THE CHILDREN ACT 1989 AND THE VOICE OF THE CHILD IN FAMILY CONCILIATION

THE CHILDREN ACT 1989 AND THE VOICE OF THE

CHILD IN FAMILY CONCILIATION

Bob Simpson

Over the past 10 years, there has been a rapid development of conciliation throughout Great Britain in matters relating to divorce and separation. The growth has been in terms of the accessibility of services as well as in the styles of conciliation practice offered. Throughout this period the question of the involvement of children in conciliation has persisted as a key issue. Should children be involved at all, and if so, how should this involvement best be brought about? This article suggests that the change of philosophy regarding child law intended by the new Children Act I989 willgive considerable impetus to this debate and should lead toa clarification of the role of conciliation in allowing the voice of the child to be heard following divorce or separation

INTRODUCTION: THE VOICE OF THE CHILD

In the pursuit of what Bruno Bettelheim (1987) referred to as “good enough parenting,” parents must inevitably consider the balance between giving structure and security to the child, on one hand, and, on the other, step- ping back in order that he or she can discover and develop a sense of autonomy and confidence in making decisions (Blumstein, 1982). The balance is particular to each child and one that inevitably must change as the child develops and matures. The circumstances in which this balance is inappro- priately struck, or at worst ignored altogether, can have serious consequences for the child, impairing or distorting the move toward self-determination and independence.

This is also the case where crises occur within the family. Bereavement, debt, serious illness, child abuse, and the like can all result in circumstances in which the capacity for parents to foster a sense of autonomy and responsibility in the development of their children is rendered especially vulnerable, leading a suspension of familial democracy, tenuous though it might be, in

Author’s Note: My thanks go to all those who worked on the Conciliation Project Unit research but in particular to Judy Corlyon, Pete McCarthy, and Jan Walker who each commented on earlier drafis of this article.

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many households. Expediency, avoidance of painful issues, lack of understanding of the needs of the child, and an underestimation of the capacity of the child to assimilate events can lead parents to avoid the child’s need to have information and a sense of participation in the decisions which concern him or her. These difficulties are likely to be experienced particularly acutely in circumstances where parents divorce or separate and the very framework of familial democracy is not merely suspended but severely ruptured.

The likely consequences for the children of divorcing parents have been well documented from medical, psychological, and emotional perspectives (Hetherington, Cox, & Cox, 1978; Richards & Dyson, 1982). To say that children experience distress at the time of their parents’ divorce or separation is now a truism, and even in the longer term, the effects may cause considerable anguish (Bonkowski, 1989; Wallerstein & Blakeslee, 1989). Regard- less of the quality of life in the nuclear family prior to divorce, from the child’s point of view the splitting of the family is not without cost. Parents are likely to become preoccupied with their own emotional turmoil and the problems which marital breakdown brings in its wake. This has led some researchers, in particular, Wallerstein and Kelly (1980; also Wallerstein, 1987), to talk of a “diminished capacity to parent” and the “overburdened child.” Children are likely to find themselves at the center of conflict between their parents which they have neither created nor have the power to control. The child may have to face an intolerable double-bind: It is wrong to love both parents, yet it is equally wrong not to. Factors such as these add substantially to the feelings of loss, insecurity, and deep confusion which a child is, in any case, likely to be feeling during and after the divorce.

Research conducted in Great Britain among children whose parents have divorced has consistently revealed feelings of pain, resentment, anger, and distress arising from their sense of exclusion from their parents’ divorce (McGredie & Horrox, 1985; Mitchell, 1985; Walczak & Bums, 1984). Lack of information and consultation about impending changes which radically transformed the child’s life were often identified as important factors in the child’s ability to adjust to the changes in family structure which divorce initiated. In their study of 45 children who had experienced their parents’ divorce, McGredie and Horrox (1985) reported that “again and again, the children said that it was the failure of adults to take seriously their needs and their views that made adjusting to divorce so difficult” (p. 6). Furthermore, it has been found that many children were left to shoulder heavy emotional burdens alone, without support and with no one apparently interested or able enough to share their feelings of pain and distress. Indeed, in many instances,

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it appeared parents’ perceptions of their children’s feelings were substantially at odds with the children’s accounts of what they themselves were feeling. As one boy commented at the end of his interview with Ann Mitchell (1985), “You’re the first person who has ever bothered to ask me how I felt!” (p. 81).

