Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Second Global Conference of OIE Reference Laboratories

Paris, 21 June 2010

The Biological and ToxinWeapons Convention

Richard LennaneHead, BWC Implementation Support Unit

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs(Geneva Branch)

BWCIMPLEMENTATION

SUPPORT UNITUNITED NATIONSOFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Second Global Conference of OIE Reference Laboratories

Paris, 21 June 2010

Disease as a weapon?

� R e p u g n a n t t o t h econscience of mankind�

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Second Global Conference of OIE Reference Laboratories

Paris, 21 June 2010

International response to the BW threat

� 1925 Geneva Protocol� Prohibits use of CW and BW in warfare

� 1972 Biological Weapons Convention� Prohibits development, production, stockpiling, acquisition,

retention or transfer of BW

� 2004 UN Security Council Resolution 1540� Requires all states to take measures to prevent WMD

(including BW) terrorism

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Second Global Conference of OIE Reference Laboratories

Paris, 21 June 2010

BWC facts and figures� Opened for signature in 1972; entered into

force in 1975� Current membership:

� 163 States Parties� 13 signatories� 19 states neither signed nor ratified

� Main provisions:� completely prohibits any acquisition or retention of biological or

toxin weapons; no exceptions� prohibits assisting or encouraging others to acquire BW� requires national implementation measures� peaceful uses of biological science and technology to be

protected and encouraged

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Second Global Conference of OIE Reference Laboratories

Paris, 21 June 2010

BWC strengths and weaknesses� Strengths:

� Clear, comprehensive ban: no exceptions, few loopholes� Strong international norm, never publicly challenged� Futureproof (so far...)

� Weaknesses: � No organisation or implementing body� No systematic monitoring of implementation or compliance� No systematic assessment of needs or provision of assistance� Uneven national implementation� No mechanism for investigating alleged violations � Conceived to deal with state-based BW programs: covers

bioterrorism only indirectly

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Second Global Conference of OIE Reference Laboratories

Paris, 21 June 2010

Weapons of Mass Destruction

NuclearWeapons

Nuclear Non-proliferation

Treaty

InternationalAtomic Energy

Agency

ChemicalWeapons

ChemicalWeapons

Convention

Organization forthe Prohibition of

Chemical Weapons

BiologicalWeapons

BiologicalWeapons

Convention

?

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Second Global Conference of OIE Reference Laboratories

Paris, 21 June 2010

Biothreats: the 21st Century view� Government biological weapons programs

� Non-state actors: bioterrorism

� Naturally-occurring, emerging and re-emerging disease

� Rapidly growing biotech capabilities, shrinking costs, and widely expanding interest, participation, availability and access� Unintended consequences, experiments gone wrong� Accidents, leaks, mistakes � or deliberate misuse or sabotage (bio-terror

vs. bio-error)� Awareness and management of risks lagging far behind

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Second Global Conference of OIE Reference Laboratories

Paris, 21 June 2010

Strengthening the BWC: the new way� Focus on improving and coordinating national

implementation of BWC:� legislation, regulation, law enforcement, export controls� biosafety and biosecurity� scientific oversight, education and awareness-raising� disease surveillance and response capacity

� Annual work programme deals with specific topics; exchange of technical expertise

� Range of different actors and organisations involved: network approach

� Implementation Support Unit coordinates activity

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Second Global Conference of OIE Reference Laboratories

Paris, 21 June 2010

The Spectrum of Biological Risk

Natural disease outbreak

Deliberate use of BW

Unintended consequences Accidents

Vandalism, sabotageNegligence

OIE BWC

�We must look at [the BWC] as part of an interlinked array of tools, designed to deal with an interlinked array of problems� � Kofi Annan, 2006

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Second Global Conference of OIE Reference Laboratories

Paris, 21 June 2010

BWC approach: a network model

BWC

State State

WHO

FAO

OIE

SCR 1540

INTERPOL

Professionalassociations Industry Scientific

organisations

WorkProgram

ISU

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Second Global Conference of OIE Reference Laboratories

Paris, 21 June 2010

BWC intersessional work program

NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION

REGIONAL ACTIVITIES

RESPONSE TO USE OR THREAT OF USE

BIOSAFETY & BIOSECURITY

OVERSIGHT, EDUCATION & OUTREACH

CAPACITY BUILDING FOR DISEASE

SURVEILLANCE, DETECTION,

DIAGNOSIS, AND CONTAINMENT

2007 2008 2009 2010

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Second Global Conference of OIE Reference Laboratories

Paris, 21 June 2010

The new BWC vision: examples� Kofi Annan (2006): �Building public health capacities can

strengthen safeguards against bioterrorism. And being better prepared to deal with terrorism can mean better public health systems overall. Similarly, the availability of training and technology is crucial to improving laboratory safety and security, and making labs safe and secure encourages cooperation and creates opportunities for development.�

� USA (2009): �In order to implement our Article X commitments, it is critical that we work together to achieve, sustain and improve international capacity to detect, report and respond to outbreaks of disease, whether deliberate, accidental or natural ... Greater cooperation and technical assistance are key to achieving and sustaining the capabilities we need to prevent biological weapons use and to combat infectious diseases.�

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction

Second Global Conference of OIE Reference Laboratories

Paris, 21 June 2010

For more information�www.unog.ch/bwc

Or contact:

BWC Implementation Support UnitUnited Nations Office for Disarmament AffairsRoom C.115, Palais des NationsGenevatel: +41 (0)22 917 2230fax: +41 (0)22 917 0483e-mail: bwc@unog.ch