[A note: This is a very rough draft of the paper which needs revision. The draft focuses too much on how the blind ecstasy on the rise of China has undercut China’s long overdue effort to introduce meaningful political reform. When presenting I will focus more on how the arrogant publicity of the so-called China model by the propaganda machine of China may deepen the concern held by some of the American opinion makers over a potential clash with what they see as a much flawed Chinese “civilization”.]

The Rise of China and Its Consequences1

Yawei Liu

The China Program, The Carter Center

APSA Preconference 2011Panel Proposal

The Political Communication of Threat and the New Public Diplomacy:Prospects for China-US relations

Abstract:

At the 13th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1987, Secretary

General Zhao Ziyang laid out an executable plan to launch China’s political reform. If

implemented, this plan would have put Deng Xiaoping’s dual-track reform into action.

After all, Deng Xiaoping believed that without political reform all other reforms would

eventually fail. The 1989 incident derailed the plan, sent Zhao Ziyang into political exile

and almost terminated China’s economic reform as well. Deng’s Southern Tour in 1992

managed to revive the economic reform but he was never able to put political reform

back on track. He had no political capital nor determined personnel to realize his vision.

In the next 15 years, through Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, despite a very brief trial with

direct township magistrate elections, political reform was largely shelved. But the

economy has soared and China is now the 3rd largest economy in the world. This

tremendous economic growth without tinkering the political system has changed China’s

discourse on the necessity of political reform and emboldened many Chinese officials and

scholars to declare that the China model (or the Beijing consensus) is not only a solution

for China but can be the key of development for all developing countries. This

developmental hubris will further delay China’s long overdue political reform that may

eventually make the glorious China model unsustainable.

This chapter argues that a political reform plan was always part of the initial reform

package but its priority on the CCP agenda has been in decline as China’s economic lot

continues to improve. When Joshua Cooper Ramos introduced the Beijing consensus, the

Chinese who are always suspicious about political reform seized and turned it into a

perfect weapon of agenda slaughter. While Westerners are largely dubious about the

meaning and significance of the China model, many Chinese scholars have joined the

efforts in packaging and publicizing it. The campaign to pitch the China model to both

domestic and overseas audiences is so intense and effective that the need to debate

political reform has been swept aside. It is uncertain how many countries will adopt the

Beijing consensus in the near future; in the long term, this blind belief in China

exceptionalism will put China on a collision course with the entire Western world. A true

clash of civilizations will be unleashed. It is another Cold War that may be equally long

but a lot harder to settle which side will eventually win.

The slow decline of CCP’s interest in political reform

By the time Mao Zedong passed away in 1976, China was inching toward a general

political and economic paralysis if not a dire collapse. Mao’s successor, Hua Guofeng,

did realize that China’s modernization must be put on the front burner but he was not able

to move away from the “two whatevers”. In a series of shrewd political maneuvers,

Deng Xiaoping managed to assert himself into decision-making process of the Party, the

state and the military.2

With senior CCP leaders coming to a tentative consensus, Deng Xiaoping presided

over the historic Third Plenum of the 11th National Congress of the CCP in December

1978 and made the momentous decision to disengage in irrational class struggle and

focus on economic development. The foundation for the launch of the so-called reform

and opening up in December 1978 was the gigantic effort to swing back to pragmatism

although it was still couched in the rhetoric of building a new socialist country of Chinese

characteristics.

The next 10 years saw phenomenal economic development and impressive

improvement of living conditions of the Chinese people. Deng Xiaoping had another

reform agenda on his mind. He believed economic reform efforts would eventually be

bottled up if political reform was not initiated. He had a strong feeling that without

reforming the political structure, 1) the accomplishments of the economic reform could

not be protected; 2) further deepening of the economic reform could not be secured; 3)

productivity would be blunted; and 4) the four modernizations of China would be not

achieved.3

But Deng Xiaoping also understood how important a politically correct ideological

façade was in order to deepen the reform. To move forward, he had to put himself in a

politically unassailable position first. On March 3, 1979, in a speech to CCP’s theoretic

work, he introduced the concept of insisting on four cardinal principles, namely 1)

insisting on the socialist road; 2) insisting on the proletarian dictatorship; 3) insisting on

the leadership of the CCP and 4) insisting on Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong

Thought. This was as good as a political cover as one could ever get but to make each

and every decision in accordance with the “four cardinal principles” alone would be self-

defeating. A new framework had to be developed and it was called “one core and two

fundamentals”. The core was “developing the economy is the top priority” and the two

fundamentals were 1) “four cardinal principles will always be adhered to” and 2) “reform

and opening up cannot be abandoned”.4

By the fall of 1986, Deng Xiaoping began his push for political reform. At the 6th

Plenum of the 12th National Congress of the CCP, details of the political reform began to

emerge. One Chinese scholar believes that Deng had identified two main areas for the

proposed political reform, namely separation of the CCP and the state in decision-making

and transforming the role of the government. Another scholar lists three areas that were

of extreme concern to Deng, source of legitimacy, concentration of power in the hands of

the CCP and lack of a checks and balance system.5 The final package was put out by

Zhao Ziyang, general secretary of the CCP at the first session of the 13th CCP National

Congress. In the political report submitted to the Congress on October 25, 1988, Zhao

listed eight tasks in the soon-to-be-launched political reform. Four of the eight were the

most important: 1) initiate separation of the CCP and the state apparatus, 2) improve

cadre selection procedures, 3) establish mechanisms for societal consultation, and 4)

perfect the system of democratic politics.6

The Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 derailed the long planned political reform.

Zhao Ziyang was removed from his position and put under house arrest. Jiang Zemin

was abruptly promoted to be CCP’s new General Secretary. Jiang would be in this

position until 2002 for a total of thirteen years. Busy consolidating his power and

scrambling to deflect attacks from the left, Jiang made a hard turn to the left. Collapse of

the Communist regimes in Eastern European countries and the disintegration of the

Soviet Union convinced the CCP top leadership that the train of reform had to be slowed

down. Not totally sidelined but losing political clout as a result of the crackdown, Deng

felt powerless and was not able to intervene and reverse the rising tide of political

conservatism. Not only political reform was tabled; his economic reform was to be

frozen as well.7

In 1992, at the age of 87, isolated and not often consulted in Beijing, Deng Xiaoping

headed south, visiting Wuhan, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai where he talked to local

officials. Initially, his tour was not even reported by the Beijing media outlets. When

newspapers in Shenzhen and Shanghai began reporting Deng’s visits and his remarks the

top Chinese military leadership vowed to escort reform and opening up. This “southern

tour” jumpstarted the stalled reform.8 This was the second time that Deng pulled the

government back to the middle from the left using pragmatist approach. He said there

were only three measures that could determine if a policy was right or wrong: 1) if it was

beneficial to increase socialist productivity; 2) if it was conducive to increase the

comprehensive power of the nation; and 3) if it was helpful in improving the living

conditions of the people. Deng’s tour caused a panic in Beijing. Jiang and his supporters

stopped their turn to the left and decided to come back to the center, returning to the

reform and opening up started by Deng Xiaoping back in 1978.9 Unfortunately, Deng

Xiaoping was no longer in a position to oversee the launching of the political reform. His

ideas, well defined by Zhao Ziyang in 1988, were diluted beyond recognition. China

moved into a new era of economic liberalization and political tightening, a development

that later would be a salient component of the so-called China model.

