The cognitive basis of translation universals

The cognitive basis of translation universals*

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Target 15:2 (2003), 197–241.

issn 0924–1884 / e-issn 1569–9986�©John Benjamins Publishing Company

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Sandra HalversonUniversity of Bergen, Norway

At present, there are few attempts to provide external explanations for thepatterns subsumed under the heading of “translation universal”. In thispaper, I discuss the possible cognitive basis for the patterns/processes thathave been variously referred to as simplification/generalization, normaliza-tion, standardization, sanitization, and exaggeration of target languagefeatures. The framework that I adopt is that of cognitive grammar, and myclaim is that all of the above arise from the existence of asymmetries in thecognitive organization of semantic information. I also propose that theconverse case is true: cases involving a lack of conspicuous cognitive asym-metries will demonstrate the opposite effect in translated text. In closing, Iplace the argument in a larger perspective by adopting Croft’s (1990) scalar

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notion of generalization in a discussion of explanation in translation studies.

Keywords: translation universals, translation and cognition, translation andsemantic networks, explanation in translation studies

1. Introduction

Research into so-called “translation universals” is a productive and innovativearea in Translation Studies. Not only is empirical research expanding throughthe development of electronic corpora; the theoretical constructs on which thisresearch is based are also being questioned and refined (see e.g. Chesterman

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2001, Englund-Dimitrova 2001, Mauranen 2001, Tirkonnen-Condit 2001). The

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level of activity and increasing generation of empirical results make it all themore imperative that we begin to posit explanations for these findings.

In this paper I elaborate on the view that a number of the various lexical/semantic patterns that have been subsumed under the heading of “translationuniversals”1 may be explained with reference to general characteristics of

198 Sandra Halverson

human cognition. In making my case, I build on the theory of cognitivegrammar, primarily as elaborated by Langacker (1987). The theory provides an

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account of how broad and general cognitive processes are reflected in humanlanguage. Essential to the current discussion are the notions of schematicnetworks and cognitive salience and asymmetry.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I present the necessaryintroduction to Langacker’s theory of cognitive grammar and the principles ofcognitive organization that it incorporates, including brief mention of the keyprocesses involved. In addition, I link this account to current research onsemantic representation in bilinguals. In Section 3, I present my hypothesesconcerning the role of cognitive organization in translation. In Section 4 I linkthe discussion in Section 3 to findings from related investigations in anothermetalinguistic environment, more specifically second language acquisition. Ialso briefly touch on the origins and development of cognitive structure. In theconclusion I discuss the implications of the argument for Translation Studies.

2. The cognitive organization of information

Langacker’s theory of cognitive grammar rests on a number of general assump-tions. In the following, I will present those that are of greatest relevance for thediscussion of research on translation universals. My presentation is not compre-hensive, nor do I elaborate on the relative significance Langacker imputes to thevarious assumptions or aspects of them. In fact, in presenting such an overview,I run considerable risk of oversimplification. Readers are referred to Langacker

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(1987) for the full account.

2.1 Basic assumptions

In the introductory chapter to Foundations of cognitive grammar (1987),Langacker outlines the general and methodological assumptions on which hisproject rests. The first of Langacker’s general assumptions is that “language issymbolic in nature” (1987:11). This statement is more portentous than it mayappear at first glance. Langacker continues:

From the symbolic nature of language follows the centrality of meaning tovirtually all linguistic concerns. Meaning is what language is all about; … Butit is not enough to agree that meaning is important if this results, say, inpositing a separate semantic “component” treating grammar separately as an

The cognitive basis of translation universals 199

autonomous entity. I contend that grammar itself, i.e. patterns for groupingmorphemes into progressively larger configurations, is inherently symbolic andhence meaningful. … Grammar is simply the structuring and symbolization ofsemantic content; … (1987:12)

This particular idea is one that sharply divides cognitive grammar fromgenerative grammar or from other formalist approaches. Where generativegrammar posits a strict dividing line between the symbolic lexicon and the non-symbolic, fully generative grammar, Langacker’s program provides for a unifiedapproach to symbolization, and grammar and the lexicon differ only in degree,not in kind. From this follows that the same cognitive structures and processesare held to account for both grammatical and lexical structure.

The second guiding assumption, concerning the relationship of language togeneral cognition, is particularly important in the context of the current discus-sion. Langacker claims that, “… language is an integral part of human cognition.An account of linguistic structure should therefore articulate with what is knownabout cognitive processing in general …” (ibid). The reader is again referred toLangacker (1987:99–146 in particular) for a detailed account of the most

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central processes. For the current purpose, I shall focus on a smaller subset.Cognitive grammar in general is taken to be a “usage-based approach” to

language (1987:45–47, 494). The theoretical ramifications of this statement arenumerous, but at this stage let us focus on the issue of emergence and activationof structure for the individual. Langacker describes a cognitive, includinglinguistic, event as:

a cognitive occurrence of any degree of complexity, be it the firing of a singleneuron or a massive happening of intricate structure and large-scale architec-ture. We can assume that the occurrence of any such event leaves some kind ofneurochemical trace that facilitates recurrence. If the event fails to recur, itstrace decays; recurrence has a progressive reinforcing effect, however, so anevent (or more properly, event-type) becomes more and more deeply en-trenched through continued repetition. … An event type is said to have unitstatus when it is sufficiently well entrenched that it is easily evoked as anintegrated whole, i.e. when it constitutes an established routine that can becarried out more or less automatically once it is initiated. I will refer to theexecution of such a routine as its activation. (1987:100, author’s emphasis)

For the purposes of our discussion, the most important notions here are thoseof entrenchment and activation. In a linguistic event, e.g. encountering a wordor expression, certain cognitive routines are activated. The more frequently theevent-type is repeated, the more “permanent” its activation pattern becomes.


We might conjecture that this same process will pertain to translation events. Inother words, translation (sub)routines will also become entrenched withincreasing repetition.2

In various publications, Langacker describes the kinds of abilities that figurein these events, i.e. that are activated and eventually result in established unitsof varying complexity (1987, 1991, 1999). Again, I quote extensively here in theinterest of expositional economy:

We have, first, the inborn capacity for certain basic kinds of experience: we canexperience a certain range of colors, pitches, tastes, smells, and tactile sensa-tions; we have a notion of spatial extionsionality in which spatial configura-tions can be manifested; we sense the passage of time; we undergo a certainarray of emotions; and so on. I refer to these irreducible realms of experientialpotential as basic domains. We have, next, various cognitive abilities that areapplicable to any domain of experience and essential to the emergence ofspecific concepts (at successively higher levels of organizational complexity).We can, for instance, compare two experiences and register either their identityor any discrepancy between them. We can use one structure as the basis forcategorizing another. We have the capacity for abstraction (schematization) andthus for conceiving of situations with varying degrees of specificity and detail.We are able to direct and focus our attention, and to structure scenes in termsof figure/ground organization (which is often reversible). (1999:2, author’semphasis)

As seen here, the second guiding assumption of cognitive grammar means thatexternal (to linguistics) knowledge of general cognition is put to use in account-ing for linguistic structure and processes at every level. Several of the keyconcepts emphasized above, i.e. domain, comparison, categorization, abstraction/schematization will be considered in more detail in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.

The third assumption that is relevant in the current context concerns the issueof discreteness. As Langacker begins, “much in language is a matter of degree”(1987:14). In Langacker’s theory, categorization, a fundamental cognitiveability, plays a vital role, and categories are taken to be structured around proto-types.3 In prototype categories, membership is not an all or nothing matter:members are rather more or less central. Similarly, gradient structures or conti-nuums are posited at all levels, rather than rigid dichotomies. Finally, “mostlinguistic units are highly integrated structural complexes, or systems, whichare more than just the sum of their recognizable parts” (1987:19).

Even at this early stage, we see the contours of a radically different accountof linguistic structure. This account does not make use of discrete categories


and lists of rules operating on them. There is no distinction in kind betweenrules and categories. Quite on the contrary, the relevant structures are non-discrete, continuous and integrated systems and the system makes no distinc-tion in kind between grammar (rules) and associated categories (the lexicon).The specifics of semantic structure will be further outlined in Section 2.2.

2.2 Semantic structure: Linguistic units, domains, access points,categories and schematic networks

In this section, I will outline Langacker’s account of semantic structure. Therewill be three separate steps to the account: description of linguistic units,description of the semantic “pole” of these units, and description of integratedsystems, i.e. accounting for increasing structural complexity.

2.2.1 Linguistic unitsThe most significant structures and relationships posited in cognitive grammarare illustrated in Figure 1 below, adapted from Langacker (1987:77).

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As shown in the figure, linguistic units (lexical and grammatical) consist ofbipolar symbolic structures. The two poles are phonological and semantic,respectively, and each provides access to a section or area of its respectivecognitive space, i.e. phonological or semantic. The association between the twopoles, both within the grammar and within a specific usage event, is a symbolicone: the phonological structure symbolizes the semantic one. In a specific usageevent the vocalization symbolizes a conceptualization, which is described as:

… embracing any kind of mental experience. It subsumes (a) both establishedand novel conceptions; (b) not only abstract or intellectual “concepts” but alsosensory, motor, and emotive experience; (c) conceptions that are not instanta-neous but change or unfold through processing time; and (d) full apprehen-sion of the physical, social, cultural and linguistic context. (1987:3)

Furthermore, usage events are defined as neutral with respect to the speaker/hearer distinction.

Symbolization is to be distinguished from the coding relationship, whichpertains between the symbolic unit in the grammar of a language and itsrealization in a usage event. Coding is defined as “finding an appropriate targetstructure that ‘fits’ a sanctioning unit within some degree of tolerance” (Lang-

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acker 1987:77). The process of establishing “fit”, i.e. selecting an appropriatelinguistic item, is thus an instance of categorization.


At this stage it is important to note that a communicative event is the

vocalization

conceptualization

symbolic unit

usage event

Semantic space

Phonological space

grammar(linguistic convention)

sem. unit

phon.unit

coding

sym.

sym.

Symbolic space

coding

coding

Figure 1.�Structures in symbolic space

equivalent to a usage event in Langacker’s terms. In Section 3 we shall beconsidering translated texts as the products of such usage events.

2.2.2 The semantic poleLet us proceed to take a closer look at the structuring of semantic space at thesemantic pole of the linguistic unit. According to Langacker, “every predicate ischaracterized relative to one or more cognitive domains, collectively called itsmatrix” (1987:147). A domain is defined as “a context for the characterizationof a semantic unit” and such entities are further characterized as “… necessarilycognitive entities: mental experiences, representational spaces, concepts, orconceptual complexes” (ibid). Domains may be either basic or abstract, andthey may vary in their degree of complexity, their dimensionality (whether they


are multi-dimensional, bounded or unbounded, continuous or discrete), andwhether they are locational or configurational in terms of the types of predica-tions they allow.