Although it is unlikely that greater awareness of, and attention to, the “voice of the child” by divorcing parents and the agencies with which they come into contact would be the panacea for all ills, it is felt by many to be a crucial step toward reducing the distress which many children feel at their parents’ divorce. In this respect, conciliation occupies a crucial position v is -h is other more formal channels through which the “voice of the child” may be heard. “Family conciliation” is presented as an “informal” alternative to traditional methods of resolving interpersonal conflict; it is geared toward decisions, such as custody and access, which directly concern the children and ultimately seeks to work in the interests of those “caught in the middle.” For these reasons alone, its candidacy as the “best” setting for children to be directly involved is self-evident for many conciliation advocates. However, while few who would question the importance of giving voice to the child in the making of postdivorce arrangements, important questions need to be addressed regarding the appropriateness of conciliation for this task.

CHILDREN IN CONCILIATION: THE DEBATE CONSIDERED

In the majority of cases, parents’ ability to negotiate and arrive at consensual decisions regarding postdivorce arrangements will be to the benefit of the child. However, the question arises as to how the child should contribute to this objective when parents are not in agreement and furthermore choose to take their disputes to a conciliator. Should the child’s role in conciliation be a primary one, that is, as a direct participant, or is it both necessary and adequate that the child remains outside the actual process-the primary object of concern but with his or her interests mediated by parents? The search for answers to what may appear to be a simple question has been subject to much controversy, with powerful arguments being made both for and against the direct involvement of children in conciliation.

On one hand, it is often argued that children should remain the secondary beneficiaries of conciliation and not be included in the conciliation process. The temptation for social work professionals to import a child-saving ideol- ogy into conciliation and thus introduce an awesome moral pressure on par-


ents is felt to be too great (Davis, 1983,1985). The end result is seen as con- founding the very essence of conciliation; the possibility of coercion and the denial of parental autonomy by the conciliator lurk ominously beneath an apparently voluntary negotiation process (Roberts, 1983). In a more direct sense, concerns are expressed about the wisdom of involving children in what are essentially adult decisions. At a time when children may be experiencing the stress of divided loyalties toward their parents, the additional burden of having to contribute a view of what is in their own best interests is felt by some to be too tall an order (Roberts, 1988). Given the extent to which parents appear to be confused and apprehensive about the objectives of conciliation in some settings (Simpson, Corlyon, McCarthy, & Walker, 1990), it would be surprising if this was not passed on to children, resulting in unrealistic expectations of what the conciliator might be able to achieve. Conversely, Davis (1988) suggested that a child’s expression of a view in conciliation may feature as an inordinately powerful trump card in the negotiation process. Once expressed, a child’sview, irrespective of its origins or authenticity, may mark the end of a move toward a consensual decision. Arguments of this kind were also put forward by Haynes and Haynes (1989), for whom one of the key assumptions of conciliation practice was that the outcome is the responsibility of the parent. For them, conciliation is an adult business, and a ringing endorsement is given to parental responsibility and control. The inclusion of children in the negotiating process would presumably confound this objective by introducing participants who could not be held responsible for the outcome.

On the other hand, there are many who argue that there are ways of involving children in conciliation which need not result in either the use of “the best interests of the child” to bludgeon parents into agreement or a de- structive overburdening of the child with weighty decisions. On the contrary, the incorporation of a child’s perspective is seen as a crucial component in the process of amving at workable postdivorce parenting arrangements. In Great Britain, conciliation services based in the courts and run by probation services have a long tradition of seeing children, and the arguments sup- porting this position are well rehearsed (Guise, 1983; Howard & Shepherd, 1982; Taylor, 1984). Similar arguments have also been put forward with respect to services operating in the voluntary sector (Ross, 1985). All of these researchers have essentially argued for the importance of bringing children into the process of making agreements and arrangements in conciliation (cf. Drapkin & Bienenfeld, 1985). It is argued that the presence of children in conciliation enables the conciliator to check the views of parents against

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those of the child, thus reducing the likelihood of parents reaching agreements which children themselves feel are not in their own best interests. Furthermore, conciliation may provide an all too rare opportunity for children to share and unload some of the emotional burden which, unbeknown to anyone, they may have acquired along the way. As such, the involvement of children in conciliation is seen to be a crucial step in the process of em- powering children when it comes to making important decisions about their own futures (Taylor & Adelman, 1986).

