THE CAUSES OF WAR

Rutgers University Political Science 324 Spring 2012

Professor Jack S. Levy304 Hickman Hall; 732 932-1073jacklevy@rci.rutgers.eduhttp://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/levy/Office Hours: after class (on CAC) & by appointment (in Hickman 304)

War has been a plague on humanity for thousands of years, from early hunter-gatherers,to tribes and chiefdoms, to empires and early states, to the contemporary internationalsystem. War takes place between states, within states, and between other kinds of politicalorganizations. Most of us would like to see an end to war, or, at a minimum, a reductionin the horrible destructiveness of war. Despite the intellectual energy devoted to thequestions of what causes war and how to control it by philosophers, historians, politicalscientists, economists, sociologists, anthropologists, biologists, primatologists, and others little consensus has emerged regarding what the causes of war are or how best toidentify those causes. It is perhaps not surprising that debates persist between variousdisciplines, given their different assumptions and methodologies. But debate persistswithin disciplines as well. No consensus has emerged among political scientists as to thebest theory of war, how we might construct or validate such a theory, or even theappropriate criteria for evaluating competing theories of war. Historians, who aregenerally quite skeptical about the possibility of constructing general theories aboutanything as complex and context-dependent as war, rarely agree among themselves aboutthe causes of particular wars. This is true even in cases such as the First World War,where most of the documents pertaining to the war are now available.

Our aim in this course is to gain a better understanding of the conditions, processes, andevents which lead to the outbreak and escalation of war. War defined generally assustained, coordinated violence between political organizations comes in enormousvarieties, including tribal wars, imperial wars, interstate wars, great power wars,revolutionary wars, civil wars, insurgencies, and terrorism. Although different kinds ofwar may exhibit some common themes pursuit of interests and fears of insecurity, forexample many of the more specific causes of war differ for different kinds of wars. Atheory of great power war (like the First or Second World Wars) will probably notprovide a very good explanation for the insurgencies in Iraq or Afghanistan. A generaltheory of all war would be too general and too watered down to provide usefulexplanations of particular kinds of wars. For that reason we limit our focus in this courseto the causes of interstate wars.

2True, interstate war is no longer the dominant form of warfare, as it was for most of thelast five centuries of the modern international system. Great power wars (between theleading states in the system), which have done much to shape the nature of the statesystem during the last half millennium, have disappeared since World War II (or at leastsince the Korean War), and interstate wars in general have declined over that period.Meanwhile, civil wars exploded in number since the 1960s before reaching a peak in the1980s, and civil war, insurgency, and terrorism continues to be the most frequent form ofarmed conflict in the world. Nevertheless, interstate war is still the most destructive formof war and the one that has the greatest potential for fundamentally reshaping thestructure and evolution of world politics and the lives of many peoples. In addition, thereare enough danger spots in the world the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the prospectiveemergence of a nuclear Iran, the Indo-Pakistani rivalry, the Korean peninsula, and the riseof China as a rival to the United States to warrant a continued concern with thephenomenon of interstate war.

Our primary aim is to understand the conditions under which interstate wars are mostlikely to occur, to answer the question of Who Fights Whom, Where, When, and Why?(as the late Stuart Bremer once asked). These are theoretical questions, and much of thefocus in the lectures and readings are theoretical in nature. We supplement our theoreticalanalyses with a large number of historical illustrations, both in lecture and in readings onparticular wars, from the Peloponnesian War that engulfed the Greek world from 431-404BCE to the 2003 Iraq War. These historical case studies will serve several purposes.Individual wars are important in and of themselves, and are worth studying for theirhistorical value. I am also convinced that the best way to understand general theories ofwar is to see how they work in particular cases. Theories are useful in abstracting from amass of detail in order to identify the underlying causal processes, but actual wars areoften quite complex, as historical studies will show. Understanding the causes of warrequires both theoretical knowledge and historical knowledge.

The course begins with an historical and theoretical introduction. We classify differentkinds of war and examine the evolution of interstate warfare over the last half millenniumand some significant changes in patterns of warfare during the last half century. We thenanalyze the Clausewitzian conception of war as an instrument of state policy. Next, weturn to the "levels-of-analysis" framework, which will serve as an organizing concept forour theoretical survey of the causes of war. We consider "human nature" explanations forwar and ask what we mean by the question of "what causes war?"