A second principle that is vital to an understanding of the cognitiveorganization of semantic space is the understanding that linguistic semanticsrequires an encyclopedic approach to meaning. As Langacker points out, “Mostconcepts require specifications in more than one domain for their characteriza-tion” (1987:154). Thus the semantic pole of a symbolic unit may incorporateseveral domains of knowledge, all varying in their degree of internal complexityand of boundedness, etc. This is not to say that any or all possible knowledgethat may be related to an entity is of equal significance. Indeed, in the character-ization of a particular semantic unit, “the multitude of specifications that figurein our encyclopedic conception of an entity form a gradation in terms of theircentrality …” (1987:159, author’s emphasis). Centrality may be based on theextent to which a specification is “conventional, generic, intrinsic and charac-teristic” (ibid). Centrality will be covered in more detail in Section 2.3.

2.2.3 Integrated systems: Increasing structural complexityLet us return for a moment to the two poles of the symbolic unit. A furtherelaboration is necessary at this point. As Langacker puts it:

Most symbolic units are variable in both form and meaning. [I] argue that thesemantic and phonological poles of a symbolic unit are analyzable as complexcategories, and that these are best conceived and described as schematicnetworks. (1987:369)

At the phonological pole, then, various realizations of a phonological unitrepresent more or less central members of a prototype category. Our main interest,however, lies in the prototype categories at the other pole, in semantic space.

It has been argued that the various senses of a lexical item may be fruitfullydescribed as constituting a prototype category (Lakoff 1987, Taylor 1989). It is this

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approach which underlies cognitive grammar as well. In Langacker’s presentation:

A lexical item of frequent occurrence displays a substantial, often impressivevariety of interrelated senses and conventionally sanctioned usages; its set ofestablished values can be regarded as a complex category, the members ofwhich are treated as equivalent for symbolic (and possibly other) purposes.(1987:370)

It is not enough, however, to recognize that the semantic pole is constituted bya complex category. We must also have a more detailed understanding of the


structure of this category, i.e. a means of accounting for the relationships thatpertain between the members. In cognitive grammar, category relationships areof two types: “elaboration (the relation between a schema and its instantiations)and extension (the relation between prototypical and peripheral values)”(Langacker 1987:370, author’s emphasis). The schema, defined as the super-

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ordinate structure in a taxonomic hierarchy (Langacker 1987:68), is an integral

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aspect of the process of developing/acquiring categories and is part and parcelof the general cognitive ability to abstract. This cognitive capability is funda-mental to numerous operations, linguistic and otherwise. In the formulation ofcategories, abstraction from recurrent usage events results in the formulation ofincreasingly schematic representational structures. Another key cognitivecapability, i.e. generalization, is involved in the extension of categories toinclude new members. Category growth occurs through the comparison of apotential member (a target) with either a schema or with the category proto-type. Langacker summarizes the growth of category structure through theseprocesses as follows:

If we think of extension as a “horizontal” relationship, and schematicity as a“vertical” one, we can say that the “outward” growth of a lexical network byextension from prototypes is inherently associated with its “upward” growth byextraction of schemas. One is not possible without the other, but they tend toco-occur as interrelated facets of the same expansive mechanism. (1987:373)

Up until this point, we have been referring to prototypes and schemas as ifeach lexical network had only one each. This is rarely, if ever, the case, however.The complexity of these categories is compounded by the existence of localcenters of gravity. As this is a point of major significance, I shall quote exten-sively from Langacker:

… not every complex category offers viable or unique candidates for the rolesof prototype and schema at the “global” level. A particular node can berecognized as the global prototype if it is substantially more salient than anyother and functions as the apparent basis of more extensions. Nothing intrinsicto the structure or the dynamics of complex categories guarantees that a singlenode will always distinguish itself in this way, however, or that multipleprototypes of considerable local prominence will not arise in different portionsof an extensive network. There is similarly no assurance that a schematicnetwork will always be graced with a single “superschema” compatible with allother members of the category; extensions can occur without the motivatingschemas (similarity perceptions) achieving the status of conventional units.Thus a network need not incorporate a well-behaved schematic or taxonomic


hierarchy, with a single topmost node that dominates all the others. Moreover,even if an all-subsuming superschema can plausibly be posited for a category,it may well be only minimally entrenched and have very little cognitivesalience. Although such a schema would define the commonality of the entirecategory, its cognitive and linguistic significance might be negligible. (1987:381)

In short, precisely which activation patterns will become salient in any givennetwork is not predictable a priori. There may or may not be one or moresalient prototype or high-level schema.

Thus far, we have seen the gradual development of a system for the cognitiveorganization of semantic information. First, semantic knowledge is encyclope-dic in nature and involves the activation, through symbolic structures, of one ormore domains of varying complexity and extension. The semantic pole of asymbolic structure (lexical or grammatical) is linked to specifications in one ormore such semantic domains. The domains activated through one lexical/gram-matical item are collectively referred to as its matrix. Cognitive domains, inaddition to variation along dimensions such as complexity, boundedness,discreetness, etc., domains also vary in their degree of cognitive centrality.4

At the next level, we see the organization of semantic spaces growing intoso-called schematic networks linking the various senses associated with a lexical/grammatical item. These networks consist of various nodes and links betweenthese nodes, i.e. arcs. These links, or arcs, become increasingly entrenchedthrough the repetition of cognitive routines (repetitions of sufficiently similarusage events). The nodes themselves may be structures of any degree of internalcomplexity:

… for instance, a single node … consists of a complex matrix that incorporatesnumerous domains, some of them representing substantial knowledge systems.… Certain knowledge systems serving as domains for one sense of a lexicalitem must be included in the matrix for other senses as well … (Langacker

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1987:378)

In other words, the related senses of one lexical item are also linked, via therelevant nodes, to complex categories of semantically related items.

One final point must be established with respect to the nature of the nodesin these schematic networks. Within such a network, nodes represent links tointerlocking knowledge systems. Thus far, we have not touched upon the typeof knowledge that is represented in these systems, though implicitly one mightassume that much of it is typically extra-linguistic. For instance, to elaborate on


an example from Langacker (1987:404), the network for aunt for any individual

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speaker of English would involve nodes for a system of kinship relations, which,in turn, may lead to nodes linking to cultural stereotypes, e.g. maiden aunts;there may be knowledge of particular individuals linked to the network, etc.

In addition, a network for aunt, for example, may include metalinguisticinformation, such as the existence of alternative phonological variants /ant/ vs./ænt/ and relevant information concerning them (here geographical differenc-es) (Langacker 1987:404, also note 25). Schematic networks may also incorpo-

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rate information regarding context of use (e.g. relative social status of speakerand hearer, etc). Thus these networks include not only complex and dynamicconnections; they also include information that is more or less intrinsic to theobject/event that is being characterized.

In addition to understanding the architecture of semantic space, certainaspects of its functioning are also crucial to our current purpose. One aspect ofthe representation of knowledge in schematic networks concerns the function-ing of the symbolic unit with respect to the semantic network. We have seenthat the phonological pole (see Figure 1), i.e. a specific vocalization in a usageevent, symbolizes a conceptualization that is encoded in a semantic unit. Thesymbolic unit (the pairing of a phonological and semantic unit) may be seen asa point of access to a network. As Langacker states:

The semantic value of a symbolic unit is given by the open-ended set ofrelations — simple and complex — direct and indirect — in which this accessnode participates. Each of these relations is a cognitive routine, and becausethey share at least one component the activation of one routine facilitates (butdoes not always necessitate) the activation of another. (1987:163)

2.3 Asymmetry, cognitive salience and categorial prominence

The outline of semantic structure at two levels, matrix and network, hasincluded discussion of the various ways in which certain elements or structuresat each level are more prominent, or central, than others. Even though therelated notions of centrality and cognitive salience are played out in slightlydifferent ways at the two levels, the key idea is the same: there is asymmetry inthe complex cognitive structures and this asymmetry arises from generalcharacteristics of human cognition. Moreover, the asymmetry has numerouslinguistic consequences. In the following we will take a closer look at thisasymmetry at each of the two levels.5 In the discussion, I refer to “asymmetry”as a feature of the structures described, while “cognitive salience” is used to


refer to the prominence these features have in the process of running variouscognitive tasks. The two terms merely reflect two perspectives, one more staticand the other more dynamic, on the same phenomenon.

2.3.1 Asymmetry in the matrix: Specifications for lexical itemsAs Langacker discusses (1987:158f), one of the main objections to the encyclo-pedic/network account of semantic structure arises out of a concern with therelative ranking of specifications for any lexical item. In more familiar terms,some qualities, or specifications, are considered more accidental, or contingent,while others are considered more “essential”.

Langacker’s response to this concern lies in the notion of gradation:

I do not specifically claim that all facets of our knowledge of an entity haveequal status, linguistically or otherwise — quite the contrary. The multitude ofspecifications that figure in our encyclopedic conception of an entity clearlyform a gradation in terms of their centrality. Some are so central that they canhardly be omitted from even the sketchiest characterization, whereas others areso peripheral that they hold little significance even for the most exhaustivedescription. (1987:159, author’s emphasis)

The notion of centrality is then further elaborated with reference to fourparticular factors: the degree to which a specification is conventional, generic,intrinsic and characteristic (ibid).

Conventionality makes reference to the degree to which a linguisticcommunity agrees on a given specification with regard to a given linguisticitem. For instance, most English-speakers would agree that a specification of thelexical item egg would include knowledge structures related to eating, Eastercelebrations, chickens, etc., though not, perhaps, to the use of eggs as idealprojectiles. If, however, the throwing of eggs in given social contexts were toreach a critical level in community awareness, this knowledge too, may becomeconventional and more central to the matrix of the lexical item.

Similarly, information that is considered to be generic, rather than individ-ual, is held to be more central to a specification. Both genericness and conven-tionality “tend to correlate” (Langacker 1987:160) with intrinsicness. A

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property is taken to be intrinsic to “the extent that its characterization makes noessential reference to external entities”. Langacker continues:

Shape, for example, is a highly intrinsic property of physical objects, as itreduces to relations between the parts of an object and does not requireinteraction or comparison with other entities. Size, on the other hand, implies


comparison either with other objects or with some scale of measurement;hence it is not quite so intrinsic as shape. Behavioral properties tend to be lessintrinsic, for most behaviors involve interaction with other entities. Somebehaviors are fairly intrinsic, e.g. the sounds that cats emit, and their tech-niques for washing themselves … Such activities as chasing mice and scratch-ing furniture bring external entities into the picture more saliently and areconsequently more extrinsic. The cultural role of cats, for instance theirassociation with witchcraft and Halloween, is highly extrinsic; it has little to dowith cats themselves, but is rather a matter of how others regard them. …(1987:160–161)

The fourth and final factor that affects the centrality of a specification iswhether or not it is characteristic, or whether it is “unique to the class of entitiesdesignated by an expression and consequently sufficient to identify a classmember” (Langacker 1987:161).

