The Challenges of the Internet and Social Media in Public Diplomacy

7/29/2019 The Challenges of the Internet and Social Media in Public Diplomacy

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www.AmericanSecurityProject.org 1100 New York Avenue, NW Suite 710W Washington, DC

Te Challenges o theInternet and Social Media

in Public DiplomacyMatthew Wallin

February 2013

IN BRIEF

Using the internet and social media or government public diplomacy purposes may bemore dicult than many practitioners anticipate.

Tough social media platorms may be ree to use, proper use o the medium is bothtime and labor intensive.

Engagement through the internet and social media is best when used as a componento real-world public diplomacy.

Metrics must measure both actual audience and inuence.

raditional broadcast mediums have the potential to be used interactively.

Matthew Wallin is a Senior Policy Analyst at the American Security Project

Introduction

Recent years have witnessed an explosion o social media in conjunction with politicalupheaval around the world, causing many in the international policy community to draw animmediate connection to the perceived power o social media.

Yet the perceived power o social media must be scrutinized, acting more as a acilitator andnot as a cause. As a communications medium, the internet (whether the world wide web orsocial media) must be given credit or what it allows the average person to do: instantly accesscustomized inormation and engage in omnidirectional(all directions)communication on

equal ooting as other actors.
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AMERICAN SECURITY PROJECT

Te revolution in communication ushered in by the internet is evident not in the medium itsel, but in thstandards and expectations it has created.

When examining how to best adapt to the challenges presented by the relatively new nature o the internand social media, it is crucial to comprehend that governments have successully adapted to previocommunications revolutions such as the telegraph, radio, and television. Understanding that each o the

new mediums had their limits, the use o online tools and social media should not be treated as a panacea. Athe core, the goals o traditional diplomacy have not changed with each revolution. Te advent o the internmay be making public diplomacy more public and more prominent, but it does not change the basic premisconduct or goals o statecrat.

Te purpose o this paper is to explore the challenges that the use o the internet and social media pose or U.public diplomacy, and to provoke thought about better ways to use these or other tools. It is not intended an argument against the use o social media or public diplomacy purposes, but to encourage a critical look its practice and encourage those employing it to better analyze its eect.

Challenges1. Designing Eect

Beore employing social media tools, it is imperative that a public diplomacy practitioner must understanthe strategic policy objective, and establish a communications goal.1 Tis will inorm that strategist how thetools can best be used to augment results, or whether they are the appropriate tools or the campaign at han

Many may mistake the use o social media as a universally eective toolbecause it appears comparatively cheap, relatively ast, and it is currentlyexperiencing a certain aura o mysticism around its use and potential.

echnology, innovation, and 2.0 are all buzzwords that ignore the actthat much o the world is not as advanced as the United States or otherconnected regions. Tough some point to the vast and growing globalnumber o mobile phone subscriptions, roughly 6 billion,2 this numberdoes not explain how many have access to online networks, how manyusers are literate, or whether those users can keep their phones charged.

Tis is not meant to discount potentially eective uses o social media. For instance, one eective use o socmedia is as a tool or ortiying existing relationships. It provides a means o regular interaction during times

which parties would not normally converse. Sometimes, this may be due to limitations o time and distanc

But this does not suggest that social media is not labor and time intensive. In order to do social media propera government must regularly engage and converse with its audiences.

Inormation vs. Infuence

Dening public diplomacy (PD) as communication with foreign publics for the purpose of achieving a foreigpolicy objective,3 PD practitioners should be cognizant that inormation is dierent than inuence.

Image courtesy ISA


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Awareness does not imply action. While some policy issues may require the United States to engage in asignicant inormation campaign, the question o what people should do with that inormation is paramount.Making inormation available online does not necessarily inuence people to do something with thatinormation.

2. Measuring Eect

Audience

How does a government employing social media strategy understand i it is reaching its target audience?

Facebook likes and witter ollowers do not necessarily equate a strong connection with an audience. Havinga million ollowers says nothing about whether those tweets are read, nor does that top-line number indicate

where a users ollowers reside. Neither does it necessarily indicate whether those ollowers are undertakingaction to support a users communications goals. Furthermore, i the number o an organizations onlineollowers in the target audience is outweighed by the number o ollowers outside o the target region or

audience, what does this signiy? However, audience expansion can be a perectly legitimate goal o particularcommunication campaigns.

