The Caspian Project .11

The CaspIan proJeCTa BI-weeKly eDITIon from The moDern DIplomaCy

www.moderndiplomacy.eu [email protected]

proJeCt team

Dimitris GiannakopoulosDr. matthew Crosston

petra poseGateJa palko

luisa monteironina lavrenteva

Gabriela pasCholati Do amaralbrian huGhestaylor morse

Jeanette JJ harperDianne a. valDezevan thomsen

amy hanlonJareD s. easton

Jonathan hartneranDy Deahn

his edition of the Caspian Project testifies to the enormouswealth of analytical opportunity seen all across the region.While in the past we have enjoyed producing single-issue

specializations (which we did over the past two weeks with TheRussian Debate and The Persian Gambit, to great fanfare and ap-plause), the true essence of the Project is to have great diversityfor the readers every issue. No. 11 as it turns out is something ofa hybrid of these two aspects: readers with this issue get quite abit of diversity while also getting to enjoy a mini-specialization,as a number of the articles inside deal with different aspects ofthe Russian intelligence community, namely, the Federal Secu-rity Service or FSB.

So, on top of some very thought-provoking and hard-hitting ar-ticles dealing with the ethics, surveillance, and transnational ac-tivities of Russian intelligence, readers ALSO get to learn morein this issue about the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Turk-menistan’s human rights record, and Kazakhstan’s entrance intothe WTO. It is an issue, therefore, that cuts across domestic pol-itics, global affairs, security, economics, and international organ-izations. This is something we at Modern Diplomacy hold dearlywhen it comes to the Caspian Project: so much that is happeningin the world today, affecting so many countries, transects in oneway or another the greater Caspian sea region. It shall always bea hub of activity and importance, far beyond the standard callabout energy and natural resources.

So read on and enjoy this edition and all of us at Modern Diplo-macy hope it inspires your own questions, new lines of thinking,and opens new doors for research. We take pride not in keepingup with the waves of global affairs, but justifiably feeling like weride out along FRONT of the leading edge. We hope you enjoythe view and benefit from our efforts.

Prof. Dr. Matthew Crosston

Senior Editor, Caspian Project Director

T

reading the best of both worlds…

ThEinDuSTRial

Spy GamE

FSB aS RuSSianEconomic DEvElopER

ince the fall of the Soviet Union, the RussianFederation (RF) has sought to reclaim its for-mer glory and regain recognition as a greatpower. Throughout this progression the na-tional science base to the RF’s economic de-

velopment is of high importance. This has beendemonstrated through policy documents like the RF’sNational Security Strategy from 2009. The focus of thisanalysis is to examine the role of RF intelligence-gath-ering activities for the purpose of domestic modern-ization.The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federa-tion up to 2020 identified five key high-technologysectors: energy, information technology (IT), telecom-munications, biomedicine and nuclear technology(RF, 2009). Nanotechnology was also highlighted asan important investment and growth area. In 2010,the RF announced plans that scientific and technolog-ical centers would focus on the development and do-mestic commercialization of modern technologies,motivated in part by the success of America’s SiliconValley (Medvedev, 2010).

S

THE CASPIAN PROJECT | ISSUE 11

JARED S. EASTON

Jared S. Easton is currently an undergraduate in the International Securityand Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University

in Omaha, NE, USA.

There are many ways a nation can bolster ascience and technology (S&T) foundation,not just through domestic industry, andeach nation tends to use multiple options. Acritical way that is not often discussed inmainstream media sources is to procure for-eign knowledge and equipment through es-pionage activities. Russia engages this pathaggressively with the likes of the Federal Se-curity Service (FSB).

There is little doubt that the FSB has been ac-tive in S&T intelligence collection, concen-trating on foreign nations for domesticmodernization and improving Russia’s com-petitiveness in the global economy. Themodern era of intelligence-collection capa-bilities sees the American intelligence com-munity as dominant. Before the modern era(pre-2001), the RF operated one of theworld’s largest S&T information-gatheringapparatus, which worked almost as a substi-tute for legitimate industrial domestic re-search & development (Almquist, 1990). Forthe RF, intelligence support to the scientificcommunity and its own domestic industrialcomplex was the standard, not the excep-tion, and in 2010 Russia confirmed that itmade no secret of its motivations to gatherS&T intelligence for the benefit of its nationalsecurity interests defined broadly.

The RF intelligence complex, including theFSB, has been obliged by federal law “to as-sist the country’s economic developmentand its scientific and technical progress andto ensure the military-technical security ofthe Russian Federation.” This activity is in linewith Article 8 of the Federal Law on the FSB.The collection of S&T intelligence and “indus-trial espionage practices established a tem-plate for Soviet and later Russian [FSB]intelligence gathering that remains in use tothis day; as long as U.S. technology main-tains its preeminent global position, such es-pionage will likely continue” (Sibley, 2004).This was validated in 2010 by the AmericanODNI (Office of the Director of National In-telligence), which stated that the RF “contin-ues to strengthen its intelligence capabilitiesand directs them against US interests world-wide. Moscow’s intelligence effort includesespionage, technology acquisition andcovert action efforts.” (Blair, 2010) JonathanEvans, the head of the domestic British Se-curity Service (MI5), noted in 2007 that “thescope of the Russian intelligence gatheringwas equal to the Soviet effort during theCold War… [and] that Russian intelligenceservices were particularly interested inBritish science and technology. (Brogan,2007)

The RF, and specifically the FSB, has exten-sively leveraged operational cover fromdiplomatic missions abroad and the postingof illegal agents in their target countries toapproach foreign researchers and entrepre-neurs. They would often establish a career inone or several third countries, allowingagents to use academic research institutionsor commercial companies as platforms forespionage activities (Kouzminov, 2006). Butit has also been observed that the triumphsof human intelligence (HUMINT) operationsduring the former Soviet era are unlikely tobe achieved in the present day RF.

ThE naTional SEcuRiTy STRaTEGyoF ThE RuSSian FEDERaTion up To 2020

iDEnTiFiED FivE kEyhiGh-TEchnoloGy SEcToRS:

EnERGy, inFoRmaTion TEchnoloGy (iT),TElEcommunicaTionS, BiomEDicinE

anD nuclEaR TEchnoloGy


In the modern era the primary method forcollecting S&T intelligence is through cyberespionage. In 2008, the US noted that morethan 1 trillion USD worth of data was lost tocyber espionage (Ackerman, 2009). This factis further confirmed with the knowledgethat the RF is developing advanced offensivecyber capabilities (McAfee, 2009). In additionto cyber espionage, scientific and technolog-ical intelligence can be exploited throughsignals intelligence. This is another areawhere the RF intelligence services haveleveraged the previous Soviet foundationwith modern advancements in current tech-nologies. In conclusion, while the FSB has advancedsignificantly in S&T intelligence collectionsince the former Soviet period, “the FSB’s in-creased influence may prove to be counter-productive in terms of economicmodernization and industrial restructuring.Despite its self-confidence, the FSB isscarcely prepared to manage all the indus-trial complexes with international standing.”(Gomart, 2008) This last point is crucial, as itimplies that the gains made covertly

through the intelligence community couldin fact have an unintended detrimental ef-fect on economic progress and industrialmodernization happening more organicallywith native companies across Russia. This isnot the desire effect, of course, but a conse-quence of the classical dilemma in modernmarket economies that try to figure out howmuch governmental intervention is positivebefore it hits a tipping point and becomes anet negative impact on development.

This is not even considering the likely moresevere stress this reliance on covert activityhas on the entrepreneurial spirit and risk tak-ing that is crucial for any developing econ-omy in the 21st century. The RussianFederation operates no differently than theUS intelligence community agencies in thatit pursues its own national security interestsand aims to improve its domestic standingon the global stage. The issue it should con-sider, however, is whether or not some oldschool spy thinking might be a less effectivelong-term strategy, even if it does producemore immediate results.

The evoluTIonof The sCo

The PluToof InTernaTIonal

organIzaTIons

his piece investigates the unique peculiari-ties of the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-tion (SCO). Instead of being a Eurasiancounterpart to the EU, an additional IObridge between East and West, or even influ-

enced by organizations like ASEAN, the SCO is domi-nated by micro-agendas that work in opposition tothe theoretical literature explaining international or-ganization purpose.Consequently, this particular IO has so far not onlyfailed to become a nexus for globalization, democraticrespect, or the fight against terror, it really cannot beconsidered a legitimate IO as is traditionally framedby theory at the present time. When promise is foundmore in the literature than in empirical reality, thereis need for caution. This analysis suggests that thereis a present-day tendency to be empirically loose inhow the designation ‘international organization’ is ap-plied. As such, the SCO is the ‘Pluto’ of IOs and shouldbe renamed and removed as an international organi-zation if its present course does not radically change.

T


DR. MATTHEW CROSSTON

Senior Editor, Caspian Project Director

Matthew Crosston is Professor of Political Science,Director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program,

and the Miller Chair at Bellevue University

Looking at the SCO’s relative power sourcesand how influence interacts with institu-tional design, it will become clear why theorganization does not increase internationalcooperation, economic prosperity, or globalsecurity, as is typically expected from majorIOs to strive to. Rather, the manner in whichall three of the above goals are underminedby SCO institutional design and internalagendas should call into question whether itshould be classified as an IO at all. Renamingit a politically-motivated axis of convenienceis less grand but perhaps a more accuratedescription of its nature and functions.

CHINAChina's main position within Central Asia iseconomic, though certain security issuesalso exist. China is extremely interested incurrying favor with Central Asia to help feedits voracious energy appetite. On the otherhand issues of ethnic unrest in Xinjiang,China's western border, make cooperationand mutual understanding with Central Asiastrategically advantageous. Thus Central Asiaacts as a dual purpose economic-securitybridge for China: a bulwark against Uighurand pan-Turkic nationalism/separatism andan energy hub for importing oil and gas.