These two responses to the question of children’s involvement in family conciliation are consistent with two broader notions of conciliation as it is practiced in Great Britain. The first corresponds to a relatively “pure” notion of conciliation, in which conciliation is seen as a process rather than an intervention or an agency. It is precisely defined and draws more rigorously on theories of conflict and dispute resolution. In theory, the technique is transferable to any conflict situation; the principles and practice will remain the same. Advocates of this position would also express the importance of not confusing the process of conciliation with other processes which might be construed as therapeutic, investigative, or analytical and which might lead to the adulteration of the dispute resolution process.

The second model corresponds to a more pragmatic approach in which conciliation is taken to be a generalized form of help for couples in conflict. Although geared to reaching agreements, it will also help the parties overcome practical and emotional difficulties which stand in the way. Somewhere on the agenda lies the “best interests of the child.” The strategy for achieving these objectives is flexible, and the conciliator might draw on a repertoire of techniques and strategies to achieve the broad objective of “helping.” Indeed, one element of this strategy might be to involve the children directly in a conciliation session. A good account of the pragmatist strategy is provided by Garwood (1990).

CHILDREN IN CONCILIATION: PROFESSIONAL VIEWS AND CURRENT PRACTICE

As part of the Conciliation Project Unit (CPU) research, a nationwide survey was conducted to canvass the views of the judiciary, county court administrators, senior probation officers, probation officers involved in conciliation, lawyers, and coordinators of independent schemes (Conciliation Project Unit, 1989; also see Walker, McCarthy, Simpson, & Corlyon, 1990).


Part of this survey requested these individuals to rank a list of 13 potential aims and benefits of conciliation on a 5-point scale according to whether they thought each item was very important through to not important at all (see Simpson, 1989, p. 270). With regard to the items which related directly to children, there was a clear indication that “ascertaining what is in the best interests of the children” was a fundamental objective; overall, this was ranked second after “encouraging communication between the parties” and not lower than third in the ranking by any individual group of respondents. However, “allowing children to express their views and/or feelings” was given a much lower priority; it was ranked eighth overall.

One should not infer that respondents necessarily felt that allowing children to express their views was unimportant. Rather, it was given far less priority than items pertaining to a conciliator’s work at the level of adult relationships in the interests of children. This view is further reflected in the findings from our survey of conciliation services (Conciliation Project Unit, 1989, chap. 7).

Of the 65 conciliation services which were based in the courts, the majority regarded the attendance of children as optional, although in 3 schemes it was obligatory in the case of a child dispute, and in another 3 it was prohibited. Thirteen of the schemes which allowed children to attend im- posed a lower age limit, which ranged from 5 to 12 years. Most (41 schemes) only allowed children to attend if both parents gave their consent. Four schemes required the consent of only one parent. In 10 schemes, children could attend conciliation even if neither parent had consented, although how this worked in practice was far from clear. In many court-based schemes, although the attendance of children was described as optional, it was strongly felt that children should attend. One court, for example, extended an “invitation” for children above the age of 9 years to attend. Our research subse- quently found this “invitation” to be something of a requirement, as parents were often quizzed if their children were not present at the court. However, children’s attendance at the court did not necessarily mean they would be seen. In the court-based services that regularly saw children, the appointments invariably took place away from the judicial chambers in a separate meeting with the conciliation “officer” either alone or with parents. Anumber of the services studied offered parents the opportunity of further meetings away from the court, usually at the probation service offices.

The presence of children was regarded by all 42 independent schemes as optional, although 4 did operate an age bar which varied between 6 and 13 years. Two schemes would allow children to attend even if only one parent had consented. Most schemes appeared to be flexible on the issue of whether

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children were seen separately or with one or both parents, but in 2, they were always seen separately, and in 8, they were only seen with their parents.

In view of the social work background of most conciliators working in the courts, the greater tendency in court-based services to assume that children will be involved at some stage in the conciliation process is not surprising. Probation officers have traditionally involved children in their investigative work (James & Wilson, 1984), and doing so has an important influence on their policy and practice in conciliation. In contrast, the marriage guidance training of many conciliators working in the independent sector is unlikely to have provided the skills necessary to work with children directly. No independent services in our study made the involvement of children auto- matic, and the criteria for their involvement were fairly loose. However, despite the intention of many services to involve children, the filter mecha- nisms, such as the child’s age, parental consent, the nature of the dispute, and the stage in the conciliation process, inevitably restrict the frequency of children’s participation in conciliation. In the cases we monitored passing through independent schemes, only 13% (33) of cases actually involved the attendance of children. Of the cases which passed through court-based services, the figure was only slightly higher (15%, or 43 cases). These figures may even be on the generous side given that the definitions of what consti- tutes a child’s involvement in conciliation vary from service to service. For example, some services recorded the simple fact of a child’s attendance at an appointment as “involvement,” even though the child may not have been actively involved in the process in any way.

