The British Journal of Psychology

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\

CambrtDgt:

PBINTED

BY

JOHN

CLAY,

M.A.

AT

THE UNIVEBSITY

PRESS.


9/459

CONTENTS

OF

VOL. III.

f^L

Parts 1

aiid

2.

December

^

1909.

The natural

history

of

experience. By

C. Lloyd Morgan

PAGE

1

Confluxion and

contrast

effects

in

the

Miiller-Lyer

illusion.

By

E. O.

Lewis.

(Seventeen

Figures.)

21

Colour

preferences

of school children.

By

W.

H.

Winch

.

42

On

monocular

visual

space.

By

W. Heinrich.

(Four

Figures.)

66

On

the fluctuations of

recipi ocal

position

of

two

points

in the

monocular

field

of vision.

By

Jan Kurtz

......

75

The

influence of

margins

on

the

bisection

of

a

line.

By

W.

G.

Smith

and

J.

C.

Robertson

Milne.

(One Figure.)

....

78

Experimental

tests

of

general intelligence.

By

Cyril Burt.

(Two

Figures.)

94

^

Further observations*

on

the

variation

of the

intensity

of visual

sensation

with the

duration of

the stimulus.

By

J. C. Flugel

and

W. McDougall.

(One

Figure.)

178

Proceedings

of the British

Psychological

Society

208

Part 3.

October,

1910.

Instinct

and

intelligence.By

Charles S. Myers

Instinct and

intelligence.

By

G.

Lloyd Morgan

Instinct

and

intelligence. By

H.

Wildon Carr

.

Instinct and

intelligence. By

G.

F.

Stout

.

Instinct

and

intelligence.By

Wiluam McDougall

Instinct

and

intelligence

A

Reply.

By

Charles S.

Myers

209

219

230

237

250

267


10/459

iv

Contents

of

Vol. III.

PAGE

^

Correlation

calculated from

faulty

data.

By

C. Speakman

.

.271

Some

experimental

results

in

the

correlation of mental

abilities.

By

William Brown

296

Some

problems

of

sensory

integration. By

Henry J. Watt.

(Two

Figures.)

323

Proceedings

of the British

Psychological

Society

....

348

Part

4.

December,

1910.

Experiments

on

mental

association in

children.

By

Robert

R.

Rusk

349

The

transfer

of

improvement

in

memory

in

school-children.

II.

By

W. H.

Winch

386

The

'perceptive problem'

in the

aesthetic

appreciation

of

simple

colour-combinations.

By

Edward

Bullough

406

Proceedings

of the British

Psychological Society

....

448


11/459

LIST OF

AUTHORS

Brown,

William.

Some

experimental

results

in

the

correlation

of

mental

abilities

.........

BuLLOUOH,

Edward. The

'perceptive

problem'

in the aesthetic

appre-iation

of

simple

colour-combinations

.....

Burt,

Cyril.

Experimental

tests

of

general intelligence

.

Cahr,

H.

Wildon.

Instinct

and

intelligence

....

FlCoel,

J.

C.

Further

observations

on

the

variation

of the

intensity

of visual sensation with

the

duration of the stimulus

.

Heinkich,

W.

On monocular visual

space

....

KuHTZ,

Jan. On the fluctuations

of

reciprocal

pasition

of

two

points

in

the

monocular

field of

vision

......

Lewis,

E. O. Confluxion

and

contrast

effects

in

the

Miiller-Lyer

illusion

..........

McDougall,

William.

Further

obsei'vations

on

the variation

of

the

intensity

of visual

sensation with the duration

of the

stimulus

McDougall,

William.

'Instinct

and

intt^lligence

Milne,

J.

C.

Robertson.

The

influence of

margins

on

the

bisection

of

a

line

...........

Morgan,

C. Lloyd.

Instinct and

intelligence

....

MorgaA,

C. Lloyd.

The

natural

history

of

experience

.

.

.

Myebs,

Charles

S.

Instinct

and

intelligence

....

Myers,

Charles

S.

Instinct and

intelligence

A

Reply

.

Rusk,

Robert

R.

Experiments

on

mental

association

in

children

Smith,

W. G. The

influence of

margins

on

the

bisection of

a

line

/

Spearman,

C.

Correlation calculated

from

faulty

data

Stout,

G. F.

Instinct

and

intelligence

.....

Watt,

Henry J. Some

problems

of sensory

integration

Winch,

W.

H. Colour

preferences

of

school

children

Winch,

W.

H.

The

transfer of

improvement

in

memory

in

school

children.

II.

.

........

PAOB

296

406

94

230

178

66

75

21

178

250

78

219

1

209

267

349

78

271

237

323

42

386


12/459


13/459

Volume

III

DECEMBER,

1909

Pabt

1

THE

BEITISH

JOURNAL

OF

PSYCHOLOGY

THE NATURAL

HISTORY OF

EXPERIENCE.

By C. LLOYD

MORGAN,

Prqfeaaor

of Psychology

^

University

of

Bristol.

^ ^

The

standpoints

of

science and

metaphysics

Tfie

scientific

ethod

of interpretation

The relation

of

mental process

to

physiological

process

An

interpretative

deal construction

Some

implications

of

the doctrine

of

continuity

A

hybrid

universe

of

discourse

Instinc-ive

and

intelligent

ehaviour

The

primary

tissue

of

experience

Metaphysical

criticisms

of

a

scientific

onception

in

genetic

terms

Sketch

of

the

stages

of

development of experience

Plea

for keeping

distinct

the

scientific

nd

the

metaphysical

universe

of

discourse.

I

PROPOSE

to

approach

the

problem

of

the

genesis

of

experience

in

the

individual

mind

along

lines that

are

purely

naturalistic,

through

the

avenue

of

biological

nd

psychological

onsiderations. I

propose

also

to

consider the relation

of this

problem

to

that with

which

the

metaphysician

is

concerned. I

shall endeavour to

render

clear what

I

understand

by

science

:

what

by

metaphysics.

The

standpoint

and

the initial

postulates

f

science

are

profoundly

different

from those

of

metaphysics.

So

radical is

the distinction

that the student

of the

one

branch

of

human

enquiry

has

some

difficulty

n

understanding

what the

votary

of the other is

driving

at.

For the

student

of

science,

seeking

to

give

some

systematic

statement

of

the

natural

history

of

experience

self-consciousness,

s a

mode

of

that

experience,

s

the

terminus ad

quern

to

which,

or

towards

which,

the

developmental

process

leads

up.

For

the

votary

of

metaphysics,

seeking

to

elucidate the ultimate

ground

of

experience,

elf-consciousness

is the

tenninus

a

quo

from

which

he

starts

J.

of

Psych.

lu

1


14/459

2

The

Natural

History of

Experience

forth

on

his

quest.