RUSSIARussia has always viewed Central Asia as itsown backyard and particular sphere of influ-ence. Thus, the SCO has largely been seen asa soft entry for Russia to maintain and proj-ect its military influence into the region.While Central Asia may represent a bufferzone for China's western flank, it also repre-sents a buffer zone for Russia's southernflank, in particular against Islamist extremistthreats that may look to move into Russiafrom the region. There is also a clear competitive dynamicwith China that has the SCO as the peacefularena in which Russia tries to keep a warningembrace around it. Some have seen this as avoluntary division of leadership within theSCO: China maintaining economic oversightwhile Russia assumes the position of pri-macy in security matters.

Despite these explicit leadership roles,Moscow remains the weaker of the two ‘su-perpowers’ in comparison to Beijing. It can-not, regardless of propaganda or posturing,oppose China’s emergent economic influ-ence in the region and as such it has largelyembraced the SCO not so much because ofa strong belief in the relevance of the organ-ization but rather as an easier conduit withwhich to maintain Moscow-friendly regimesacross Central Asia and a decent mechanismto try to keep China from sprinting too farahead.

CENTRAL ASIAPerhaps the most unique ability of the Cen-tral Asian members is to simultaneously bar-gain and balance across multiple fronts.Indeed, the Central Asian states have alwaysbeen acutely aware of their precarious posi-tion in between two major powers while athird distant American power commonly ini-tiates contact because of its own crucial se-curity agenda within the region.

The member sTaTessImulTaneously

suPPorT and undermIneThe organIzaTIon

vIa IndIvIdualIzedmICro-agendas beCause of

TheIr worrIes abouT The TrICkseaCh mIghT Play uPon The oTher


The SCO, therefore, has always been a toolfor Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, andTajikistan to attempt to balance China andRussia off of each other and carving out ma-neuverability space. At the same time, theStans have not hesitated to engage with theEuropean Union and the United States, striv-ing to expand their options and minimizethe possibility of being overwhelmed by thelocal superpowers. While it is true that Cen-tral Asia is largely more sympathetic to Chi-nese leadership over Russian, it is also truethat no major power has single-handedlybeen able to satisfy all of the diverse needsof the Central Asian states.

The multidirectional policy of bargainingand balancing best serves the interests ofthe Central Asian states and as such it willlikely continue long into the future. After all,the primary economic and security concernswithin Central Asia are not unimportant toRussia, China, as well as the United States.

These concerns include: Islamic radicaliza-tion; proliferation of weapons of mass de-struction; narcotics trafficking; laggingeconomic development and investment cli-mates; and pervasive poverty. The obviouscriticism is that none of these concerns havebeen alleviated with the Central Asian states’involvement in the SCO, despite a decade ofexistence. The one characteristic that seemed to be anaxiom for the SCO – maintaining the politicalstatus quo – cannot be considered a given,what with the non-response to civil unrest inKyrgyzstan in 2010. The possibility that thislack of response to assist could signal abenevolent ignorance on the part of theSCO, tacitly endorsing potential democrati-zation, falls flat: all of the members of theSCO unanimously voiced their concerns anddisapproval over the events in Kyrgyzstan. Asa result, it marked an IO ‘double whammy’ ofhypocrisy: the SCO physically did not cometo the aid of a member but then still verballydenounced democratic change.

So far, the SCO identifies as an ineffective or-ganization. That lack of efficiency emergeswhether analyzing the institutional design ofthe SCO or reviewing empirical evidencethrough case study analysis. The SCO seems to be structured in a mannerthat undermines its own development, as IOevolution is understood by the scholarlycommunity. The member states simultane-ously support and undermine the organiza-tion via individualized micro-agendasbecause of their worries about the trickseach might play upon the other. Interest-ingly, what the literature does not do is ques-tion the legitimacy of the SCO. This is one ofthe main contentions here: membership ofthe SCO in the IO community should bequestioned instead of simply de facto be-stowed. Until now, its membership has al-ways been a given.

Recently, both India and Pakistan have beenaccepted as future members of the SCO, ex-pecting to be formally incorporated some-time in 2016. There are four other statesgiven ‘Observer Status’ which include Be-larus, Iran, Afghanistan, and Mongolia. Fi-nally, there is yet another category called‘Dialogue Partners,’ including Armenia, Azer-baijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, andTurkey. Aside from a geopolitical alliancethat seems to be aiming for the SCO to ab-sorb something that could be called the‘Greater Caspian Region,’ none of the afore-mentioned countries, if formal members, canbe expected to bring smooth transitions andpeaceful cooperative relations betweenmembers. If anything, internal SCO relations wouldonly become more chaotic, micro-managed,and potentially zero-sum (does anyone reallythink India and Pakistan will resolve their dif-ferences by being part of the SCO? Armeniaand Azerbaijan? Turkey and Iran?).

In short, the SCO seems to be evolving in away to guarantee it remaining one of themost fascinating organizations in the world,but that does not mean it will be effective oroutwardly-impactful on the global stage.

THE PLUTO OF IOS?If the SCO seems to affirm only the negativeconcerns and detrimental aspects of faultyIO formation and development, while pro-viding little to no empirical evidence of thepositive impacts and cooperative influenceinherent to most of the general IO literature,then how can the SCO continue to be ac-cepted as a formal IO? The answer is it shouldnot be. There is a present-day tendency to beempirically loose in how the designation ‘in-ternational organization’ is applied.This is nosmall matter: lax empiricism inadequatelysupported by or even ignoring acceptedtheoretical underpinnings results not only inmisdirected scholarship but actually carriesthe potential to undermine foreign policyanalysis as a whole. Perhaps with the SCO asan initial first step, there can be renewed in-terest and diligence in looking over theworld's IOs and rigorously applying IO the-ory to empirical reality as a sort of legitimacylitmus test. Is the SCO the world's only Pluto? The present analysis finds that highly un-likely. Scientific brethren in astronomy canattest: just because a planet has always beencalled a planet does not mean it should re-main so. If Pluto can be re-designated, thenit should not be considered too high a con-troversy to rename IOs that do not measureup to accepted standards. Whether that newname is ‘politically-motivated axis of conven-ience’ (P-MAC) or some other moniker mat-ters little: the importance is in shoring up thediscipline so that empirical reality and intel-lectual theory inform each other rather thancontradict one another and actual analysisbecomes more accurate.

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all eyes on meThe emergence of a russian

surveillance sTaTe

efore analyzing the activities and assessingthe ethics of any intelligence organization, itis first necessary to remember that intelli-gence organizations are secretive by natureand it’s impossible to assess their methods

in full given most countries’ secrecy laws. This is espe-cially the case with Russia’s Federal Security Service(FSB). Much like its predecessor, the KGB, its activitiescontinue to be troublesome for diplomats, journalists,and citizens alike. The Russian government uses prop-aganda, deception, and manipulation to a muchhigher degree and with great effectiveness. The Russ-ian surveillance state, largely powered by the FSB anddriven by the threat of terrorism, is resurgent and be-coming ever more intrusive.One example of Russia’s use of deception and propa-ganda, according to David Frum on The Atlantic web-site on April 18, 2014, even went so far as to includethe notorious former NSA contractor Edward Snow-den in a propaganda stunt (Q & A forum) with RussianPresident Vladimir Putin.

B


JONATHAN HARTNER

Jonathan Hartner is currently an undergraduateat Bellevue University in Omaha, NE, USA,

pursuing a degree in International Security and Intelligence Studies.

During the session, which was televised onRussian television, Edward Snowden chal-lenged Putin on government surveillance inRussia. To this, Putin simply stated: “We don’thave a mass system for such interceptionand according to our law it cannot exist.” Thisis typical of the deception that the govern-ment uses and this statement was widely re-garded by experts and watch-dog agenciesas false.

It would also be foolish to assert that theAmerican intelligence establishment doesnot continue to engage in covert operationsinvolving ethically questionable methodsgiven the information available. However, ithas found itself at the heart of major contro-versies concerning its collection methodsjust in the last decade which have forcedgreater transparency and greater debate,both internally and externally. An analysis ofthe outcome of the controversy over theNSA’s collection of bulk data, for example,sparked a greater discussion on the legalityof the NSA’s collection programs and tookplace both within Congress and the publicmedia. The constitutional legality of thesecovert programs caused a lot of problems forthe government in the courts. The President,the Director of National Intelligence, andother senior officials were made to answerfor the programs before the Supreme Courtand Congress. (Mornin, 2014)

This level of transparency cannot and likelywill never be found in Russia. Political andlegal discourse between academia, the jus-tice system, and the general public is cer-tainly lacking as well. The evidence is clear:as noted in the Atlantic article cited previ-ously regarding Putin’s interaction with Ed-ward Snowden:“Russian journalists will not ‘revisit’ (as heputs it) the truthfulness of Putin’s answers.Russian journalists who do that end up dead,in at least 56 cases since 1992. AnnaPolitkovskaya, the journalist who pressedPutin hardest, was shot dead in her ownapartment building in 2006, after years of re-peated arrests, threats, and in one case, at-tempted poisoning.” (The Atlantic, April2014)Detailed statistics provided by the Commit-tee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) do indeedsupport these claims. (Akhmednabiyev,Beketov & Gekkiyev)

It wouldn’t be completely inaccurate to thinkof Russia as an American surveillance stateon PEDs (performance-enhancing drugs). It’sasserted that “over the last two years, theKremlin has transformed Russia into a sur-veillance state—at a level that would havemade the Soviet KGB (Committe for State Se-curity) envious.” (Borogan and Soldatov,2013) The 2014 Winter Olympic Games inSochi demonstrated Russia’s resurgent sur-veillance state. The System of Operative-In-vestigative Measures (SORM) was Russia’sstrategy to legally analyze all electronic traf-fic and it was used to its maximum extent atthe Games. The U.S. Department of State is-sued travel warnings to Americans travelingto Sochi to watch the Games, giving advicesuch as “sanitizing” electronic devices, re-straining from using local wireless internet,and considering the use of “burn phones”and destroying materials when leaving thecountry.

