The Barth-Feuerbach Confrontation

Harvard Divinity School

The Barth-Feuerbach ConfrontationAuthor(s): Manfred H. VogelSource: The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Jan., 1966), pp. 27-52Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Harvard Divinity SchoolStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1508425 .

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THE BARTH-FEUERBACH CONFRONTATION

MANFRED H. VOGEL NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

EVANSTON, ILL.

THE name of Feuerbach is usually associated with the philosophic critique of religion. Feuerbach is seen, and quite rightly so, as the spokesman par excellence for the philosophic attack of

religion--an attack launched from the anthropocentric viewpoint of modern cultural awareness against transcendental religion. There is no question but that Feuerbach has given a most vivid, forceful and persistent expression to this philosophic critique. But it should be also clear that his contribution here is precisely this and nothing more. The substance and basic outline of the critique are not the unique or distinctive contribution of Feuerbach. They had been formulated long before Feuerbach and expressed repeatedly throughout the history of Western philosophy before and after Feuerbach.' Thus, while Feuerbach still remains an excellent representative and spokesman for this critique, he is by no means the only one.

If Feuerbach has something distinctive and unique of his own to contribute in the area of religion, then it must be in some role other than that of the philosophic critic of religion. This is indeed the case. And, strange as it may seem at first sight, this other role in which Feuerbach presents himself and in which he makes his distinct and unique contribution is none other than the role of the theologian.2 For Feuerbach is not only standing outside,

1 For examples and a more detailed substantiation of this point see S. Rawido- wicz, Ludwig Feuerbachs Philosophie; Ursprung und Schicksal (1931), 209-12.

2We say that this may appear strange at first sight because Feuerbach would seem to be more than anything else the great antagonist of theology. Theology seems to be his one great enemy against which he fights relentlessly and uncompromisingly. This in a way is true, and yet it can be very misleading. For Feuer- bach is the great antitheologian only if we equate theology generally with the neoplatonic-idealist formulation. True, historically speaking, much of theology was neoplatonic-idealist in its formulation, and Feuerbach himself identifies and equates theology in general with the neoplatonic-idealist formulation. Nevertheless, such an identification is not valid. The neoplatonic-idealist formulation is only one kind, albeit a very pervasive and a very important kind, of theology but not theology as such. Thus, the fact that Feuerbach negates neoplatonic- idealist theology does not preclude the possibility of his assuming the role of the



28 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

criticizing, evaluating and, indeed, negating transcendental religion; he is also standing inside the religious tradition, specifically the Protestant Christian tradition, with the positive intention and claim to be merely interpreting this tradition, offering only to spell out in clear and straightforward language what this tradition has been really saying all along, albeit in a concealed and distorted way. But this latter role belongs to the position of the theologian - a position which stands within a religious tradition and whose claim is to merely interpret and explicate the content of that tradition. In short, therefore, while Feuerbach is definitely cast in the role of the philosophic critic of religion, he also, just as definitely, claims the office of the theologian, and it is in this latter office that he presents a distinct and unique position.

It is to the great credit of Karl Barth to have clearly recog- nized the theological role of Feuerbach.3 Working in the nineteen-twenties to clear the theological ground in preparation for the elaboration of his own theology, Barth confronts the theologian Feuerbach. For Barth this confrontation is not incidental but of basic importance. For Barth recognizes that Feuerbach's theological interpretation is by no means a superficial offering of an ignorant outsider but the position of one who has wide and perceptive knowledge of the Christian tradition. Feuerbach can-

theologian himself, although, of course, presenting a different kind of theological interpretation. This is further seen in the fact that although Feuerbach uses the word theology as standing for something to which he is completely opposed, and although he tries to show that theology is really but another name for the neoplatonic-idealist Weltanschauung, he still finds kindred spirits to his own in what he and all of us would call the theological sphere, e.g., Luther in particular. Indeed, it is a basic thesis of Feuerbach expressed in the Grundsitze that the internal development of theology, i.e., neoplatonic-idealist theology, has been propagated by the continuous attempt to interpret Christianity in the Feuerbachian way, i.e., reducing itself to anthropology. Of course, in Feuerbach's view, it failed to articu- late it completely and uncompromisingly. But the attempt and orientation are there. Thus, from this aspect Feuerbach himself sees himself as the culminator (not only the negator) of the theological tradition, thus, as a theologian. Feuer- bach's relation, therefore, to the whole body of previous theology is really twofold. He sees himself both as the negator and culminator. In a way this is not paradoxical for Feuerbach, since in good Hegelian tradition culmination means in a special sense also negation.