Political reform did not come to a complete stop. They were continued in ways that

could not and would not even leave a dent on the supremacy of the CCP. According to

Xu Yansong, a Tsinghua University political scientist, political reform since 1992 has

followed four trajectories: 1) improving the administrative efficiency of the government

through restructuring; 2) introducing a civil servant system; 3) extensive research on

source of power and its legitimacy; and 4) promoting rule of law.10 At the same time,

1 In this paper, the China model and the Beijing consensus are used interchangeably. Sometimes, they are put next to each other.2 “Two whatevers” refers to Hua Guofeng’s declaration that 1) Whatever Mao has decided we will carry through and 2) whatever Mao has said we will obey”. For details of Deng and his supporters’ epic battle to move China away from old ideology and quest for socialist purity, see Su Shuangbi, “Liangge fanshi shi zenme bei fouding de” [How the “two whatevers” were negated], Beijing Ribao [Beijing Daily], July 21, 2008.3 See Deng Xiaoping wenxuan [Selected works of Deng Xiaoping], Vol. III, p. 164 and 176.4 For the Chinese language description of the pillars of Deng’s reform, please see “Sixiang jiben yuanze” [Four cardinal principles] at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/20/content_698005.htm; accessed September 18, 2009.5 See Xu Yansong, “Zhongguo zhengzhi tizhi gaige zhihou de yuanyin fenxi” [Analysis of the lack of progress of China’s political reform], August 20, 2003 in the China elections & governance web site at http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=18837; accessed September 17, 2009. For details of Deng’s political reform agenda, Xu cites Deng Xiaoping wenxuan [Selected works of Deng Xiaoping], Vol. II, p. 176 and p. 213. The second scholar, Cao Youqin’s article is entitled “Chaozhe deng Xiaoping sheji de zhengzhi1gaige fangxiang qianjin” [March toward goals of political reform set by Deng Xiaoping], Zhonggai luntan [China Reform Forum], at http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=103302; accessed September 5, 2009. Cao cites Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, Vol. II, p. 328 and Vol. III, p. 131, 6 The section on political reform in Zhao Ziyang’s historic political report is available at http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=157257; accessed on September 17, 2009. 7 See Xu, “Analysis of the lack of progress of China’s political reform”.8 For details of Deng Xiaoping’s talking points during his southern tour, see “Deng Xiaoping nanxun tanhua yaodian” [Summary of Deng Xiaoping’s talks during the southern tour], People’s Daily online, February 6, 2006, http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=39777; accessed on September 23, 2009.9 See Qin Xiaoying, “Deng Xiaoping lilun yu hexie shehui” [Deng Xiaoping’s theory and the harmonious society], Ta Kung Pao, January 26, 2007.10 See Xu, “Analysis of the lack of progress of China’s political reform”.

direct village elections were mandated by the Organic Law of the Villager Committees of

the PRC, promulgated on provisional basis by the National People’s Congress (NPC) in

1986 and made into a basic law in November 1998.11

Jiang Zemin presided over three CCP National Congresses but no new platform on

political was ever introduced. The 14th CCP Congress was held in 1992 after Deng

Xiaoping’s southern tour. It pledged to continue the reform. Five years later, in the

political report of the 15th CCP Congress, Jiang Zemin declared that CCP would build a

socialist China with rule of law.12 Before and after the 16th CCP Congress, there was a

flurry of activities. First, Jiang invented “the three represents”, effectively changing the

mission of the CCP, which used to be to represent the industrial workers and farmers in

China. Second, there were talks of adding “political civilization” to the two existing

civilizations that CCP had vowed to build, namely “materialistic civilization” (economic

activities) and “spiritual civilization” (ideological purification). In his political report

delivered on November 18, 2002, Jiang Zemin outlined the tasks of political reform as

the following: 1) adhere to and perfect the socialist democratic system, 2) strengthen the

construction of the socialist rule of law, and 3) reform and improve CCP leadership.

Jiang further added that political reform means “perfecting democratic system, enriching

democratic formats, expanding channels for citizens’ orderly participation in politics,

guaranteeing people’s entitlement to democratic election, democratic decision-making,

democratic management and democratic supervision, making more rights and freedom

available to the people, and respecting and defending human rights.” He also said that

11 For details of the history of direct village elections in China, see Yawei Liu, “Consequences of village elections,” China Perspective, Fall Issue, 2000.12 For details for China’s slow move toward political reform in terms of changing ideas and adopting new thinking, see Yu Keping, “Sixiang Jiefang yu zhengzhi jinbu” [Mind emancipation and political progress], Beijing Ribao [Beijing Daily], September 17, 2007.

only by adhering to and perfecting the people’s congress system could laws and decisions

represent the will of the people. Lastly, other democratic parties in China could only

provide consultation under CCP leadership.13

After Jiang delivered his swan song report, Hu Jintao was “elected” by members of

the CCP Central Committee as the new Party Secretary. In March 2003, he was

“elected” by deputies to the NPC as president of China. This was the first smooth change

of top leadership in the CCP history, a sign of political progress and a more

institutionalized transfer of power. However, not until 2004 was Hu able to assume the

chairmanship of the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC). What many had hoped

to be a new deal began to emerge quickly. Hu Jintao acted quickly to deal with the case

of Sun Zhigang, abolishing an old regulation designed to detain and deport migrants in

the cities and enforced accountability through removing the mayor of Beijing for failing

to prevent the SARS epidemic. However, the long anticipated political reform was not

launched.

Observers of Chinese politics tended to believe Hu could not do anything in the area

of political reform until he was able to consolidate his power. Since he was not able to

get the CMC chairmanship until 2004, he did not have time and resources to plan for a

systemic overhaul of China’s political system. All hope was pinned on the 17th CCP

Congress. But the 17th CCP Congress came and went without a big bang proposal in

Hu’s report. In terms of the significance of conducting political reform, Hu said that

expanding socialist democracy was to serve the purpose of defending people’s interests

and maintaining social fairness and justice. Without political reform, China would

13 For details of political reform advanced by Jiang Zemin at the 6th CCP Congress, see http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=17193; accessed September 17, 2009.

become politically disoriented, the Party and the state would lose their vitality and the

initiative of the people could not be unleashed. On how to proceed with political reform,

Hu listed a total of seven tasks, including expanding people’s democracy, promoting

grassroots democracy, implementing rule of law and building a service oriented

government.14

Parallel to the increasingly vague discourse on political reform in China a new

concept began to emerge. This is the concept of “peaceful rise”. In 2003, at the Boao

Forum, Zheng Bijian, former secretary of Hu Yaobang and vice president of the Central

Party School, gave a speech entitled “The New Road of China’s Peaceful Rise and the

Future of Asia.” In the speech, Zheng described the nature of China’s development.

First, China has 1.3 billion people and this will make China a developing nation for a

long time to come. Second, in the 25 years since the launching of reform and opening up,

China has invented a new model of development. Third, this new model could be

characterized as actively participating in globalization, being independent, and not

seeking conquest and hegemony. China’s peaceful rise will not only solve the

development issue for the most populous nation in the world but also make an enduring

contribution to peace and prosperity of the world. However, in order for China not to

deviate from this path, there are three strategies that have to be adopted. 1) Economic

and political reform had to move forward simultaneously because market economy and

political democracy are the twin engines of China’s growth. 2) There must be courage

14 Hu Jintao’s report at the 17th CCP Nationa Congress is at http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=120321; accessed September 20, 2009. To see differences of the political reform agenda of the 13th CCP Congress and 17th CPP Congress, see Wang Xiao, “Shisanda baogao yu shiqida baogao de bijiao” [Comparing the political reports of the 13th CCP Congress and the 17th CCP Congress], http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=118807, November 16, 2007; acceded September 16, 2009.

and vision in absorbing all advanced achievements of the mankind since China’s rise

needs spiritual pillars. 3) Maintaining the balance of different interests groups, keeping

the harmony between mankind and nature and reducing friction between domestic

political need and international demand are all too important to be neglected.15 It must be

noted that Zheng was giving equal emphasis to both market economy and political

democracy. In other words, political reform is not only needed; it is a must for China to

sustain its growth.

Two years later, in an article that appeared in the overseas edition of the People’s

Daily, Zheng Bijian tried to define the nature and orientation of the CCP. First, the CCP

is different from the Communist Party of the former Soviet Union. It does not seek

conquest and denounces wars. Second, it is economic globalization that has contributed

to China growth miracle. Therefore, destroying the existing power balance and

challenging the United States are not in the best interests of the CCP. Third, seeking

three “和 s” [peace] is the paramount mission of the CCP: pursuing peace outside China,

building harmony domestically and seeking reconciliation across the Taiwan Strait.

Zheng emphasizes that Moscow and Beijing took divergent roads largely because it was

against the very essence of the Chinese culture to use force or violence to expand

territorially, develop economically and influence ideologically. Yes, China is a socialist

nation but its unique socialism is to increase productivity at home and wage peace

abroad. CCP’s mission does not go beyond protecting territorial integrity and securing

development and modernization for China.16

15 Zheng Bijian, “Zhongguo heping jueqi xindaolu he yazhou de weilai” [The new road of China’s peaceful rise and the future of Asia], November 23, 2003, http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=157366; accessed September 22, 2009.