Thus

T. H. Green

says'

that

self-consciousness

is

at

its

beginning

formally

or

potentially

r

implicity

all

that it

becomes

actually

or

explicitly

n

developed

knowledge.

Hence

it

follows that

a

natural

history

of

self-consciousness is

impossible

since

such

a

history

must

be

of

events

and self-consciousness is

not

reducible

to

a

series

of

events. For the student of

science,

again,

ideational

knowledge

is

developed

from and

out

of the

perceptual

experience

which

is

its

precursor;

but

for

the

votary

of

metaphysics

the

very

beginnings

of

experience

imply

the existence of

an

ideational

subject.

For him

sensation has

no

meaning

apart

from

thought.

In

order

to

the

impress

of

any

impression

being

conscious,

is

not,

he

asks,

the existence

of

a

self

that is

to

say

of

a

subject

capable

of

being impressed,

necessary

?

and he

replies

we

must

first

assume

the existence

of

a

conscious

self

^

Thus,

for

the student

of

genetic

psychology

as a

branch

of

science,

the

concept

is

the

outcome

of

development

from

fore-unning

perceptualexperience;

but

for

the

votary

of

rational

psychology,

as an

application

of

metaphysical principles,

the

percept

is

the

particular

and

concrete

example

through

which

the

pre-existing

concept

is rendered

explicit

or

actually

realised. The universal

(concept)

is the

archetype

of which the

individuals

(percepts)

are

an

illustration.

It

appears

to

me

that

for

one

who

would

presume

to

deal

with

the

genesis

of

experience

from what

he

regards

as

the scientific

point

of

view,

it is before all

things

necessary,

that

he should

distinguish

s

clearly

as

possible

this

point

of

view from that

of

metaphysics.

If

I

say,

to

begin

with,

that

science,

as

such,

does

not

seek

to

explain

anything,

knows

nothing

of

the

cause or causes

of

phenomena,

and

makes

no

reference

to

any

power

or

agency,

I

must

hasten

to

qualify

these

assertions

by adding

in the

sense

in

which the

metaphysician

uses

these

terms.

It would

not

a

little

conduce

to

clearness

of

thought,

and would

prevent

much

confusion,

if those

men

of

science

who

accept

the views

I

seek

to

state,

could

be

induced

to

abandon these

terms

altogether

when

they

are

dealing

with the

philosophical

spect

of

their

subject.

This,

however,

is

too

much

to

hope

for.

The next

best

thing

is

to

define

exactly

what

is

meant

by

these

terms

as

they

are

used

in

a

scientific universe

of

discourse. Let

us

take

as a

concrete

example

the

formation

of

a

crystal

in

an

appropriate

solution.

The

metaphysician

1

Introduction

to

Hume,

Vol.

i.

of

Treatise,

p.

166.

'

Wm

Knight,

Hume

(Blackwood's Philosophical

Classics),

p.

137,

140.


15/459

C.

Llotd

Morgan

3

explains

this

by

reference

to

an

underlying

cause,

such

as

a

principle

of

crystallisation,

hrough

the

agency

of

which

it is

produced

;

or

his

explanation

may

take

a

theological

urn

as

he

bids

us

regard

the

crystal

as one

of the

innumerable

examples

of the

exercise

of

Divine

Power.

I

am

not,

be

it

noted,

scoffing

at

a

metaphysical

interpretation.

I

merely

seek

to

distinguish

it

from that

of

science,

according

to

which

the

growth

of the

crystal

is

explained

when

it is

referred

to

the

general

rules

or

laws

which,

as

a matter

of observation

and

inference,

hold

good

in

the

particular

case

and

in other

like

cases.

For

science

the

cause

of

the

production

of

the

crystal

is

nothing

more

and

nothing

less

than

the antecedent

and

accompanying

conditions

which

may

be

observed

or

inferred

from the

fullest

and

most

minute

study

of

all the

phenomena

and

of

nothing

but

the

phenomena.

Modern

science

has

given

up

all

reference

to

Crystalline

Force

or

any

such

agency

by

or

through

which

the

crystal

is

produced

;

and

if

in

other

cases

the

term

agency

is

employed

when

we

say,

for

example,

that

an

engine

is

driven

through

the

agency

of

steam

it

is

obvious that the

sense

in

which

the word

is used is

a

different

one.

Now when

one

is

dealing,

not

with

a

crystal

which

is

diflferentiated

within

a

solution but

with

a

percept

which is differentiated

within

experience,

I

conceive

that the

same

limitations

should be

imposed

on

scientific

treatment.

The

metaphysician,

o

doubt,

may

explain

it

by

reference

to

an

underlying

cause,

the conscious

ego,

through

the

agency

or

self-activity

f

which

ifis

produced;

but

the

man

of

science

can

only

explain

it

by

reference

to

the antecedent and

accompanying

conditions

in

relation

to

the

generalisations

hich have been found

to

hold

good

in

such

cases.

It

cannot

be

too

roundly

asserted

that

for

psychology

as

a

science

(in

the

sense

in

which

I,

for

one,

accept

its

limitations)

the mind

is

not an

active

agent

or

producing

cause.

Professor

Knight

tells

us'

that

the notion

of mind

as a

passive

product

of external

influence

and

not

at

the

same

time

an

active

agent

or

producing

cause

is

a

radical flaw

in

the

psychology

of Hume. I

am

not

sure

that I

fully

understand the

exact

implications

f

the

phrase

a

passive

product

of

external

influence ;

but

I

am

quite

sure

that the

description

of

mental

processes

as a

series

of

happeningsconcerning

which

generali-ations

may

be

formulated

is

too

often

vitiated

by

the

radical flaw of

interpolating

eference

to

metaphysical

conceptions.

Let

me

once more

repeat

that not

for

one

moment

do I

presume

to

deny

the

validity

f

*

Hume,

p.

148.

1

a


16/459

4 The Natural

History of Experience

metaphysical

explanations. My

sole contention is

that

they

are

wholly

out

of

place

in

psychology,

if

psychology

is

to

be correlated with other

branches

of

science.

The method

of science

as

it is

applied

in the

study

of

inorganic

nature

is

to

reach

by

induction

from

an

adequate

number

of

carefully

conducted

observations

a

generalisation,

o

frame

an

ideal

construction

within which

it is assumed that this

generalisation

s

universally

true

;

and

to test

its

universal truth

by

applying

it

to

further

cases

of like

order and

by

submitting

it

to

the

test

of

deductive verification.