3 This can be seen quite clearly in Barth's evaluation of Feuerbach in Theology and Church (1962; see, for example, 217f., 222f., 226, 228) and in Protestant Thought (1959; see, for example, 355, 357-59). [The first of these is included as an Introductory Essay in the Harper Torchbooks ed. of Feuerbach's The Essence of Christianity (1957), x-xxxii.]



THE BARTH-FEUERBACH CONFRONTATION 29

not, therefore, be a priori laughed out of court but must be con- sidered seriously.4 Indeed, Feuerbach's theological interpretation has in many respects great strength, in as much as it has on a number of important issues the authentic Christian tradition on its side. Namely, it is in Feuerbach's theological formulation that justice is done to such important aspects of the authentic Christian tradition as, for example, its antispiritualism and anthropological realism, its emphasis on the "thatness" and the "suchness" of being and on the whole concrete reality (heart and stomach) of man, its radical Easter faith, and its sense of social and economic justice. In these points Feuerbach's theology has much to recommend it, particularly when we compare it with the many other supposedly more "respectable" or "orthodox" the- ologies that have been offered in the past but have failed miser- ably in betraying these aspects of authentic Christian tradition.'

But most important of all, the confrontation with Feuerbach's theology is of utmost significance because its main thesis - that of reducing the independent metaphysical being of God to human attributes, i.e., reducing the noun God to the adjective divine - spells out clearly the necessary culmination of what was really implied all along, albeit in a somewhat concealed form, in the whole theological effort of the modern era. It is in Feuerbach's theology that the necessary outcome of the theological orientation of the modern era is made manifest. Feuerbach is the one who lets the cat out of the bag for us to see.' Thus, the confrontation with Feuerbach is no longer just a confrontation with one specific theological formulation, no matter how important it may be, but with the whole trend of the theology of the modern era. Indeed, the significance of the confrontation goes even deeper, for modern theology pursued one of the two basic alternatives open to theology, i.e., basing religion in man's consciousness, while Barth offers the other alternative, i.e., basing religion in the grace of divine revelation. Thus, the confrontation between Barth and Feuerbach is in essence the confrontation between the two basic alternatives that are open to theology -

'K. Barth, Theology and Church, 217.

5 Ibid., 231-34. " Ibid., 228.




either start with man and end up with Feuerbach or turn to Barth and stay with God. A great deal, therefore, depends on the outcome of this confrontation, for, clearly, in the last analysis only one alternative can be tenable - either Barth or Feuerbach. Thus, before one can turn to Barth, Feuerbach must be overcome; and if Feuerbach is not overcome, this is tantamount to blocking the way to Barth.

Quite clearly it is of the greatest importance for Barth to confront, challenge and overcome the theologian Feuerbach. This, indeed, he undertakes to do in the nineteen-twenties. But let us note well, at the risk of repeating ourselves, that the Feuerbach whom Barth confronts here and whom he undertakes to overcome is exclusively Feuerbach qua theologian. Barth himself makes it very clear:

Among the philosophers of modern times there is perhaps no other who occupies himself so intensively and so exclusively with the prob- lem of theology as did Feuerbach . . . Feuerbach . . . showed himself to possess a theological knowledge which sets him far above the majority of modern philosophers. None of the other philosophers in his time penetrated so far into the theological position; said so little that was extraneous to it and so much that was exactly pertinent to theology itself as did Feuerbach . . . the position of Feuerbach the antitheologian was more theological than that of many theologians . . an antithesis which could be grounded only theologically . . . we should miss something decisive for us theologically if we refused to let him speak to us . . . who knows whether it ought not to be said that he belonged inwardly and truly to the guild of new Protes- tant theology as legitimately as anyone else? 7

