The China's neocolonialism case in Africa
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Transcript of The China's neocolonialism case in Africa
Tecnológico de Monterrey Campus Chihuahua
The China’s neocolonialism case in AfricaThe economic advance of China Jorge Alberto López Lechuga
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Index
I. Introduction...............................................................................................2
II. Political Relations Between China and Africa and their Impact on International Area.....................................................................................3
i. Diplomatic Relations................................................................3
ii. China’s Support for Authoritarian Governments of Zimbabwe and Sudan..............................................................................8
III. Economic Relations Between China and Africa……………...……….….12
i. The New Strategic Partnership for EconomicDevelopment..........................................................................12
ii. Bilateral Trade…….................................................................14
iii. Chinese Direct Investment to Africa.......................................16
1. Agriculture....................................................................18
iv. The Chinese Expectations......................................................20
v. Oil Resources.........................................................................22
1. Angola Case................................................................22
2. Sudan Case.................................................................23
IV. Conclusions............................................................................................26
V. Bibliography………………………………………..…………………………29
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I. Introduction
People’s Republic of China undoubtedly has become one of the new economic
and political powers in the world. However, their international success was
achieved not only for its huge and cheap production levels, but for investment
projects and business expansion in low priority geographical regions for Western
economies. The African continent is one of those areas where China not only
maintains high levels of investment and trade, but an important political influence
directly with certain member states of the African Union. The procurement of new
oil reserves, a new market for domestic production are the center on relations of
the People’s Republic of China in Africa, however, beyond this, the new Asian
Dragon seeks greater political influence in the continent in order to obtain more
support in the process of voting in the United Nations system, principally the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations General Assembly. For this, the
large financial flow from China to Africa has degenerated into a neo-colonialism
that while it has brought major infrastructure and employment in Africa, has also
caused serious problems in environmental conservation and human rights.
Precisely this is the central thesis of this research paper.
To start will need to define neo-colonialism for this analysis. Neo-colonialism
(Ginebra, 1998) can be defined as the continuation of the economic model of
colonialism after a colonized territory has achieved formal political independence.
Western countries had colonized most of the continent in the late nineteenth
century, instituting a system of economic exploitation in which African raw
materials, particularly cash crops and minerals, were expropriated and exported to
the sole benefit of the colonizing power. The idea of neocolonialism, however,
suggests that when foreign powers granted nominal political independence to
colonies in the decades after World War II, they, as others like China, control the
economies of Africa but the most important thing is that domination is made by an
economic and financial mean.
To demonstrate it, will be necessary to begin analyzing the political relations
between the People’s Republic of China and Africa including their diplomatic ties,
programs and systems of cooperation in the historical and current context, later to
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analyze how the Asian Dragon has come to legitimize some totalitarian regimes in
Africa, where the supply of weapons is one of the basic issues in relations, a
situation that has become controversial in the context of United Nations Security
Council.
Subsequently it will be analyzed the topic of bilateral trade (including
agricultural issues) and the Chinese investment in the exploitation of natural
resources, mainly oil, for which we choose two cases in particular for its relevance:
Angola and Sudan.
Finally, based on the above analysis will integrate the positive and negative
impacts that the Chinese neo-colonialism in Africa has generated particularly in the
areas of economic development, environment and human rights, all this taking into
account the current international scenario and the new counterweight that China
represents for the traditional western economies.
II. Political Relations Between China and Africa and their Impact on International Area
i. Diplomatic Relations
As China is the biggest and most important developing country in the world,
Africa is the biggest developing continent which has the largest number of
countries. A long term, stable, friendly and co-operative Sino-African relations
would not be only beneficial for the solidarity and cooperation among the
developing countries, but would have significant influence on the trend of
multipolarization of world politics.
Diplomatic relations between China and Africa are based on political and
economic cooperation and bilateral trade. The pillars of the Sino-African
relationship were established under the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC) in 2000: Sincerity, equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and common
development.
China, currently has diplomatic missions on 48 countries in Africa (Embassy
of the People’s Republic of China in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 2010),
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certainly a significant number if we remember that the U.S. has 45 (U.S.
Department of State, 2010).
The founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 started the current
diplomatic relations with Africa. The Arab Republic of Egypt was the first country in
the continent where was established a diplomatic mission of China. Since then, as
African countries were gained their independence they established diplomatic
relations with China. Within this process should not forget the context of the
second half of the twentieth century around this, particularly, the role of China as
an important member of the movement of non-aligned countries in the North-South
dialogue.
The foreign policy of People’s Republic of China focused, since its
establishment as a republic, in supporting the independence process, legal equality
of states and self-determination of countries against imperialism and colonialism.
As George T. Yu mentioned (1977): “the Chinese model also relates to China’s
developmental experience. China has stressed struggle against the superpowers,
the U.S. and Soviet Union, identifying with the Third World against them. There
can be no doubt that Africa occupied a central place in Chinese foreign policy... In
this sense, the success of the relationship lies on the answer that China has been
held in the changing situation in Africa”.
In other words what China and African countries had in common was their
shared history and their perception dominance by the West. Statements such as
‘we all belong to the Third World; we are developing countries’ were commonly
heard at this time (Van de Looy, 2006). As Yu (1977) also asserts, the importance
of Africa to China is that the continent “became a battlefield in the Sino-Soviet
conflict, just as Africa had earlier become an arena in the Sino-American
competition. An example of the Sino-Soviet battle was manifested in China’s
campaign to win African support to exclude Russian participation at the abortive
Afro-Asian conference of 1965”.