We

say,

in effect

:

If

the

generalisation

be

true,

as

assumed,

then

this

or

that

will

follow

as

a

logical

onclusion and

may

be

put

to

the

test

of

further

observation.

For

example,

if

the revolution

of the

planets

round the

sun

be

a

true

generalisation

and

if

the

earth be

travelling

n

its

orbit,

there

should

be

an

apparent

shifting

of

the

position

of

the

stars

in

accordance

with

another

generalisationconcerning

the

aberration of

light.

This

can

be verified

by

observation.

Always

and in all

cases

the

(postulated)

universal

validity

of

any

sound induction is tested

by

its

consequences

for

further

scientific

procedure

and its

application

n

further

observation.

So

far with

regard

to

the several inductions

of

science.

But there

is

one

all-embracing

induction,

the universal

validity

of

which

is

postulated by

science, as common

to

the whole

range

of

scientific

procedure.

This is

the

uniformity

of

nature.

The

only

justification

or its

validity

is the whole

system

of

scientific know-edge

as

(a)

a

rational

system,

and

(6)

a

system

which

can

on

these

terms

be

applied

to

the

elucidation

of

the

observed

facts.

It should

be

noted that in

saying

that

any

scientific

generalisation

is

universally

true

we

may

mean one

of

two

things:

(1)

that

it

is

absolutely

nd

unconditionally

rue

within the ideal construction

as

such

;

or

(2)

that it is

universally

rue

in

the world of

perceptual

experience

or

of

the

objective

eference in that

experience.

The

latter

assertion,

in

any

absolute

or

unconditional

sense,

is

beyond

the

scope

of

science.

All

that

we

have

any

right

to

say,

within the universe

of

discourse of

science,

is

(1)

that

any

given generalisation

s

true

within the

limits

of

exact

observation

and

measurement;

(2)

that

it

has, so far,

not

been

proven

false in

any

case

;

and

(3)

that,

since it

works

and

aids

us

in the

interpretation

f

further

observations,

we

shall

continue

to

accept

it

as

true

and

postulate

its

universality,

ntil

it is

proven

false.

In

other

words the

regulative

ideal

constructions

of

science,

are

only

working

approximations

to

the

constitutive truth

of

the

world

of

objective

reference

for

experience.


17/459

C.

Lloyd Morgan

5

I

conceive that mental

happenings,

no

less

than

any

other

happenings

in this

wide and varied

universe,

afford

material

for

scientific

study

and

should

be studied

under the

recognized

canons

of

scientific

procedure.

Any given

mental

process

has

constituent factors

which

are

definitely

connected in accordance

with the rules

or

laws

of such

occurrences.

The

process,

as

part

of

a

continuous

series,

is

connected with certain

foregoing

events

and

leaves its

impress

on

events

which follow. It is

part

of

the business

of

science

to

observe,

describe and

interpret

these

psychological

ccurrences,

to

formulate

generalisationsoncerning

them

within

an

ideal

construction,

and

to

bring

them into relation with

physiological

vents,

and with

happenings

outside the

body

in

the

surrounding

world.

There

can

be little

question

that

physiological

vents

form

part

of

the

same

continuous

train of

happenings

as

comprises

also

those

events

which

we

describe

as

physical.

An

organism

subjected

to

stimulation

exhibits

responsive

behaviour.

No

matter

how

much

or

how

little

of

the

metaphysics

of

vitalism

be

falsely

from

the

standpoint

of

science)

introduced,

here is

a

series

of

events

of

the

same

physical

order

a

series

which

we

believe

to

be

capable

of

interpretation,hough

they

may

not

as

yet

be

adequately

interpreted,

n

terms

of

antecedence,

co-existence

and

sequence.

It is

wholly

beside the

question

to

say

that

physiological

vents

have

a

specific

haracter of

their

own

which

serves

to

distinguish

them from other

physical

and

chemical

events.

No doubt

they

have.

It

is the aim-

of

physiology

to

determine these

dififerences

as

matters

of fact. It is

not

the

aim

of

physiology,

s

a

science,

to

enquire

why

the

facts

are

what

they

are.

There is

really

o

difficulty

here,

for

science,

if

metaphysical

questions

be

excluded

excluded,

be

it

noted,

not

from

the field of

human

enquiry

but from

a

specific

universe

of

discourse.

The

relation

of

mental

process

to

physiological

rocess

does however

present

serious difficulties

to

the

investigator

ho seeks

to

keep

within

the

limits

of

scientific

interpretation.

I

can

but indicate

here

what

appears

to

me

to

be the

scientific

position.

In

the

first

place

it

should,

I

conceive,

be

frankly

admitted that

of

direct evidence of connexion

between

mind-process

and

brain-process

there

is little

enough.

On the

other

hand

there

is

a

very

considerable

body

of

indirect

evidence

which,

when

it is

critically

xamined,

justifies

he

current

belief

that such

a

connexion of

a

peculiarly

intimate

kind exists. In

the

second

place

I

am

not

aware

that

there

are

any

scientific

grounds

for

inferring

r

assuming

that

brain-pix cess

s the

antecedent

condition

(and

therefore


18/459

6

The

Natural

History

of

ExpeHence

in

the

terminology

of

science

the

cause)

of

mind-process

or

vice versd.

The

hypothesis

of

co-existence

or

concomitance

appears

to

be

more

acceptable,

o

long

as

it is

regarded

frankly

as a

working hypothesis.

In

the

third

place

the doctrine of interaction and

that

of

parallelism

must

both be

set

aside

;

partly

because

they

are

from

the

standpoint

of

science

unnecessary,

partly

because

they

are

charged

with

metaphysical

implications.

Revert then

to

the

organism

which

responds

under the stimulation

of the environment

in

such

a

way

as

to

lead

us

to

believe that

the

response

is of

the

intelligent

rder. That

implies

that

in

accordance

with the ideal construction

in

terms

of

which such behaviour is inter-reted

by

science, a

specific

modes

of

stimulation is the antecedent

condition of

a

psycho-physical

isposition

which is

in

turn

the

antecedent

condition

of the

resulting

behaviour.

Broadly

speaking,

and

regarding

the

sequence

of

events

as a

whole,

the

interpretation

s

in

accordance

with

the

canons

of

scientific

procedure.

At the

same

time it

is

necessary

that

we

should

distinctly

ealize and

not

in

any way

attempt

to

slur

over

the

fact

that,

in

so

far

as

certain

links

in

the chain

of

antecedence

and

sequence

are

psycho-physical,they

differ

from

those other links

which

are,

so

far

as

we

know,

physical

only.

