CAMPAIGN281

THECAUCASUS1942–43Kleist’sraceforoil

ROBERTFORCZYK ILLUSTRATEDBYSTEVENOON SerieseditorMarcusCowper

CONTENTSORIGINSOFTHECAMPAIGN

CHRONOLOGY

OPPOSINGCOMMANDERSGerman Soviet

OPPOSINGFORCESGerman Soviet Orderofbattle,1August1942

OPPOSINGPLANSGerman Soviet

THECAMPAIGNCrossingtheDon,20–31July,1942 Pursuit,1–10August ClearingtheKuban,11August–27September CostlydiversiontoTuapse,11August–23October TotheHighCaucasus,10August–2September StymiedontheTerekRiver,12August–3October LastgaspontheTerek,25October–12November Behindthelines Stalemateandretreat,November1942–January1943

AFTERMATH

THEBATTLEFIELDTODAYFURTHERREADING

ORIGINSOFTHECAMPAIGN

IfIdon’tgettheoilofMaikopandGrozny,thenImustliquidatethewar.AdolfHitler,1June1942

Traditionally, Germany preferred to fight its wars with Bewegungskrieg (manoeuvrewarfare)andbytheearly20thcenturythisrequiredconsiderablequantitiesofoilbothtopoweramechanisedmilitarymachineandtooperatethewarindustriesathome.Hitler’sThird Reich developed powerfulPanzer-Divisionen and a strong Luftwaffe in order toconductitswarsofaggression,butthesetoolswereparticularlydependentuponassuredaccesstolargestockpilesoffuel.TheproblemwasthatGermanywasanoil-poornationand had to import about 70 per cent of its petroleum products in 1939. The unlikelysolutionwastoimportoilfromtheThirdReich’sprimaryenemy–theSovietUnion.BysigningtheMolotov–RibbentropPactinAugust1939,HitlerwasabletothwarttheBritishblockadeinitiatedattheoutsetofWorldWarIIandtogainaccesstotheSovietUnion’shuge oil reserves, in return for German financial credits and industrial technology. By1940,Germanywasreceivingabout51,000tonsofoilpermonthfromtheSovietUnion,mostlyfromtheoil-richCaucasusregion.Overthecourseofthe18-montheconomicpact,Germanyreceived912,000tonsofoilfromtheSovietUnion,whichgavetheWehrmachttheabilitytomountthelightningcampaignsof1939–41.

SlovaktroopsenteringRostov,July1942.Althoughthe1st(Slovak)MobileInfantryDivision(orFastDivision)wasanintegralpartof1.Panzerarmee,itwasmisusedintheCaucasusasasecond-echelonunit,whichreduceditscontribution.(Author’scollection)

YetHitlerwas not sanguine aboutmaintaining a trading relationshipwith his arch-enemy Stalin, particularly since it meant transferring technology that would make theSovietUnion’sarmed forces stronger in the long run.AfterFrancewasdefeated,HitlerissuedFührerDirective21inDecember1940,whichoutlinedhisintentto‘crushSovietRussia in a rapid campaign’ known as Operation Barbarossa. Although this betrayalwouldcostGermanyitssteadysupplyofoilfromtheSovietUnion,Hitlerbelievedthathismilitary could seize the Soviet Union’smain oil-producing areas before the cut-off

could impair German operational capabilities. Ironically, the Wehrmacht had onlymanaged to stockpile adequate fuel reserves forBarbarossa due to the economic treatywith the Soviet Union; without Stalin’s oil, Hitler would have been forced to adopt adefensivestrategy.Itwasahugegamble,basedmoreonoptimisticignorance,ratherthansoundmilitaryanalysis–and it failed.Despite inflictingenormous lossesupon theRedArmy and conquering huge swathes of territory during the summer 1941 campaign,Germanpanzer spearheadsoutran their logistical support andGermany’s industrialbaseprovedincapableofreplacingtheirownlosses.HeeresgruppeSüdcapturedRostovon20November 1941, but the idea of pushing on into theCaucasus provedwell beyond thegrasp of its exhausted troops and worn-out tanks. Just as the German offensiveculminated,theresurgentRedArmywasabletolaunchaseriesofcounteroffensivesthatrecoveredRostovandthenrepulsedtheGermanpanzerspearheadsfromtheoutskirtsofMoscow.

While theRedArmywas able to recover some territory during the 1941/42WinterCounteroffensive and inflict some painful losses on the German Army, it lacked theexpertiseorresourcestopermanentlyregainthestrategicinitiative.StalinhopedtorolluptheweakenedGermanarmieswithaseriesofmassivecounteroffensivesstretchingfromLeningrad to the Crimea, but they did not prove decisive. Instead, Stalin’s hubris wascapped off by a disastrous offensive directed at Kharkov in May 1942, which greatlyweakened theRedArmy in the southernUkraine.By spring 1942, theWehrmachtwasbeginningtorecoveritsstrengthandHitlerknewthathewouldhaveonemorechancetofinishofftheSovietUnionbeforetheWesternAlliescouldseriouslyinterveneinthewar.YetthequestioninBerlinwas,wheretostrike?

While the German Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) planning staff looked atcampaignsintermsofgeographicalobjectivessuchasMoscow,HitlerlookedatthewarintheEastprimarilyinracialandeconomicterms.Hislong-termintentwastodecimatethe Slavic population in the Soviet Union in order to pave the way for GermancolonisationoftheEast,butinordertodothatheneededtoeliminatetheRedArmy–andinordertodothat,heneededtherawmaterialstofeedhiswareffort.SinceGermanforceshad not seized any significant Soviet oil-producing areas in 1941, the consequences ofabrogating the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact were making it increasingly difficult for theWehrmacht to conduct large-scale protracted operations, as oil stocks began to decline.Rather thanengageinanotherattritionaldeath-struggleat thegatesofMoscowwiththeRed Army – which Hitler believed would offer no decisive advantage – the Führerreasoned that oil was both his centre of gravity and Stalin’s, and that the side thatcontrolled the most oil resources would eventually prevail in a protracted war.Consequently,Hitler decided that the 1942German summer offensivewould notmakeanother attempt to conquer geographic objectives likeMoscow or simply destroy largeformations of the Red Army, since these methods had not proven decisive in 1941.Instead, he decided that the principal aim of the summer 1942 offensive should be toconquer economic objectives that would permanently swing the strategic balance inGermany’s favour. German intelligence estimated that about 70 per cent of Soviet oilproductionwascentredintheCaucasusregion,whichappearedtobewithinstrikingrangeof Heeresgruppe Süd. If Germany could seize the Caucasus oilfields, the Wehrmachtwould no longer be constrained to fight a pauper’s war with inadequate fuel reserves.

Furthermore,theRedArmywouldalsosufferfromthelossoftheCaucasianoilfieldsandHitlerhopedthatfuelshortageswouldconstrainSovietoffensivecapabilities.

AnotherfactorinHitler’szero-sumcalculusthatredirectedthewarintheEasttowardstheCaucasuswastheAllied–SovietoccupationofIraninAugust–September1941.Soonafterwards,theBritishbeganestablishingalandroutethroughIranknownasthePersianCorridor to supply Lend Lease aid to the Soviet Union. By November 1941, the firstBritish-builtaircraftandtanksbeganarrivingatBakuintheCaucasusandbyearly1942theUSArmyalsojoinedintheeffort.SinceSovietindustrywasstillunabletoreplaceallthe material losses of 1941, Allied Lend Lease helped to bridge the gap until Sovietdomestic production could outstrip Germany’s. Consequently, cutting off the PersianCorridor was an important secondary objective that could be fulfilled by a Germanoccupationof theTranscaucasusregion.DeprivedofbothoilandAlliedmateriel,Hitlerexpected the Soviet war effort to wither. More quixotically, he believed that once theCaucasuswas occupied, itmight be possible to sendGerman expeditionary forces intoIraqandIrantothreatentheBritishpositionintheMiddleEast.

Thus, theGerman invasion of the Caucasuswas intended to be an all-out effort toinflictacripplingblowupontheSovietUnionbeforetheWesternAlliescouldmountanylarge-scaleoperations in theWest.However,HeeresgruppeSüdcouldnotmoveinto theCaucasuswithoutexposingitsleftflanktoSovietcounterattacksfromtheregionbetweenVoronezh and Stalingrad. Thus, the invasion of the Caucasus would necessitate asignificant supporting offensive toward Stalingrad and the Volga to prevent the RedArmy’s reserves from interferingwithHitler’smaster strategy. It seemed tobea simpleconceptthatwouldassureultimatevictory:amaineffortintotheCaucasustoseizetheoilandcutLendLeaseroutes,withjustasupportingeffortonthenorthernflanktokeeptheRedArmyoff-balance.However,asClausewitzoncewrote,everythinginwarissimple,butactuallydoingitisdifficult.

AdestroyedSovietMatildatank,summer1942.TheRedArmy’sSouthernFrontlostmostofitsarmourintheretreattotheDon,leavingtheNorthCaucasusFrontcriticallyshortoftanksformostofthecampaign.(NikCornishatwww.Stavka.org.uk)

CHRONOLOGY

1941

25August SovietandCommonwealthforcesinvadeIraninordertoopenasouthernrouteforLendLeaseaidtoreachtheUSSR.

November USandCommonwealthpersonnelbeginestablishingthePersianCorridortoallowLendLeaseaidtoflowtotheUSSR.

1942

5April HitlerissuesFührerDirective41,specifyingtheCaucasusastheprimaryobjectiveoftheGermansummeroffensive.

9July AspartofOperationFallBlau(CaseBlue),HeeresgruppeAattackstheSovietSouthernFrontwestofRostov.

23July Rostoviscapturedafterheavyfighting.FührerDirective45outlinesobjectivesofOperationEdelweissintheCaucasus.

24/25July GermanscapturethevitalbridgeovertheDonatBatayskbyacoupdemain.

25July VonKleistbeginshisadvanceintotheCaucasus.

28July TheSovietSouthernFrontandNorthCaucasusFrontarereorganised.

NKOOrderNo.227isissued:‘NotaStepBack!’

28/29July SovietarmourisdefeatedatMartynovka.

30July 13.Panzer-DivisioncapturesSalsk.

HitlertransfersXXXXVIIIPanzerkorpsbackto4.Panzerarmee.

StavkaorderstheTranscaucasusFronttoprepareadefensivelineontheTerekRiver.

3August 13.Panzer-DivisioncapturesArmavir.

3.Panzer-DivisioncapturesStavropol.

9August Armeeoberkommando(AOK)17capturesKrasnodar.

10August ThefirstGermanobjectiveiscaptured:theMaikopoilfields.

15August 23.Panzer-DivisioncapturesGeorgiyevsk.

17August 1.Gebirgs-DivisioncapturestheKlukhorPass.

AOK17capturesKrymskaya.

21August 1.Gebirgs-DivisionraisestheNaziflagonMountElbrus.

22–23August MostoftheAzovFlotillaisscuttledinTemryuk.

25August 3.Panzer-DivisioncapturesMozdok.

31August GermanKampfgruppeBodenhauseninterruptsrailtrafficfromBaku.

RomaniancavalrycapturetheportofAnapa.

2September OperationBlücherII:GermanforcescrosstheKerchStrait.

VonKleist’sforcessucceedincrossingtheTerekRiver.

10September Listisrelievedofcommand;Hitler/OKHtakesdirectcontrolofHeeresgruppeA.

AOK17capturesNovorossiysk.

10/12October FliegerkorpsIVraidsonGroznyoilfields.

3November IIIPanzerkorpsbeginsitsattacktowardsOrdzhonikidze.

6–11November ASovietcounterattacknearOrdzhonikidzeencircles13.Panzer-Division,whichsuffersheavylossesinitsbreakouteffort.

21November TheGermansbeginrestoringoilproductionatMaikop.

22November VonKleisttakescommandofHeeresgruppeA.

23November TheSovietscompletetheencirclementofAOK6atStalingrad.

24November 23.Panzer-Divisionistransferredto4.PanzerarmeetoparticipateintheStalingradreliefeffort,OperationWintergewitter.

26–29November TheSovietslaunchamajorcounterattacknearOrdzhonikidze.

24December TheSS-Division‘Wiking’istransferredto4.Panzerarmee.

1943

1January HeeresgruppeAbeginstoretreatfromitsgainsacrosstheTerekRiver.

9January TheRedArmyliberatesMozdok.

24January Hitlerorders1.PanzerarmeetoretreattoRostovandAOK17towithdrawintotheKubanbridgehead.

29January GermansabandonMaikop.

31January GermanAOK17retreatsintoKubanbridgehead.

4February SovietamphibiouslandingnearNovorossiysk.

12February TheRedArmyliberatesKrasnodar.

12September TheGermanKriegsmarinebeginsOperationBrunhildtoevacuateAOK17fromtheKuban.

16September TheRedArmyliberatesNovorossiysk.

9October GermanscompletetheirevacuationoftheCaucasus.

OPPOSINGCOMMANDERS

GERMANTheGermanmilitaryleadershipintheCaucasuscampaignstartedwithasimplechainofcommand, with Heeresgruppe A and its two subordinate armies reporting to theOberkommandodesHeeres(OKH).However,whenListwasrelievedinSeptember1942,HitlerattemptedtotakedirectcommandoverthearmygroupintheCaucasus,whichledtoanambiguouscommandstructure.

GeneralfeldmarschallWilhelm List (1880–1971), commander of Heeresgruppe AfromJuly to9September1942,wasanexperiencedseniorcommanderwhohadled14.ArmeeinPolandin1939and12.ArmeeinFrancein1940andagainstGreecein1941.Hehadmissed the entire first year ofwarfare on the Eastern Front. Furthermore, List hadlimited direct experience with mechanised warfare, even though the advance into theCaucasuswasintendedtobeaclassicblitzkrieg-styleoperation.Instead,Listhamstrunghis field commanderswith aWorldWar I-eramentality about not advancingwith openflanksandmoppingupeverycentreofSovietresistance.Healsowasunabletoappreciatetheeffectofmountainousterrainuponmobileoperations.Hitler’sselectionofListtoleadHeeresgruppe A was every bit as disastrous as his decision to place GeneraloberstFriedrichPaulusinchargeofAOK6atStalingrad.

GeneralfeldmarschallWilhelmList,commanderofHeeresgruppeA.Listthoughtintermsofoccupyinganentireregion,notjustspecificobjectives,andfailedtoconcentratedecisiveforceatanypointoncehecrossedtheDon.(Bundesarchiv,Bild183-S36487)

GeneraloberstEwaldvonKleist(1881–1954),commanderof1.Panzerarmee,wasacavalryofficerwithagreatdealofcommandexperience inbothworldwars. InAugust1939hewasgivencommandofoneof the firstGermanmotorisedcorps,whichhe ledintoPoland.PanzergruppeKleistmadethedecisivebreakthroughatSedaninJune1940,leadingtothecollapseofFranceinamatterofweeks.In1941,vonKleistsuccessfullyled

Panzergruppe1initsblitzacrosstheUkraineandcapturedRostov,beforelosingittotheSovietwinter counteroffensive. InMay1942, vonKleist led1.Panzerarmeeduring theSecondBattleofKharkov,whichcutoffandannihilatedthebulkofthreeSovietarmiesinaboldpinceroperation.VonKleistwasthemostexperiencedseniorpanzerofficerintheGermanArmyanda skilledpractitionerof fast-movingmanoeuvrewarfare, but hewashandicapped in the Caucasus with insufficient resources and conflicting guidance onobjectives.

GeneraloberstEwaldvonKleist(left),commanderof1.Panzerarmee,inspectingacapturedsteelplantintheUkraine,late1941.VonKleistwasalreadyfamiliarwithHitler’sintenttousehispanzerforcestoseizekeyeconomicfacilitiesandunderstoodthattheprimaryfocusoftheCaucasuscampaignwastheoilfields.(Bundesarchiv,Bild183-2005-1017-521;photobyFriedrichGehrmann)

GeneraloberstRichardRuoff,commanderof17.Armee.Ruoffwasa‘bythebook’commanderwhoconductedaseriesofcostly,set-piecebattlesforsecondaryobjectives.(Author’scollection)

GeneraloberstRichardRuoff (1883–1967) tookcommandof17.Armeeon1June1942 after commanding 4. Panzerarmee between January andMay 1942. Ruoff was acareerinfantryofficerwithextensivecommandandstaffexperienceinbothworldwars.

He led V. Armeekorps during the critical campaigns of 1939–41. However, hisperformance in the Caucasus and Kuban campaigns of 1942–43 was sub-par; Hitlerpermanently assignedhim to theFührerReserve in June1943 andgavehimno furtherassignments.

SOVIETMilitary decision-making authority within both the North Caucasus and Transcaucasusfronts resided in their respectiveMilitaryCouncils. Stalin ensured that these councils –which had to approve all important plans and decisions – included Communist Partyhardlinersinordertoensurecompliancewithhisorders.LazarM.Kaganovich,knownas‘IronLazar’forhisroleinforcedcollectivisationthatresultedintheUkrainianfamineof1932–33, was one of the most trusted and vicious members of Stalin’s inner circle.Kaganovichhadnomilitaryexperienceor training,buthewasanold-schoolBolshevikwhoactedasthedominantvoiceintheMilitaryCouncilandMarshalBudyonnycouldnotactwithout his support.CommissarLeonidR.Korniets, a formermanual labourerwhoboastedafifth-gradeeducation,alsotowedtheparty lineontheNorthCaucasusFront’sMilitary Council. InMoscow, Stavka provided some quality control over planning andrecommendedactions,butotherwisecouldonlyexerciseindirectcontroloveroperationsintheCaucasus.

MarshalBudyonnyasheregardedhimself–theconsummatecavalryman.Inreality,hewasamilitaryfigureheadduringtheCaucasuscampaignandthecommissar-dominatedMilitaryCouncilmadeallcommanddecisions.(Author’scollection)

Marshal SemyonM. Budyonny (1883–1973) was made commander of the NorthCaucasusFront(Severo-KavkazskiyFront,orCKF)inMay1942.Budyonnywasaniconof the Red Army, having famously led the 1st Cavalry Army (Konarmia) during theRussian Civil War (1917–22) and Russo-Polish War (1919–21). He was also a closepersonal crony of Stalin and was promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1935.Budyonny easily dodged the military purges of the 1930s but failed to adapt to theconditionsofmodernwarfare,whichresultedindisasterwhenStalinassignedhimtolead

thedefenceoftheUkraineagainsttheGermaninvasionin1941.VonKleist’spanzersranrings around Budyonny’s armies, eventually resulting in a catastrophic battle ofencirclementatKiev,whichresultedinBudyonnybeingassignedtothebackwaterNorthCaucasusmilitarydistrict.Budyonnydidhaveconsiderableexperienceandknowledgeofthisregion,buthelackedtheimaginationorskill tocounter theGermanblitzkrieg-styleoffensiveintotheregioninthesummerof1942.Heendedupbeingafigurehead,leavingtheactualcommanddecisionstomorecapablesubordinatessuchasMalinovsky,AntonovandCherevichenko,aswellashiscommissars.

General-polkovnik Rodion I. Malinovsky (1898–1967) was commander of theSouthernFront(YuzhnyFront)andthendeputycommanderoftheNorthCaucasusFront.Malinovsky was tasked by Stalin with preventing the Germans from occupying theoilfields of the Caucasus. Although lacking a formal education, the Ukrainian-bornMalinovsky had gained considerablemilitary experience duringWorldWar I, when heserved on both the Eastern Front and in Francewith theRussian ExpeditionaryCorps.Afterwards,heservedin theRussianCivilWarandthenasanadvisor inSpain in1936and1937.AtthestartofOperationBarbarossa,MalinovskywasfortunatetocommandariflecorpsontheRomanianborderandsucceededinescapingtheGermanspearheadstoretreat towardsRostov.Bylate1941,MalinovskyhaddemonstratedenoughcompetencetobeputinchargeoftheSouthernFront.Heprovedtobeatough,practicalcommanderwith a good hands-on approach. In August 1942, he was transferred to Stalingrad andplayed a critical role in stopping the German relief operation in December 1942.MalinovskyplayedequallyimportantrolesasafrontcommanderinliberatingtheUkrainein1943–44aswellasleadingtheSovietconquestofManchuriain1945.AfterWorldWarII,heservedasSovietMinisterofDefencebetween1957and1967.

GeneralIvanV.Tyulenev,commanderoftheTranscaucasusFrontformuchofWorldWarII.StalindoubtedhiscommandabilityandpreferredNKVDgeneralslikeMaslennikovtoleadTyulenev’sforcesontheTerek.(Author’scollection)

General-polkovnikIvanT.CherevichenkocommandedtheBlackSeaGroupofForcesduringthecriticalearlymonthsofthecampaign.Cherevichenkoprovedtobeadeptatpullingtogetherarmiesthathadbeendecimatedandrestoringthemtofightingorder.(Author’scollection)

General Ivan V. Tyulenev (1892–1978) commanded the Transcaucasus Front(Zakavkazskiy Front, ZKF) from February 1942 to July 1945. Like Budyonny,CherevichenkoandGrechko,TyulenevwasacavalryofficerandveteranoftheKonarmia.Hiscavalrycredentialshelpedhimsurvivethepurgesandhewaspromotedtogeneralin1940,alongwithGeorgyZhukov.However,Tyulenev’sperformanceascommanderoftheSouthernFrontduringtheGermaninvasioninJune1941wascriticisedbyStalin;afterhewas badly wounded in August, Stalin had him assigned to the TranscaucasusMilitaryDistrictfortherestofthewar.

General-polkovnik Ivan T. Cherevichenko (1894–1976) was a Ukrainian cavalryofficerwhoservedwithBudyonny’sKonarmiaduringtheRussianCivilWarandwhohadcommanded two armies in the Southern Front during the 1941 campaign. During theWinter Counteroffensive, he was given command of the Bryansk Front. When theCaucasus campaign began, Cherevichenko was made Budyonny’s deputy and givenauthorityovertheBlackSeaGroupduringSeptember–October1942.

General-leytenantAlekseiI.Antonov(1896–1962)wasChiefofStaffoftheNorthCaucasus Front, before commanding the Black Sea Operational Group and then theTranscaucasus Front. Hewas a career staff officer who spent the period 1938–41 as asenior instructorat theFrunzeMilitaryAcademy(teachingclassesonGermanoffensivetacticsanduseofarmourinSpain).HewasthesonofaTsaristartilleryofficerandhadbeenbroughtup inan intellectualenvironmentandwasfluent inFrench– thecompleteopposite of the uncultured cavalry officers he served. Antonovwas well trained at theGeneralStaffAcademyin1936andhewouldprovetobethekeySovietoperational-levelplannerintheCaucasuscampaign.By1943,AntonovhadbecametheheadoftheSovietGeneralStaff’sOperationsDirectorate,responsibleforplanningallfront-leveloffensives.

General-mayor Andrei A. Grechko (1903–1976) was a Ukrainian cavalry officerwhoalsoservedwithBudyonny’sKonarmiaduringtheRussianCivilWarandwasthen

trained as a General Staff officer during the interwar period. Grechko was an ardentcommunistanda‘political’-typegeneralwhousedhispartycontactstofurtherhiscareer.DuringtheCaucasuscampaign,Grechkohadapenchantforreplacingcommanderswhohad been relieved, enabling him to lead the 12th, 18th, 47th and 56th armies. LikeMalinovsky, Grechko had a very successful military career and served as Minister ofDefence between 1967 and 1976. He also wrote the best-known Soviet history of thecampaign.

General-mayorAndreiA.GrechkomadeanameforhimselfduringtheCaucasuscampaign,whichaidedhispost-warriseintheSoviethierarchy.Hehadnoproblemwithbackstabbinghispeersandreplacedthreedifferentrelievedcommanders.HishistoryofthecampaignpresentedtheofficialSovietversionofevents.(Author’scollection)

Captain1stRankGeorgiiN.Kholostyakov (1902– 1983)was aBelarusian navalofficerwho commanded theNovorossiysk defensive area inAugust.Kholostyakovwasoneof thebestsubmarineofficers in theSovietNavyandwellconnectedpolitically;hewasawarded theOrderofLenin in1935.However,hewasarrestedduring theStalinistpurgesinMay1938,accusedofbeingaspy,andspenttwoyearsinforcedlabourcamps.Twoyearslater,KholostyakovwasreturnedtoservicewiththeBlackSeaFleetandoncewarbrokeout, hewas involvedwithprovidingnaval support to armyoperations in theCrimea. After the war, he played a major role in fielding the first-generation nuclearsubmarinesintheSovietNavy.

OPPOSINGFORCES

GERMAN

Mechanisedforces

The spearhead of theGerman invasion of theCaucasuswas provided by threePanzer-Divisionen (3, 13 and 23) and two motorised infantry divisions (16 and SS-Division‘Wiking’).AllthreePanzer-Divisionenstartedthecampaignatclosetofullstrength,eachwiththreePanzer-Abteilungen.Thiswasaremarkablysmallmechanisedforcetoconqueranareathatwaslarger thanGermanyitself,andHeeresgruppeA’sarmouredcomponentconsisted of a total of 11 Panzer-Abteilungen with just 500 tanks. Two-thirds of theGerman armour sent into the Caucasus consisted of PzKpfw III medium tanks, evenlysplit between theoldermodels equippedwith the short5cmKwK38L/42gunand thenewermodelswiththelong5cmKwK39L/60gun.AlthoughthePzKpfwIIIwasclearlyinferior to theSovietT-34medium tank, therewere fewT-34 tanks in theCaucasus inmid-1942andthePzKpfwIIIwassuperiortotheubiquitousSovietlighttanksandAlliedLendLeasemodels.The small number ofGermanPzKpfw IVmedium tanks equippedwith the long-barrelled 7.5cmKwK 40L/43 gunwere themost capableGerman tankscommittedintotheCaucasus.Ratherunusually,theisolationoftheCaucasusenabledtheGerman panzer forces in the region to maintain both quantitative and qualitativesuperiorityovertheirSovietopponentsuntilJanuary1943.

Eachof the threePanzer-Divisionen had onePanzergrenadier-Bataillonmounted inSchützenpanzerwagen(SPW)half-tracks;thesewereextremelypowerful,combined-armsbattalionsthatincludedthree5cmPakguns,four7.5cminfantryguns,six8.1cmmortarsand about 900 troops. In addition, each of von Kleist’s Panzer-Divisionen had aKradschützen-Bataillon,which had been greatly strengthened since the 1941 campaign.Instead of just being amotorcycle infantry unit, theKradschützen-Bataillone had beenprovidedwith 24 armoured cars and 37 half-tracks and their overall strength had beenraised to 1,280men. During OperationEdelweiss, theKradschützen-Bataillone led theway,actingasVorausabteilung(advancedguard)fortheirdivisions.

In order to increase the firepower ofGerman non-motorised units, HeeresgruppeAwasprovidedwith fourSturmgeschütz-Abteilungen, eachwith28Sturmgeschütz (StuG)III assault guns. The new StuG III Ausf. F, armed with the long-barrelled 7.5cmSturmkanone(StuK)40L/43cannon,wasjustbeingintroducedinJune1942,whichgavethe assault-gun units a much-improved anti-tank capability. In addition to Germanmechanised forces, Heeresgruppe A was assigned the 1st Slovak (Mobile) InfantryDivision(alsoknownastheSlovakFastDivision),amotorisedinfantryformationwhichpossessedanorganictankbattalionwithabout40LT-35/LT-38lighttanks,stillusefulintheCaucasus.