Tis quantitative analysis provides the basis rom which public diplomats can crat better messages to actuallyunderstand who they are reaching, and make adjustments accordingly.

As a measure o success, as o January 23, 2013, the State Department claims to have:4

3.2 Million ollowers on 308 ocial witter eeds in 10 languages

18.5 Million ans, riends and ollowers on 411 Facebook accounts

Communication with more than 21 million worldwide

However, these numbers do not explain much, as there is no indication o how many o those ollowers arebased in the U.S ., in the corresponding countries or each account, or elsewhere. Interested in this inorma-tion, ASP inquired to the State Department about obtaining a list o 10 U.S. embassies social media accountsand a breakdown o their ollowers. O those 10 embassies, the Department o State provided the ollowingbreakdown by percentage o its likes and ollowers across Facebook and witter or only the U.S. Embassiesin Moscow and Cairo:5

Moscow Cairo

Facebook Twiter Facebook Twiter

Russia/non-U.S. U.S. Russia/non-U.S. U.S. Egypt/non-U.S. U.S. Egypt/non-U.S. U.S.

75% 25% 89% 11% 98.5% 1.5% 61.4% 38.6%

When analyzing the above gures, several considerations must be taken. For instance, the State Department


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uses social media to connect with domestic and oreign audiences alike. While an embassy in a oreign countmay ocus on communicating with the people o that nation, the same social media eeds can be used connect with American nationals living in or visiting that country. Te numbers also cannot take into accouthe number o people within a country connecting via a proxy server or virtual private network (VPN). Proxiallow a user to connect to a website to by rst connecting to another computer or server in a third country, thallowing the viewer to mask their identity or location, and potentially bypassing online restrictions. In th

case, a ollower or website visitor in Iran may appear as those they are connecting rom Pakistan, or anothcountry. Te nature o this ability makes it incredibly dicult to determine with 100% certainty where aorganizations online ollowers live.

As a result, the metrics above cannot be established with 100% certainty. Further adding to the conusioinormation provided to ASP by the State Department insisted ASP that the above numbers are based on sereported locations, and claimed:

It is not possible to provide ully accurate geographical location inormation about social mediausers, because the only source o inormation on a users geographical location is what that uservoluntarily chooses to include in his/her prole.6

While this may be true or some social media outlets, Facebook indicates that Location data is based on tgeographic location o each person as determined by their browser IP address.7

Yet despite the ambiguities that are evident, metrics can be used to establish a baseline rom which genertrends can be observedand although that baseline may be determinable, it is another question altogether to whether or not the internet baseline is representative o real-world action or behavior. Internet commenand conversation oten tends to be extreme8 and it is unclear whether or not the postings that people ponline are necessarily representative o how they choose to act in person.

Inormation Longevity

Supposing that inormation posted via social media is passed on, the attention that inormation gains generalhas little staying power. Research by the link tracking organization bit.ly in 2011 indicates that the hal-lio a link posted in social media is very short. An internet hal-lie, dened as the time by which a link will receihalf the total clicks of its existenceis approximately 3 hours, while Youube links tend to last or about 7.9 Trelative short lie o these links may be related to the news eed nature o the platorms on which they aposted. As links move arther and arther down a list o recent posts, they are more likely to all o the rado the average user. Bit.ly proposes that the content o the link itsel, as opposed to the medium, has the biggimpact on longevity, as indicated by the wide variance in the liespans o the links used in its sample study.1

3. Methods o Eect

Real-ime Communication

A primary challenge o online communication involves the real-time nature in which it occurs. Te clearan


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process used by the U.S. State Department can oten be slow, and is ill-equipped to respond to the demandingnature o social media.

Ocial government statements, and those made by employees in their ocial capacity, are oten combed overword by word by sometimes dozens o oces and individuals beore release. Exploring the impedance o thegovernment clearance process on social media use, ormer State Department Assistant Secretary or Public

Aairs P.J. Crowley commented at a GWU event on public diplomacy:

...the key is not to have a layer o people looking over your shoulder all the time but to giveautonomy to the people who are out there doing the tweeting, otherwise they are not going todo it or its going to take them a long time to do it11

Contrary to this, in U.S. public diplomacy, it is vital that messages issued by government representatives beconsistent with policya necessity which discourages individual action.