This from

the

standpoint

of

science

we

must

be

content

to

accept

as

a fact,

or,

if

it be

preferred,

as

something

which

we

postulate

in

the ideal construction

in

terms

of

which

an

interpretation

f the

facts

is formulated.

Presumably

the latter mode

of

statement

will

be

regarded

as

the

more

satisfactory.

et

us

grant

then

that,

in the

interpretative

cheme

in

accordance

with which

we

endeavour

to

describe

and

interpret

intelligent

behaviour,

the

occurrence

of

psycho-physical

links in

the

chain of antecedence and

sequence

is

postulated.

We

may

study

these

psycho-physicaldispositions

ither

from the

physical

and

physiological

aspect

or

from the mental

or

psychical

aspect.

But what

exactly

do

we mean

by

aspect

?

I take it that

we

mean

or

should

mean

nothing

more

than that

the

enquiry

is

conducted in

each

case

from

a

specific

point

of

view.

Just

as we

may

consider the

merits of

a

rose

in

reference

first

to

its

form

and

then

to

its

colour

so

in

dealing

with

psycho-physical

events

we

may

concentrate

our

attention

on

either their

psychical

or

their

physiological

aspect

in accordance with

the

exigencies

of

the

enquiry.

There

is

no

metaphysicalimplication

in

this

use

of the

word

'

aspect.

It

simply

stands

for

the

point

of

view from which the

same

occurrences

may

be studied.

Of

course

it

may

be

said that

we

cannot

directly

observe

in

our


19/459

C. Lloyd

Morgan

7

neighbours

the

psychicalaspect

of

psycho-physical

occurrences,

in the

same

way

that

we

can see

both

the form and the colour of

a

rose.

That

is

true

enough.

But if science

is

to

be restricted

to matters

of

direct

observation

not

only

will modern

psychology

but

modem

physics

also

have

to

be

carried

on

under

a

diflferent

name.

Science deals

with ideal

constructions in

terms

of

which

observable

facts

may

be

interpreted.

The

molecule and

atom

of

the

physicist,

he

psycho-

physical

disposition

of

the

psychologist,

re

ideal

constructions,

of

value

only

in

so

far

as

they

contribute

to

a

scheme

of

interpretation.

We

may

follow

Sir

J, J.

Thomson in

regarding

their

acceptance

as

a

policy

rather

than

a

creed

;

but

a

successful

policy

is

one

which

we

trust

and

in

the value

of

which

we

believe.

Regarded

from

the

physiological

spect

psycho-physical

processes

are,

in

accordance with the ideal construction under

consideration,

whether

we

regard

it

as a

policy

or a

creed

or

both,

continuous

with

other

physiological

rocesses

as

these

in

turn

are

continuous

with those

occurrences

iu

the

environment

which

precede

and

accompany

stimula-ion

and

those

occurrences

which

accompany

and follow

response.

There

is

one

continuous

sequence

susceptible

of

interpretation

in

terms

of

changes

of

configuration

in

one

material

system.

No doubt

the

physiologicalhanges

which

are

the

concomitants

of mental

processes

are

highly

specialised

and

run

their

course

in

accordance

with the

specific

biological

rules

or

laws

which characterise

them and

which

serve

to

distinguish

them

from

sundry

other

changes

in the

material

world.

But

this

does

not

imply

any

breach

of

continuity.

So

far

as

we

know

there

is

within the continuous

process

no

leakage

of

energy

and

no

influx of

energy.

So far

as we

know the law

of

the

conservation

of

energy

and

that of

the conservation of

moment

of

momentum

hold

throughout.

That in

any

case

is

postulated

within the determinate

ideal

construction

which deals

with

the

physical

aspect

of

psycho-physical

interpretation.

When, however,

we

turn to

the other

aspect

we

enter

a new

universe

of

discourse

whose

subject-matter

is of

a

wholly

different

order.

It

includes

sense-impressions,

ercepts,

concepts,

and

judgments,

memories

and

anticipations,

leasures

and

pains,

and

so

forth. These

are

organised

and

developed

within

the

field

of

conscious

experience;

but

the laws

of

their

sequence

and

the

generalisations

oncerning

their

mode

of

development

are

different

from

those

of

physics

or

physiology.

Of

course

there

is

a

sense

in which

it

may

be said

that

this universe of

discourse,

including

as

it does

include,

the

whole

range

of

experience


20/459

8

The Natural

History

of

Experience

and human

knowledge,

is

all-embmcing.

It

is,

no

doubt,

true

enough

that

all

our

acquaintance

with,

and

all

our

knowledge

of,

the

physical

universe is

nothing

less and

nothing

more

than

an

elaboration

of

conscious

experience.

We

may

go

further

and

say

that,

for

scientific

interpretation,

hat

is

to

say

apart

from

metaphysics,

there

is

no

valid

distinction between the

external world

as

it

is,

and the

external

world

as

it exists

for

experience

and

knowledge.

With what the

world is

or

may

be

independently

of

experience

science

has

no

more

concern

than

the

plainest

and

most

unsophisticated

ommon

sense.

But

for

science,

as

for

common

sense,

the

interpretation

of

experience

is

organised

and

elaborated in

terms

of

a

duality

of reference

on

the

one

hand

a

reference

to

the external world

and all the

objects

of

experience

therein

contained,

and

on

the other

hand

a

reference

to

the conscious

experience

to

which

the

world and its

objects

are,

in

current

phraseology,

presented.

Ideal

constructions in

terms

of the former reference

fall

within the

physical

and

physiological

niverse of

discourse

;

ideal

constructions in

terms

of

the

latter

reference

fallwithin

the universe of discourse

which

deals with

conscious

or

mental

processes.

The

group-name

for

the

product

of

the

one

ideal

construction is

the

world;

that for

the

product

of

the other

ideal

construction is the mind.

But

neither

product

is

adequate

so

long

as

it

is

regarded

as

the

outcome

of

merely

individual

experience,

o

matter

how

completely

this

experience

is

systematised.

It

will,

at

any

rate

be

admitted that

my

personalexperience

and

knowledge

in

its

world-reference

is

by

no

means

co-extensive

with the world

as a

product

of

ideal

construction.

And

it

will

also be

admitted that

my

personal

experience

and

knowledge

in its

self-reference

is

very

far from

exhausting

the universe

of

discourse which

deals with mental

processes.

It is

wholly

unnecessary

to

adduce

evidence

in

favour of the

obvious fact that

our

ideal construction

of the

world

on

the

one

hand and

of

mind

on

the

other

hand

are

social

products.

Their

existence

depends

on

inter-subjective

ntercourse

and

the

co-operation

of

many

people.

But how is

this social

co-operation

effected

?