But even beyond these specific characterizations of Feuerbach as theologian which Barth clearly makes it is clear from the context of the confrontation that it is exclusively Feuerbach qua theologian that Barth chooses to confront here. For, the issue of the confrontation, the issue that Barth undertakes to answer and repudiate, is an issue which belongs exclusively to the area of theology. The issue is what Barth calls Feuerbach's deification of

'Ibid., 217f. For the many other instances where Barth clearly characterizes the Feuerbach he confronts as Feuerbach the theologian see the references given above in footnote 3.




man or, as we would prefer to call it, Feuerbach's humanization of God.8 The metaphysical independent being of God is reduced to attributes dependent upon men. The noun God signifying a transcendent being is converted to the adjective divine which is to signify merely the completion and perfection of human attributes. "God the subject is determined; the predicates (i.e., human predicates) are determining, . . . therefore 'man is the

beginning of religion, man is the middle point of religion, man is the end of religion.' "9 'Clearly this issue belongs to theology, since its subject, i.e., the God that is to be reduced to human attributes, in order to be reducible must have in the first place some definite content and signification which it can derive only from some religious tradition. Evidently, for Feuerbach this content and signification are derived from the Christian tradition. Namely, the God that he proposes to reduce into man's attributes is the Christian God, i.e., the God as conceived and understood in the Christian tradition. Thus, the issue of the humanization of God is inextricably inbedded in and inescapably dependent upon what the Christian tradition has to say about God. In other words, the issue is by its very essence theological.

Furthermore, Feuerbach himself formulates the issue even more distinctly as a theological issue by claiming for himself in connection with this issue the office of the theologian. For Feuer- bach does not claim merely to take the God of Christianity and reduce him to man. He claims that such a reduction is what Christianity itself really meant to convey in its idea of God. It is

' While it is true that Barth himself and most other scholars of Feuerbach refer to Feuerbach's thesis as the deification of man, it seems to us that this is not a precise description of what Feuerbach is actually doing. Feuerbach does not deify man to the nature of God but rather reduces God to human attributes. Thus, the precise description should be the humanization of God rather than the deification of man. While the two obviously may serve to point to the same phenomenon, i.e., the cancellation of all differences between man and God, and to the extent that this is the issue in question the two formulations may be used interchangeably, they nevertheless point also to important differences in the process by which the cancellation is brought about. Barth, although referring to Feuer- bach's deification of man, is nevertheless dealing with and answering Feuerbach's humanization of God. For further treatment of this point see the introduction to my forthcoming translation of Feuerbach's Die Grundsitze der Philosophie der Zukunft (L. Feuerbach's Principles of the Philosophy of the Future) to be published soon by Bobbs Merrill Co.

9 Ibid., 226, 227.




Christianity which really understood its God as nothing but the divinity of man. All that Feuerbach claims for himself is to be the true interpreter, the one who states clearly and in a straightforward manner what Christianity has been really trying to say all along, although it said it in a distorted and lopsided fashion, thus concealing its true message. Feuerbach emphasizes this, shouting repeatedly, "It is not I but religion which says.

... ." "o

But by claiming to be merely the interpreter of a religious tradition, specifically of Christianity, Feuerbach is actually claiming here the office of the theologian, specifically the Christian theologian. For it is precisely the office of the theologian to be an interpreter of a religious tradition. And the issue itself becomes thoroughly theological, for what is now at stake is a question of interpretation regarding the Christian tradition - is Feuerbach's interpretation of Christianity, as saying in reality that God is nothing but the attributes of man, valid or not? Thus formulated the issue becomes in its very core an issue which belongs to the area of theology.

Barth's choice, therefore, in the nineteen-twenties to confront Feuerbach qua theologian is well grounded. He is not choosing to confront an imaginary Feuerbach. For Feuerbach clearly plays a theological role in advancing his thesis of the humanization of God - a thesis which, moreover, in its very content is theological. And it is this issue, i.e., the humanization of God, that is the issue which Barth in the nineteen-twenties wants to confront and overcome. Indeed, it is precisely because he chooses to confront this issue that he confronts Feuerbach the theologian.