To a certain extent, Zheng advanced what later became a trademark of Hu Jintao, the

idea of harmony. Obviously, one of Zheng’s goals was aimed at dismissing the China

threat theory in general and disarming the Americans who felt uneasy about China’s

phenomenal growth in particular. In the process, he actually hit something that was

bigger. His treatise on China’s peaceful rise was the first step toward defining am

emerging China model, building a new consensus and identifying the uniqueness of

China’s development.17 However, Zheng did not discredit the necessity of political

reform. He was one of a few CPP thinkers that have had access to the top leadership.

Like all leaders at the top, they are only absorbing ideas from their advisors selectively.

Hu Jintao likes the idea of harmony but appears to dislike Zheng’s emphasis on the

urgent need to carry out political reform and economic development with same force and

determination. In October 2006, at the 6th Plenum of the 16th CCP Congress, a resolution

was adopted to go all out in pursuit of social harmony.

The idea of harmony is a new turning point for the CCP engineered by Hu Jintao.

The first generation of the CCP leaders applied the ideas of continuous revolution and

class struggled in pursuit of an egalitarian world. They ran into a dead end with gigantic

social and human cost. Deng Xiaoping put brakes on that frenzied quest for the

Communist utopia and swung the nation onto a path of creating material wealth for the

people. His efforts to secure economic development through political reform were

derailed by the unforeseen event in 1989. After a few years of wavering and hesitation,

Jiang Zemin began to deepen the economic reform without giving too much thought to

16 Zheng Bijian, “Zhonguo gongchandang zai ershiyi shiji de zouxiang”, Renmin ribao [People’s Daily], November 22, 2005, http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=42130; accessed September 19, 2009.17 See Hong Zhaohui, “Zhongguo tesulun yu zhongguo fazhan lujing” [China uniqueness and China’s path of development], Dangdai zhongguo yanjiu [Journal of Contemporary China], Issue 2, 2004 at http://www.chinayj.net.

political reform. China’s GDP soared. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao came in with a new

playbook. They understand reckless pursuit of revolution was as bad as reckless pursuit

of GDP. While it was glorious to be rich back when Deng first started the reform it was

dangerous if the gap between the haves and have-nots becomes too wide. A harmonious

society by way of focusing more on the people’s affairs is the way to go. Although

democracy remains part of the package, it is moved to the backburner.

All in all, there is a precipitous decline of interest in political reform on the part of

the CCP top leadership. 18 It is still on the lips of CCP leaders and flowing from the

articles penned by scholars from thinks tanks to universities. But, as CCP is completing

its historic transition from “war and revolution” to “peace and development”, less and

less attention is being given to political reform. Deng’s success was to instill the CCP

with the idea that development is the hard truth. Hu’s achievement is to inject a notion of

social justice and equitable development into Deng’s formula. Deng had intended to use

political reform to prepare the CCP and the government for new challenges down the

road. Hu probably feels the same goal can be attained without overhauling the political

system. All he needs to do is to make small adjustment and get CCP officials to pay

more attention to people’s concerns and make them happy, feel indebted to the CCP and

thank the top leadership for everything.

The China model/Beijing consensus talk surfaced against this backdrop. It has

become increasingly high-pitched since 2008. In January 2008, there was a severe

18 Qian Gang wrote in his article “Where is ‘political reform” that one of the most prominent developments was the disappearance of the term “political reform” in current CCP rhetoric. Qian came to this conclusion through looking at the use and frequency of key words related to political reform in the Party reports, resolutions and speeches. According to him, “political reform” appeared in the political reports of the 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th CCP National Congresses but was replaced by “democratic politics” in the political report of the 17th CCP National Congress. See Qian Gang, “Zhengzhi tizhi gaige zai nali”, http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=118562, November 11, 2007, accessed September 21, 2009.

snowstorm that paralyzed most of Southern China but the Chinese government responded

quickly and no riot took place. In May, the Chinese nation rallied to provide relief to the

people victimized by the disastrous earthquake in Sichuan. Throughout the spring, the

negative response to China’s Olympic torch relays in Europe and the United States

triggered an unprecedented patriotic fervor. In August, the Beijing Summer Olympic

Games awed the world. China’s economy has not sunk too low like everywhere else

since the collapse of the Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. These events have

provided nutrition that feeds the China model frenzy. Before we look at this new

discourse we need to look at the origins of the Beijing consensus/China model and the

international reaction to it.

The origin of “the Beijing consensus”

Chinese officials, scholars and reporters are very adept at inventing new terms to

describe and define CCP or state policies but “the Beijing consensus” or “the China

model” was not invented by them. It was coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo, a partner at

the consulting firm Kissinger Associates. In 2004, Ramo wrote a paper entitled “The

Beijing Consensus”. In this paper, Ramo identifies three underlying grids of the Beijing

Consensus, namely 1) a strong commitment to innovation and experimentation; 2) a nice

combination of increasing per capita GDP and securing sustainability and equitable

distribution of wealth; and 3) a firm adherence to national self-determination which

guards against Western financial encroachments and adopts an asymmetrical military

strategy. 19 It seems Ramo has coined the term “the Beijing Consensus” to deliberately

offer an alternative to the so-called Washington Consensus. He writes, “China is

19 See details at http://joshuaramo.com/beijing-consensus/; accessed September 1, 2009.

marking a path for other nations around the world who are trying to figure out not simply

how to develop their countries, but also how to fit into the international order in a way

that allows them to be truly independent, to protect their way of life and political choices

in a world with a single massively powerful center of gravity.”20

Since its inception, the nice and neat formulation of China’s development has been

warmly received not only in China but also in many corners of the developing world.

With China’s economy enjoying double-digit growth in the almost three decades and

Washington’s advice of privatization, deregulation, trade liberalization and fiscal

austerity leading to economic disasters in countries like Argentina, the Beijing Consensus

has gained more attraction in both intellectual and policy making circles in Asian,

African, Latin-American capitals. In praising the Beijing Consensus, more ideas and/or

policy options are thrown into the formula. Andrew Leonard, a contributor to Slate,

quoted a Nigerian journalist in his article “No Consensus on the Beijing Consensus”:

The Chinese government knows what is good for its people and therefore shapes its economic strategy accordingly. Its strategy is not informed by the Washington Consensus. China has not allowed any [IMF] or World Bank to impose on it some neo-liberal package of reforms ... their strategy has not been a neo-liberal overdose of deregulation, cutting social expenditure, privatizing everything under the sun and jettisoning the public good. They have not branded subsidy a dirty word. 21

A Brazilian professor who studies China tells Chinese reporters that the China model

is made up of several things, including the initiatives of the top Chinese leadership, the

trust the Chinese government has in its people and the decision to build the nation up first

before it opens to the outside world.22 Vishwanath Pratap Singh, former Indian foreign

20 Quoted in http://www.salon.com/tech/htww/2006/09/15/beijing_consensus/; accessed September 10, 2009.21 Ibid.22 Quoted in Zhongguo wei quanshijie tigong le yangben [China has supplied a model for the entire world], in http://www.china.com.cn/international/txt/2009-09/07/content_18477114.htm, accessed September 15, 2009.

minister, told the famous Chinese political scientist Fang Ning that the he sees the China

Model as being characterized by “open-mindedness, competition and focused

approach”.23 To Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor to President Jimmy

Carter, the China Model could be seen in the talent and innovation of the Chinese people

and how the Chinese government manages successfully to unleash it without triggering

any political violence and social instability. With this model in place, China will be

ranked one of the top three powers in the next thirty years.24 In a recently released book

(in Chinese and German) called China’s Megatrends: The Eight Pillars of A New Society,

eighty-year old John Nesbit identifies, among other things, ideological liberalization,

global integration, policy experimentation and seeking liberty and fairness as unique

traits of China’s quest for reform. He said during a recent interview that what China does

now is brand new in social structuring, economic development and political

establishment. What he wants to describe in the book is the unprecedented and brave new

world China is building.25

Robert Lawrence Kuhn, an American who wrote the definitive biography of Jiang

Zemin and was given unlimited access to Chinese leaders at all levels in the past few

years, is even more hyperbolic when talking about the China Model. In his view, the

financial crisis has shattered the global power balance and the era of China is dawning.