In

many

ways,

from

which

we

may

select

spoken

language

and the written

or

printed

record

as

conspicuotisexamples.

It

is

effected

by means

which

fall

within

the

physical

universe

of

discourse. The

point

to

which

I

desire

to

lead

up

is

this

:

the mental universe of discourse

can

only

be

unified

and

rendered consistent

for

scientific

interpretationby

introducing

connecting

links

which

lie

outside that

universe

and

belong

to

that of

world-reference.

If

now

we

revert

to

the

conception

of

psycho-physical

processes

as


21/459

C. Lloyd Morgan

9

links in

a

continuous chain of

causes

and

effects,

r

of

antecedent and

consequent

occurrences

;

and if

we

agree

that

they

may

be studied either

in

their

physical

r

in their mental

aspect;

we

find that in

the

former

aspect

they

are

continuous with

other

physical

processes,

but

in the

latter

aspect

they

form

isolated

systems.

To relieve

them of

this isolation

we

must

either

(1)

pass

over

to

the

physical

aspect

of

which

they

are

the

concomitants,

or

(2)

accept

the

hypothesis

that all

processes

are

psycho-physical.

Whatever

may

be said in

support

of

the

latter

hypothesis

from the

point

of

view of

philosophical

theory,

there

is

little

to

be

urged

in its

favour

from

the

standpoint

of

scientific

interpretation.

Even if it be

granted

that

not

only

do

certain

nerve-centre

occurrences

have

mental

or

psychical

concomitants,

but that

all

organic

processes

have

a

conscious

or

quasi-conscious

entient

aspect,

it

is

not

obvious

in what

way,

if

any,

scientific

interpretation

s

advantaged.

It would

seem

that

of this

quasi-

conscious

aspect,

concomitant

let

us

suppose

with

the

segmentation

of the

fertilised

ovum,

we

know and

can

know

nothing.

A

fortiori

therefore

the

assumption

that all

mechanical,

physical,

r

chemical

processes

are

of

like

nature

that

they

too

are

psycho-physical

does

not

appear

to

be

of the smallest service

for

scientific

interpretation.

The

man

of

science,

with his

strong

pragmatic

tendencies,

will

ask

what is the

use

of

any

such

assumption

;

and it is difficult

to

give

him

a

satisfactory

eply.

Regarding

the

matter

solely

from the

standpoint

of

scientific inter-retation

the

truth

or

error

of

such

a

view does

not

seem

to

be

a

living

question.

Admittedly

useless

as a

policy

it

may

however

be

accepted

as

a

creed

by

those who

are

unable

to

conceive the

development

of

consciousness

save

out

of that which

bears with

it

at

least

the elements

or

germs

of the conscious order

of

existence.

Apart

from such

a

speculative

creed which

we

may

leave

on

one

side,

though

it is

one

to

which I

myself

provisionally

ncline,

we

must

either

frankly

acknowledge

that

mental

processes,

as

they

occur

in

individual

organisms,

form

isolated

systems,

or

we

must

link

them

up

by

passing

over

into the world

of

physical

reference.

That,

in

fact,

is what

even

those who

accept

the

speculative

creed

actually

do

as

a

matter

of

methodological

procedure.

And the

science

of

psychology,

as

that

which deals

or

attempts

to

deal

with

mental

processes,

definitely

accepts

this

latter

alternative.

Modem

psychology

as

a

science

fully,

frankly

and

wholly adopts

in

its

methods

of

interpretation

hat

we

may

term

a

hybrid

universe

of

discourse

in

part

physical

and

in

part

psychical,

ot

only

in

dealing

with

inter-subjective

ntercourse

between


22/459

10

The

Natural

History of Experieiice

different

persons,

but

also

in

treating

f

the

psychology

of

the'lndividual.

By

its doctrine of concomitance

it

weds the

two

universes,

v

Fully

alive

to

the fact that

the

rejection

or

practical

urposes

of

the

assumption

that all

processes

are

psycho-physical

involves the abandonment of the

conception

of

continuity

in

mental

development

and

places

mental

phenomena

outside the

pale

of

evolutionary

reatment, genetic

psychology

faces the

situation

boldly.

It

accepts

continuity

as

part

of

and

as

essential

to

the

evolutionary

thesis

;

but it

regards

some

of

the

links

of

the chain

as

not

only

physiological

ut

as

also

psycho-physical.

Modem science

broadens its

conception

of

biology

so as

to

include the

concomitant mental

processes

;

and

in

like

manner

it broadens its

conception

of

psychology

so as

to

include

the

concomitant

physiological

processes.

Refusing

to

be bound

by

limitations which

restrict it

to

the

purely

psychical

realm,

genetic psychology

claims

that mental

happenings,

as

aspects

of

natural

phenomena,

are

only

comprehensible,

only

continuous,

only

susceptible

of scientific

treatment

in

so

far

as

they

are

concomitant with

happenings

in the brain and

are

thus

related

to

other

biological

rocesses

and

through

them

to events

in the

physical

environment.

Revert

now

to the

assumption

that,

for

purposes

of

scientific

treatment,

and

apart

from

the

un

verifiable

and

speculative

creed

of

panpsychism,

there is

no

direct

psychical

continuity

between the

mind

of

parent

and the

mind of

offspring.

This

implies

that

the

mental

organisation

of

the

individual,

quA

mental,

starts

de

novo.

But

the

physiologicalorganisation

does

not start

de

novo.

There is direct

continuity

between the

psycho-physical

happenings

of the adult brain

and the

physiological

appenings

in the fertilised

ovum.'^^It

is

true

that

in

accordance with the

teaching

of modern

biology

the

direct

physiological

continuity

is

that of

the

germ

plasm

and

may

be

represented

diagrammatically

s

under,

where

g

g' g

are

the fertilised

ova

derived from

the

germ

plasm

while

6

h'

h

are

brain

structures

differentiated

from

the fertilised

ovum.

h h' h h'

I I I I

\

9-9-9 -9 '-

It

may

be noted

that there

is

here

no

direct

continuity

between

brain

and brain

though

there

is

direct

continuity

of cell

products.

If

now we

convert

this

structural

schema into

a

functional

schema

we

have

\\


23/459

C*

Lloyd

Morgan

11

ps

.

pg'

.

ps

.

ps'

I

I I I

p.

p'.

p .

p '

Here

p.p'.p

.p

are

physiological

rocesses

and

ps

.

ps' ps

.

pa'

are

psycho-physical

processes.

Since the latter

are

also

physiological

processes

there

is

continuity

from

the

biologicalstandpoint.

There

is

no

continuity

from

the

psychicalstandpoint.