“over The lasT Two years,The Kremlin has Transformed

russia inTo a surveillance sTaTe—aT a level ThaT would have made

The sovieT KgB envious”


Joshua Kopstein noted in ‘Sochi’s OtherLegacy’ that drones, soldiers, surveillanceblimps, thousands of cameras, and high-techscanning devices were also used. (NewYorker, February 2014)

Naturally, this surveillance state extends farbeyond Sochi. According to Soldatov andBorogan, the Russian government has tight-ened its grip on the country in the name ofnational security and safety. Seven investiga-tive and security agencies have beengranted permission to legally intercepteverything from phone calls to emails, withthe FSB establishing the procedures. What’smore, these agencies are only required toshow warrants (once obtained) to their su-periors in the FSB; the parties being investi-gated have no right to see the warrant,unlike in the United States. The FSB itself hascontrol centers directly connected to com-puter servers and their usage of SORM sys-tems has increased. These surveillancemethods are not restricted to Russian citi-zens, either.

British Journalist Luke Harding claimed in2014 that he was constantly followed aroundMoscow when he lived there, his flat was re-peatedly broken into by FSB agents (whopurposely left clues to let him know who itwas), and that Russian agents made it clearthat they were eavesdropping once by cut-ting phone service after he made jokesabout President Putin. The author was finallykicked out of Moscow in 2011 after livingthere for four years.Aside from this, it is clearthat other states, such as the British govern-ment, know that the FSB targets foreigndiplomats using the same techniques. TheFSB and the Russian surveillance state,driven by the Putin administration’s Soviet-style political maneuvers, has seen a resur-gence particularly in the last decade. This isa divergent path from that of the Americanintelligence community, which, while it maybe no less controversial in it activities aroundthe globe, is certainly more beholden to do-mestic laws and the system of checks andbalances hallmarked in American democ-racy, thereby rendering it open to debateand criticism.

KazaKhstanUnsC 2017-2018

azakhstan, in an attempt to build its repu-tation as mediator and the leading countryin Central Asia, is seeking a position on the15-member nonpermanent United Na-tions Security Council for 2017-2018.

Kazakhstan outlined its global priorities for its posi-tion on the prestigious governing and security bodyvia the “Kazakhstan: United Nations Security Council2017-2018” web site. Kazakhstan’s priorities are: foodsecurity, water security, energy security and nuclearsecurity. The campaign for Kazakhstan’s seat for 2017-2018 launched in September 2014; the Governmentof Kazakhstan declared its candidacy for the seat on1 June 2010. A promotional video was also releasedin late 2013.The four priorities are vital to the stability of the Cen-tral Asia states particularly the issue of water securityas the Aral Sea is nearly depleted and diplomatic spatsbetween Uzbekistan and Tajikistan over water re-sources and the Rogun Dam.

K


SAMANTHA BRLETICHMD Advisory Board Member

Samantha Brletich is a current graduate student studying peace operations policy atGeorge Mason University, Arlington, VA. Ms. Brletich focuses on Russia and Central

Asia focusing on extremism and terrorism, regional relations, strategic relations,Kyrgyz and Western relations, and governance.

Ms. Brletich is an employee of the US Department of Defense.

Water and energy security are the mostprominent as the Central Asia states are pri-marily land locked developing countries andare resource rich. Many attempts have beenmade by Kazakhstan to rectify this issuethrough agreements: Concerning Use ofWater and Energy Resources in Syr DaryaRiver Basin (1998); A Kazakh-Chinese JointCommission on the Use and Protection ofTransboundary Rivers has been founded toregulate the use of water resources withChina and resuscitating the Aral Sea. Kaza-khstan’s Working Paper for the UNSC is al-ready available on Kazakhstan’s UNSCwebsite.

Kazakhstan’s current international commit-ments (even if unmet) and current programsare consistent with UNSC priorities: Initiatedthe Congress of Leaders and Traditional Re-ligions, Launched the Conference on Inter-action and Confidence Building Measures inAsia (CICA), and held the chairmanship of theOrganization of Islamic Cooperation and theOrganization for Security and Cooperation inEurope (OSCE) in 2010.

Kazakhstan maximizes the benefits of high-profile positions in seemingly low-level andweak organizations and committees. Whilethe Chairmanship of the OSCE should not bedownplayed— as Kazakhstan is a consoli-dated autocracy and the first former SovietRepublic to hold the position— the OSCEhas been perceived as weak and unable toenforce its mandate and compliance.

The organization failed to hold countries ac-countable for their human rights violationsand make headway on transparency. Havinga human rights violator (Kazakhstan) as thelead for Europe’s primary watchdog groupwas expected to damage the OSCE’s reputa-tion. Kazakhstan’s location in a “rough neigh-borhood” made Kazakhstan a greatcandidate “to advance the organization’smandate, invigorate efforts to settle existingconflicts, and generate discussions on im-portant security, economic, and human de-velopment matters” according to the Centerfor Strategic and International Studies. Kaza-khstan’s legacy was adding a “Eurasian di-mension,” by “highlighting security problemsstemming from the Afghan conflict, poten-tial failed states, destabilizing economic andenvironmental problems, and vexing humanrights issues.”

Kazakhstan has failed to implement the prin-ciples of OSCE and its own commitments.Human rights in Kazakhstan before and afterthe OSCE chairmanship were poor. Journal-ists continued to be jailed, freedom ofspeech and religion is restricted, and thegovernment imprisons human rights de-fenders and activists. After Kazakhstan’s 2010chairmanship, the country struggles to con-solidate democratic reforms, create a multi-political party system, guarantee freedom ofpress/speech and human and political rightsfor all. Arbitrary detention is still rampant de-spite the government passing the NationalPrevention Mechanism on Torture in 2014according to Human Rights Watch. Laws es-tablished to support human rights aresophistry and are never enforced, but arepassed to make it appear that Kazakhstan isupholding its obligations. Kazakhstan hasmade great strides compared to many of itsneighbors falling behind and struggling withimplementing basic governance.

KazaKhstan’s priorities are:food seCUrity, water seCUrity,

energy seCUrity andnUClear seCUrity


Kazakhstan is scooping up high-profile chair-manships in regional organizations for twoprimary reasons: to advance Kazakhstan’simage as a peacemaker and mediator; andto fulfill President Nazarbayev’s vision forKazakhstan of being the “Eurasian Bridge,”linking Asia to Europe. With a track record ofhigh participation in international organiza-tions, Kazakhstan can benefit from and buildlasting trade and political and economic re-lationships. Obtaining the UNSC seat rein-forces Nazarbayev’s multi-vector foreignpolicy and adds diversity to the Asia bloc ofcountries of the 15 member UNSC.If granted the 2017-2018 UNSC seat, Kaza-khstan would be able to move beyond its re-gional problems while addressing globalissues most importantly nuclear security andenergy security.

Kazakhstan has experience with globalthreats (nuclear security), extremism, andterrorism. This includes, but not limited to,renewing and strengthening arms controlagreements, cracking down on organizedcrime involving nuclear materials, and nego-tiating intra-regional water agreements/arrangements in Central Asia. Kazakhstan’shistory with nuclear work can be consideredsoft diplomacy: passing the annual “Interna-tional Day Against Nuclear Tests” (29 August);and starting the NGO, the ATOM project,aimed at stopping nuclear testing and tobring awareness about the physical and en-vironmental devastation caused by nucleartesting.Kazakhstan, while pursuing these initiatives,offers the UNSC non-permanent SecurityCouncil distinct advantages.

Kazakhstan would expectedly act as a medi-ator, but many members such as Russia andChina, may attempt to exploit Kazakhstan’smembership, calling on Kazakhstan for sup-port, as China and Russia tend to veto andblock actions by other UNSC members. Kaza-khstan, in such a scenario, would most likelyabstain or make the decision reinforcing its“mediation” stance. This would be no sur-prise to Russia. From an international secu-rity perspective (beyond the issue of nuclearterrorism), Kazakhstan aligns itself with Rus-sia-led organizations as they primarily dealwith regional issues such as separatism, ex-tremism, and terrorism. Kazakhstan wouldalso serve as the outlier of the Soviet states(along with the Baltics) that is able to dis-agree with Russia without retaliation. As a re-sult of the multi-vector foreign policy,Kazakhstan has friendly (or stable) relation-ship with most P5 members.

India supports Kazakhstan’s seat on the 15member UNSC as “both leaders affirmedtheir commitment to the negotiations oncomprehensive reform of the council.” Ac-cording to the Astana Times, “Nazarbayev re-iterated his country’s support for India’sapplication to be a permanent member ofthe expanded UN Security Council.” If bothIndia and Kazakhstan were to become mem-bers, their policies would be mutually rein-forced as India is recognizing the strategicimportance of Central Asia and in recentmonths increased relations with Kazakhstan.India became a full member of the SCO on11 July 2015. Kazakhstan’s and India’s pres-ence on the council would challenge the no-tion that developing countries or “countriesin transition” are unable to fulfill the role ofpower players and would balance out the P5.As global issues are no longer dominated bya hegemon or a bipolar power structure andcooperation is conducted on a regional level,the UNSC membership is expected to reflectthe shift.

Kazakhstan’s relations and memberships areon a regional level, but memberships in or-ganizations like the SCO, CSTO, and the EAEUhave not provided Kazakhstan the opportu-nity to make impactful decisions and authorsubstantial policy. Kazakhstan relies on bilat-eral or multilateral relationships and organi-zations to execute its policy or to projectideas. Kazakhstan’s involvement with organ-izations like the SCO and CSTO have beennarrowly focused primarily on economicsand security respectively and often Russiaand China set the agenda. Debate continuesover the proportionality of representationand “geopolitical shifts have led to the radi-cal changes in the distribution of power, in-terstate interactions on the global playingfield, economic fluctuations, and the growthof political confidence of rising nations.”