In summary, the Sino-American competition particullary was centered on the
conflict between People’s Republic of China and Republic of China (Taiwan). With
more than 50 states in Africa, there have been opportunities for both Taiwan and
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China to establish alliances. With aid programmes and loans, the two governments
sought partnerships and thus recognition. The foreign policies of African countries
have for a long time been driven by the search for aid and substantial financial
contributions have often determined the choice made by African governments in
this respect. However, relations could easily change. For example Liberia, Senegal
and the Central African Republic have switched allegiances al least five times in
the past (Ríos, 2006). Currently, there are only six African countries that have
diplomatic ties with Taiwan: Burkina Faso, Chad, Gambia, Malawi, Sao Tomé and
Principe, and Swaziland (FOCAC, 2009).
Currently, most of African countries adhere to the “principle of one China”
and support its reunification. On several occasions they have led to the failure of
the attempt of Taiwan to participate in the World Health Organization (WHO),
World Trade Organization (WTO) and other agencies of the UN system. It was
thanks to the support of African countries that China succeeded in restoring its
position as a permanent member of UN Security Council and contributed to the
failure of western anti-china proposals on the issue of human rights at the UN. The
success of Beijing’s bid to host the 2008 Olympic Games was also supported by a
large number of African countries (Embassy of The People’s Republic of China in
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 2010). In this sense, African countries have
played an important supporting role for China in the international framework.
The Paper on China’s African Policy is the main strategic instrument issued
by the Chinese Government on its foreign policy toward a continent in all history,
which shows the great importance of the relationship. The content of this document
focuses on the proposal to create and develop a strategic partnership based on
equality and trust in the political, cooperation and joint satisfaction in economic
exchange and mutual learning in the cultural (FOCAC, 2009). In politics, the
Chinese government maintains a constant number of visits by presidents and
business leaders to Africa. Since the fall of the Soviet Union the Chinese leaders
have visited the continent on numerous occasions, particularly Hu Jintao, who has
been in over 20 States of the continent. Only in February 2009 the president made
a trip in which visited four countries: Mali, Senegal, Tanzania and Mauritius.
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Meanwhile, in 2006 there were more than 40 African heads of state one gathered
in Beijing for the FOCAC, the largest gathering of African heads of state outside of
the United Nations (Bodom, 2009). Such activities are more common within the
Chinese Government than any other western state.
Another example of the relevance of the relationship is the exchange of
legislative bodies and political parties between China’s National People’s Congress
(NPC) on the one hand and Parliaments of African countries and the Pan-African
Parliament of the African Union (AU) on the other, for the purpose of deepening
understanding and cooperation.
The consultation mechanisms are also recurrent, which work as bilateral
committees between China and African countries in which they develop policy and
technical consultations between ministers of trade, science and technology,
everything from the typical pragmatic approach of Chinese foreign policy.
Other areas where there are cooperation forums between local governments
creating brotherhood of cities aimed at strengthening the systems of local social
development and administrative professionalization. In the areas of human
development and education there are important financial founds for human
resource development in Africa, through which vocational training is provided to
workers from priority areas according to the needs of countries in the region.
Another area of interest in Sino-African cooperation is education,
strengthened through exchanges of students and teachers to provide academic
assistance. The Chinese Government encourages the participation of students in
volunteer programs in which the purpose is to train African students in specific
areas. Related to this is to mention that China has provided African countries with
government scholarships for more than 20,000 persons (FOCAC, 2010). In an
official visit that Chinese president Hu Jintao attended in February 2009 in
Tanzania he said: “many young Chinese have also come to Africa”, describing
them as "young ambassadors for China-Africa friendship”. He concluded: “Working
in local communities day in and day out, they have gone through thick and thin
together with the people there and contributed their share to economic and social
progress in Africa" (FOCAC, 2009).
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Other important areas in the bi-regional cooperation are science and
technology transfer, cultural exchanges (artists, sportsmen and the establishment
of Confucius Institutes for Chinese language learning in Africa) medical and health
cooperation (China send medical teams with programs for prevention and
treatment of infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS and malaria), media
cooperation (in order to facilitate the communication and contact between
government departments and social groups); consular cooperation, people-to-
people exchange (between social organizations, especially the youth and women);
environmental cooperation (water resources conservation, anti-desertification and
bio-diversity protection by facilitating technological exchange), disaster reduction,
relief and humanitarian assistance, military cooperation (military high-level
exchanges between two sides in order to support defense and army building of
African countries for their own security), conflict settlement and peacekeeping
operations and judicial and police cooperation (China put special emphasis on
combating transnational organized crime, corruption and human trafficking,
terrorism, small arms smuggling, drug trafficking, etc.)..
The People’s Republic of China argues that like the African nations, is
devoted to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, however, does not
denies he is trying to establish a new international, political and economic order
based on justice, rationality (pragmatism), equality and mutual benefit, promoting
more international diplomatic relations and the rule of law in global affairs,
safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries.
Thus, Beijing displays its progress in Africa as a model for developing countries
(many of them see his success as a stimulus to escape poverty), not imposing or
demanding political or economic reforms to access to its technical and financial
assistance. In doing so, China is seen in the eyes of African states as a world
power that is more attractive than the United States or the European Union (Ríos,
2006).
Going beyond the official positions on the surge of Chinese interest in Africa,
it is clear that the Asian Dragon as a rapidly developing economy requires a large
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amount of raw materials like oil, gold, diamonds and iron, resources that Africa has
in abundance.
Africa, meanwhile, realizes the need to seek new alliances for development
beyond the western economies with which it has previously associated. African
countries therefore accept the investment from China in order to revive their
economies. Given this reality, raises the question of whether we are seeing an
equal partnership or one of the two is the one who dictates the terms of the
relationship (Bodom, 2009).
China's international relations are based on the pragmatism, and their
bargaining power lies in two sources: the international trade and investment and
soft power (based on diplomacy involving the Chinese Government's efforts to
convey their culture with the goal of understanding between nations). This, beyond
the existence of an asymmetrical relationship between the parties or not,
represents a viable way to African economic development and a means to balance
the equation in the international arena.