In the view here

taken,

however,

psychology

combines

(and

in order

to

be

a

science

must

combine)

both

standpoints

in

one

hybrid

universe

of

discourse

and is

thus,

and

thus

only,

in

a

position

to

discuss

problems

of

development

and

evolution.

\^

The

functioning

of

the

organism

as

a

whole

in relation

to

the

environment is what

we

may

broadly

term

behaviour.

Only

through

behaviour is

experience

unified.

I

shall

assume

that

in the

higher

organisms

such behaviour

involves the functional

activity

of the

central

nervous

system.

I

shall

apply

the

term

instinctive

to

those

factors

in

behaviour

which

are

prior

to

individual

experience,

and

the

term

intelligent

to

that behaviour which

involves what

we

may

term

factors

of

reinstatement,

such reinstatement

being dependent

upon

previous

experience,

the

net

results

of

which

are

revived.

The in-tincti

factors

depend entirely

on

how the

nervous

mechanism

has

been built

up

through

heredity

under that mode

of racial

preparation

which

we

call evolution

;

intelligent

ehaviour

depends

also

on

how

the

nervous

system

has been modified and moulded

in

the

course

of that

individual

preparation

which

we

call the

acquisition

of

experience.

Let

us

however

descend

to

particulars.

Some

years

ago

I

had under observation

two

young

moorhens

or

waterhens

which

I

had hatched in

an

incubator and watched from

day

to

day

with

some care.

One of

these

about

two months

old

was

swimming

in

a

pool

at

the bend

of

a

little

stream

in Yorkshire.

A

vigorous

rough-haired

puppy,

highly

charged

with canine

vitality,

ran

down

from

the

farm,

barking

and

gambolling.

In

a

moment

the

waterhen

dived,

disappeared

from

view,

and

reappeared

beneath

the

overhanging

bank. Now this

was

the first

time the bird had dived.

I

had

repeatedly

endeavoured

to

elicit

this characteristic

instinctive

response

but had

failed

to

secure

the

appropriate

presentation

which

should

supply

the

necessary

conditions of stimulation.

It is

of

course

difficult

to

say

how much

in

this

dramatic

situation

was

new

to

the

experience

of

the

waterhen.

Unquestionably

there

were

many

factors

of

reinstatement

gained

as

he

swam

about in the

stream.

There

was


24/459

12

The Natural

History

of

Experience

an

already-established

ody

of

experience

which could assimilate the

newly

introduced instinctive

factors. But

one

may

feel

justified

n

saying

that there

was

something

about the total

puppy-presentation

which

was so

far

new

as

to

elicit

an

instinctive

response

which

supplied

to

experience

the

group

of kinsesthetic

factors

that

accompanied

the

new

mode of

behaviour

in

diving.

I do

not

think that the

young

bird

had

ever

really

been

scared before

;

and

we

may

probably

infer

that

there

was a

specificquality

of emotional

tone

which

had

not

been

hitherto

felt.

When I took it

out

of

the

water

the

bird

was

panting,

its

heart-beat

was

strong

and

quick,

and I dare

say

it

had

queer

sensa-ions

in its little

gizzard.

If then I

interpret

the

situation

aright

there

was,

concomitant

with

the brain

processes

of

the

waterhen

as

he

swam

in the

pool,

a

certain

amount

of

experience actually

present,

and

a

certain

amount

of

in-ividual

preparation

f

the

brain

such

as

to

afford the

neural conditions

of

revived

experience.

So much

to

begin

with. Here

we

have the

waterhen

as

actual

or

potential

experiencer.

Then

comes

a new

situation

which the

experiencer

can

assimilate. In this

case,

in

so

far

as a

new

instinctive

response

is called

forth,

the conditions

are

largely

suppliedby

the

racial

preparation

of the

nerve-centres

as

the

outcome

of

evolutionary

process.

The

new

factors

comprise

(1)

a

specific

re-entation

dififering

rom

previouspresentations,

2)

a

specific

esponse

affording

ew

data

to

behaviour-experience,

nd

(3)

a

hitherto unfelt

quality

of

emotional

tone.

But

though

we

may

analyse

the

newly

experienced

situation

in

some

such

way

as

this

the

bird

presumably

gets

the whole

as

the

coalescent net-result with

a

bearing

on

behaviour.

It is

not

so

sophisticated

s

to

place

its

felt

presentation,

ts

felt

in-tinctiv

response,

and its felt

emotion into

separate

chapters

and

only

come

to

realise

by

effort

of

thought

that

experience

is

one

and in-ivisibl

He

just

lives

through

one

palpitating

ituation,

assimilates

its

teachings,

nd

emerges

from

the ordeal

a

new

bird.

As

experiencer

he is

never

again

what he

was

before.

We

started with

our

birdling

s

experiencerswimming

about in

the

stream.

How

did he reach

this

level

of

conscious

organisation

There

was a

time

when

he

had

no

experience

of

water

or

swimming.

I

re-ember

the

day

when

I

first

placed

him

gently

in

a

tepid

bath.

Even

then

he

was an

experiencer,

hough

his

store

of factors

of

revival

was

exceedingly

limited.

Of

swimming

experience

he

had

none.

Racial

preparation

had

however

fitted

the tissues contained within

his

black

fluffy

kin

to

respond

in

a

quite

definite

manner.

And

in

the first

act

\


25/459

C. Lloyd

Morgan

13

of

swimming

there

were

afforded

to

his

experience,

analogous

factors to

those

I

have

given

above

in

considering

his later

dive

a

specific

presentation,

specific

espond,

a

specific

motional

tone,

all

coalescent

into

one

felt

situation.

And

if

we

go

yet

one

stage

further

back

when

the

moorhen

was struggling

out

of the

cramping

egg-shell,

here

came

what

we

may

fairly

regard

as

the initial

presentations,

ollowed

by

the

initial

responsive

behaviour

in the

earliest

instinctive

acts,

accompanied,

we

may presume,

by

the

initial

emotional

tone,

coalescent

to

form

what

I have

ventured

to term

the

primary

tissue of

experience.

Thus I

con-eive

that,

for

scientific

interpretation,

xperience

has

its

genesis.

A

number of

instinctive

responses

occur

in virtue

of

the

organisation

established

by

centuries

of

racial

preparation

as

the

outcome

of

natural

selection

or

of

other

factors

in

organic

evolution.

These

run

together,

overlap,

coalesce

and unite

synthetically

o

form

a

primary

body

of

experience.