In view of this we can perhaps understand why Barth's Feuer- bach is, as professor John Glasse l puts it, "pre-eminently the

10 Essence of Christianity, translated by George Eliot (Harper Ed.), 21.

11John Glasse, "Barth on Feuerbach," Harvard Theological Review 57 (April, 1964). This is a most recent contribution to the evaluation of the Barth-Feuer- bach confrontation. It is a substantial and most learned essay, taking full cogni- zance of the literature and making an important contribution to the understanding of the confrontation by its thorough probing into the material. Although we cannot but commend the authentic scholarship involved, we, nevertheless, must in the last analysis take issue with the interpretation offered. As will become clear later in cur paper when we have occasion to deal at greater length with professor Glasse's paper, the quarrel is not about the facts of the case (here he is superb in the authenticity and breadth of his perception) but about the interpretation and evaluation of what they signify.




author of Das Wesen des Christentums." 12 This fact leads Glasse to object, though only in passing, that Barth ignores the develop- mental aspect of Feuerbach's thought which, indeed, resulted in important changes in Feuerbach's position. Thus, for example, we have the change from the conception of God as the essence of man found in Das Wesen des Christentums to the conception of God as the essence of nature found in Das Wesen der Religion. This to us would seem to be a serious objection. The only defense, however, that professor Glasse offers on Barth's behalf is that at least Barth "has the merit of meeting his opponent where Feuerbach is generally acknowledged to be at his best." 13 This is true enough; but is it good enough? Does it really do justice to Barth and to the very substance of his confrontation with Feuer- bach?

Granted that the burden of Barth's confrontation with Feuer- bach rests primarily, almost exclusively, on Das Wesen des Christentums and Die Grundsaitze der Philosophie der Zukunft. Granted that Feuerbach has written considerably more than these two works. Granted also that important changes took place in Feuerbach's position. Indeed, if one were to survey the whole

productive output of Feuerbach, then one would have to concede not only marked changes but outright diametrical reversals.'4

12 Ibid., 74. Actually, judging by the number of references, Barth's Feuerbach is preeminently the author of both Das Wesen des Christentums and Die Grund-

s'itze der Philosophie der Zukunft. In Barth's essay on Feuerbach in Theology and Church there are 37 references to Das Wesen des Christentums and 22 references to Die Grundsitze der Philosophie der Zukunft. This is to be compared with seven references to Das Wesen der Religion. But even these few references to Das Wesen der Religion are, as professor Glasse rightly remarks, only those which are fully consistent with the standpoint of Das Wesen des Christentums and Die Grundsitze der Philosophie der Zukunft, thus betraying none of the differences which exist between the former and the latter. Feuerbach's position in Das Wesen des Chris- tentums and Die Grundsitze der Philosophie der Zukunft is, therefore, essentially the only Feuerbachian position which Barth confronts. Although there are, as we shall see presently, some differences between the two works, professor Glasse is justified, nevertheless, in referring exclusively to the Feuerbach of Das Wesen des Christentums, since the basic Feuerbachian position in both works is essentially the same. Die Grundsitze der Philosophie der Zukunft, by the way, to which Barth refers is the one edited by H. Ehrenberg and entitled, somewhat briefly, Philosophie der Zukunft (1923).

3 Ibid., 93, footnote 47. " Feuerbach in his writing prior to 1839, for example, is a Hegelian attacking

vehemently the very positions he was to hold after 1839. See in particular his




Still, all these considerations become immaterial and inconse- quential when we realize and remember that Barth undertakes specifically and exclusively to confront Feuerbach the theologian. Had Barth's interest in Feuerbach been that of the historian of philosophy, then his omission, for example, of the pre-1839 pro- Hegel Feuerbach would have been, indeed, a serious lacuna. Or had Barth's interest in Feuerbach been that of the philosopher of religion in general, then his slight, almost neglectful, treatment of Das Wesen der Religion and the complete omission of such later works as the Theogonie and Gott, Freiheit und Unsterblich- keit would have been reprehensible. But Barth does not claim such interest. His interest in Feuerbach is determined exclusively by the theological aspect, namely, Feuerbach's role and significance as a theologian. And this is to be found only in Das Wesen des Christentums and Die Grundsaitze der Philosophie der Zukunft.15 Hence, Barth need make no apologies for disregard- ing the many other works of Feuerbach, or the reversals and developments in Feuerbach's philosophic thought. The fact that Feuerbach is generally acknowledged to be at his best in these works where he is primarily of theological interest is a most interesting and enlightening observation (and keeping in mind our contention above that it is really only in the theological area that Feuerbach makes an original contribution, it is no mere accident

critique of Carl Bachmann's Anti-Hegel in Feuerbach's Simtliche Werke, ed. W. Bolin and F. Jodl (Formann, Stuttgart, 1903-11), II, 17-80.