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2.3.2 Asymmetry in schematic networks: Prototypes and schemasIt should be obvious that the determinants of centrality within the semanticspecifications of a lexical item are primarily derived from general cognitivecapabilities, many of them perceptual (e.g. shape, size). In addition, conventionis related to a certain level of frequency at both language community andindividual levels (entrenchment).

Centrality, or rather the more overarching notion of gradation in categorymembership, is a vital element of cognitive organization at several levels. If weproceed to the level of schematic networks, in which the numerous senses of alexical item are categorially linked to each other and to semantically relateditems, we see further evidence of asymmetry in cognitive organization.

At the network level, there are several dimensions that contribute to increasedprominence for specific nodes. The three that are outlined by Langacker are:

1. the prominence of the domain linked to the node (e.g. privilege of spaceand vision, sensory experience over more abstract domains)

2. the level of schematicity (the prominence of the basic level in categoryhierarchies)

3. the degree of entrenchment (frequency of activation) (1987:380).

Langacker summarizes the relevant aspects of cognitive asymmetry in schematicnetworks as follows:

Within a schematic network, therefore, certain nodes and relationships are farmore prominent and important than others, both cognitively and linguistically.


In particular, special significance attaches to the nodes that function as thecategory prototype and the highest-level schema. The prototype is significantbecause of its developmental priority and notable cognitive salience. As theprimary basis for extension, it defines the center of gravity for the category.The highest-order schema is significant because it embodies the maximalgeneralization that can be extracted as a characterization of the categorymembership. (1987:380–381, my emphasis)

In summary, we have seen that semantic structure may be characterized interms of integrated networks. These networks are complex and dynamic and areaccessed by symbolic units (bipolar structures). There are various kinds ofknowledge included in these networks, including perceptual knowledge, extra-linguistic “real world” knowledge and metalinguistic information. The net-works are also characterized by global and/or local centers of gravity or promi-nence (prototypes and high-level schemas) that originate in various ways andthat have numerous linguistic effects. In Section 3 we will consider the possibleeffects of such a system on translational tasks. But first, we must briefly addressthe question of cognitive organization in the bilingual brain.

2.4 Representation in the bilingual brain

In the preceding sections, we have outlined an approach to the cognitiveorganization of semantic information without considering the highly relevantquestion of how such organization is affected by the existence of more than onelanguage in a given cognizer. There is a vast field of research into the questionof semantic representation in bilinguals, and the brief outline to follow does notby any means cover the field in its entirety. Moreover, current research in thefield has not expressly provided links to the kind of cognitive linguistic ap-proach outlined in Section 2. On the contrary, predominant research groupshave approached the area from either a psycholinguistic or a cognitive neurosci-ence perspective. It is primarily the former that is in focus here.

2.4.1 Organization: Lexical and semantic elements and their interconnectionsWhile researchers on semantic representation in bilinguals may disagree oncertain details of organization and processing, there seems to be a consensus onthe general assumption that there are two layers of representational elements(de Groot 1997:34). The first of the two, the lexical level, is where “the (ortho-

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graphic and phonological) forms of words are stored”, while in the second, theconceptual level, “word meanings are stored” (ibid).


The differences that emerge in the literature concern, quite simply, thenature of the conceptual layer and the types of links that exist between lexicaland conceptual elements. More specifically, the issues at stake are whether ornot the conceptual layer contains one common store or separate stores for eachlanguage, whether the conceptual level is conceived of as “local” or as “globallydistributed”, whether or not there are connections between the lexical elementsof the two languages, and whether or not there are direct connections betweenthe lexical elements of L2 and the conceptual level (ibid). Moreover, in the caseswhere links are posited between the lexical items of both languages and acommon conceptual store, there is also the issue of whether the two sets of linksare of similar or identical strengths.

There are two models that predominate in the literature, and both provideinteresting and relevant information for the present discussion. The two havemuch in common and vary primarily in the representation of the conceptuallayer and in the elaboration of the links to and from the lexical elements. Bothrepresent the growing consensus on the “one-store” account of the conceptuallevel. Moreover, the empirical support for both models is quite convincing (seede Bot and Schreuder 1993, de Groot 1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1997, Kroll 1993).

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Neither model provides real problems for our framework from Section 2,though clearly one of the two, that involving so-called “distributed representa-tions” (de Groot 1992) is more amenable than the other. Indeed, I argue that its

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conceptual base is fundamentally the same as that of Langacker (seeSection 3.1). Moreover, this same model provides more parsimonious explana-tions of a number of empirical results than does its contender. For these reasonswe shall focus on that model in what follows.

The distributed representation model is shown in Figure 2 from de Groot

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(1992a:390).6

In the figure, the two levels of representation are labeled “lexical memory”and “conceptual memory”. In the latter, the meaning of the concept associatedwith the Dutch word vader is distributed over six elements (the number six hereis purely arbitrary). As de Groot explains it, “Upon presentation of the wordvader, each of these elements receives excitatory activation via its connectionwith the lexical node” (1992a:390).

The elaboration of the figure above to account for bilingual representationsis shown in Figures 3a and 3b, also from de Groot (1992a:393).

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As shown in the figures, lexical items in a bilingual’s two languages arelinked via shared connections at the conceptual level. The two versions ofFigure 3 demonstrate greater and lesser degrees of conceptual overlap. In 3a, the


two lexical items share all of their respective nodes; in 3b they share only some.

lexical memory

conceptualmemory

vader

Figure 2.�A distributed conceptual representation

lexical memory

conceptualmemory

vader father

Figure 3a.�A distributed conceptual representation. Translations have exactly the samemeaning

The functioning of the system in a word translation task is described by deGroot as follows:

Translation again involves the tracing of links (spreading activation) from thelexical representation of a word in one language to that of this word in thesecond language via conceptual memory, but now the links to be traced arethose connecting the lexical nodes with the individual meaning elements of theconceptual representation. (1992a:392)

De Groot also points out that word frequency will be reflected in these net-works. In her account frequency will affect the strength of the various connec-tions between nodes.


2.4.2 Translation tasks: Word-type effects

lexical memory

conceptualmemory

vader father

Figure 3b.�A distributed conceptual representation. Translations differ in meaning

The model briefly outlined above was derived and developed on the basis ofextensive empirical testing (see de Groot 1992a for an overview). As mentioned

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earlier, this research has been carried out within a psycholinguistic paradigm.The methodology employed is experimental and involves such tasks as wordtranslation (given a word in L1 subjects are asked to provide a translation inL2), translation recognition (word pairs are given and subjects are askedwhether or not they are translation pairs) and various tests of semantic priming(testing of effects of prior provision of semantically related primer words)within and between languages. The dependent variables are most often responsetime and frequency of error and omission. This methodology has been criti-cized by translation scholars as ecologically invalid (see de Groot 1997 for a

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discussion). And quite clearly, translation of words in a laboratory environmentis very different from translating situated texts in a real translation environ-ment. However, some of the results are interesting in the context of the currentdiscussion, in spite of these limitations. In the context of our discussion of theeffects of cognitive organization and processing on translation, it is interestingto consider the effects of word type on translation performance.

De Groot (1993), in one of a series of studies aimed at the investigation of

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representational form in bilinguals, studied the effects of words’ concretenessand cognate status on translation tasks like those mentioned above. Thefindings of various studies suggest that “the translations of concrete words sharemore of their representations than the translations of abstract words”(1993:40). The same results were found for cognates. These findings, however,are considered to be indicative of a deeper causal factor: similarity of meaning.


In summing up a review of a series of studies, de Groot states:

It was suggested that concreteness and cognate status per se are not the deter-minants of the representational form. Rather, the degree of meaning similaritybetween the words within a translation pair may ultimately determine thebilingual representational form. The more similar the meanings of the transla-tions, the more likely they are to be stored compoundly in the mental lexiconsof some types of bilinguals or — in the case of distributed conceptual represen-tations — the larger the number of conceptual elements that the translationpair is likely to share. (1993:46, author’s emphasis)

The relationship of word contriteness and similarity of meaning is a non-arbitrary one. Indeed, as de Groot states:

concrete words refer to entities whose function is likely to be the same acrosslanguages. The outward appearance of these entities and the behaviours thatthey elicit are also likely to be similar across language communities becausethese relate directly to their function. As a consequence, the conceptualrepresentations for the translations of concrete words will have very similarcontents. (1993:41)

We shall return to the significance of concreteness/abstractness and its relation-ship to semantic representation in Section 3.1.

3. Cognitive organization and translation effects

At this point, it may be helpful to reiterate the general argument put forward inthe introduction. I started out by stating the general claim that a number of thevarious lexical/semantic patterns that have been subsumed under the headingof “translation universals” may be explained with reference to general charac-teristics of human cognition. In this section, I explain how this is so using theframework outlined in Section 2.

3.1 Bringing it all together

In this section, I bring together the various elements presented in Section 2 inpreparation for discussing their role in accounting for “universal” linguisticpatterns in translated text. It is helpful to distinguish between features ofcognitive organizational structure and features of cognitive functioning, thoughthis is in some ways a misleading distinction. As Langacker points out, “Mind


is neurological activity, and established concepts are simply entrenchedcognitive routines …” (1987:162). Thus the structural elements discussed here,as well as the procedural features outlined both ultimately correspond todynamic patterns of neural activation, not static entities.7

With that caveat in mind, let us consider the “structures” that are positedfor knowledge representation. In the cognitive grammar account, encyclopedicknowledge is organized in domains that are linked together and elaborated intomatrices. These domains and matrices organize the semantic pole of bipolarsymbolic units. The other pole is phonological. The two poles are similar incontent and function to the two layers of representational elements, conceptualand lexical, that prevail in bilingualism research.

At a higher level of complexity, the semantic pole may cover several relatedsenses that are linked to one phonological unit. These various senses constitutea complex category, whose internal structure is represented on the semanticpole by a schematic network. Such networks may be exceedingly complex, andthey are linked, through shared nodes and matrix configurations, to networksrepresenting similar and related meanings. Indeed, the networks may be said topartially overlap, or to fade into one another. The affinity of the semanticnetwork account to the distributed representation model shown in Figure 3should be obvious. The latter is simpler in design than the former, and thedepiction of it in the figure does not include the kind of “three-dimensional”depth that would be necessary to account for the kind of network extension andgrowth outlined in Section 2.2. However, this, I think, is a deception of thediagram only. The two models are conceptually alike in that meaning elementsat the conceptual/semantic level are separate but linked and that the conceptuallevel is structured through a distributed network.