However, research indicates that connections are best made online when organizations converse in a less-ocial tone, making them appear more personable and approachable. Fergus Hanson notes that the StateDepartments more successul online outreach sites tend to avoid traditional diplomatic bureaucratese andadopt a less obviously governmental style.12 Te question or those operating ocial social media eeds is howto become more inormal and conversational using social media while still maintaining the unity and accuracyo message required by the nature o government communications.

When employing social media, the State Department is aced with a seemingly stark choice between saeguardsensuring message accuracy, and allowing its employees the reedom to engage audiences conversationallyin a manner that humanizes their eorts. On one hand, using the clearance process ensures that onlinecommunication by government employees is consistent with U.S. oreign policy. On the other hand, allowingemployees the reedom to respond rapidly in a manner consistent with the nature and discourse o online

communities runs the severe risk o enabling those employees to essentially determine policy without theapproval o Washington. Tis holds the potential or disastrous consequences which cant be easily mitigated.

Te perceived solution would be to improve and expedite the clearance processa discussion which in itselis controversial. In December 2012, leaked internal State Department discussions related to reducing thethen-current allowance or a 30-day review period to two days caused intense debate on the internet aboutthe premise o such a delay at all or a real-time medium.13

In the end, this is an issue that will likely evolve over time as the experience with online tools continues togrow. Te U.S. government will have to nd a proper balance that gives its employees using social media or

ocial purposes the ability to respond quickly, but only i that quick response is accurate and reects ocialU.S. policy.

Getting Noticed

Social media and internet users are aced with a volume o inormation unprecedented in recorded history.


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When governments communicate online, there is no guarantee that the target audience is paying attentioSince the playing eld is leveled, and individuals can have the same voice as a government online, thgovernment voice can oten be drowned out by noise.

Te numbers game o social media is simply daunting. o put it into perspective, 72 hours o video auploaded on Youtube per minute.14 Tere are over 400 million tweets per day.15 With numbers like this, havin

ones voice heard can be a challenge, and shouting is hardly a guarantor.

Furthermore, much o the inormation consumed online requires a user to actively seek out or choose consume that inormation in an active manner. Posting content on 300 dierent eeds hardly guarantees

will be viewed. In many cases, users must choose to click on links, subscribe to eeds, or watch a video, ancan ace these simple decisions thousands o times a day. Employers o social media must consider what thare doing to make their target audience choose to consume their inormation over someone elses. Since thinternet provides all users with an equal platorm, government messages hardly exercise privilege o access.

Consumers o social media ultimately need a reason to divert their attention rom the typical social anentertainment purposes o social media. Since outlets like Facebook are purposed to be centered arounnetworks o riends and amily, a riends or amily members message is naturally more credible than tho an organization or government. As Clay Shirky notes, the internet is most eective in the second step the two step inuence process (developed by Katz and Lazareld): that is, that political opinions are orme

when amily, riends and colleagues circulate inormation produced by the media.16 Tereore, in tappinthe potential power o social media to carry a message aimed to inuence, the United States must exploit thinteraction o virtual networks with networks in the real-world.

Going Viral

o surpass the problem o inormation overload, one method is to employ techniques that cause inormatioto go viral online. Viral distribution can be an eective short-term method to spread inormation.

Rather than relying on the top down distribution methods o old, viralism relies on either lateral or bottomup spread, allowing a message to grow not rom a single source, but to be replicated instantaneously andistributed across what is essentially a peer-to-peer or electronic word-o-mouth system. Unlike biologicviruses or malware, achieving viral status o internet content is entirely dependent on the end-user or evestep o growth. It has to be consciously and intentionally spread.

While there are many theories on what causes material to go viral, viral content oten thrives on the unusuhumorous/emotional, cute, utterly impressive, or shocking to gain traction and inspire the user to pass it on

their social networks. Te common theme between these types o content is that they evoke both positive annegative high-arousal emotions.17 Government messaging oten alls short in all o these areas.

Yet Americas adversaries, like al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), have managed notable viral successes achieved througthe distribution o shocking content. Furthering AQIs communication goals, the sheer number o day-tday attacks captured on video by insurgent groups and spread via the internet became its own spectaclea


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unstoppable message intended specically to challenge the American narrative o the wars in Aghanistan andIraq. Tose viewing these videos may begin to see that amount o security, money, or military power thrown atthis problem could prevent dedicated individuals rom planting IEDs, committing suicide attacks, or carryingout assassinations.