Mountaintroops

TheGermanscommittedtwooftheirGebirgs-Divisionen,speciallytrainedformountain

warfare, with AOK 17 in the Caucasus; meanwhile, four other high-quality Gebirgs-DivisionensatontheirhandsinthebackwatertheatreofFinland–Norway.Both1.and4.Gebirgs-Divisionwere elite veteran outfits, comprising a total of 12mountain infantrybattalions.Inordertosupplementthem,on20July1942theGermanArmyorganisedtwospecial high-altitude alpine units for the upcoming campaign in the Caucasus – theHochgebirgs-Jäger-Bataillon1and2–whichwereattachedto1.Gebirgs-DivisioninlateAugust.Althoughwelltrainedinmountaineering,theCaucasusMountainswereanorderofmagnitudemorechallengingthanthemountainwarfareschoolsinBavariaorAustria.Whereas the tallestpeak inGermanywas2,962m inelevationand the tallest inAustriawas3,798m,theCaucasusMountainshadoveradozenpeaksthatrangedbetween4,000and5,642m.MountElbruswas the tallestmountain inEurope–mostpreviousGermanexperienceinmountainwarfarewasatelevationsbelow2,000m.

Althoughthehigh-qualityGebirgsjägerputinaninspiredperformanceintheCaucasusMountains,theywerespreadtoothinlyacrossawidefrontandthelackofadequateoff-roadlogisticsupportgreatlyreducedtheirabilitytooperateinthisenvironment.TheOKHhadadvisedvonList thatHeeresgruppeAwouldbe reinforcedwith the threemountaindivisions from the Italian Corpo degli Alpini (Alpine Corps), but this formation wasinsteadsenttoreinforceHeeresgruppeB.Eventually,vonListreceivedtheRomanian2ndand3rdMountaindivisions incompensation,witha totalof12moremountain infantry(VanatorideMunte)battalions.

Specialforces

Although the German Army had employed special forces in the opening phase ofOperationBarbarossa in 1941, little use had been made of them since. The Caucasuscampaignwasadeparturefromthispattern,asHeeresgruppeAemployedspecialforcesagain and again to unlock tough Soviet defensive positions or seize key terrain. TheAbwehr (military intelligence) provided a three-company battalion fromLehr-RegimentBrandenburg z.b.V. 800 underOberstleutnant PaulHaehling vonLanzenauer to supportHeeresgruppe A’s advance into the Caucasus. These Brandenburgers were trained asinfiltrators and often provided with Soviet uniforms, weapons and vehicles; a largenumber of their members were ethnic Georgians and other Caucasian minorities whospokeRussian.IntheCaucasus,theBrandenburgersweretaskedwithaverywidevarietyofmissions,includinglong-rangereconnaissance,covertseizureofoilfieldsandimportantbridges, behind-the-lines raids, amphibious raids and working with local ChecheninsurgentstoseverSovietlinesofcommunications.AlthoughtheBrandenburgerssufferedheavycasualtiesintheCaucasus,theirdaringandimaginativetacticssetanewstandardfortheintegrationofspecialforceswithinaconventionalcampaign.

Ju-87Stukadive-bombersfromStG77headingtowardsacoastaltarget.PlentifulLuftwaffecloseairsupportintheopeningstagesofthecampaigngreatlyassistedthegroundadvanceofHeeresgruppeA.(NikCornishatwww.Stavka.org.uk)

Airsupport

TheGermanArmy’sabilitytoachievedecisiveresultsonthegroundwasdirectlytiedtotheamountofavailableairsupport.VonRichthofen’sLuftflotte4supportedtheadvanceinto the Caucasus with 260 aircraft from Fliegerkorps IV and VIII. Initially, Germantacticalairsuperioritywasdecisivebutitquicklydwindledasforcesweresiphonedofftoreinforce Heeresgruppe B’s advance upon Stalingrad. By September 1942, onlyFliegerkorps IV remained to support Heeresgruppe A and it had too few fighters tomaintaincontrolovertheairspaceandtoofewgroundattackaircrafttosupportoffensiveaction,whichledtoatrenchwarfare-stylestalemateontheground.

Pioneers

FortheGermans,thekeytacticalenablerintheCaucasuswasthebridgingcapabilitiesoftheirPionier-Bataillone.InordertogainaccesstotheCaucasusoilfields,HeeresgruppeAhad to cross numerous rivers and there were only limited engineer bridge-buildingcapabilitiesavailable.Atdivision/corpslevel,eachPionier-Bataillonhadacompany-sizeBrückenkolonneB,whichwassupposedtohavesufficientpontoonstobuildeithera20-ton tacticalbridgeacrossa50m-widegapor tocreateone20-ton ferry.However, sincemanyriversintheCaucasuswerewiderthan50mandaPzKpfwIIItankweighed23tons,supplementalengineeringcapabilitieswereoftenrequiredfromArmy-levelBrücken-Bau-Bataillone (bridge construction battalions); vonKleist’s 1. Panzerarmee had three suchbattalions (41, 560 and 699) and Ruoff’s AOK 17 had one (646). Nevertheless,Heeresgruppe A was short of bridging capability throughout the campaign and fuelshortages meant that the pionier units were often far to the rear, which meant that

relativelyminorobstaclessuchastheTerekRiverprovedtobeshow-stoppers.

Logisticalsupport

HeeresgruppeAcrossed theDonona logistical shoestringandconducted thecampaignwith inadequate supplies – particularly of fuel – for the duration. Heeresgruppe A’slogisticallifelinedependedentirelyuponasinglerailline:thetrackrunningfromRostovtoArmavir and Pyatigorsk. Once the bridges over theDonwere repaired, theGermanReichsbahnwasable topushtrainsfairlyfardownthe track,but the tonnagesdeliveredweregrosslyinadequateforthetask.InAugust,thefuelshortagebroughtvonKleist’s1.Panzerarmee pursuit to an abrupt halt short of the Terek River and even in earlySeptember,1.Panzerarmeewasonlyreceiving130–230tonsofsupplieseveryotherday.Althoughtheamountoffueldeliveredintothetheatrewasjustenoughtosatisfyminimumneeds, it was insufficient to conduct sustained offensive operations. German doctrinestipulated thatunitsneededtostockpilefuelamounting to4.0VS(Verbrauchssatz– theloadof fuel required tomoveallvehicles inaunit100km) foranoffensive,buton theTerekRiverIIIPanzerkorpsonlyhad0.5VSand theXXXXPanzerkorpshad0.8VS–adequateonlyfordefensiveoperations.

Nor could air- or sea-lift make up the German logistical deficiencies. By mid-September 1942, the Kriegsmarine was able to establish a sea supply route from theCrimeatothesmallportofAnapa,butthiswasbarelysufficienteventomeetpartofAOK17’sneeds.TheLuftwaffealsoprovidedoccasionallogisticalsupportintheCaucasus,buttheStalingradairliftdivertedmost resourcesnorthwarduntil theHeeresgruppeAretreatbegan.

SOVIETOncevonKleist’spanzersseveredtheTikhoretsk–Stalingradrailline,theNorthCaucasusFront(CKF)foundthatitwaspartlyisolatedfromthemainSovietwarindustriesinthehinterland.Inconsequence,theRedArmyintheCaucasuswasforcedtofightwithoutitscustomary advantages in materiel and numerical superiority. In addition to directingground and air forces, Budyonny’s North Caucasus Front also exercised commandauthorityovertheBlackSeaFleetandAzovFlotilla.

Infantry

Initially, theNorth Caucasus Front did not have a great deal of infantry to oppose theGerman advance into the Caucasus. Most rifle divisions inherited from the shatteredSouthernFrontandtheearlierfightingintheCrimeawerereducedtoanywherebetween300and1,200 troopseach, andonly the12th,18thand37tharmieshadany remainingcombateffectiveness.TherewereonlytwoGuardsrifleunitslocatedintheCaucasus–the2nd and32ndGuardsRifle divisions (GRD)–bothofwhichplayedmajor roles in thecampaign. While there were combat units in the Transcaucasus Military District, theywereprimarilytrainingcadresorlow-qualityborderdefenceunits.TheBlackSeaFleet’snaval infantry units played amajor role in the defence of theCaucasus, but lacked theartillerysupportofarmyrifleunits.Therealgame-changeroccurredinearlyAugustwhenfourairbornebrigadesweresentfromMoscowbyStavkatoprovidethecoreofthe10th

and11thGuardsRiflecorps (GRC),whichwerehastily raised inOrdzhonikidze.Theseveteran troops were critical in providing a steady infantry force just as the GermansreachedtheTerekRiver.

Tanks

At the beginning of the Caucasus campaign, the battered remnants of Malinovsky’sSouthern Front could barelymuster 70–80 operational tanks to contribute to theNorthCaucasusFront.NorwastheTranscaucasusFront(ZKF)anybetteroff,withonlyasingletank brigade still equippedwith obsolete T-26 light tanks. Stavka gave priority of tankreplacements to the Stalingrad Front and only sent two brigades that were quicklydemolished in July; no further units were sent to the Caucasus until November 1942.Furthermore,theGermaninterdictionoftheTikhoretsk–StalingradraillinemeantthatT-34 tanks built in the Urals could only be sent to the North Caucasus Front across theCaspianSea.

LackingasteadysupplyofSoviet-builtmediumtanks,Budyonny’sCKFwasinitiallydependent uponAmerican andBritish Lend Lease tanks, delivered through the PersianCorridor. Bymid-August 1942, theCKFwas able to begin fielding a few independenttankbattalions (otdel’nyy tankovyy batal’on, OTB), equippedwithM3Lee andMk IIIValentinetanks.By1October1942,theCKFhadfivetankbrigadesandfourindependentbattalionswith a total of 313 tanks, including 7KV-1 and 64T-34s; LendLease tankscomprised42percentofthistotal.EventhoughtheGermanshadthreePanzerkorpsintheCaucasus, theCKFdid not have any large tank formations until it formedTankGroupLobanov(with106tanks)on31December1942andTankGroupFillipov(123tanks)on5January1943;bothwereersatztankcorpsthatlackedsupportinginfantryandartillery.Only one-third of the tanks in these two groupswere T-34s, the rest being either lighttanksorAlliedLendLease.

Armouredtrains

The North Caucasus Front had five separate Armoured Train divisions (otdel’nykhdivizionov bronepoyezdov, ODBP), each with two trains at the start of the Caucasuscampaign:fourwiththe18thArmyonthemainRostov–Tikhoretsklineandonewiththe51st Army on the Tikhoretsk– Stalingrad line. The armoured trains provided the RedArmywithmobilefirepower,usuallybeingequippedwithtwotofour75mmor76.2mmguns. Yet despite being equipped with anti-aircraft machine guns, they were veryvulnerabletoairattackandtheirlevelofarmouredprotectionwasmodest.

Airsupport

The Voyenno-Vozdushnye Sily (Military Air Forces, VVS) had two air armies in theCaucasus,the4thVozdushnayaArmiya(AirArmy,VA)and5thVA,aswellastheBlackSea Fleet’s air arm, the VVS-ChF. However, these formations were badly battered byheavylossessufferedbetweenMayandJuly1942andwerenotofmuchhelpintheinitialphase of the German invasion. The 4th VA, which provided primary air support toMalinovsky’s armies south of theDon, started the campaignwith only 126 operationalaircraft, of which almost half were obsolete Po-2 or R-5 biplanes. The 5th VA wasdeployed in the Taman Peninsula with 94 operational aircraft and the VVS-ChF was

deployed todefend theBlackSeaports likeNovorossiysk–whichmeant that less thanone-thirdofSovietaircraft in theCaucasuswereeven inaposition tooppose the initialGerman invasion. The VVS-ChF focused most of its air assets on defendingNovorossiysk. During the campaign, Stavka was able to dispatch considerable VVSreinforcementstotheCaucasusandAlliedLendLeaseaircraftarrivedfromIran,enablingtheVVStogainlocalairsuperiorityoverpartsoftheCaucasusbymid-September1942.

Navalsupport

AlthoughtheBlackSeaFleetwasmuchweakenedbylossessufferedduringtheCrimeacampaign, it was still able to play a credible role in defending the coastline of theCaucasus.Inparticular,theconvoysthatcarriedRedArmytroopsfromPotitoTuapse–atgreatriskfromLuftwaffeairattacks–wereinstrumentalinsavingthatcity.TheSovietswere able to keep a small but capable surface action group, usually consisting of onecruiser and two to three destroyers, in play to provide naval gunfire support atNovorossiyskandTuapseandevacuationwhennecessary,asfromtheTamanPeninsula.

Logisticalsupport

The Anglo-American-operated Persian Corridor played an important role in sustainingSovietforcesintheCaucasusin1942and1943.Inparticular,theUSestablishedatruckassemblyplantinIran,whichsuppliedtheRedArmywith1,070cargotrucksinAugust1942.Duringthecourseoftheyear,theUSprovided721lightbombersand21fighterstothe VVS through the Persian Corridor. Eventually, the US would supply high-octaneaviation fuel from the Abadan refinery as well. By January 1943, there were almost11,000USArmypersonnel inIran,supportingtheSovietwareffort.Armouredvehiclesandrawmaterialsbegantoflowinthroughthisrouteinthesummerof1942,easingtheSoviet burden of sustaining their isolated forces in the Caucasus. Without the PersianCorridor,Budyonny’sNorthCaucasusFrontwouldhavehadfarfewertanks,planesandtruckstoopposeHeeresgruppeA’sadvance.

ORDEROFBATTLE,1AUGUST1942GERMANFORCESINTHECAUCASUSHEERESGRUPPEA(GENERALFELDMARSCHALLWILHELMLIST)1.Panzerarmee(GeneraloberstEwaldvonKleist)

IIIPanzerkorps(GeneraloberstEberhardvonMackensen)

16.Infanterie-Division(mot.)(GeneralleutnantSigfridHenrici)

Infanterie-DivisionGroßdeutschland(GeneralmajorWalterHörnlein)

Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung203

XXXXPanzerkorps(GeneralderPanzertruppeLeoFreiherrGeyrvonSchweppenburg)1

3.Panzer-Division(GeneralmajorHermannBreith)

23.Panzer-Division(GeneralmajorErwinMack)2

LVIIPanzerkorps(GeneralderPanzertruppenFriedrichKirchner)

13.Panzer-Division(GeneralmajorTraugottHerr)3

SS-Division‘Wiking’(SS-GruppenführerFelixSteiner)

1stSlovak(Mobile)InfantryDivision(Brigadier-GeneralJozefTuranec)

XXXXIVArmeekorps(GeneralderArtillerieMaximiliandeAngelis)

97.Jäger-Division(GeneralmajorErnstRupp)4(Wallonische)InfanterieBattalion373

101.Jäger-Division(GeneralmajorErichDiestel)

Armyassets:

Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung191

II./RegimentBrandenburgz.b.V.800

Werfer-Regiment52:Stab,I.,II.

ArmeegruppeRuoff/17.Armee(GeneraloberstRichardRuoff)

XXXXIXGebirgskorps(GeneralderGebirgstruppeRudolfKonrad)

1.Gebirgs-Division(GeneralmajorHubertLanz)

4.Gebirgs-Division(GeneralmajorKarlEglseer)

73.Infanterie-Division(GeneralmajorRudolfvonBünau)

298.Infanterie-Division(GeneralleutnantArnoldSzelinski)

VArmeekorps(GeneralderInfanterieWilhelmWetzel)

9.Infanterie-Division(GeneralleutnantSiegmundFreiherrvonSchleinitz)

125.Infanterie-Division(GeneralleutnantWilliSchneckenburger)

198.Infanterie-Division(GeneralmajorAlbertBuck)5

LIIArmeekorps(GeneralderInfanterieEugenOtt)

111.Infanterie-Division(GeneralmajorHermannRecknagel)

370.Infanterie-Division(GeneralmajorDr.ErnstKlepp)

Infanterie-Battalionz.b.V.5006

ArmyAssets:

Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung210

Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung249

schwereArtillerie-AbteilungenII./AR42,154,844(15cm)

schwereArtillerie-Abteilungen(mot.)151,634(10cm)

schwereArtillerie-Abteilung732(21cmMörser)

17.Flak-Division(Luftwaffe)

Romanian3rdArmy(GeneralPetreDumitrescu)

RomanianCavalryCorps(Lieutenant-GeneralMihailRacovita)

5thCavalryDivision(ColonelVasileMainescu)

6thCavalryDivision(ColonelCristuCantuniari)

9thCavalryDivision(ColonelMihailChiruacescu)

Romanian1stCorps(Major-GeneralTeodorIonescu)

Romanian2ndMountainDivision(Brigadier-GeneralIonDumitrache)

LUFTWAFFELuftflotte4(GeneralfeldmarschallWolframFreiherrvonRichthofen)

Stab,I.,II./StG77(48operationalof67Ju-87Ds)

Stab,III.,15.(Kroat)/JG52(30operationalof52Bf-109E/F/Gs)

FliegerkorpsIV(GeneralKurtPflugbeil)I./KG100(36He-111H-6s)

FliegerkorpsVIII

Stab,I.,III./KG51(Ju-88A)

Stab,II,III./KG55(He-111H)

Total:89operationalof128bombers

Stab,I,II./ZG1(71operationalof108Bf-110E/F)

FliegerführerSüd(OberstWolfgangvonWild)

III./LG1(32Ju-88A)

II./KG26(30He-111H-6)

Ergänzungsgruppe/StG2(20Ju-87s)

TechnicalBrigadeMineralöl(GeneralmajorErichHomburg)

KRIEGSMARINE

1.Landungs-Flotille(KapitänleutnantMaxGiele):24Marinefährprahme(MFP)

3.Räumbootsflotille(KorvettenkapitänArnulfHölzerkopf):R36,R37,R163,R165,R166

1.Schnellbootflotille(KapitänleutnantHeinzBirnbacher):S-26,S-27,S-28,S-40,S-72,S-102

REINFORCEMENTSGerman

2September1942:46.Infanterie-Division(GeneralmajorErnstHaccius)7

11September1942:Korpsz.b.V.Felmy(GeneralderFliegerHellmuthFelmy)8

November1942:50.Infanterie-Division

January1943:5.Luftwaffen-Feld-Division

Romanian

3rdMountainDivision(Brigadier-GeneralLeonardMociulschi)

10thInfantryDivision(Brigadier-GeneralSavaCaracas)

19thInfantryDivision(Brigadier-GeneralCarolSchmidt)

SOVIETFORCESINTHECAUCASUSNORTHCAUCASUSFRONT(SEVERO-KAVKAZSKIYFRONT,CKF)(MARSHALSEMYONM.BUDYONNY)9

12thArmy(General-mayorAndreiA.Grechko)

4thRifleDivision

31stRifleDivision

176thRifleDivision

261stRifleDivision

81stNavalInfantryBrigade

RVKG(ReserveoftheSupremeHighCommand)units:81stGuards,374thArtilleryregiments,521stAnti-TankRegiment

18thArmy(General-leytenantFedorV.Kamkov)

216thRifleDivision

236thRifleDivision

353rdRifleDivision

383rdRifleDivision

395thRifleDivision

16thRifleBrigade

68thNavalRifleBrigade

17thKubanCossackCavalryCorps(General-mayorNikolaiIa.Kirichenko)

12thCavalryDivision

13thCavalryDivision

15thCavalryDivision

116thCavalryDivision

64thTankBrigade

16thSeparateDivisionofArmouredTrains(16ODBP)

51stSeparateDivisionofArmouredTrains(51ODBP)

53rdSeparateDivisionofArmouredTrains(53ODBP)

RVGKunits:368th,377th,880thArtilleryregiments,530thAnti-TankRegiment

37thArmy(General-mayorPetrM.Kozlov)

2ndGuardsRifleDivision

74thRifleDivision10

230thRifleDivision11

275thRifleDivision

295thRifleDivision

347thRifleDivision

41stRifleBrigade(mot.)

RVGKunits:1230thGuards,262nd,268th,Artilleryregiments

47thArmy(General-mayorGrigoriiP.Kotov)

32ndGuardsRifleDivision

77thMountainRifleDivision

103rdRifleBrigade

126thIndependentTankBattalion(OTB,36T-26s)

56thArmy(General-mayorAleksandr.I.Ryzhov)

30thRifleDivision

339thRifleDivision

349thRifleDivision

76thNavalRifleBrigade

RVGKunits:1195thArtilleryRegiment[11x152-mm]

1stSeparateRifleCorps(PolkovnikMikhailM.Shapovalov)12

139thRifleBrigade

CKFfront-levelforces

5thGuardsTankBrigade

15th,63rdand140thTankbrigades

67thand75thIndependentTankbattalions(OTB)

7th,16th,64th,65thand66thSeparateDivisionofArmouredTrains(ODBP)

4thAirArmy(VA,General-mayorKonstantinA.Vershinin)

216thFighterAviationDivision:16GIAP(Yak-1s/MiG-3s),45IAP(Yak-1s),88IAP(I-16s)

229thFighterAviationDivision

265thFighterAviationDivision:68IAP,483IAP,805IAP(LaGG-3s)

230thGroundAttackAviationDivision:7GShAP(Il-2s),590ShAP(I-15bis/I-153s),805ShAP(Il-2s)

219thBomberAviationDivision:8GBAP(Pe-2s),288BAP(Su-2s),366BAP(SBs),244BAP(A-20s)

218thNightBomberDivision(U-2s)

8thGuardsShort-RangeBomberAviationRegiment

136th,647th,762nd,889thMixedAviationregiments

5thAirArmy(VA,General-leytenantSergeiK.Goriunov)

236thFighterAviationDivision

237thFighterAviationDivision

267thFighterAviationRegiment

132ndBomberAviationDivision

238thAssaultAviationDivision

742ndReconnaissanceRegiment(Pe-2)

763rdLongRangeBomberRegiment(U-2)

AzovFlotilla13(Rear-AdmiralSergeiGorshkov)

LargegunboatsBug,Don,Dniester14(840tonseach,two130mmguns)

RivergunboatsOktyabr,Rostov-Don15

MonitorZheleznyakov

144thand305thNavalInfantrybattalions

BlackSeaFleet16(Vice-AdmiralFilippOktyabrsky)

HeavycruiserVoroshilov

LightcruiserKrasnyiKrym17

FlotillaleaderKharkov

DestroyersBoiky,Bezposhchadny,Soobrazitel’ny,Nezamozhnik,Zhelezniakov

GuardshipsShtorm,Shkval

VVS-ChF(General-mayorPavelP.Kvade)–NavalAviationGroupNovorossiyskDefensiveArea18

18th,46thand47thGroundAttackregiments(Il-2s/UT-1bs)

62ndFighterBrigade:7thFighter

Regiment(Yak-1s/MiG-3s);32nd

FighterRegiment(LaGG-3s);62nd

FighterRegiment(I-16s/I-153s)

36thFighterRegiment(I-16s)

805thFighterRegiment(LaGG-3s)

119thIndependentReconnaissance

AviationRegiment(MBR-2s)

80thand82ndIndependentReconnaissanceAviationsquadrons(MBR-2s)

RECONSTITUTING

9thArmy(General-mayorF.A.Parkhomenko)19

Remnantsof51st,81st,106th,140th,242nd,255th,296thand313thRifledivisions,30thCavalryDivision

24thArmy(General-mayorVladimirN.Martsinkevich)20

TRANSCAUCASIANFRONT(ZAKAVKAZSKIYFRONT,ZKF)(GENERALIVANV.TYULENEV)44thArmy(General-mayorAndreiA.Khriashchev)

Threerifledivisions(223,414,416)andtworiflebrigades(9,10)

46thArmy(General-mayorVasiliyF.Sergatskov)21

3rdMountainRifleCorps(General-mayorKonstantinN.Leselidze):9thand20thMountainRifledivisions

Fourrifledivisions(389,392,394,406),oneriflebrigade(155),onecavalrydivision(63)

ZKFfront-levelforces

318thand417thRifledivisions

52ndand191stTankbrigades

SpecialMotorisedBrigade22

ReinforcementstoNorthCaucasusFront

2August1942:11thGuardsRifleCorps23(8,9,10GuardsRiflebrigades,62ndNavalInfantryBrigade,98thGuardsArtilleryRegiment[122/152])(General-majorKonstantinA.Koroteev)24

4August1942:31stSeparateDivisionofArmouredTrains(ODBP)ArmouredTrain717OrenburgskiiZheleznodorozhnik25ArmoredTrain731Vpered,naZapad!(Forward,totheWest!)26

13August1942:10thGuardsRifleCorps27(4,5,6,7GuardsRiflebrigades,92ndGuardsArtilleryRegiment)(General-majorIvanT.Zamertsev)

22August1942:83rdNavalInfantryBrigade(formedinNovorossiysk)

3September1942:200thNavalInfantryRegiment(raisedinPoti)

1–6September1942:255thNavalRifleBrigade(formedinNovorossiysk)

1October1942:52ndTankBrigade(fromTranscaucasus)

13October1942:10thRifleCorps28(43rd,59thand106thRiflebrigades)(General-majorPetrE.Loviagin)

1November1942:2ndTankBrigade(fromRVGK,Stavkareserve)

29November1942:207thTankBrigade(fromTranscaucasus)1XXXXPanzerkorpswastransferredfrom4.Panzerarmeeto1.Panzerarmeeon1August1942.2KilledbySovietmortarfire,26August1942.

3Badlywoundedbyashellsplinteron31October1942.

4KilledintheretreattotheKuban,30May1943.

5KilledinactionatNovorossiysk,6September1942.

6Apunishmentunit,probablyattachedtoLIIArmeekorps.7Killedinaction11February1943.

8Formedon11September1942fromtheGermanmilitarymissiontoIraq.Itsprimarysub-unitwasatwo-battalionad-hocmotorisedinfantryregiment,withahandfulofassaultguns,Panzerjägerandflakattached.

9IncorporatedGeneral-polkovnikRodionI.Malinovsky’sSouthernFronton28July1942.On1September1942,redesignatedasBlackSeaGroupofForces.

10Notknownforcertain.

11Disbanded23August1942.

12CapturednearArmaviron14August1942.HeoptedtojoinAndreiVlasov’santi-communistRussianArmyofLiberation(RusskayaOsvoboditel’nayaArmiya,ROA)in1943andcommandedits3rdInfantryDivision.Hewasexecutedaftercapturein1945.

13Disbanded8September1942.Re-formedon3February1943.

14AllthreescuttledinTemryuk,23August1942.

15BothscuttledinTemryuk,22August1942.

16Onlyoperationalvesselsarelisted.

17ThelightcruiserKrasnyiKavkazwasrepairedandreturnedtooperationalstatusinOctober1942.

18MorskayaaviagruppaNovorossiyskogooboronitel’nogorayona(MAGNOR).

19ReplacedbyGeneral-mayorVladimirN.Martsinkevichon8August,whowasreplacedbyGeneral-mayorKonstantinA.Koroteevon4September.

20Relievedofcommand,6August1942.21Relievedofcommandon28August1942byLavrentiBeria.

22Redesignatedas40thMotorisedRifleBrigadeon9September1942.

23FormedinOrdzhonikidzefromthreeairborneunits,butcommittedbeforefullyformed.

24Replaced,1September1942.

25DestroyedatArdon,30October1942.

26DestroyedatArdon,31October1942.27FormedinNorthCaucasusfromthreeairbornebrigades.

28Corpsdisbanded17December1942.

OPPOSINGPLANS

GERMANTheGermansweredrawntotheCaucasusbytheprospectoflootingitsoilfields.DuringOperationBarbarossa,thesupplementtoFührerDirective33inJuly1941specifiedthatHeeresgruppeSüdwould‘thrustforwardacrosstheDontotheCaucasus’,butthisprovedimpossible.WhenvonKleist’s1.PanzerarmeelimpedintoRostovonthelastofitsfuelon20 November 1941, Heeresgruppe Süd had the presumption to issue an order dubbed‘Wintersport’ that called for a continuedwinter offensive to seize theMaikop oilfields300km distant. In fact, von Kleist’s forces could not even hold onto Rostov and hisexhausted army was unceremoniously booted out by the Red Army only a week aftertaking the city. Ignoring this defeat, Hitler issued Führer Directive 41 on 8 December1941,which orderedHeeresgruppe Süd tomaintain positions near theDon in order toprovide‘favourableconditionsforoperationsagainsttheCaucasusinthespring’,buteventhisprovedover-optimistic.