Kazakhstan within the last ten years has in-creased participation and has expanded itsreach not only through natural resourcemarkets and trade, but also diplomatically.Kazakhstan’s further integration is demon-strated accession to the World Trade Organ-ization. Mediating high level talks betweenSyrian rebels (late May 2015), Iran NuclearTalks (February and April 2013), and theUkraine Peace Talks with individual leaders(Putting and Poroshenko) the NormandyGroup—France, Germany, Russia, andUkraine. The talks in Kazakhstan in Februaryand April 2013 made little progress, but werelauded by the Kazakhstan Government asAstana has “consistently advocated forpeaceful dialogue and negotiations” and

“Kazakhstan “was proud to have made apractical contribution to the negotiations onIran’s nuclear [program.]”Kazakhstan may not be able to convinceRussia or China on many pressing global se-curity issues, but Kazakhstan’s participationon the UNSC might mitigate some tension.It is unlikely that Kazakhstan’s participationwould end badly for Kazakhstan as many ofthe agitators on the P5—China and Russia—have too much to lose to endanger theirdiplomatic relations with Kazakhstan. Bywinning a seat on the UNSC, Kazakhstan willbe able to continue its policies it wished toimplement during time overseeing the OSCEto better its country and nations facing thesame issues.

The RebiRThof The PaTRiaRch

of Moscow

he Orthodox Church and the Christian tradi-tion have always assumed a role of primaryimportance in Russian history and tradition.The origins of Christianity in Russia go backto 988 and coincide with the baptism of

Prince Vladimir the Great. He had come to Constan-tinople, following which the evangelization of thePrincipality Kievan Rus’ started. The latter included thespace currently occupied by the areas of Russia, theUkraine and Belarus, considered the predecessor ofthe Russian Empire. Formed by Igor in 882, the Princi-pality Kievan Rus’ is the first political form organisedby the Oriental Slav tribes placed on those territories.This gave rise to the common orthodox faith and theRussian people’s sense of national belonging.Retracing the path of the Principality one can indeedobserve that the Orthodox Christian Faith was imme-diately embraced by those populations. It also suc-ceeded in asserting itself in the Eastern zones, wherethere was strong pagan influence.

T


DR FILIPPO ROMEO

Director of the “Infrastructure and Territorial Development”Programme, IsAG Rome.

This barely digested the advent of the newcreed and accompanied their evolution, act-ing as a stalwart for the Country’s nationaland cultural identity. Orthodoxy is evengranted with Scripture, which is surely a cul-ture’s fundamental principle. It was intro-duced via the spread of Christianity amongthe Slav tribes through the creation of theCyrillic characters due to two great saints,Cyril and Methodius. It also constituted theprerequisite for the political and cultural de-velopment of the Principality of Kiev, leavinga heritage that would last even after its dis-integration.

Indeed, following the collapse of the SovietUnion, Orthodox religion regained that roleit traditionally enjoyed.To understand the extent of this phenome-non, one can analyze some statistics carriedout by the International Social Survey Pro-gramme:“Russians return to religion, but notto Church 10/02/2014” relating to the num-ber of the faithful in the Country between1988 and 2008.

If in 1988, before the collapse of the SovietUnion, the Russian Orthodox Churchcounted 67 dioceses, 21 monasteries, 6,893parishes, 2 academies and 3 theologicalseminars.

In 2008 it counted 133 dioceses, over 23,000parishes, 620 monasteries (including 298male ones), 322 convents, 5 academies and32 theological seminars, 43 schools for sem-inary preparation, 1 theological institution, 2orthodox universities and 2 female diocesantheological schools.

Examining the data also reveals that be-tween 1991 and 2008, the share of Russianadults considering themselves orthodox hadgrown from 31% to 72%, while the share ofthe Russian population not consideringthemselves religious had dropped from 61%to 18%. However, research carried out by theInternational Social Survey Programme alsoreveals that the return to religion does notcorrespond to its practice. The researchdemonstrates two substantial facts: only onein ten of those declaring themselves reli-gious attended mass at least once a month;the growth in practisers was ridiculous whencompared to that in believers. The latter is borne out by the fact that from1991 to 2008 it was just 5 percent, goingfrom 2% to 7%.

The growth in the population towards thevarious religious affiliations was also ana-lyzed over various demographic groups. Thisanalysis revealed that from 1991 to 2008there was an increase of around 38% inwomen approaching Orthodox religion,going from 43% to 81%; and an increase of46% in men, going from 17% to 63%. It alsoreveals that the increase in identificationwith Orthodox religion grew by 43% inyouthful groups, aged between 16 and 49,going from 26% in 1991, to 69% in 2008, andby 39% amongst those aged over 50, goingfrom 40% in 1991 to 79% in 2008. One mayfurther register that approach to the Ortho-dox Faith grew substantially in the popula-tion with a high level of education, and inparticular graduates.

exaMining The daTa also RevealsThaT beTween 1991 and 2008, The shaRe

of Russian adulTs consideRingTheMselves oRThodox had gRown

fRoM 31% To 72%, while The shaRe ofThe Russian PoPulaTion

noT consideRing TheMselves Religioushad dRoPPed fRoM 61% To 18%.


This can be augmented by the facts that in2008, women of faith were the majority andpracticing more than men, and that theover-70s were a more religious group thanthe youngsters. Reference to age therefore,highlights that the elderly form the most re-ligious: 82% of the over-70s declare they areorthodox, in comparison with 77% of peopleaged between 50 and 69 and 74% of thoseaged between 30 and 49. Finally, the 62% ofyouths aged between 16 and 29 remains.Although the above-mentioned study dis-plays a clear discrepancy between the prac-ticing and non-practicing faithful, the greatrebirth of orthodoxy in the Russian peoplecannot be denied. In this regard, it is inter-esting to quote the episode of great massparticipation occurring in November 2011.

Three million Muscovites, facing the coldand rain, poured onto the streets to veneratethe belt of the Virgin. This had benn broughtfrom Mount Athos to the Cathedral of Christthe Saviour (the church destroyed by Stalinand substituted by a pool, but rebuilt in afew years under El’cin).There is no doubt that this rebirth was sup-ported by the collaboration between theChurch and political power. This significantlygrew over time and intensified on the occa-sion of two events in particular: the electionof Archbishop Cyril Somolensk as patriarchof Moscow and all Russia in 2009, andVladimir Putin’s return to power in 2012.The Orthodox church's policies can actuallybe easily reconciled with Putin’s vision andhis strong call to the Country’s traditions.

Patriarch Alexei II had already set himselfclearly apart from the Western concepts of“human rights” and “globalization”, consider-ing them unsuited to Russian specifics. Fur-ther, Cyril I, his successor, issued the“Declaration of Human Rights of Russia’s Or-thodox church”, after repudiating the West-ern Universal Declaration of Man’s Rights.

The intensification of relations betweenChurch and State has become even more ev-ident in recent years. Indeed, on the forth an-niversary of the nomination of Patriarch Cyril,the Kremlin explicitly wished for the Ortho-dox church to raise its beneficent role in so-ciety. In a meeting between the State andreligious exponents, held on 11 February2013, Putin also underlined the need to givethe Orthodox church more space. This ex-tended, to political questions regarding mat-ters like the family, education of youths andthe patriotic spirit. With reference to defend-ing these values, in particular the family, Rus-sia has often wished to confirm and remarkdefending traditional, natural values ofhuman society. To this end it has underlined its conceptionof “family” – understood as the basic elementin ordered development for State and soci-ety – and the realization of a political and so-cial strategy favouring it. These havedecisively contributed to inverting the verynegative demographic trend afflicting theCountry over the last decades, warding offout-and-out social disaster. If one considersthat the “demographic Winter” striking Rus-sia around 1991 to 2005 is now a commonsituation in most European states, there canbe no doubt that the Russian model consti-tutes an international example.Keeping these facts in mind, in some alarm-ing cases the attempt to define and orientStates’ policies supporting families andyoung mothers is even more important andcurrent.

It aims to guarantee correct demographicdevelopment, crucial for effect on theprocess of State's main internal and externalpolicy. In this regard, President Putin hasoften insisted how humanity today clasheswith very serious challenges, like continuousattacks on the institution of the family. Thisexplains why Putin’s Russia is very interestedin demographic and family matters. Protect-ing the rights and interests of families, moth-erhood and childhood is a priority for publicauthorities. This actively support and en-courage politics and initiatives in theirfavour: they, benefit from the close collabo-ration with non-governmental organisationsand voluntary citizen associations. Russia’sobjective is to defeat this long-lasting demo-graphic deficit, by reaching a fertility rate of2,1 instead of its current 1,7.Indeed, for the Russian authorities the prob-lem of birth reduction cannot only be attrib-uted to the economic sphere. It has deeper,cultural roots hence the need to intervene inthe fields of education and information too.On many occasions, both Putin and PatriarchCyril have emphasised that the globalised fi-nancial system caused the world economiccrisis as of 2008, creating and making hege-monic speculative, parasitical financing. It isalso responsible for the ethical, moral yield-ing developing internationall to create adangerous ‘tendency to destroying humansociety’. This moral crisis had exacerbated atendency to selfishness and individualism.These phenomena appear in Russia as the“social orphan”: 80% of abandoned childrennormally have both parents, who intention-ally choose not to bring them up.One may further note that a new agreementbetween the Church and the Counts’ Courtwas recently signed at Moscow. It aimed toraise morale in Russia, impaired by corrup-tion, a real blight there; and safeguard thenational spiritual, historical and cultural her-itage, necessary for the social good.