It is dicult or the American government to attempt to out-communicate terrorists by using these techniques.

Whereas depictions o brutality can spread virally and subsequently work in avor o terrorist recruiting ortraining goals (though this hasnt always proven to be the case),18 the oten unintentional viral distribution ographic violence committed by Americans typically proves more harmul than benecial. Part o the reason orthe massive amount o online insurgent and terrorist multimedia stems rom the now ubiquitous nature o cellphones, video cameras, and laptops. Unortunately, this ubiquity also works against the American narrative, asthe material captured by Americans using these devices has oten produced negative results. Incidents such asthe Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse photos serve as prime examples o how damaging imagery can be.

On the other hand, none o this necessarily means that governments areincapable o having viral successes. In Te Atlantic Wire, John Hudsonargues that NASA is the governments one true viral hit actory.19Indeed, NASAs primary witter account has more ollowers than allo the State Departments 308 witter accounts combined. In 2011,the CDC had a notable viral success with its Zombie Preparednesscampaign,20 as it was something completely unexpected rom agovernment agency and tapped into a prominent pop culture themeat the time.

However, going viral also doesnt necessarily imply that the message is accomplishing its intended purposewith the target audience. Tere are a variety o reasons that internet contentgoes viral, and they arent always necessarily benecial or the originator.

Case in point, in 2012, the European Commission created a teaser ad thatreached viral status called Science: Its a Girl Ting. Yet the ad didntreach viral status on the credentials o its quality or messageit did sobecause o its shockingly sexist content. Featuring images o ashionable

women in high heels and makeup with little actual science, the campaignrapidly made the internet rounds as a result o the amount o objection andoutrage it generated.21

PD practitioners should understand that viral status can be reached or reasons o incompetence as well asbrilliance. Te trick or governments is to be very aware o the social andmedia environments in which they

operate, to ensure that incompetence isnt the impetus or viral distribution.

Getting the Signal Trough

When employing a social media strategy, one cannot assume that because inormation has been put onthe web, that the intended audience can actually access it. Aside rom questions o internet penetration,

Screen-grab rom Science: Its a GirlTing

Tis image o JPLs Bobak Ferdowskiwent viral during coverage o the MarsCuriosity Rover landing


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some target audiences cannot be reached due to blocking or censorship technologies put in place by thegovernments.

While many blocking and censorship techniques can be overcome using methods like anonymity sotwarvirtual private networks (VPN), and proxies, the net eect o blocking techniques is not overcome by usinthese methods. By their nature, these tools are not able to completely eliminate the total impact o blockin

methods, as they require the interest and knowledge o users to a greater extent than unrestricted browsing.

Te power o the internet is irrelevant when a host country shuts o the network. Beyond merely restrictinaccess, countries acing protest movements have on more than one occasion simply turned o the interneIn November 2012, the internet in Syria was shut down.22 During the Egyptian Revolution, the internet wshut down on multiple occasions, and the protest movement grew despite its absence.23 Egypts restrictienvironment, reected in the presence o only our major internet service providers (ISPs), allowed thgovernment to make a ew phone calls to disable service.24 Perhaps indicative o the internets limited abilito sustain a movement, the protest movement continued its activities, turning to hard copy pamphlets, axeand landline phones or communication purposes.25

Even i social media plays a role in the ormation o a protest movement, it ar rom guarantees it will succeeDuring the 2009 Iranian Election protests, witter played a signicant role in enabling communication the movement. During this time, the State Department requested that witter delay planned maintenance order to allow its continued use during the protests.26 Yet despite the role social media played in enabling tprotest movement, it could not deend that protest movement against the hard power tactics employed by thIranian regime to put it down.

For PD practitioners, it is crucial to see this issue as a primary reason or connecting online engagement real-world activities. Since the internet is inherently vulnerable to state control, eorts must be made or thconnections made online to have resiliency ofine. Tough the United States should continue to develo

technologies and support policies that preserve the ability or people around the world to access inormatioreely online, it cannot assume that the materials it produces will always be accessible to the target audience

Innovative uses o Social Media

Tough this paper ocuses on the challenges o using the internet and social media or PD purposes, there aseveral instances where the State Department has engaged oreign populations using these tools in innovatiand appropriate ways. Below are a ew examples.