ThebridgesovertheDonRiveratRostov.Therailwaybridgeontherighthasonespandroppedintheriverbuttheroadbridgeontheleftisstilltrafficable.TheentireGermanstrategyintheCaucasushingedonquicklyrepairingtherailwaybridgeinordertoprovidelogisticalsupporttoHeeresgruppeA.(Author’scollection)

Although the role of Generalfeldmarschall Hermann Göring in the Stalingradcatastrophe iswellknown,hisequally important role inpushing theWehrmacht towardtheCaucasus ismuchlessnoticed.Onhisownauthority,GöringhadtakencontrolovertheGermanoil industryinNovember1940andheworkedcloselywithKontinentaleÖlAG(abbreviatedtoKontiÖl)todeterminewhereGermanycouldfindtheoiltosustainits

warmachine,particularlyhisLuftwaffe.Thankstohisendorsement,KontiÖlwasgivenexclusive rights to sell oil from captured territories. The experts at Konti Öl wereparticularly enthusiastic about theCaucasus oilfields and briefedGöring thatwithin sixmonthsofcapturingandrestoringtheoilfields,Maikopwouldbeproducing30,000tonsofcrudeoilamonthandGrozny9,000tons;furthermore,theyconfidentlypredictedthatbothcapturedoilfieldswouldproduceanannualtotalofover1milliontonsofcrudeoilby1943. Inorder to transformthevision intoreality,Göringordered theformationofaspecial unit – under Luftwaffe command – known as the Technical BrigadeMineralöl(TBM)torestoreoilproductionatcapturedfields.GeneralmajorErichHomburgwasputinchargeoftheTBM,whichconsistedof5,500personnel,over1,100vehiclesand80,000tons of oil-drilling equipment, mostly looted from the French oil industry. In Göring’smind, once the German Army captured Maikop and Grozny, the TBM would quicklyrestorethemandthentheoilwouldbeginflowing(andintheprocess,makinghimandhisKonti Öl partners even richer). Göring and his Luftwaffe would get the credit for thisstrategicsuccess.Withvisionsofanoilcornucopiadancinginhismind,GöringsoldtheCaucasus oil strategy toHitler,whowas eager to find an exit strategy for the growingdebacleintheeast.GöringalsoknewthatHitlerwaslookingforaneasyvictorytorestoreGermanprestige and theCaucasuswas poorly protected compared toMoscowor otherpotentialtargets.Yetinsteadofexaminingthedifficultyofconductinglarge-scalemilitaryoperations in the distant Caucasus, Hitler instead focused on fanciful musings aboutturningtheCaucasusintoaspecial‘militarycolony’withGermanveteransremainingtoguardtheoil-productionareasfordecades.

HavingbeenconvincedbyGöringthatseizingtheoiloftheCaucasuswasthesolutiontotheWarintheEast,on5April1942HitlerissuedFührerDirective41,whichspecifiedthathisaimwas‘towipeouttheentiredefencepotentialremainingtotheSoviets,andtocutthemoff,asfaraspossible,fromtheirmostimportantcentresofwarindustry’.Towit,thedirectiveorderedthat‘allavailableforceswillbeconcentratedonthemainoperationsintheSouthernsector,withtheaimofdestroyingtheenemybeforetheDon,inordertosecure the Caucasian oilfields and the passes through the Caucasus Mountainsthemselves’.Althoughtheplan,whichgelledintoOperationFallBlau,clearlymade theCaucasusthemaineffort,italsospecifiedthatamajorsupportingeffortwouldbemadetodestroy the Red Army between Voronezh and Stalingrad. This consideration requiredHeeresgruppeSüdtobesplitintotwodiverginggroups:HeeresgruppeAtodriveintotheCaucasus andHeeresgruppeB to advanceeastwards to captureVoronezhandneutraliseStalingradasastagingarea.WhilevonKleist’s1.PanzerarmeewassolelycommittedtotheCaucasus,partsofGeneralHermannHoth’s4.Panzerarmeewouldbeusedtosupportbothoffensives.Furthermore,evenHeeresgruppeA’sadvanceintotheCaucasuswassplitbetween two distinct objectives – oilfields and mountain passes – which requiredcompletely different types of forces. To say that oil was uppermost as the objective inHitler’smind,itdidnottranslateintoasingularobjectiveonpaper.

OneimportantitemthatGöringandtheKontiÖlspecialistsfailedtoappreciate–ormentiontoHitler–wasthepeculiarSovietskillforsabotageandthepossibilitythattheoilfieldswouldbewreckedprior toGermanarrival.HeeresgruppeSüdhadcaptured thesmalloilfieldatRomny,200kmeastofKiev, inSeptember1941.TheretreatingSovietshadpluggedallthewellswithconcreteandevenayearlaterGermantechnicianshadonly

restoredafractionofitscapacity(theGermansheldRomnyfortwoyearsandextractedatotalofjust4,000tonsofoil).

OperationFallBlau commenced on 28 June 1942withHeeresgruppeBmaking itspush towards Voronezh and the Don, but it was not until 9 July that Heeresgruppe Ajoined in. Von Kleist’s 1. Panzerarmee attacked the right flank of General-polkovnikRodion I.Malinovsky’s Southern Front and in short order,Generaloberst Eberhard vonMackensen’sIIIPanzerkorpssmashedthroughtheSoviet12thand37tharmiesandnearlyencircled the18thArmy.Malinovsky’s forceswerebadlydefeatedby this avalancheofonrushingGerman armour andonly survivedbymeansof a pell-mell retreat.Hoth’s 4.PanzerarmeealsopushedintotheDonbendandby20July,the3.and23.PanzerdivisionsfromXXXXPanzerkorpsreachedtheDoneastofRostov.MalinovskybeganevacuatingmuchofhisforcesintotheCaucasus,whileleavingthe56thArmytoconductarearguardatRostov.VonKleistconvergedonRostovwith the IIIPanzerkorps fromthenorthandfromthewestwiththeLVIIPanzerkorpsandXXXXIXGebirgskorps.Withtheassistanceof Russian-speaking infiltrators from the II./Regiment Brandenburg z.b.V. 800, the 13.Panzer-Division and SS-Division ‘Wiking’were able to fight theirway intoRostov on22/23 July, although heavy fighting continued for several days.By this point, it lookedlike theGermanswouldbeable toshiftconsiderable resources tosupportHeeresgruppeB’sintendedadvanceintotheCaucasus,sincetheleadelementsofHeeresgruppeBwerelessthan80kmfromitsobjective:Stalingrad.

GermanarmourcrossestheDonRiveroverapontoonbridge,eastofRostov.HeeresgruppeAwasfacedwithcrossingonewaterobstacleafteranother,whichstraineditslimitedengineeringcapabilities.(Author’scollection)

WhilevonKleistwasadvancingtowardRostov,HitlerissuedFührerDirective43on11July1942,whichspecifiedthatGeneralfeldmarschallErichvonManstein’s11.Armee–havingcompletedtheconquestofSevastopol–wouldpreparetoconductanamphibiousoperation known asBlücher across theKerch Strait bymid-August.OperationBlücherwas a pet project of Hitler’s, enabling a dual advance into the Kuban region of theCaucasusfromthewest,withtheobjectivebeingtosecuretheportofNovorossiysk.Yetthe plan for how the Caucasus was to be conquered remained surprisingly vague untilHeeresgruppeA actually reachedRostov and theDonRiver. Finally, on 23 July 1942,Hitler issuedFührerDirective 45,which provided details onOperationEdelweiss – theconquest of the Caucasus. It was a wonderful plan, full of zeal and interesting sub-components. Once across theDon, vonKleist’s panzers and Ruoff’s 17. Armeewouldconductapincer-styleadvance toward therail junctionatTikhoretsk inorder todestroyMalinovsky’s remaining forces in a kesselschlacht (cauldron battle). Then, von KleistwouldthrustrapidlytowardstheoilfieldsatMaikopandGroznywhile17.ArmeeclearedtheTamanPeninsulawithhelpfrom11.Armee.HitlerpromisedthatboththeRomanianmountain corps and three Italian mountain divisions would be committed to reinforceHeeresgruppeAbymid-August,enablinganequally rapid thrust to seize theCaucasianmountainpassesandbeginclearing theBlackSeacoast.EdelweissalsomadeextensiveprovisionfortheuseofGermanspecialforcestoseizeorsabotagekeytargetsandHitlerauthorisedHeeresgruppeAtoconsiderusingairbornetroopsiffeasible.However,theplandidnotdetail howGerman forceswould reachdistantBakuorwhat theLuftwaffewasexpected to accomplish beyond supporting the army and attacking coastal shipping.Atbest, Edelweiss was an unfinished sketch, vulnerable to diverging objectives, limitedknowledgeoftheterrainandtheFührer’swhimsy.

Terrainandweather

VonKleist’spanzersracedintotheCaucasuswithonlyahazyideaaboutthenatureoftheterrainandweather theywouldbeupagainst.Germanmapsof theregionweredecadesoutofdateandmanybridgesorothercriticalterrainwerenotproperlymarked.Roadsthatappearedtrafficableforvehiclesoftenturnedouttobemulepaths.Indeed, theGermanswerenotevensureabout theexact locationof theirprimaryobjectives– theoilfields–andwouldbeshockedtodiscoverthatmostoftheoilwellsatMaikopwerenotactuallyinthecityorevencentralisedinonelocation.Againandagain,theGermanswereforcedtofeeltheirwayblindlyahead,lookingfortrafficableroutesandrivercrossingsinalandofwhichtheyweremainlyignorant.Furthermore,theamountofdistancethatneededtobecovered to reach theoilfieldswas staggering:330km toMaikop,750km toGroznyand1,285kmtoBaku.DuringOperationBarbarossa,someGermanpanzerunitshadadvancedover 1,000km in five months, but Hitler was asking Heeresgruppe A to accomplish asimilarlevelofeffortinjustthreemonthsbeforewinterweatherarrived.

The Caucasus region consists of three distinct terrain areas: the open, desert-likesteppe in the north; a subtropical and hilly area in the interior; and the rugged,mountainousareaalongthecoastalstrip,withpeaksrangingbetween4,200and5,600minheight.Despite thehot,aridnatureof theCaucasus, thereweremarshyareasaround itsriversandtheSeaofAzovthatcouldmakeoff-roadmovementdifficult.Theroadnetworkin the Caucasuswas evenmore primitive and undeveloped than in thewesternUSSR.

MovementintooroutoftheCaucasusMountainswascompletelydependentuponcontrolof critical mountain passes, which were heavily wooded and easily defended. Prior toEdelweiss, the German mountain warfare school wrote a study on the CaucasusMountains, including information from Soviet prisoners of war, but much of theinformationwasoutdatedorinaccurate.TherewerethreemajorriversintheCaucasusthatwouldfigureprominentlyasobstaclesinthe1942–43campaign:theKuban,ManychandTerek. These rivers were relatively narrow but fast-running, which made fordingoperationsandbridge-buildingdifficult.Asidefromrailwaybridges,whichwerecriticalformobility,mostoftheexistingroadbridgeswerelightwoodenaffairs,withlittleabilitytohandleheavymilitarytraffic.

TheclimateintheCaucasuswasmoreextremethaninotherpartsoftheSovietUnionand summer campaigning was more akin to desert warfare, while operations in themountain areaswere atypical at all times of year. Temperatures in the summermonthscouldsoarashighas40°C(104°F),butdropto-6°C(20°F)inJanuary.OntheKalmykSteppe,temperaturesinAugustreached52°C(125°F).ThemainrainyperiodwasfromMay to July and the heaviest snowfall from December to February. In the CaucasusMountains, thepeakswerecoveredwithsnowformuchof theyearandthevitalpasseswereclosedwithdeepsnowbylateSeptember;HeeresgruppeAwouldhavetoseizethemwithineightweeksorbeshutoutfromthecoastalregionuntilspring1943.Inshort,whilethetabletopterrainoftheinterioroftheCaucasusappearedtoofferanexcellentvenueforfast-moving manoeuvre warfare, the restrictive nature of mountains, rivers and limitedroad networks combined to hinder manoeuvre options. This was not a land forBewegungskrieg.

SOVIETInJune1942,StalinexpectedtheGermanstomaketheirmaineffortinanotherattempttocaptureMoscow,sothebestRedArmyunitswerecommittedtotheWesternandBryanskfronts. Stavka did not anticipate a major campaign in the Caucasus and the NorthCaucasus Military District (MD) was an area that was primarily used for raisingformationstofightintheCrimeaorthesouthernUkraine.ThebestunitsinthedistricthadalreadybeensenttotheCrimea,wheretheyweredemolishedbytheGermanoffensivesatKerch inMay andSevastopol in June.Other unitswere sent to reinforceMalinovsky’sSouthern Front, but these toowerewrecked in themid-July fighting. After the loss ofRostov,Malinovsky’s12th,18thand37tharmieswerereducedtoatotalofabout54,000troopsand17operational tanks,whichhad todefenda155km-widesector southof theDon. The exhausted 56th Army was placed in second echelon behind these frontlinearmies, while the 9th and 24th armies were sent further to the rear to reconstitute.Malinovsky alsohad control overGeneral-mayorNikolai I.Trufanov’s51stArmyuntiltheendof July,when this formationwas transferred to theStalingradFront.Trufanov’sarmywasinbettershape,withabout40,000troopsand57tanks, toholda171km-widesectoronMalinovsky’s right flank.By the time thatHeeresgruppeA reachedRostov, itwas apparent that theNorthCaucasusMDwould have to be converted from a trainingcommand into an operational command, but it had very few combat troops or heavyequipmentat itsdisposal. InspiteofStalin’s‘NoRetreat’order issuedon28July1942,

theRedArmy’sweaknessintheregiondictatedadelayingstrategyuntilreinforcementscouldarrive.Unlike the restof theEasternFront, the isolationof theCaucasusmade itdifficultfortheRedArmytoemployitstraditionaltrumpcards–aseeminglybottomlesspitof rifleunits,T-34 tanksandmassedartillery–and insteadwouldhave to relyuponcunninguseofitslimitedforcestodelaytheinvaders.

GeneralIvanV.Tyulenev’sTranscaucasusFront,comprisingthe44thand46tharmies,wastaskedwithdefendingtheBlackSeacoast,theTurkishborderandcontributingforcestotheoccupationofIran.AlthoughTyulenev’sfrontwasnotdirectlyinvolvedinopposingthe initial German invasion of the Caucasus, it was quickly assigned commandresponsibilityoverthecoastalsectorsotheNorthCaucasusFrontcouldconcentrateupontheinlandbattles.Tyulenev’scommandalsorepresentedapooloffreshbutuntriedunitsthat would prove to be an important source of reinforcements for the North CaucasusFront.AlthoughbadlydepletedintheCrimeancampaign,theBlackSeaFleetstillhadanoperationallysignificantcapabilitytotransferdivision-sizeunitsalongthecoastlineandtoprovideoccasionallyhelpfulnavalgunfiresupport.

Soviet planning in the Caucasus was also affected much more by internal securitythreatsthaninotherregions.LavrentiBeria’sNKVDplayedalargeroleintheCaucasus,partlytoprotectcriticalinfrastructurelikeoilpipelinesandrailroads,butinlargepartduetomountingethnicinsurgencyproblems.TheChechenshadbegunananti-Sovietguerrillacampaign in the mountains near Grozny in 1940 and by 1941 this spread to theneighbouringIngush,thentheDagestanisinearly1942.Sovieteffortsatsuppressingtheinsurgencywereineffective,buttheirheavy-handedtacticsledtomoreCaucasianethnicgroups turning hostile. The German Abwehr (intelligence) was aware of these SovietinternalsecurityproblemsandmadeaconcertedefforttoreachouttotheChechenrebelsin mid-1942, promising military support in return for local assistance with OperationEdelweiss.Thistypeofthreat–foreignersworkingcovertlywithinternaldissidents–wasexactlythekindthattheparanoidSovietstatefearedmost.Consequently,Beria’sNKVDdeployed considerable numbers of security troops into the region prior to the Germaninvasion.ItisnotcleariftheSovietleadershipmadeplanstosabotagetheoilfieldsintheCaucasuspriortotheGermaninvasion,butitisclearthatlocalofficialshadthemeansinplacetoquicklyrendertheoilfieldsunusableforanextendedperiodiftheychose.

THECAMPAIGN

CROSSINGTHEDON,20–31JULY,1942The point of the spear of vonKleist’s 1. Panzerarmee approaching theDonRiverwasGeneralderPanzertruppeLeoFreiherrGeyrvonSchweppenburg’sXXXXPanzerkorps,with the3. and23.Panzerdivisions.GeneralmajorErwinMack’s23.Panzer-Division’sKampfgruppeZejdlik reached the riveratNikolaevskayabeforeduskon20July.MajorZejdlikwasnot amanoeuvreofficerbut an engineer,whohadpreviously served in theAustrian Army before the 1938 Anschluss. His Kampfgruppe was built aroundKradschützen-Bataillon 23, supported by a company of his own pioneers, two artillerybatteries and a panzerjäger company. After catching the Soviets in Nikolaevskayacompletely by surprise, twodismounted platoonswere sent across the 150m-wide riverwhile engineers established a pontoon ferry.TheSoviet 51stArmywas responsible forthissectorbutwasinastateofdisorganisedconfusionandunabletomountanimmediateresponse;General-majorNikolaiI.Trufanovwasrelievedofcommandon22Julyandhissuccessor,General-majorTrofimK.Kolomiets,didnottakeoverforseveralcriticaldays.Unmolested by the temporarily leaderless 51st Army, Zejdlik’s pioneers were able toestablishapontoonferryby2000hourson22Julyandbegintransportinglightvehiclesacross the Don. Yet despite this stroke of good fortune, 23. Panzer-Division could notimmediatelyexploitthebridgeheadbecauseithadexhausteditsfuelsuppliesjustreachingtheDonRiveranditsvehicleswerevirtuallyimmobilised.TheLuftwaffewasabletoflyin enough fuel to replenish Generalmajor Hermann Breith’s 3. Panzer-Division, soKampfgruppeWesthoven from 3. Panzer-Division was substituted and sent across intoMajorZejdlik’sbridgehead.Beforedawnon23July,theVorausabteilung(advanceguard)ofKampfgruppeWesthovensetoutwithtwobattalionsandboldlyadvanced40kmsouthacross open steppe to seize an intact bridge across the Sal River nearOrlovka.On thesame day, Infanterie-Division Großdeutschland reached the Don and seized a smallbridgeheadnearMelikhovskaya,whereapontoonbridgewasbegun; the37thArmydidnotopposethecrossing.

ReconnaissancetroopsfromInfanterie-DivisionGroßdeutschlandcrosstheDonRiveronpontoonferries,July1942.Thisfamousdivisiononlyparticipatedinthefirstweekoftheinvasion;itwasthenwithdrawnandsenttoRzhev.(Author’scollection)

It was not until 25 July that the Soviets made any effort to counterattack the twoGermanbridgeheadsacrosstheDon,bywhichpointitwastoolate.Malinovsky’sartilleryhadabandonedmanygunsandmostoftheirammunitionnorthoftheDonandnowhadlittleabilitytobombardtheGermancrossingsites.Kolomiets’51stArmycommittedthreerifle divisions to contain the German bridgehead over the Sal River, while sending itslimited armour to strike the open eastern flank of 3. Panzer-Division’s Nikolaevskayabridgehead.AsmallgroundcounterattackwithT-60 light tankswaseasily repulsed,butSoviet bombers from General-mayor Konstantin A. Vershinin’s 4th Air Army (4 VA)gamely succeeded in destroying the pontoon bridge.WhileHeeresgruppeAhad gainedtwo tenuous bridgeheads across the Don even before Rostov fell, it was impossible tosustainalarge-scaleinvasionoftheCaucasusacrossapairofflimsy,16-ton-limitpontoonbridges. It was necessary to seize a railway bridge across the Don and the only oneavailablewasinRostov.

When General der Panzertruppen Friedrich Kirchner’s LVII Panzerkorps fought itswayintoaburningRostovon23July,theprioritywastogettothebridgesovertheDononthesouthsideofthecity.ThefirstGermansoldierstoreachthemainroadbridgewerelightly armed troops from Generalmajor Traugott Herr’s 13. Panzer-Division’sKradschützen-Bataillon 43, who arrived at the river around 1600 hours. They found asceneofchaosreminiscentofNapoleon’sretreatacrosstheBerezina,withmobsofSoviettroopsfleeingacrossbothbridges.Whilesurveyingthesituation,troopsfromSS-Division

‘Wiking’alsoarrivedinthevicinityanddecidedtobeginshellingthepackedbridgeswithartillery – generally a good idea but on this occasion the standingorderwas to capturethesevitalbridgesintact.Germanartilleryroundsbeganimpactingonandnearthebridgesand a lucky hit apparently found a Soviet vehicle laden with ammunition – whichdetonated and dropped the southern span of the railway bridge into theDon. The roadbridgewasalsosoondamagedandsetafire,forcingthefleeingSoviettroopstotakesmallboatsandanythingthatfloatedtoescapetheapproachingpanzers.

While threeGermaninfantrydivisionscontinued tomopupSoviet rearguards in theburning city of Rostov, Herr’s 13. Panzer-Division quickly moved to establish abridgeheadacrosstheDon.Division-levelpioneersworkedonbothbridgesallthroughthenightof23/24Julyandwereabletorestoretheroadbridgetofoottrafficbymorning,buteven before then, German troops had already crossed the river. Around 2300 hours,Kradschützen-Bataillon 43 sent part of a company across theDon in rubber boats, andtheywere followed thenextdayby the restof theirbattalionandHauptmannSiegfriedGrabert’s 8./Regiment Brandenburg z.b.V. 800. The 26-year-old Grabert was a veteranspecialoperator;havingbeentrainedbytheAbwehrhethenledcommando-styleassaultsinHolland,France,GreeceandCrete,andwasawardedtheKnight’sCross(Ritterkreuz)forcapturingabridgeinGreece.

In order to get tanks and heavy equipment across theDon, theGermans needed toseizea6,000m-longraisedcauseway,whichconsistedoffiveseparatebridges,flankedbymarshes on both sides. General-leytenant Fedor V. Kamkov’s 18th Army, tasked withdefending the Bataysk sector, was disorganised after the retreat and lacked effectivecommandandcontroloverthe339thRifleDivision,whichwasthefront-lineunitinthiscrucial sector.TheSovietdivisionhadassignedmortars andmachineguns to cover thecausewaybut,oddly,noeffortwasmadetomineorcraterthecauseway.IntheRedArmy,engineersdidnotblowupstatepropertywithoutordersandapparentlynobodythoughttogivethem.

Although a direct assault across the causeway seemed suicidal, that is exactlywhatGrabertdecidedtodo,countingonaudacitytotriumphovertheSovietlackofinitiative.At 0230 hours on 25 July,Grabert’s 8.Kompanie ofBrandenburgers began infiltratingforwardandmanagedtoreachthesecondbridgebeforeencounteringseriousresistance.Then all the Soviet weapons in the area opened fire on the causeway, catching theGermans in the open. Nevertheless, Grabert pushed on andmanaged to seize the thirdbridge by about 0400 hours, before falling mortally wounded. Although theBrandenburgers were pinned down under heavy fire, when the sun rose at 0505 hoursStukasarrivedoverheadtosuppressSovietstrongpointsandthefirstpanzersarrivedaftercrossing over the repaired railway bridge. Incredibly, Grabert’s Brandenburgers openedthe causeway, but at the cost of 33 killed or missing and 54 wounded. Now thatHeeresgruppe A had kicked open the doorway into the Caucasus, it was hopeless forMalinovsky’sweakforcestotryanddefendtheareasouthoftheDon.

WhileGermanpioneersrepairedthedamagedDonRiverbridgesandbeganbuildinganew pontoon bridge, von Kleist sent 73. and 125. Infanterie-Division across on themorning of 26 July to expand the bridgehead. A single regiment from 73. Infanterie-Division pushed south into Bataysk and then captured the suburbs of Koysug. Once

Kamkov’s18thArmyscreeningunitswerepushedbackfromtheBatayskbridgehead,the4. Gebirgs-Division, and 198. and 298. Infanterie-Division also began constructingcrossing sites across the river, in order to further widen the bridgehead and reducedependence upon a single crossing site. After the Germans were across the Don instrength,Malinovsky’sbatteredunitshadnochoicebuttofallbacktowardtheKagalnikRiver,35kmsouthofRostov.General-mayorNikolaiIa.Kirichenko’sintact17thKubanCossackCavalryCorpsservedasadelayingforce.

GermantroopswerequicktoerectsignsclaimingthattheyhadcrossedtheborderbetweenEuropeandAsiaattheManychRiverbutthiswasstrictlyapropagandaploy.TheactualborderofAsialayintheTranscaucasusregion,whichtheyneverreached.(NikCornishatwww.Stavka.org.uk)

East of Rostov, 16. Infanterie-Division (mot.) followed into the Großdeutschland’sbridgeheadandquicklydispatchedaVorausabteilungtowardtheManychRiver;the37thArmy units in this sector failed to prevent this token motorised force from seizing acrossing,whichgreatlyreducedtheriver’sremainingdefensivevalue.On27July,partofBreith’s3.Panzer-DivisionadvancedsouthfromOrlovkawithtwosmallKampfgruppen,while the rest of his division and 23. Panzer-Division continued to cross the Don.Kolomiets’ 51st Army was poorly deployed and equipped to stop a German armouredthrust,withonlythe302ndRifleDivisioninBreith’spath,whichenabledBreith’sforcesto advance 85km in a single day. Indeed, fuel shortages were proving a greaterimpediment to the Germans than Soviet resistance. Malinovsky’s forces were neitherretreating nor defending, but merely milling around south of the Don, with littlecoordination.Sovietoperational-levelcommandandcontrolwasnearcollapse.Althoughhis forces were weak, the Kagalnik and Manych rivers offered Malinovsky potentialdefensive lines, but the Soviets allowed the Germans to cross both rivers with littlehindrance; on 28 July, 73. Infanterie-Division established a bridgehead across theKagalnik River in spite of Kirichenko’s cavalry. On that same day, Stalin issued hisinfamousNKOOrderNo.227whichcommandedallRedArmyunits‘NotaStepBack!’Meanwhile, after nearly a week of engineer work to construct a large pontoon bridgeacrosstheDonnorthofBataysk,Kirchner’sLVIIPanzerkorpsfinallybegantocrosstheriver.Malinovsky’s threadbare armieswere now in deadly peril and unprepared for thestormthatwasinevitableonceHeeresgruppeAsucceededindeployingitsarmouracross

theDon.

Marshal Budyonny, headquartered in Armavir, ordered Kolomiets’ 51st Army tocounterattacktheGermanbuild-upnearOrlovkaandprovidedthefresh135thand155thTank brigades, which were just arriving in Kuberle by rail from theMoscowMilitaryDistrict.These twobrigadeshada totalofabout40T-34and40T-70tanks,buthadnocombat experience.General-mayorBorisA. Pogrebov, a career cavalryman,was put inchargeofanadhoccavalry/tankcorps-sizedgroupthatalsoincludedhis110thand115thCavalrydivisions.Budyonnyhadnounderstandingofcombined-armstacticsorplanningandorderedboth tankbrigades to proceeddirectly from the railhead intobattle, after a50kmroadmarch.PogrebovwasabletooccupyMartynovkaontheSalonthemorningof28 July without difficulty, but his forces were strung out and he made the mistake ofassuming that the Germans would sit still in their Nesmeyanovka bridgehead.Unfortunately,Mack’s 23. Panzer-Division had just arrived at the Sal River and ratherthanawaitaSovietarmouredcounterattack,theGermanscunninglydecidedtoconductaflankingeffortoftheirownwithKampfgruppeBurmeister(twoPanzer-AbteilungenfromPanzer-Regiment 201) at dawn on 29 July. Pogrebov had moved into the town ofMartynovkaontheSalwithover5,000troopsandthe155thTankBrigade.Hedeployedtwo cavalry regiments to screen his left flank, supported by tanks from the 135thTankBrigade, which was still moving from Kuberle. Burmeister’s panzers eliminated onecavalryregimentandscatteredthe135thTankBrigade,thengotaroundPogrebov’sopenflanks and unexpectedly struck his massed troops from behind. Concerned about theunexpectedthreat,GeneralPogrebovmovedwithhisstafftorestoreorderonhisshatteredleftflankbutwaskilledbyGermantanks.KampfgruppeBurmeisterthenfoughtitswayinto the town andmethodically shot up the packed Soviet armour, claiming 77 Soviettankseliminatedforthelossofonly3Germantanks.About1,000corneredSoviettroopsinMartynovkasurrendered.Kolomiets’51stArmywasleftwithnomobilereservesandcouldnotstoptheXXXXPanzerkorpsadvanceacrosstheSal.