China used to be part of the dire problems in the world and it is now part of the much

needed solution to the global crises. What is even more important is China’s mission to

build and sustain harmony both at home and abroad. The pursuit of harmony has taken

23 Quoted in Tang Yaoguo, “Jiema zhongguo moshi” [Deciphering the China model], Liaowang xinwen zhoukan [Outlook Magazine], September 8, 2009.24 Jiang Guopeng and Kui Jing, “Interview with Brzezinski”, Huanqiu [Globe Magazine], August 12, 2009. 25 Wu Bo and Weng Tianbing, “Nesbit: China Megatrends”, Guangzhou ribao [Guangzhou Daily], September 9, 2009.

the breath out of those Westerners who whine about a China Threat and made the China

Model much more attractive.26

There are other foreigners who see the China Model with trepidation and even

question its validity. James Mann, a former reporter stationed in China for the Los

Angeles Times, wrote a scathing piece in May 2007 entitled “A Shining Model of Wealth

without Liberty”. According to Mann, China “has been coming into its own as the first

full-blown alternative since the end of the Cold War to Washington's model of free

markets and democracy. As the U.S. model has become tarnished, China's has gained

new luster.” Mann credits the rise of the China Model to two parallel developments. The

first has been the foreign policy failures of the United States. “U.S. foreign policy has

been dominated by a school of thought that emphasizes military power and has tied the

spread of democracy to the use of force. Not only has this failed, it has also undermined

support for democracy. U.S. attempts to export free markets and political liberty by force

have been unable to bring even security, much less prosperity” to Iraq and other

countries. “The second key development has been the staying power and economic

success of the Chinese Communist Party.” Mann sees the success and appeal of the

China Model through the lens of national security for the United States. He writes,

“Above all, we should approach China through the lens of our national interest. That

includes not just security and prosperity but our interest in a world with open political

systems and the freedom to dissent. If we don't take China's new model as seriously as

the rest of the world does, we could find that we're the ones on the wrong side of history.

”27

26 Mei Zhiqing and Cao Si, “Zhongguo yi wancheng xiandaihua shishi de sanfenzhier” [China has completed two thirds of its epic modernization], Nanfang ribao [Nanfang Daily], September 16, 2009.

Ian Buruma issued a warning similar to that of James Mann. In a piece entitled “The

Year of the China Model,” he writes, “To come back from near destitution and bloody

tyranny in one generation is a great feat, and China should be saluted for it. But China’s

success story is also the most serious challenge that liberal democracy has faced since

fascism in the 1930’s.” While Buruma does not argue with China’s success he sees

something is glaringly missing: “While individuals have regained many personal

freedoms since the death of Maoism, they are not free to organize anything that is not

controlled by the Communist Party.” What worries him even more is the appeal of the

China model to nasty political players in other parts of the world: “African dictators –

indeed, dictators everywhere – who walk the plush red carpets laid out for them in

Beijing love it. For the model is non-Western, and the Chinese do not preach to others

about democracy. It is also a source of vast amounts of money, much of which will end

up in the tyrants’ pockets. By proving that authoritarianism can be successful, China is an

example to autocrats everywhere, from Moscow to Dubai, from Islamabad to

Khartoum.”28

David Shambaugh, another influential American China watcher, attributes China’s

success to the Chinese Communist Party. In his words, this is “a party that is full of

wisdom and that conducts ceaseless self-reflection on the reasons for failure of other

Communist countries with a firm determination not to follow the same downfall.”29 . In

27 James Mann, “A Shinning Model of Wealth Without Liberty”, Washington Post, May 20, 2007.28 Ian Buruma, “The Year of the China Model”, Project Syndicate, January 2008, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/buruma8; accessed September 27, 2009.29 Quoted in Sunny Lee, “Why Chinese Communist Party Lasts”, Korean Times, September 18, 2009, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/09/117_52097.html; accessed September 18, 2009.

the cover story for Time entitled “China’s Road to Prosperity”, he writes, China’s

“hybrid model of quasi-state capitalism and semidemocratic authoritarianism —

sometimes dubbed the ‘Beijing Consensus’ — has attracted attention across the

developing world.” However, Shambaugh does question the cost and even danger of the

China model. The China development model is causing both short-term and long-term

problems for China and for the world. They include but not limited to dire environmental

pollution, huge greenhouse gasses emission, serious water poisoning, severe ethnic

tensions, growing gap between the city and the countryside, rising Gini coefficient and

incessant riots in all corners of the nation. Shambaugh still believes the CCP will have

strong grip of the power because it is “remarkably adaptable and open to elements from

different countries and political systems”. It is a hybrid political party “with elements of

East Asian neo-authoritarianism, Latin American corporatism and European social

democracy all grafted to Confucianist-Leninist roots.” 30

Ezra Vogel, former director of the Fairbank Center at Harvard University, was

recently interviewed by a Chinese reporter. During the interview, he was pushed

repeatedly to discuss the China model. Although less severe than Man and Buruma in

expressing his concerns, he does make it clear that he has very strong reservations about

the China model. First, he believes to call China’s development pattern a model is as bad

as labeling America’s rise to power a model. Both nations have different culture,

political system and economic elements. Second, China’s success comes against a

backdrop of little freedom and liberty for individual citizens. It is similar to the situation

in Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore when their economy took off. Third, China’s

30 David Shambaugh, “China’s Road to Prosperity”, Time, September 28, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1924366,00.html; accessed September 18, 2009.

influence in the world is so much bigger than it was before but China’s appeal to the

outside world will remain limited as long as China does not address political reform

issues. Finally, China’s pursuit of harmony and assumption of responsibility in the world

are very good but the perceived arrogance of China and its large military budget is

causing grave concerns outside China.31

Arif Derlik, a professor of Chinese intellectual history at University of Oregon, does

not think highly of Ramo’s crystallization of the Beijing Consensus. He describes

Ramo's plan as a "Silicon Valley Model of Development" that ignores the fact that the

exploitation of China's labor force by foreign countries is a major part of the Chinese

development. In his critique paper, Derlik does not see this China model has any

sustainability; on the contrary, he sees its possible demise in a short period of time.

Derlik focuses his repudiation of the China model on its economic development and its

political consequences. Toward the end of his critique paper, Derlik writes:

The undeniable success of the development of the Chinese economy should not blind us to the problems created by the very same success—problems which ironically are in those very areas that attract the admiration of outsiders. The PRC economy is by no means integrated but suffers from severe uneven development in both spatial and social terms. Levels of pollution have reached such severity that they have become an additional cause of public suffering and disturbance. While there has indeed been a remarkable growth of wealth in certain sectors of the population, and an explosion in the size of the urban class, the majority of the population has experienced a decline in basic welfare.32

Although the Chinese media is working hard to inform the Chinese people that 1) the

Beijing consensus is now being acknowledged by both foreign officials and scholars and

31 Zun Zhongxin, “Hafo zhongguo tong tan zhongguo yanjiu yu zhonguo moshi” [A Harvard China watcher talks about China research and the China model], Zhongguo shehui kexue xuebao [The China Social Science Journal], September 21, 2009.32 http://anscombe.mcmaster.ca/global1/servlet/Position2pdf?fn=PP_Dirlik_BeijingConsensus; accessed September 18, 2009.

2) it is winning more and more people around the world, its acceptance is dubious at best,

its appeal somewhat questionable and its potential spread a source of grave concern.33

The strange career of “the Beijing consensus” in China

It must be pointed out at the outset that the well informed Chinese do not seem to

accept the idea of a well-defined and well received China model. The People’s Daily on

line launched a poll on the China model in March 2009 during the Second Session of the

10th NPC. The numbers of the ongoing poll clearly shows there is no consensus among

the netizens on the so-called Beijing Consensus. The first question is “Do you believe in

the existence of China Model?” Over 65% (1487) of those who took the poll answered

“no”. Only 369 (16%) believe the China Model has matured.34 If the informed Chinese

public is not engaged in this discourse, who are then telling the epic story of China

providing an alternative to the Washington Consensus? How has it evolved in China?