China justifies its model applied on Africa insisting that they do not want to
repeat the mistakes of western colonialists. Relations with African countries are
increasingly multidimensional and narrower; however, economic investment should
not be the only topic of attention in the case, which would be a mistake.
At a meeting between presidents Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Hu
Jintao, the African leader loudly proclaimed his desire to: “let China lead the world”
(Radio France International, 2006).
ii. China’s Support for Authoritarian Governments of Zimbabwe and Sudan
The system of Sino-African cooperation maintains a broad exchange and
coordination of actions; however, the “Paper on China's African Policy"” specifically
excludes the interference in internal affairs, being consistent with its foreign policy
based on respect to self-determination of nations.
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Despite this fact, the People's Republic of China has been accused by some
western governments to assist oppressive African States, legitimizing their political
systems. Thus, Beijing is accused of exporting its model of development based on
the existence of a totalitarian single party with full authority over all aspects of
economic activity, a system that Africans could emulate.
Moreover, China is accused of reward them with diplomatic attention and
financial and military assistance to dictatorships exacerbating the existing social
dislocations, creating a complicity in human rights violation, increasing the
likelihood of propagation of weak and failed states, mainly referring to Sudan and
Zimbabwe (Brookes & Ji Hye, 2006).
For example, China is attributed to the protection of the government of
Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe and the Hamam Al-Bashir of Sudan from economic
sanctions to which their countries have been imposed by the international
community. On July 11, 2008 China vetoed the economic sanctions imposed on
Zimbabwe for the UN Security Council. In a statement about the vote on China’s
ambassador to the UN, Wang Guangya, said the threat of sanctions was not
conducive to solving Zimbabwe’s problems and he concluded: “the situation in
Zimbabwe had not exceeded the context of domestic affairs and did not
constitutive threat to international peace and security” (CNN, 2008).
For his part, Sudanese president Haman Al-Bashir, requested to trial in
2008 by the International Criminal Court has been supported by the Chinese
Government justified by its policy of non-intervention. Western nations are angered
by the reluctance of China on the issue of human rights in Sudan, particularly
(Woolford, 2008). The Asian country is an investor in the vast oil industry in Sudan
and has therefore adopted a policy of support Africans in the case.
In addition, several continent dictatorships are common buyers of chinese
weapons and military equipment, which they use to oppress minority populations
and suppress political opposition. In 2004, despite the arms embargo imposed by
the U.S. and the E.U. against Zimbabwe, China sold war aircraft and military
vehicles by USD $200 million (Business Day, 2004).
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When Robert Mugabe became president of Zimbabwe in 1980, the country
was one of the wealthiest in the continent. However, during the decade of the 90’s,
Mugabe cracked down on opposition political groups and ethnic minorities.
Currently, the country faces a chronic food shortage and 70% unemployment
(Woolford, 2008). The increasing isolation and pressure from the West have
prompted Mugabe to engage in close diplomatic relations with China as a means
to resist sanctions and criticism from the United States and United Kingdom
mainly.
China has a history of arms sales and production systems through its state
enterprises whose main clients are some repressive governments in Africa,
including Liberia, Sudan and Zimbabwe. We can only mention that almost 80% of
the USD $500 million of Sudan's annual oil income is used to buy weapons to
subdue the rebels in the south. With the assistance of China, the Khartoum
government has built three weapons factories near the capital (Dickie & Reed,
2005).
Added to this, we know that in 2003, several Hong Kong firms were accused
of smuggling illegal weapons, including AK-47s, machine guns and rocket-launcher
grenades from China and destined to Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Sudan
(Agence France-Presse, 2003).
The weapons have always been one of the products exported to China over
Africa, from the processes of independence to the conflict during the Cold War.
This trade continues, and not just represents an income, but a means by which
bilateral relations have improved: a growing demand for arms in Africa to cope
armed conflicts and China’s access to oil and other natural resources of the region.
Despite the demands of western powers, China shows little concern for
human rights, which they consider a western concept and not a reference of the
current international scene.
The arms market also allows China to participate in African politics,
especially through military exchanges. For example, most of the defense ministers
of China, since the formation of the republic, have visited Africa and its
counterparts as well (Servant, 2005).
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According to the National Congress of Investigation Service of United States
(2003), Chinese arms sales to Africa, between 1996 and 2003, constitute 10% of
all arms transfers to the continent. During the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, in
1998, was sold to both sides a total of USD $1,000 million (Pan, 2006).
In 2000, Zimbabwe delivered eight tons of national ivory in exchange for a
shipment of small arms. And in 2004, China sold to the army of the country 12
fighter jets and 100 war trucks in a transaction valued at more than USD $200
million (Ríos, 2006). The policies of president Mugabe’s know as "Look East
Policy" is understandable, after all China is a big investor in mining, infrastructure
and agriculture of his country with 70% unemployment (Chinese Government,
2000).
As China’s power and influence grows, Beijing is increasingly prone to
challenge the United States and the European Union to protect its interests in
Africa. Undoubtedly, in the future, differences between China and western countries
on human, political and civil rights will be intensified. The question lies in the so
exceedingly pragmatic and realistic approach of the Asian government to Africa.
Their positions seek to maintain economic growth, improved quality of life of
Africans and their political independence; however, there are certain gaps in the
means by which they try to achieve it.
As an example remember that time in which to protect their influence in
Sudan, in September 2004, China vetoed the resolution 1564 of the UN Security
Council that condemned the mass killing of civilians in the Darfur region, showing a
stand against any type of sanctions against the African country (CNN, 2004).