1 While these two works form a definite unit in Feuerbach, i.e., the theological unit, there are also differences between them. In the Grundsdtze Feuerbach ex- amines theology in more general terms. He criticizes the neoplatonic-idealist theology (which he equates with theology in general) in its various manifestations in Western culture in order to establish vis-a-vis it his own position. It is this position which serves him as the foundation and basic orientation on which to build his own specific theological approach to Christianity, i.e., interpreting the doctrines, rituals and symbols of Christianity in accordance with his viewpoint. This latter specifically positive Christian theological task is carried out in Das Wesen des Christentums. Of course it is true that the Grundsiitze appeared two years after Das Wesen des Christentums, although logically, according to our interpretation, it should have preceded it. But Feuerbach clearly views the Grundsdtze as a summation and explication of what has underlined his position since 1839 (see his introduction to the Grundsitze). He does not arrive at it later. It is only that he writes it and spells it out more forcefully and systematically later. It is evident that for Barth's theological interest in Feuerbach both works are important, since the Grundsitze provides Feuerbach in the general theological context while the Wesen provides him in the specific Christian theological context.




that here Feuerbach is at his glamorous and most forceful best). But it is merely incidental to Barth in his exclusive interest in these works. It is not only that Barth is dealing with the best Feuerbach. He is dealing with and confronting the only Feuer- bach that really matters to him.

In the same way we can dispose, furthermore, of another criticism which professor Glasse raises and which, indeed, he con- siders to be more serious. According to this criticism "Barth has yet to respond to a type of argument which Feuerbach re- garded as important for the support of his thesis about theological illusion: the rational argument that exhibits the self- contradiction of theological assertions . . . he minimizes the

import of this type by judging its negative conclusion to be less fundamental to Feuerbach's position than his positive assertions." 16 But the answer to this critique is already evident in its very formulation. If, as we have maintained, Barth chooses to confront Feuerbach as theologian, then he is perfectly justified in confining his confrontation to Feuerbach's positive assertions, for it is here, and only here, that Feuerbach as theologian expresses himself.7 Again, if "Feuerbach's position" is, as we claim, the position of the theologian, then Barth is perfectly right in min- imizing "the import of this type by judging its negative conclusion to be less fundamental to Feuerbach's position," for the position of the theologian is not negative. Indeed, the very thesis which this type of argument supports, i.e., the thesis about theological illusion, is not the thesis which Feuerbach qua theologian can put forth. The thesis about theological illusion and the type of argument which supports it are put forth by Feuerbach qua something else. What this "something else" is, in what way it involves Barth and to what extent professor Glasse's critique is valid in these new circumstances we shall have occasion to exam- ine later."8 But here Barth does not choose to confront Feuer- bach qua "something else" but qua theologian. He chooses to confront Feuerbach's theological thesis about the humanization of God and not his thesis about theological illusion. In these

1 Ibid., 93, footnote 48. ' See above, p. 28. ' See below, p. 46.




circumstances, therefore, the critique misses its mark. It criticizes Barth for failing to do something which he does not undertake to do in the first place.