The lexical elements in the model of bilingual representation and the phono-logical pole of Langacker’s symbolic structures are also similar. In the psycho-linguistic accounts of bilingual representation, the lexical level seems to have aninitial triggering function vis-a-vis the conceptual level. In Langacker’s accountthe phonological pole plays an analogous role in the bipolar symbolic structuresthat trigger or initiate access to the semantic structure to which they are linked.Symbolic structures as a whole serve (bipolar structures, form/meaning pairs)as gateways, as it were. Langacker describes the process as follows:

the entity designated by a symbolic unit can therefore be thought of as a point ofaccess to a network. The semantic value of a symbolic unit is given by the open-ended set of relations — simple and complex, direct and indirect — in which thisaccess node participates. Each of these relations is a cognitive routine, and because


they share at least one component the activation of one routine facilitates (butdoes not always necessitate) the activation of another. The correspondencebetween the phonological pole and the semantic pole of a symbolic unitimplies the ability of the phonological routine to activate the subroutineconstituting the access node together with an indefinite number of relationalroutines that incorporate this subroutine. (1987:163, author’s emphasis)

The notion of access brings us over to the more dynamic aspects of cogni-tive semantic functioning. Thus far we have seen the network structures (aspatterns of spreading activation) that represent conceptual knowledge. We haveseen how language users access these networks. We assume, along with mostbilingualism researchers, that bilinguals have one knowledge store, with variousaccess routes, either via L1 or L2. An additional elaboration of this picture isnecessary, however. As we saw in Section 2.4, according to the distributedrepresentation model, words in a bilingual’s two languages may share all, some,or no nodes at the conceptual level. In other words, there may be configura-tions, or patterns of activation, in networks of meaning that are linked only tophonological representations in one of the two languages,8 though these mayultimately, in different configurations and through different, less direct, routes,be linked to phonological representations in the other language.9 These couldbe exemplified by, for instance, so-called “culture-specific concepts”. At theother extreme, there may be networks in which the two phonological nodesshare all conceptual nodes, e.g. in words with highly concrete meanings, e.g. deGroot’s example of father/vader in Figure 3a.

An extension of the overall map is then that schematic networks containnodes for lexical/phonological representations in the bilingual’s two languages.The activation of (different parts of) the network may vary to a greater or lesserdegree, depending on which phonological representation (i.e. which language)is chosen as the access point. Moreover, the availability of a phonologicalrepresentation in L2 is affected by how many meaning elements a potential L2item shares with the L1 structure that was originally activated. There may alsobe networks that are primarily accessed by way of a phonological realization inL1 or L2 only. The activation of such a network would not directly activatenodes in networks linked to any one specific L2 item. In the event that an L2item or items (translation) were activated, this would, presumably, be the resultof considerable active searching. Clearly, if such active searches are repeatedoften enough, these more indirect activation patterns would also becomeentrenched, as the necessary connections are strengthened.


We will recall (see Section 2.1) that the networks also contain metalinguisticnodes that activate information about context of use, phonological variation,etc. It must also be plausible to posit metalinguistic nodes to account forknowledge regarding non-overlap of conceptual configuration. This wouldaccount for the fact that most advanced bilinguals have at least some knowledgeof linguistic items in either L1 or L2 that are unique to the language in question,or for which the semantic structures of the two languages diverge in some(unexpected) way. The former would correspond to the extreme case of thescenario outlined above, where the search was unsuccessful. Even if not allbilinguals have such knowledge, it seems fair to assume that practicing transla-tors do: they are the ones who would repeat the search often enough.

Given that linguistic units access schematic networks, it is then necessary toconsider what happens once the network is activated. We saw in Section 2.3 thatmost schematic networks are asymmetrical in terms of cognitive salience. Thatis, some elements of either the matrix or the network are more central or salientthan others. To reiterate, certain nodes are more prominent than others: thoselinked to domains of space, vision, and sensory experience, those at a certainlevel of schematicity (basic-level categories) and those that are most deeplyentrenched (which “presumably correlates with frequency of activation”(Langacker 1987:380)). These three factors come together in the derivation of

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two key gravitational centers: the category prototype and the highest levelschema. The key idea here is that once a network is activated, particular force isexerted by these two kinds of structures. They must be expected to exert somesort of gravitational pull on the cognizer.

Interestingly, it is precisely this kind of effect that has been demonstrated inthe word-translation studies carried out by de Groot (1992a, 1992b, 1993). The

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translation effects demonstrated (as measured by translation speed, rate ofomission and error) were shown to be affected by the level of concreteness ofthe word in question. In short, subjects translate faster and more correctly themore concrete the word. De Groot links this to a discussion of the conceptualstructure of concrete words as opposed to more abstract ones. She states(previously quoted in Section 2.4):

It is unlikely that concreteness per se causes words that differ on this dimen-sion to be represented differently in bilingual memory. A more plausible causeis the degree of overlap between a pair of word translations, this overlappresumably being larger for concrete words than for abstract words. Thereason to assume this to be the case (de Groot 1992a; cf. Koler 1963:98) is that

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concrete words refer to entities whose function is likely to be the same across


languages. The outward appearance of these entities and the behaviours thatthey elicit are also likely to be similar across language communities becausethese relate directly to their function. (1993:40–41)

Without explicitly mentioning the term “basic-level”, de Groot has linked herresults unambiguously to this notion. The basic-level is defined as that categorylevel that is most cognitively significant to humans on the basis of perceptualand functional (behavioral) characteristics. The translation effects that de Groothas demonstrated and linked to conceptual structure are precisely those thatwould be predicted on the basis of a network model that incorporates cognitiveasymmetry. As mentioned in Section 2.3.2, the basic level is highly prominentin category hierarchies, which are one of the types of relationship found in anetwork. Given that the basic level is highly cognitively salient, we would expectthat salience, i.e. its asymmetrically prominent position, would have an effecton translation tasks also.

A final aspect of the dynamic functioning of semantic networks concernsthe role of frequency. As we saw in Section 2.1, repetition of usage events mayresult in a linguistic unit type’s achieving “unit status”; it is then considered tobe “entrenched” (Langacker 1987:100). Thus frequency plays a role in the

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development of schematic networks over time. First, “a high degree of en-trenchment is a major determinant of prototypicality” (Langacker 1987:38).

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Second, frequently encountered usage events that are similar, though notidentical, allow for the extraction of higher level schemas. With respect to theexpansion of categories, a certain level of frequency is required before a moreperipheral member is allowed into a category and before the categorizingrelationship will become entrenched.

Frequency has also been demonstrated to have effects on translationperformance in psycholinguistic experiments. Performance in word translationtasks (measured in response time, errors and omissions) is better for morehighly frequent words. The initial explanation for this is that words that arefrequently used in monolingual settings are also frequent in monolingualsettings in L2, and that this strengthens the links between the conceptual leveland the corresponding lexical representations in both languages. De Groot alsopoints out that words that are frequent in monolingual settings tend to befrequent in translation settings as well. According to de Groot, “Each transla-tion act will strengthen the link between the lexical representations of thetranslations that it traces. … Therefore, translating between these two wordswill gradually become more skilled” (1992a:15).


3.2 Effects of high cognitive salience on translation

The view of cognitive organization and function outlined above allows us tomake predictions about the effects of structural asymmetry in semantic net-works on translation tasks. The prediction that follows from the account givenabove is that, as a result of high cognitive salience, two particular types ofstructures will exert gravitational pull within a semantic network. Thesestructures are the category prototype and the highest level schema. My claim isthat the gravitational pull of these two types of structures can account for thepartially overlapping results found in studies of simplification and generaliza-tion (see below). Moreover, these same structures, I claim, will be able toaccount for patterns of normalization (Englund-Dimitrova 1997), sanitization

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(Kenny 1998), conventionalization (Baker 1993) and exaggeration of TL


features (Baker 1993). A similar account could also be given for Toury’s “law of

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growing standardization” (1995:267ff), which is a related idea.The basic idea is straightforward: in a translation task, a semantic network is

activated by lexical and grammatical structures in the ST.10 Within this activatednetwork, which also includes nodes for TL words and grammatical structures,highly salient structures will exert a gravitational pull, resulting in an overrepresen-tation in translation of the specific TL lexical and grammatical structures thatcorrespond to those salient nodes and configurations in the schematic network.11

It is precisely overrepresentation of this type that has been demonstrated inempirical studies. Perhaps the most thoroughly researched universal is simplifi-cation. Laviosa (2001) provides a review of the simplification literature, and

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points out that the studies carried out have varied considerably in both methodand conceptual apparatus. What is important within the current discussion,however, is that all of the studies she refers to (Blum-Kulka and Levenston

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1983, Vanderauwera 1985, Klaudy 1996) present evidence of simplification of


lexical relationships that supports the hypothesis given above. Blum-Kulka andLevenston discussed lexical choices in translation and found evidence forsystematic choice of superordinate lexical items where co-hyponyms would beexpected and the selection of more familiar TL words over their less familiarsynonyms.12 These two patterns would support the “pull” of a high-levelschema and of a category prototype (local or global) respectively.

Vanderauwera (1985) discusses what she views as reflections of “a tendency

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towards textual conventionality” (1985:93). This tendency is manifested in avariety of syntactic adjustments such as simplifying complex syntax, such asnon-finite clauses and suspended periods. Other patterns include splitting up


or shortening long structures and circumlocutions, omitting or reducingrepetitions and redundancies, and omitting modifying phrases and words (seeLaviosa 2001). Clearly, the manifestations of “textual conventionality” will vary

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from language to language and from text type to text type. However, if it is truethat translations are more conventional than their source texts, relative toprevailing norms,13 then this too is in line with the predictions of my hypothe-sis. Remember that prototypes may also be grammatical and pertain at everylevel of linguistic organization (see Taylor 1989).

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Lastly, Laviosa’s own findings on what she refers to as “core patterns oflexical use” (1998:565) are also precisely those that would be predicted by thehypothesis. In her 1998 article, Laviosa summarizes her key findings as follows:

i. Translated texts have a relatively lower percentage of content words versusgrammatical words (i.e. their lexical density is lower);

ii. The proportion of high frequency words versus low frequency words isrelatively higher in translated texts;

iii. The list head of a corpus of translated texts accounts for a larger area of thecorpus (i.e. the most frequent words are repeated more often)

iv. The list head of translated texts contains fewer lemmas. (Laviosa 1998:565)

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Laviosa’s findings provide clear evidence of overrepresentation in translatedtext (relative to non-translated texts) of high-frequency lexical items and a morelimited range of lexical choices in translations. The overall picture is that thetranslators have restricted their lexical choices to a narrow range of thoseavailable, and that the choices made have been words that are highly frequentin the target language. As mentioned earlier, asymmetry in schematic networksis linked to frequency, i.e. gaining status as category prototype is dependent onfrequency, and once established, prototypes are selected more frequently thanmore peripheral structures or items. Laviosa’s findings support the idea ofgravitational pull from category prototypes.