Just

as

there is

one

waterhen

with

inter-related

parts

and

organs,

one

central

nervous

system

correlating

the

incoming

data

of

presentation

nd

co-ordinating

he

outgoing

nerve-impulses

in

responsive

behaviour,

so

too

there

grows

up

in

concomitance

with the

brain-processes

one

experience

for which

the

presentative

data

acquire

meaning

and

become

percepts

for the

guidance

of

further

behaviour.

Thus is

it,

I

conceive,

in the

case

of

the moorhen

:

thus is

it in

the

case

of

the

human infant

Such

in all

cases

is the

starting-point

f

the

natural

history

of

experience,

the

unification

of

which

finds

expression

in

behaviour.

^

r

I

am

well

aware

that

the

metaphysician,

if

he

should chance

to

cast

a

passingglance

over

these

benighted

lucubrations,

will

groan

in

spirit

and,

if he be

tender-hearted,

pity

for

his lack of

insight

or

ineptitude

an

erring

fellow

mortal.

For

a

century

he has

criticised Hume's

doctrine of

the

origin

of

knowledge

from

the

more

vivid

impressions

and

their fainter

echoes

in

ideas.

He

has

repeated,

until he

is

weary

with

well-doing,

that

a

sensation

never

exists,

and

cannot

possibly

exist,

without

a

conscious

subject,

hat

sensation

has

no

meaning

apart

from

thought,

that

to

have

any

being

as

a

constituent

part

of

experience

it

must

be

known,

and

obviously

to

be known

presupposes

a

knower. All

this,

he

insists,

is

familiar

to

the

veriest

tyro

in

philosophy.

And here

in the

twentieth

century

comes

along

a

third-

rate

biologist

ho has

meddled

a

little

with

psychology

and

repeats

in

a hashed-up

form,

garnished

with

evolutionary

terms,

the

exploded

fallacies

of

the so-called

philosopher

of

Ninewells.

And the

pity

of

it

is

that

after

reading

so

many

metaphysical

sermons,

and

really

enjoying


26/459

14

The Natural

History

of

Experience

them,

perhaps

even

profiting

by

them

on

my

philosophical

Sundays,

I

remain

in

the

week-day

and

work-a-day

world

of

science,

unconverted

and

unregenerate.

Let

me

use

the

phrase

group

of

impressions

for

the

net

result in

experience

of

the

felt

development

of

an

instinctive situation

such

as

the

swimming

of the waterhen when first he is

placed

in

water.

Is

it

the

same

thing

to

say

that

such

a

group

of

impressions

or

let

us

for

simplicity

ay

an

impression

exists

and

to

say

that

an

impression

is

known

?

Is

Huxley right

in

saying^

There is

only

a

verbal

difference

between

having

a

sensation and

knowing

one

has it

;

they

are

simply

two

phrases

for

the

same

mental

state

?

Note

that

even

here

Huxley

speaks

of

having

a

sensation :

now

to

have

a

sensation

implies

a

haver

and therefore

a

consciousness

that has it. So

we

may

extend

our

question

and

ask:

Are

the

following

three

statements

simply

differing

forms of

one

statement

:

(a)

an

impression

(or

group

of

im-ression

exists

;

(6)

I have

an

impression

;

(c)

I

know that

I

have

an

impression

?

I conceive that

they

are

all three different. I

am

unable

to

agree

with

Huxley

that there is

only

a

verbal

difference between

having

an

impression

and

knowing

that

one

has it.

I believe that

Dr

Stout

'^

is

truer

to

fact

when he

says

that for

one

to

be

angry

and

to

know

that

one

is

angry

are

not

psychologically

quivalent.

To

know

that

one

is

angry

and

to

know

that

one

has

an

impression

are

products

of

reflective

thought

and involve ideational

process.

The

distinction

between

having

an

impression

(6)

and

knowing

that

one

has it

(c)

is

this

:

to

have

an

impression

impliesprevious

experience

to

which it

can

be assimilated

implies

therefore

an

experiencer

;

to

know

that

one

has

an

impression

implies

reflective

thought

by

which it

can

be

apperceived

implies

therefore

a

thinker

or

knower.

So

far

so

good

or

bad

What about

the

statement

I

placed

first,

(a)

the bare

statement:

An

impression

or

group

of

impressions

exists?

Well,

we

start

with

the

organism

as

part

of

the

ideal

construction of

the world

of

things

in

terms

of

objective

reference.

The

organism

is

the

recipient

f

stimuli

which affect

the

sense-organs,

and,

through

the

nerves,

set

up

molecular

changes

in

the brain.

In

terms

of

the

scientific

ideal construction

a

given

impression

is the

concomitant

of

a

given

group

of neuronic

changes

set

up

by

a

given

group

of

(say)

visual

stimuli. Consider then the

very

first

group

of

stimuli,

giving

rise

to

the

very

first

group

of

neuronic

changes,

with

its

very

first

concomitant

'

Collected

Essays,

Vol.

in.

p.

86.

Manual

of

Psychology,

Introduction,

Chapter

i.

3,

p.

8.


27/459

C. Lloyd Morgan 15

impression.

Can

we

from

the

standpoint

of

scientific

interpretation

ay

more

in

this

case

than that

the

impression

exists

?

No

doubt

within what I

have termed the

hybrid

universe of dis-ourse

of

psychology

it

may

be said that the

organism

has the

impression.

But it

would be better

perhaps

to

say

that

the

organism

has the

psycho-physical

disposition.Regarded

from the

psychicalspect

and

that

alone,

the

impression

is

not

yet

possessed

there is

no

previously

gotten

experience

to

possess

it: it

simply

comes

into

being:

it

simply

exists.

Consider

an

ideally

simple

case

that

of

a

newly-hatched

chick

pecking

at

a

small

object

within

striking

distance

and

either

swallowing

or

rejecting

it

;

and

suppose

(what

is

of

course

not

quite

true

to

fact)

that

this is

the

first

presentation

o

sense.

The visual

stimuli call

into

being

an

impression

(A)

and also initiate the

pecking

behaviour which

itself

calls

into

being

a

group

of kinaesthetic

impressions

(B)

;

the

object

is

seized and

gives

rise in the bill

to

a

taste

impression

(C)

;

in

accordance

with the

nature

of

which there

occurs

the

responsive

be-aviour,

say

of

vigorous

rejection,

with its

kinaesthetic

impression

(D).

Of

course

this is much

simpler

than the

actual

occurrences

;

but

we

have

the four

impressions

A

B

C

D

following

in

close

sequence

and

forming

part

of

a

continuous

piece

of

behaviour. These

four form

a

coalescent

group

or

disposition

a

psycho-physicaldisposition

ith

physiological

nd

psychological

associative connexions

a

bit

of

the

primary

tissue

of

experience,

unified

through

the

behaviour

it

pro-otes.