We then turn to system-level "realist" explanations for war, beginning with a brief reviewof realist theories of international politics. We give particular attention to balance of powertheory, power transition theory, and preventive war. Moving to the "dyadic" level ofanalysis, we examine the deterrence model and spiral models of conflict, and then analyze

3"Prisoner's dilemma" models. We next turn our attention to the "bargaining model of war"and theories of crisis management. Our next subject is economic theories of war, whichcut across system and societal (domestic) levels. Our main focus here is on Marxist-Leninist theories of imperialism, the liberal "trade promotes peace" hypothesis, and realistcritiques of the liberal view. Turning to the societal level, we examine the "democraticpeace" (the fact that democratic states rarely if ever go to war with each other). Afterlooking at the possible links between both ideology and religion and war, we then turn tothe diversionary theory of war and to the argument that the process of democratizationmight actually make war more likely.

After a review of system, dyad, and societal-level theories of war (and the first exam), weturn to the individual level and examine the belief systems and psychology of leaders. Welay out a rational model of decision-making and then examine various ways in whichactual decision-making deviates from a rational decision calculus. Specific topics includemisperceptions and war and the psychology of threat perception and intelligence failure.We also look at prospect theory, which emphasizes loss aversion and the high-riskbehavior its sometimes generates. We end our theoretical discussions with a look atbureaucratic and organizational theories of war.

We finish up the course with more detailed explorations of the causes of World War I, the"seminal conflict" of the 20th century, which is now approaching its 100th anniversary andwhich will get a lot of attention in the next few years; World War II, the most destructivewar in history; and the Cuban Missile Crisis, which is the closest the world has come to anuclear war and which will be observing its 50th anniversary this year.

READINGS

I have done my best to minimize your expenses for the class by limiting the number ofbooks to one and selecting the rest of the reading materials in the form of journal articlesand book chapters that are available for free on my Sakai site for the course.

BookJack S. Levy & William R. Thompson, Causes of War. Chichester, UK: Wiley- Blackwell,2010.

The book is available for purchase at New Jersey Books (37 Easton Avenue; 732 2537666) and on the internet. Kindle and Nook editions are also available. I have also askedAlexander library to place copies of the book on reserve. The book will not be available onmy Sakai site.

4Articles and Book Chapters (available on the course Sakai site, www.sakai.rutgers.edu)In the order of appearance on the syllabus:Steven Pinker, A History of Violence. Edge Master Class, 2001. Excerpt from

http://edge.org/conversation/mc2011-history-violence-pinkerClausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1976. Book I, chap. 1. Thomas Schelling, "The Diplomacy of Violence." In Schelling, Arms and Influence. New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. Chap. 1.Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.

Chap. 1.Greg Cashman, "The Individual Level of Analysis: Human Aggression." In Cashman,

What Causes War? New York: Macmillan/Lexington 1993. Chap. 2. Margaret Mead, "Warfare Is Only an Invention Not a Biological Necessity." In Leon

Bramson and George W. Goethals, eds., War. Rev. Ed. New York: Basic Books, 1968.Pp. 269-74.

John J. Mearsheimer, Anarchy and the Struggle for Power. In Robert J. Art and RobertJervis, eds., International Politics. 7th ed. New York: Longman, 2005. Pp. 50-60.

Stephen M. Walt, The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition. In Ira Katznelsonand Helen V. Milner, Political Science: State of the Discipline. New York: W.W.Norton, 2002. Pp. 197-230.

Edward Vose Gulick, "The Aims of Europe's Classical Balance of Power." In Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1955. Pp.390-97.

Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning. In Robert J. Art and RobertJervis, eds., International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues. Tenthed. Boston: Longman, 2011.Pp.127-134.

Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle.Trans. Charles Fullman. New York: Vintage, 1962. Pp. 224-46.

Jack S. Levy, "Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions, and Research Design. InJohn A. Vasquez and Colin Elman, eds., Realism and the Balancing of Power: A NewDebate. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003. Pp. 128-53.

Ronald L. Tammen, et al. Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century. New York:Chatham House Publishers, 2000. Chap. 1.

Ronald L. Tammen, et al. Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century. New York:Chatham House Publishers, 2000. Chap. 7.

Jack S. Levy, Preventive War and Democratic Politics. International Studies Quarterly,52, 1 (March 2008): 1-24.

Robert Jervis, "Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and the Intentions of the Adversary." InRalph K. White, Psychology and the Prevention of Nuclear War. New York: New YorkUniversity Press, 1986. Pp. 107-30.

5Janice Gross Stein, "The Arab-Israeli War of 1967: Inadvertent War ThroughMiscalculated Escalation." In Alexander L. George, ed., Avoiding War: Problems ofCrisis Management. Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1991. Chap. 8.