Barth's choice to confront the theological issue of the humanization of God is, however, not arbitrary. As we pointed out above, Barth must clear the theological ground prior to promul- gating his own theology, and Feuerbach's theological interpretation of the humanization of God - by virtue of its own content but even more by virtue of its being the necessary culmination of so much of previous theology - is a major stumbling block that must be removed. But it is a stumbling block only in the context of Barth's intentions and strategy. Only because Barth cannot allow his projected theology to be one among other alternatives but must claim that it be the only valid one does Feuerbach's alternative theological formulation become a stumbling block and a challenge. Namely, it is Barth who makes it into a challenge that must be answered and overcome. In itself and as such the thesis of the humanization of God is not a challenge. It is not formulated as an attack, a critique, a polemic, or a negation. Its intention and formulation are positive and con- structive. Thus, Feuerbach the theologian can only be brought into the confrontation by someone else, and then only as the object of attack. He is not the subject who can initiate the confrontation. The initiator, the attacker, must be Barth. This indeed is the case - Barth initiates in the nineteen-twenties the confrontation by assuming the role of the polemicist and the critic, i.e., the role of the attacker vis-a-vis Feuerbach's theology.

Assuming the role of the polemicist and critic, however, allows Barth not only to initiate the confrontation but also - and this is even more important - to pursue it in an authentic way. For the true critic and polemicist must allow his opponent to determine the ground and rules of the confrontation. He must let his opponent speak and be the one to provide and formulate the issue of the confrontation. Finally, if he is truly to overcome his opponent, he must answer his opponent in the latter's terms. Barth in the confrontation of the nineteen-twenties does precisely this, namely, he is true to his role as a critic and polemicist. He




most meticulously and generously lets Feuerbach speak.'9 More- over, he listens carefully and indeed very often even sympathet- ically to what Feuerbach has to say. But most important, he lets Feuerbach provide the issue and determine the ground of the confrontation: namely, the issue is Feuerbach's thesis of the humanization of God and the ground on which it is to be con- sidered is exclusively Feuerbach's anthropological realism. We cannot but conclude, therefore, that Barth in this confrontation does undertake to answer Feuerbach in the straightforward sense of "answer." He fully complies with the criteria and demands that would be required of a legitimate answer and rebuttal.

But granted that formally Barth adheres to the conditions required for a proper answer, does he also substantially succeed in giving the answer? Does he succeed in actually overcoming Feuerbach? The answer is yes. But we must clearly keep in mind that Barth is dealing here exclusively with Feuerbach qua theologian, i.e., with Feuerbach's theological thesis of the humanization of God. Barth overcomes Feuerbach's theological thesis precisely by pushing Feuerbach's anthropological realism beyond Feuerbach and showing thereby that an anthropological realist position, when consistently pushed all the way, does not substan- tiate the complete and total reduction of the God of Christianity to man. A consistent anthropological realism will have to admit that man is a finite being, i.e., a being that must die, and that he is a sinful being. But God as conceived and understood in Chris- tianity is most definitely neither.20 Hence, the God of Christian- ity who in his very essence is neither finite nor sinful cannot be completely reduced to, i.e., translated in terms of, man. Feuer- bach, Barth argues, can maintain his thesis of the complete and total humanization of God only because he is "a man who 'did not know (Nichtkenner) death' and who 'misunderstood (Verken-

19 One half of Barth's essay on Feuerbach in Theology and Church is devoted to reporting what Feuerbach has to say, much of it in direct quotations from Feuerbach.

' It is interesting to note that the question of whether what the Christian tradition holds is valid or illusion does not arise here. This would be the question of the philosopher of religion. Here the question is only whether what the Christian tradition holds can be completely interpreted in Feuerbach's way. This, indeed, is a question in the area of theology.




ner) evil.' " 21 But such misknowing and misunderstanding cannot possibly be substantiated or justified by a thoroughgoing and consistent anthropological realism. The complete humanization of the God of Christianity is, therefore, not tenable on the very ground of anthropological realism.

But it is precisely the claim to totality which gives the force and impact to Feuerbach's theological thesis. It is as such, and only as such, that it presents a serious alternate theological interpretation which Barth must view as a challenge to be overcome. The minute, therefore, that Barth can repudiate the total claim of Feuerbach's theological thesis, he has overcome Feuerbach's challenge. And this overcoming is by no means weakened or compromised by the fact that Barth can and, indeed, does go a long way in agreeing with Feuerbach in so many other aspects of Feuerbach's theological interpretation, e.g., the emphasis on the concrete, whole man, or the demand for social and economic justice.22 Thus, if the confrontation of the nineteen-twenties is initiated by Barth, as we have attempted to show, in order to clear the theological ground, i.e., overcome Feuerbach qua theologian, then it seems that Barth has succeeded in carrying out his intentions. He answers in the straightforward sense of "answer," and the answer is valid.

