provides an exceent exampe o disunity. However, I have chosen to ocus on the

priest, or the psychic tensions that I wish to highight are somewhat cearer and more pronounced

in the priest.44My account o the rst essay draws on Bernard Reginster, Nietzsche on Ressentimentand Vau-

ation, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research57 (1997): 281305, and Jay Waace, Ressentiment,

Vaue, andSe-Vindication, in leiter and Sinhababu, Nietzsche and Morality.


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let us summarize the argument so ar. The priests come to bear a negative a-

ect oressentimenttoward the nobe. This creates a state o discord between aect

and evauative judgment; the priests have an intensey negative aect directed at

those who epitomize their own vaues. The priests respond to this state o tensionby atering their evauative judgments.48

There is one more important compication. Reca that the priest came to resent

the nobe because the priest was engaged in a strugge or dominance with the

nobe. That is, the priest wanted to occupy positions o poitica power, wanted to

dominate, and so orth. Ater the revauation, the priest judges traits such as the

desire or dominance to be evi. However, Nietzsche makes it cear that the priest

continues to desire to be dominant. Indeed, his very process o revauing vaues

was undertaken because he ardenty desired dominance. As Bernard Reginster

puts it, The priests who so vehementy condemn the thirst or spoi and victory

o the nobe bond beast (GMI.11) are in act pursuing the very same goas

victory, spoi, and seduction (GMI.8).49

So athough the revauation eiminates one orm o discord between aect

and evauative judgment, it gives rise to a secondorm o discord between aect

and evauative judgment: the priest ardenty desires that which he judges evi.

Conronted with the discrepancy between aect and evauative judgment, the

priest resorts to se-deception:

The man oressentimentis neither upright nor nave nor honest and straightorward

with himse. His sou squints. (GMI.10)

[The man oressentiment] has, thanks to the countereit and se-deception o im-

potence, cad itse in the ostentatious garb o the virtue o quiet, cam resignation,

just as i the weakness o the weak were a vountary achievement, wied, chosen,

a deed, a meritoriousact. (GMI.13; c. I.14)

Through se-deception, the priest hides rom himse the act that he desires that

which he condemns as evi.

4.2 Important eatures o the character type

Notice that the priests exhibitpreciselythe structure that Schier identies withdisharmony: their refective judgments are out o accordance with their aects;

the two parts direct the agent toward opposing ends. As Schier woud put it, the

rationa and the sensibe parts o the se are in confict.

48This interpretation is somewhat controversia. A dierent, and perhaps more amiiar, interpreta-

tion caims that the priests engage in revauation not in order to eiminate their own psychic tension,

but in order to succeed in their strugge or dominance with the nobes. On this interpretation, the

priests beieve that i they can convince the save cass that the nobes are evi, then the priests wi

be abe to assume a dominant position. So the priests engage in revauation in order to u their

desire or dominance. I think this interpretation aces a number o dicuties, which are discussed by

Waace in Ressentiment,Vaue, and Se-Vindication. However, nothing that I am about to say aboutthe psychic state o the priest hinges on this point. Readers who preer the second interpretation o

the priesty revauation can substitute this interpretation or the one oered in the text, above. or

my purposes, the ony important point is that the priests have a orm o discord between aect and

evauative judgment. It does not matter whether this discord motivates the revauation, or pays a ess

substantia roe.49Reginster, Nietzsche on Ressentimentand Vauation, 291.


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This discord between aect and evauative judgment shows up at two crucia

junctures o the Genealogy. irst, when the priest begins to bear ressentimenttoward

the nobe, the discord between aect and evauative judgment motivates the

priests revauation o vaues. Second, ater the revauation, the priest experiencesdiscord between his ardent desire or dominance and power, on the one hand,

and his refective condemnation o those traits, on the other hand. This discord

motivates the priests se-deception.

Given the centraity o this notion, we might be tempted to identiy it with

Nietzschean disunity. That is, we might caim that an agent is disunied i the

agents refective judgments confict with the agents drives and aects, in the

sense that they direct the agent toward conficting ends. I think this is amost, but

not quite, correct. There is an additiona acet to Nietzsches account o disunity:

discord between refective judgment and aect is not sucient to engender

disunity. It is onycertain ormso discord between refective judgment and aect

that ead to disunity.