At dawn on 29 July, Kirchner’s LVII Panzerkorps exploded out of the Batayskbridgehead,withtheSS-Division‘Wiking’slicingthroughtheremnantsoftwoSovietrifledivisions and heading due south for Belaya Glina while Herr’s 13. Panzer-Divisionmarchedsouth-easttowardsSalsk.General-mayorPetrM.Kozlov’s37thArmyneverhadachancetoholdoffthisonslaughtandwasquicklyfacedwiththethreatofencirclementas Kirchner’s panzers crushed his left flank and von Schweppenburg’s XXXXPanzerkorps enveloped his right flank. Breith’s 3. Panzer-Division committedKampfgruppeWesthovenandKampfgruppevonLiebenstein–amere threebattalions–againstthecityofProletarskaya,whichcaughttheSovietscompletelybysurprise.Afterabrieffight,about500Soviettroopssurrenderedandthecitywascapturedby1500hours,whichachievedtheobjectiveofinterdictingtheTikhoretsk–Stalingradrailline–theonlyremainingraillinkbetweentheCaucasusandtherestoftheSovietUnion.Forsometime,the Soviets remained unaware of the loss of Proletarskaya, which provided Breith’spanzerstheopportunitytoshootupanumberofSoviettrainsattemptingtopassthrough.TheSoviet 8ODBP (armoured train division) attempted to intervene but one armouredtrainwasdamagedbytheLuftwaffeandretreatedwhiletheotherfounditsescapecutoffby theGermanadvance, so thecrewblewup theirown train.However, theSovietsdidmanagetoblowuptheroadbridgeovertheCheprakRiver,asubsidiaryoftheManych.

VonSchweppenburgfinallymanagedtorefuel23.Panzer-Divisionandgetmostofitacross the Sal, while 16. Infanterie-Division (mot.) crossed the Manych River andadvanced to cover the space between XXXX and LVII Panzerkorps. Five Germanmechanised divisions were barrelling down upon the city of Salsk and the SovietsattemptedtoslowtheiradvancebyopeningadamontheManychRiver,butthefloodinghadonlylocalimpact.Breith’s3.Panzer-Divisionwasabletoestablishacrossingoverthe

Manych and got a Panzergrenadier battalion across, but the full-strength 11th NKVDRifle Division fiercely opposed the effort and inflicted painful losses. Simultaneously,GeneralderGebirgstruppeRudolfKonrad’sXXXXIXGebirgskorpswasadvancingsouthfrom the Kagalnik River with 73. Infanterie-Division and 4. Gebirgs-Division, whileGeneral der InfanterieWilhelmWetzel’s V Armeekorps covered their open flank with125. Infanterie-Division.VonKleist intended to use Salsk as a pivot point, then swingrapidlywestwardwithhisarmourtolinkupwithKonrad’sinfantryandtherebyenvelopthe18thArmyontheYeyaRiver.DespiteOrderNo.227,Malinovskyrecognisedthathisweak and dispersed forces now faced annihilation if he tried to make a stand, so heorderedthe12th,18thand37tharmiestoretreat.

Kirichenko’s17thKubanCossackCavalryCorpsplayedanimportantroleindelayingRuoff’sadvancetowardKrasnodarandTuapse.SovietcavalrywashandyintheCaucasus,bothforitsoperationalmobilityandtacticalflexibility.Unlikemechanisedforces,itslogisticalrequirementsweremodest,andStalintoyedwiththeideaofformingacavalryarmyintheregion.(CourtesyoftheCentralMuseumoftheArmedForces,MoscowviaStavka)

On30July,Herr’s13.Panzer-DivisioncapturedSalskandLVIIPanzerkorpsbaggedalmost 10,000 prisoners and a large amount of equipment from the disintegrating 37thArmy,whichwasnowreducedtoabout3,000fugitives.OnvonKleist’srightflank,73.Infanterie-Divisionwasabletopushthe17thKubanCossackCavalryCorpsall thewaybacktoKushchevskayaandthenmanagedtoseizeatentativebridgeheadacrosstheYeyaRiver.However,Kirichenko’s17thKubanCossackCavalryCorpsconductedasuccessfuldelayingoperationwith the13th and15thCavalrydivisions,whichpreventedKonrad’sXXXXIXGebirgskorpsfromgettingacrosstheriverinstrengthforseveraldays.Sovietcavalry, reinforced with a small number of tanks, counterattacked the KushchevskayabridgeheadandbroughttheGermanadvanceinthissectortoatemporaryhalt.

Atthispoint,StavkaorderedthatallremainingremnantsoftheSouthernFrontwouldbeabsorbedintoMarshalSemyonM.Budyonny’sNorthCaucasusFront.BudyonnywasuncertainwhereHeeresgruppeAwasheading,buthehadtocoverallpossibilities,soheredesignated Malinovsky’s 12th and 37th armies as the Don Operational Group andorderedhimtoprotecttheArmavir–Stavropolaxis.Kolomiets’51stArmywastransferredtotheStalingradFront.InordertodefendKrasnodarandtheKuban,Budyonnydecidedto

usetheforcesintheTamanPeninsula,General-mayorGrigoriiP.Kotov’s47thArmyandPolkovnikMikhailM. Shapovalov’s 1st SeparateRifleCorps,whichwere renamed theCoastalOperationalGroupandplacedunderthecommandofGeneral-polkovnikIvanT.Cherevichenko.UncertainifBudyonny’sforcescouldhold,StavkaorderedGeneralIvanV. Tyulenev’s Transcaucasus Front to begin constructing a fall-back line on the TerekRiverwith the 44thArmy, to protectGrozny. Stavka dispatched four airborne brigadesfromMoscowtoformtwonewriflecorpsontheTerek.UnliketheGermans,theSovietsweremore flexible about planning for defeat, whichworked in their favour during thecampaign.

By31July,vonKleisthadalleightofhisdivisionsacrosstheDonandGeneraloberstRichardRuoff’s17.Armeehadsixofhisninedivisionsacrosstheriver–atotalofover167,000Germantroops.AlthoughGermanlogisticsacrosstheDonwereminimalatthispoint, List had a decisive superiority over Budyonny’s scattered units and for theadvancingpanzercrewsitmusthavefeltliketheheadydaysofOperationBarbarossaalloveragain.However,quicksuccessesencouragedHitlertotinkerwiththeplan.OperationEdelweiss had always been premised upon the idea that von Kleist’s 1. Panzerarmeewould receive substantial assistance from Hoth’s 4. Panzerarmee and the XXXXVIIIPanzerkorpshadbeenbrieflyplacedundervonKleist’scontrolduringthecrossingoftheDon.YettheSovietshadcommittedtheir1stand4thTankarmiesagainstHeeresgruppeBin the Don bend, so Hitler felt compelled to transfer XXXXVIII Panzerkorps back toHoth,whose4.Panzerarmeewouldnowfocusexclusivelyonpushing toward theVolgaRiver and Stalingrad. This decision is often described as amistake, but the fact is thatBudyonny’s front had disintegrated south of theDon andList could neither supply norprofitably employHoth’s panzers in the Caucasus for the time being; sending them tosupportPaulus’6.ArmeewasprudentandledtoamajorGermanvictoryintheDonbend.

However,Hitler and theOKHwerenot satisfiedwith transferring justpanzers fromtheadvanceintotheCaucasusandwereworriedthattheSovietswouldmountoffensiveson other parts of theEasternFront, particularly theRzhev salient, so itwas decided totransfer Infanterie-DivisionGroßdeutschland toHeeresgruppeMitte. List had also beentold toexpectsubstantial reinforcementsfromvonManstein’s11.Armeein theCrimea,butnowHitlerdecidedthatthebulkofthatformationwouldgonorthtoparticipateinanew offensive at Leningrad, leaving Listwith the disappointing promise that hewouldeventuallyreceiveoneortwoofvonManstein’sinfantrydivisions.PartsoftheRomanian3rdArmywouldalsobeusedtoguardtheyawninggapbetweenHeeresgruppeBandA,rather than participate in theCaucasus campaign.Consequently, List’sHeeresgruppeAwas suddenlydeprivedof follow-on forces and itwas clear thatHitler’s prioritieswereshifting.

At 1200 hours on 31 July, Breith’s 3. Panzer-Divisionmounted a deliberate assaultacrosstheManychRivernearProletarskaya,supportedbyNebelwerferrockets.AlthoughtheleadPanzergrenadierunitsufferedheavylosses,PolkovnikPetrP.Sushevskii’s11thNKVDRifleDivisionwasdefeatedafteratensefightthatinvolvedhand-to-handcombatandretreated,with1,000troopscaptured.At0245hoursthenextmorning,MajorGüntherPapeledasmallarmouredKampfgruppesouthfromthebridgeheadandadvancedintothevirtually unguarded city of Salsk. A few hours later, the advance guard of 13. Panzer-Divisionarrived.TheRedArmywasinfullretreat.

PURSUIT,1–10AUGUSTOnceSalsk fell andBudyonny’s thin frontwasbroken,List’sHeeresgruppeAswitchedinto pursuit mode. Rather than a single main Schwerpunkt (main effort), the Germansadvancedinfivedispersed,corps-sizedgroups,whichbecameveryspreadout.Konrad’sXXXXIXGebirgskorpsfrom17.Armeeadvancedtheslowest,with4.Gebirgs-Divisionand73.Infanterie-DivisionmarchingsouthfromStaro-MinskayatowardsTimoshevskaya,clearing the eastern shore of the Sea of Azov. Two of XXXXIX Gebirgskorps’ fourdivisions were still back near Rostov, mopping up bypassed pockets of resistance;Konrad’sadvanceguardswerethusrelativelysmall,whichenabledKirichenko’scavalrytodelaythemforafewdays.

AcolumnofGermanPzKpfwIIImediumtankspushesintotheCaucasus,inpursuitofBudyonny’sretreatingarmies.Germanmechanisedmobilitywasconstantlyhinderedbyfuelshortages,whichforcedthemtocommitdivisionsintocombatpiecemeal.ThefailureofsparepartstoreachfrontlineunitswouldalsoreducetheoperationalreadinessofvonKleist’spanzersbySeptember1942.(NikCornishatwww.Stavka.org.uk)

On Konrad’s left flank, General der Infanterie Wilhelm Wetzel’s V Armeekorpsadvanced with 9., 125. and 198. Infanterie-Division towards the vital rail junction atTikhoretsk (population 40,000), held by remnants of Kamkov’s 18th Army. KamkovlackedcavalryortankstodelayWetzel’sinfantryandrashlydecidedtoemploytheeightarmouredtrainsof the16th,51st,53rdand65thODBPsasamobilefiresupportgroup.The armoured trains of the 51st ODBP supported a counterattack by the 15th CavalryDivision against the vanguard of 73. Infanterie-Division atKuschevskaya on 1August,firingover250shells.However,theLuftwaffeeasilyfoundtheexposedSovietarmouredtrainsanddamagedseveralofthemwithnearmissesandstrafingattacks.Kamkov’sstaffordered the remaining trains to move south of Tikhoretsk and assemble at theMalorossiyskiytrainstation,butbythetimethisoccurredtheGermanLVIIPanzerkorpshad already severed the rail line below this station.The 18thArmy staff dithered for acritical 24 hours – apparently forgetting about the plight of its armoured trains, duringwhich time the German 198. Infanterie-Division had marched into Tikhoretsk andoccupied the city by 1500 hours on 4 August. Four Soviet armoured trains were nowstranded,withtheGermansholdingthelinebothnorthandsouthofthem.The18thArmyordered the trains to attempt a highspeed run through occupied Tikhoretsk, then head

south-west on open line to Krasnodar. At 1700 hours on 5 August, a group of Sovietarmoured trains attempted a run through Tikhoretsk but were immediately engaged byGermanartillery.Firstonetrain,thenanotherwerederailedinfranticeffortstogetaroundtheGermandefencesandtheircrewswereforcedtodestroytheirdisabledtrains.Boththe51stand53rdODBPswereeliminatedasfightingunitsinthisdebacle,althoughmostofthecrewsescapedsouthonfoot.

The fate of Kamkov’s armoured trains had been sealed by Kirchner’s LVIIPanzerkorps,whichadvancedrapidly towards thecityofKropotkinon theKubanRiverwith the SS-Division ‘Wiking’ and the Slovak FastDivision.General-mayorAndreiA.Grechko’s retreating12thArmywasunable tomakea standatKropotkin,butwhenanarmouredKampfgruppe from‘Wiking’advanced into thecity,SovietengineersblewupthebridgesovertheKubanRiver.However,anotherKampfgruppefromtheSS-Regiment‘Germania’ had already seized a small bridgehead over the Kuban at Grigoripoliskaya25kmsouth-eastofKropotkinandengineersestablishedan8-tonpontoonbridgethereby0500hourson6August.Sincethiswasinsufficientforheavyvehicles,itwasreplacedbya24-tonbridgeonthenextday,allowingWiking’sPanzer-AbteilungtocrosstheKuban.Brigadier-GeneralJozefTuranec’sSlovakFastDivisionarrivedatKropotkinandsecuredthe city, enabling SS-Gruppenführer Felix Steiner to shift his entire division to theGrigoripoliskayabridgehead.GrechkomadelittleefforttodefendthebendoftheKubanRiver,andonceitwasclearthat‘Wiking’wasacrossinforceby7August,theremnantsofhis12thArmyretreatedtotheCaucasusMountains.

SovietsretreatingacrosstheSteppeinsmallgroups.Manywouldbescoopedupbythepursuingpanzers,butotherswouldmakeittoTuapseortheTerekRivertoreform.GermanprisonerhaulsintheCaucasusweresmallincomparisontopreviousoperations.(NikCornishatwww.Stavka.org.uk)

While Kirchner’s corps crossed the Kuban, von Mackensen’s III Panzerkorps boredown upon the city of Armavir with Herr’s 13. Panzer-Division and GeneralleutnantSigfridHenrici’s16.Infanterie-Division(mot.).AlthoughGermanpropagandistsclaimedthatvonKleist’spanzershadenteredAsia,theactualboundarylaysouthoftheCaucasusMountains,intheTranscaucasus.Nevertheless,vonMackensen’stroopsdidbegintospotcamelsandtemperaturesintheregionwereupto104°F(40°C),whichmadewaterjustaspreciousasfuel.Grechko’s12thArmydecided tomakeastandatArmavir,acityof150,000,becauseitwasessential todelaytheGermanadvanceinorder togain timeforthe44thArmytopreparepositionsontheTerekRiver.Theonlycombattroopsavailablewerefromthe236thRifleDivision,whichhadbeenarelativelyluckyunitthusfarandnotsufferedcripplinglosses.Grechko’sforceswereweakbuthehadoneadvantage:Armavirwasonthewestbankofthe80m-wideKubanRiverandvonMackensen’stroopswereontheeastside– theGermansneededabridgetogainaccess to thecity.Grechkoensuredthatthefewbridgesintheareawerewellguardedandpreparedfordemolition.

HerrselectedMajorAlbertBrux,commanderofI./Panzergrenadier-Regiment66andahighlyskilledcombatveteranwhohadbeenawardedtheRitterkreuzin1941,toleadthearmouredKampfgruppethatattemptedtoseizeabridgeovertheKubannorthofArmaviron3August.BruxhitthebridgewithfuryandmanagedtogetsixpanzersacrossbeforetheSovietsblewupthebridge,strandinghistanks.Duringthenight,Bruxmanagedtogetsome of his infantry across on rubber rafts to reinforce the bridgehead, but a Sovietbattalion prevented any further expansion. Stymied by tough Soviet resistance and theKuban River, Herr’s 13. Panzer-Division was forced to wait for 24 hours for bridgingcolumnsandartillerytoarriveinordertomountaforcedriver-crossingoperationsouthoftheexistingbridgehead.AnotherKampfgruppe,comprisingOberstleutnantHaraldStolz’sKradschützen-Bataillon43,wasquietlysentacrosstheKubanonthenightof4/5August.Oddly,Grechko’stroopsdidnotcontestthiscrossing,whichenabledGermanengineerstoestablishaferrywithin2hoursanda24-tonpontoonbridgewithin10.5hours.At1000hourson5August,GermanmechanisedforcesbegancrossingtheKuban.

Generalleutnant Sigfrid Henrici’s 16. Infanterie-Division (mot.) sent its Infanterie-Regiment60tocaptureArmavir,whileaKampfgruppe fromHerr’s13.Panzer-Division

headedwesttowardMaikop.Grechko’stroopshadduganti-tankditchesoutsideArmavir,butinsteadoftankstheywerestruckbythreebattalionsofdismountedPanzergrenadiere.SupportedbyartilleryandtheLuftwaffe, thePanzergrenadierequicklyfought theirwayintothecitybutittooktheremainderofthedaybeforeSovietresistancewasovercome.Thecapturedcityyieldedasmallrefineryandanoilstoragearea–bothburning–andanairfield,whichwasquicklyoccupiedbytheadvanceelementsofFliegerkorpsIV.

WhilepartofHenrici’sdivisionclearedArmavir,Herr’s13.Panzer-DivisionsentthreeKampfgruppen toward theprimarystrategicobjectiveofMaikop.Already,a special62-man detachment of Russian-speaking Brandenburg troops, led by Leutnant Adrian vonFölkersam,hadinfiltratedMaikop,disguisedasNKVDsoldiers.Herr’sdivisionwasabletoestablishasmallbridgeheadovertheintermediateLabaRiveron6August,butrequiredanother 24 hours to construct a pontoon bridge to allow the tanks of Major WolframMontfort’s I./Panzer-Regiment 4 and the SPW half-tracks of Major Brux’sPanzergrenadiere tocross.Bythemorningof8August,Herrhadpushedaconsiderableforceacross theLabaRiver,whileboth ‘Wiking’and16. Infanterie-Division (mot.)hadalsocrossedtheriver,oneitherflank.SovietresistancealongtheLabaRiverwasminimal,focused around the inexperienced Special Motorised Brigade. The Soviet 12th Armytroops in Maikop feared that German troops would arrive at any moment, and vonFölkersam’s men went into action on the afternoon of 8 August, knocking out Sovietcommunications in thecityand issuing falseorders that thecitywas tobe immediatelyabandoned. Von Fölkersam’s raid was a success insofar as it destabilised an alreadywobbly Soviet defence of the city, but his men failed to prevent real Soviet securitypersonnelandengineersfromsabotagingtheoilrigslocatedaroundthecity.Infact,MajorBrux’sSPWsdidnotarriveattheoutskirtsofMaikopuntil1500hourson9Augustandthey found oil storage tanks near the train station and other facilities ablaze.However,Bruxcouldnotsecuretheentirecityuntil twootherKampfgruppenarrivedthenextdayandhewaswoundedduringmopping-upoperations.

THETIPOFTHESPEAR:KAMPFGRUPPEPAPEINPURSUIT,MORNING,3AUGUST1942(PP.42–43)

By early August 1942, the German 3. Panzer-Division was across the Don River and in hot pursuit of theretreating Soviet 37th Army. However, fuel shortages made it impossible for the entire division to advancesimultaneously,sosmalladvanceguardsweredispatchedtopushasfarastheycouldbeforerunningoutoffuel

themselves. At the tip of 3. Panzer-Division’s advance guard wasMajor Günter Pape’sKampfgruppe, whichconsisted of his Kradschützen-Bataillon 3 and the I./Panzer-Regiment 6, along with small detachments ofPanzerjäger,Pioniereandsignaltroops.

By the morning of 3 August, Kampfgruppe Pape was approaching the city of Stavropol, where theyencountered friendlyCaucasian civilians, aswell as camels.Only a few PzKpfw III tankswere still with thecolumn,with the rest falling out due tomechanical problems.Along the road, Pape’s columnpassed disabledSovietvehicles,abandonedintheirhastyretreat.Pape’ssmallcolumn,consistingoffewerthan2,000troops,wasthrustingdeepintotheCaucasus,againstminimalenemyresistance.TheGermansthoughtthatthiseasypursuitindicatedthatthecampaignwouldsoonendinvictory,butthatfeelingwouldquicklypass.

HereweseetheGermancolumn,withthemotorcycles(1)infront,followedbyanSdKfz251half-track(2),andtwoSdKfz250SPWswithtroopsaboard(3and4)andaPzKpfwIIItank(5).TheyarepassingbyaderelictSovietGAZ-AAtruckononesideoftheroad(6)andontheotherpeasantsandacamelarewatchingthempass.

Although Kirchner’s LVII Panzerkorps had been led to believe that their primaryobjectivewaslocatedwithinMaikop,thisprovedtobeafalseassumption.Infact,oftheapproximately150oilrigslocatedintheregion,onlyaboutadozenwereactuallylocatedwithin the city environs. Imprudently, an advance battalion from theTechnicalBrigadeMineralöl (TBM) followed in the wake of Herr’s panzers, along roads that were stillteemingwithbypassedSoviettroopsandsufferedheavylosses.AfterarrivingatMaikop,itquicklybecameobviousthatrestoringoilproductionincapturedCaucasianfieldswasnot going to be as simple asKonti Öl executives in Berlin had believed. TheGermanoilmenhadexpectedsomesabotage,butwerestunnedbythelevelofSovietingenuityinvandalism;steelcoreshadbeendrivendowneachshaftandcouldnotbe removed.TheTBMpersonnelwouldhavetodrillnewshafts.

Having spentmore than twoweeks fighting across 300km of the Caucasus, Herr’stired Panzergrenadiere now learned from the TBM oil experts that the bulk of the‘Maikop oilfield’ was actually located 45–50km to the south-west, near the villages ofNeftegorsk,KhadyzhenskandShirvanskaya.ThismeantthatKirchner’scorpsneededtocrosstheBelayaRiverandcontinuetheadvancesouthwards,intothemountains,inorderto seize the oilfields. As a follow-on objective, the OKH added the port of Tuapse toKirchner’stasklist.AninitialattempttogetacrosstheBelayaRiverendedinfailureduetoSovietartilleryfire.ThusthecaptureofMaikopitselfprovedtobeanemptytriumphandshouldhaveservednotice toHitler,Göringand theOKHthat theseizureof theoilresourcesintheCaucasuswasnotgoingtobeeasy.

The fog of warwas particularly thick at this stage of the Caucasus campaign. TheGermanshadlittleideawherethebulkofBudyonny’sforceshadretreatedandLuftwaffeFw-189 reconnaissance planes sought out columns of vehicles and other signs ofdefensivepreparations.Fortheirpart,theSovietsonlybecameawareofGermanadvanceswhentheylostcommunicationswithtowns.ManysmallgroupsofbypassedSoviettroopsretreatedsouthwards,leftbehindinthewakeofvonKleist’spanzers.

Up to this point, Kirchner’s panzers had been operating in flat terrain, but now atMaikop they were asked to proceed down a single dirt road into the foothills of theCaucasusMountains – terrain thatwas increasingly unsuitable formechanisedwarfare.Konrad’sXXXXIXGebirgskorps hadmoved south and had 1. and 4.Gebirgs-DivisionnearKropotkinontheKubanRiver,whileGeneralderArtillerieMaximiliandeAngelis’XXXXIV Armeekorps was even closer, with 97. and 101. Jäger-Division on the LabaRiver.Atthispoint,Listmadeacriticalmistake–thekindofmistakethatsnatchesdefeat

fromthejawsofvictory.HedecidedtosendKonrad’stwoGebirgs-DivisionenfartothesouthtomakeapushtowardstheportofSukhumiinwesternGeorgia.Listdidallow13.Panzer-Divisionand16.Infanterie-Division(mot.)topulloutoftheadvancetowardstheNeftegorsk oilfields, but decided to leave SS-Division ‘Wiking’ and the Slovak FastDivision to continue pushing into the mountains. Angelis’ two Jäger-Divisionen werecommitted to support the advance towards Tuapse, but were badly deployed as flankguards, instead of the main effort. SS-Gruppenführer Steiner’s ‘Wiking’ was given thehonour of pushing on to the oilfields and Tuapse, albeit along a one-tank front. Themuddle causedby this spateof baddecisionsgavevital days toGrechko to rebuildhis12thArmyandbuildanewdefensivelineinthemountains.

While Kirchner’s and von Mackensen’s panzers were focused on Maikop, vonSchweppenburg’s XXXX Panzerkorps was the only significant German force pushingtowards the next strategic objective of Grozny. Initially, von Schweppenburg’s XXXXPanzerkorpsheadedsouthfromSalsktowardsStavropol(renamedVoroshilovskin1935,butitrevertedtoStavropolin1943;bothnameswereusedin1942)some160kmdistant.Soviet resistance evaporated in front of the panzers, which advanced southwards withBreith’s 3. Panzer-Division in the lead and Mack’s fuel-starved 23. Panzer-Divisiontrailing. Breith’s 3. Panzer-Division moved with Kampfgruppe Pape and KampfgruppevonLiebensteinoutinfront,buttherestofhisdivisionwasstrungoutover60kmtotherear. The German advance towards Stavropol was particularly dramatic, with themechanisedVorausabteilungenmovingover100kmacrosstheflatsteppeinasingleday,but severe fuel shortages were already immobilising many of the vehicles in eachmechaniseddivision.AfullyfueledPzKpfwIIItankhadamaximumrangeofbetween90and 160km, while an SdKfz 251 half-track could travel between 150 and 300km on asingleloadoffuel;thismeantthattheadvancewasledbythemorefuel-efficientvehicleswhilemostof the tanks,artilleryandbridgingengineers laggedbehindorsatstationary.MajorPape’sKampfgruppeconsistedofKradschützen-Bataillon3andI./Panzer-Regiment6–about1,200troopsand30tanks–buttheretreating37thArmycouldnotstopit.Hereand there, the Germans encountered resistance, but either overran it or bypassed it infavourofkeepingBudyonny’sforcesontherun.

AsKampfgruppePapeapproachedStavropol,itenteredafertileagriculturalbeltandencounteredfriendlyCaucasiancivilians,whowerehappy tosee theRedArmyand thehatedNKVDgone.OutsideStavropol,Pape’spanzersoverranatrainstationandcapturedanabandonedtrainwithseventanksaboard.FliegerkorpsIVbombedStavropoltodisruptthe Soviet retreat, setting parts of the city on fire, but Budyonnymade no stand there.Pape’spanzersentered the smoulderingcityof85,000soulsat1345hourson3Augustand found no civilians or enemy troops in sight; within 75 minutes, Pape’s men hadsecuredtheentirecity.StavropolprovidedawindfallforBreith’s3.Panzer-Division,withanintactfuelstoragedumpandwarehousesfilledwithalmost3,000tonsofgrain.Amongthecitizens tofallunderGermanoccupationwas11-year-oldMikhailGorbachev, futureSovietleader.Uninformedaboutthefallofthecity,theSovietVVS(MilitaryAirForces)kepttryingtolandatthecapturedairfield,tothegleeofBreith’s2cmflakgunners,whodestroyedsevenaircraft,includingaTB-3heavybomber.