This then is our understanding and evaluation of the Barth- Feuerbach confrontation of the nineteen-twenties. But this is

1K. Barth, Theology and Church, 235. Barth is here quoting Ehrenberg's description in the latter's introduction to his edition of Feuerbach's Philosophie der Zukunft. A more accurate description of Feuerbach, in our view, would be to characterize him as one who misunderstood death and did not know evil. We justify this switch in the introduction to our translation of Feuerbach's Grund- sitze, see above, note 8. Still, for our purposes here it makes no difference.

22 It is important to note in this connection that going along with Feuerbach, even when it is to a considerable extent, does not necessitate finishing with him. And it is the finishing which is crucial. Furthermore, it is also important to note that Barth's agreement with Feuerbach is not motivated by mere clever strategy, i.e., giving in to your opponent as much as possible in order to build him up before proceeding to the kill, thus making his fall all the more dramatic and forceful. Barth's agreement is genuine. He is giving credit where credit is due. Indeed, as we pointed out above, it is these aspects of Feuerbach's theological interpretation, where Feuerbach receives his due from Barth, which make Feuerbach such a forceful and serious opponent and which compel Barth to listen so carefully to him. Still, as long as one can avoid going all the way with Feuerbach, as long as one can say in the last instance "no," his threat is eliminated, and one can even "laugh in his face."




not the only occasion where Barth is dealing with Feuerbach. After a long interval of silence Barth returns in the nineteen- fifties in his Church Dogmatics, particularly in volumes IV/2 and IV/3, to deal again with Feuerbach. How are we to understand and evaluate Barth's position vis-a-vis Feuerbach in the nineteen-fifties?

Professor Glasse rightly points out three important innovations in Barth's position of the nineteen-fifties as compared to his position of the nineteen-twenties. The first, and actually least important, innovation is a change in the "diagnosis" of why modern theology has been so vulnerable to Feuerbach. While in the nineteen-twenties Barth attributes it to causes external to theology, i.e., to the human self-reliance of modern cultural awareness, in the nineteen-fifties he finds the cause within theology itself, i.e., in the development of Lutheran Christology without the Calvinist corrective.23 The second, and more substantial, innovation is seen in "Barth's confrontation of Feuerbach with a positive anthropology based on Christology." While in the nineteen-twenties Barth in his response to Feuerbach, intending to destroy Feuerbach's anthropocentric position, is led "into a kind of nay- saying about man," in the nineteen-fifties per contra "we find him affirming the positive predicates of man more forthrightly than his negative ones and even exalting the human status." 24 The third innovation cited by professor Glasse is admittedly the most substantial and fundamental. "It involves a shift of the ground on which he (i.e., Barth) finally rests his polemic against the main negative contention of Feuerbach, the reduction of theology to illusory projection. In the nineteen-twenties his argument against that reduction had relied decisively upon the condition of man. . . . Now, however, that appeal to the human condition has receded to the periphery, and he makes his central appeal to the character of God himself." 25 In the nineteen-fifties, then, quite distinctly and, indeed, in opposition to his treatment of the Feuerbachian question in the nineteen-twenties, Barth's reply is based exclusively on the "manifest radiance," the gracious dis-

' J. Glasse, ibid., 84. 2 Ibid., 84. 2 Ibid., 87f.




closure and self-impartation of God given to man in revelation. In the light of this revelation we know that Feuerbach's contention is simply unfounded. Thus, while in the nineteen-twenties Barth formulates his answer in terms of man, i.e., sinful and finite man, in the nineteen-fifties he shifts his ground and formulates his answer exclusively from a theocentric position.

These innovations lead professor Glasse to argue - against W. Schilling, Richard Niebuhr and others who see Barth's response to Feuerbach as of "one piece" - 26 that Barth's response is actually constituted of two phases. The differences clearly indicate to him that Barth's treatment of Feuerbach in the nineteen-fifties cannot be seen as a mere repetition of what Barth has already maintained in the nineteen-twenties. They clearly indicate a change in Barth's polemical strategy against Feuerbach.