There are two pieces o textua evidence indicating that certain orms o discord

between aect and refective judgment are compatibe with agentia unity. irst,

Nietzsche oten enjoins us to put ourseves in states o confict between aect

and evauative judgment. He caims that conficts between aects and evauative

judgments are an exceent opportunity or acquiring a deeper understanding o

our vaues. He writes that the individua with contradictory drives has a great

method o acquiring knowedge: he ees many pros and cons. The wisest man

woud be the one richest in contradictions (WP259; c. HH618, GMIII.12, andBGE284). Indeed, Nietzsche describes his geneaogies as operating in precisey

this way: they are meant to generate an emotiona reaction to the vaue under in-

vestigation, thereby creating a discord between the aective response to the vaued

object and the refective evauation o the object.50 or exampe, a geneaogy o

pity might proceed by ostering a negative emotiona response to pity, in order to

generate a confict with our positive evauation o pity. This state o tension eads

us to reassess the vaue (o course, this reassessment need not cuminate in the

rejection o the vaue).

Now, the act that Nietzsche enjoins us to enter these discordant states does notby itse indicate that confict between aect and evauative judgment is compat-

ibe with agentia unity. Ater a, we coud identiy disunity with confict between

aect and evauative judgment, and interpret Nietzsche as caiming that disunity

is instrumentay vauabe, as a means to some vaued end. But reca that unity is

meant to be an account o agentia activity. It is hard to beieve that the individua

who engages in a Nietzschean geneaogy, and discovers ormery hidden aspects

o her psychic states and vaues, thereby becomes lessactive in the production o

her actions.51

50

Nietzsche writes, The inquiry into the origin o our evauations and tabes o the good is inabsoutey no way identica with a critique o them, as is so oten beieved: even though the insight

into somepudendo origocertainy brings with it a eeing o diminution in the vaue o the thing that

originated thus and prepares the way to a critica mood and attitude toward it (WP254).51And indeed, Nietzsche seems to associate increasing se-knowedge with increasing activity. or

an iuminating discussion o this point, see John Richardson, Nietzsches New Darwinism(New York:

Oxord University Press, 2004).


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This brings us to the second piece o textua evidence. Some o the individuas

whom Nietzsche praisesespeciay Goethe and Nietzsche himseare praised

or harboring and toerating inconsistent vaues.

Human beings have in their bodies the heritage o mutipe origins, that is, opposite,and oten not merey opposite, drives and vaue standards that ght each other and

rarey permit each other any rest. Such human beings o ate cutures and reracted

ights wi on the average be weaker human beings: their most proound desire is

that the war theyareshoud come to an end. But when the opposition and war

in such a nature have the eect o one more charm and incentive o ieand i,

moreover, in addition to his poweru and irreconciabe drives, a rea mastery and

subtety in waging war against onese, in other words, se-contro, se-outwitting,

has been inherited or cutivated toothen those magica, incomprehensibe, and

unathomabe ones arise, those enigmatic men predestined or victory and seduction,

whose most beautiu expression is ound in Acibiades and Caesar and among

artists perhaps leonardo da Vinci. They appear in precisey the same ages when thatweaker type with its desire or rest comes to the ore: both types beong together and

owe their origin to the same cause. (BGE200; c. BGE224)

Nietzsche caims that having conficting drives and vaue standards oten leads

todisunity: it eads to war, opposition, and so on. However, certain individuas

remain unied despite experiencing these orms o confict: these individuas

manage to achieve se-contro. In other words, disunity is a requent resut o

having discordant aects and evauative judgments, but disunity is not identica

to having discordant aects and evauative judgments.