It is beyond the scale of this paper to map the rise of the China model theory. My

brief survey of the literature seems to suggest that it began as a response to Western

theories such as “China will quickly collapse” and “China is a threat”. In the process, the

Chinese scholars began to develop a new theory to counter these ill-intentioned

33 A lead article on September 18, 2009 in the tabloid Global Times entitled “The 4th Plenum and PRC 60th Birthday attracts global attention to the CCP” cites so many quotes to support this claim. It is interesting to note that when they used David Shambaugh’s series of books to make the point of him warming up to the idea of China exceptionalism, the word “atrophy” was dropped from the title of his most recent book. See Ding Gang, et. al., “Quanqiu jujiao gongchandang”, Global Times, September 18, 2009. 34 I used the term “informed Chinese” to include Chinese who are not only well educated but also frequent the web sites. There are four questions in the poll. Only a significant number of people chose to answer the first question “Do you believe in the existence of the China Model”. The other three questions are on the nature and contents of the China model and have been barely answered. The numbers to the first question on September 24, 2009 are as follows: there is a China model (369, 16.2%); it is a model still in development (400, 17.5%); there is China model but yet to win official recognition (28, 1.2%) and there is no China model (1487, 65.1%). The result is at http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49150/49152/9033838.html; accessed September 24, 2009.

prediction of China’s collapse and evil-spirited description of China as a threat, they have

settled on Chinese uniqueness (or China exceptionalism). In 1994, only two years after

Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour, Justin Lin, an economics professor at Peking University

and current vice governor of the World Bank, and two other scholars published a book

entitled The China Miracle: Development Strategy and Economic Reform. The notion of

a China miracle was first introduced in this book. Five years later, Tsinghua University’s

economist Hu Angang put out an article on China’s economic reform in the journal

Strategy and Management. Hu believes that China possesses a very sound strategy to

develop and sustain its economic development. In 2003, Kang Xiaoguang published an

article in the same journal in which he declares that China’s miraculous success is due to

its “successful transformation” and “successful conservatism” respectively. “Successful

transformation” refers to China’s adoption of the market economy and “successful

conservatism” to China’s strong adherence to the one party rule.35

This discovery of China exceptionalism coincided with the collapse of Communist

powers in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European nations and China’s economic

assertiveness. It was also a time when the Washington Consensus introduced by John

Williamson in 1989 did not succeed in reviving developing nation’s economy and when

Westerners began to feel uneasy about an increasingly more powerful China.

35 For books and articles on China’s possible collapse and China as a threat, see Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publisher, 2000)；Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl Wudunn, China Wakes: The Struggle for the Soul of a Rising Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1994)；Nicholas Kristof, “The China Threat?”, New York Times, December 20, 2003, Gordon Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House，2001), Richard Berstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A.Knopf，1997). Lin Yifu et. al., Zhongguo de qiji [China’s miracle] (Shanghai, Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1994), Hu Angang, “Zhongguo jingji zhengzang de xianzhuang, quanqi qianjing ji changqi qushi”[The current status, short-term and long term prospect of the Chinese economy], Zhanglve yu guangli [Strategy and Management], Issue 3, 1999 and Kang Xiaoguang, “Zhongguo teshulun”[Chinese Exceptionalism], Zhanglve yu guangli, Issue 4, 2004. For a summary of the theory of China exceptionalism, see Hong Zhaohui, “China Exceptionalism and China’s path for development”.

Furthermore, there was an urgent need to solve the China riddle: how can one explain

China’s economic development, lifting hundreds of millions of its people from poverty

and sustaining a double digit growth for so long when it resisted successfully changing its

political structure? Joshua Cooper Ramo’s paper came out in 2004 to fill the theoretic

void. Between 2004 and 2005, there were many articles in the Chinese media outlets on

the decline of the Washington Consensus and the rise of the Beijing Consensus. An

article in the 23rd issue of China Economic Weekly in 2004 predicted that the debate of

Ramo’s theory would be become increasingly prominent. A newspaper forum orgainzed

by the 21st Century Economic Report, a newspaper in Guangzhou, invited prominent

scholars such as Justin Lin, Joseph Stiglitz, Fan Gang, Tang Min and Li Daokui to share

their views on both the Washington Consensus and the Beijing Consensus. An article in

the China Reform Forum on April 16, 2005 described the clash of the two consensuses

and its impact on China’s reform.36

By 2008, in the wake of the snow storm in the South, the earthquake in Sichuan, the first

space walk conducted by Chinese astronauts and the Summer Olympic Games in Beijing,

the China model/Beijing Consensus talk has solidified among the Chinese scholars. In

December 2008, Pan Wei, a US-educated professor teaching at Peking University

organized an international conference called “PRC at 60 and the China Model”.37 In the

same month, Wang Shaoguang, another US-educated professor teaching at the Hong

36 Zhao Xiao, “Cong huashangdun gongshi dao Beijing gongshi” [From the Washington Consensus to the Beijing Consensus], China Economic Weekly, Issue 23, 2004; Wang Zi, “From the Washington Consensus to the Beijing Consensus”, Ershiyi shiji jingji baodao [21st Century Economic Report, March 28, 2005]; and Xie Minggan, “Cong huashengdun gongshi dao Beijing gongshi jiantan zhongguo gaige jingyan jiaoxu” [From the Washington Consensus to the Beijing Consensus and lessons of the Chinese reform], China Reform Forum, April 16, 2005, http://www.chinareform.org.cn/cirdbbs/dispbbs.asp?boardID=2&ID=52455; accessed September 25, 2009. 37 Minutes of this conference were published at Kaifang shidai [Open Times], Issue 4, 2009, pp. 140-148.

Kong Chinese University, published his speech at the conference at the China Review

web site, defining the China model as PRC government’s keen desire to learn and skillful

capacity to adapt.38

2009 marks the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PRC. Efforts to drum up the

China model pick up momentum.39 In January 2009, Red Flag Article, a journal affiliated

with CCP’s theoretical journal Seeking Truth ran an article on the status of research on

the China model. According to the authors, foreign scholars began to examine China’s

development model since the 1960s. Half way through China’s economic reform, many

of these scholars began to question if an old and autocratic political system can coexist

with a vibrant market economy. However, the advantage and strength of China’s

national mobilization model (juguo tizhi) is so brilliant in overcoming the difficulties

caused by the snowstorm, providing relief to earthquake victims and hosting the summer

Olympic Games, the international suspicion has resided and criticisms decreased

tremendously. 40 In same month, a Chinese national living in France, Song Luzheng, put

out an article that was circulated widely on many Chinese online portals. He declares in

the article that democracy is not invincible but China model is.41 In May, People’s Daily

reporter filed a story from the United Nations, using his interview with a Harvard

38 Wang Shaoguang, “Lun zhongguo zhengfu de xuexi jizhi yu shiying nengli” [On Chinese government’s mechanism of learning and capacity to adapt], http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=143268; accessed September 22, 2009.39 A search for articles that contain “China model” in the title at the China elections & governance web site in 2009 (www.chinaelections.org) generates more than forty entries.40 Zhuang Junju and Zhang Xili, “Jinqi youguan zhongguo moshi yanjiu guandian zongshu” [A examination of viewpoints in recent research on the China model], Hongqi wengao [Red Flag Articles], January 21, 2009.41 Song Luzheng, “Minzhu bisheng haishi zhongguo moshi bisheng” [Is democracy or China model invincible], http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=143294, accessed September 23, 2009.

business school professor to underscore the point that China model is challenging

traditional development theories.42 In June, a Guangming Daily article was called “Why

is the China model so attractive in the world?”43 In July, Zhang Wei-wei, who once was

Deng Xiaoping’s interpreter and currently does research in a couple of European

universities, was invited to the People’s Daily online to talk about the China model and

its impact on problems of the world. In his view, the China model is political, economic

and cultural. It is a cornucopia of solutions to most of the problems in the world.44

Into the summer and early fall, as the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s

Republic draws near, there has been a full court press in the Chinese media to publicize

the China model. In August, the New China News Agency changed the title of an article

penned by Francis Fukuyama in a Japanese journal into “More countries favor the China

model”.45 The cover story of the September issue of Liaowang Newsweekly, one of

China’s most famous current affairs magazines, was on the China model. The article

tries to explain why China is the only nation in the world that has edged out of the

economic downturn and making a huge effort to help other nations to weather it. The

China model works and it may be universal.46 On September 26, Hu Wei, professor and

dean of the School of International Affairs and Public Administration at Shanghai

42 Wu Yun, “Zhongguo moshi tiaozhan chuantong lilun” [China model is challenging traditional development theories], People’s Daily on line, May 8, 2009.43 Wang Jiabo, “Zhongguo moshi yuanhe dui shijie chongman meili” [Why is the China model so attractive in the world], Guangming ribao [Guangming Daily], June 27, 2009.44 Zhang Wei-wei, “Zhongguo moshi beihou de linian ji dui jiejue shijie wenti de1 yingxiang” [The ideas behind the China model and its impact on solving problems of the world], People’s Daily on line, July 17, 2009.45 See the Xinhua story at http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=155493; accessed September 20, 2009. 46 Tang Yaoguo, “Zhongguo jiazhi--Jiema zhongguo moshi: quanqiu weiji zhong de zhongguo re ” [Deciphering the China model: the China wave amidst global crisis ], Liaowang Newsweekly, September 2009.