The proposed generalization universal is sometimes confounded withsimplification, as in Blum-Kulka and Levenston (1983). In this case, selection

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of a superordinate term is considered to be a form of simplification. Accordingto my hypothesis, however, the two would result from cognitive pull originatingin two different structures, i.e. prototypes and schemas. Generalization wouldthen originate from the pull of higher level schemas.

Klaudy (1996) also discusses generalization. She is concerned with classify-

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ing what she refers to as “translational operations” and with mapping those thatare forced by discrepancies between the linguistic systems involved and thosethat are not. Klaudy presents evidence for several subtypes of generalizations,


some of which are attributed to differences in lexicalization patterns in Hungar-ian as opposed to a set of Indo-European languages.

Clearly, cases like this are different than those we have considered earlier,where simplification/generalization occurred in spite of the existence oflinguistic items in the target language at the same level of complexity orgenerality. Translation choices in circumstances such as these are still affectedby salient structures, as the TL structures chosen are affected by frequency(prototype). However, in such instances the constraints of the systems inquestion are the most important conditioning factor. Presumably, patterns suchas these would not show up in an analysis of a comparable corpus, as the TLpatterns would closely resemble those found in non-translated text.

All in all, there is not an overwhelming amount of empirical evidence thatgeneralization is a universal of translation, though what evidence there issupports the hypothesis. Interestingly, a generalization strategy figures innumerous accounts of translation, both theoretical and pedagogical (for thelatter see e.g. Baker 1992), precisely in the conditions studied by Klaudy, i.e.

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difference in lexicalization patterns between SL and TL. In short, there issufficient cause to investigate this further.

Of the remaining universals, or general patterns, mentioned earlier in thissection, normalization, sanitization (Kenny 1998), conventionalization (Baker


1993) and exaggeration of TL features (Baker 1993), growing standardization

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(Toury 1995), most are still more or less likely candidates. There has been little

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empirical testing, though the methodologies for doing so seem to be in thepipeline (see especially Kenny 1998 and Malmkjær 1998). I might mention in


passing the findings of a study that I am currently working on involving theexpression of durative aspect in translation between Norwegian and English,using the English–Norwegian parallel corpus (http://www.hf.uio.no/iba/prosjekt). The figures indicate a clear and unambiguous overrepresentation ofthe present progressive in translations from Norwegian to English, relative tonon-translated English text (Halverson, in preparation). Indeed, in the ENPCdata, there were over twice as many instances of the present progressive intranslated texts, as opposed to non-translated. This is clear support for the ideathat TL features are overrepresented in translated text and is in line with thehypothesis of gravitational pull from category prototypes and global schemas.

At this point, a brief digression is in order, in the interest of clarification. Itmust be remembered that the gravitational pull posited here is in no way meantto function in a deterministic way. In other words, my claim is that such gravi-tational pull is in effect: not that it cannot be overridden if other competing

http://www.hf.uio.no/iba/prosjekt

http://www.hf.uio.no/iba/prosjekt


motivations are stronger. A case in point here is that of Toury’s “translation-specific lexical items” (Toury 1995:206ff). The phenomenon described and

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documented by Toury is that “… in translations, linguistic forms and structuresoften occur which are rarely, or perhaps even never encountered in utterancesoriginally composed in the target language” (1995:207–208). One might suspect,on the basis of the account of translation that I am presenting, that such a thingwould never occur, as there would be no link to a non-existing linguistic itemin the target language. This, I would suggest, is an instance in which extra-textual factors motivate the translator to create a new word. Such factors may berelated to any of a number of situational circumstances, for instance the role ofthe ST author, the role/position of the translator herself, the position of the STauthor in the target literary system, etc. Thus, the cognitive semantic structureand the forces working there are not a closed system: co-textual and contextualfactors are also operating in any given translation event.14

To return from this brief, but important, digression and to sum up: most ofthe candidates for the status of translation universal would represent processesthat substantiate the prediction outlined at the beginning of this section: as aresult of high cognitive salience, the category prototype and the highest levelschema will exert gravitational pull within a semantic network. The labels“tendency towards conventional grammaticality”, “normalization”, and“standardization”, I argue, all designate essentially the same thing, and repre-sent the effects of gravitational pull exerted by category prototypes. At present,simplification is a more theoretically refined notion, and has the best empiricalsupport. The basic difference between the latter, simplification, and the formerthree seems to be that the former are often, though not always (see Kenny 1998),

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defined in terms of syntactic relationships, while the latter is defined as a semanticrelationship (with the exception of Laviosa). However, in a unified account ofsemantic structure such as Langacker’s presented in Section 2, the differences areof degree and not kind. This means that the intrinsic similarity between lexicalsimplification, as, for instance, investigated by Blum-Kulka and Levenston andLaviosa, and the tendency towards syntactic simplification as studied byVanderauwera, are caused by the same underlying principles. The sameunderlying principle would also account for all of universals mentioned here.15

3.3 Effects of low cognitive salience and low arc strengths on translation

As mentioned in Section 2.2.3, it is not always the case that specific nodes within aschematic network will be distinguished as either prototype or general schema.


The point was made that the type of cognitive organization posited does notrequire that this be the case in every structure. This point is important, as itdemonstrates an important constraint on the types of generalizations that mightbe made in claiming the existence of “universal” patterns of translation. Weshall return to this point later in this section and in the concluding section.

The account of cognitive organization and processing that is put forwardhere will nonetheless allow for hypotheses here as well. The converse of whatwas found in highly asymmetrical networks will be predicted. In other words:In networks with no clearly distinguished prototype or general schema, therewill not be overrrepresentation of linguistic structures corresponding toconceptual nodes for such structures. Instead, a range of translation selectionswill be found.16

The research done on word translation by de Groot has already demonstrat-ed the likelihood of such a result. We will recall that in word translation tasks,subjects showed slower response times and more omissions and errors intranslation of abstract words than concrete ones (de Groot 1992, 1993). As was

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mentioned in the discussion in Section 2.4.2, de Groot’s view is that theseresults may be attributed to the underlying conceptual representation, which,in the case of abstract words, involves fewer shared meaning nodes.

In the discussion in Section 3.1, we also saw that in a model involvingdistributed representations, there will also be items, presumably in both of abilingual’s two languages, which share no nodes with items in the otherlanguage. The logical prediction from this will also be greater variation amonga group of translators, as the search and resulting activation routines are highlylikely to vary.17

Interestingly, this type of effect may be what is found in studies of under-representation of typical TL features (Tirkonnen-Condit 2001, Mauranen


2000). In these studies, the reverse of the proposed translation universal“exaggeration of target language features” is demonstrated. In the case of theformer study, the linguistic items studied were a particular type of Finnish verb,verbs of sufficiency, and two clitic pragmatic particles. In the latter, the itemsstudied were metatextual connectors and verbs. In Tirkonnen-Condit’s study,the TL-specific items were clearly underrepresented in the translation corpus.In Mauranen’s study, the picture was somewhat more complicated. I willaddress various aspects of these studies in the following.

It is highly interesting that in the introduction to her paper, Tirkonnen-Condit discusses the issue of frequency, here related to “unique” items, i.e.items that are unique “in the sense that they lack straightforward translation


equivalents” (2001:2). She states that in a pilot study, “the single linguisticphenomenon shared by those texts which most readers believed to be originaltexts — whether this was in fact the case or not — was their relatively highfrequency of the unique elements” (ibid). This is a further indication that nativespeakers are highly sensitive to frequency relationships, and that they use themin evaluation tasks.

However, in light of the current discussion, the most interesting aspect ofTirkonnen-Condit’s results is that in translation situations where there is noconceptual overlap between the nodes associated with a given TL structure and anyspecific SL structure, there is underrepresentation of that TL structure relative tonon-translated text. Her case is, of course, the extreme, as there is no conceptualoverlap at all. To put this in another way, the networks accessed by various SLstructures are only very distantly and weakly connected, if at all, to the networksfor the TL structures in question here.18 Thus there is no cognitive salience inimmediately accessed networks acting as a force in the translation of such items.

A rather different situation arises in the case of Mauranen’s connectors andmetatextual verbs. Here the schematic networks can be assumed to be shared tosome degree, though the number of common nodes will presumably be fewerin this abstract, pragmatic domain than is the case with more concrete items.This would be similar to de Groot’s example of father/vader as opposed to idea/idee, as shown in Figures 3a and 3b. Mauranen’s results for connectors show amixed picture, with few significant differences between translated and non-translated text. However, analysis of one specific connector, toisalta, revealedthat it was clearly underrepresented in translated text. This specific connectorwas described as being “mildly contrastive in meaning” and as “a more vague orgeneral transition marker than either of its most direct English equivalents”.Moreover, “… it generally appears to indicate that the writer is moving on toanother point in the discourse … It could be described as having a kind ofgeneral additive sense …” (Mauranen 2000:126).

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Mauranen describes the results of her analysis of toisalta as follows:

In all, the English translations of toisalta showed a good deal of variation,including a fair amount of non-translation. It seems, then, that the varioussenses of toisalta were reflected in the translations into English, whereastranslations into Finnish were more narrowly confined to rendering the mostobvious sources (on the one hand/on the other hand). (2000:129)

These results would be as expected given the outline of cognitive organizationand functioning as presented in Sections 2 and 3.1. If the access node to the


“mildly contrastive/transitional/additive” network is provided by the Finnishtoisalta, then its numerous links, through its various senses, to alternativetranslations in English will result in a variety of English translations. If theaccess node is one of many contrastive/transitional/additive connectors inEnglish, then the chances of converging on toisalta in Finnish are less. It seems,on the basis of this evidence, that for Mauranen’s native speakers of Finnish, the“on the one hand/on the other hand” sense must be most salient, or central, oftoisalta’s many senses: it is virtually the only reliable trigger to its activation, atleast from English.

Mauranen’s analysis of metatextual verbs demonstrated a higher frequencyof such verbs in translated Finnish than in non-translated Finnish. This resultis considered in light of text type and relative cultural position (hegemonicsource culture, dominated target culture). Mauranen also demonstrates that theFinnish translations show different collocational patterning than the originalFinnish, i.e. “less stable”, or in many cases, “a different and/or more variedpattern of combinatorial choices” (2000:137). The interesting point in Maura-nen’s discussion here concerns the issue of frequency, which is central to ourentire discussion. In her conclusion, Mauranen discusses the issue as follows:

How does this relate, then to the assumption that translations tend to be morerestricted and conventional in their choices? The findings can well be seen ascompatible with those obtained by Laviosa (1996 and 1998), and which have

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since received support from other studies, namely that translations tend tooveruse most frequent lexis. Even if the combinations are unusual or infre-quent in original texts, the individual items that constitute the combinationsmay still be frequent. (ibid)

Thus as Mauranen says, even if translations show non-typical patterns, thetranslators still show effects of frequency, and according to our account, effectsof cognitive salience. Remember that centrality in prototype categories is notabsolute, it is statistical. In other words, centrality will show variation alsowithin a native speaker population. Thus, Mauranen’s subjects are still demon-strating centrality effects, even though their performance may be “non-typical”.