Center or Strategic Counterterrorism CommunicationsTe Center or Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) poses a direct challenge to the advantagheld by insurgent groups and terrorists online. Established in 2010, it is an interagency eort based in tDepartment o State and operates under the broad policy direction o the White House and an interagensteering committee.27 It is intended to:


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coordinate, orient, and inorm government-wide public communications activities directedat audiences abroad and targeted against violent extremists and terrorist organizations,especially al-Qaida, its aliates, and its adherents.28

Operating at a budget o $5 million in FY2012,29 the CSCC is divided into three areas o operation, includingintelligence and analysis, plans and operations, and the Digital Outreach eam (DO).30 Te DO was

originally ormed in 2006, and was absorbed into the CSCC with the purpose o conducting counterterrorismcommunications through the internet. o do this, the DO engages via written text posted to online orums,Facebook or the comment section o media websites, and also through the use o graphics and video to ensurethat al Qaeda and its supporters do not operate with impunity online. 31

While working to develop extensive metrics or its eorts, theCSCCs Director, Ambassador Alberto Fernandez, has indicatedthat initial signs o success are reected in the irate responses byextremists,32 and the adoption o CSCCs rhetoric by members othe target audience.33 Tis analysis is thus more qualitative thanquantitative, as it ocuses on action actually taken by the targetaudiencea primary goal o public diplomacy.

Te CSCCs strategy appears solid or several reasons. First, it hasdened goals. Second, it has an understanding o its limitations,indicated by Ambassador Fernandezs awareness o his organizationsmission during his congressional testimony.34 Tird, it has a nuanced understanding o its target audience.Tis involves not only the publication o its materials solely in appropriate oreign languages, but a ocus onthe action o Al Qaeda and its aliates rather than on a discussion o Islam itsel. 35

While the results o the CSCCs work may take years to realize, it addresses the problem o disinormation

and presents a counter narrative directly in the areas where those seeking to harm American interests may beotherwise unopposed.

Embassy Jakarta

Te case o Embassy Jakartas social media eorts represents a primary example o rapid expansion and onlinesuccess. Te Embassys eorts have been exemplary o a good understanding o the limits o social media, andan understanding o how it can be used to compliment real world activities.

In a research paper looking into Embassy Jakartas success, Melanie Ciolek notes:

Embassy Jakarta has skillully incorporated Facebook into its public diplomacy eorts byusing it within integrated media campaigns that relate to ofine events and recognizing theaudience Facebook allows it to reach.36

For example, by tying in Facebook with President Obamas then-upcoming visit to Indonesia, Ciolek contends:

Ambassador Alberto Fernandez testiyingbeore Congress. Image Courtesy: C-SPAN


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Embassy Jakarta was able to generate signicant interest in a real-world event throughdirect online engagement with users. While Facebook is not a venue or serious policydiscussion, Embassy Jakarta has strategically used Facebook to inormally but directly connect

with an audience about its existing public diplomacy eorts. Tese interactions are buildinga community that is oriented around both online and ofine opportunities to engage in a

dialogue about the United States.37

Te Embassys eorts to expand its social media audience went beyond inserting its voice into interndiscussions, and instead actually oered a tangible benet to its ans. As Dr. Ralph Wilson notes in his s

principles o viral marketing, successul viral endeavors oten give awvaluable products or services to attract attention.38 In the Embassys casgiveaways included books and other prizes donated by Microsot anStarbucks.39 As a signicant prize, Embassy Jakarta also began a goldeticket program or its Facebook ollowers, eaturing three all expenspaid educational tours o the U.S., where [the winners] get to viseveral o the places in America that had a signicant impact on the lie U.S. President Obama.40 Tis type o oering not only provides a chanto attract people to orms o virtual engagement, but also the physicperson-to-person contact that occurs as the result o a tour.

Te strategy proved successul in increasing the Embassys online reach by tapping into Indonesias connectioto President Obama, expanding its Facebook likes rom 30,000 to 60,000 in a one month period. 41 As

January 2013, the Embassys Facebook page has over 527,000 likes.42

However, these types o activities arent the only reasons or the Embassys success, as the Embassy also madesignicant attempt to engage inuential bloggers. Tis included hosting the largest annual national gatherin

o bloggers in Indonesia in 2008 and 2009.43 Engagement with these kinds o strong online personalities nonly provides a basic method or gaining an online audience, but also establishes in-person relationships thcan be maintained through electronic means.