On 5 August, Breith’s 3. Panzer-Division had salvaged enough captured fuel inStavropol to dispatch Kampfgruppe Pape (six tanks, I./Panzergrenadier Regiment 3,

Kradschützen-Bataillon 3, Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon 39 and artillery) south through thefoothills toseize thecityofNevinnomysskand therebysever theArmavir–Georgiyevskrail line. Justoutside thecity, asPape’scolumnapproachedabridgeover theKuban, itcameunderSovietartilleryfire.ASovietriflebattalion,supportedbyanartillerybattery,defendedthecrossingsite.However,PapequicklyrecognisedthattheSovietswereonlydefending theareaaround thebridgeandhesimplysenthismotorcycle infantry furthersouth and they found an unguarded crossing. Once across, Pape’s troops overran theoutflankedSovietartillerymenandroutedthebattalionat thebridge.Withjustsix tanksand two battalions of infantry, Breith’s division captured the city of Nevinnomyssk.Further back,Mack’s 23. Panzer-Divisionmopped up retreating Soviet units, capturing2,200 prisoners and 34 artillery pieces from the 4th Rifle Division. However, vonSchweppenburg’s XXXX Panzerkorps was completely out of fuel and immobilised forthree critical days. It was not until the morning of 8 August that Breith’s 3. Panzer-Division could resume its advance,with thenext objectivebeing the cityofPyatigorsk(population62,000).

Kampfgruppe Westhoven advanced in the lead, with one Panzer-Abteilung,Kradschützen-Bataillon3,aPanzergrenadier-Bataillon,artilleryanddivisionalpioneers.In19hours, theKampfgruppe advanced100km,encountering light resistanceat severalpoints.Forthefirsttime,theGermanscaughtsightofthesnow-coveredMountElbrusinthedistance.However,theretreatingSovietssuccessfullyblewupallthebridgesalongtherouteanddestroyedtheoilpumpingstations.Onthemorningof9August,KampfgruppeWesthoven began fighting its way into the northern outskirts of Pyatigorsk, butencounteredheavyresistancefromNKVDtroops,supportedbymultiplerocketlaunchers.Westhoven’s group consisted of fewer than 4,000 troops and the German troops werefatiguedbytheexcessiveheat,whichreached52°C(125°F).Nevertheless,Westhoven’stroops slowly fought theirwayblockbyblock into thecity, suffering significant losses.German reinforcements arrived in the afternoon, as Breith added another Panzer-Abteilung andaPanzergrenadier-Bataillon to tip the fight inhis favour.Byevening,3.Panzer-Division had occupied the northern half of Pyatigorsk. The next morning,Kradschützen-Bataillon 3 sent motorcycle infantry across the Pudkumok River and thesouthernhalfofthecitywasoccupiedbeforenoonon10August.TheNKVDtroopshadwithdrawn.

Germantroopscautiouslyapproachaburningoilstorageandtrans-shipmentfacilityatMaikop’strainstation.Sovietsabotagerenderedmostoftheregion’soilinfrastructureuselessformostoftheGermans’briefoccupation.(Author’scollection)

After the capture of Pyatigorsk, von Schweppenburg called a temporary halt to alloffensiveactionbyhisXXXXPanzerkorps.Thecombatunitswerealloutoffuelandthelogistical support units were far to the rear, some as far back as the Manych River.NumerouspocketsofSoviettroopshadbeenbypassedduringtheheadypursuit,butnowthey threatened von Schweppenburg’s tenuous lines of communications. It was time toconsolidate theconqueredareasandreplenishthetroopsforadeliberateadvance,ratherthancontinuingonwithacoupleofbattalionsofmotorcycleinfantryandsomearmouredcars. The tip of von Kleist’s spear had outrun its supplies, giving Budyonny a vitalbreathingspace.

WhilevonKleist’spursuitwasculminatinginthefoothillsoftheCaucasusMountains,Ruoff’s17.ArmeewasdescendinguponthecityofKrasnodarwithfourinfantrydivisionsfromWetzel’sVArmeekorps.Theinfantrymenhadbeenmarching20kmormorefortwoweeksthroughthedesert-liketerrainsouthoftheDonandtheheatandlackofwaterwasparticularly tellinguponthehorses thatpulledtheirartillery.Ruoff’sarmyhadlostover950horsessincecrossingtheDon,whichreducedthemobilityofhisdivisions.InordertokeepupwiththefleeingSoviets,eachofWetzel’sinfantrydivisionsformedamotorisedVorausabteilungbypoolingallavailabletrucksandcars,butthisfurtherdeprivedlogisticunitsofvehiclesessentialtomovesuppliesforward.Nevertheless,Wetzel’scorpsclosedinonKrasnodar,thecapitaloftheKubanandacityof200,000inhabitants.KrasnodarwasakeytargetofEdelweisssincecrudeoilfromMaikopandthenearbyKrymskayaoilfieldin the Taman Peninsula was sent to the city by pipeline, where the city’s refineriesconverteditintofuel.Budyonnycouldnotsimplyabandonsuchacriticalobjective,soheorderedGeneral-mayorAleksandrI.Ryzhov’s56thArmytomakeastandthere.Ryzhov’sarmy consisted of the 30th, 339th and 349th Rifle divisions and two separate artilleryregiments,buttheywereinpoorshapeaftertheretreatfromRostov.PolkovnikBorisN.Arshintsev’s30thRifleDivisionwas in thebest condition,but the339thRifleDivisiononlyhad2,573troopsandthe349thRifleDivisionjust1,137troops(halfofwhomwereunarmed). On 7 August, communist party officials began to mobilise 19,000 local

residents–mostlyteenagersandoldmen–todigtrenchesandanti-tankditchesoutsideKrasnodar.ThousandsofhastilyleviedmilitiamenwereprovidedtoRyzhovtoreplenishhisbattle-worndivisions,butheremainedveryshortofammunition,weaponsandradios.

WhiletheKrasnodarmilitiamenwerestilllookingforshovelstodiganti-tankditches,Oberst Paul Scheuerpflug’s Vorausabteilung from 9. Infanterie-Division reached thenorthernoutskirtsofKrasnodaronthemorningof8August,followedsoonthereafterbyelements of 73. and 125. Infanterie-Division. Major Kurt Schäff’s Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung249providedabatteryofStuGIIIassaultgunstoreinforcetheassault.Ryzhovtried to establish a perimeter north of the city, with Arshintsev’s 30th Rifle Divisionholding the centre and the twoweaker divisions covering the flanks, but left only twobattalionsofofficercadets.Thiswasaseriousmistake.Onceitbecameclearduringtheafternoon that his thin red linewas going to be attacked by three full-strengthGermaninfantrydivisions,RyzhovhadachangeofheartanddecidedtoorderArshintsevtomountarearguard,whilehewithdrewtherestofhisarmyacrosstheKubanRiver.WhenWetzellaunched his attack on themorning of 9August, 9. and 73. Infanterie-Division simplyenveloped much of Arshintsev’s positions and quickly penetrated into the city proper.Although Arshintsev managed a fighting withdrawal to a pontoon bridge across theKuban,mostofthecitywasinGermanhandsbytheendoftheday.However,thevitaloilrefineryandstoragetanks,aswellasallthebridgesacrosstheKuban,hadbeendestroyed,leaving an empty triumph forRuoff’s 17.Armee.Havinggained awrecked city,Ruoffdirected the newly arrivedRomanianCavalryCorps to advancewestwards to clear thecoastlinealongtheSeaofAzovandisolateGeneral-mayorGrigoriiP.Kotov’sintact47thArmyintheTamanPeninsula.

Thefirst tendaysofAugustwereaheadytimeforvonKleist’spanzersandRuoff’sinfantrymenbutdespite theseizureofagooddealof terrain,notonestrategicobjectivehadbeenaccomplished.FuelshortagesdeprivedvonKleist’spanzersoftheirmobilityatacriticalmoment,whilethebulkoftheGermaninfantrywastooslowtocatchBudyonny’sretreatingforces.GermanlogisticalsupportsouthoftheDonwasbadandgettingworse,whileLuftflotte4wasunable toprovideeffectiveair supportacrosssuchabroadfront.Furthermore, losses hadbeen fairly heavy– over 12,000 casualties – despite the spottySovietresistance.Inessence,therewerealreadysignsbyearlyAugustthatHeeresgruppeAcouldnotachieveitsobjectives.ItwasclearthattheSovietswerenotgoingtoletanysignificantoilresourcesfallintoGermanhandsintact.

Following on the heels of Heeresgruppe A, SS-Brigadeführer Walther Bierkamp’sEinsatzgruppe D also brought the Holocaust to the Caucasus. Bierkamp recruitedCaucasianauxiliariestoconduct‘SpecialOperations’againsttheNaziregime’senemies.The actual number of Jews in the Caucasus was estimated to be only 45,000 out of apopulation of about 7.5 million and spread across a very large area. Consequently,EinsatzgruppeDmadeextensiveuseofspeciallybuiltvanstogastheirvictims,beginninginStavropolon5August.BierkampestablishedhisheadquartersinthepicturesquecityofPyatigorsk,buthisminionsspreadoutacross theCaucasus,usingpreciousfuel tobringgenocide to each corner of the region. Nor were Jews the only victims of Bierkamp’shomicidal campaign; particularly repugnant was the murder of retarded and invalidchildreninYeiysk.

Apanzerunitfrom16.Infanterie-Division(mot.)hasestablisheditselfinavillageontheKalmykSteppe.InitiallythissectorwasfairlyquietandtheGermantroopshadtimetorestaftertherapidadvancefromtheDon,butintimeisolatedGermandetachmentsinthisareawereatgreatrisk.(Author’scollection)

CLEARINGTHEKUBAN,11AUGUST–27SEPTEMBERWhilevonKleistwaitedforfuelinordertoresumehisadvancetowardstheTerekRiverand Grozny, the bulk of German combat activity shifted towards clearing the TamanPeninsulaandtheKuban.TheOKHbelievedthatthisoperationwouldimproveGermanlogisticsintheCrimeabyallowingnavalconvoystoarrivethroughtheportsofAnapaandNovorossiysk, aswell as eliminating agoodpart of theSoviet coastal forces.AlthoughWetzelspentafewdaysmoppinguparoundKrasnodar,hehadhisfourinfantrydivisionsfairlyconcentrated.Inaddition,Lieutenant-GeneralMihailRacovita’sRomanianCavalryCorps,withits5th,6thand9thCavalrydivisions,wasbroughtuptocoverWetzel’srightflanktotheSeaofAzov.TheRomanianshadalreadychasedtheAzovFlotillaoutofitsbase at Yeisk (8 August) and were about to evict them from Primorsko-Akhtarskaya.Wetzel’s eastern flankwas loosely tied inwithKirchner’sLVIIPanzerkorps, advancingtowardsTuapse.

In contrast, the SovietMaritimeGroup in theKubanwas dispersed. Ryzhov’s 56thArmyhad retreated southof theKubanRiver andestablisheda lineardefence,butwasthinly spread. The main force in the Kuban was General-mayor Kotov’s 47th Army,consistingof the32ndGuardsRifleDivision, the77thMountainRifleDivisionand the103rd Rifle Brigade – all intact formations. Kotov’s headquarters was shifted toNovorossiyskalongwiththe77thMountainRifleDivisionand103rdRifleBrigade,butBudyonnyorderedVice-AdmiralFillippOktyabrsky’sBlackSeaFleettobeginevacuatingthe32ndGuardsRifleDivisionby seaon7August to reinforce thedefenceofTuapse.About 5,000 naval personnel were left to guard the Taman coast, while Rear-AdmiralSergeiGorshkov’sAzovFlotillaestablishedanewdefensivehedgehogintheminorportofTemryuk.

SinceearlyAugust,GeneralKurtPflugbeil’sFliegerkorps IVhadconducted regular

bombing raids against the port ofNovorossiysk, inflicting considerable damage to bothshippingandfacilities.Consequently,theBlackSeaFleetAirArm(VVS-ChF)formedtheMAG-NOR(NavalAviationGroupNovorossiyskDefensiveArea)toprovideairdefencefromthreeairfieldsaround theport.TheSovietnaval fighter regiments inflictedpainfullosses on German raiders: three Ju-88s from I./Kampfgeschwader (KG) 51 were shotdown on 8 August and five He-111s from KG 55 on 10 August. Due to this resoluteresistancebySovietnavalfighters,theLuftwaffewasunabletointerdictSovietnavallinesof communication into Novorossiysk and to the Taman Peninsula, which led to aprotractedbattlefortheKuban.

Germaninfantryfordariveratashallowpoint.Ruoff’s17.Armeewasfacedwithcrossingonewaterobstacleafteranother,manyofwhichwerenotthiseasy.(NikCornishatwww.Stavka.org.uk)

While Racovita’s Romanian cavalry cleared the coastline, Wetzel prepared for anoperation to cross theKubanRiver; his intentwas to hitRyzhov’s 56thArmy across awide front andhope to findaweak spot.Beforedawnon14August, all fourdivisionsfromWetzel’s V Armeekorps conducted regimental-size crossing operations across theKubanusingrubberboats.Sovietresistancewasunexpectedlyheavyatfirst,particularlyfrom the 5th Air Army andVVS-ChF, which repeatedly bombed the German crossingsites.OberstOttoHitzfeld,commanderofGrenadier-Regiment213andoneoftheheroesof the Crimean campaign, was badly wounded by a Soviet air raid. Attempts to buildpontoon bridges were also frustrated by Soviet air raids, but eventually 9. Infanterie-Divisionsucceededinestablishingaviablebridgeheadanda16-tonpontoonbridgewaserected by nightfall. OnceWetzel had established his bridgehead across theKuban, hebrought the entire 9. and 73. Infanterie-Division across and began pushing eastwardstowardsKrymskaya,whilehisothertwodivisionsslowlypushedthe56thArmybackintothemountains.

Kotovshiftedthe103rdRifleBrigadeandacompanyofT-26lighttanksfromMajorPeterI.Reshetin’s126thOTBtoKrymskaya,inordertoblocktheGermanadvance.The103rdRifleBrigadewas an unusually large 5,000-man formation, consistingmostly ofmilitary students, butwaswoefully short of heavyweapons.On 17August, 9. and 73.Infanterie-Division fought theirway into the townandgaineda foothold,but couldnotcompletelyejecttheSovietbrigade.However,losseswereheavy,includingtenT-26tanks.While the 103rd Rifle Brigade bought time at Krymskaya, Kotov deployed the 77th

Mountain Rifle Division to block the main Novorossiysk–Krasnodar road atVerkhnebakanskiy.ThisdivisionhadbeendestroyedintheCrimeainMayandwasstillintheprocessofrebuilding;itwasshortonbothweaponsandpersonnel.Captain1stRankGeorgii N. Kholostyakov took charge of the inner defences around Novorossiysk andassigned the newly raised 83rd Naval Infantry Brigade (NIB) to cover the north-westsectorandacompositenavalinfantrybrigadetocoverthenorth-easternapproachesnearNeberdzhayevskaya. Due to the delay in establishing a fortified defensive perimeteraroundNovorossiysktherewerefewbunkers,andthedefendershadtorelyuponhastilydug entrenchments. However, the port was well protected behind two tall ridgelines,whichgreatlyfavouredthedefence.

ARomanianmachine-gunteamintheKuban.TheRomanian3rdArmyperformedfairlywellintheCaucasusandwereoftensuperiortotherag-tagRedArmyunitsinvolvedintheearlystagesofthecampaign.Onseveraloccasions,suchasatTemryuk,theRomaniansengagedinhouse-to-housecombat.(Author’scollection)

IttookWetzel’stwoinfantrydivisionsfourdaystoclearthe103rdRifleBrigadeoutofKrymskayaandtostruggle throughtheforestedandmountainousterrainsouthof thetown.TheimportanttownsofNeberdzhayevskayaandNizhnebakanskiywerecapturedon22August,rippingaholeinNovorossiysk’souterdefensiveperimeter.Yetthesacrificeofthe103rdRifleBrigadehadboughtKotovvaluabledaystostrengthenthedefencesaroundNovorossiysk andGerman casualtiesweremounting.Wetzelwas forced to temporarilysuspendhisoffensiveon25August.Kotovimmediatelyorderedthe77thMountainRifleDivisiontomountaregimental-sizecounterattacktoretakeNeberdzhayevskaya,butthisendedupasabloodyrepulse.Soviet losseswereheavyduring thefightingon theouterperimeter,andthe126thOTBlost30outof36T-26tanks.

Meanwhile,Racovita’sRomaniancavalryhadbettersuccessalongthecoast,sincetheSovietshaddenudedthissectorinordertoreinforceNovorossiysk.TheRomanian6thand9th Cavalry divisions pushed back the Azov Flotilla’s two ill-equipped naval infantrybattalionsandclosedinontheirbaseatTemryuk.By22August,Racovita’scavalrywasjustoutsidetheportandGorshkovwasforcedtoscuttleallofhisgunboatsandorderhiscrewstomaketheirwayonfoottoNovorossiysk.TheRomaniansoccupiedTemryukon23AugustandthenturnedsouthtowardstheportofAnapainordertotrapSoviettroopsintheTamanPeninsula.

It was clear that Novorossiysk was going to be a tough nut to crack, not unlikeSevastopol, so Wetzel used the temporary lull to bring up two regiments (Infanterie-Regiment 419 and 421) from 125. Infanterie-Division, more assault guns and moreartillery.Ruoff’s17.Armeedidnothaveagreatdealofheavyartillery,buthewasabletoprovideWetzelwithabattalionof21cmMörser,onebattalionof10cmcannonsandonebattalionof15cmhowitzers.Thiswasnothing like the levelofsupportprovided tovonManstein’s 11. Armee for the assault upon Sevastopol twomonths earlier and Ruoff’sLuftwaffeairsupportevaporatedatthiscriticalmoment.BuoyedbytherapidcaptureofKrasnodar, Maikop and Pyatigorsk, Generalfeldmarschall Wolfram Freiherr vonRichthofendecidedinmid-AugustthattheCaucasuscampaignwasallbutoverandoptedto transfer the bulk of his Luftflotte 4 to support Heeresgruppe B’s advance towardsStalingrad. Between 17 and 19 August, Fliegerkorps IV began shifting the bulk of itscombatpowernorthwards,includingsixbomberGruppen.List’sHeeresgruppeAwasleftwith anaemic air support – just 30 Bf-109G fighters (III/ Jagdgeschwader 52 based atArmavir), 23Bf-110 fighter-bombers (II/Zerstörergeschwader1 atKrasnodar),20 Ju-87Stuka dive-bombers (II./Sturzkampfgeschwader 77 at Belaya Glina) and 4 He-111

bombers.With thesharp reduction inLuftwaffesupport, theSovietMAG-NORbecameveryactiveinsupportingthedefenceandWetzel’stroopscameunderfrequentenemyairattack.

SovietinfantrydefendatownintheKuban.ManyoftheadhocunitscreatedinAugustandSeptember1942wereformedfromofficerandNCOtrainingunits.(Author’scollection)

Nevertheless, German tactical communications intercepts by Nachrichten-Nahaufklärungs-Kompanie596wasable to learnagreatdealabout theSovietdefences,particularlyfromthe47thArmy’s indiscreetartillerystaff.Armedwith this intelligence,Wetzelresumedhisoffensiveon29Augustandachievedtacticalsurprisebyshiftinghisaxisofattackfromthenorth-easttothenorth-west.Thetwoinfantryregimentsfrom125.Infanterie-Division pushed back the 83rdNaval Infantry Brigade’s screen line north ofKrymskaya–Verkhnebakanskiyandbeganenvelopingtheleftflankofthe77thMountainRifleDivision.Atthesametime,9.Infanterie-Divisionattackedwithtwoofitsregimentsagainst the Composite Naval Infantry Brigade, threatening to overwhelm the easternsectorofthedefence.Wetzelalsocommittedtwoassault-gunbattalionstostrengthenhisattackunits.OnlystubbornresistancebytheSovietnavalinfantrymen,assistedbynavalgunfiresupportfromthedestroyersKharkovandSoobrazitel’nyinTsemesBay,preventeda German breakthrough. However, the German attacks had fixed most of the SovietdefendersinplaceandthecentreofKotov’slinehadbeendangerouslythinnedtosupportthethreatenedflanks.

GermanforcesadvancetowardsKrasnodar,supportedbyStuGIIIassaultguns.Ruoff’s17.Armeewasheavilydependentuponmulesandhorsestocarrysupplies,likethisonewithaspareMG42barrelandtwoboxesof7.92mmammunition.(NikCornishatwww.Stavka.org.uk)

WhileWetzel’scorpswasclosinginonNovorossiysk,theSovietholdovertherestoftheKubanwas disintegrating aswell.On31August,Racovita’s cavalry pushedback athin screen ofGorshkov’s naval infantrymen and captured the port ofAnapa.With theTamanPeninsula isolated, theAxisforceswerenowpreparedtoconductanamphibiousoperation across theKerch Strait.On the night of 1/2 September,KapitänleutnantMaxGiele’s1.Landungs-FlottillebeganOperationBlucherII,by transporting46. Infanterie-DivisionacrosstheKerchStraittooccupythenorth-westcorneroftheTamanPeninsula.By this point,Gorshkov’sAzov Flotillawas out of the fight and the Soviets could notoppose the German amphibious operation. The German Kriegsmarine employed 24Marinefährprahme (naval ferry barges,MFP) to transport the division across the straitduringhoursofdarkness, inorder toavoidSovietairattacks.Once theSoviets realisedthat the landing was in progress, they used their own remaining light naval forces toevacuate5,000isolatednavaltroopsontheTamanPeninsula.

AsthesituationdeterioratedintheKuban,Stavkadecidedon1SeptembertotransferCherevichenko’s Black Sea Group (12th, 18th, 47th and 56th armies) to Tyulenev’sTranscaucasusFront.ThisrealignmentallowedBudyonnytofocusontheinlandbattles,while Tyulenevmanaged the coastal fight. InNovorossiysk, Kholostyakovwas able toformtwoadditionalbattalionsofnavalinfantrymenfromsailorsandthreemorebattalionswerebroughtinbyseafromPoti,addingatotalof4,900troopstothedefence.However,Wetzel’s outflankingmanoeuvre with 125. Infanterie-Division was gradually encirclingthe 77thMountain Rifle Division at Verkhnebakanskiy from the north-west, while 73.Infanterie-Divisionclosedinfromtheeast.Afterthreedaysoftoughfighting,thetrappedSovietdivisionwassmashed.The73.Infanterie-Divisionthenshiftedsouthwards,crossedthelastridgelinebeforethecityandoverwhelmedthethincordonofnavalinfantrymen,including the newly formed 255thNaval InfantryBrigade.On 4 September, Infanterie-Regiment 213 captured the Vorota Pass, leading directly into the city. Kotov andKholostyakovdesperatelytriedtoshiftforcestoblocktheGermanbreakthroughandtheydid succeed in delaying 73. Infanterie-Division’s advance into the city. However, 125.Infanterie-DivisionandtheRomanian5thCavalryDivisionhadswungwidetothesouthand were now approaching the virtually undefended western side of the city. On 7

September,abattalionfromInfanterie-Regiment186wasthefirsttofightitswayintothecityandmanagedtooccupytheportarea.TheflotillaleaderKharkovledaSovietnavalconvoy carrying2,500 reinforcements from the137thNaval InfantryRegiment into theharbourbutfounditimpossibletolandtroopsintheenemy-occupieddocks.

SOVIETTHERMOPYLAE:THEPROLETARYCEMENTFACTORY,8/9SEPTEMBER1942(PP.56–57)

AftertheGerman73.Infanterie-DivisioncapturedcentralNovorossiysk,RuofforderedWetzel’sVArmeekorpstocontinuetheadvancealongthecoastroadtothreatenTuapsefromthewest.TheSoviet47thArmyhadbeenvirtuallydemolished in the fight for the city and theonly significantSoviet forceblocking the coast roadwasthree battalions of naval infantrymen, formed from survivors ofGorshkov’sAzovFlotilla and the 83rdNavalInfantryBrigade.On8/9September,theGermanInfanterie-Regiment213begantheefforttopushalongthecoastroad,supportedbyassaultgunsandheavyartillery.

The 16thNaval InfantryBattalion had occupied a strong position in the ProletaryCement Factory, on theoutskirts of the town, while the other two battalions were in the nearby Krasny Oktyabr Factory. LikeThermopylae in ancient Greece, the terrainwas narrow here due to thewater of Tsemes Bay and the nearbymountains,whichreducedtheGermannumericaladvantage.Atdawnon8September,theGermanLandserfromInfanterie-Regiment213cameonatthepointofthebayonet,butencounteredunexpectedlystrongresistanceattheCement Factory.German infantrymen fought theirway into the lower floors and engaged in hand-to-handcombat,whileSovietsailorsfireddownuponthemfromupperfloors.Afteradayofintensefighting,theSovietbattalion was nearly surrounded, but the survivors were able to slip out to continue the fight at the OktyabrFactory.Despiterepeatedattacks, theGermanVArmeekorpscouldnotachieveabreakthroughalongthecoastroadandthecostlySovietdefenceultimatelyprovedsuccessful.

Thissceneshowsthesideofthefactory(1)andtheoncomingGermaninfantry(2).SeveraloftheGermanshavealreadybecomecasualties(3),butafewoftheGermanshavereachedthelowerfloor(4)andareengagedinvicioushand-to-handcombatwiththeSovietnavalinfantrymen(5).

GermanpioneersandRomanianmountaininfantrycrossingawaterobstacleinalargerubberraft,probablyeastofNovorossiysk,September1942.AxiscooperationintheCaucasuscampaignwassomewhatbetterthaninothersectorsoftheEasternFront.(Bundesarchiv,Bild146-2004-0186;photobySteiniger)

Although two more days of mopping-up were required to secure the city,Novorossiysk had fallen. The German V Armeekorps claimed to have captured 6,500prisoners in the city, but had suffered over 4,000 casualties in two weeks of costlyfighting.Once centralNovorossiyskwas occupied, Stavka relievedKotov of commandandtransferredGrechkototakeoverthe47thArmyon8September.Verylittlewasleftofthe latter, but twobattalions of Soviet naval infantrymen and some army survivors hadestablished a strong blocking position at the Proletary Cement Factory and OktyabrFactory at the south-east outskirts of Novorossiysk. Once the city was secured, RuofforderedWetzel to advance along the coast road towards Tuapse, but when Infanterie-Regiment213attemptedtoadvanceonthemorningof11September,itencounteredheavyresistance from the Soviet naval infantrymen in the two factory complexes. Despite

repeated attempts, Wetzel’s corps could not budge the Soviet defenders and GrechkoreceivedsomereinforcementsfromtheTranscaucasusFront.Sovietcoastalbatteriesalsostill controlled Tsemes Bay, which prevented Axis shipping from using the port ofNovorossiysk for logistic purposes. Wetzel continued to pound futilely on Grechko’spositionsbutfailedtotakeanyground;hefinallyshiftedtothedefenceon27September.TheGermanconquestoftheKubanhadprovedtobeahollowtriumphandtheonlyslimcompensationwastheseizureof23operationalwellsinthesmallKrymskayaoilfield.ByJanuary1943, thesewellswereproducingbetween12and20 tonsofcrudeoilperday,althoughthissmallamountwasconsumedlocallybyAxisforcesintheKuban.