Jiaotong University, published an article in Jiefang Daily, Shanghai’s Party newspaper,

on China’s model’s special place in the world. Hu Wei writes that the China model is not

only a model for economic development but also a model for political development. It is

the logic result of mankind’s democratic political processes. It is the responsible gift of a

rising power to the troubled world.47

No top Chinese leader has ever been recorded of referring to the China model or the

Beijing consensus in their official speeches or writings. However, this does not mean

they are not approving or endorsing this idea.48 Since 2008, CCP leaders seem to more

and more acknowledge or imply the China model in their speeches and remarks. In

February 2009, Xi Jinping, Hu Jintao’s heir apparent, made some remarks that shocked

the world. When meeting with Chinese Mexicans when visiting Mexico, Xi said that

China did not export revolution, did not export hunger and poverty, and did not create

problems for any countries. Those foreigners who kept nitpicking China should have

better things to do. Although some Chinese intellectuals were upset by the cockiness of

the remarks, many interpreted this as a reflection of growing confidence in the China

model.49

47 Hu Wei, “Zhongguo moshi de shenceng hanyi yu shijie yiyi” [The deeper meaning of the China model and its global significance], Jiefang Ribao [Lieberation Daily], September 26, 2009.48 When the term “peaceful rise” was first introduced by Zheng Bijian, it was wildly popular. However, it eventually became “peaceful development” in official speeches and writings. As a Chinese scholar told the author, Hu Jintao felt the term “peaceful rise” sounds arrogant. By the same token, for top Chinese leaders to echo China model or Beijing consensus in their speeches does not project an image of modesty. After all, by many measures, China is still a developing country. 49 Qin Henhai, “Xi Jinping tong pi” [Zi Jinping criticizes harshly], ifeng.com, http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=143465; accessed September 22, 2009.

On March 9, 2009, in his speech to the NPC annual session, Wu Bangguo declared that

the socialist political development road of Chinese characteristics is the only correct road

for the Chinese people under the CCP leadership. “While actively absorbing useful

achievements of political civilization of the mankind, we will never ever copy the

Western style of politics, never ever adopt a multiparty system, checks and balances and

a parliament divided by two chambers.”50 Again, Wu, who ranks second in the powerful

Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo, did not use the term China model but who can

deny that he sees a vibrant China model in operation?

On January 1, 2009, Qiushi magazine published Hu Jintao’s speech on the outlook of

scientific development. Hu writes that in the article that raising high the flag of socialism

of Chinese characteristics is a must for every CCP member in the nation.51 In July, the

newly created China mega think tank, the China Center for International Economic

Exchanges headed by former State Councilor Zeng Peiyan, had its inauguration meeting

with a specific focus on examining the meaning of the China model during worldwide

economic downturn. In endorsing the conference that was attended by think tank

representative around the world, Vice Premier Li Keqiang delivered a keynote speech52.

In a speech commemorating the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People’s

Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) on September 20, 2009, President Hu Jintao

says which road of political development a nation chooses is decided by the nature and

circumstances of this particular nation. The socialist road of political development of 50 Wu Bangguo, “Gongzuo baogao” [Work report], xinhuanet.com, March 9, 2009.51 Hu Jintao, “Guanche luoshi kexue fazhan guan” [Carry out and implement the outlook of scientific development], Qiushi [Seeking truth], January, 1, 2009.52 Renmin ribao [People’s Daily], July 4, 2009

Chinese characteristics is a road that has been traveled by the Chinese people under CCP

leadership. It is a road that fits China’s circumstances, follows the global trend,

maintains CCP supremacy, makes people masters of their own country and upholds rule

of law. He repeats what Wu Bangguo said back in March: China does not reject working

governance formula from other countries but will never adopt Western political system in

a wholesale manner.53

Four days later, Hu Jintao was addressing the general assembly of the United Nations.

He mentioned “three insistences” in his speech, namely insisting on making decision in

accordance with Chinese circumstances, insisting on taking the socialist road of Chinese

characteristics, and insisting that building a China that is civilized economically,

politically, socially and ecologically through continuous reform. He says that the more

developed China is the more contribution it will make to the world and the more

opportunities it will provide to the world.54

This brief review indicates that the chorus of the China model/Beijing consensus inside

China is orchestrated by the Chinese government. Many Chinese scholars and media

workers have participated to broaden and deepen the campaign. The top CCP leadership

not only endorses the China model talk but also speaks collectively on the uniqueness of

China’s development model. But why do most of the people polled not support this

brave new model? In fact, a few Chinese scholars have openly criticized the China

53 Hu Jintao, “Zai qingzhu zhengxie liushi zhoiunian dahui shang de jianghua”[Speech on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the founding of CPPCC], xinhuanet.com, September 20, 2009.54 Hu Jintao, “Tongzhou gongji gon chuang weilai” [Let’s build a brave new future together], chinanews.com.cn, September 24, 2009.

model, its impact on China and its possible application outside China. On what grounds

have they rendered their critique? We need to take a quick look at the contents of the

China model/Beijing consensus as specified by the Chinese scholars.

The goods in the Beijing consensus basket

When Chinese officials and scholars describe the China model/Beijing consensus, they

go far beyond Ramo’s initial definition. They simplify the Washington consensus as a

combination liberal democracy and market economy and frame the China model as the

very opposite of it. During a recent interview, Ma Zhengang, China’s former ambassador

to the United Kingdom and president of the Chinese Institute of International Affairs,

said the core of the Western model is political democratization and economic

liberalization. Without political democratization, economic development can be secured.

China has taken a different path and scored big successes. That was why Westerners are

dumbfounded, upset and scared. He then said two very important components of the

China model are a strong and firm CCP leadership and the people’s keen desire to see the

rise of China.55 Fang Ning, director of the Institute of Political Science under the

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) said that two fundamental characteristics of

the China model are 1) protecting people’s right to pursue happiness and 2) centralizing

power at the top. The first has unleashed people’s energies and initiatives and the second

is the key in improving decision-making process and marshalling resources to achieve

predetermined goals.56 Some scholars go as far as saying that the shaping of the China

model is merely the outcome of applying Marist theory to the special circumstances of

55 See Tang Yaoguo.56 Ibid.

China. Xu Chongwen, a CASS senior researcher said in a recent interview that China’s

contribution to the world is to have sinifyied Marxism and solved problems that cannot

be effectively dealt with by any other ideology or political system in the world. This is a

new path in pursuing progress of civilization, producing a developmental alternative to

the one offered by developed nations whose rise was built on hurting other nations

politically and economically, and securing global harmony and world peace. What else

can explain China’s achievement in becoming the third largest economy and reducing

poverty in such a dramatic manner?57

Hu Wei is more interested in examining the political component of the China model. He

outlines two Western theories in his recent article. One, according to Hu Wei, is that

China is doing relatively well economically but its political development is quite

backward. The other theory is that China cannot sustain its economic growth without

liberalizing politically. He uses Nesbit’s recent book to buttress his view that China has

not only managed to adapt to economic globalization but also weathered the political

challenge from the West. Whereas Western nations have horizontal democracy China

has introduced vertical democracy. Since all democratic nations have different formats

of democracy, China is by all means entitled to have its own democratic system. The

China model should not be narrowly defined as one-dimensional. It includes a unique

political system that will enrich the arsenal of democracy in the world.58

57 Ibid.58 See Hu Wei.

Some scholars see the China model as an epic battle to crush the Western monopoly on

the discourse of development and human progress and to secure a safe place for the

China development experience that can be easily identified and understood by other

developing nations. Wang Hui, a Tsinghua University professor, feels the key to the

success of this battle is CCP’s courage to maintain independence and focus on

developing China in its own unique way.59 Zhang Wei-wei summarizes the China model

as “strong government”, “pragmatic approach”, “people focused” and “gradual reform”.