Applying Online Lessons to Other Mediums

Considering many o the diculties and challenges o social media use, public diplomacy practitioners shoualso search or alternative methods to transplant the seemingly unique properties o online communication other potentially more accessible platorms.

What the internet has taught us is that the public loves to be involved and wants to be heard. Tis lesson is kin understanding what public diplomacy needs to be in the modern area. How do we engage oreign publics an interactive manner that enables them to interact or be heard? What would applying these lessons to othorms o communication look like?

Tese examples provide methods by which audiences themselves can interact and have their voices hear

A web graphic advertising EmbassyJakartas Golden icket Contest


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Tey are communications models which may at rst appear unidirectional but hold the potential or bi- oromnidirectional content, and create more meaning or users who are no longer satised with traditionallyunidirectional broadcast.

Radio has the potential to be used as new media, even though it is an old technology, as it can be interactiveand allow or the input o the population. In Kunar Province, Aghanistan, the U.S. military established

a small-scale Aghan-run call-in radio station that operates with one reporter, one microphone, and onetelephone line.44 Te station also has a reputation or impartiality, taking calls rom everyone, includingaliban members, and allows discussion on most any topic, including religion, politics, and music. U.S.military members are oten eatured as guests on the station, answering questions rom whoever calls in. Temilitary has also handed out wind-up radios to the population, negating the need or electricity or batteries tolisten in.45 As a result o small projects like this, the people o Aghanistan are given a voice in similar ashionto the internet. Tey are able to ask questions directly to Americans, express their concerns, and receiveanswers in a relatively anonymous manner. O course, there are other aspects to this as well that cannot beignored, including phone inrastructure and broadcast equipment, but this is a solution thats well suited orsocieties within Aghanistan.

elevisionalso presents opportunities or interactivity. Consider the case oPop Idol, the British televisionseries which has spawned numerous spinos worldwide, includingAmerican Idol. Tese types o series are

widely popular, and encourage interaction in several ways. Not only do these programs encourage audienceinteraction by including a voting element, but they also allow the public to participate in the production othe shows content. Since these series draw contestants directly rom the public, they provide a very real meansor the average person to communicate to wide audiences through culture and music. Te numbers are alsoastounding. In 2008, American Idols 7th season, the nale saw 97.5 million votes cast46 (it should be notedthat viewers are able to vote numerous times). It also important to note that the basic ormat o these types o

shows holds potential or conversion to a radio ormat in areas where V

is less available.

Tis ormat has also been reproduced indigenously in countries like Iraq,where Iraq Stardrew over 1,200 contestants in 2006. Te success o theshow piqued the interest o the U.S. Military, which sought options orsponsoring the program with messaging.47 While this type o show shoulddraw the interest o Americans with a public diplomacy agenda, theyshould simultaneously be cautious not to taint the potential o home-grown programs in struggling countries that otherwise have ew successes.

ConclusionsTe global story o social media has been one o empowerment. As Alec Ross describes, recent years haveseen a shit in geopolitical power rom hierarchies, to citizens and networks o citizens, and the internethas accelerated the speed and growth o political movements.48 Te events o the past several years, romIran, to Egypt, to Libya and beyond demonstrate that social media is a tool most eectively employed bythe public and individuals because it enables them to speak through a popular medium at the same level

Iraq Star is an example o interactivetelevision


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as governments. Ultimately, social media practitioners within the State Department should understand thsocial media naturally diuses power away rom state run institutions, and that the level o inuence that cbe exerted through these types o tools is subsequently limited.

Doing social media right is actually time, labor, and resource intensive. While creating accounts on manwesbites is ree, the labor to produce content or those sites is not, and the time it takes to actively engage use

in real time is considerable.

It may prove that a governments best use o social media might not be to instigate or create, but rather guide, acilitate and moderate. While a government may oten be unable to generate viral content in a mannconsistent with its principles, it can still use its inuence to help steer conversation, and it can still help provithe tools or orums that allow conversation to happen.