I think these two pieces o textua evidence indicate that Nietzsche treats discordbetween aect and evauative judgment as a condition that requenty resuts in,

but is not identica to, disunity. Setting the textua evidence aside, though, there

is aso a compeing phiosophica reason or distinguishing disunity rom discord

between aect and evauative judgment. Reca that the concept o unity is designed

to pay a particuar phiosophica roe in Nietzsches account o agency: when an

agent is unied, the agent pays an active roe in producing her action; when she

is disunied, her action is produced independenty o her participation. Nietzsche

quite righty points out that having conficting aects does not undermine an ac-

tions attributabiity to the agent.52 Ater a, it is possibe or an agent to harbor

massivey conficting sets o aects, whie remaining in contro o her actions. Just

so, the mere act that an agent has conficting aects and evauative judgments

does not indicate that the agent pays no roe in the production o her action. or

it is possibe, abeit dicut, to harbor conficting aects and evauative judgments

whie remaining in contro o ones actions.

Consider an exampe o an individua who experiences a confict between his

aects and his vaues. Earier, we considered an acohoic who ardenty craves a

drink, but judges that drinking woud be disvauabe. Suppose this agent experi-

ences requent and poweru desires or acoho. Yet he vaues sobriety and disvaues

acoho. His aects and vaues are discordant, or the desire or acoho confictswith the disvauation o acoho. This agent is certainy in an unortunate state;

it wi be hard or him to contro his actions, and he may end up succumbing to

52See especiayWP966 and BGE212, quoted above.


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the desire or acoho. But suppose he does manage to avoid drinking. Rather

than drinking the acoho, he pours it down the sink. That actionpouring the

acoho down the sinkseems attributabe to the agents activity. The act that the

action is rendered dicut by opposing aects, which tempt the agent to rerainrom pouring out the acoho, does not seem to show that the agent is passive in

the production o his action. I anything, the opposite is the case. Put simpy, the

discordant aects make it hard or the agent to contro the action, but do not

render the action not his own.

4.3 Nietzschean Unity

In the prior section, I pointed out that the priests exhibit a confict between their

refective judgment and their aects. I argued that this eature does not, by itse,

engender disunity: certain agents dispay the same type o confict, but remain

unied. So what dierentiates the priests rom these unied individuas?

Notice that the confict between refective judgment and aect takes a specia

orm in the priests: it is hidden. I wi argue that this act is important.

O course, there is nothing unusua about being ignorant o various aspects o

ones actions. Nietzsche disparages the idea that agents are generay cognizant

o their actions, caing it the universa madness. or the opposite is precisey

the naked reaity demonstrated daiy and houry rom time immemoria! Ac-

tions are neverwhat they appear to be a actions are essentiay unknown (D

116; c.D119).

However, the priests have a distinctive orm o se-ignorance. I think we cancapture their condition as oows:

(Disunity) The agent currenty approves o his A-ing. However, i he knew more about

the drives and aects that gure in As etioogy, he woud notapprove o his A-ing.

This notion o disunity is meant to characterize a pecuiar psychoogica state, in

which an agent approves o his action, but woud reverse the attitude, were he to

know more about the actions causa history.(The particuar eements in the causa

history that occupy Nietzsches attention are the agents drives and aects, though

in principe there is no reason or restricting it to these types o motives.)

Notice that disunity, so dened, constitutes a kind o dissatisaction with ones

action. I an agent is disunied, he woud cease to approve o his action, were he

to know more about its etioogy. So we might state the denition o disunity as

oows: an agent is disunied in perorming an action Ai, were he to know more

about the drives and aects that are causing him to A, he woud notafrmA-ing.

With this in mind, et us oer a characterization o the contrary o disunity,

nameyunity:

(Unity) The agent As, and arms his A-ing. urther knowedge o the drives and

aects that gure in As etioogy woud not undermine this armation o A-ing.

The account shoud be understood as appied to agents, hoding a ese constant

except giving the agent urther inormation about the drives and aects guring

in the etioogy o the action under consideration. In particuar, we do not want to

consider cases in which the agent changes his vaues. or exampe, I woud now

disapprove o many o the actions that I perormed, approvingy, as a chid; but


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this does not show that I was disunied in perorming the actions, or at the time

o action I may have whoeheartedy approved o them.53

Additionay, notice that the ony actor that we are changing here is how much

inormation the agent has about the etiologyo the action. Agents sometimes dis-approve o a past action, not because they earn more about the acts etioogy,

but because they earn more about the acts consequences. I did not reaize that my

innocent, ohand remark woud hurt Sarahs eeings. Now, seeing her upset, I

regret the remark, and wish that I had not made it. But this does not show that I

was disunied in acting.