He even challenges both Chinese scholars and Western experts to identity a single nation

that has used Western political system to have successfully turned itself into a more

advanced nation. In his views, there are two benchmarks to measure if a nation is

successful: elimination of corruption and achieving modernization. He sees three major

trends in the world in the past thirty years. The first is the rise of radical Islam which has

led the current war on terrorism. The second is the so-called third wave of

democratization. Countries that have become democratic during this wave, particularly

Eastern European nations, are now facing serious challenges. The third is the

modernization drive led by China. It has triggered seismic reactions and will eventually

impact the political landscape of the world.60

Other scholars see other unique aspects of the China model. He Xuefeng, an influential

researcher on China’s rural development, believes that China’s economic takeoff is due

to the artificial and deliberate division of urban centers and the countryside. Farmers can

migrate to the cities when jobs are available and return home when life becomes

59 See Zhi Zhengfeng and Zang Li.60 See Zhang Wei-wei.

unbearable. The availability of this large army of cheap labor and the fact that their land

provides a safety valve give China a unique master key to open the door of development

without paying too high a price.61 Zhang Yu, an economics Professor of Renmin

University of China defines China model as 1) combining strong and large state owned

businesses with a vibrant private sector, 2) running a market economy that is subject to

tough state regulations, and 3) opening to the outside world gradually with state control.62

Many believe China model is a comprehensive tool box that can solve different problems,

a set of experiences and practices that can be borrowed and applied by different nations

facing different challenges, and a new paradigm shift whose impact is going to be felt in

many years to come. Pan Wei, who early this year called Chinese scholars to declare war

on the Western civilization, divides the China model into three sub-models, social,

economic and political. The four pillars that support the political sub model are 1) the

adept application of populist democracy, 2) a leadership group that is progressive,

unselfish and unified, 3) a meritocratic civil servant system, and 4) a system of effective

checks and balances and efficient self-corrective capacity. These four pillars make up the

brain of modern-day China. China’s different social structure constitutes the body. The

economic sub model provides two strong feet and huge wings for China.63

Finally, the China model/Beijing consensus is not something that suddenly burst into

China and became the beacon for its development. It is the cumulative learning,

adaptation and exploration by several generations of CCP leaders. It began with Mao’s

61 See Zhi Zhengfeng and Zang Li.62 Ibid.63 Ibid.

heroic effort to choose and pick what was useful for China from the classics of Karl Marx

and Vladimir Lenin. It moved a step further with Deng Xiaoping placing bricks of

pragmatism in Mao’s theoretical warehouse. Jiang Zemin came along and supplied “the

three represents” to the CCP inventory. Hu Jintao introduces the outlook of scientific

development and harmony to this development treasure house. None of the four have

severed the relationship with Marxism but all have made creative and positive

adjustments and contributions.64 As indicated by the CCP Resolution adopted on

September 18, 2009 at the 4th Plenum of the 17th CCP National Congress, 88 years after it

was founded, 60 years after it came to power, and 30 years after it launched reform, the

CCP has transformed China from a weak, poor and pathetic country into a great power of

peace, prosperity and harmony. This is an unprecedented achievement of CCP through

understanding and transforming the world. This is an unsurpassable glory of changing

China and making contributions to universal human progress. Without the CCP, there

would have been no new China, no socialist road of Chinese characteristics. In other

words, the China model is undeniably a CCP invention.65

The lingering doubt about the China model

The China model talk is largely an intellectual exercise conducted away from most of the

informed Chinese. From the CCP perspective, it is something that is very useful in

injecting a sense of pride to the Chinese people and strengthening the legitimacy of the

government. It may also be useful in competing with the West in the area of

64 Yan Shuhan, “Zhongong daolu de shijie yingxiang” [The global impact of the Chinese Road], Liaowang [Outlook newsweekly], September 8, 2009. 65 CCP Central Committee, “Guanyu dangjian luogan zhongda wenti de jueding” [Several major decisions on CCP construction], September 18, 2009, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/10128293.html; accessed September 27, 2009.

development discourse, which used be monopolized by Western scholars and experts. It

further builds a wall against any sinister attempts of “Color Revolution” by evil

Westerners led by Washington. Zheng Yongnian, a China policy analyst and director of

the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore detects Western fear of

the China model. According to Zheng, this fear originates from two primary sources.

First, the rise of China is different from the rise of any other Western nations. Second,

Westerners consider their values as universal and applicable to other nations. When

China rises from a different path, they are concerned that their value system as well as

their way of making economy work and government clean will eventually be replaced by

the China model. Westerners, particularly Americans, are mission oriented. They have

spent large quantity of resources, used huge manpower and even conducted military

operations to expand their democratic system to other countries. When China rises, it has

begun to expand to developing nations with no strings attached. A world fixated on the

China model is a different and possibly scary world. Zheng also sees a third source of

fear which is the simplification of the China model. Many Westerns draw an equal sign

between the China model and China’s poor human rights record, neglect of individual

liberty and non-interference in nations where there are abuses of human rights or

abundant corruption. However, Zheng feels that Westerners should not be terribly

worried by the rise of China and the development path associated with this rise. They

should understand that China’s rise is largely due to a global system established by

Westerners and that each nation is entitled to its own way of developing the economy and

building legitimacy for its government.66 Zheng does not believe the West can contain

the spread of the China model. In his analysis, to block the expansion of the Beijing

model is as futile as the earlier attempt by the West to block China’s economic rise. It is

understandable that British professor Martin Jacques predicts the rise of the middle

kingdom and the end of the Western world but the West can do what China has done in

the past thirty years, i.e. learning from the West while preserving what is still working in

China. Managing international relations is not a zero sum game. If China and the West

work together, a gentler and kinder world may emerge. 67

Not all Chinese scholars are as optimistic as Zheng Yongnian. A few of them have

serious issues with the China model. Some have raised their concerns in a very public

manner. Others may not have the courage or platform to have their voices heard. Ding

Xueliang, a US-educated professor at the Hong Kong Institute of Technology wrote an

article in September 2008 raising the concern that the China model cannot be easily

promoted outside China. Ding centers his concern on two questions: 1) What did this

model achieve? and 2) How did it get there? He believes that the social cost of the China

model is so high that it is impossible for any other nation to adopt it. This sky high cost

is shown in three areas: lack of social justice and fairness, environmental degradation and

administrative cost. Ding writes that in no normal nation where collective bargaining is

not allowed. But in China those who try to bargain and defend their interests will go

straight to jail. Industrial workers are not respected and farmers’ interests are not

protected at all. Under the doctrine of maintaining stability is paramount any Chinese

who dares to take on the government will be harassed and silenced. Environmental

degradation is so serious that it is doubtful if China can overcome its water crisis any 66 Zhang Yongnian, “Xifang weihe jupa zhngguo moshi” [Why the West is afraid of the China model], Liahe zaobao [International Herald Tribune], April10, 2009 67 Zheng Yongnian, “Zhongguo moshi neng bei xifang weidu ma” [Can the West contain the China model?], Lianhe zaobao [United Daily], September 9, 2009.

time soon. China’s governance through national mobilization is effective all right but its

cost is mind-boggling and can never be applied in any country where spending taxpayers’

money requires debate and approval. The cost of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games was

four and five times higher than that of the Athens and Sydney Summer Games and this

does not include expenses paid by other government agencies in China. Ding uses Hu’s

outlook of scientific development to issue his serious warning: it is perfectly all right to

acknowledge the amazing achievements of the thirty-year-old reform but it is criminal to

be blind to the gigantic cost of these achievements. Without lowering the cost, not only

the China model will be irrelevant to other nations the sustainability of China’s own

reform may be questionable.68

An article in Study Times, a journal edited and published by the Central Party School,

echoes Ding Xueliang’s view. According the author, Qiu Gengtian, there is a price for

any successful experiment. What attracts the world about the China model is the scale

and speed of the economic development; what the world has yet to notice is the high

price China has paid for this economic development. China’s wealth and progress have

indeed come at a huge expense of human and environmental degradation. This is neither

acceptable to China nor tolerable to the world. China must seek a low-cost development

road. Otherwise, the global warning of yet another China threat will be just around the

corner.69 Yu Keping, vice president of the CCP Central Bureau of Translation, does not

think the China model is a finished model. First, China is still in the process of finding