Certainly, social media does have a role in public diplomacy. Nevertheless, the proper use o internet ansocial media is not as a primary method o communication. Rather, these tools should be componentso integrated strategy. On their own, social media campaigns are extremely dicult to generate results romTose who choose to employ them must keep an eye on the physical in addition to the virtual. How are yocommunicating in person? What tangible things are you doing? How are you physically engaging your targaudience? And then, how is your social media component being used to support or augment these eorts?

Matthew Wallin is a Senior Policy Analyst at the American Security Project.


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Endnotes1. Wallin, Matthew, Te New Public Diplomacy Imperative, American Security Project, 2012, p. 21-22 http://americansecu-

rityproject.org/eatured-items/2012/the-new-public-diplomacy-imperative/

2. BBC, UN: Six Billion Mobile Phone Subscriptions in the World, 2012, October 12 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technol-ogy-19925506

3. Wallin, Matthew, Te New Public Diplomacy Imperative, American Security Project, 2012, p. 3 http://americansecurity-project.org/eatured-items/2012/the-new-public-diplomacy-imperative/

4. U.S. Department o State Ocial, Response to Inquiry rom Matt Wallin, American Security Project, via email, 2013,January 23.

Previous numbers rom November, 2012 can be ound here:

U.S. Department o State, 21st Century Statecrat,2012, http://www.state.gov/statecrat/overview/index.htm

5. U.S. Department o State Ocial, Response to Inquiry rom Matt Wallin, American Security Project, via email, 2013,January 23.

6. Ibid.

7. Facebook Developers, Insights, https://developers.acebook.com/docs/insights/

8. Singal, Jesse, Most Comments are HorribleSites Look or Ways to Make them Better, Te Daily Beast, 2012, June 16,http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/07/16/most-comments-are-horrible-sites-look-or-ways-to-make-them-better.html

9. Bit.ly, You Just Shared a Link. How Long Will People Pay Attention? 2011, September 6, http://blog.bitly.com/post/9887686919/you-just-shared-a-link-how-long-will-people-pay

10. Ibid.

11. Institute or Public Diplomacy and Global Communication, Public Diplomacy in the Next Four Years, 2012, November13, http://www.gwu.edu/~ipdgc/events/2012_11_13_PostElectionPD/PDN4Y%20ranscript.cm

12. Hanson, Fergus, Baked in and Wired: eDiplomacy at State, Brookings, 2012, October 25, http://www.brookings.edu/re-search/reports/2012/10/25-ediplomacy-hanson

13. Labott, Elise, weets gone wrong a concern at State Department, CNN, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/10/tweets-gone-wrong-a-concern-at-state-department/

14. Murphy, Kate Catching up with Kevin Allocca o Youube rends, Te New York imes, 2012, June 9, http://www.ny-times.com/2012/06/10/opinion/sunday/catching-up-with-kevin-allocca-o-youtube-trends.html

15. Farber, Dan witter hits 400 million tweets per day, mostly mobile, CNE, 2012, June 6, http://news.cnet.com/8301-

1023_3-57448388-93/twitter-hits-400-million-tweets-per-day-mostly-mobile/

16. Shirky, Clay, Te Political Power o Social Media, Foreign Aairs, Jan/Feb2011, Vol. 90 Issue 1, p28-41

17. Berger, Jonah and Milkman, Katherine L.,What Makes Online Content Viral?Journal of Marketing Research, Vol 49 Issue2, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cm?abstract_id=1528077

18. Attack videos proved most popular at driving oreign recruitment or Al Qaeda in Iraq, but ultimately alienated the generalIraqi population. See:
http://americansecurityproject.org/featured-items/2012/the-new-public-diplomacy-imperative/http://americansecurityproject.org/featured-items/2012/the-new-public-diplomacy-imperative/http://americansecurityproject.org/featured-items/2012/the-new-public-diplomacy-imperative/http://americansecurityproject.org/featured-items/2012/the-new-public-diplomacy-imperative/http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2012/10/25-ediplomacy-hansonhttp://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2012/10/25-ediplomacy-hansonhttp://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/10/opinion/sunday/catching-up-with-kevin-allocca-of-youtube-trends.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/10/opinion/sunday/catching-up-with-kevin-allocca-of-youtube-trends.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/10/opinion/sunday/catching-up-with-kevin-allocca-of-youtube-trends.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/10/opinion/sunday/catching-up-with-kevin-allocca-of-youtube-trends.htmlhttp://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2012/10/25-ediplomacy-hansonhttp://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2012/10/25-ediplomacy-hansonhttp://americansecurityproject.org/featured-items/2012/the-new-public-diplomacy-imperative/http://americansecurityproject.org/featured-items/2012/the-new-public-diplomacy-imperative/http://americansecurityproject.org/featured-items/2012/the-new-public-diplomacy-imperative/http://americansecurityproject.org/featured-items/2012/the-new-public-diplomacy-imperative/


