The Brevity of Japan’s Constitution
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Transcript of The Brevity of Japan’s Constitution
The Brevity of Japan’s Constitution
Kenneth Mori McElwainUniversity of [email protected]
Prepared for Conference: “Is Japan’s Constitution Suitable for the 21st Century?”, University of
Michigan, April 15th, 20111
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Explaining the infrequency of amendments1. Japan’s constitution is relatively VAGUE
Covers fewer topics, and in less detail Allows for more statutory change
2. However, it is also becoming EASIER to amend Electoral reform has increased size of Diet majorities Public opinion backs reform, although fickle
Prognosis: Public support linked with (unstable) foreign policy concerns. Revision more likely if bicameralism + decentralization become focal issues
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Data: “Comparative Constitutions Project” Elkins, Ginsberg, and Melton (2009)
General data: 860 constitutions, 198 states (from 1789) Birth / expiration dates Number + year of amendments # issues covered
Specific data: 184 current constitutions 13 categories 61 topics ~800 variables Codes WHETHER constitution specifies a particular
provision Codes WHAT the constitution says about provision
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How detailed is Japan’s constitution? Measuring “Scope” = % of issues mentioned
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Sample Categorie
s
Elkins, Ginsburg, Melton sample = 92 issues
ExecutiveDecree power; war power; immunity;
replacement
LegislatureElection method; political parties; special bills
(tax, budget)
JudiciaryConstitutional review; interpretation;
independence
Society Education; religion; civil rights; media
EconomyCentral bank; bankruptcy; economic plan
(market, socialism)
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Guarantees: Education (4 var.)
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Stipulate:(% Yes)
Access Hi-Ed
30%
Free School64%
Acad. Freedom
33%
Spain, Italy, Brazil [N=24]
Japan, Korea, Russia, [N=23]
Sweden, India, Taiwan [N=45]
Norway, Thai, USA [N=17]
Guarantees: Civil Rights (15 var.)
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Stipulate:(% Yes)
Censor40%
Privacy83%
Express
93%
Press64%
Assembly
92%
Germany, Korea, Brazil [N=46]
Japan
USA, Tonga
Australia, Thai, France [N=6]
Mentioned: Religion (4 var.)
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Topics: (% Mentioned)
Official44%
Freedom93%
Separation
29%
USA, Korea, Brazil, Mexico [N=27]
Japan, Italy, Brazil, Poland, [N=26]
Ireland, Indonesia, Spain, [N=49]
France [N=1]
Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen [N=6]
Austria, NZL, Libya, Thailand, [N=5]
Mentioned: Judiciary (16 var.)
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Topics:(%
mentioned)
Any crts99%
Special crts23%
Independ78%
C Review
33%
Fiji, Swaziland [N=3]
Austria, Germany, Korea [N=27]
Japan, Eritrea, Bhutan [N=3]
USA, Canada, Nauru [N=14]
France, Sweden, Brazil [N=57]
Mentioned: Political Institutions (27 var.)
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Electoral System
LH rule LH quota UH rule UH quota
% of total, (in
Japan?)
46%(No)
17%(No)
79%(No)
66%(No)
Executive Powers
DecreeTerm Limit
Dismissal
Veto
% of total, (in
Japan?)
62%(Yes)
34%(No)
96%(Yes)
86%(No)
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Propensity for future amendments?
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Japan has benefited from peace and prosperity Cold War minimizes global / regional conflict Constitutional legacy of Meiji (never amended either) Low social / cultural heterogeneity, high economic
growth Political consistency under LDP
But the constitution has also been stretched pretty thin Article 9 Malapportionment & electoral fairness Decentralization of fiscal / administrative powers
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Is the amendment process prohibitive?
Unamend
QMVInterve
neReferend
umLocal
25% 64% 22% 58% 15%Subsample of 55 democracies
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2/3 QMV (n = 23) Required Ref (n = 9)
Japan, Korea, Iraq
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Why institutional structure matters1947-1993: MMD-SNTV Semi-proportionate electoral system
Small changes in vote share medium changes in seat share
Encourages parties to splinter multi-party system
1955: Liberals and Democrats merge LDP 1956: Hatoyama tries to switch the electoral
system Wants to amend Article 9 First-past-the-post would generate large super-
majorities
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Why institutional structure matters1994- : “mixed-member majoritarian” More disproportionate electoral system
Small changes in vote share large changes in seat share
Less malapportionment
Plurality party should win 50%, plausibly 66% of seats 2005: LDP = 61.7% 2009: DPJ = 64.2%
Caveat: hurdles remain in Upper House, which produces more proportional results
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LDP 2005 proposal: Making amendments easier! Article 9: Peace Clause
Maintain a Defense Army (not “SDF”) Permit forces abroad to…
Protect Japanese lives Participate in internationally-coordinated
actions
Article 96: Amendment Rule Diet hurdle reduced to absolute majority Keep 50% in voter referendum
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So what’s the prognosis?
Partisan differences appear relatively small Plurality of LDP, DPJ supporters have backed
revision Diet members strongly support revision (70-80%)
Caveat: easy to support in abstract
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% For Issues interested Issues to fix
DPJ LDP1) SDF, War: 42%
1) Decentralization: 30%
41% 42% 2) Environment: 33%
2) Self-defense military: 28%
3) Social insurance: 27%
3) Environment: 26%
Yomiuri Poll, March 2010
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Revision will be linked to LDP’s fate
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If amendment hurdle stays at 50%, then revision more likely under LDP LDP supporters more amenable to reform DPJ in coalition w/ SDP against Article 9 change
What issues will drive revision? Foreign policy fluctuates too much to be reliable Fiscal decentralization central to current
political debate Bicameralism majority supports revision
Research agenda for constitutional analysis
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What are the appropriate comparison groups? Common histories, e.g. military occupation, civil
war Mimicking Inception date changing roles of state, human
rights norms
One alternative: compare texts Data: “scope” from CCP Method: Coarsened Exact Matching (Iacus, King,
Porro 2008)
Rate of overlap with Japan [5+ yrs old]
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Top USAGerma
nyFranc
eBottom 3
All
Nauru (70%), Palau, Iceland,
Samoa, Tuvalu
48% 52% 50%Philippines, Colombia,
Mexico
Civil[21]
Poland (90%), Macedonia, Portugal, Albania
48% 67% 29%France,
Australia, Austria
Courts [55]
Australia (93%), Eritrea,
Nauru, Trinidad
73% 65% 53%Bosnia, Gabon, Portugal
Inst. [61]
Bosnia (74%), Austria, Belize,
Grenada
54% 69% 63%Costa Rica, Gambia,
Kenya
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Bases of Comparison Are there causal relationships underlying
similarities? Why so many island countries? Why E. European nations on civil rights? Parallel evolution, or conscious copying?
Do textual similarities matter? Constitutions set parameters for legislative /
judicial actions But if same actors control all branches, then do
constitutions function as institutional constraints??
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