Undoubtedly, present days requires countries to develop a pragmatic foreign
policy that moves away from any ideological dogma. China is one of the countries
that its economic and political success has been achieved thanks to this, however,
must take responsibility for what is becoming the next great economic power
rivaling the United States. The People’s Republic of China must understand that
their power involves a great responsibility of becoming an actor contributing to
maintaining peace and security; China must understand and accept that it is wrong
to feed the demand for illegal weapons in Africa. While Africa has benefited greatly
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in economic terms for the contributions of China, should play a role in requiring the
Asian stop the illegal sale of weapons, mostly. Otherwise, the proliferation of weak
and failed states and other problems like terrorism, human trafficking and crimes
against humanity will continue to recur throughout the African continent.
III. Economic Relations Between China and Africa
i. The New Strategic Partnership for Economic Development
After several years in which the cooperation between China and Africa has
increased, the FOCAC (2010) approved a plan of action for three years where
there is a new type of partnership strategy. This partnership, as the document
mentions, will be based on pragmatic cooperation, equality and mutual benefit. The
plan pledges that China:
• Double aid to Africa by 2009 (to about USD $1 billion)
• Set up a USD $5 billion China-Africa development fund to encourage
Chinese companies to invest in Africa
• Provide USD $3 billion in preferential loans and USD $2 bn in preferential
buyer’s credits to African countries
• Cancel all debt stemming from Chinese interest-free government loans that
matured by the end of 2005, for the 31 highly indebted and least developed
countries (LDCs) in Africa that have relations with China (an amount
estimated at around USD $1.4 bn)
• Further open China’s markets to exports from African LDCs by increasing
from 190 to 440 the number of products receiving zero-tariff treatment
• Train 15,000 African professionals, double the number of Chinese
government scholarships given annually to Africans (to 4,000) and send 100
senior agricultural experts and 300 youth volunteers
• Build 30 hospitals, 30 malaria treatment centers and 100 rural schools.
It can be said that great progress has been made by the implementation of
the 7 measures developed in pragmatic cooperation between Africa and China,
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and most of these measures are already being implemented. For example, the
dramatic increase in humanitarian aid to African countries, zero-tariff measures
that are already launched, and debt relief to several countries on the continent.
China promised to give aid to the construction of Conference Center for
African Union, and the construction has formally begun. The work of setting up an
economic and trade zone in some African countries also gained momentum. To
date, China has trained various kinds of personnel for African countries for 13,307
person-times. In addition, Chinese young volunteers and senior agricultural
technical experts work in Africa in succession. The projects of offering aid to
construct hospitals, agricultural technical demonstration center and rural schools
were carried out smoothly. At the 4th Ministerial Conference of FOCAC, we will
continue to assess the implementation of the mentioned projects without doubt.
The third of the 7 policies and measures was: to set up China-Africa Fund
that will reach the total of USD $5 billion progressively in order to encourage and
support Chinese enterprises to make investment in Africa (Zhang Ming, 2009).
The Chinese Government will adopt more effective measures to facilitate
access for African commodities to the Chinese market and fulfill its promise to
grant duty-free treatment (zero-tariffs) to certain products of least developed
African countries, as mentioned above, in order to expand and balance the bilateral
trade and optimizing trade structure. Efforts will be made to encourage the
business communities of both sides to establish China-Africa Joint Fund of the
Chamber of Commerce and Industry. When conditions are solidified, China is even
willing to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement with African countries and African
regional organizations (FOCAC, 2010).
The statistic data do not end, the last November 3rd 2009, in Beijing opened
the third China-Africa summit, the largest diplomatic gathering organized by China
and ended two days later with a balance outstanding and certainly many
commitments to double in 2010 the amount of assistance offered this year to
Africa, provide USD $3,000 million in preferential loans and other 2,000 million in
preferential loans to African buyers in the next three years, establishing a special
fund of 5,000 million to encourage Chinese investment in Africa; provide further
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debt cancellation for some countries, more scholarships for students, more
resources for technical training and cooperation especially in energy (FOCAC,
2010).
ii. Bilateral Trade
Since the founding of the FOCAC in 2000, the trade and economic
cooperation between China and Africa has entered in a new era with a
comprehensive, rapid and stable development. The bilateral trade volume grew
from USD $10 billion in 2000 to 39.7 in 2005 and 45.3 in 2009, according to the
same international organization.
Of the total trade volume between them, 21 billion are imports of products
from Africa. The main products China exports to Africa are machinery and
electronics (25%), textile and apparel (17%), hi-tech products (10%) and finished
goods (9%), while imports from Africa concentrate on crude oil (40 %), iron ore
(28), cotton (13%), diamond and other natural resources and primary goods (Africa
Business, 2010).
The main African countries exporting to China are: Angola (30%), South
Africa (19%), Sudan (11%) and Congo (10%). For its part, the major African states
that import goods from China are: South Africa (21%), Nigeria (12%), Egypt (10%),
Morocco (7%), Algeria (7%), Sudan (6 %) and Benin (4%), according to National
Bureau of Statistics of China (2005).
However, the African continent currently accounts for only 2.3% of China’s
exports, and 2% of its imports. And Sino-African commerce consists predominantly
of trade with South Africa, which represents 19% of the trade with the continent as
a whole. This situation is perfectly normal, since the South African economy is still
the most dynamic in the region, with a GNP equivalent to that of all the other sub-
Saharan African states combined. China’s second major customers are Nigeria,
Egypt, Morocco and Algeria, followed by Sudan and Benin (Lafargue, 2005).
Added to this, China has forgiven debts of 10.9 billion Yuan (USD $1.38
billion) to 31 least developed countries in Africa and has exempted commodities
import tariffs for certain of these countries. China has announced the names of 25
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African countries that enjoy zero-tariff preferential treatment and special rate for
exports of some 190 products to China, ranging from food, mineral and textile
product, to machinery and electronics (FOCAC, 2010).