On the occasion of signing, Patriarch Cyrildeclared that “The work of the Counts’ Courthas a substantial impact on society’s moralclimate. We know that corruption degradeshuman beings. And if corruption reaches asignificant extent, it erodes the healthy fabricof society and undermines the basis of theState.”In fact, for Cyril, the “current vices, connectedwith theft of public and state property” areattributed to the difficulties faced by thepopulation in the ’90’s and early 2000’s. Theyare, “the collapse of the economy, the de-struction of certain ideals and the attempt tocreate new ones”.For these reasons, the Kremlin considers theChurch a fundamental ally to preserve Rus-sia’s spiritual and cultural identity. Politicsand the Church are intertwined: the Kremlinneeds to promote the Church as an organrepresenting the nation’s values to regroupconsensus; it is opportune for the Church tocollaborate with politics to promote choicesprotecting the family and safeguarding pub-lic morality

With reference to safeguarding life, the Or-thodox church has worked hard to explainthat abortion is nothing but the killing of aninnocent human being. The work of many NGOs promote the pro-lifecause in Russia.Another emblematic case of the commonpolitical strategy linking the Orthodoxchurch and the Kremlin is the anti-blas-phemy. This was adopted following theepisode of three feminist activists, Pussy Riot,who played in the Cathedral of Christ theSaviour in Moscow. Their rock music, blas-phemous in character, was performed on theplatform of the altar, to protest againstPutin’s policy. For the secular authorities thegesture was considered as one by hooligansor vandals; for the Ecclesiastical leaders itwas blasphemous profanity.

Further, the Church supported the new reg-ulations limiting access to abortion; andPutin's law forbidding the publication of ma-terial portraying homosexuals, lesbians, bi-sexuals and transsexuals.

The Orthodox church’s action also spreadsinternationally, appearing as the promoterof dialogue between different religions andcultures. Patriarch Cyril actually stated theneed to build orthodox geopolitics, in linewith Putin’s foreign policy. To favour this role, the "Inter-Religious Coun-cil of the Russian Federation" and its analo-gous "Inter-religious Council of the CSI"(Community of Independent states) were setup in 1998. Orthodox Christians, 230 millionin all, include: countries orthodox by tradi-tion (Belarus, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Georgia,Greece, Macedonia, Moldavia, Montenegro,Romania, Russia, Serbia, the Ukraine), withtheir own orthodox national Churches, coun-tries containing orthodox ethnic-cultural mi-norities (Albania, Czech Republic, Finland,Poland, Slovakia), and countries containingorthodox faithful, principally in Western Eu-rope. Patriarch Cyril often visits countriesfrom the former Soviet belt to consolidatecultural, religious, but also political relations.The Orthodox church moves in the formerSoviet area, which the Kremlin aims to re-group.

All this, supports the government's foreignpolicy, continually appealing to a shared val-ues between the “sister nations” with “aunique story, a unique Church and uniquefuture”.To understand the importance one may referto Eirini Patsea' article, “Church diplomacy:Greece, Russia and beyond”.The author stresses that “after the dissolutionof the Soviet Union, the Orthodox post-So-viet states chose to submit to the spiritualleadership of the Ecumenical Patriarchate ofConstantinople; not the Patriarchate ofMoscow. It was important, for those statesand for their western interlocutors, that theycut the cord from the ROC and the Sovietpolitics”.With reference to foreign policy, the situa-tion lived in the Ukraine following the con-flict is also interesting. In this countryOrthodox church exponents were submittedto pressure from the Ukraine’s new “nation-alist” authorities and other organisations.The latter wished to take over faculties totransfer the clergy depending on theMoscow Patriarch under the Kiev Patriarch(the latter not recognised, not even by theConstantinople Patriarch). In this regard itshould be stressed that the Ukraine countsthe highest number of orthodox parishesafter Russia.To conclude, it is fundamental to underlinethat this type of collaboration betweenChurch and state has facilitated the rebirthof faith in Russia. It is possible in the tradi-tional acephalus-national reality of Ortho-doxy, which has made the “symphonic”Caesaropapism the true foundation of Russ-ian identity for centuries. It is then clear thatthe model cannot be exported. However, theNational character of the orthodox Ecclesi-astical reality has not hindered the possibilityof an “orthodox ecumenism” open to inter-national dialogue between cultures and re-ligions.

Soft power aS a threatto a hard power

012 was fruitful for Russian legislators and painful for the NGOs. That year marked the series of laws threatening the fragile civil society in the country: penalties for violation of the law on assembly

were toughened, defamation criminalized, and NGOs receiving foreign funding forced to register as “foreign agents”. Later on the State Duma passed another law expanding the notions of "espionage" and "treason" as crimes that include “any financial, technical,advisory and other assistance to a foreign state or an inter-national organization, as part of any activities directedagainst the security of Russian Federation”.

The NGO law: theoryThe law states that Russian nonprofits that receive "fundingor material support from foreign states, international andforeign organizations" and engaged in "political activities"are endowed with the status of a “foreign agent”.

2

NINA LAVRENTEVA

MD Russia Editor

Nina Lavrenteva is finishing her Master studies in “History of international relationsand integration processes: cross-border cooperation” at the Institute of Political

Studies, the University of Strasbourg. Previously she finished BAin International Relations at the State University of Tyumen, Russia

Also, any materials published or distributedby those organizations, even online, shouldbe marked as “published by the organizationperforming functions of a foreign agent”. Incase if an NGO refuse to register or provideany information on its finances, it may face aconsiderable fine and its representativecould be imprisoned. The law significantly complicates the proce-dure of financial reporting and also givesgrounds for unscheduled inspections.

The essential drawback of the law is that thedefinition of "political activity" is ratherblurry.

According to the lawmakers it includes any"political action or influence on public opin-ion aiming to change a policy". Russian leg-islation does not provide a clear definition ofthese concepts and thus gives the freedomof interpretation to the authorities. However, activities in the field of science andeducation, culture, health, environment, so-cial protection of citizens are exempt fromthe law as they are not “political”.

FARA: Is the US Russia’s role model?In response to criticism of the law Russian of-ficials contend that the same law exists in theUnited States, which proves that this kind oflegislative act may be adopted in a demo-cratic state. Indeed, the Russian NGO lawseems to be “copied” from the American For-eign Agents Registration Act (FARA) – it con-templates almost the same terminology andconcepts and provides similar penalties forits violation. Both American FARA and theRussian NGO claim to “increase trans-parency”. A law, however, cannot be evalu-ated outside the context of its implementation practices.

FARA was adopted in 1938 and aimed to pro-tect the Americans from foreign propagandaduring the war. It required that the “agents”representing interests of foreign powers inthe US politics have to disclose their ties withforeign governments and information onfunding. Since then the law was several timesamended, concepts specified, and the bur-den of proof elaborated. It has become socomplicated that actually just a few criminalprosecution cases made it through the end.However, the most substantial distinction ofFARA is that it primarily aims to disclose theforeign lobby that promotes its political in-terests in Congress and not any organizationreceiving funding from abroad.

The NGO law: practiceAs the law came into force more than a thou-sand NGOs have been subjected to unsched-uled inspections and searches, many of themgot “warnings” that their activity is "political"and should be changed. Some organizations have been charged withadministrative offences and fines, and theirleaders prosecuted as they refused to enterthe roster of Foreign Agents at the Ministryof Justice.

the ruSSian nGo lawSeemS to be “copied”

from the americanforeiGn aGentS

reGiStration act (fara)– it contemplateS almoSt

the Same terminoloGyand conceptS and provideS

Similar penaltieSfor itS violation


The first organization to be recognized as a"foreign agent" was the Golos Association(“voice” or “vote”), Russia’s biggest organiza-tion protecting electoral rights. It had to paya big fine and suspend work for severalmonths but eventually they managed to winthe court case.Many Russian non-profits obtain fundingthrough foreign grants and even though inmany cases it is only a few percent of abudget, the government sees it as a reasonto suggest that the organization representsinterest of a foreign power. Lack of financingis quite a big problem for many of the Russ-ian NGOs. Before the bill became law,Vladimir Putin claimed that public fundingfor nonprofits will be increased.

Later it was confirmed by Prime MinisterDmitry Medvedev – he said that the govern-ment will support the NGOs, however, as-suming "their activity is useful and positivefor the country".

The same year the “foreign agents” law wasadopted, the United Stated Agency for Inter-national Development (USAID), one of thebiggest donors for the Russian nonprofitshalted its activities in the country. Besides,the government lunged at some of the inter-national organizations – Russian office of theTransparency International and bureau ofthe Nordic Council of Ministers which sus-pended its work this year were forced toenter the “foreign agents” roster.

The inclusion of the Dynasty Foundation inthe list of the “foreign agents” and its subse-quent closure produced a strong public re-action. The organization is the first familynonprofit foundation in Russia. Created by abusinessman and scientist Dmitry Zimin itsupported talented scientists and educa-tional projects. Mainly, the organization wasfinanced from his private funds. The Founda-tion gave scholarships and grants to stu-dents and young professionals, supportedschool teachers of exact sciences, organizedpublic lectures, developed a program ofshort-term visits of foreign scientists to Rus-sia. The Dynasty also financed the “LiberalMission” Foundation which conducted re-searches on economic and political issues.Apparently, this was a good reason to con-sider its activities as “political”. Unexpectedly,several environmental organizations we alsoincluded in the Foreign Agents lists.

The law was applied on many organizationspromoting human rights and civil society,gender equality, and independent mediaworking in the domains of social protectionand assistance to refugees and displacedpeople. Among them are the prominenthuman rights center "Memorial" which wasoriginally concentrated on the history of po-litical repressions in the Soviet Union, the fa-mous “Levada – Center”, independentsociological research organization, " TheCommittee against Torture", and "Perm -36",the founder of Russia's only museum of thehistory of political repressions created on theterritory of the former Gulag.

As the Russian paratroopers were detainedin the Eastern Ukraine, “the Saint-PetersburgCommittee of Soldiers' Mothers” which re-ceived the complaints from the families ofthose who were allegedly involved in theconflict, was recognized as a “foreign agent”.The organization claims that it hadn’t re-ceived any foreign funding.