The lesson to be learned from all of this is quite simple. Analyses aimed atthe investigation of translation universals must be contingent on the type ofsemantic network that is tapped into in any given instance. In short, differenteffects may be expected dependent on the structure of the network, includingthe types of connections within it, their varying strengths, the number of nodesshared and resulting distance between L1 and L2 items, the question of activa-tion from one or the other language and the existence of any type of asymmetry


within the network. As we have seen, both over and underrepresentation of TLitems may be expected, depending on the structure of the network in question.Thus, attempts at verification or falsification of hypothesized translationuniversals must be specified at this level, and, crucially, must take into accountthe two languages involved, as well as the direction of translation.19 I will returnto this issue in Section 4.1 and in the conclusion.

4. Additional effects and origins of cognitive salience and asymmetry

Translation is a typically metalinguistic activity, in that it involves reflexiveawareness of linguistic activity. The same is true of another linguistic environ-ment, i.e. second language acquisition. The two cases differ in many respects,but they share this fundamental characteristic.

In the context of the current discussion, it is relevant to consider whethercognitive asymmetry, or variations in cognitive salience, has similar or compa-rable effects in an acquisition context. In other words, do highly salient struc-tures exert gravitational pull on language learners? The hypothesis must besimilar to that for translation, i.e. that linguistic structures corresponding toparticularly salient areas of a schematic network, e.g. the prototype and/orhigher-level schemas, will be overrepresented in learner language.

4.1 Asymmetry effects in second language acquisition (SLA)

As we might expect, there is evidence of such overrepresentation in secondlearner language.

Blum-Kulka and Levenston’s (1983) discussion of lexical simplification in

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translation, mentioned in Section 3.2, was related to Levenston and Blum’s

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(1977) research on similar processes in second language acquisition. Levenstonand Blum found that “the learner will use words of more general meaning andapplicability to a greater extent than the native speaker” (1977:62). Thoughtheir investigation was carried out within a different paradigm, their findingsprovide clear and unambiguous support for our hypothesis.

Similar results are reported in Hasselgren (1993). In her study, Hasselgren

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compared language learner and native speaker lexical choices. As part of thestudy, she identified a set of “core items”, specifically, give, get, take, have, know,keep, tell and make. Hasselgren defines “core items”as “familiar, all-purposeitems” (1993:22), a definition based on traditional notions from SLA research.


For our purposes, these may be considered representative of highly salientstructures: prototypes and/or schemas. It is relevant that two of these verbs, getand make, are identified as so-called “light verbs” in the child language acquisi-tion literature. These verbs are considered cognitively basic and representativeof high-level schemas that are derived from basic patterns of experience (seeGoldberg 1998).

<LINK "hal-r14">

In Hasselgren’s study, the relative frequency of selection of these items incloze tests was calculated for the two groups of subjects, native speakers andsecond language learners. Her results showed that,

In all cases, the learners supplied relatively more cores than the native speakers,and the chi-square for the whole task, being far in excess of the 3.84 requiredfor a 95% reliability level of significance, heavily supports the theory thatlearners use more core transitive verbs than do native speakers. (1993:109)

These results are also precisely as predicted.In another study, Ijaz (1986) studied “linguistic and cognitive determinants

<LINK "hal-r20">

of lexical acquisition in a second language”. Adopting a prototype approach,Ijaz investigated native speaker and language learner use of a set of semanticallyrelated English prepositions, i.e. on, on top of, upon, onto, over, and above. Ijazdemonstrated that centrality of category membership was a key determinant inlanguage learners’ acquisition of lexical items. Several of her findings areinteresting in light of our discussion. First, in instances where the centralmembers (prototypes) of L1 and L2 categories were the same, the languagelearners showed much more native-like lexical use. As Ijaz describes it, “ESLlearners … approximate native speakers more closely in the meaning theyascribe to typical or central instances of semantic categories than in the mean-ing ascribed to noncentral ones” (1986:433). She explains her findings concern-ing the specific categories of spatial relationships she studied with reference tothe “basic-level” at which the most central members were found. Thus we seethe effect of centrality (prototype pull) and level of schematicity (basic-level) onlearner’s linguistic choices.

Second, Ijaz found that the native speakers and language learners performdifferently as regards less central members and boundaries of semantic categories.In explaining this, Ijaz claims that language learners operate in accordance withwhat she refers to as a “semantic equivalence hypothesis” (1986:437). The claimis that, “conceptual patterns and linguistic/semantic coding practices in the L1provide the essential criteria for those in the L2” (ibid). This means that forlexical categories with diverging structure in L1 and L2, the structure of the L1


category is utilized in lexical decisions in L2, resulting in nonnative patterning.Ijaz describes two nonnative lexical patterns, over- and underuse. Overuse

was demonstrated when the most central member of a category was selected bylanguage learners where a native selected a less central member in the samecontext. This is gravitational pull, in our terms. In the case of underuse,category distinctions that were missing in L1, but present in L2 resulted inunderuse of corresponding lexical items in L2. In other words, languagelearners did not as frequently access L2 structures that did not share configura-tions with their L1 networks. This cross-linguistic asymmetry is precisely whatwas found by Mauranen and Tirkonnen-Condit, as discussed in Section 3.3.

Another result from Ijaz’ study is interesting in light of our discussion. Ijazfound that, “in some instances, nontypical meaning features of close translationequivalents to on in the subjects’ native language were not transferred to the L2,although such transfer would have resulted in the use of an appropriateresponse term in English” (1986:439). This is a case in which the posited“semantic equivalence hypothesis” is overridden. As Ijaz puts it, “it is possiblethat because a noncentral meaning feature … was involved, subjects werereluctant to transfer this meaning” (1986:440). Ijaz also cites similar resultsfound in studies by Kellerman (1978, 1979), who found that “of the polysemous

<LINK "hal-r23">

senses of Dutch breken, central ones were transferred more readily to an L2 thannoncentral ones” (Ijaz 1986:446). These findings are clearly effects of cognitive

<LINK "hal-r20">

asymmetry working in two ways: willingness to “transfer” central meanings,and unwillingness to do the same for noncentral meanings. Ijaz points out,however, that noncentrality in itself cannot account for her subjects’ overridingthe semantic equivalence hypothesis in the case in point. As she points out,coping with noncentral senses in lexical categories is also affected by linguisticsalience phenomena linked to the specific items in question.

In short, though not expressly designed to do so, several SLA studies haveprovided evidence very similar to that found in translation studies. Thesestudies indicate that lexical choices in a metalinguistic environment aresensitive to the asymmetric structure of semantic networks. All of this evidencesupports the hypothesis put forward, i.e. that asymmetry in cognitive structures,or alternatively, variations in cognitive salience, will have effects on translationchoices. These will include overrepresentation of linguistic items correspondingto gravitational centers in networks where such are found and, conversely,underrepresentation of corresponding linguistic items in networks where eitherno or several such centers are found.

One aspect of Ijaz’ study requires further comment, and that is her “semantic


equivalence hypothesis”. We recall that this hypothesis claims that languagelearners “assume” similarity of conceptual structure between their two languag-es, and that it is the structure of L1 that serves as the standard. Though Ijaz’discussion utilizes the vocabulary of SLA, including such terms as “assume”,“strategy”, the actual claim of the hypothesis could be reformulated in order tolink it to the key hypothesis under consideration here. The main idea is that thestructure of the L1 network exerts pressure and pull which is greater, the lesscentral a potential L2 item is its own network, i.e. as a consequence of asymme-try. There was also evidence to suggest that centrality within the L1 networkitself is significant for L2 choices. This idea could be investigated in terms ofnode connections and arc strengths, and this would further add to our under-standing of cognition in bilingual processes. There are also serious consequenc-es for the investigation of translation, in that these findings suggest that thequestion of directionality needs to be considered in much more detail.

4.2 Origins of asymmetric structure

Fundamental to the cognitive project is the assumption that cognition andlanguage are embodied, i.e. that structures and processes are inherently part andparcel of our human body, and that they are a result of our situated (in-the-body) interactions with our surrounding environment. Features of the humanperceptual apparatus and various aspects of our biological and social function-ing are thus integral to the kinds of structure that evolve over time. As aconsequence, the fundamental “human-ness” of cognitive patterning meansthat the processes and structures described here, for instance, will be universal,though their actual realizations will vary within a constrained space. (For moredetailed discussions see Johnson 1987, Heine 1997.)


The idea of cognitive salience and asymmetry in semantic structure, whichis the focus of the current discussion, is intrinsically linked to the notions ofembodiment and environmental interaction. The two types of structures we havediscussed, prototypes and schemas, have been demonstrated to arise out ofprecisely such factors, for instance perceptual characteristics, behavioral patterns,including functions, etc. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of the currentdiscussion to provide a discussion of this area. The point here is that the origins ofthe structures posited here as gravitational centers have been extensively docu-mented. For relevant discussions, see e.g. Barsalou (1992, esp. Chapter 2), Gibbs


and Colston (1995), Heine (1997), Lakoff (1987), Langacker (1987), Johnson

<LINK "hal-r19"><LINK "hal-r27"><LINK "hal-r28"><LINK "hal-r22">

(1987). For specific applications in linguistic analysis, see e.g. Goldberg (1998).

<LINK "hal-r14">


It is also important to mention, in this context, that studies of child languageacquisition have also demonstrated the kinds of effects that we have been discuss-ing. In other words, the linguistic items corresponding to category prototypes havebeen demonstrated to be learned earlier (Lakoff 1987:46ff). Similarly, “light

<LINK "hal-r27">

verbs”, corresponding to basic event schemas, play a key role in child languageacquisition (see Goldberg 1998 for discussion; see also Tomasello 1999).


The key idea presented in this section is quite simple. The gravitational pullof certain cognitive structures has been demonstrated in the production ofsecond language learners. The same structures have been demonstrated to playa particular role in children’s linguistic development. These same structures aretaken to originate in fundamental characteristics of human beings, theirenvironments, and the interaction between them. The overall significance ofthese same structures in translation tasks should not come as any surprise.

5. Conclusion

In this section, I will conclude, first of all, by placing my account into the largerlandscape of Translation Studies. This will involve addressing the issue ofexplanation. Secondly, I will try to make explicit the precise implications of myview for further research into translation universals. Some indications havebeen touched upon in the course of the discussion, and these will be statedmore directly here.