Chinese companies, known for their marketing and business skills, have
been reaping rich dividends by promoting their products and services in the new
and emerging markets of Africa. The Asian Dragon has established in Africa more
than 800 non-financial companies. Investment projects are distributed in 49
countries on the continent and in sectors such as trade, manufacturing, resource
exploitation, communications and agriculture, mainly. Have been conducted with
financial assistance from China, more than 720 completed projects in 49 countries.
In 26 of these states, China has provided concessional loans for a total of 58
projects and has trained 14,600 African employees in different professions
(Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, 2010).
Moreover, the importance of these figures not only focuses on the financial
aspect, but also in the socio-economic development. More and more Chinese
people work in Africa in different productive activities. Among those Chinese, some
go to Africa to carry out construction projects that are aided by their government;
some work as volunteers in the continent, some are medical staff of the national
medical team sent to the Africa (FOCAC, 2010).
Despite this, there is a problem in the system of prices of Chinese products
into the African market that clearly exposes the unequal relationship between the
two actors, a clear example of this are the textiles, a major Chinese imported
goods in Europe. Textiles are Morocco’s leading export, representing 45% of its
industrial employment, but Chinese industrialists can offer prices 50% or 60%
lower than the Moroccans or Tunisians. While the geographical and cultural
proximity of the Maghreb countries to the European Union operates in their favour
(allowing quicker delivery times), this advantage will probably last for only a limited
period. In sum, then, relations between China and some of the countries of Africa
do not appear equitable. In exchange for its construction projects, China
17
sometimes makes demands that are felt to be excessive, like the granting of large-
scale fishing rights (Angelier, 2005).
The problem does not end here; the manufacturing sectors also have a
similar problem. To this question we must make the question that if in fact China's
role in Africa is that of a partner committed to the welfare of its counterpart.
iii. Chinese Direct Investment to Africa
According to a recent study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) in 2009, Chinese direct investment flow to Africa in
2008 reached USD $107 billion, more than 100 times the level recorded in 1991.
Currently, some 700 Chinese firms are estimated to hold shares for a total
investment of USD $6.3 trillion, which represents 10% of total Chinese investment
in the world.
In the first six months of 2009, China made a non-monetary direct
investment of USD $875 million, an increase of 78.6% year-on-year. So, Africa is
one of the regions with a relatively fast growth for Chinese ODI.
China’s financial activity in Africa is another notable feature. Everyone
knows nowadays that China is the primary recipient of direct overseas
investments, amounting to USD $53 billion in 2003, but is actually also now one of
the major sources of such investments. In 2003 China was fifth in the world, after
the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom and France. Its overseas
investments totaled to USD $2.087 billion, which represented an increase of 112%
over the amount for 2002, and made it an active presence in 160 countries. China
is investing massively in raw material deposits overseas, and is multiplying its
trading partnerships in order to secure regular supplies. China’s presence has
undergone rapid expansion in both Latin America and Africa. In 2002 its total
overseas investments (leaving aside Hong Kong and Macao) amounted to USD
$5.083 billion, of which 25% were in North America, 9.5% in Latin America, 8.7% in
Africa, and 8% in Australia. The main recipients of Chinese investment in Africa are
Zambia, South Africa, Mali, and Egypt (Lafargue, 2005).
18
Meanwhile, Africa has become China's second largest engineering
contracting market. By late 2008, China had made deals for contract projects worth
USD $126.3 billion in Africa and completed a turnover of 68.1 billion. And in the
first three quarters of 2009 China completed the contract engineering business
turnover of 17.84 billion dollars, up 41.2% year-on-year (FOCAC, 2010).
Most of all these data are aimed at oil exploration projects, road and rail
infrastructure, development of information and communication technologies, as
well as the exploitation of natural resources like forests and minerals.
Not surprisingly, China is investing in countries where natural resources can
be obtained. In 2004, oil-exporting countries such as Algeria, Libya, Nigeria and
Sudan received 54% of total Chinese investment in Africa. Other countries that
receive a large amount of investment are: Zambia, Ethiopia and Botswana (Van de
Looy, 2006).
Given this, not all Chinese investment in Africa is perceived as positive by
the international community. First, the Chinese construction companies have
lowered their costs so overwhelming, that has caused the displacement of their
western competitors on the continent. Likewise, international observers fear that
the Chinese way of doing business (paying bribes and fixing no conditions)
undermines local efforts to improve transparency and good governance. For its
part, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) are unable to
put pressure on the countries concerned by the support of China. Finally, Chinese
companies in Africa have their own national employees. In areas where
unemployment is high, the effects of Chinese migrant labor will be felt over time.
For example, in Angola, some domestic suppliers and retailers have had to close
because they can not compete against the Chinese, which in some parts of Africa
has created resentment against Asians projects (Woolford, 2008).
However, in this situation we can not deny the role that China has in the
economic development of Africa, seen in statistics; as an example, from 2004 to
2008 the average GDP growth rate was over 5% in five successive years (UN,
2009). So far, the nature of these flows has been quite similar to those between
Africa and its traditional trading partners, noted the OECD study, The Rise of
19
China and India: What’s in it for Africa? For the most part, it found, Africa exported
oil and other raw materials to China, while importing Chinese manufactured goods.
Inexpensive Chinese textile and clothing products have become prevalent in many
African markets, seriously jeopardizing the survival of Africa’s own manufacturers.
A columnist in the Nigerian Daily Trust newspaper, Mr. Charles Onunaiju
(2007), observed that unless steps are taken to alter this pattern of trade, “the
relationship in future will come to resemble the Europe/America and Africa
relations, that is, lopsided, dependent and even detrimental to Africa.” China’s
leaders are responding to such criticisms. The action plan calls for the growth of
China-Africa trade “in a more balanced manner.” The decision to double the
number of African products allowed into China duty-free was one concrete step in
that direction. Another was a Chinese pledge earlier in the year to voluntarily cap
clothing exports to South Africa (Harsch, 2007).