Soft power as a threat to a hard powerA person familiar with the political history ofRussia can easily notice that the Kremlin onboth official and unofficial levels more andmore actively uses the Soviet phraseology.The expression "foreign agent" had stuck inideological memory of a Russian - accordingto polls this phrase is perceived as the anal-ogy with the terms like "spy", "enemy", or"traitor” even among the younger genera-tion. The ”foreign agent" terminology usedin the text of the law, thus, clearly functionsas a pointer - the enemy can sabotage thecountry from within.

As the Kremlin began to hunt down “unsuit-able” NGOs, some organizations terminatedtheir activities or had to change legal forms.Many do not agree to accept the new“shameful” status and continue to presscharges against the Ministry of Justice. Someof the NGOs filed complaints in the Euro-pean Court of Human Rights. The persecu-tion of the independent non-governmentalorganizations continues. In May this year thenew law was adopted according to whichany foreign or international NGO “whichthreaten the national security” can be recog-nized as “undesirable” and banned from con-ducting its activities in Russia. The AmericanNational Endowment for Democracy (NED)became the first one in the blacklist. Afterthe law was introduced one of the largest USprivate nonprofits, The MacArthur Founda-tion, announced its closure in Russia.

ReimagiNiNgThe gReaT Oil game

The Russia-OPeC-ameRiCa NexusBRIAN HUGHES

Brian Hughes is currently a student in the International Securityand Intelligence Studies program at Bellevue University

in Omaha, NE, USA.

he geopolitical implication to the sudden fallin oil prices has had broad-reaching ramifica-tions for a number of very powerful countries.Two of those countries, Russia and Saudi Ara-bia, are the most important energy commod-

ity exporters in the world. The other, the US, is thesingle most crucial oil importer in the world. The pos-sibility of Russian fatalism awakening is very real as thecountry faces tightening sanctions, severely under-priced oil exports, and rapid inflation as militaryspending has increased. Similarly, Saudi Arabia’s diminishing currency reservesand its military adventurism in Yemen have manyquestioning how the economy can diversify to stabi-lize the budget. In the US, shale companies havelargely been cannibalized to consolidate power acrossfewer but larger corporations. At a time when theworld is increasingly looking at alternative energies tolower pollution and greenhouse gases, oil industrieshave drastically lowered prices to the detriment ofbudgets and investors. The question that loomsamong these oil producers: who will blink first?

T

The Organization of Petroleum ExportingCountries (OPEC), controlling over 40% ofthe global crude oil production, curiously re-fused to cut production while oil prices wereplummeting last summer, further exacerbat-ing the price fall. OPEC stated that the deci-sion was not politically based and that priceswere simply returning to ‘normal.’ OPEC’s de-cision to force prices lower in the wake of theworldwide glut confounded oil market pun-dits. Many looked to shale oil for a formidable ex-planation. Producing over 5 million barrels aday, the US shale oil revolution has revital-ized the local economies of North Dakotaand Texas, while little regulation has allowedcompanies to produce at prodigious rates.This has lowered US oil imports and softenedthe influence of OPEC producers on US for-eign policy.

While OPEC may have wanted to deliver a se-vere blow to the shale oil companies, whooperate with smaller margins than tradi-tional producers, the simple reality is thatOPEC was too late to react. Shale oil produc-tion increased since the drastic price collapselast year and has only recently shown signsof stagnation.

Large shale oil companies have repeatedlybought previously thriving small shale com-panies for pennies on the dollar as possiblebankruptcies have loomed. This consolidation of the shale industry hasprovided more oil fields for future explo-ration to companies that have the capital towait until prices again rise. While the USshale oil industry only accounts for roughly6% of the global oil market, OPEC’s decreas-ing reach into the US market may have initi-ated the production glut. Thus, while theprice decrease has recently slowed the shaleoil market, consolidations have kept the in-dustry alive.

The most intriguing geopolitical connectionwith oil prices collapsing is the Western sanc-tion regime on Russia. As inflation hit theRussian economy and protracted recessionweighed on Russian morale, OPEC rampedup production. Similarly, Russia has (as ofMay 2015) produced more oil since the endof the Soviet era. Interestingly, this economicstand-off brought the two biggest oil-pro-ducing countries (Saudi Arabia and Russia)to the bargaining table as Russia considerscloser ties to OPEC. This tantalizing prospectof a Russian-OPEC alliance has almost alwaysbeen an illusion since OPEC’s formation andwould drastically increase OPEC’s globalpower in determining oil prices. OPEC hasnever really trusted Russia and an alliancemay only form out of dire necessity. But that is something the United Stateswould staunchly oppose.

As Iran will likely demand greater regionalpower responsibility as the lifting of sanc-tions occur in coming months, Saudi Arabiawill find its close Western ties strained. Thus,a closer OPEC relationship with Russia wouldbe a geopolitical conundrum for the Westernworld as the Middle East once again facespossible political destabilization.

OPeC has NeveR ReallyTRusTed Russia

aNd aN alliaNCemay ONly fORm OuT

Of diRe NeCessiTy.BuT ThaT is sOmeThiNg

The uNiTed sTaTeswOuld sTauNChly OPPOse


Witnessing the difficulties of Russian naturalgas dependency in recent conflicts inUkraine, Georgia, and Estonia, an OPEC-Russ-ian alliance would control nearly half of theworld’s oil, with Russia becoming the likelyleading producer. This could echo the 1973 oil embargo, a timewhen OPEC controlled 53% of the world’s oiland subsequently handicapped Westerneconomies. With Russia continually lookingfor ways to damage Western economies andstrengthen its own geopolitical position,more Russian energy control would be de-plorable to the West. Contrary to the OPEC-Russian alliance is thesimple fact that such cooperation would fur-ther strain interrelations with Western

powers and would be a difficult politicalgamble for Saudi Arabia. As Westerneconomies are projected to continuallydwarf that of Russia for the foreseeable fu-ture, and with an apparent divide betweenthe US and Saudi Arabia regarding Iran, anyfurther strain would leave Saudi Arabia’sWestern relations questionable. However, asChina becomes the world’s major oil im-porter, Saudi Arabia has monopolized theChinese market and increased Chinese sales37% in the last year, while every other coun-try lost market share. However, Russia is un-likely to agree with any OPEC policy oflowered production while Saudi Arabia con-tinually strives for dominance in the covetedChinese market.

While market competition has surely de-creased oil prices, it remains the mostgeopolitically significant commodity in theworld by all measures. In this environment oflittle policy clarification and OPEC’s failure tohalt shale oil production, Russia has facedthe harshest conditions of all oil-producingcountries. Although Russia would benefitfrom an end to shale oil, its economy was al-ready facing difficult projections. VladimirPutin has had to balance his military adven-turism with economic difficulties, exacer-bated by the oil glut. In this way, Russia maybe aligned with Saudi Arabia in wanting todamage the US shale oil industry (and, at thesame time US oil giants, like Exxon), but hasmore to lose than Saudi Arabia. However,Saudi Arabia and Russia have deftly man-aged budgets, low debt (a meager 2% and18% respectively), and strong nationalism.While they would serve each other better aspartners in OPEC, the US cannot allow it andSaudi Arabia is, as of now, most unlikely tomake that gamble.

All countries involved have much to gainand, similarly, much to lose by way of oil. TheUS will be the last to consider any kind ofradical action in the oil market as low pricesserves the White House’s policy for the mo-ment. Russia has little history of giving intoforeign pressures and most likely will adaptto lower oil prices. Saudi Arabia, as the leader of OPEC, will mostlikely act first to balance its budget. Whilethis will leave Russia to increase oil produc-tion if OPEC lowers theirs, it may be the onlyworkable political solution. As of now, however, production remainshigh as all sides stare down each other anddecide which direction is the best directionto take. For the first time in a long time, be-cause of so many diverse geopolitical ma-neuvers happening at one time amongst theworld’s energy producers and consumers,the future of ‘status quo’ may indeed be veryuncertain.

turkMEnistan’sHuMan rigHts

rEcord

Exposing gEopolitical Moral rElativisM

ith all eyes on Iran, the human rightsabuses that continue in the repressivecountry of Turkmenistan have taken a backseat. Despite pressure from internationalNGOs and the U.S. Department of State’s

designation of Turkmenistan as a country with anabysmal human rights record, its regime has not reallydone much to address these issues. In fact, thingshave gotten worse in the last few years. Unlike other states that have a poor human rightsrecord, Turkmenistan enjoys quite a bit of prestige be-cause it has the fourth largest reserves of natural gasin the world and an impressive network of major gaspipelines that pass through it, terminating at its portsin the Caspian Sea. In fact, its foreign relations are con-tingent on its immense oil and natural gas holdings.State control of these resources is also what allowsTurkmenistan’s regime to keep a tight grip over its cit-izens.

W

JEANETTE “JJ” HARPER

Jeanette “JJ” Harper is a graduate studentin the International Security and Intelligence

Studies program at Bellevue Universityin Omaha, NE, USA.

Is Turkmenistan essentially getting a freepass? One has to wonder why North Korea isconsistently singled out for internationalcondemnation while Turkmenistan – withthe exception of a little head-butting withthe United States about how it should pro-ceed on the path towards democratic andeconomic reform – gets very little pushbackfrom global powers. In general, the publicknows at least something about North Koreabut knows virtually nothing about Asia’sother reclusive dictatorship. Most cannoteven identify Turkmenistan on a map.

While some might think it not entirely fair tocompare the isolated and tyrannical countryof North Korea with Turkmenistan, which isactively and largely cooperatively workingwith the other “Caspian 5” countries of Iran,Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan to pro-mote the oil and gas industries in CentralAsia, one thing is clear: Turkmenistan has ahuman rights problem that cannot continueto be ignored by the global community if thecountry expects to realize its full potential. Ithas already been passed up for valuable op-portunities that could have boosted its inter-national image and regional presence, all ofwhich would have been a direct benefit tothe Turkmen people.