In general terms, the role of children in conciliation is still an open question for many conciliators. As one would expect from the data just presented, the advantages and disadvantages of seeing children are not subject to any hard and fast rules; discretion and flexibility seem to be the typical approaches taken. The battle lines between purists and pragmatists, at least out in the field, are less than clear. Although many conciliators intuitively felt that involving children in some way in their work with parents is a good idea, only a relatively few actually did so. The difficulties encountered in involving children in conciliation and the reservations which conciliators themselves have are the major factors inhibiting this practice.

For many, the introduction of the Children Act 1989 promises a radical transformation in the way the law approaches issues relating to children and might offer some direction on the question of children’s involvement in conciliation. On the contrary, however, the effect of the Act is likely, in the short term at least, to be one of making the issue of children’s involvement in conciliation less clear and even more controversial.


THE CHILDREN ACT 1989

The Children Act 1989 represents an important attempt to introduce order and consistency into what was hitherto a confused and confusing collection of statutes relating to child law. The Act establishes a new legal framework which will necessitate a reconsideration of practice by all those who work with children. It will also bring about a reappraisal of the quality and quantity of interagency cooperation.

Central to the philosophy of this Act is the shift away from state intervention in child-care issues with an assertion of the belief that children are best looked after within the family with both parents playing their part, whether they are together or separated. As such, the Act is believed by many to be good news for parents and particularly those who, for one reason or another, find themselves parenting at a distance. “Parental responsibility” as con- ceived in the Act is not affected by separation, and there is an implicit assumption throughout that parenting need only be modified or regulated by the courts in the form of orders if it is felt to be in the child’s best interest to do so. Those who adopt the “purist” position regarding conciliation, seeing it as an activity which should take place at the parental level, will look with approval to this aspect of the Act.

However, the Children Act 1989 is also believed by many to be good news for children. According to Section 1(2), when the court is considering making an order, it must have regard to the “ascertainable wishes and feelings of the child (considered in the light of his age and understanding).’’ Further- more, all courts should be able to make a child a party if given leave to make an application. At the time of writing this article, the voluminous and all- important practice rules are not yet available. Consequently, there are a host of agencies and professionals who at the present time see themselves as appropriate for eliciting the ascertainable wishes of the child; these include lawyers, child psychiatrists and psychologists, social workers, and conciliators, to name a few. Thus how, when, where, and by whom the voice of the child will be elicited is not yet clear. Nevertheless, this aspect of the Act is warmly welcomed by all those who would like to see the voice of the child amplified and by those who see conciliation as an appropriate venue for this to take place.

Clearly, the way the Act is intended to operate should eliminate any conflict between parental responsibilities and children’s wishes. There is a presumed logical sequence in the Act which places parental responsibility first; parents know best what are the best arrangements for their children following divorce and the majority will, as they have in the past, be left to get


on with it. What is in the children’s best interest will be mediated by parents with professionals operating initially at the parental level only. Parental responsibility will only be superseded in cases where there are disputes or the best interests of the child are in question. Under these circumstances, the hitherto unassailable notion of parental responsibilities is progressively eroded by the best interests of the child, perhaps articulated directly by the child as his or her “ascertainable wishes.”

However, there are points where the presumption of parental responsibility is brought into question because the interests of the child, expressed directly or by a third party, are seriously at odds. Indeed, divorce, particularly in the early stages, can create a triangle of forces, with the interests of mother, father, and child pulling in different directions, each with different concep- tions of what postdivorce family relations should look like.

THE VIEWS OF PARENTS

At the end of the Conciliation Project Unit study, users of the services we had studied were asked whether their children had attended the conciliation appointment. Only 19% of parents reported appointments in which their children had been involved (interestingly, this is the same proportion as reported by Garwood, 1989!). The views of these parents appeared to be almost equally divided, with 27 saying it was useful and 26 saying it was not useful. Those who said their children’s presence had been unhelpful felt that unnecessary upset had been caused and that their children had been given too much say in decisions which they were too young to understand. Alter- natively, those who found it helped pointed to the need for children to air their views when decisions were being made about their future.