Notice, nay, that a disunied agent woud not necessariy want to actdi-

erenty. She might be dissatised with her actions, not because she disapproves

o what she has done, but because she disapproves o her motivesor doing what

she has done. or exampe, suppose that Say vounteers in a soup kitchen. She

beieves she is vounteering out o a desire to aid the impoverished beneciaries.

Yet a psychoogicay adept observer, we acquainted with Says character, woud

describe things dierenty: Say takes satisaction in eeing superior to the impov-

erished recipients, and her vounteering is in part motivated by this desire. Suppose

Say comes to reaize that one o the desires motivating her action is the desire

to ee superior. She nds this desire reprehensibe, and she is no onger abe to

view her action o vounteering with approva. Thus, she is disunied. However, it

woud be inaccurate to say that she wants not to vounteer. Rather, she sti wants

to vounteer, but she wants to vounteer out o benecent motives, rather than

se-serving ones. So she is disunied, not because she wants to act dierenty, butbecause she wants to act out o dierent motives.

With these points in mind, we can see that disunity constitutes a orm o psy-

chic confict. An agent acts and approves o his action. However, this approva is

contingent upon ignorance o the drives and aects that are actuay eading him

to act. So there is a confict between the agents attitude toward the action as he

takes it to be, and the agents attitude toward the action as it is. Moreover, disunity

impies that one has aects and drives that are moving one in ways that one woud

disavow. Thus, there is an interesting orm o confict between the agents refec-

tive and unrefective aspects at the time o action.The notion o disunity can be used to characterize the psychic state o the priests.

The priests are ignorant o aspects o their actions; they do not reaize that they

ust ater the very states o aairs that they refectivey condemn. To adopt Nietz-

sches pithy ormuation, The motiveso this moraity stand opposed to itsprinciple

(GS21). The ast section argued that this discord between aect and refective

judgment is compatibe with the agents paying an active roe in the production

o his action. The strugging acohoic who successuy overcomes his cravings

or acoho pays an active roe in the production o his action, despite his experi-

ences o discord. However, notice that the priests discord is hidden. Rather than

53Nietzschean unity bears a resembance to Harry rankurts notion o whoeheartedness.

Roughy, rankurtian whoeheartedness obtains when the agent bears a higher-order attitude o ac-

ceptance or approva toward his ower-order desires (see rankurt, The Reasons o Love). Nietzschean

unity is more demanding: the approva in question must be stabe in the ace o urther inormation

about the actions etioogy.


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but his aects ag behind; he continues to bear the aects that were associated

with the vauation o pride (e.g. attraction to pride, deight in instances o pride,

etc.), and these aects minge with and infuence the aects that are associated

with disvauation o pride (e.g. shame at dispays o pride, aversion to pride, etc.).Thus, Augustine manages to take deight in his shame at dispays o pride, thereby

maniesting a mixture o the od and new aects.

like the Genealogyspriest, Augustine experiences discord between his aects

and his refective judgments. Unike the priest, Augustine strives to recognize and

eiminate the maniestations o this discord. He oten ais: above, he describes his

discovery that his refective assessments o his own motives are being infuenced

by the very motives that he is attempting to disavow. That is, he discovers that his

refective disavowa o pride is motivated by pride. So, in refectivey disavowing

pride, he is disunied: once he earns more about the etioogy o these disavow-

as, he comes to disapprove o them. or he can no onger see these disavowas o

pride as expressive o his disvauation o pride; on the contrary, he sees that these

disavowas o pride are being motivated by his persistent attraction to pride.