Whatever questions Africans may still have about China’s economic
relations with the continent, noted Legwaila (2006), the high African turnout in
Beijing “was a clear demonstration that China has succeeded in winning the
confidence of its African partners.”
China has also provided humanitarian aid to its African partners, contributing
to the building of physical infrastructure to treat infectious diseases such as malaria
and HIV/AIDS. Since 1960, about 15,000 Chinese doctors have worked in 47
African states serving about 180 million patients (Shin Hye, 2006).
There are also important works of roads and railways financed by Chinese
companies in Kenya, Rwanda and Nigeria as well as a mobile telephone network
currently being built in Tunisia. These projects also are sometimes granted to
Asian firms rather than local ones provide little impact to the economy in terms of
employment.
1. Agriculture
The agricultural issue has special importance in the context of Sino-African
relations. The large flow of Asian investment to Africa is represented not only in
building infrastructure, but also in technology development and agricultural
20
production. The past five years China's role has somehow combat some cases of
famine in Africa. However, African euphoria may fade soon, due to the significant
increase in the price of agricultural products. African countries are still mostly
importers of grain, like corn and wheat, mainly. In this sense, the development of
China is palpable, but in a negative direction. Although the purpose of feeding a
billion people has been reached, the objective defined in the mechanisms of
cooperation for the development of the FOCAC, the position of agriculture in China
is still as precarious. While China is currently the leader in rice production (176
million tons in 2004), on going to India and Indonesia, and wheat (91 million tons),
up from India, Russia, U.S. and France, still being the fourth agricultural importer in
the world, and the problem with Africa is that most production for the African
continent is accused of submitting low quality. The demand for African producers
lies in the finding that Chinese imports without an adequate transport system,
resulting in the arrival of agricultural products in many cases outdated (Angelier,
2007). Although China has pledged to combat cases of famine in Africa, has to
feed 20% of the world population with its production.
In 2002-2003, Morocco, Algeria and Egypt imported 15 million tons of
wheat, mostly from Canada and China. Sub-Saharan African countries have little
impact on the international grain markets because of the low levels of their imports,
but any price increases will still have serious financial consequences for them.
Nigeria has become the first major African importer of rice, and Africa in general
buys a quarter of global rice imports. Although there is currently no fixed global
price for this cereal (since only 6% of global production is exported), the prices
fixed by Thailand, the major global exporter (25%), are a useful benchmark. In
Africa, everyone admits that the price of rice is rising continually. In addition to the
increase in world market prices (averaging 10% since 2001) rising shipping costs
are also having their effect (Woolford, 2008).
China’s dynamic presence in Africa is therefore developing along several
different lines. And as Shintaro Ishihara emphasizes in his analysis: “Africa can
say no”. African countries must demand more equitable economic relations with
China (Brooks, 2006). They should not be satisfied with just exporting their raw
21
materials but should receive technological transfers in exchange. Taking
advantage of the potential fears aroused by the emergence of China, India is
attempting to offer African countries a more equitable partnership. India, who faces
the same problem of energy dependence, is unable to rival China in financial terms
but offers its suppliers technical co-operation (such as technological transfers, the
sofcomp information technology project, medicine sales, etc.). This competition
between the two Asian giants could be favorable to the development of the African
continent
iv. The Chinese Expectations
Given the magnitude of the investment and cooperation of the Chinese
government in Africa, it is clear that China wants to work with so many African
countries are ready. China has much to gain:
I. Securing natural resources to fuel its own fast-growing economy
II. Great new markets for national manufactured goods and services
III. Large-scale projects for Chinese companies
IV. New jobs for citizens, currently there are 750,000 working in Africa
V. The cheap local labor to supplement the Chinese labor in infrastructure
projects and exploitation
VI. Favorable support of 53 African nations at the UN
VII. Increased solidarity with solidarity with the principle of One China
And certainly, the key to Chinese success in achieving these aims is to
develop a pragmatic policy, giving priority not to seek political constraints, as if to
reach both the European Union and United States. And apparently, while China
continues to invest at this level in Africa, the continent's countries continue to allow
the role of Asians in their region.
On the other hand, it is necessary to examine the perhaps more important
reason for China-Africa relations: the quest for natural resources.
22
China is currently the fastest growing economy in the world with an annual
growth rate of 8%, reaching 9% in some cases. But this rapid economic
development in post-Mao era has been a steady and growing demand for oil and
minerals.
The biggest change came in 1993 when China became a net importer of
energy. Oil demand in China has been so fast that in 2004 the country became the
second largest oil importer after the United States. The demand growth is due not
only to the expansion of the economy, but also to increase the quality of life of the
population causing increased consumption of highly specialized goods like cars
and appliances. In this situation, it is estimated that Chinese demand for oil will
grow 156% between 2001 and 2025 (IEA, 2005).
Just as the United States does, China is looking for new countries and
different suppliers to meet their requirements of hydrocarbons in order to diversify
their sources and facilitate energy security. In Africa, where new reserves have
recently been found, China has a large chance of success when the exploitation of
deposits, all thanks to the goodwill and cooperation that has meant to African
countries. To gain and maintain control of these sources allocated a considerable
sum of military, diplomatic and economic.
Africa has about 8% of world oil reserves and 11% of global production. It is
estimated that production in the continent is growing 6% annually. For 2007,
amounted to seven million barrels per day and by 2010 an estimated eight million,
we must remember that generally African oil is of good quality. New offshore fields
have been discovered in the Gulf of Guinea, more specifically in Nigeria, Angola
and Equatorial Guinea. Despite the notorious political and social problems in
Africa, oil companies continue to invest in the continent (Brooks, 2006).