For example, the European Bank for Recon-struction and Development (EBRD) has beenhesitant to invest in Turkmenistan’s busi-nesses because of its pervasive state inter-vention and state ownership. Even thoughprivate entrepreneurs and companies aregrowing in Turkmenistan, the country’s pri-vate sector is still very small and closely reg-ulated by the state. The Bank has plans tooffer financing to privately-owned compa-nies outside the oil and gas sectors (wheremost of the jobs are) to boost Turkmenistan’sfood processing and distribution, logistics,transport services, packaging, furniture, andhospitality sectors. But it wants the Turkmengovernment to meet specific benchmarks onpluralism and accountability, establishmedia freedoms, and improve its overallhuman rights record. With Turkmenistan’s in-credibly high unemployment rate – someeconomists believe it is somewhere around60% - the country cannot afford to pass upthis important opportunity. Until Turk-menistan’s government starts makingprogress on these issues, the EBRD’s engage-ment will remain limited.

The European Union has also expressed se-rious concerns about Turkmenistan’s humanrights situation, specifically on the issue of itsreported use of torture. They urged the Turk-men government to release information onthe status and location of prisoners whohave disappeared in detention, facilitateprison visits by international monitors and tocooperate with UN special procedures. TheEU also wants Turkmenistan to ease its re-strictions on Internet access, cease disman-tling satellite dishes, and lift excessiverestrictions on civil society. It requires Turk-menistan to stop interfering with the right tofreedom of expression, association, and reli-gion and to be more transparent on issuesregarding arbitrary evictions – like those thatare happening in the country’s deserted

unlikE otHEr statEstHat HavE a poor

HuMan rigHts rEcord,turkMEnistan Enjoys

quitE a bit of prEstigEbEcausE it Has tHE fourtH

largEst rEsErvEs ofnatural gas in tHE World


capital city of Ashgabat to make way formore white marble-clad monuments, hotels,and office buildings. The UN plans to reviewTurkmenistan’s progress on these issues bysometime next year. Unfortunately, even though Turkmen Presi-dent Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov regu-larly professes respect for peace, integration,and good-neighborliness – which he claimsare “essential for sustainable, stable and bal-anced international work” – the country isstill very much at risk of falling back into thebizarre totalitarian-style rule Turkmenistanknew under its previous president -Saparmurat Niyazov, a megalomaniac dicta-tor who ruled the country from 1985 to 2006– whose cult of personality rivals NorthKorea’s contemporary despotic dynasty. Ele-ments of this cult of personality still exist, asevidenced by the golden statues that dotTurkmenistan’s landscape. Alas,

Berdymukhamedov has also started to addsome of his own. President Berdymukhamedov – who “won”re-election with 97% of the vote in 2012 – isconsidered an improvement over his prede-cessor. Even though he did, to some degree,dismantle Niyazov’s personality cult, he isstill regarded by most as a despotic rulerwho represses minorities, has a deep distainfor basic freedoms, forces thousands of peo-ple to attend long events (with no breaks),and has zero tolerance for dissidents, jour-nalists, and organizers of political parties. Hisregime has closed the country off from bothgeopolitical and independent inspection,frequently dodges inquiries from concernedforeigners, imposes draconian restraints onmedia and religious freedoms, and practicesgovernment strong-arm tactics on activistswho dare to step forward to defend humanrights.

Despite claims by the president that therehave been reforms, imprisonment and/orforced labor are still being utilized as toolsfor political retaliation. It is feared many ofthese prisoners die or just “disappear” in cap-tivity. The country’s justice system lackstransparency and there is no due process.The government is known to monitor elec-tronic and telephone communications. Reli-gious freedom is nonexistent in thatunregistered religious groups or communi-ties are not allowed and fines are imposedfor unregistered religious activity. There arealso nasty rumors that children are beingtaken out of school to go to work harvestingcotton or to labor in other sectors. Despite all of this, there is hardly any de-mand globally for accountability. NGOs arebanned from doing anything until they areregistered. However, few independent NGOshave obtained legal registration in years. TheInternational Committee for the Red Crossdoes not have full access to Turkmen prisonsand Turkmenistan’s record of cooperationwith the UN and the International Labor Or-ganization is bleak.

To make matters worse, it appears Berdy-mukhamedov is intent on building a newpersonality cult to replace the one he hasslowly been trying to eradicate.While hisspeeches do receive positive reception at theregional level, questions still linger at the in-ternational level about how Turkmenistanwill handle its human rights issues in the fu-ture and how the country will manage itsmassive resources under Berdymukhame-dov’s one-party, dynastic leadership. If Turkmenistan cannot get important thingsdone – like industrial privatization, marketliberalization, fiscal and legal reforms – thecountry will not be able to attract foreigntrade and investment like the prosperousand sovereign state it has the potential tobecome should.

Unfortunately, that motivation may rest withthe global community to forcefully make it amajor Turkmen priority. So far, that global re-sponsibility has been weak at best andlaughable at worst. Perhaps the greatest dif-ference in terms of human rights attentionbetween North Korea and Turkmenistan isthe former’s ownership of nuclear weaponsand nuclear technology. While this is nosmall matter, it is disappointing to see the in-ternational community basically sending amessage to the rest of the world that theonly time it will truly care about basic civilliberties and human dignity in oppressivecountries is when said countries actuallyhave the capability of causing damage ordoing harm to people other than their own.In short, if all Turkmenistan is interested in ishurting Turkmen, that is acceptable to out-side observers. This inhumane example ofgeopolitical moral relativism must be endedat the global level. For the message it sendsis heard far beyond the borders of CentralAsia’s own Hermit Kingdom.

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KazaKhstan’swto MEMbErshipEnd of an odyssEy or nEw LEap forward?

azakhstan applied to join the World TradeOrganization (WTO) in January of 1996.Twenty long years later (July 27, 2015), Pres-ident Nazarbayev signed the official ascen-sion documents in Geneva, making it the

162nd WTO member state. While assessing the impactof Kazakhstan’s entrance into the WTO is difficult atthis early stage, speculation is rampant given currentgeopolitical tension in Central Asia and the globalprice of oil. This article will attempt to contextualizethis decision by adding insight to three questions -why, why now, and what’s next?

Why?The WTO is an important stepping stone for legiti-macy and integration on the world stage. To some,most notably Kazakh economist Aidarkhan Khu-sainov, WTO membership is more comparable toUnited Nations membership, simply providing animage boost, rather than a substantive change inKazakh political economy.

K


EVAN THOMSEN

Evan Thomsen is a graduate of the International Security and IntelligenceStudies Program at Bellevue University in Omaha, NE and is currently

a Master’s student at the world-renown Elliott School of International Affairsat The George Washington University in Washington, DC.

He has just joined with the Eastern Congo Initiative as Strategic Partnerships Officer.

This diminished outlook is not the only posi-tion in Kazakhstan and around the world,however, as many believe that this move willopen up Kazakh markets, allow for increasedforeign investment, and diversify the largelyenergy-dependent and landlocked nation.Regardless of economic prognostications,Nazarbayev’s signature ultimately formalizedan already informal economic reality. AsNazarbayev himself said, “In the mid-1990s,Kazakhstan had ties only with post-Sovietstates, while now we are trading with 185countries of the world.” Kazakhstan’s ele-vated status into the WTO, therefore, is a bitmore pomp and circumstance, and less sub-

stantive change, as much of the Kazakheconomy has already been developed in theglobal arena for some time. Thus, WTO mem-bership is more about affirmation of deedsalready accomplished, than hope for poten-tial development somewhere far off in thefuture.

Why Now?Kazakhstan’s membership status in someways could always be seen as a foregoneconclusion. For example, more than 50% ofthe nation’s trade is with the EuropeanUnion. WTO membership, therefore, is a con-tinuation of a two-decade long process ofreal economic integration and reform, ratherthan a radical departure from it.

The significance of ‘now’ is less about Kaza-khstan’s economic reality and more aboutthe potential geopolitical and economicchallenges in the region.First, the global drop in the price of oil hashad a significant impact on the Kazakh econ-omy. WTO membership will not only providenew opportunities for investment and eco-nomic diversification, but greater flexibilityin global markets.

Second, U.S.-led sanctions on Russia have in-directly constrained Kazakhstan’s economy.Russia and Kazakhstan are more than tradepartners, but members of the Eurasian Eco-nomic Union (EEU), which features Kaza-khstan, Russia, and Belarus. Russia’seconomic woes have negatively affected thestrength of this union. Evidence of this froma political perspective is the renewed stresson WTO negotiations from both Kazakhstanand Belarus starting in 2013. Moreover, Rus-sia has gradually shown a willingness to sup-port these negotiations (Russia joined theWTO in 2012) rather than oppose them.

Third, the why now of this moment is repre-sentative of a broader desire for engage-ment in Central Asia, particularly betweenthose global players with higher stakes inthe region. We are far from a proliferation ofcooperation, but recent events have shownan environment in cautious conversationand optimistic consideration. WTO member-ship does not magically transform enemiesinto friends, but it does pave the way for amore solid process of enhanced cooperationbetween Kazakhstan and many other na-tions. What remains to be seen is whether this shiftis more representative of the dynamism ofthe landscape or the individual states? In thiscase, will we see motivated regional cooper-ation or cooperation in lieu of state capacityfor direct or unilateral action?

thE MEMbEr statEssiMuLtanEousLy

support and undErMinEthE organization

via individuaLizEdMicro-agEndas bEcausE of

thEir worriEs about thE tricKsEach Might pLay upon thE othEr


What’s Next?Economic projections range from the opti-mistic (new investment and development)to the pessimistic (job loss, wage decrease,and simply being out competed) to the apa-thetic (WTO is more about banal prestigeand less about workable policy). Any basiceconomic theory will show that increasedfree trade comes with benefits and draw-backs, where the effect on the state is ulti-mately determined by good governance.What is most clearly next is Kazakhstan’s op-portunity to diversify economically and havethat diversification feed into a new positivepolitical evolution. If the country is able tobroaden its economic capacity, then itsmembership in the WTO, at least in the shortterm, is a win, offering Kazakhstan an outletfrom energy export dependence.