Bruce Russett, The Prisoners of Insecurity. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1983.Chap.5-6.Geoffrey Blainey, "The Abacus of Power." In Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. New

York: Free Press, 1988. Chap. 8.Alexander L. George, "A Provisional Theory of Crisis Management." In Alexander L.

George, ed., Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management. Boulder, Col. Westview,1991. Chap. 4.

Charles Callan Tansill, War Profits and Unneutrality. In Herbert J. Bass, ed., American Entry into World War I: Submarines, Sentiment, or Security? New York:Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964. Pp. 39-52.

Michael W. Doyle, Commercial Pacifism: Smith and Schumpeter. In Doyle, Ways ofWar and Peace. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997. Chap. 7.

John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace." International Security, 19, 2 (Fall 1994): 87-125.Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72, 3 (Summer 1993):

22-49.Jack S. Levy and Lily I. Vakili, "Diversionary Action by Authoritarian Regimes:

Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas Case." In Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., TheInternationalization of Communal Strife. London: Routledge, 1992. Pp. 118-46.

V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia." International Security, 19, 3 (Winter 1994/95): 130-166.Jack Snyder, "Transitions to Democracy and the Rise of Nationalist Conflict." In Snyder,

From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. New York: W.W.Norton, 2000. Chap 1.

Joe D. Hagan, Does Decision Making Matter? Systematic Assumptions vs. HistoricalReality in International Relations Theory. International Studies Review, 3, 2 (Summer2001): 5-46.

Janice Gross Stein, Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of Threat. InNeil J. Kressel, Political Psychology. New York: Paragon House, 1993, Pp. 367-92.

Robert Jervis, "War and Misperception." Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18, 4(Spring, 1988): 675-700.

Avi Shlaim, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom KippurWar," World Politics, 28 (1976): 348-80.

Jack S. Levy, "Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict." In Manus I.Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies II. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,2000. Pp. 193-221.

Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War. In Kagan, On the Origins of War and thePreservation of Peace. New York: Doubleday, 1995. Chap. 1.

6Herbert J. Bass, ed., American Entry into World War I: Submarines, Sentiment, orSecurity? New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964. Pp. 1-7.

Scott D. Sagan, "The Origins of the Pacific War." Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18,4 (Spring 1988): 893-22.

John G. Stoessinger, In the Name of God: Hindus and Moslems in India and Pakistan. InStoessinger, Why Nations Go to War. 11th ed. Boston, MA: Wadsworth, 2011. Chap. 6.

John G. Stoessinger, The Sixty Years War in the Holy Land: Israel and the Arabs. InStoessinger, Why Nations Go to War. 11th ed. Boston, MA: Wadsworth, 2011. Chap. 7.

Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, "How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the GulfWar." International Security 16, 2 (Fall 1991): 5-41.

Steve A. Yetiv, The Iraq War of 2003. In Yetiv, The Absence of Grand Strategy: TheUnited States in the Persian Gulf, 1972-2005. Baltimore, MD: Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 2008. Pp. 118-44.

Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and SomePolicy Implications. World Politics 24 (Spring 1972): 40-79.

James C. Thomson, "How Vietnam Happened? An Autopsy." Atlantic Monthly, April1973: 47-53.

F.R. Bridge & Roger Bullen, The Great Powers and the European State System, 1815-1914. London: Longman, 1980. Pp. 112-179.

James Joll, Origins of the First World War. 2nd ed. New York: Longman, 1992. Chap 2.Geoffrey P. Megargee, "Chronology" and "Dramatis Personae." In Richard F. Hamilton

and Holger H. Herwig, eds. (2003) The Origins of World War I. New York: CambridgeUniversity Press. Pp. 507-24. No need to read, but use as a reference.

Jack S. Levy, "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914." International Security15, 3 (Winter 1990/91): 151-86. (Optional)

T.W. Mason, Some Origins of the Second World War. Past and Present, 29 (December1964): 67-87.

Allan Bullock, "Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War." In Esmonde M.Robertson, ed., The Origins of the Second World War. New York: Macmillan, 1971. Pp.189-224.

Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban MissileCrisis. 2nd ed. New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999. Chap. 2.

Alexander L. George, The Cuban Missile Crisis. In Alexander L. George, ed., Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management. Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1991. Pp.222-68.