5.1 Description, explanation and generalization

In her seminal 1993 article, Baker defined “universal features of translation” as“… features which typically occur in translated text rather than original utterancesand which are not the result of interference from specific linguistic systems”(1993:243). In Toury’s empirical/descriptive translation science, the aim ofempirical science is to elaborate an increasingly coherent set of probabilistic laws.Such laws would be formulated as sets of conditional statements as follows:

If X, then the greater/the lesser the likelihood that Y

(where Y is an observed behavior, or a certain part/aspect thereof, and/or theirobservable result, and X is the conditioning factor). (Toury 1995:265)

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Baker’s universals are, in fact, potential probabilistic laws of this sort. In areformulation such as the above, the potential patterns constitute the Y in the


schema: they are the observed behavior, or candidates for it. The X is not explicitlystated, but is understood to be something intrinsic to translation as such.

What makes this kind of statement so interesting is, of course, its status ina science. Generally speaking, the aim of science is to achieve “better” or“deeper” understanding of some phenomenon or set of phenomena. Under-standing is equated with explanation of what has been observed. Moreover, oneof the main assumptions on which empirical science rests is that broadergeneralizations constitute explanations of a deeper nature, relative to the objectof study. In other words, the more observations that can be accounted for, themore variables that can be controlled for, the closer we are to the basic, orfundamental “nature” of the object. To take Translation Studies as an example,the idea is that if we can describe features of translated texts that characterizetranslations independent of source language/culture, target language/culture,the relationships between the languages/cultures, the individual translator,his/her working conditions, the point in time when the translation was created,etc., then we are approaching something deep about translation as such (seeToury 1997:75f on factors that impact translation).

<LINK "hal-r44">

It is important to mention that the aim for the broadest possible generaliza-tions, or “universal laws”, probabilistic or otherwise, is common to all empiricalscience, regardless of the status assigned to the highest level generalizations. Bysome, universal laws may be regarded as statements of objective “truth”. Byothers, they may be considered theory-laden statements imbued with theperspective or perspectives of the human observer. In either case, generaliza-tions are the objective.20

In attempting to sort out the relative positions of current studies ontranslation universals and my own view, I find it helpful to adopt Croft’sapproach to linguistic explanation (1990:246ff). Croft (see also Greenberg 1968,

<LINK "hal-r15">

1979, Bybee 1988) presents “a more general framework for characterizing the

<LINK "hal-r8">

notion of explanation in terms of generalization” (1990:248). This frameworkis described as follows:

Instead of using the dichotomy of “description” vs. “explanation”, one candescribe grammatical analysis (or any other sort of scientific analysis, for thatmatter) with a scalar concept of degrees of generalization. The basic concept isthat a more general linguistic statement can be said to explain a more specificone, though it may itself be explained by a yet more general statement. Thus,any given statement is an explanation for a lower-level generalization, but adescription in comparison to a higher-level generalization. (ibid)


Croft continues to elaborate on the three levels of generalization that are“significant for approaches to human languages” (1990:247):

The first level is the lowest, the level of observation, that is what constitutes thebasic facts of language. … The second level is actually a set of levels, the levelsof internal generalization. The third is that of external generalization, at whichthe linguist invokes concepts from psychology, biology and other realmsoutside the structure of the language.

In my view, this is a very fruitful way to address the issue of explanation withrespect to Translation Studies in general, and universals research in particular.If we are to fit current corpus-based studies21 into this scheme, then parallel-corpus studies would be found at the first level, where translation-relevantrelationships and structures are mapped in the context of specific languagepairs. In Croft’s account, the second level, internal generalization, involveslanguage internal and cross-linguistic generalization. Croft’s example here isrelative clause structure in English, which could be compared either with othercomplex clause structures in English, leading to generalization over suchcomplex sentence structures in English, or to relative clauses in other languages,leading to generalizations over similar structures across human languages. ForTranslation Studies, an analogous distinction can be illustrated in the investiga-tions of simplification that we have considered earlier. For instance, at the firstlevel, studies such as Blum-Kulka and Levenston (1983) and Vanderauwera

<LINK "hal-r5">

(1995) identify and exemplify simplification in translation between specificlanguage pairs and with respect to specific linguistic indicators. Second-levelgeneralizations over these studies may be based on either the linguistic indica-tors (e.g. specific lexical relationships or patterns of syntactic reduction), or oncross-language-pair comparisons of similar findings (e.g. Klaudy’s 1996

<LINK "hal-r25">

generalizations over translation between a set of Indo-European languages andHungarian). Baker’s proposed universals and investigations such as Laviosa’s

<LINK "hal-r29">

(1996, 1998) using the comparable corpus methodology represent generaliza-tions at this level. The comparable corpus methodology aims at second-levelgeneralizations in that it neutralizes the role of the specific languages involved.Thus it is analogous to cross-linguistic comparisons in Croft’s framework.

The third level of explanation is, as we recall, external generalization. At thislevel, explanations invoke language-external factors rooted in human psycholo-gy (and biology), sociology, etc. The highest level explanations, then, involverecourse to independently established features of human biological adaptation,through the intervening levels of cognition and social/cultural behavior (see


also Chesterman 2001 on causes of translation universals).

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At present, research into translation universals has reached the stage ofsecond-level generalizations. The proposed universals (or hypothetical univer-sals) represent generalizations over numerous studies, and as such are explana-tory with respect to individual studies of particular linguistic realizations and/orlanguage pairs. What remains is to suggest third-level generalizations, i.e.explanations for these, which is precisely the objective of the present paper.22

I might conclude by returning to the general schema outlined by Toury, asmentioned in the introductory paragraph. The converse hypotheses put forwardin this paper with respect to the role of cognitive asymmetry/salience intranslation tasks will also fit into the schema. The observed behavior (Y) wouldbe patterns of simplification, generalization, conventionalization, etc., while theconditioning factor (X) is the presence/absence of particular salience structures.It still remains to be seen whether the observed behavior is particular totranslation. Previous research suggests that it is not (see Section 4).

5.2 Researching translation universals

In this final section, I draw together several threads from the proceedingdiscussion in order to delineate the implications of my argument for futureresearch on translation universals. Let me be quite explicit at the outset, myargument does not entail a major revision of current practices. What is doesprovide is two things: first, the hypotheses that I have argued for here are aninitial attempt to provide explanations for the types of results that have beenemerging to date. Secondly, the discussion in Section 5.1 represents a means ofunifying the research program by providing an overall framework within whichthe various studies can be related to each other. A lack of such coordination isa concern that several others have addressed previously, e.g. Chesterman

<LINK "hal-r9">

(2001), Englund-Dimitrova (2001), Laviosa (2001). In the following, I will


consider these two issues in turn.First, my argument on the structure and functioning of schematic semantic

networks and their role in translation provides a pair of converse hypothesesthat constitute third-level generalizations. In other words, in the event that theyare adequately substantiated, they will have explanatory power with respect totranslation universals as they are commonly studied. This is a first attempt toprovide the type of analysis that has been called for by Chesterman (2001, 2000)

<LINK "hal-r9">

and Laviosa (1998), among others. It is important to point out, however, that the

<LINK "hal-r29">

cognitive factors that I have described are by no means the only external factors


that may be posited. Indeed, as I suggested in Section 5.1, there are also social/cultural factors that must come into play. I might note, however, that for theuniversals thus far posited and investigated, I believe that the cognitive factorsare far more important than the social ones. This remains to be seen, however.

A further point that is of great significance with respect to the hypothesesput forward is that cognitive salience/asymmetry in a semantic network is notto be understood as deterministic in any sense. That is, cognitive salience in anetwork will not be an absolute predictor of translation choices. Other factorsmay override the gravitational pull described here in any given case. Context,obviously, will constrain activation patterns. The argument is, rather, thattranslated language at an aggregate level will show an overall over- or under-representation of specific structures, which is a probabilistic, i.e. statistical, kindof claim that will pertain to larger bodies of text, rather than specific, individualinstances of linguistic items.

I believe that Croft’s hierarchy of levels of generalization provides a fruitfulmeans of relating different studies to each other. If, in specific studies ofuniversals, we can make explicit the type of generalization we are aiming at,then a number of methodological inconsistencies will be eliminated. If weremember the two types of internal generalization at level two this becomesclear. Recall Croft’s example of relative clauses in English, and how descriptionsof such structures might be compared to other complex clause types in Englishor to relative clause constructions in different languages. Analogously, to takeanother translation universal that we have not discussed thus far, i.e. explici-tation, we might distinguish between two types of investigation, aimed atdifferent kinds of generalizations. In the first, we might consider variouslinguistic means of achieving explicitation, i.e. filling-in of ellipses (see Lie

<LINK "hal-r32">

1998), addition of connectives (Halverson 1996), etc. These would be studied

<LINK "hal-r17">

in specific language pairs prior to generalization. In the second, we mightconsider the same linguistic indicator, e.g. connectives, in translation betweennumerous language pairs. The two types of analysis would require two differentkinds of corpora: the first parallel corpora and the second multilingual corpora.Clearly, generalizations would be based on the results of many individualempirical investigations.

The comparable corpus methodology deserves a special comment in thisconnection. In the examples mentioned above, comparisons were suggestedbetween source and target texts. In the comparable corpus methodology, as weknow, comparisons are between translated and non-translated text in the samelanguage. It may appear then, that I see no place for a comparable corpus based


approach. This is not so. As we saw in Section 3.2, analyses of the type carriedout by Laviosa (1998; Laviosa-Braithwaite 1996) are instrumental at a key stage


in the investigation, as they provide large-scale statistical pictures of the typethat we must ultimately achieve. The role such analyses play is thus a heuristicone, and one that is vital precisely for the type of hypothesis generation that hasbeen so rewarding and productive thus far. The analyses that I suggest at leveltwo above thus represent the next stage in a finer grained testing of the univer-sals hypotheses.

In short, analyses such as those carried out by Laviosa, and later Mauranenand Tirkonnen-Condit, are instrumental and crucial for hypothesis generation.As we saw, however, broad generalizations such as “exaggeration of TL fea-tures” are too coarse, and are fallaciously “falsified” by studies such as Maura-

<LINK "hal-r35">

nen’s (2000) and Tirkonnen-Condit’s (2001). By deriving finer-grained

<LINK "hal-r42">

hypotheses on the basis of external factors (potential third-level generaliza-tions), we avoid the risk of prematurely abandoning good hypotheses.

Thus, I see a development of the research tradition through a combinationof hypothesis generation using the Baker/Laviosa comparable corpus methodol-ogy with finer grained analyses of the kind I argue for here. In investigatinggravitational pull in schematic networks, I recommend adaptation of methodol-ogy presented in the study by Ijaz (1986), including the mapping of the concep-

<LINK "hal-r20">

tual networks. Such mapping would determine the relevant center(s) of gravity,or lack thereof, and consequently make predictions about translational effects.An important question here is brought to light by studies such as Klaudy

<LINK "hal-r25">

(1996), which demonstrates that generalization in the movement from ST to TTmay be forced by constraints in the networks, i.e. differences in lexicalization.I would argue that such networks are less relevant here as their explanations liein language-internal (level two) constraints. It is patterns of simplification/generalization, etc. that are found in circumstances where there is no linguisticmotivation for them that allow for third-level, external explanations.