A quarter of China's oil imports come from Africa: Algeria, Angola, Chad,
Sudan, Nigeria, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. The thirst for oil has become so
important that even the principle of One China was not taken into account when
Chad established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. A new pipeline from Chad to
Cameroon opened in 2003; thereby Chad's oil can be transported directly to a
major port (Woolford, 2006). While this trade in natural resources has a positive
23
effect on the trade balance in Africa, has some major disadvantages caused
largely by China. Usually in countries where there are abundant deposits of oil,
governments and their economic policies tend to focus on the hydrocarbons sector
and neglecting others. Corruption is a common problem.
Unfortunately, instead of facilitating the development, resource wealth has
been an important factor of political instability, armed conflicts, social dislocation
and economic decay that has characterized much of the post-colonial Africa.
v. Oil Resources
For this section it was decided to analyze two specific cases, the Sudan and
Angola, first because the issue of oil exploration goes hand in hand with the
controversial case of repression and violation of human rights by the government in
Khartoum regime that has been supported by China in the international arena and
represents one of the demands of the world community toward the eastern country.
The second on the importance of Angola as a new source of oil resources, a
situation that has allowed China to solve its energy security for the next 10 years.
1. Angola Case
Angola is currently recovering from a civil war that lasted 30 years, and
solves its economy thanks to donations and humanitarian aid from Western
countries for the reconstruction of needed public and economic institutions.
China is also present in Angola, assisting in the reconstruction of infrastructure.
China offered Angola a loan of USD $2 billion with unrestricted policies that was
completed in March 2004. The terms of the loan was established within 17 years at
an interest rate of 1.5% (Malaquias, 2005). Considerably low and attractive. The
money has been earmarked for reconstruction and development projects such as
railways and administrative buildings and power generation. Despite this, the terms
of the agreement are beneficial to China because 70% of construction projects
were assigned to Chinese companies. Local contractors may cover only 30% of
the projects covered by the loan, a fact that is causing consternation among the
Angolan entrepreneurs (Servant, 2005). In short, the loan is not creating
24
opportunities for nationals, which is vital to the livelihoods of local people. A second
important term in the agreement is that China may import 10,000 barrels a day of
oil from Angola without cost. The African country currently exports 25% of its oil to
China, which is a form of payment of credit and no income for the balance of
payments (Global Witness, 2005).
The loan, which was originally intended to rebuild the country, was used for
government propaganda in the 2006 elections. Some international observers have
stated that part of the problem is the unwillingness of government to be more
transparent on the issue of oil reserves. Angola preferred to sign commercial debt
held by major oil and without political or administrative requirements than small
loans from international institutions like the World Bank or International Monetary
Fund demanded reforms and transparency.
2. Sudan Case
Sudan, which currently supplies 7% of total oil imports of China has
benefited from the investment of large sums of China. The China National
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is the single largest shareholder (40%) in the
Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, which controls Sudan's oil fields, and
has Invested USD $3 billion in refinery and pipeline instruction since 1999
(Malaquias, 2005).
Total Sudan oil reserves are currently estimated at USD $5 billion. The
African country was producing about 500,000 barrels per day in 2004 and
increased by 750,000 in 2006. According to the World Trade Organization (2006),
oil exports to China accounted for 64% of Sudan's total exports in 2004 (Walta
Information Centre, 2006).
China's National Petroleum Corporation began the exploitation of Sudanese
oil and has expanded steadily since 1995. In 1997 the U.S. imposed trade and
economic sanctions on Sudan and China became the intermediary between
Western countries and the African country, coming to occupy a more legitimate
role for the Khartoum regime.
25
China covered the cost of the USD $15 billion pipeline of 932 miles to get to
Port Sudan where is building an oil terminal. In 2005, approximately 10,000
Chinese workers were employed in Sudan (Malaquias, 2005).
Both China and Sudan enjoy this relationship. China has been able to
diversify its oil reserves and become less dependent on other producing countries,
while Sudan has found a reliable economic partner that does not undermine its
domestic political situation. Just worth noting that China has offered financial
support to the government of Sudan, a symbol of recognition of his government, as
some Western countries.
As mentioned above, China has assisted financially and militarily to Sudan,
even after the actions of ethnic cleansing in Darfur. Human Rights Watch (2006)
for this reason accuses China of having cooperated in the genocide in Darfur since
2003.
In days coming up to the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, an American
athlete had his visa revoked by the Chinese government because of his activism
against China's connection to Sudan's civil war. Joey Cheek, a former Olympic
speed skater and the founder of the group Team Darfur, received a call from the
Chinese embassy in Washington, D.C. some weeks before the beginning of the
Olympic Games saying that his visa had been revoked.
In short, good Sino-African relations are in the role of China as the main
operator of the oil business in Sudan. To ensure oil resources to its expanding
economy, China has supported the Khartoum government both financially and
politically and has ignored any ethical issue. In a 2004 interview with the New York
Times, China's Deputy Foreign Minister, Zhou Wenzhong said: "Business is
business.... We try to separate politics from business" (New York Times, 2004). In
other words, energy security is more important than anything else, such as Human
Rights.
Moreover, not only Angola and Sudan are African countries where China
exploited the oil resources, there are other specific cases of interest, such as
Nigeria, where Petro China concluded a deal for USD $800 million in July 2005
with Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation in exchange of 30,000 barrels of oil a
26
day during a year. At the end of that contract, in January 2006, China National
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), after failing to acquire American-owned
Unocal, purchased a 45% stake in a Nigerian offshore oil and gas field for USD
$2.27 billion and promised to invest an additional USD $2.25 billion in field
development (Harsch, 2003).
In the middle of this decade, Chinese president Hu Jintao visited Algeria,
Gabon and Nigeria -the three African oil giants- to consolidate further the security
of energy supplies. Since then, there have been dozens of high-level visits from
both sides; most of the visits have focused on economic and energy cooperation.