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White, Jeremy, Virtual Indoctrination and the Digihad: Te Evolution o Al-Qaedas Media Strategy, Small Wars Journal,2012, November 19, http://smallwarsjournal.com/print/13534

19. Hudson, John, NASA is the Governments One rue Viral Hit Factory, Te Atlantic Wire, 2012, August 6, http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2012/08/nasa-governments-one-true-viral-hit-actory/55447/

20. Khan, Ali S., Preparedness 101: Zombie Apocalypse, CDC, 2011, May 16, http://blogs.cdc.gov/publichealthmat-ters/2011/05/preparedness-101-zombie-apocalypse/

21. Rice, Curt Science: Its a girl thing! A Viral Fiasco, Te Guardian, 2012, June 29, http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/blog/2012/jun/29/science-girl-thing-viral-asco

22. Fantz, Ashley, As rebels appear to gain ground, Internet shuts down in Syria, CNN, 2012, November 29, http://www.cnncom/2012/11/29/world/syria-civil-war/

23. Papic, Marko and Noonan, Sean, Social Media as a ool or Protest, Strator, 2011, February 3, http://www.strator.com/weekly/20110202-social-media-tool-protest

24. Beam, Christopher, Block Like an Egyptian: HowHow did the Egyptian Government urn o the Internet? Slate, 2011,January 28, http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2011/01/block_like_an_egyptian.html

25. Ibid.

26. Landler, Mark and Stelter, Brian, Washington aps into a Potent New Force in Diplomacy, Te New York imes, 2009,June 16, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/17/world/middleeast/17media.html?_r=0

27. U.S. Department o State, Ambassador Alberto Fernandez Appointed Coordinator o the Center or Strategic Counterterroism Communications (CSCC), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/03/186790.htm

28. Ibid.

29. Committee on Foreign Aairs, House o Representatives, Te State Departments Center or Strategic CounterterrorismCommunications: Mission, Operations and Impact, 2012, August 2, http://oreignaairs.house.gov/112/75389.pdp.5

30. Ibid. P.7

31. Ibid. p.13

32. Ibid. p.7

33. Ibid. p.21

34. Ibid. p. 17, 18, 22

35. Ibid. p.17

36. Ciolek, Melanie, Understanding Social Medias Contribution to Public Diplomacy USC Center on Public Diplomacy at tAnnenberg School, 2010, http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/pds/mciolek_socialmedia_indonesia.pd, p8

37. Ibid, p. 10

38. Wilson, Ralph F. Te Six Simple Principles o Viral Marketing, WebMarketingoday, 2012, May 10, http://webmarketingtoday.com/articles/viral-principles/

39. Embassy o the United States, Jakarta, U.S. Embassy Looks or op Facebook Fans Beore Obama Visit, 2010, February 1http://jakarta.usembassy.gov/pr_02122010.html
http://blogs.cdc.gov/publichealthmatters/2011/05/preparedness-101-zombie-apocalypse/http://blogs.cdc.gov/publichealthmatters/2011/05/preparedness-101-zombie-apocalypse/http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/75389.pdfhttp://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/pdfs/mciolek_socialmedia_indonesia.pdfhttp://webmarketingtoday.com/articles/viral-principles/http://webmarketingtoday.com/articles/viral-principles/http://webmarketingtoday.com/articles/viral-principles/http://webmarketingtoday.com/articles/viral-principles/http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/pdfs/mciolek_socialmedia_indonesia.pdfhttp://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/75389.pdfhttp://blogs.cdc.gov/publichealthmatters/2011/05/preparedness-101-zombie-apocalypse/http://blogs.cdc.gov/publichealthmatters/2011/05/preparedness-101-zombie-apocalypse/


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The Challenges of the Internet and Social Media in Public Diplomacy

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