This polarization of views appeared to be common to many parents in our sample. The parents who were able to approach issues regarding their children jointly were in a minority (this is not so surprising given that our sample comprised parents in dispute over arrangements for their children). The divergence of view was clearly related to the power (or lack of it) over the children of the marriage, which different parental statuses conferred or were believed to confer on parents. Thus custodial parents would often take the position that in view of the level and quality of their contact with the child, they were in the best position to know what was in their child’s best interests. Already made vulnerable and defensive by the very nature of their dispute, custodial parents often made assumptions that an intervention involving the child would inevitably be traumatic and it was therefore necessary for them


to adopt a protective stance. The view was also expressed that divided loyalties could come to the fore in such an appointment, with the result that children might express opinions on a whim. Alternatively, noncustodial parents expressed the view that the power of the custodial parent was likely to have obscured the real wishes of the child, which had become smothered in an overbearing relationship. Consequently, the view was expressed that if the voice of the child is to be heard, unprimed and uncorrupted, it needs to be heard directly and ideally away from the custodial parent.

For the custodial parent, the exclusion of the child from direct participation in the process of divorce was often a means of maintaining the status quo; for the noncustodial parent, the desire to include the child directly was a means to alter the status quo. Where this aspect of the triangle of forces prevails, both parents are invariably convinced that their actions are moti- vated by the best interests of their children and that what they do, they do because they love their children.

This discrepancy of views is part of a wider pattern of attitudes governing the way children are thought of in the postdivorce period. On one hand, the desire of the custodial parent to protect the child from damaging outside intervention is part of a set of cultural assumptions centered on family and kinship relations: The parental role is seen as natural and self-evident. Chil- dren are, in effect, property over which parents, and principally custodial parents, have rights of control - as one research participant commented, “The person with custody knows their child!” Conversely, the noncustodial parent is likely to see the child as a freestanding individual who has rights which may need to be protected by a wholly legitimate welfare intervention. In this respect, a major hurdle which conciliators are likely to have overcome in dealing with disagreements between parents over arrangements for the child is that they are not dealing with a single, rational, decision-making unit. On the contrary, there are invariably two separate decision-making units, each operating according to its own distinct rationality and models for action.

The Children Act removes the emotive and divisive fiction of custody and seeks to replace it with the more encompassing notion of parental responsibility and, in cases where arrangements are in dispute, the more precise concept of residence. However, the link between words and actions is often tenuous. A declaration of the importance of parental responsibility is unlikely to have much impact on the discrepancy which exists for many parents after marriage, if not also before, between their versions of what is best for their child. In this respect, the primary objective for conciliation is to introduce a degree of harmony between these two parental models such that workable arrangements can be made and renegotiated in the future.

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GIVING CHILDREN A VOICE IN DIVORCE: THE ROLE OF FAMILY CONCILIATION

The Children Act 1989, by placing increased emphasis on parental responsibility and the ascertainable wishes of the child, is a major step forward in British family law. However, in the making of postdivorce arrangements, there is a fine line to be drawn between private disputes and public interest. This particular line is not new to family conciliators, whose role it often is to balance the limits of parental responsibility with a sense of what is likely to be in the child’s best interests. As we have seen, there are clearly reasons why the voice of the child ought to be heard, not least by parents, in the aftermath of a divorce, and conciliation may indeed provide the venue for this to happen. However, conciliators must inevitably work at the parental level and because conciliation is by its very nature a voluntary process, they have no power to coerce or cajole; they are present in the family dispute by invitation only. Should parents, for whatever reason, wish to keep the child shielded from outside contact, then little, beyond gentle advocacy, should be done to reverse this. Likewise, when parents are able to agree on the benefits of involving a child in conciliation, such that it really does become “family conciliation,” then there will undoubtedly be benefits for the family con- cerned. However, attempts to extract the wishes of a child from the turmoil of postdivorce relationships without due acknowledgment of parental wishes is a responsibility which, by definition, falls outside conciliation.

Conciliation clearly has a great deal to offer the children of divorcing parents when there is agreement of parents and the child as to his or her involvement and a clarity of purpose for all participants. Policies in this respect, however, are still far from consistent in Great Britain at the present time, and professional ideologies are often in competition rather than coor- dinated and cooperating. It is hoped that the Children Act 1989 by encompassing areas of public and private child-care law will bring about a more comprehensive consideration of this most important issue and lay the grounds for a unified approach to the involvement of children in decisions that profoundly affect their lives.

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Bob Simpson is a Research Associate in the Family and Community Dispute Research Center at the University ofNewcastle upon Tyne, England He was previously a member of the Conciliation Project Unit.

THE CHILDREN ACT 1989 AND THE VOICE OF THE CHILD IN FAMILY CONCILIATION

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