TheM193745mmanti-tankgunwasthestandardSovietdivisionalanti-tankweaponintheearlyyearsofthewarandwaseffectiveagainstGermanPzKpfwIIIandPzKpfwIVtanksatrangesupto500m.Thisweaponisdeployedonopensteppe,butinmountainousterrainthe45mmanti-tankguncouldbeverydifficulttospotbeforeitopenedfire.(NikCornishatwww.Stavka.org.uk)

COSTLYDIVERSIONTOTUAPSE,11AUGUST–23OCTOBERListhadorderedKirchner’sLVIIPanzerkorpstocontinuetheadvancetowardsNeftegorskwith the SS-Division ‘Wiking’ and Henrici’s 16. Infanterie-Division (mot.), while deAngelis’ XXXXIV Armeekorps was moving up with 97. and 101. Jäger-Division toreinforce them.Kirchner intended to conduct a pincer operation on the Soviet oilfieldslocated between Khadyzhensk and Apsheronsk, with ‘Wiking’ advancing fromBelorechenskaya in thewest andHenrici’sdivisionadvancing fromMaikop in theeast.After the oilfields were occupied, German forces would advance towards the port ofTuapse along two routes: the Belorochensk–Tuapse rail line, and the Apsheronsk–Lazarevskoye road. Initially, Soviet resistance was light; Budyonny had transferredKirichenko’s17thKubanCossackCavalryCorpstoblock‘Wiking’butarrivedtoolatetointerferewithitsopeningmoves.Cherevichenkohadthe12thArmydeployedonthemainroutetoTuapse,butithadfewinfantrymenandlittleartillery.Assistedbyinfiltratorsfromthe7.KompanieofBrandenburgers,‘Wiking’wasabletocaptureanintactbridgeoverthePshekhaRiveron11August,enablingtwobattalionsfromtheSS-Regiment‘Germania’and its Panzer-Abteilung to advance 50km in three days to overrun the oilfields atKabardinskaya. However, the captured oilfields were all burning and Soviet resistancesuddenlystiffened.Kirichenko’scavalrybeganharassing‘Wiking’’sexposedrightflank,

whichforcedSS-GruppenführerFelixSteinertodivertoneofhisregimentstoscreenthatareauntilthatmissioncouldbehandedofftotheSlovakFastDivision.Steiner’sdivisionwasveryspreadoutandheonlyhadafewbattalionscommittedtotheadvancealonganarrow axis towards Tuapse. The terrain was increasingly mountainous and heavilyforested,whichenabledtheSoviet12thArmytofocusitsdefenceatKhadyzhensk.Theeffortsmadeby‘Wiking’tobreakthroughthisSovietblockingpositionon15–16Augustfailed.

RomanianinfantryclearingoutaSovietrailstationintheKuban.TheRomaniansconductedasuccessfulandsemi-independentcampaignclearingouttheTamanPeninsula,whichenabledtheGermanstoconducttheiramphibiousoperationacrosstheKerchStrait.(NikCornishatwww.Stavka.org.uk)

Nor did Henrici’s 16. Infanterie-Division (mot.) achieve much success. South ofMaikop,hesentKampfgruppeBredesouthon12August,tryingtoapproachApsheronskand the Neftyanaya oil centre from the east. However, Brede had to approach along anarrow, heavily forested mountain road and encountered one of 12th Army’s blockingpositions. Brede attempted a hasty attack, but this was repulsed with heavy losses,including himself. Henrici was forced to bring up more troops and mount a set-pieceattack on 13 August, but gained little ground. By 15 August, de Angelis’ XXXXIVArmeekorps began to conduct a forward passage of lines through Kirchner’s LVIIPanzerkorpsandassumedthelead,whileHenrici’sdivisionwasrelievedandsentsouthtorejoin von Kleist’s spearhead. The two German light divisions – 97. and 101. Jäger-Division – now assumed the lead in the offensive towardsTuapse, butKirichenkowasbeginningtoexertrealpressureontheBelorechenskaya–Kabardinskayaroad,sobothSS-Division‘Wiking’andtheSlovakFastDivisionwereretainedtoprotectdeAngelis’rightflank; the commitment of these two mechanised divisions to a supporting role for thebetterpartofamonthwasanabsurderroronList’spart.

Generalmajor Erich Diestel’s 101. Jäger-Division was first into action and easilyoverranApsheronskon15August,thenpivotedwestwardstooutflanktheSovietblockingpositionsatKhadyzhensk.Initially,Diestel’sJägermadegoodprogress,approachingtheoutskirts of Khadyzhensk by evening of 16 August. However, the lead elements ofPolkovnikMikhailF.Tikhonov’s32ndGuardsRifleDivision– transferredby sea fromtheTamanPeninsula–begantoarriveintheareaatthesametime,whichre-energisedthe

12thArmy’sdefence.BythetimethatDiestelbegantoorganiseadeliberateassaultuponthetown,the32ndGuardsRifleDivisionwasduginaroundthetrainstationandnearbyrailway tunnel. When 101. Jäger-Division began its attack upon Khadyzhensk on 18August, supported by Stukas and corps-level 21cm Mörser fire, Tikhonov’s troopsrepulsedeveryGermanattempttoadvance.

On de Angelis’ left flank, Generalmajor Ernst Rupp’s 97. Jäger-Division began amajor attack southwards from Apsheronsk on 16 August with two regimental-sizeKampfgruppen.TheJägermovedquicklythroughtheruggedandheavilyforestedterrain,capturingSamurskayaonthefirstday.SovietresistancewasspottyandRuppallowedhisdivisiontodisperse,withindividualbattalionspushingforwardasfastaspossible.On18August, I./Jäger-Regiment 204 captured the Neftyanaya oilfield. Hauptmann FriedrichHöhne’s III./Jäger-Regiment 204 achieved a remarkable 25km advance in three daystowardstheTubyPassandoverranaSoviet15cmhowitzerbattalion.However,theSoviet12thArmy hadmerely retreated tomore defensible positions onmountain tops furthersouth and Höhne’s lone battalion boldly advanced along a narrow track into a classicambushatthe50m-wideWolf’sGatePass.Bothsidesofthenarrowpasswereflankedbysteep,woodedridgeswhichwereoccupiedbytheSoviets.Höhne’sbattalionadvancedina long column and was blasted from both sides as it entered the pass, destroying thevanguard.TheSoviets had fortifiedMountOplepek (GoraOplepen), which overlookedthe Wolf’s Gate Pass and brought the German column under heavy fire while Sovietinfantrymen manoeuvred through the hills to cut off their escape route. With greatdifficulty, Höhne extracted his bloodied battalion from the ambush at the cost ofabandoning his wounded and heavyweapons and retreated 12km back to Samurskaya.Thenextday,RupptriedanoutflankingmanoeuvrewithII./Jäger-Regiment207,butthistoofailed.

DeAngelis’ XXXXIVArmeekorps offensive towards Tuapse had been halted afteronlyfourdaysbytheincreasingSovietresistanceandruggedterrain.Diestel’s101.Jäger-Divisionbroughtupmoreartilleryandattemptedanambitiousdoubleenvelopmentofthe32ndGuardsRifleDivisionbetween28and30August; the jawsof the twoconvergingJäger-RegimentalmostclosedaroundTikhonov’sdivision,butgroundtoahaltjustshortof their objective. Tikhonov launched a counterattack that briefly surrounded II./Jäger-Regiment 228 before Diestel called off the offensive. West of Khadyzhensk, 198.Infanterie-Division had captured Goryachy Klyuch on 20 August, which offered thepossibilityofoutflankingtheSovietposition,buttheoffensivewascalledoff.Instead,17.Armeeremainedinafunkforthenextmonth,slowlypreparingforanotheroffensiveanddriftingintocommandlimboafterListwasrelievedbyHitleron10September.

WhileRuoff’sarmysatimmobile,theSovietsusedtherespitetorushreinforcementsto Cherevichenko’s Black Sea Group from the Transcaucasus. Kamkov’s 18th Armyeventually absorbed the depleted 12th Army and assumed primary responsibility fordefendingthemainavenueofapproachtoTuapse;thisarmywasrebuiltaroundsixrifleandonecavalrydivisions,andreceivedsubstantialartilleryreinforcements.On23August,the Military Council of the North Caucasus Front ordered the creation of a TuapseDefensiveRegion(TOR),underthecommandofRear-AdmiralGeorgyZhukov–whichwould be subordinate to Kamkov’s 18th Army. Ryzhov’s 56th Army, with four rifledivisions,wasordered todefendKamkov’s left flank and to tie inwithGrechko’s47th

Army.The5thAirArmyalsoreceivedanotherfighterdivisionandmoreIl-2Sturmoviks.

Ruoff’s 17. Armee was not able to resume the offensive until late September; hewantedpropermountaintroopstoconducttheoperation,butnonewereathand.SincethepromisedItalianAlpineCorpshadnotarrived,theOKHfinallycancelledtheoperationbyXXXXIXGebirgskorpsagainstSukhumiandsentpartsofbothofitsdivisions,totallingfiveinfantryandfiveartillerybattalions,asDivisionLanztoreinforce17.Armee.Ruoffalso received an infantry regiment from 46. Infanterie-Division. Altogether, Ruoffintended tohurl threeGermancorpsagainst theTuapsedefences,but thedelayallowedtheSovietstoregaintheirconfidence.Duringthelull,on6SeptemberSoviettroopsfromthe 395th Rifle Division managed to ambush and kill Generalmajor Albert Buck,commanderof198.Infanterie-Division,andwoundhisoperationsofficer.

GermantroopsarrivingintheTamanPeninsulaacrosstheKerchStraits,September1942.Originally,theentire11.ArmeewastoreinforceList’soffensiveintotheCaucasus,butonlytwodepletedGermandivisionswouldarrivefromthisquarter.(NikCornishatwww.Stavka.org.uk)

Ruoff’s offensive, dubbed Operation Attika, began on 23 September when LVIIPanzerkorpscommitted125.and198.Infanterie-Divisionagainst the56thArmy’s395thRifleDivisionsouthofGoryachyKluych.His intentwas topenetrate throughRyzhov’sweaker defences and push down the Psekups Valley to reach Shaumyan, therebyenvelopingKamkov’sleftflank.Kirchner’stwoinfantrydivisionssucceededinmakingamodest10kmbulge intoRyzhov’s frontandcapturedFanagoriyskoyeby30September,butwere then stymied by tough Soviet resistance. In the centre, deAngelis’XXXXIVArmeekorps concentrated both Jäger-Divisionen, reinforced by Infanterie-Regiment 72from 46 Infanterie-Division, against Tikhonov’s 32nd Guards Rifle Division on 25September; although they kept pounding for a week, they could not capture the maindefensivepositions.Despite support fromStukas, heavy artillery and assault guns, 101.Jäger-Divisionwas repeatedly repulsed by Tikhonov’s division. The 97. Jäger-Divisionsucceededinpushingbackthe236thRifleDivisionandcapturingMountLyssaya,butwasfoughtoutafterjustfourdaysofcombat.

ThenarrowWolf’sGatePass,whereHauptmannFriedrichHöhne’sIII./Jäger-Regiment204wasambushedon18August1942.Ascanclearlybeseen,movingabattalionincolumnthroughsuchadefileinenemy-heldterritoryviolateseveryruleofmilitarycommonsense.Thepost-warmonumentatrightmarksthefurthestpointoftheGermanadvancetowardTuapsealongthisroute.(Author’scollection)

TheremainsoftheProletaryCementFactory,locatedonthesouth-eastoutskirtsofNovorossiysk.TheGermanVArmeekorpsattackedfromwheretheelectricitypylonislocated.TsemesBayisjustvisibletotheleft.Sovietnavalinfantryturnedthisbuildingandothersnearbyintoaformidabledefensiveline.(Author’scollection)

ItwasGeneralmajorHubertLanz’sadhocdivisionofGebirgstruppen that achievedthemost success. Lanz did not launch his attack until 27 September and his battalionsadvancedacrossmountainousterrainthattheSovietsregardedasnearlyimpassible.Injustthreedays,Lanz’sGebirgsjägeradvanced10–15km,capturingMountGeimanandMountGunai. On 28 September, the remainder of 46. Infanterie-Division (two regiments)conducted a supporting attack on Lanz’s left flank and succeeded in capturing MountOplepek.HavingbrokenthroughKamkov’scentre,DivisionLanzpivotedwestwardinto

the Gunaika Valley, intent upon outflanking Tikhonov’s 32nd Guards Rifle Division.Kamkov was forced to pull some of his units back to prevent encirclement. The 46.Infanterie-Division achieved a clear-cut breakthrough south of Mount Oplepek andadvancedtoseizeKotlovinaon3October.DeAngelis’XXXXIVArmeekorpscontinuedto pound on Tikhonov’s nearly encircled division and briefly cut it off by seizingKurinskiy,buta rapidSovietcounterattackby32ndGuardsRifleDivisionreopened theroad.

By earlyOctober, theGerman advance towards Tuapsewas bogged down,movingonlyoccasionallyinfitsandstarts.Ruoffcouldonlyjabinafewsectors–helackedtheresources to mount an all-out offensive. Short of infantry, Ruoff was forced to useSicherungs-Regiment4inthefront linetocoverhisarmy’sleftflank.Kamkovreceivedreinforcementsfromthe47thand56tharmies,enablinghimtomountlocalcounterattacksbetween 7 and 13 October, which succeeded in cutting into the flank of XXXXIXGebirgskorps and recapturingMount Oplepek. The weather was beginning to turn andwouldsoonmakeoffensiveoperationsimpossible in themountains.Nevertheless,on14October Ruoff kicked off another offensive by all three corps. The 198. Infanterie-Division was able to break through the 56th Army’s defences, which finally causedTikhonov’s 32nd Guards Rifle Division to evacuate its positions at Khadyzhensk andretreattowardsTuapse.The101.Jäger-DivisionfollowedandcapturedShaumyanon17October.Ruoffwasconfidentthat17.ArmeewouldmakeittoTuapsebeforetheweatherclosed in. Then it began to rain on 18 October, turning the mountain trails intountrafficablemuck.LowcloudcoveralsointerferedwiththeabilityofI./StG77’sStukastoprovidecloseairsupport.

SovietreinforcementsarrivebyseafromPotitoreinforcethedefencesofbothNovorossiyskandTuapse.FliegerkorpsIV’slimitedresourcesintheCaucasuspreventeditfrominterdictingSovietcoastalconvoys,whichenabledTyulenev’sTranscaucasusFronttoshiftthousandsoftroopsbysea.(NikCornishatwww.Stavka.org.uk)

TheentrancetoavalleyintheCaucasus,withariverrunningthroughit.GermanforceshadgreatdifficultymovingrapidlyinthistypeofterrainsinceevensmallSovietblockingdetachmentsonthehighgroundtookagreatamountofefforttoneutralise.(NikCornishatwww.Stavka.org.uk)

OnlyDivisionLanzcontinuedtopushforwardslowly,whiletherestofRuoff’sarmystruggledmerelytoholdontowhattheyalreadypossessed.KampfgruppeLawall,withallthreebattalionsofGebirgsjäger-Regiment98,pushedonresolutelydespite therainsthatbeganon18October.Fourdayslater,theGebirgsjägerwereabletocapturethe1,016m-high Mount Semashkho, from which they could see the Black Sea in the distance.However,furiousSovietcounterattacksbythefresh408thRifleDivisionand383rdRifleDivision brought the German advance to a halt and inflicted heavy losses on DivisionLanz. Although the German effort to capture Tuapse would continue for two morepointlessmonths,Ruoff’soffensivehadpeakedby lateOctober1942and the front linesettled into a static nature. Soviet counterattacks kept picking at the exposed Germanflanksthroughoutthenexttwomonths.ThecommitmentofthreeGermancorpstocaptureaminorBlackSeaporthadprovedtobeacostlydiversioninacampaignwhichhadlittlemarginforerror.

TOTHEHIGHCAUCASUS,10AUGUST–2SEPTEMBERTheoffensiveagainstTuapsehadbeenweakenedfromthebeginningbytheOKH’slast-minute decision to send General der Gebirgstruppe Rudolf Konrad’s XXXXIXGebirgskorpsfartothesouthtoadvancedowntheso-called‘SukhumiMilitaryHighway’in order to seize several mountain passes in the High Caucasus Mountains and thencapture the port of Sukhumi. Konrad argued for using his corps in the advance uponTuapse, while von Kleist wanted to use the Gebirgsjäger to assist 1. Panzerarmee’sadvancetoGrozny,butbothwereoverruled.Asearlyas5August,Konradwasinformedthatinadditiontoseizingseveralkeypasses,hewastoorganiseanexpeditiontooccupyMount Elbrus – the highest point in the Caucasus and in Europe. The powers back inBerlin,likeDrJosephGoebbels,wantedaphotogenicpropagandatriumphwhichplanting

aNaziflagonElbruswouldserveadmirably,whileignoringtheaffectofthisextravagantdiversionontheoveralloperation.

Konrad knew that the Caucasus mountain passes would be closed by snow bySeptember,solikeagoodsoldierheforced-marchedhistwodivisions200kmsouthwardsas rapidly as possible, following in the path of von Kleist’s panzers. Amazingly, hisvanguard –Kampfgruppe Lawall from 1. Gebirgs-Division – reached Cherkessk on 11AugustandthenstormedintoMikoyan-Shakhar(Karachayevsk).The‘SukhumiMilitaryHighway’turnedouttobelittlemorethanadirtroad,whichturnedintoanevennarrowertrack as they approached the main Caucasus peaks. Meanwhile, Tyulenev’s ZKF(TranscaucasusFront)staffwerecompletelyunawarethatKonrad’stroopswerepushingthrough the mountains towards Sukhumi and did not even issue orders to defend thepassesuntil 10August.General-mayorVasiliyF.Sergatskov’s46thArmywas assignedthemission of defending theCaucasus passes, but even Soviet sources are frank aboutcondemninghis lethargiceffort tomoveunits towards them.SergatskovmerelyorderedGeneral-mayorKonstantinN.Leselidze’s3rdMountainRifleCorpstosendcompanyandbattalion-sizedetachmentsfromthe9thand20thMountainRifledivisionsandthe394thRifleDivision to observe the passes.One unit, the 1stBattalion, 815thRifleRegimentfromthe394thRifleDivisionmarchedtothetownofTeberda,whereitwassurprisedanddefeated byKampfgruppeLawall on 14August. TheGermanGebirgsjäger pushed on,with a single picked battalion known as Kampfgruppe von Hirschfeld and seized theimportantKlukhorPassontheeveningof17August.StalinwasfuriousthattheGermanshadpenetratedsodeeplyintotheCaucasusandorderedhisNKVDchiefLavrentiBeria,whohadarrivedatTyulenev’sheadquartersinTbilisi,torelieveSergatskovofcommand.Leselidze,aGeorgianofficer(StalinandBeriawerebothGeorgians)managedtosurvivethis shake-up anddemonstrated abilityby rushing a reinforced regiment to theKlukhorPasstoblockanyfurtherGermanadvancetowardsthecoast;Stalingavehimcommandofthe46thArmy.

VonKleist’spanzersadvancetowardtheTerekRiver,passingtheirfirstfoothills.Often,smallSovietunitswerebypassedinthistypeofterrainbeforeemerginglatertoattackGermansupplycolumns.(Author’scollection)

Konrad’s other division, 4. Gebirgs-Division, also initially made good progresstowardsthecoastbymarchingonaparallelroute,anditsvanguardKampfgruppeStettner(twoGebirgsjäger-Bataillone and six 7.5cmmountain guns) seized several passes. YetdespitetheapparentproximityofSukhumi–just30kmaway–Konradneverreallyhada

chance to reach that objective. It began to snow in the mountains on 18 August andcontinued for several days, reducing the German advance to a crawl. The SukhumiMilitaryHighwaypeteredoutaftertheKlukhorPassintotracklessmountains.TheOKHstaff members who thought that Konrad’s Gebirgstruppen could advance from theKlukhorPasstothesouthernsegmentoftheSukhumiMilitaryHighwaynearthecoastdidnotappreciatethatthiswouldrequireacorpstosupplyitselfalonga90kmstretchoftrailthatwasonly fit formules; thenearest railheadwasover170kmdistant. Itwasnot theSoviets that defeated Konrad, but a combination of the terrain and weather. Even ifKonradcouldsomehowhavereachedthecoast,hewouldhavehadtodefeatthebulkofthe46thArmywithahandfulofbattalionsinordertoseizeSukhumi–andthenhislinesofcommunicationsacrosstheCaucasuswouldbeseveredbysnowfortheentirewinter.Ifhis corps was caught on the wrong side of the passes once winter arrived, it wouldeventually be destroyed. Neither the Kriegsmarine nor the Luftwaffe would be able tosupplytheGebirgskorpsintheCaucasusMountainsforanentirewinter.Indeed,theentireOKHplantopushKonrad’sGebirgskorpstowardsSukhumiwasahalf-bakedconceptthatignored terrain and weather and which risked these elite troops becoming isolated andpossiblydestroyed,allforthesakeofatertiaryobjective.

AcolumnofGermanGebirgsjägeradvanceintothefoothillsoftheCaucasus.Noticethatthetracktheyarefollowingisa3m-widedirttrail,whichsnowandrainwouldrendervirtuallyimpassable.Atfirst,thiswasagreatadventurefortheGebirgsjäger,anathleticchallengeratherthanamilitarymanoeuvre,butthatimpressionwouldsoonchange.(Author’scollection)

AftertakingtheKlukhorPass,1.Gebirgs-Divisionsentahand-pickedforcetoclimbMountElbrus,whichwasaccomplishedon21August.Hitlerwasrightlyfuriouswhenheheard about this frivolous expedition,which caused further frictionwithList.Konrad’sadvancewasnowrunningupagainstseriousopposition.Leselidzequicklyshiftedhis46thArmy divisions along the coast road and received reinforcements fromTyulenev,whileKonradwasonhisown.KampfgruppeStettnerwasable tocross theBsybRiveron28August but was blocked by the 354th Rifle Division near the Achavkar Pass, whileKampfgruppe Lawall was blocked by the 304th Rifle Division. Konrad’s supply lineswere a mess, requiring four days or more for mule convoys to reach KampfgruppeStettner.BylateAugust, itwasclear that theplantoseizeSukhumihadfailedandList,Ruoff and Konrad met in Krasnodar to discuss options. It was decided that the

GebirgstruppecouldbebetteremployedinsupportingRuoff’soffensivetowardsTuapse,ratherthanfreezingtodeathintheHighCaucasus.TheSukhumifrontwouldbecomeaneconomyofforceeffort,wheretheGermansleftonlyenoughtroopstopreventTyulenev’sforces from threatening von Kleist’s lines of communications. Gruppe von Le Suire,consistingoffivebattalions,waslefttoguardthepasses.Consequently,KonradpulledtherestofhiscorpsbacktoreducehissupplyproblemsandtransferredtheremainingunitstoDivisionLanz,whichwassentnorthtojoininthesecondoffensiveagainstTuapse.

TheGermanGebirgs-DivisionenadvancedveryquicklytowardSukhumiinAugust1942andseizedseveralkeymountainpassesbeforetheSovietscouldreact.EachGebirgs-Bataillonhadabout250packanimals.(NikCornishatwww.Stavka.org.uk)

ByOctober1942,thefrontlineinthemountainswasstaticandGermansupplylineswerestrained.Here,Germanpioneershaveriggedacable-carsystemtotransfermortarandhowitzerammunitionuptohighpeaks.(Bundesarchiv,Bild183-B22462;photobyKintscher)

SovietscoutsadvancinginthehighCaucasusMountains.TheRedArmyhadverylittlemountaininfantrybutwasforcedtocreateanumberofunitsthatcouldchallengetheGebirgsjägerinthemountains.TheSoviettroopshadtheadvantageoflocalknowledge,butlackedthetrainingoftheGebirgsjäger.(Author’scollection)

GermanwoundedfromtheGebirgskorpsbeingtransportedtotherearinaPanjewagon.Itcouldtakedaysforacasualtyinthehighmountainstoreachanaidstationinthebestofconditions;oncewinterweatherarrived,casualtyevacuationwasevenmoredifficult.(NikCornishatwww.Stavka.org.uk)

STYMIEDONTHETEREKRIVER,12AUGUST–3OCTOBERVonKleisthadanarrowwindowofopportunitytoreachGrozny,butheonlyhad3.and23.Panzer-Division fromvonSchweppenburg’sXXXXPanzerkorps inposition topusheastwards.Both divisionswere extremely short of fuel andwere scattered over a largearea.SovietunitsthathadbeenbypassedduringthepursuitphasewerenowappearingtoattackvonSchweppenburg’slinesofcommunications,forcinghimtodevotecombatunitsto mop up his rear areas. Consequently, it was not until 13 August that vonSchweppenburg could begin advancing east from Pyatigorsk and then only with smallcombat forces. Breith’s 3. Panzer-Division committed Kampfgruppe Pape

(II./Panzergrenadier-Regiment394reinforcedwithartilleryandengineers)andMack’s23.Panzer-Division contributed Kampfgruppe Bachmann (I., II/Panzergrenadier-Regiment128). BothKampfgruppen advanced south-east about 20km to theMalka River, wherethey began to encounter unexpected difficulties. The Malka consisted of three smalltributaries,eachlessthan10mwide,but togetherforminga60m-wideobstaclethatwascoveredbyenemyfire.Kozlov’s37thArmywasnolongerrunning–itwasestablishingdefensivepositionsbehindwaterobstaclesandonroughterrain.

Getting across theMalka consumed thebetter part of a day andonceKampfgruppeBachmann advanced southwards, it encountered an evenmore formidable obstacle: the80m-wideBaksanRiver.Kozlov’stroopshaddestroyedallthebridgesacrosstheriverandanupriverdam,whichincreasedthecurrent.Furthermore,Kozlovhaddeployedthe2ndGuardsRifleDivision, and the275th and392ndRifle divisions along the lengthof theBaksan, supported by two artillery regiments with 122mm and 152mm howitzers.Although all theSoviet unitswere depleted, they greatly outnumbered the twoGermanKampfgruppen. Furthermore, Vershinin’s 4th Air Army was also out in force, sinceFliegerkorpsIVwastoodispersedtomaintainaircoverovermultiplesectors.Mostofthetime,XXXXPanzerkorps received little or no fighter cover.Kozlov’s artillery poundedthe German spearheads as they approached the Baksan, while Pe-2 andA-20 bombersstruckthecolumns.Germanpersonnelandequipmentlossesweresignificant,whiletheyhadnorealmeanstostrikeKozlov’sforcesontheotherside.VonSchweppenburgwantedbothKampfgruppentocrosstheBaksanRiverandadvancetoseizeNalchik,butaftertwocostlyattempts toget across the river,hechangedhismindon19August. Instead,vonKleistandvonSchweppenburgdecidedtopivotdueeasttowardsProkhladnyyandcrossthe Terek River, along with Mackensen’s III Panzerkorps, which was en route. TheRomanian 2nd Mountain Division was brought up and assigned to screen the BaksanRiver,topreventKozlov’s37thArmyfromcausinganymischiefagainstvonKleist’sleftflank.

AGermanbasecampestablishedintheCaucasusMountains.Allwoodforconstructionpurposeshadtobelabouriouslybroughtupbymuletrains.Notethecampisbuiltonareverseslope,toprotectitfromSovietartilleryfire.OncetheGebirgskorpsabandonedtheoffensivetowardSukhumi,theGermanscreatedachainoffortifiedcampssuchastheseonkeyterraintocontrolthemountainpasses.(NikCornishatwww.Stavka.org.uk)

SupplyproblemsandrearareadifficultiesfurthercomplicatedvonSchweppenburg’s

abilitytomountanoffensiveeastwardanditwasnotuntil23Augustthathewasreadytoproceed.Thistime,hearrangedforsupportfromMajorGordonGollob’sJagdgeschwader52fighterstocovertheadvanceandhehadalarger,bettersuppliedforce.However,theSovietshadusedtherespitetorushsixairbornebrigadesfromtheStavkareservestothe9thArmy,whichwaserectingdefencesalongtheTerekRiver;thesefreshbrigadeswereformedintothe10thand11thGuardsRiflecorps.