Mineral resources are also a recurring event in trade negotiations, especially
with South Africa (which has the largest reserves of platinum and iron of the world)
as well as Togo, Benin, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Zambia, all important centers of
mineral reserves.
Moreover, and rightly so, for African countries, China is a tempting partner
after witnessing U.S. interventions in Iraq and Europe in Afghanistan, taking control
in most of the oilfields of the Middle East (except Iran). This undoubtedly has led to
greater distrust of African countries to the west. Therefore, Africa is a continent of
great opportunity for China, which has come to occupy the parental role previously
belonged by Europeans in the economic and political.
Added to this, the deposits in the Caspian Sea have been disappointing,
only representing somewhere between 2% and 4% of global reserves, according to
conflicting estimates. China is especially fearful of American initiatives in this area
of the Caucasus, of which GUUAM is an example (Malaquias, 2005). Founded in
1996 with the joint support of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe, this organization is intended to
advance economic and military co-operation between its member states in close
collaboration with the United States, and to deal with such matters as the fight
against terrorism, the settlement of local conflicts, etc. (Woolford, 2006). The five
founding members share a common platform in refusing the presence of Russian
forces on their territory. But one of the main aims of GUUAM is the building of a
supply network, independent of Russia, with the support of the Atlantic alliance.
27
Peking shares Moscow’s view that GUUAM is a mechanism for allowing
Washington not only to pursue a policy of encirclement aimed at Russia, but also
to expand it later to include China. Admittedly, China is attempting to bypass
GUUAM through rapprochement with Kazakhstan, but still the threat of
encirclement weighs heavily on it (Brooks, 2005). So Africa allows Peking to
reduce its dependency on these energy supplies, since the African continent
possesses almost 10th part of global oil reserves and represents 11% of global
production. China is currently the second major importer of African oil, after the
United States. Africa supplies 25% of its requirements as opposed to 15% in the
1980s (Statesman, 2003).
IV. Conclusions
On October 23th, 2006 the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tang
Jiaxuan said that the deepening of friendly relations and cooperation between
China and Africa is the only road leading to the African continent to the
development and prosperity in the new century (Embassy of the People's Republic
of China in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 2006). Clearly, speaking on
behalf of the People's Republic of China, the declaration is an expression
messianic attempts to put the Asian Dragon as an economic and political
alternative for Africa, that in the absence of Western countries.
China’s arrival in the continent provides African countries with a new
horizon. Unlike France and the United States, China makes no specific political
demands, and allows African countries to retain complete sovereignty. China’s only
demand for entering into commercial relations is a complete break of links with
Taiwan. But Peking allows African countries to vote as they please at the United
Nations Organizations, does not propose to deploy any troops on their territory,
and above all refrains from lecturing African governments on democracy. Its
intention to re-establish relations was marked in 2000 by the foundation of the
Forum on China-Africa Co-operation. Nearly all African states belong to this
organisation, and it commits China to adopt measures to support their economies
28
(such as giving an important investment, giving zero-tariffs preferences, lowering
customs duties, and granting tourist exit visas to Chinese citizens, etc.).
Cooperation with Peking offers some real advantages for Africa. China
provides know-how to its raw materials providers, plus a labour force, low-interest
loans, and favourable financial conditions for infrastructural building projects. It
does not restrict its presence in Africa to the petroleum-producing countries, and is
expanding its commercial activities in all regions from the continent.
Maybe the most important advantage for Africa in this relation is the
increased room for maneuver for African states now that they are no longer totally
dependent on the West. In addition, increasing oil production has boosted the
revenue of African states. On the other hand, the Chinese way of doing business
does not take into account human rights, the environment or good governance,
though this is also not uncommon among western countries when dealing with
Africa. The Chinese government states very clearly that the import of oil is its top
priority. Exports of textiles and household utensils from China dominate the African
market and, as a consequence, national factories have had to close and people
have lost their main source of income.
While Chinese investment for the African continent are a huge source of
income and welfare, the truth is that Chinese entrepreneurs are the most profitable
of this activity, such as having a market on the continent virtually neglected by the
West for its products, workers and construction companies and
telecommunications, while contributing to national income, has served as a
justification for African countries to China provide many of the rights to exploit
natural resources and support in the international arena on particularly in the case
of Taiwan's sovereignty. In return, China also prevented the other four permanent
members of United Nations Security Council impose sanctions on countries
recognized as a threat to stability in the region, Sudan, mainly.
Sino-African trade has many implications for Africa. The continent as a
whole is currently China’s third biggest trading partner, after the United States and
France. Statistics show, on the other hand, that Africa is less important for China.
29
In spite of increased oil exports from Africa, the continent’s total trade with China
amounts to only 2% of its international trade (CIA, 2009).
China is fast becoming a dominant player in Africa, the problem is that
China has being accused of doing so from a purely pragmatic view, focusing on
profits and not on other important issues as human rights, employment of Africans,
the high prices of agricultural products, as well as the disadvantage of regional
companies to the power of Asians.
In summary, we can say that treatment that Africa needs to revive its
economy and social development, from investment and cooperation in China is
both a means by which the Asian giant is introducing a neo-colonial system, if
while not based on the subjugation tax, appears as a model of economic
imperialism, which, far from helping African development, regional development is
being compromised, not forgetting China is holding regimes accused of committing
crimes against humanity in their territories, which puts on show among other
States, the international justice system does not work as expected.
The possibility of changing this situation for the good of the African
continent is that members reconsider the relationship with China, to try to develop
a more equitable, that actually allows the continent to develop economic, social
and public solid enough to transform Africa into a competitive region, capable of
development on their own without having to rely on the charity that China is
offering, that undoubtedly contributes most to Asians.
30
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