The Comparative Effect of Minority Vetoes on Shared Governance in Post-Conflict

Consociational Societies:Case Studies of Bosnia-Herzegovina and

Lebanon

Dina Abdel-Fattah

Advisor: Professor Paula PickeringGovernment Department

What is Consociationalism?

• Term developed by Arend Lijphart

• Government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy

• Consociational democracy was engineered to counterbalance the “destabilizing effect of social segmentation”

• “The essential characteristic of a successful consociational democracy is not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the deliberate joint effort by the elites to stabilize the system”

Why is Consociationalism Implemented?

• For heterogeneous societies▫ Societies that need to

find overlapping memberships: a consensus that spans different societal segments in order to show that different societal segments are in favor of such an agreement

• The “main political institutions” of consociational democracy help facilitate inter-group relationships

What Does a Consociational Government Consist Of?1. Grand coalition• Joint consensual rule between

the minority groups

2. Mutual veto • Vetoes granted to all the

minority groups

3. Proportional representation• Fair and equal treatment

instead of the disproportionality of majority rule

4. Segmental autonomy• Minority rule over the

minority itself in the area of the minority’s exclusive concern

• In reality, that the success of consociationalism is largely contingent on whether elites are able to set aside their differences and work together

• Adds a difficult dimension to consociationalism▫ Its success is largely

based on factors that cannot be significantly shaped through institutional design and engineering

Q: Why Look at These Two Countries?A: Numerous Controls

• Both BiH and Lebanon have: 1. Experienced wars between members of their different

communal groups

2. Had large, undocumented (i.e. no post-war censuses) demographic shifts

3. Ethnoreligious quotas in their governments, in addition to having parliamentary seat reservations for the respective ethnoreligious groups

4. An extremely decentralized governmental structure

5. Experienced heavy-handed international intervention (both internationally and regionally)

6. The largest network of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in their respective regions

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)• National Government

▫ Parliamentary Assembly (bicameral), Tripartite Presidency, Council of Ministers

• Two Entities ▫ Federation

10 cantons Municipalities

▫ Republika Srpska No cantons, just

municipalities

• 1 Internationally-Supervised District

Lebanon

• National Government…

• Divided into Governorates…

• Divided into Districts… ▫ the Beirut governorate is

not subdivided into districts

• Divided into Municipalities

Formulating My Research

• I am investigating variations in the rigidity of minority vetoes in different consociational contexts▫ Formally (e.g. written) allocated to the minority groups

in BiH▫ Informally (e.g. understood, similar veto-like system

present due to strict ethnoreligious quotas) allocated to the minority groups in Lebanon

• Thus, my hypothesis is that the more a minority veto is formally institutionalized in a post-war deeply divided society, the more difficult it will be for ethnoreligious parties to cooperate

Methodology of Analysis

• Looking at legislation in both countries’ national parliaments▫Laws passed▫Laws not passed

• Specifically looking at controversial and non-controversial sectors▫Theoretically, more controversial sectors should see

more use of the minority veto against them▫Controversial sector: education▫Non-controversial sector: agriculture

• Controversial and non-controversial sectors chosen based on theoretical arguments

Data Limitations

• For BiH▫No information on laws not passed before 2007▫No information on parties who voted for and

against laws, just voting counts at the entity level

• For Lebanon▫As of now, no access to laws not passed in

Lebanon▫Similar lack of information on party voting,

though probably more due to security reasons

Remaining Work

• In the process of analyzing legislation

• Preparing to incorporate subjective implications regarding finding▫ i.e. what do the resident

populations in BiH and Lebanon perceive of their legislature’s functioning?

▫ Use interviews and meetings from the summer regarding different perceptions in BiH International organizations,

domestic non-governmental organizations, political parties

• Applying my findings and theory to other consociational governments▫ i.e. Afghanistan

Questions and Answers