In the interest of time economy, researchers interested in pursuing thisapproach could make use of extant network mappings and proceed to prediction.Mappings exist for numerous linguistic items in a variety of languages in thecognitive linguistics literature. Predictions regarding translational effects based onthese mappings could then be tested on corpus or experimental data. Thus themovement is from comparable corpus to monolingual corpora to parallel corpora,as hypotheses are generated, refined, and tested further. Step two will involve thedetailed mapping of individual networks, and, due to the detail and complexityof the analysis will probably never be carried out for more than exemplary cases.


This is, admittedly, a sketchy view, at best. Further development of method-ology is obviously a requisite next step. However, even at this early stage, thecontours of certain relevant issues are already visible. As we saw in Sections 2.4and 3.1, the direction of translation into or out of the translator’s mothertongue is crucial in this kind of account. Even such issues as the translator’sbilingual history are not to be taken lightly. For the time being, my objective isgain recognition for the explanatory power of asymmetry in cognitive structuresand processes in accounting for general lexical/semantic/syntactic patterns intranslated text. An ancillary agreement to adopt an overall explanation/general-ization framework would also be nice.

Notes

*�Many thanks to Gideon Toury and another anonymous reader for helpful comments on

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an earlier version of this paper.

1. The use of the term “universal” is not unproblematic, as witnessed by the debate duringthe panel discussion on translation universals at the Third EST Congress in August 2001. Forvarious reasons, I personally prefer Laviosa’s notion of “core patterns” or the scalar notionof generalization outlined in Section 5. As “universals” is the term in current use in the field,however, I shall utilize it here without addressing its actual content.

2. This is, of course, reminiscent of the discussion of automated processes in translationprocess analysis (Jääskeläinen and Tirkonnen-Condit 1991), though there are important

<LINK "hal-r21">

differences as well. For instance, the notion of consciousness/awareness is not equated withany specific level of entrenchment as it is with automation. This and related issues will,however, not be pursued further here.

3. The literature on protoype categories is quite extensive. Important early references includeBerlin and Kay (1969), Rosch (1975, 1978). Further discussion of the notion of prototypi-


cality is found in Geeraerts (1989). For a survey of the development of the prototype account

<LINK "hal-r12">

of categorization see Lakoff (1987).

<LINK "hal-r27">

4. As Langacker himself has pointed out, his concept of complex domain is compatible with,or partially overlaps similar notions of scenes, frames, scripts, and idealized cognitive models(1987:150, note 4; see also Taylor 1989:87–90). It is not possible to explore potential

<LINK "hal-r40">

complementarities at length here, though there may be significant gains in doing so.

5. In the following, I follow Langacker in focussing on two levels at which asymmetry issignificant. These two “levels” are sufficient for the task at hand. Geeraerts (2000) has

<LINK "hal-r12">

provided a more detailed taxonomy of what he refers to as “salience phenomena” which arethe same as the asymmetry effects discussed here. His initial cut between “perspectival” and“variational” salience corresponds roughly to the aspects of asymmetry located in domains/matrices and networks, respectively.


6. For the antecedents of the model see de Groot 1992. For references to similar approaches

<LINK "hal-r16">

in studies of lexical structure in monolingual settings, see de Groot 1993.

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7. This is not to say that either cognitive psychology and/or cognitive grammar ultimatelyreduce to neuroscience. For a discussion of an alternative to theory reduction, see Bechtel

<LINK "hal-r3">

1988, especially Chapter 6.

8. This is also discussed by de Groot (1993), albeit in a different context, in her argument for

<LINK "hal-r16">

a “mixed representational system”.

9. After all, as we remember from Jakobson, “All cognitive experience and its classificationis conveyable in any existing language” (in Chesterman 1989:56). And, “Languages differ

<LINK "hal-r9">

essentially in what they must convey, not what they may convey” (in Chesterman 1989:58).

<LINK "hal-r9">

10. Remember that grammatical structures are also symbolic, and that they too contributeto the selection of access nodes at the conceptual level.

11. Such overrepresentation may either be relative to non-translated text in the targetlanguage or relative to an (imagined) translation equivalent that would correspond preciselyto the semantic representation of the ST item. In other words, the relationships that areevaluated and found to be “simpler”, “more normal”, “more conventional”, etc. may pertaineither between an ST and a TT item, or between TT items and broader TL patterns. It isimportant to keep these two separate, however, as they are important at different stages in aninvestigation. This is discussed further in Section 5.2. For a discussion of these and otherissues related to classification of “translation universals”, see Chesterman 2001.

<LINK "hal-r9">

12. They also discussed “approximation, word coinage and the use of converse terms”(Blum-Kulka and Levenston 1983) in addition to “transfer” in their discussion of “commu-

<LINK "hal-r5">

nication strategies of lexical simplification”. These three can also be described in terms ofcognitive organization and functioning presented in Section 2. However, these patterns arenot generally associated with simplification in other studies, and they are of a different kind.These processes would be related to search processes, and may or may not involve the pullof salient structures. Approximation might be related to category centrality and/or frequency,while the other two could be found in cases where no such highly salient structures wereactivated. This remains speculative at the present stage, however.

13. It is important to note that “norm” necessarily entails a cognitive component. In otherwords, “conventionality” will be linked to high frequency, which is, in turn, related tosalience in the schematic network.

14. Thank you to Gideon Toury for bringing up this issue. See Toury (1995:206ff) for further

<LINK "hal-r44">

discussion and references to additional work on the subject.

15. Another of Baker’s initial universals, explicitation, has also been the subject of someinvestigation (Blum-Kulka 1986, Klaudy 1996, Halverson 1996, Lie 1998, Øverås 1996). This

<LINK "hal-r5"><LINK "hal-r25"><LINK "hal-r17"><LINK "hal-r32"><LINK "hal-r46">

universal is not being dealt with in the present paper not because I don’t believe that it doesnot have a cognitive explanation. Indeed, I believe it does and that such an explanation isrelated to the notion of construal (see Halverson 2001). This is a different issue, however,

<LINK "hal-r17">

and must be dealt with separately.

16. The dynamic and flexible nature of prototype categories cannot be overemphasized.Indeed, empirical research has shown that category structure varies both across individuals


within a community and across individuals over time (Barsalou 1987). Significantly,

<LINK "hal-r2">

members of prototype categories are more or less central, and the most central member isnot most central in any absolute sense.

17. This is not to say that there may not be an “accepted” or conventional translation forsuch an item. Oftentimes it is the case for items that are highly relevant in one way oranother that translation trainees are taught to use such a conventional translation. In such aninstance, corpora will reveal an unexpectedly high convergence on a translation.

18. There must be a distance connection for Tirkonnen-Condit’s verbs of sufficiency. Thenotion of sufficiency in itself is not specific to Finnish. However, its encoding in a verbalstructure distinguishes Finnish from many other languages, and makes the accessing of theseverbs from very different access points a more laborious cognitive task. See note 6.

19. The issue of directionality is one that has not been given the significance that it is due inTranslation Studies, though see Marmaridou (1996) and Pokorn (2001). Thankfully most of


the corpora that are coming into existence provide information on the translator and his/herlinguistic biography, such that this factor may be controlled for.

20. This crucial point is often misunderstood, as empirical aims are mistakenly equated witha quest for absolute truth. See the Forum discussion on “Shared ground in translationstudies” in Target 12:2 and 13:1, specifically Halverson (2000).

<LINK "hal-r17">

21. I utilize Baker’s (1995) categories of translational corpora in the discussion.

<LINK "hal-r1">

22. Mauranen (2001) argued for three types of translation universal, i.e. cognitive, social and

<LINK "hal-r35">

linguistic. Within the current framework, the first two would be level three, as they wouldposit explanatory factors in cognitive processes and social/historical contexts, respectively.The latter, linguistic universals, would be at the second level. Similarly, Chesterman (2001)

<LINK "hal-r9">

was concerned with classification of universals, and posited three types: prescriptive,pejorative, and descriptive. The first two categories, prescriptive and pejorative, have moreto do with predictions about attitudes to translations than about translations themselves. Thelatter, descriptive universals, covers what I have referred to as level-two generalizations.

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Baker, Mona. 1993. “Corpus Linguistics and Translation Studies: Implications and applica-tions”. Mona Baker, Gill Francis and Elena Tognini-Bonelli, eds. Text and technology: Inhonour of John Sinclair. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1993. 233–250.

Baker, Mona. 1995. “Corpora in Translation Studies: An overview and suggestions for futureresearch”. Target 7:2. 223–243.

Barsalou, Lawrence. 1987. “The instability of graded structure: Implications for the nature of

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concepts”. Ulric Neisser, ed. Concepts and conceptual development: Ecological andintellectual factors in categorization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.101–140.


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Bechtel, William. 1988. Philosophy of science: An overview for cognitive science. Hillsdale, New

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Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum.Berlin, Brent and Paul Kay. 1969. Basic color terms: Their universality and evolution. Berkeley:

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House and Shoshana Blum-Kulka, eds. Interlingual and intercultural comunication.Tübingen: Gunter Narr, 1986. 17–35.

Blum-Kulka Shoshana and Eddie A. Levenston. 1983. “Universals of lexical simplification”.

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De Bot, Kees and Robert Schreuder. 1993. “Word production and the bilingual lexicon”.

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Schreuder and Weltens 1993. 191–214.Bybee, Joan. 1988. “The diachronic dimension in explanation”. John A. Hawkins, ed.

<DEST "hal-r8">

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Résumé

À l’heure actuelle, on tente rarement de fournir des explications externes pour les structuressubsumées sous la rubrique “universaux de la traduction”. Cet article examine les basescognitives de structures /processus tels que : la simplification/généralisation, normalisation,standardisation, censure et amplification de propriétés linguistiques de la langue-cible. Lecadre adopté est celui de la grammaire cognitive et le propos tenu le suivant : tous lesprocessus cités proviennent d’asymétries dans l’organisation cognitive de l’informationsémantique. J’estime cependant que le cas inverse est également vrai : des cas d’absenced’asymétries manifestes produiront un effet opposé dans les textes traduits. Enfin, je chercheà replacer l’argument dans une perspective plus large : en me référant à la notion scalaire degénéralisation définie par Croft (1990), j’entame une discussion sur l’explication en étudesde traduction.

Author’s address

Sandra HalversonDepartment of EnglishUniversity of BergenSydnesplassen 7N-5007 BERGEN, Norway

e-mail: [email protected]

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mailto:e-mail: [email protected]

The cognitive basis of translation universals

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