TheGermansformedVorausabteilungenfromlightmotorisedelementstopushonaheadofthemainbody.Here,aKruppProtzefromthedivisionalreconnaissanceunittowsa2cmflakgunintoatown.AlthoughtheGermanadvanceguardswereoftenquitesmallandvulnerabletoambushes,theretreatingRedArmyrarelyturnedtofightintheearlystagesofthecampaign.(NikCornishatwww.Stavka.org.uk)

Onthemorningof23August,XXXXPanzerkorpsresumeditsoffensive.Breith’s3.Panzer-Divisioncrossed the2m-wideLeninCanalatRusskoyethenswungsouthacrossflatterrain,reachingtheoutskirtsofMozdokbylateafternoon.MajorGollob’sBf-109GsprovidedaircoverovertheKampfgruppen,downingat least19aircraft inthefirst threedays. However, the Soviets had rushed elements of General-mayor Konstantin A.Koroteev’s11thGuardsRifleCorps toMozdokandemplacedminesandanti-tankgunsaround the town. When Breith’s panzers approached Mozdok, they were aggressivelyengagedbytwoSovietarmouredtrains,bothofwhichwereknockedout.Breithdecidednot to try and storm into an obviously well-defended townwith just his vanguard andinsteadoptedtoslowlyclearthetownoverthenexttwodays.Koroteev’sparatroopersputup strong resistance, butMozdokwas in German hands by the evening of 25 August.MajorGollobimmediatelyflewintoMozdok’scapturedairfieldwithIII./Jagdgeschwader52 to provide fighter cover over the area.Meanwhile,Mack’s 23. Panzer-Division hadclosedinonProkhladnyy.Sovietresistanceinthissectorwasstiff,aswell.KampfgruppeBurmeister finally fought its way into Prokhladnyy on the morning of 26 August andcaptured the town and 300 prisoners. However,Mack did not live to see this success;whileobserving the front,heandabattalioncommanderwerekilledbySoviet artilleryfire.Norwas23.Panzer-DivisionabletoseizethenearbyrailwaybridgeovertheTerekRiver,whichwasdestroyedandtheoppositebankheldbythe151stRifleDivision.Bytheendof26August,vonSchweppenburghadreachedtheTerekatseveralpoints,butitwasapparent thatSoviet resistancewas increasingand theprospects fora rivercrossingdidnotlookpromising.Aboveall,heneededmoreinfantryandfueltocontinuehisadvance,butbothwereinshortsupply.

Panzersfrom23.Panzer-DivisionreachtheTerekRiveron25Augustafteranadvanceofover550km.Fewerthan150kmnowseparatedthemfromtheirobjectiveoftheGroznyoilfields.However,fuelshortagesimmobilisedmuchofvonKleist’spanzersatthecriticalmomentinthecampaign.(Author’scollection)

Note:Germanunitsareshownintheirpositionson12August1942.

1.4August:theAstrakhan–Kizlyarraillineiscompleted.

2.12August:ElistaiscapturedbytheVorausabteilungfrom111.Infanterie-Division.

3.14August:KampfgruppeLawallfrom1.Gebirgs-DivisioncapturesTeberda.

4.14August:34thGuardsRifleDivisionisdeployedtodefendAstrakhan.

5.15–17August:23.Panzer-DivisioncapturesGeorgiyevsk,buteffortstocrosstheBaksanRiverfail.

6.17August:KampfgruppevonHirschfeldfrom1.Gebirgs-DivisioncapturestheKlukhorPass.

7.20August:theRomanian2ndMountainDivisionarrivestoscreenXXXXPanzerkorps’leftflankontheBaksanRiver.

8.21August:troopsfrom1.Gebirgs-DivisionscaleMountElbrus.

9.25August:3.Panzer-DivisioncapturesMozdok.

10.26August:GeneralmajorMack,commanderof23.Panzer-Division,iskilledduringtheattackonProkhladnyy.

11.28August–2September:KampfgruppeLarochefrom16.Infanterie-Division(mot.)arrivesinElistaandpusheseasttoKhulkhuta.

12.29August:KampfgruppeStettnerfrom4.Gebirgs-DivisioncrossestheBsybRiverbutcanadvancenofurther.

13.30August:3.Panzer-DivisionestablishesalimitedbridgeheadacrosstheTerekatIsherskaya.

14.31August:KampfgruppeBodenhausenadvancestoChervlennaya.

15.August:theSoviet9thand44tharmiesreceivereinforcementstocreatethe10thand11thGuardsRifleCorps.The58thArmyisformedinMakhachkala.

16.2September:111.Infanterie-DivisionestablishesalargerbridgeheadacrosstheTereknearMozdok.

17.6–11September:LIIArmeekorpsslowlyexpandstheMozdokbridgehead,opposedbythe11thGuardsCorps.

18.12September–3October:13.Panzer-DivisioncrossesintotheTerekbridgeheadandslowlyclearstheDonbend.SS-Division‘Wiking’arrivestoreinforceit.

19.13–14September:Kradschützen-Bataillon165conductslongrangepatrolstowardsAstrakhan.

GermaninfantryadvanceintothecornfieldsoftheCaucasus,withmountainsinthebackground.Thistypeofadvancewasnerve-wrackingforthetroops,sinceclosecombatcouldoccuratanytime.Itwasalsodifficulttodetectminesinsuchterrain.

(Author’scollection)

While vonKleist’s 1. Panzerarmeewas advancing eastwardswith just twoPanzer-Divisionen,GeneralderInfanterieEugenOtt’sLIIArmeekorpshadadvancedwithhistwoinfantry divisions fromSalsk east towards theKalmyk Steppe. The deployment of twoinfantrydivisions in sucha flat, arid regionwhileLVIIPanzerkorps attempted tomovethroughmountainousterraintoTuapsedemonstratesthescaleofmisjudgementsmadebyListinthecriticalstagesofthecampaign.Ott’sinfantrydivisions,heavilydependentuponhorse-drawn transport, could not advance en masse into this desert-like region, but hedirectedeachofhisdivisions to formamotorisedVorausabteilung fromreconnaissanceand support units. By 12 August, the Vorausabteilung from 111. Infanterie-DivisioncapturedElista,whileotherunitsclearedthenorthandsouthsidesoftheManychRiver.Ott was also tasked with maintaining tenuous communications with Heeresgruppe B’sforcestothenorth.However,vonKleistrecognisedthatOtt’scorpswasclearlyunsuitedfor this role and demanded the release of motorised units from the Tuapse sector toassumethismission.Listdidnotagreetorelease16.Infanterie-Division(mot.)fromtheTuapsesectoruntil15Augustand it took tendays for itsadvanceelements toarrive inElista.At that point,Ott’s LIIArmeekorpswas ordered south to reinforce vonKleist’soffensiveontheTerek,butitwouldnotarriveuntiltheendofAugust.

StavkarushedsixairbornebrigadestotheCaucasusbysea,railandTB-3bombers,shownhere.TheseexperiencedtroopswereusedtoformtwonewGuardsRiflecorpsthatslowedGermaneffortstocrosstheTerekRiver.(Author’scollection)

An impatient vonSchweppenburg tried toget across theTerekbeforeOtt’s infantryarrived.Breith’s3.Panzer-DivisionmanagedtogettwodismountedbattalionsacrosstheTerek30kmeastofMozdokatIsherskayaon30August,butthesiteprovedunsuitableforapontoonbridgeandSovietcounterattacksmadeitimpossibletoexpandthetoehold.Thenextday,vonSchweppenburg sentKampfgruppeBodenhausen inaprobeas fareast asChervlennaya andbriefly interferedwithSoviet rail traffic fromBaku,beforebeating ahasty retreat from the 10thGuardsRifleCorps.Ott’s infantrywere not in place until 2September, when 111. Infanterie-Division conducted a successful company-size assaultcrossing near Mozdok, which was rapidly expanded into a two-battalion bridgehead.Koroteev’s11thGuardsRifleCorpsfoughtbitterly tocontain thebridgeheadbutduringthenightof2/3September,twopanzercompaniesfrom23.Panzer-Divisionwereferried

acrosstheTerektoreinforce.At0500hourson4September,theGermansbeganattackingout of the bridgeheadwith III./Infanterie-Regiment 117 and two companies of panzers.After advancing a fewkilometres, theGermans ran into tough resistance from the 11thGuardsRifleCorps,supportedbytwoartillerybattalionsandseveralanti-tankunits.Intheafternoon, the Soviets counterattackedwith the 62ndNaval Rifle Brigade and 25 T-34tanks from the 249thOTB; the Soviet tacticswere crude and sevenT-34s lost, but theGermanattackwashalted.

Bothsidesnowengagedinarace towin theBattleof theMozdokbridgehead,withvonKleist pushingmore forces across the Terekwhile the Soviet 9th and 44th armieswerefurtherreinforced.By6September,theGermanshadpushedtwocompletePanzer-Abteilungenacrosstheriverandanartillerybattaliontoreinforce111.Infanterie-Division.OberstOttoHerfurth(aRitterkreuzholder,whowasexecutedforhisroleinthe20July1944plottokillHitler)organisedaKampfgruppewithtwobattalionsfromhisInfanterie-Regiment 117 riding on the twoPanzer-Abteilungen, to attackwestwards toKizlyar toexpand the bridgehead and catch the Soviets by surprise. However, the Soviets hadcapturedaGermansoldierwhorevealedthisplanandthe9thArmyadjusteditsdefences.WhenKampfgruppeHerfurthattackedat0400hourson6September,itwasimmediatelystruck by Soviet multiple rocket-launcher barrages and the panzers ran into the 47thGuards Anti-Tank Battalion. Additionally, the 4th Air Army mounted 420 sorties,including low-level strafing runs. Herfurth’s assault was broken up with heavy losses.Vershinin’saircraftthenwentafterthecrossingsite,sinkingsevenferries.Laterthatnight,aU-2biplanefromthe599thNightBomberAviationRegiment,flownbya20-year-oldfemale pilot named Marina P. Chechneva, scored a direct hit on the German pontoonbridgewith50kgbombs.Although theGermanssoonrepaired theirpontoonbridgeandmanaged to carve out a larger area around the bridgehead, continuous Sovietcounterattacksprevented theGermansfrommakinganyrealheadway.For thefirst timesincethebeginningofthecampaign,theSovietsbegantocommitsubstantialamountsofarmour,upto60tanksinoneattackagainstthebridgehead.

Soviettroopsrushtosetupamachine-gunpositioninavillage.SovietresistanceincreasedgreatlyinSeptember1942,bothatStalingradandintheCaucasus.VonKleist’stroopswerenolongeradvancingacrosssteppecountry,butfightinginfoothillsthatfavouredthedefender.(CourtesyoftheCentralMuseumoftheArmedForces,MoscowviaStavka)

GermantroopspreparingtocrosstheTerekRiverinalargeraft,whichcouldholdasquad.GermanpioneershadgreatdifficultybridgingtheTerekduetoitsfastcurrentandconstantSovietbombardment.AmotorisedSturmbootisreturningfromthefarshore.(NikCornishatwww.Stavka.org.uk)

StalintookapersonalinterestintheCaucasuscampaign,whichthreatenedhisnativeGeorgia,buthewasnotentirelyconfidentintheabilityofBudyonnyorTyulenevtodirectapropercampaign.OnBeria’s suggestion,General-leytenant IvanA.Maslennikov–anNKVDofficer–wassenton8SeptembertocommandtheNorthernGroupontheTerekRiver.Maslennikovwasnotabadchoiceforadefensiveoperationsincehecouldenforcediscipline andmotivate subordinateswith threats of sending them to theGulag, but hisabilitytocoordinatefourarmieswasnegligible.

Eventhoughthebridgeheadbattlewasnotgoingwell,vonKleistdecidedtocommittheentire13.Panzer-DivisionacrosstheTerektoaffectabreakout.Thiswasaveryriskydecision, since1.Panzerarmeeonlyhad small detachments screening its flanks and the10th Guards Rifle Corps was getting increasingly aggressive. Nevertheless, Herr’s 13.Panzer-DivisioncrossedtheTerekandbeganattackingwestwardstowardsthebendintheTerek on 12 September. Massing up to four Panzer-Abteilungen along one axis, theGermansslowlybegan tochewtheirway through the9thArmy’sdefences.Assistedby370.Infanterie-Division,Herr’spanzersslowlybenttheleftflankofthe11thGuardsRifleCorpsback,pushingtowardsTerekandElkhotovo.Ittookthreeweeksofcostlyfightingtoaccomplishthisobjectiveandby3October,theGermanoffensivewasspent.VonKleisthadcarvedoutalargerbridgeheadacrosstheTerek,butKoroteev–nowincommandofthe9thArmy–hadsealeditoffwithaverysolidfront.

OnceacrosstheTerek,13.Panzer-DivisionslashedsouthwardstoexpandtheMozdokbridgehead.Here,aPzKpfwIIItankadvancescautiously,withPanzergrenadiers,whileundermortarfirefromSoviettroopsontheridgelineinthedistance.(Author’scollection)

ASSAULTCROSSINGOFTHETEREKRIVER,0500HOURS,2SEPTEMBER1942(PP.76–77)

InordertogettotheGroznyoilfields,1.PanzerarmeeneededtocrosstheTerekRiver,buttimewasrunningout.Stavka had rushed several airborne brigades to reinforce the Soviet 9thArmy’s defences on the Terek River,whichmadeacrossingproblematic.On30August,3.Panzer-DivisionsucceededingettingtwoPanzergrenadierbattalionsacrosstheTerekatIsherskaya,30kmeastofMozdok,butthesitewasunsuitableforabridge.OncetheGermanLIIArmeekorpsreachedtheTerek,111.Infanterie-Divisionwasorderedtoprepareaset-piececrossingoperationnearMozdokfor2September.Atthispoint,theTerekRiverwaslessthan200mwide,butthecurrentwasverystrongandtheSovietswerealertinthissector.

HauptmannKonradLyhme’sIII./Infanterie-Regiment50wasselectedforthedangerousmissionandthefirstwavewouldconsistofonlythe11.Kompanie,in16rubberrafts.Inordertogainsurprise,thecrossingwouldbemadewithoutanartillerypreparation.TheGermaninfantrybegancrossingat0200hoursbutweresoondetectedbyoutposts from the8thGuardsRifleBrigade,whichopened firewithmachinegunsandmortars.Some raftsweredestroyed,but11.Kompaniesucceededingettingacrossandbeganestablishingabeachhead.SubsequentwavesbroughtHauptmannLyhmeand the restofhis III./IR50across, then the I./IR50.TheSoviet8thRifleBrigademountedaspiritedcounterattackbutcouldnoteliminatetheGermanbridgehead.

Here, one of the subsequent waves carrying Hauptmann Lyhme (1) – still under heavy fire – is depictedcrossing early in themorning.Germanwounded (2)arewaiting at the river’s edge, to be brought back on thereturn trip.Theestablishmentof thebridgeheadatMozdokby IR50enabledGermanengineers toconstructapontoonbridge,whichthenallowedvonKleisttobeginsendinghispanzersacrosstheTerekRiver.However,thewindowofopportunitywasclosingrapidlyforvonKleist’sarmyandincreasedSovietresistancewaswreckingthetightGermanoperationalschedule.

SovietIl-2SturmoviksovertheCaucasus.Vershinin’s4thAirArmymountedconstantlow-levelraidsagainstGermanforcesalongtheTerek.(Author’scollection)

It was during the Battle for the Mozdok Bridgehead that Hitler realised that theCaucasuscampaignwasnotgoingaccording toplanand thatGeneralfeldmarschallListwas part of the problem. Hitler accused List of not following orders and not properlydeploying his troops – both of which had some truth. List had misused both LIIArmeekorpsandLVIIPanzerkorpsinthewrongtypeofterrainandhisovercommitmentofresourcestotheTuapseoperationreducedtheresourceslefttovonKleisttopushontoGrozny.HitlerhadgoodreasontobedissatisfiedwithList’sperformanceintheCaucasus– it was sub-par – but ignored the fact that he had not provided the resources he hadpromised to makeEdelweiss feasible. Consequently, on 9 September Hitler decided torelieveListofcommandandGeneralfeldmarschallWilhelmKeitelflewtoHeeresgruppeAthenextdaytoinformhim.Amazingly,Hitlerannouncedthathewouldtake‘personalcommand’ofHeeresgruppeAfromBerlin;inrealityvonKleistwastacitlyallowedtoactas army group commander, although Hitler would not make this official until 23November.Thenetresultofthisactionwastocomplicateoperationaldecision-makinginHeeresgruppeA,withHitlerincreasinglyinterveningintacticalmatters.

GermaninfantryhugtheearthasSovietartilleryimpactsnearthem.EffortstostormSovietpositionsusuallyresultedinheavycasualties,whichvonKleistcouldnotafford.(NikCornishatwww.Stavka.org.uk)

AnentrenchedSovietdefensivepositionunderartilleryfire.Bymid-September1942,thedefencesaroundTuapseandtheTerekhadhardenedtothepointthattheGermanscouldonlymakelimitedgains.(Author’scollection)

InOctober,theSS-Division‘Wiking‘beganpushingeastwardtowardSagopshiandMalgobek,butencounteredverystiffresistanceandsufferedheavycasualties.Here,anassaultgroupofSSPanzergrenadiersisabouttolaunchanattackfromdeadspace.(Author’scollection)

In lateSeptember, theSS-Division ‘Wiking’was finally transferred fromtheTuapsesector and vonKleist sent it across the Terekwith the intent of using it to attack easttowardsMalgobek.At 0500 hours on 26 September, ‘Wiking’ attacked eastwards fromNizhniy Kurp, with the SS-Regiment ‘Nordland’ in the first echelon and SS-Regiment‘Westland’inthesecondechelon,supportedbySS-Panzer-Abteilung5.TheobjectivewasthetownsofMalgobekandSagopshi,17kmtotheeast.Assoonastheattackbegan,theSS infantrymencameunder intenseartilleryandautomaticweapons firewhich inflictedheavylossesandpinnedtwooutofthreebattalions.Bytheendofthefirstday,‘Wiking’hadmanagedtoadvance6–10km,buthadnotreacheditsobjectives.Theattackcontinuedthenextdayandthenext.On28September,‘Wiking’reachedtheoutskirtsofSagopshibut theSovietscommitted two tankbrigades,which resulted ina large-scale tankbattleoutside the town. Most of the tank combat occurred at ranges of just 200 to 400m.‘Wiking’claimedtohaveknockedout11Soviet tanksintheaction,butadmittedlosingabout a dozen of their own.Despite heavy losses, the ‘Wiking’ continued to attack for

another week, until it finally securedMalgobek on 6 October. After that, the divisionshiftedtothedefenceandKoroteev’s9thArmybeganlaunchingregularcounterattacks.

IncreasinglyaggressiveSoviettroopscounterattackedvonKleist’sarmycontinually,whichsappedthefightingenergyofhisfront-linedivisionsalongtheTerekandbroughttheGermanadvancetoahalt.Thisunit,plentifullyequippedwithautomaticweapons,appearstobefromoneoftheGuardsRiflebrigades.(Author’scollection)

AGermanSdKfz10/4half-trackwith2cmflakgunintheCaucasus,alertforlow-flyingSovietaircraft.13.Panzer-Divisionhadeightsingle-barrelled2cmmobileflakgunsandtwoquad2cmflakguns,whichwasinsufficienttocoverthedivision’scombatelementswhentheyweredispersedoverawidearea.(Author’scollection)

ASovietinfantryunitpicksitswayalongastreambed,probablyearlyNovember1942.ThesoldierintheleadhasaPTRDanti-tankrifle,whichwasbestusedasananti-materialweapon.(Author’scollection)

ThesupplyofLendLeasetanksthroughthePersianCorridorwascriticaltorevitalisingSovietarmouredstrengthintheCaucasus,sincemostSoviettankproductionwasgoingtotheStalingradFront.Here,twoAmerican-builtM3Leemediumtanksarebeingusedfordrivertrainingpriortobeingsenttothefront.(FromthefondsoftheRGAKFDinKrasnogorskviaStavka)

WhiletheBattleoftheMozdokBridgeheadwastranspiring,Henrici’s16.Infanterie-Division(mot.)pushedsmalldetachmentsforwardacross theKalmykSteppe.However,water was too scarce in the region to support a full division and Henrici could onlycommit a reinforced regiment into the actual steppe. Since his mission was to screenHeeresgruppeA’snorthernflankandtieinwithHeeresgruppeB,hewasforcedtodeployindividualcompaniesinisolatedpositions.Ananti-tankstrongpointwasestablishedatthevillage of Khulkhuta, 120km west of Astrakhan. The Soviet 28th Army held theapproachestothecitywiththe34thGuardsRifleDivisionandmountedraidsagainsttheGerman outposts. Between 13 and 14 September, four armoured cars from theKradschützen-Bataillon165conductedalong-rangepatrolwhichreachedthetrainstationat Zenzeli and briefly interfered with rail traffic on the Astrakhan–Kizlyar line, thenretreated.Henricididnotknowit,butbetweenAugustandOctober1942some16,000railcarscarryingfuelmovednorthalongthislinefromBaku–atotalofabout150,000tonsofcrude oil. For the next few months, Henrici conducted his screening operation in theKalmykSteppe,occasionallysparringwiththe28thArmy.

ByearlyOctober, itwasobvious thatvonKleist’soffensivehadstalledand thathisarmywouldnotgettoGroznyanytimesoon.StavkaalsorealisedthatthedefencesontheTerekweresufficienttokeeptheGermansoutofGroznyandsentitsremainingreservestotheStalingradFront.HitlerorderedtheLuftwaffetosettheoilfieldsinGroznyablazeandFliegerkorpsIVmountedtwolarge-scaleraidson10and12October;althoughtheseinflictedseriousdamage,theeffortwassuspended.

LASTGASPONTHETEREK,25OCTOBER–12NOVEMBERWhile Maslennikov was preoccupied with the Battle for the Mozdok Bridgehead, 23.Panzer-Division quietly began pushing back the right flank of General-mayor Petr M.Kozlov’s 37thArmy from the area south of Prokhladnyy.The townofKotlyarevskaya,locatedbetween theTerekandCherek rivers,wascapturedon24Septemberanda few

dayslaterPanzergrenadierswereabletoestablishabridgeheadacrosstheeasternendoftheBaksanRiver.Kozlovdidnotseemundulyalarmedandsimplyadjustedhislines,nordid he receive reinforcements since priority was afforded to Koroteev’s 9th Army.However,vonKleist’sstaffnoticedthat37thArmy’sdefenceshadbeencompromisedandGerman signals intelligence was able to extract further useful information due to poorcommunicationsprocedures,includingtheexactlocationofKozlov’scommandpost.

The campaign appeared all but over after the failure to break out of the MozdokbridgeheadandvonKleistalreadyissuedorderstohisunitstopreparewinterquartersontheTerekfront.However, long-awaitedreplacementsbegantoarrivefor1.PanzerarmeeandvonKleistrealisedthathemighthaveonelastchancetoseizeanimportantobjective,likethecityofOrdzhonikidze,ifnotGrozny.Theformercityof127,000inhabitantswasthe terminus for the Georgian Military Highway, along which a steady stream ofreinforcementswasarrivingfromtheTranscaucasusFront;ifoccupied,thiscouldreduceBudyonny’s ability tomount awinter counteroffensive.VonKleist decided tomount adeliberateoffensiveagainstthevulnerable37thArmy,withtheintentofbypassingthe9thArmy’s thick defences and swinging round to take Ordzhonikidze. He assigned themission toMackensen’s III Panzerkorps,whichwas given 13. and 23. Panzer-Divisionand theRomanian2ndMountainDivision.Herr’s 13.Panzer-Divisiononlymoved intothe assembly area atKotlyarevskaya the night before the offensive began; thiswas notnoticedbySovietintelligence.

TheoffensivebeganwithamassiveLuftwaffebomberattackonKozlov’scommandpost,whichknockedouthiscommunications.Shortlyafterwards,theRomanianmountaintroops began crossing the Baksan with four battalions and gained a lodgement. ThisfixatedKozlov’sattentiontothenorth,whentherealthreatwastotheeast.At0530hours

on 26 October, von Mackensen’s two Panzer-Divisionen attacked, supported byNebelwerfer fire and strong air support. Opposing them was the Soviet 257th RifleDivision, which was sitting behind thick minefields covered by artillery and anti-tankguns.However,theterrainwasgrassysteppewithlittlecoverandtheweatherwasclear.SomeGermanpanzerswereknockedouton theminesandotherswere lost toanti-tankfire,buttheuncoordinatedSovietdefencewasquicklyoverwhelmedandwithinhoursvonMackensen’s panzers were fanning out in true Blitzkrieg fashion. Herr’s 13. Panzer-Division boldly enveloped Nalchik from the south-east, aiming to link up with theRomanians,while 23. Panzer-Division – now underGeneralleutnantHans Freiherr vonBoineburg-Lengsfeld–slashedsouthwardstoArgudan.BeforethedumbfoundedKozlovcouldreact,thebulkoftwomoreofhisdivisionswereencircledeastofNalchikandthecityfellon28October,alongwithover7,000prisoners.

DuetothethreatofSovietarmourandcavalryenveloping1.Panzerarmee’sleftflankintheNogaiSteppe,vonKleistdeployed8.8cmflakgunsfromtheLuftwaffe’s17.Flak-Divisionintheanti-tankroletosupportKorpsFelmyandotherscreeningunits.

Kampfgruppe Brückner from 23. Panzer-Division led the advance south to seize acrossingover theUrukhRiver atKhaznidon;Soviet resistance therewas stiff and threeGermantanksweredestroyedintheeffort.Yetby30October,Mackensen’soffensivehadsentthe37thArmyreelingbackintothemountainsandthewayappearedopenforastriketowards Ordzhonikidze. After repositioning 13. Panzer-Division – and leaving theRomanianstoguardtheiropenflank–MackensenattackedeastwardsfromtheUrukhon31October.TheSovietshadmanagedtorushthe10thRifleCorpstotheUrukh,supportedbythe52ndTankBrigade,buttheyhadyettoorganiseacoherentdefence.Underawarm,sunnysky, theGermanmechanisedunitsassaulted through them,withPanzergrenadiersremainingmountedintheirSPWs.EnemypositionswerebypassedandaSovietarmouredambush west of Ardon failed to stop 13. Panzer-Division. To the south, 23. Panzer-DivisionfoughtitswayintoAlagiron1November,blockingtheOssetianHighway.

Boldly, Herr’s 13. Panzer-Division pushed towards Ordzhonikidze, but Sovietresistanceincreasedgreatlyastheyapproachedthecity.Koroteev’s9thArmywasrushingreinforcementstobolsterthedecimated37thArmy,includingtwotankbrigadesandpartof the 10th Guards Rifle Corps. An effort by the Luftwaffe to interdict the Sovietreinforcementsintothecitywithalargebomberraidon2Novemberresultedinthedeath

ofGeneral-leytenantPavelI.Boldin,theTranscaucasusFront’schiefofstaff,andNKVDCommissarAlekseiN.Sadzhaia.BythetimethatMackensenbegantoattacktheoutskirtsof the city on 3 November, the defenders outnumbered his forces. Herr’s 13. Panzer-Divisiongottheclosest,butsoonfounditselfsurroundedonthreesidesandunderintenseartillery fire while trying to overcome minefields. Even worse, heavy rains began,deprivingMackensenofairsupportandslowinghissupplycolumns.Withoutairsupportandrunningshortoffuelandammunition,theoffensiveboggeddown.

On6November,theSovietscounterattackedinforce,mountingapincerattackfromnorthandsouth thatencircledHerr’s13.Panzer-Division.Mostof thedivision’ssupplytroopswereeliminatedonthefirstday,butthecombatelementsformedahedgehog.The23. Panzer-Division, having suffered debilitating casualties, could not break through toHerr’strappeddivision,whichwaspoundedmercilesslyforthenextfivedays.VonKleisthurriedly transferred Kampfgruppe Illig from SS-Division ‘Wiking’ to rescue Herr’sdivision,butitdidnotarriveuntil10November.Onthenightof11/12November,Herr’sdivisionconductedasuccessfulbreakouttolinkupwithKampfgruppeIllig,atthecostofabandoningmuch of its equipment. The 13. Panzer-Division had been crippled, losingover80tanksand1,088trucks.Afterthisdisaster,vonKleistterminatedtheoffensiveandorderedMackensentopullIIIPanzerkorpsbacktodefensiblepositions.