68 Ding Xueliang, “Zhongguo moshi weishenme bu hao tuiguang” [Why is it difficult to promote the China model], Financial Times Chinese online edition, September 19, 2009.69 Qiu Gegntian, “Zhongguo moshi de didaijia fazhan zhilu” [The low-cost development road of the China model ], Xuexi shibao [Study Times], September 14, 2009.

new solutions to sustain its economy. Second, China’s circumstances are so special this

model cannot be easily applied to other nations. 70 Li Jianhua cautions Chinese scholars

not to be so enthralled by the China model and lose perspective. According to him, it is

absurd to try to spread the China model through a think tank summit. It is ironic for a

nation that has always denied universality of any development models to trumpet the

China model as an attractive model to other nations. China itself has suffered a great deal

in adopting development methods from the Soviet Union. It is hard to understand why so

many Chinese officials and scholars are in such a hurry to sell the China model. It is a

dangerous business.71

Wang Jingjun, a doctoral student at Peking University, thinks that there are key

differences between the Beijing consensus and the Washington consensus. Whereas

Beijing consensus is designed to explain what China has done in the past the Washington

consensus is basically a forward looking formula intended for reform and reconstruction.

The Beijing consensus connotes experiences of a developing nation but Washington

consensus sheds light on the practices of a developed nation which is the sole superpower

in the world. While it is hard to say with certainty that the two consensuses are on a

collision course, it is easy to see that the Beijing consensus has the tendency to deny

individual aspirations that are built on universal values such as liberty and equality. 72

70 Yu Keping, “Zhongguo moshi bing meiyou dingxin” [The China model is yet to be completed], Jiaoyu yuren [Journal for the Teachers ], Issue 9, 2009.71 Li Jianhua, “Bubi mangzhe gei fazhan zhong guojia chuanshou zhongguo moshi” [No need to busy ourselves selling the China model to developing nations], Changjiang Ribao [Yangzi River Daily], June 30, 2009.72 Wang Jingjun, “Zhongguo moshi he zhongguo fazhan zhilu” [The China model and China’s development road], March 5, 2007, http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=103943;accessed September 18, 2009.

Can China move from economic reform which deals with people’s physical survival and

improving living standards to political reform that respects human rights and political

liberty?

The most serious criticism of the China model rendered by the Chinese scholars is the

absence of political reform/democratization components. Gao Ren, a columnist for the

China elections & governance web site, declares that it is a violation of the Hu Jintao

Doctrine of scientific development to say that the China model is perfect for China and

the world. The China model is just going through the stage of primitive molding. It was

not introduced until a few years ago. As it stands now, it is a model that saves no place

for political reform. Without meaningful political reform, this model creates inequitable

distribution of wealth, expands the gap between the rich and the poor, breeds rampant

corruption and turns the Chinese government into an agency that believes superficial

stability is consent to legitimacy.73 In 2006, Yang Guang published an article in the

Journal of Contemporary China in which he questions the absence of political reform in

the China model. In the conclusion of his paper, he writes, “In today’s China, there will

be very few people believing that there is absolute no need for political reform. Political

reform will be launched sooner or later in China and its breakthrough probably will come

when people realize the China model cannot be sustained exactly because it shuns

political reform.74

73 Gao Ren, “Mei ren weidu zhongguo moshi” [No one is containing the China model], September 10, 2009, http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=156655; accessed September 20, 2009.74 Yang Guang, “Zhengzhi gaige: zhongguo moshi de nandi” [Political reform: the difficult issue of the China model], Dangdai zhongguo yanjiu [Journal of Contemporary China], Issue 10, 2006.

Tentative conclusions

If we compare the Soviet reform to the China reform, the key difference is that Moscow

began its reform in the political arena and Beijing refused to put political reform ahead of

economic reform. From the Chinese perspective, that is exactly why the Soviet Union

quickly collapsed and China has territorial integrity, one-party supremacy and economic

development miracle. But, this priority shift only came after 1989. When reform and

opening was launched in 1978, Deng had a two-step plan and he believed the success of

all reforms would hinge on the success of political reform. 1989 not only saw the plan of

political reform dashed but also witnessed a hard left turn in the economic sector. This

retreat from reform was finally reversed by Deng in 1992 by which time he was too old

and too tired to push forward his political reform. As China’s economic performance

continues to shine year after year, the CCP, whose top leadership and many rank and file

members are afraid of any real political reform, has begun to push political reform to the

side. The China model/Beijing consensus provides a perfect theoretical framework and a

practical excuse to postpone political reform or even to declare it totally unnecessary.

This is something Joshua Cooper Ramo probably has never expected when he first

introduced the Beijing Consensus in 2004.

The China model/Beijing consensus is neither a sound theory nor a good set of

benchmarks to design reform and measure its success. It is a highly effective system

under the domination of one political party through which resources can be marshaled,

dissent silenced or crushed, land grabbed, lakes and rivers dammed, international events

paid and organized without looking into any human or ecological cost as long as the

outcome of the activity makes the state and the Party look good. It is a system whose

declared mission is to serve the people but whose possible abuse of power cannot be

checked and balanced. It is a system responsive to the people when pressured but it

always blames the people for all the problems in the society. It is a system whose output

has awed many foreigners, delighted millions of Chinese and appealed to leaders and

elite in other developing countries but the cost of this “miraculous” output is staggering

and long-term. It is a system that does not acknowledge the existence of universal

values, trashes democratic arrangements to hold government officials accountable and

sees a constant Western conspiracy to destroy people’s China. It is a system that

recognizes constant talent at the top, demands total obedience at the bottom and uses

incentives or fear to rein in those in the middle. It is a system that may elevate China to

the global stage of national wealth and power but it will not be able to make China a

nation where individual pursuit of happiness is guaranteed and protected. It is a system

that cannot resolve the tension between an autocratic government and the people who

want more say in their quest for individual rights. The China model is an effective

weapon to shatter political reform need into pieces. The Beijing consensus is an artificial

consensus that democratization will bring about harm and even destruction to China.

Scholars and media workers both inside and outside China have played a very important

role in building the myth of the China model/Beijing consensus. We praise those who

constantly question the validity and applicability of the China model and raise doubts

about its usefulness. We are appalled by those who have joined the China model chorus

without sound judgment or with no judgment at all. When scholars are working with the

state and party apparatus to advance something that may eventually hurt the wellbeing of

the nation and erode the liberty of the people, they are colluding with power in a reckless

way. Many Chinese and Western scholars are trumpeting the China model which, unless

it is modified significantly down the road, will hurt both China and those nations which

decide to experiment with it.

The China miracle is not just an outcome of the China model, of China’s unique political,

economic, social and cultural peculiarities. To a large extent, China’s successes, as

pointed out by Zheng Bijian, are due to existing economic globalization and rule of law,

all achievements of the West currently under the leadership of the United States. The

China model should not be the opposite of this system, defined by the Washington

Consensus. The two development models should complement each other and benefit

from each other. Many Chinese scholars have shown a rare arrogance in describing the

significance of the China model and downgrading the usefulness of the Washington

consensus. What they may not be aware of is that China’s political system and treatment

of its people cannot be easily accepted as it is by the developed Western nations and even

by developing countries. China may never collapse but its way of life can pose a threat to

Western countries and their values. In other words, if China does not change course and

deviates from the now fixed path called the Beijing consensus, it may certainly be on a

collision course with the Washington consensus. It is difficult to predict the fallout of

this collision but it is not going to be pretty. It will be an economic confrontation, a

cultural clash and a war between political systems. For China to avoid this clash, it is

necessary to revive the political reform that was on the CCP agenda but rendered inactive

by the China model. Yes, China will have a democratic system different from the United

States, the United Kingdom, Republic of France, South Africa, Japan or South Korea but

it has to have a system that can be defined as truly democratic.