Now

consider

a

second occasion

on

which

the

chick

receives

a

visual

stimulus

similar

to

the first. There is

a

concomitant

impression

which

owing

to

the

established

associative

connexions revives the

whole

psycho-physical

isposition.

The

impression

has

meaning

and is

raised

to

the level of

a

percept.

It calls

up

or

reinstates

the

past

experience

to

which it

is

assimilated. The old

experience

thus revived functions

as

assimilator

to

the

new

impression

as

assimilated. Otherwise

stated,

the old

experience

as

experiencer

as the

new

experience

as

experienced.

We thus

reach the

conception

of the

perceptual

subject

as

the revived

experience

which

assimilates

or

possesses

the

new

impression.

Similarly

at

a

later

stage

of mental

development

the

conceptual

subject,

as

k

newer,

is the

revived

knowledge

which

ap-

perceptively

ssimilates

a

new

fact.

It

should be observed

that from

this

point

of view

(1)

the

ego,

as

knower,

is

the

result

of

a

process

of

development

;

(2)

any

item

of


28/459

1 6

The Natural

History

of

Experience

knowledge

is

apperceptively

assimilated

to

that

part

of the

system

of

knowledge

which

has

already

been

organised

and

which

is

representa-ively

revived

;

(3)

when

we

say

that

a

percept

or a

concept

is

mine

all

that is

implied

is

such

apperceptive

assimilation

with

a

reflective

realisation

of its

occurrence.

From

the

metaphysical

point

of

view,

on

the

other

hand,

the

ego

exists

as

a

producing

agency

ah initio.

It is

not

the

result

of

but the

cause

of

(or

agency

in)

the

developmental

process.

For

science,

as

I

said

at

the

outset,

conceptual

thought

and

the

ego

are

the terminus

ad

quem\

for

metaphysics

they

are

the

terminus

a

quo.

To

quote

Green

again :

self-consciousness is

at

its

beginning

formally

or

potentially

or

implicitly

all

that it becomes

actually

r

explicitly

n

developed

knowledge.''^

It should

also be observed

that,

in the

interpretation

suggested

above,

the

impressions

A

B

C D

do,

as

a

matter

of

fact,

or

in accordance

with the ideal

construction,

enter

into

relationship.

If

the

question

be

asked

:

Through

what

agency

are

they

thus related

by

the

activity

of

what

relating

principle

or

producing

cause

?

Science

replies

We

don't know.

We

just

accept

the fact within

our

ideal

construction.

But

it is

obvious that

metaphysics

(seeking

the raison

d'etre

of

what

does

happen)

cannot

and should

not rest

content

with this. It

is absurd

however

of

metaphysics

to

say

that

science

either denies

or

ignores

the

fact

of

the

existence

of

differentiated

centres

of

synthetic

organisation.

It does

nothing

of the

sort.

If

it did

not

accept

the fact of such

syntheticorganisation

in

body

and mind how could

it

interpret,

under

its

own canons

of

interpretation,

ither the

development

of the

nervous

system

or

the

development

of

experience.

When it is wise it

does

not

deny

the existence of the

principle

of

synthesis

or

the

synthesising

agency

postulated by

metaphysics.

All that it

urges

is that this

in

no

way

contributes to its

own

interpretation

qud

scientific.

It

forms

no

part

of

either the

policy

or

the creed

of

science.

Consider

the

perception

of

space

as

genetically

nterpreted

in

any

modern

text-book

of

psychology.

Certain

data,

visual

or

tactual

sensations,

local

signs,

kinaesthetic

impressions,

and

so

forth,

when

combined in certain

ways

give

rise

to

the

perception

of

space.

But

why

do

they

take

on

that

particular

form

of

experience

which

we

call

space

?

Science

again

replies

I don't

know

:

that is

simply

the form

they

do take. That

is

what

we

find

to

be

the

nature

of

experience,

and

there's

nothing

more

to

be

said

of

it within

my

universe

of

dis-ourse.

Metaphysics

adds:

It

is the

form

which

mind

as

agency

impresses

on

the

data. You

only

find

it

there

because in

the

very

act


29/459

C.

Lloyd

Morgan

17

of

perceiving

you

put

it there.

You

can't

have

spacial

perception

without

it,

because

space

is

a

constitutive

form

of

the

percipient

mind.

In

all

perception

*'

we

employ

those

d

priori

categories

which

make

experience

what it is. Their

source

is within

;

and,

when elicited

in

self-consciousness

they partly

constitute

and

partly

regulate,

ur

perception

of the

objects

of

sensed Professor

Knight,

in

criticising

Hume,

says

in effect:

You can't

explain

the

physical

processes

in

nature,

or

the

mental

processes

in

man,

unless

you

are

ready

to

postu-ate

mind

as

an

agency

;

they

are

produced

as

you

find them because it

is

part

of

the inalienable

nature

of

conscious

agency

so

to

produce

them. To which

Hume,

and his scientific followers

reply

:

Thank you.

But

we

can

get

along quite

well

without

your

postulate.

We

don't

want

to

explain

as

you

explain.

It does

not

get

us a

bit

forrarder.

Our

explanations

do

help

us

on.

Hence science

has been

forging

ahead,

while

metaphysics

has been

marking

time for

a

century.

Go

on

mumbling

your

categorical

creed

by

all

means.

But don't ask

us

to

spend

valuable

time

in

repeating

its

barren

formularies. We have

business

on

hand and

a

definite

policy

to

pursue.

Those

who

attempt

to

study

the natural

history

of

experience

in

the

humbler

forms

of

animal

life,

chicks and

ducklings

and waterhens

and

the

like,

carry

on

guerilla

methods

of

conquest

apart

from the

philosophical

attle

which

rages

round

the

mind

of

man.

But

I

suppose

that,

for

the

metaphysician,

the

categories

here

also hold

sway.

We

endeavour

to

interpret

the

genesis

of

experience

in

a

young

chick

pecking

at

things

we

call

maggots,

which

are

situate within reach of its

bill in

space

;

the

process

of

swallowing

succeeding

that

of

pecking

in

time,

and

causing,

we

may suppose,

some

sort

of satisfaction.

If the

comparative

psychologist

is asked how he

accounts

for

the

fact

that

the

chick's

experience

assumes

this form with its

things,

ts

space

and

time,

its

connexions

named

causal,

and

so

forth,

he

can

but

reply

that this is

the

way

in which

experience

is

constituted. The

metaphysician

gives

the

same

answer,

but he

gives

also the

reason

why

its

nature

is such

as

we

find it

The British Journal of Psychology

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Transcript of The British Journal of Psychology