7COURSE REQUIREMENTS

Student performance in the course will be evaluated on the basis of an in-class mid-termexamination and a paper. The mid-term exam, which will take place on Thursday March 8,will include both true/false & multiple choice questions and an essay. For the essay, youwill select one question from a choice of two. The paper is a cross between a paper and atake-home exam. You will choose one question from a choice of two, and write a 5-6 pagesingle space answer. The paper topics will be posted on my Sakai site on the first day ofSpring, March 20. Papers will be due April 16. There will be a two-week penalty-freeextension in the deadline on the paper (to April 30) for those who need it. Papers should besubmitted on my Sakai site (Assignments tab). They will be processed through theTurnitin program, which detects plagiarism from internet sources and from the Turnitindatabase of papers. The exams and paper will be weighted approximately as follows for the purposes ofdetermining your final grade:

midterm exam - 40%paper - 60%

I will give some additional consideration to those who make important contributions toclass discussion, but this will only affect grades in borderline situations. There will be noopportunities for extra credit through additional work.

Regarding the paper: I will ask two very general questions, from which you will answerone. The questions will draw on material from both the first and second half of the course.You will be expected to understand the various theories of war and be able to illustrate thetheories with historical examples from the course reading and from lectures (and fromprevious course work and reading if you want, but that is not necessary). You areresponsible for the readings during the last two weeks of the term (after the formal April16 due date for the papers), in the sense that you should incorporate relevant materialsfrom the readings into your paper if that material is relevant. You are not responsible forthe lecture material during the last two weeks of the term, but you are free to use thatmaterial if you think it is appropriate.

You must take the exam as scheduled on Thursday, March 8. I will give make-up examsonly in cases medical illness or family emergency. If for any reason you are not able totake the exam, you must inform me by email at jacklevy@rci.rutgers.edu on the dayof the exam or before. Otherwise a penalty will be assessed on the make-up exam. Iwill ask for written verification of the reason for your absence.

8I will send out a few announcements during the course by way of email from my Sakai siteto your Rutgers email. If you normally use a different email, please arrange for yourRutgers email to be forwarded to your other account.

Some Rules

1) Academic Integrity. The University, the Political Science Department, and I each takeacademic integrity very seriously. The University imposes heavy penalties for plagiarismand other forms of academic dishonesty. If you do not understand what plagiarism or otherforms of academic dishonesty are, please see the Rutgers website on academic integrity:http://teachx.rutgers.edu/integrity/policy.html

2) Electronic Devices Please turn off your cell phones before entering the classroom. If you need to have yourcell phone on for medical or other reasons, please come and see me. You are free to uselaptop computers, IPADs, or other devices to take notes, to look at the syllabus or readingmaterial online, or to look up other factual material relating to the course, but not for anyother purpose texting or emailing is not permitted. No phones or other electronic devicesare permitted during the exam.

3) Attendance. I will not take attendance. Nor will I provide a summary of my lectures orclass discussion for those who miss class.

9COURSE OUTLINE AND READING ASSIGNMENTS

number indicates the week of the term beginning January 17; letters a & b represent the first and second lectures each week; -- indicates multiple topics in a class period.complete citations are listed earlier in the syllabus under "Readings"

1a. Course Introduction (Tuesday, January 17)course description, aims, organization, expectations, requirements, etc.

1b. Theoretical Introduction (Thursday, January 19)Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, chap. 1

-- Historical Evolution of WarSteven Pinker, A History of Violence. Excerpt on Sakai.

Alternatively, watch the video at http://edge.org/conversation/mc2011-history-violence-pinker, focusing on thesection on "The Long Peace," about a sixth of the way in, starting just beforefigure on The 100 Worst Wars & Atrocities.

--. The Politics of WarClausewitz, On War, book I, chap. 1 Thomas Schelling, "The Diplomacy of Violence"

2a. The Levels of Analysis Framework (Tuesday, January 24) Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War, chap. 1

-- Human AggressionGreg Cashman, "The Individual Level of Analysis: Human Aggression"Margaret Mead, "Warfare Is Only an Invention Not a Biological Necessity"

-- What Do We Mean by the Question What Causes War?