If it is able to broaden that into real political(read: democratic) consolidation, then mem-bership in the WTO will have proven far moreinvaluable than anyone could have sur-mised. These potential geopolitical ramifica-tions and speculative regional suggestionsare what should be seen as the truly fascinat-ing, and still unknown mystery, of pendingWTO ascension. What Kazakhstan’s WTO entrance hopefullysuggests is less contestation and more coop-eration across Central Asian economies. TheEEU can be seen as strong evidence of this.Until very recently, the EEU was a barrier forKazakhstan’s entrance in the WTO. With Rus-sia and Kazakhstan now WTO members, andBelarus poised to follow, the EEU (which isRussian-led), has shown a clear willingnessto conform to global economic standards.

The EEU is thus now operating within the pa-rameters of the WTO. What remains to beseen is if there is a bigger or more politically-motivated strategy behind Russia’s coopera-tion. Put another way – how does this affectthe regional economic strategy of Russia’sso-called privileged area of influence? IsKazakhstan moving away from the regionalfold and into independence (or interdepend-ence) in the global market? The EEU is thus now operating within the pa-rameters of the WTO. What remains to beseen is if there is a bigger or more politically-motivated strategy behind Russia’s coopera-tion. Put another way – how does this affectthe regional economic strategy of Russia’sso-called privileged area of influence? IsKazakhstan moving away from the regionalfold and into independence (or interdepend-ence) in the global market?

This is not necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, itis quite a normal thing when considering in-ternational political economy. But there areboth acceptable ways of achieving those ad-vantages or privileges and non-constructiveways. In this case, a win for WTO liberal insti-tutionalism is a sign that both sanctions andthe regional economic landscape have lim-ited Russia’s influence and ability to projectpower arbitrarily. Russia can either adapt tothat reality and incorporate itself better intothat changing landscape or problematicallytry to fight such change. Time will tell exactlyhow that plays out.

To turn to Kazakhstan’s strategic outlook,however, WTO membership represents notonly a win for Nazarbayev’s ambitions, butfor Kazakhstan’s potential as a serious playeron the international stage. Being thestrongest economy of the former Sovietstates but also quite literally surrounded bygreat and regional powers, Kazakhstan hasbeen unable so far to cast a long geopoliticalshadow in any direction. I expect Kazakhstanto gradually fill this opportunity of potentialby trying to expand its own capacity and inso doing drafting more of an independent,rather than subservient, strategy to its largeimposing neighbor to the North. Hopefully,Kazakhstan will carve out that new role with-out incurring a heavy price militarily or interms of new economic regional conflict. Socongratulations, Kazakhstan, on the end ofyour 20-year odyssey. Here is to hoping aWTO with Kazakhstan turns into a win-win-win for all sides: Kazakhstan, Central Asia,and the global community.

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remaInIng rogue?

Iran and the

CaspIan ConsequenCes

of the JCpoa

ould the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action(JCPOA) create a pathway toward democ-racy in the Islamic Republic of Iran or is theUnited States investing in a nation whosepolitical portfolio has continually displayed

a diminishing return? We know that democratic na-tions tend to be less willing to engage in conflict andare generally more cooperative in the realm of inter-national relations. Moreover, democratic nations tendto be economically independent and more devel-oped, and are more likely to hold alliances with othernations. While this is political theory, there is a signifi-cant amount of weight behind its importance. Sohow could the JCPOA lead to the promotion ofdemocracy within Iran and the greater Caspian Re-gion?If we take the above-mentioned political theory of in-creased cooperation among democratic states andapply it to the diverse political environment of theCaspian region we observe a series of rivalries exacer-bated by political, economic, and religious ideologiesthat have remained as relics of the Soviet Era.

C


ANDY DEAHN

Andy Deahn is a 2015 graduate with a Bachelor of Science degree fromBellevue University’s International Security and Intelligence Studies program.

He is currently employed as a Field Service Engineer at the Sierra NevadaCorporation (SNC) providing aerial surveillance and intelligence analysis for the

Department of Defense throughout various worldwide locations. He had previouslyworked as Special Tactics-Tactical Air Control Party member in the U.S. Air Force

supporting Army Special Forces ground teams as a Joint Terminal Attack Controller.

Take, for example, the nations of Iran andAzerbaijan. Iran is a nation whose politicalstructure follows that of a theocracy, whichallows for a single “Supreme Leader” to exer-cise total ideological and political controlthroughout a system dominated by clericswho manage every function of the state.Iran is home to the world’s largest popula-tion of Shi’a Muslims, with its northernneighbor, Azerbaijan, home to the secondlargest. Due to their contiguity these twocountries share a mutual past and hold com-mon links between their cultures. Despitethis common culture—which should be astrong element for any relationship—thetwo nations are stuck in a continual paradoxof competition. The reasoning behind thiscompetition lies in the Islamic Republic ofIran’s ideologically-motivated foreign anddomestic agenda, where its version of ShiaIslam influences all aspects of political, social,and economic life.

Unlike Iran, which has observed multipleeconomic sanctions from the internationalcommunity, Azerbaijan has been the recipi-ent of over $967 million in U.S. foreign aid.The Obama administration has stated thatU.S. assistance to Azerbaijan is to developdemocratic institutions and civil society; sup-port the growth of economic sectors not re-lated to oil; strengthen the interoperabilityof the nation’s armed forces with NATO;

as well as increase maritime border security,combat terrorism, eliminate corruption, andprevent the growth of transnational crime.After the September 2001 terrorist attacks,Azerbaijan allowed U.S. over-flight of its air-space, as well as approved numerous land-ings and refueling operations at Baku'scivilian airport to assist coalition military op-erations occurring in Afghanistan. It was the threat of an emerging commonenemy—global terrorism—that created anew positive relationship between the twonations, regardless of cultural differencesand/or political structures.

These efforts have later become scrutinizedby mainly Iran and Russia—the other majorsuper power in the region—which signed apolitical declaration barring foreign mili-taries from having a presence in the CaspianSea region. This is a geostrategic attempt on behalf of

Iran and Russia to prevent Western influencein the smaller states making up the region.This is because Western support would un-doubtedly come in the form of developingthe trans-Caspian pipeline, a move thatwould diversify other littoral states’ (specifi-cally Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan) energydependence and break the monopoly ofRussia’s exports of natural gas to Europeancountries. Moreover, Tehran may observe aWestern presence in the Caspian Basin as anattempt to place more pressure on its long-term geostrategic ambitions, including thenuclear issue.

The international isolation of economic sanc-tions placed upon Iran by the United Statesand European Union (EU) severely crippledits petroleum-dependent economy. Afterdecades of failing economic polices drivenby religious ideology, Iran is now ranked lastout of fifteen countries in the Middle East-North Africa (MENA) region.

Could the agreement rouse a pathwayto demoCratIC promotIon wIthIn Iran

or Is the deal sImply a dIstraCtIonthat holds the potentIal to Create

more InstabIlIty In both the CaspIanregIon and the mIddle east?


While religious beliefs are a cultural trait andshould be embraced with deep convictionby any believer, Iran’s failure to separate reli-gious propaganda from economic, political,and social realities has fueled this decline.Moreover, these failures have impacted notjust Iran, but also the bordering states withinthe Caspian Region, with cascade effectsthroughout the MENA Region. The JCPOAwould undoubtedly lead to socio-economicdevelopments within Iran and create newdynamics--intentional or not--for theCaspian region. Despite the controversy sur-rounding the nuclear deal, it is these result-ant economic developments that couldpossibly create a pathway to democracywithin Iran.

However, when Iran has remained theworld’s largest state sponsor of terrorism de-spite the crippling sanctions, which seem tohave had little effect on quelling Iranian sup-port, can Iran be trusted to not utilize itsJCPOA-inspired economic advancement tofund or equip terror organizations more ef-fectively? Iran has previously deceived and defiedworld powers as well as covertly constructednuclear facilities throughout the last twodecades. And while Iranian leadership de-clared these nuclear pursuits peaceful, itsdisregard for democratic processes and co-operation with the international communityearned it the label of rogue nation.

I think the question that needs to be askedis whether the JCPOA will be ultimatelyhopeful diplomacy or political folly? Is theU.S. allowing a rogue state to increase its useof proxy forces to build regional hegemonyor is it leading said regime out of its ‘roguish-ness’?

The JCPOA has seen divided support amongthe political elites of both the U.S. and Iran.So could the agreement rouse a pathway todemocratic promotion within Iran or is thedeal simply a distraction that holds the po-tential to create more instability in both theCaspian region and the Middle East? I be-lieve there is a possibility of democracywithin Iran because of two hopeful dynam-ics. First, the historical and religious com-monalities shared between Azerbaijan andIran and the established partnership be-tween the U.S. and Azerbaijan prove thatdemocratic processes can gain ground evenin a radically ideological nation. Second, if the agreement is approved by theU.S. Congress, the socio-economic develop-ments that will arise from the lifting of sanc-tions and the economic opportunities forIranian citizens will likely produce both socialand political change, mostly from a bottom-up approach that is from the citizens them-selves.

Acceptance of the JCPOA could possibly es-tablish a pathway to renewed relations withthe hopeful prospect of promoting democ-racy within Iran, while a Congressional rejec-tion could aggravate historical grievancesdue to economic and political isolation.While either outcome will not be zero-sumin nature, the regional dynamics in trade, ter-rorism, and energy will be dramaticallyshaped through the consequential shifts inpower. These shifts could either exacerbatethe paradox of continual competition as ob-served in the Iranian-Azerbaijani model orlead to the acceptance of democraticprocesses through socio-economic develop-ments within Iran. For now only time will tellif Iran will continue to be an isolated nationor if constructive actions can create newAmerican engagement, proving the JCPOAwas a positive investment.

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