With this discovery, Augustine is reveaed to have been ess than uy active in

the production o his past actions. or his choices were being infuenced in a ash-

ion that he did not recognize, and which he woud have ound objectionabe. This

shows that Augustines action was not whoy the product o his own activity.

like the Genealogyspriest, Augustine is strongy attracted to that which he re-

fectivey condemns. Moreover, Augustine does not initiay notice this attraction,

so he is initiay disunied. And the probem that Augustines disunity producesis that there is no cear answer to the question o where the agent stands. He has

chosen to denounce pride, and this choice is consistent with his evauative judg-

ments. However, the denunciation is motivated by an attitude that Augustine

cannot condone: pride itse. So Augustines condemnation o pride no onger

appears to be a maniestation o agentia activity. His refective thought seems to

be bueted about by inconsistent drives and aects, in a way that renders him a

passive conduit or orces within.

As this exampe indicates, Nietzschean unity is at east a necessary condition or

agentia activity. Unity seems to oer a characterization o the conditions underwhich an agent can be said to be in contro o her action.56 The agent acts, ap-

proves o the act, and urther knowedge o the action woud not undermine this

approva. To speak metaphoricay, the agents whoe being is behind the action.

I concude that Nietzsches distinction between unity and disunity adequatey

captures the distinction genuine action and mere behavior.

Moreover, notice that Nietzsches account o unity gives us a way o distinguish-

ing genuine cases o agency rom their esser reatives without committing ourseves

to concepts o the wi or the se that Nietzsche woud regard as probematic. In

order to maniest unity, an individua need not be pictured as standing apart rom

her drives and exerting a controing infuence on them. Nor must we conceive

o the agent as having and exercising a wi that is whoy independent rom her

56Notice that an individua who is unied cannot act akraticay. I an agent perorms an action

o which he disapproves, he is not unied.


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drives. Rather, the account o unity merey requires that agents have conscious

thoughts and engage in episodes o deiberation and choice, on the one hand,

and aso have drives and aects, on the other. The conscious thoughts and the

capacity or choice are pervasivey and inescapaby infuenced by drives. Yet theyare distinct rom drives, and therein arises the potentia or disunity.57

6 . c o n c l u s i o n

Nietzsches account o agentia unity is designed to oer a way o distinguish-

ing genuine maniestations o agency rom acts that are produced merey by

the agents drives and aects. In other words, the account o unity distinguishes

genuine actions rom mere behaviors. The account o unity enabes us to draw this

distinction without reying on notions o the wi or the se that Nietzsche woud

regard as probematic. Unity simpy requires a certain kind o harmony between

the agents refective and unrefective aspects at the time o action. In particuar,

an agent is uniedor, equivaenty, the agent is active in the production o her

actionwhen she approves o her action, and urther knowedge o the actions

etioogy woud not undermine this approva.

Moreover, Nietzschean unity is an anaysis o what it is or the agent to determine

her action through choice. Everyone wi agree thatoneway o aiing to determine

ones action by choice is or ones action not to conorm to ones choice: I decide

not to drink at the party, but end up drinking ater a. But Nietzsche draws our

attention to another way that one can ai to determine ones action: ones choice

can be determined by ones motives, in a way that one woud disavow were oneto recognize it. Thus, Nietzsche points out that in addition to examining the con-

nection between choice and action, we must examine the connection between

the agentand choice.58

57My interpretation does commit Nietzsche to two caims that are somewhat controversia:

conscious thoughts must be both causally efcaciousand distinct rom drives. Some commentators read

Nietzsche as rejecting one or both o these caims. or exampe, Brian leiter argues that or Nietzsche,

conscious thoughts are causay inert and perhaps not even distinguishabe rom drives; see The

Paradox o ataism and Se-Creation in Nietzsche, in Richardson and leiter, Nietzsche,281321. Ideend the idea that Nietzsche views conscious thoughts as causay ecacious and distinct rom drives

in my Nietzsches Theory o Mind,European Journal o Philosophy13 (2005): 131, and Nietzsches

Phiosophica Psychoogy.58or extremey hepu discussions o materia in this essay, I owe great thanks to lanier Anderson,

Christine Korsgaard, Richard Moran, Bernard Reginster, John Richardson, and Daniee Sevens. I am

The Concept of Unified Agency in Nietzsche Plato and Schiller

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