2b. Realist Theories of International Relations (Thursday, January 26) John J. Mearsheimer, Anarchy and the Struggle for PowerStephen M. Walt, The Enduring Relevance of the Realist TraditionLevy and Thompson, Causes of War, chap. 2

10

3a. Balance of Power Theory (Tuesday, January 31) Edward Vose Gulick, "The Aims of Europe's Classical Balance of Power" Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning"

Case Study: World War ILudwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power

Struggle, pp. 224-46

3b. Balance of Power Theory (continued) (Thursday, February 2) Jack S. Levy, "Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions, and Research

Design

4a. Power Transition Theory (Tuesday, February 7) Ronald L. Tammen, et al. Power Transitions, chap. 1

Case study: The Rise of ChinaRonald L. Tammen, et al. Power Transitions, chap. 7

Preventive War Jack S. Levy, Preventive War and Democratic Politics

4b. The Dyadic Level (Thursday, February 9)

The Deterrence Model and the Spiral ModelRobert Jervis, "Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and the Intentions of the Adversary"Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, pp. 55-63

Case Study: The 1967 Arab-Israeli War Janice Gross Stein, "The Arab-Israeli War of 1967: Inadvertent War Through

Miscalculated Escalation"

5a. The Prisoner's Dilemma Model (Tuesday, February 14) Bruce Russett, The Prisoners of Insecurity, chap. 5-6

5b. The Bargaining Model of War (February 16)Geoffrey Blainey, "The Abacus of Power" Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, pp. 63-70

Crisis ManagementAlexander L. George, "A Provisional Theory of Crisis Management"

11

6a. Economic Causes of War: Marxist-Leninist Theories of Imperialism(Tuesday, February 21) Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, pp. 83-93.

Case Study: American Entry into World War I Charles Callan Tansill, War Profits and Unneutrality

6b. Liberal Theories of Interdependence and Peace (Thursday, February 23)Doyle, Commercial Pacifism: Smith and SchumpterLevy and Thompson, Causes of War, pp. 70-77

7a. The Societal Level (Tuesday, February 28) Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, chap. 4

-- The Democratic PeaceJohn M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace"

-- Ideology and ReligionSamuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?"

7b. The Diversionary Theory of War

Case Studies: The Falklands/Malvinas War and the Yugoslav WarsJack S. Levy and Lily I. Vakili, "Diversionary Action by Authoritarian Regimes:

Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas Case" (skip pp. 125-27)V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of

Serbia"

Democratization and ConflictJack Snyder, "Transitions to Democracy and the Rise of Nationalist Conflict"

8a. Review (Tuesday, March 6)

8b. Exam #1 (Thursday, March 8, in class)

12

9a. Return Exams (Tuesday, March 20)

-- Individual Level Psychological TheoriesJoe D. Hagan, Does Decision Making Matter? Systematic Assumptions vs.

Historical Reality in International Relations Theory

The Rational ModelLevy and Thompson, Causes of War, pp. 128-33

9b. The Psychology of Threat Perception (Thursday, March 22)Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, pp, 133-61Janice Gross Stein, Building Politics into Psychology: The Misperception of

Threat.

10a. Misperception and War (Tuesday, March 27)Robert Jervis, "War and Misperception"

The Politics and Psychology of Intelligence FailureAvi Shlaim, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom

Kippur War"

10b. Prospect Theory (Thursday, March 29) Jack S. Levy, "Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict."

11ab. Historical Case Studies in the Causes of War (April 3 & 5)Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War.Herbert J. Bass, ed., American Entry into World War I: Submarines, Sentiment, or

Security? Introduction, pp. 1-7 Scott D. Sagan, "The Origins of the Pacific War" John G. Stoessinger, In the Name of God: Hindus and Moslems in India and

PakistanJohn G. Stoessinger, The Sixty Years War in the Holy Land: Israel and the

ArabsLawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, "How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the

Gulf War"Steve A. Yetiv, The Iraq War of 2003

13

12a. Bureaucratic/Organizational Theories (Tuesday, April 10) Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, chap. 6.Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm

and Some Policy Implications.

Case Study: The United States in VietnamJames C. Thomson, "How Vietnam Happened? An Autopsy."

12b. Theoretical Summary (Thursday, April 12)Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, chap. 8.

Discussion of Papers

** April 16 (Monday) - papers due (I will accept papers without penalty until April 30)

13a. World War I (Tuesday, April 17)F.R. Bridge & Roger Bullen, The Great Powers and the European State System,

1815-1914, pp. 112-179James Joll, "The July Crisis 1914"Geoffrey P. Megargee, "Chronology" and "Dramatis Personae"

No need to read, but use as a reference.Optional: Jack S. Levy, "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914"

13b. World War II (Europe) (Thursday, April 19) T.W. Mason, Some Origins of the Second World WarAllan Bullock, "Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War"

14a. The Cuban Missile Crisis (Tuesday, April 24)Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban

Missile Crisis, chap. 2 Alexander L. George, The Cuban Missile Crisis

14b. A Reassessment of Theories of War (Thursday, April 26)