Abatteryof152mmML-20howitzersintrainingintheCaucasus.TheSovietsstartedthecampaignwithverylittleartillerybutgraduallybuiltuparespectablefiresupportbasewhichwascapableofsmotheringanyGermanadvancewithhigh-explosives.ByNovember1942,theSovietshadadecidededgeinartilleryfiresupport.(NikCornishatwww.Stavka.org.uk)

BEHINDTHELINESThepopulationoftheNorthCaucasusin1939was7.2million,andby1942wasincreasedbyabout300,000 refugees.Aside from the region’soilwealth, theNorthCaucasuswasone of the few regions in the wartime USSR that enjoyed a food surplus – whichbenefitted the armies of both sides, as well as the civilian population. The GermansanticipatedthatmuchofthelocalpopulationintheCaucasuswasanti-SovietandwouldbefriendlytowardsthetroopsofHeeresgruppeA.IncontrasttoGermanbehaviourintherestoftheUSSR,thetroopsofHeeresgruppeAwereorderedtotreatCaucasiancivilians

carefully, particularly in regard to looting and respect for Muslim traditions. Germanpropagandaalsosoughttoconvincelocalsthattheyshouldjoininacommonfightagainstcommunism.Cossacksturnedout tobethemainGermanallyintheCaucasusandweregranted considerable autonomy in the conquered Kuban. In return, 11,000 CossacksvolunteeredtoserveintheGermanArmy.LargenumbersofGeorgiansalsovolunteered,butonlyafewOsttruppenunitswereorganisedinlate1942,sinceHitlerwasreluctanttoarm toomany troops of Soviet origin. Itwas not until after the Stalingrad debacle thatHitler changed his mind and allowed large-scale recruiting of Caucasian troops – andwhenHeeresgruppeAbeganitsretreatfromtheCaucasus,itwasaccompaniedby80,000Cossacks, who rightly feared retribution from Beria’s NKVD. Eventually, tens ofthousandsofethnicCaucasianswouldservetheThirdReichasOsttruppen,butnotuntilthewarwaslost.

During theCaucasuscampaign,both sides tried tousepartisans todisrupt theothersides’ rear areas, butwithonly limited results.Sincemuchof theCaucasianpopulationwas either friendly or indifferent and theGermans pointedly avoided requisitioning toomuchfromthepopulation,theRussianpartisaneffortintheCaucasuswasslowtoform.The most effective Soviet partisan units were in the mountainous terrain aroundNovorossiyskandTuapse,butsmalldetachmentsoperatednearArmavirandMineralnyeVody. Despite inflicting losses on isolated German units, the Soviet partisans failed toseriouslyinterferewithGermanoperations.Likewise,theGermanAbwehr’sefforttoco-opttheChecheninsurgencyaroundGroznycametonaught.AgentswereparachutedintothemountainstoworkwithChecheninsurgentsnearGrozny’soilfields,buttheoperationwasafailure.

AgroupofCossackcavalrypatrollingavillageintheCaucasus.BymakinganalliancewithlocalCossackleaders,theGermanshelpedtosecuretheirrearareaswithfriendlylocalmilitias.ThankstotheCossacks,Sovietpartisanscouldonlyoperateinremoteareasandcausedlittleharmin1942.(NikCornishatwww.Stavka.org.uk)

ACossackcavalryunitintheCaucasus.TheGermansbeganformingtworegimentsforfront-lineduty,whichsawlimitedactioninthelatestagesofthecampaign.AfterthedefeatatStalingrad,theGermanswouldincreasinglyseektorecruitOsttruppentomakeuptheirownmanpowerlossesincombat.(NikCornishatwww.Stavka.org.uk)

OnegrouptowhichtheGermansdidnotextendcourtesieswastheJewishpopulationin the Caucasus, estimated to be between 45,000 and 55,000 in mid-1942. SS-BrigadeführerWaltherBierkamp’sEinsatzgruppeDcameinrightbehindthespearheadsofHeeresgruppeA,wheretheyusedspeciallyequippedvanstoexterminatetheenemiesof theThirdReich.Bierkampbegan inStavropolon5August,wherehis troopsgassed660mentally ill patients, then hemoved on toKrasnodar,MineralnyeVody,Yeisk andPyatigorsk. It is not clear how many civilians Bierkamp murdered in the CaucasusbetweenJuly1942andJanuary1943,butestimatesrangefromalowof10,000toperhaps35,000.ThesearesmallnumbersinthecontextoftheHolocaustandonlyafractionoftheregion’s population, but it is important to remember that Heeresgruppe A invaded theCaucasusnotonlyinpursuitofoilrichesbutasthevanguardofasadisticandmurderousideology.

A3.7cmflakgunontheBlackSeacoast,probablynearNovorossiyskorAnapa.TheGermansmadelittleuseofthesecapturedports,whichtheVVS-ChFroutinelybombed.(www.Stavka.org.uk)

STALEMATEANDRETREAT,NOVEMBER1942–

JANUARY1943AfterthefailureoftheGermanoffensivetowardsOrdzhonikidze,Maslennikov’sNorthernGroup (the 9th, 37th and 44th armies) began to relentlessly attack both flanks of theweakened 1. Panzerarmee for the next seven weeks. The Ardun-Alagir sector held byMackensen’sIIIPanzerkorpswasparticularlyhardhitandvonKleistmanagedtoget50.Infanterie-Division brought across the Kerch Strait from the Crimea, with part of ittransferred to reinforce Mackensen’s corps in late November. Maslennikov’s NorthernGroup also began to commit more and more tanks to support its local counterattacks,leading to several pitched tank battles with III Panzerkorps. On several occasions,Mackensen’sfrontwaspenetratedandonlyrestoredwithdifficulty.TheSoviet37thArmyevenbeganattackingoutofthemountainsagainstMackensen’sexposedflank,whichwasscreenedbyasingleRomaniandivision.

AplatoonofAmerican-builtM3A1WhiteScoutcars,suppliedviaLendLease,inusebyaSovietreconnaissanceunitintheCaucasus.TheRedArmylackedarmouredinfantryvehicles,andtheonlysourcewasUS-builtscoutcarsandhalf-tracks.(FromthefondsoftheRGAKFDinKrasnogorskviaStavka)

Northof theTerek, in theNogaiSteppe,3.Panzer-Divisionwascontinuouslybeingattackedbythe44thArmy.VonKleistsentKorpsz.b.V.FelmyandtheCossackRegiment‘von Jungschulz’ to reinforce his steppe flank and Budyonny sent Kirichenko’s 17thKubanCossackCavalryCorps,whichwasredesignatedasthe4thGuardsCavalryCorps.Soon,itwasjoinedbythe5thGuardsCavalryCorpsandTyulenevevenproposedforminga cavalry army to operate on the Nogai Steppe, but Stavka rejected the idea. WhileMaslennikov’s Northern Group was getting noticeably stronger, Heeresgruppe A grewweakerasresourcesweredivertedtosustain6.ArmeeatStalingrad.On19NovembertheSoviet counteroffensive against Heeresgruppe B began, and four days later von Kleistlearnedthat6.ArmeewassurroundedatStalingrad.Thenextday,theOKHorderedvonKleisttotransfer23.Panzer-DivisiontoparticipateinOperationWintergewitter,anefforttorelievethetrapped6.Armee.Althoughsomeofficerscounselledthatitwastimetopullback Heeresgruppe A from the Terek River in order to devote all resources to theStalingradreliefoperation,HitlerwasunwillingtoabandonhisgainsintheCaucasus.

AGermanmortarteammovesalongabalka(ravine),whilepackmulesbringupammunition.Insteadofblitzkrieg,thetroopsofHeeresgruppeAsoonfoundthemselvescommittedtosemi-statictrenchwarfare,withnorealmission.Constantdefensivecombatgraduallydrainedfront-linemorale.(NikCornishatwww.Stavka.org.uk)

SovietcounterattacksincreasedsteadilyinferocityasnewsofStalingradenergisedtheNorth Caucasus Front. German armoured strength ebbed rapidly, partly from combatlosses and partly from the lack of spare parts. By 19 December, it was clear thatWintergewitter had failed and that 6. Armee was doomed. Two days later, the OKHordered von Kleist to transfer the SS-Division ‘Wiking’ north as well. By Christmas,Soviet attackswere poundingHeeresgruppeA’s front inmultiple places and it becameclearthatvonKleist’sdepletedforcescouldnotremainontheTerekRiverallwinter.Evenworse,General-polkovnikAndreiI.Eremenko’sSouthernFrontwaspushingsouthalongtheStalingrad–Tikhoretskrailline,threateningvonKleist’slinesofcommunicationsfromRostov.OnlyLVIIPanzerkorpswasinEremenko’spath.TheKalmykStepperegionwasalso wide open and 16. Infanterie-Division (mot.) was nearly encircled at Elista.Furthermore, the entire German front in southern Russia was in a flux and the newlycreatedHeeresgruppeDonwasstruggling tocreateanewfront,butSovietarmieswereadvancing towards Rostov in great strength. If Soviet armour reached Rostov,Heeresgruppe A would be isolated in the Caucasus. Fear of another encircled GermanArmyforcedHitler to react:heauthorisedvonKleist towithdraw1.Panzerarmee–butonlytoPyatigorskandtheKumaRiverline.

Soviettroopscontinuetoattackthroughtheruinsofashatteredvillage.UnliketheGermans,Sovietfront-linemoraleimprovedthroughoutthecampaign,particularlyoncenewsofthevictoryatStalingradarrived.Fromthispointon,theaverageRed

Armysoldiercouldbegintobelieveinvictory.(CourtesyoftheCentralMuseumoftheArmedForces,MoscowviaStavka)

The1.Panzerarmeewassupposedtobeginitswithdrawalat1700hourson2January,buton themorningof1January1943,Maslennikov’sNorthernGroup launchedfuriousattackswithTankGroupLobanov (106 tanks) against theNogai Steppe flank and nearArdon.The44thArmyhittheleftflankof3.Panzer-Division,whichhadfewoperationaltanksleft.Recognisingthattheylackedthestrengthtorepulsethismassiveattack,XXXXPanzerkorps began a fighting withdrawal, ahead of schedule. Despite initial success,Maslennikov’s command and control fell apart and he lost control over his forces. TheGermanswereabletowithdrawtoPyatigorskandtheKumaRiver,butLobanov’stankersfoundandoverranGrenadier-Regiment122 from50. Infanterie-Divisionbefore it couldreachtheriver.AllthreeGermancorpswereabletofallbackandformanewline,whichwas held for four days. In the high Caucasus Mountains, Gruppe von Le Suire (fourGebirgs-Bataillone)beganretreatingon4January.StavkaharshlycriticisedMaslennikovforconductingaslipshodpursuitandallowingvonKleist’sforcestobreakcontact.

Maslennikov’s9thand44tharmieswereabletoclosewiththenewGermanpositionsandgotacrosstheKumaRiverinseveralplaces.VonKleisthadexpectedthisandsimplyfellbacktotheKalausLine,eastofArmavir,wherehepausedforaweek.ExceptforthetwocavalrycorpspushingalongtheManych,Maslennikov’sforceswerenotpreparedforalengthypursuitoperationandagainlostcontactwithvonKleist’sforces.AlthoughvonKleistcouldbesatisfiedthatMaslennikov’sNorthernGroupwasnotaseriousthreat,thesteadyadvanceofEremenko’sSouthernFronttowardstheManychRiverwasadifferentstory. VonKleist shifted 16. Infanterie-Division (mot.) to help prevent Eremenko fromgetting across the river, while LVII Panzerkorps fought a tenacious defensive action atProletarskayaagainstvastlysuperiorforces.

StalinwantedMaslennikovtopindownvonKleist’sforceswhileEremenkoslippedinbehindandcuthislineofescape–hedidnotwanttheNorthernGrouptosimplyfollowasvonKleist executed a leisurely retreat. Furthermore, hewas piqued that Petrov’sBlackSeaGroupwasremainingpassivelyonthedefenceandheorderedthemtoattackRuoff’s17. Armee. On 11 January, the Soviets began probing attacks but it was not until 16Januarythatthe56thArmy,nowunderGrechko,beganaseriousattackagainstXXXXIVArmeekorps.Grechko’sinfantryslowlypushedforwardthroughruggedterrain,butfellfarshortoftheobjectiveoftakingKrasnodarorcuttingoffanyGermanunits.

Von Kleist’s situation deteriorated rapidly after Eremenko’s mechanised forces gotacrosstheManychRiveron21JanuaryandthreatenedtocuthislineofcommunicationstoRostov.Itwasnowtimetocutandrun.Hitlerdecidedto interfere, firstorderingvonKleist to take all of 1. Panzerarmee toRostov, then deciding that part should go to theKubanwith17.Armee,thenchanginghismindagain.VonKleistsentLIIArmeekorpstolink up with Ruoff’s 17. Armee, which was now falling back into the Kuban underpressure.Although therewere close callswithSovietmechanisedunits threateningvonKleist’s exposed left flank, he made it Rostov with his army intact and the last unitswithdrew across the Don bridges on 6 February. By saving 1. Panzerarmee fromdestruction,vonKleistprovidedHeeresgruppeDonwiththemeanstoprevent theentiresouthern front from collapsing. Hitler promoted von Kleist to Generalfeldmarschall –indicatingthathecouldrewardasuccessfuldefeat.Ruoff’s17.Armeeretreatedintothe

Kuban,wheretheyfoughtanextendeddefensivecampaignuntilevacuatedtotheCrimeainOctober1943.

13.Panzer-DivisionwasencircledandnearlydestroyedoutsideOrdzhonikidzebetween6and12November1942,losingmostofitstanks,artilleryandtrucks.HereSovietinfantrycaptureanabandonedPzKpfwIVtank–whichwillprobablybeputintoSovietservice.AfterthisbattleandthediversionofforcestoStalingrad,vonKleistwasleftwithfewerthan100operationaltanksbyDecember1942.(Author’scollection)

AFTERMATH

Goring and his Konti Öl associates had promised an oil bonanza in the conqueredCaucasus,butinfacttheTechnicalBrigadeMineralölwasonlyabletoextractabout1,000tons of oil fromMaikop in the periodNovember 1942–January 1943, before having toabandonthefacilitytotheadvancingSoviets.Atbest,theGermansonlymanagedtogetahandfulofrigsbackonline,capableofextractingamere7–10tonsperday.Thelimitedquantityextractedwasused locally for transportpurposes–nonebeingshippedback toGermany.TheTBMestimatedthatitwouldnotbeabletoextractsignificantquantitiesofoil until mid-1943 and that Maikop would not be restored to large-scale production(50,000–70,000tonspermonth)untillate1943.Inotherwords,itwouldrequireatleast15monthstobringMaikopbackonline,buttheGermansdidnothavethatlong.NorwastheSovietwareffortsignificantlyimpactedbytheGermanseizureofMaikopanddamageto Grozny’s oilfields, since Stalin simply ordered the oilfields in the Urals region toincrease theirproductionbydrillingnewwells.Sovietoil productionactually increasedaftertheCaucasuscampaign.

During the period from25 July 1942 to 30 January 1943,HeeresgruppeA sufferedover72,000casualtiesintheCaucasuscampaign,including22,000deadormissing.TheRomanian3rdArmyincurredabout45,000casualtiesinthisperiod,ofwhichmorethan12,000weredeadormissing.Incontrast,theRedArmysufferedover511,000casualtiesintheCaucasus,including247,000dead,missingorcaptured.Thussixmonthsoffightingin the Caucasus had resulted in over 628,000 military casualties on both sides, plusuncounted thousands of civilian casualties in thewreckage of cities likeKrasnodar andNovorossiysk.WhileHeeresgruppeAhadinflictedbetterthan4to1casualtiesupontheNorthCaucasusFront,thismatteredverylittleinthelongrunsincetheGermansfailedtoseizetheirprincipalobjectivesortoencircleanddestroyanylargeSovietformations.

AGermanGebirgsjägerwatchesthebeginningoftheretreatfromtheCaucasusinJanuary1943.AlthoughHeeresgruppeAsuccessfullyescapedencirclementintheCaucasus,itwasforcedtoabandonagreatamountofitsvehiclesandartillery,duetolackoffuelandspareparts.(Bundesarchiv,Bild101I-031-2424-08;photobyK.F.Maier)

Whencombinedwith the losses ofHeeresgruppeB aroundStalingrad, the losses of

HeeresgruppeAfurtherdrainedGermanstrength to thepoint that thestrategic initiativewaslosttotheRedArmy.YetunlikeStalingrad,theGermanscouldnotblametheirdefeatin theCaucasusupon theirRomanian allies – failurewas entirelydue toGerman-madedecisions. List,with some help fromHitler and theOKH,mademistake aftermistake,beginningwith the inability to focus on a single objective, followedby committing thewrong forces to the wrong missions. Instead of focusing on the oil, List allowed hiscommandtodisperseonmultipledivergentmissions.Whileitisunlikelythatthecaptureof Tuapse or Grozny would have had any substantial impact on the outcome of thecampaign,HeeresgruppeAdidhavetheresourcestotakeoneoftheseobjectives,butnotboth.

TheCaucasuswas the kind of campaign that the panzer divisionswere designed towin, using bold manoeuvres across flat steppes against a disorganised foe that lackedproper air, artillery or armour support. However,Hitler and theOKH failed to providetheirmaineffortwiththelogisticresourcesandairsupport itneededtosucceed.Had1.Panzerarmee received priority of fuel in August, including deliveries of fuel by air, italmostcertainlycouldhave‘bounced’theTerekbeforetheSovietscouldbuildadefensiveline along the entire river. Reduced to only two fuel-starved divisions at the tip of hisspear, von Kleist’s spearhead was stopped more by his own side than the Red Army.Failing this,Hitler shouldhave recognisedbymid-September1942 that theoffensive inthe Caucasus was futile and shifted all effort to Heeresgruppe B – which could havereduced the risk to 6. Armee at Stalingrad. Historians have generally focused onStalingrad as the defining moment of the 1942 campaign, but the faulty Germanperformance in the Caucasus indicates endemic problems in the Third Reich’s style ofoperational and strategicplanning thatgowell beyond themistakesof a few individualgenerals.

AtMaikop,theTechnicalBrigadeMineralölwasforcedtodrillnewshaftstogetattheoilsincetheoriginalshaftshadbeensobadlydamaged.ThenewrigsdidnotproduceanyoiluntilOctober1942,andthenonlyatrickle.BythetimeMaikopwasabandonedinlateJanuary1943,theTBMwasstillsixmonthsawayfromproducingenoughoiltoshipbacktoGermany.

Underthecircumstances,theRedArmy’sperformanceintheCaucasuswasquitegoodandafter thepell-mellretreatof thefirstfewweeks, theymadetheGermanspaydearlyfor terrain. The Soviet stand along the Terek River and at Ordzhonikidze was a greatdefensive success, followed up by constant counterattacks that gradually unravelled theoverextendedHeeresgruppeA.ThemainSovietproblemintheCaucasuscampaignwasatendency by Stalin to put unqualified NKVD generals like Maslennikov or partycommissars likeLazarM.Kaganovich inkeydecision-makingpositions; the reason theRed Army performed well in the Caucasus was because it had fighting generals likeKoroteevandKirichenko.Finally,itisworthnotingthatbothsidesconductedconcurrentair,groundandseaoperationsduringthecampaignthataffectedtheoutcome–whichwasrare on the Eastern Front. In modern parlance, the Caucasus was a joint campaign,conductedbyallthreeservices,plusasprinklingofAxiscoalitionpartners.Successonthegroundprovedheavilydependentuponlocalairsuperiorityandnavalforcesalsoplayedasignificantroleatkeymoments.

THEBATTLEFIELDTODAY

TheCaucasushaswitnessedagreatdealofwarfare,terrorismandinter-ethnicviolenceinthepasttwodecadesanduntilthe2014WinterOlympicsinSochi,wasnotknowntobewelcoming to foreign tourists.TheSochiOlympics briefly brought foreign tourists to atinycornerof theregion,but theRussia–Ukrainecrisisover theCrimeabroughtanewchill in East–West relations thatmade travel to andwithin theCaucasus a problematicenterprise.Mostair travel totheCaucasushastogothroughMoscowandtravellerscanexpect multiple plane-switching to get from Western locations to the heart of theCaucasus. There is only one international airport in the region, Sochi (AER),which isremote from where most of the fighting in 1942–43 occurred. There are also smallerairports at Grozny, Pyatigorsk and Krasnodar that offer limited access to flights fromTurkeyandGermany.Atouristvisaisrequired.

Thebestareastofindexhibitsrelatedtothe1942–43campaignareinKrasnodarandNovorossiysk. Krasnodar has the best tourist offerings in the Caucasus, replete withWestern-style hotels like Hilton. Two local exhibits are the 30th Anniversary of theVictoryParkandtheMuseumofMilitaryTechnologies‘OruzhiePobedy’,bothofwhichoffer open-air displays of World War II-era tanks and artillery. In addition, there arenumerous local markers denoting Soviet heroes and accomplishments. Novorossiysk islittered with reminiscences of the war and has exhibits and monuments of interest,particularly in a memorial park around the ‘Little land’ (Malaya Zemlya) beachhead.These exhibits include an Il-2 Sturmovik, trenches, some very green tanks, artillery(includingarare152mmBr-2)andmonumentstothenavalinfantryandvariousheroesofthe fighting. In south-eastNovorossiysk, thereareanumberofmonumentsmarking thesite where the advance of Wetzel’s V Armeekorps was stopped, including the ruinedProletaryCementFactoryandanothernearthesiteoftheOktyabrFactory,whichstillhasa bullet-riddled freight car once used as a command post for the 305thNaval InfantryBattalion.TuapsehasasmallHistoricalandLocalLoreMuseumofMilitaryDefencethathasacollectionofinfantryweapons,adioramaanddisplaysonfightingaroundthecityin1942.

AtypicalSovietvictorymemorial–aT-34/85tankonapock-markedconcreteplinth–onthesouth-eastsuburbsofNovorossiysk.ThissitecommemoratesoneoftheRedArmy’sproudestmomentsinthecampaign:stoppingtheadvanceof

Wetzel’sVArmeekorpsalongthecoastroadtoTuapse.(Author’scollection)

Further south, it is more difficult to find items related to the 1942–43 campaign.MaikopisstillanoiltownbutlittlelocalefforthasbeenmadetorememberWorldWarII.The same is generally true of Armavir, Pyatigorsk and Vladikavkaz (formerlyOrdzhonikidze).Ofcourse,thereistheusualtank-on-a-plinthtypedisplay,althoughoftenananachronousT-34-85orIS-3asnearMalgobek.Grozny,targetofvonKleist’spanzers,was centre stage in theFirstChechenWar (1994–96) andSecondChechenWar (1999–2000), which resulted in a brutal Russian counter-insurgency campaign against theChechens.After thewarswere over, theUnitedNations declared thatGroznywas ‘themostdestroyedcityonearth’.Althoughgraduallyrebuilt,thecityhaslittletoofferforeigntouristsandthethreatofterrorismstillhangsheavilyovertheregion.

ASovietmonumentatopMountSemashkho,whichwascapturedbyGermanGebirgsjägeron22October1942.Thisprovedtobethehigh-watermarkoftheGermanoffensivetowardTuapse,whichlay22kminthedistance.(Author’scollection)

TheCaucasusMountainsstillholdsomevestigesofWorldWarII.InSeptember2012,aRussian team found five7.62mmM1927howitzers (capturedSovietweaponspressedintoGermanservice)andammunitionontheslopesofDonguz-Orunsouth-eastofMountElbrus.Partly coveredby ice, thegunshad lain abandoned for70years.OtherRussianteams have found the remains of wartime casualties, preserved in the ice, as well aspersonal effects. One of the most poignant was a German camera, found inside anammunition pouch, on the ice; clearly the owner had found the Caucasus Mountainbeautiful and intended to send photos back to Germany; however, neither he nor hiscamerareturned.

FURTHERREADINGBergström,Christer,BlackCross–RedStar:AirWarovertheEasternFront,Vol.3(Hamilton,MT:EagleEditions,

Ltd.,2006)

Eichholtz,Dietrich,WarforOil:TheNaziQuestforanOilEmpire(Dulles,VA:PotomacBooks,2012)

Glantz,DavidM.,TotheGatesofStalingrad:Soviet-GermanCombatOperationsApril–August1942(Lawrence,KS:UniversityPressofKansas,2009)

Grechko,AndreiA.,BitvazaKavkaz(BattlefortheCaucasus)(Moscow:MilitaryPublishing,1967)

Klapdor,Ewald,VikingPanzers:TheGerman5thSSTankRegimentintheEastinWorldWarII(Mechanicsburg,PA:StackpoleBooks,2011)

Mackensen,Eberhardvon,VomBugzumKaukasus(Neckargemünd:KurtVowinkelVerlag,1967)

Moshchanskii,Il’ia,OboronaKavkaza:VelikoeOtstuplenie(DefenceoftheCaucasus:GreatRetreat)(Moscow:VechePublishers,2009)

Rebentisch,Ernst,TheCombatHistoryofthe23rdPanzerDivisioninWorldWarII(Mechanicsburg,PA:StackpoleBooks,2012)

Shtemenko,SergeiM.,TheSovietGeneralStaffatWar1941–1945(Honolulu,Hawaii:UniversityPressofthePacific,2001)

Tieke,Wilhelm,TheCaucasusandtheOil:TheGerman-SovietWarintheCaucasus1942/43(Winnipeg,Canada:J.J.FedorowiczPublishingInc.,1995)

Tyulenev,IvanV.,CherezTriVoyny(ThroughThreeWars)(Moscow:MilitaryPublishing,1960)

VailMotter,T.H.,TheUnitedStatesArmyinWorldWarII:TheMiddleEastTheater:ThePersianCorridorandAidtoRussia(Washington,DC:CenterofMilitaryHistory,2000)

Veteransofthe3rdPanzerDivision,ArmoredBear:TheGerman3rdPanzerDivisioninWorldWarII,Vol.II(Mechanicsburg,PA:StackpoleBooks,2013)

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DEDICATIONToCaptainJasonB.Jones,1stBattalion/3rdSpecialForcesGroup(Airborne),KIAnearJalalabad,Afghanistan,2June2014;1stLieutenantMarkymSavchenko,Ukrainian95thAirmobileBrigade,KIAnearLuhansk,19July2014;and1st

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LISTOFACRONYMSANDABBREVIATIONSAOK–Armeeoberkommando(ArmyCommand)

CKF–Severo-KavkazskiyFront(NorthCaucasusFront)

GCC–GuardsCavalryCorps

GRD–GuardsRifleDivision

GRC–GuardsRifleCorps

JG–Jagdgeschwader

KKK–KubanCossackCavalryCorps

KG–Kampfgeschwader

MAGNOR–MorskayaaviagruppaNovorossiyskogooboronitel’nogorayona(NavalAviationGroupNovorossiyskDefensiveArea)

MD–MilitaryDistrict

MFP–Marinefährprahm(navalferrybarge)

mot.–motorised

MRD–MountainRifleDivision

NIB–NavalInfantryBrigade

NKO–NarodnyKomissariatOborony(CommissariatofDefence)

NKVD–NarodnyyKomissariatVnutrennikhDel(People’sCommissariatofInternalAffairs)

ODBP–Otdel’nykhdivizionovbronepoyezdov(armouredtraindivision)

OKH–OberkommandodesHeeres

OTB–Otdel’nyytankovyybatal’on(independenttankbattalion)

PzAOK–Panzerarmee

PzKpfw–Panzerkampfwagen

RB–RifleBrigade

ROA–RusskayaOsvoboditel’nayaArmiya(RussianArmyofLiberation)

RVGK–ReserveoftheSupremeHighCommand(Stavka)

SPW–Schützenpanzerwagen

StG–Sturzkampfgeschwader

StuG–Sturmgeschütz

StuGAbt–Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung

StuK–Sturmkanone

TBM–TechnicalBrigadeMineralöl

TOR–TuapseDefensiveRegion

VA–Vozdushnayaarmiya(airarmy)

VS–Verbrauchssatz

VVS–Voyenno-VozdushnyeSily(MilitaryAirForces)

VVS-ChF–BlackSeaFleetAirArm

YF–YuzhnyFront(SouthernFront)

ZG–Zerstörergeschwader

ZKF–ZakavkazskiyFront(TranscaucasusFront)