But we must note two all-important things. First, although professor Glasse distinguishes between the answers given by Barth in the nineteen-twenties and nineteen-fifties, he (and for that matter all the other authorities) does not seem to distinguish between the roles that Barth assumes in the nineteen-fifties and in the nineteen-twenties. Namely, according to our presentation and putting the matter in our terminology, we would say that in both instances the basic role and intention of Barth vis-t-vis Feuerbach is taken to be the same. The thing that changes is the strategy, i.e., the manner in which Barth carries out his role and intention. In other words, Barth in the nineteen-fifties, main- taining his same role and intention, changes his arguments against Feuerbach, thus constituting a second and somewhat different phase in his response to Feuerbach. Since in the nineteen- twenties Barth, as we have shown, clearly assumes the role of the polemicist, we must, therefore, also see the Barth of the nineteen- fifties as a polemicist, i.e., as one who goes out to engage his opponent, to initiate a confrontation with him with the intention of attacking and negating his position. Secondly, professor Glasse (and here again he is joined by all other authorities) does not seem to distinguish between the Feuerbach involved in the confrontation of the nineteen-fifties and the Feuerbach involved in the confrontation of the nineteen-twenties. In both instances

' Ibid., 82; also 82, footnote 26.




it seems that Barth undertakes to answer the same Feuerbach. But since, as we have shown, the Feuerbach implicated in the confrontation of the nineteen-twenties is Feuerbach qua theologian, are we to understand that the Feuerbach implicated in the confrontation of the nineteen-fifties is also Feuerbach qua theologian? In short, are we to understand that the confrontation of the nineteen-fifties is the same as that of the nineteen-twenties, i.e., to put it in our scheme of understanding, a confrontation between Barth as polemicist and Feuerbach as theologian, and that only the strategy employed by Barth in answering Feuerbach changes? Our answer must be definitely, no. Indeed, it is the failure to see that in the nineteen-fifties we have a totally different kind of confrontation between Barth and Feuerbach from the confrontation of the nineteen-twenties, both in terms of the roles of the participants and the issues involved, that leads to con- fusion and fuzziness in our evaluation and understanding of the Barth-Feuerbach relationship. A proper understanding and evaluation of the total Barth-Feuerbach relationship can be gained, therefore, only when a proper understanding of the confrontation of the nineteen-fifties is first secured. And the confrontation of the nineteen-fifties can be properly understood only if we clearly determine the roles of the participants and the nature of the issue involved.

Barth in the nineteen-fifties, according to our view, no longer assumes the role of the polemicist and the critic of Feuerbach, i.e., the role of the attacker, destroyer and nay-sayer. He no longer is the one whose task it is to clear the ground. He now assumes the role of the dogmatic theologian, i.e., the positive role of articulating, confessing and interpreting his own theological position. He is now the builder who possesses his own founda- tions, and who, therefore, must speak from his own ground and his own vantage point. He is now a Barthian theologian.

Indeed, the innovations which professor Glasse so ably notes and authentically describes indicate clearly, in our judgment, that more fundamental change. Thus, the third innovation, and, by professor Glasse's own admission, the most substantial innovation, clearly reflects the change in role, from Barth the Feuer- bachian polemicist to Barth the Barthian theologian. It is indeed




"a shift of the ground" - a shift from the Feuerbachian ground of the human condition which Barth as the Feuerbachian polemicist must adopt to the Barthian ground of the exclusive centered- ness of God's character which Barth as the Barthian dogmatic theologian must confess. As a polemicist and a critic Barth must, indeed, fight his battle on his opponent's ground. Fighting Feuer- bach, therefore, necessitates his adoption of the anthropocentric view. But as a dogmatic theologian Barth is under no such obligation. On the contrary, his obligation now rests with his own ground, i.e., with his own theology. And this theology which Barth as the dogmatic theologian now enunciates is uncompromisingly theocentric. The theologian of the Word cannot speak from an anthropocentric ground nor can the polemicist and critic of anthropocentrism argue from a theocentric ground. The shift of ground, therefore, is clearly a shift of role.

The same holds true regarding the second innovation cited by professor Glasse. That Barth is dealing with the question of man both as a polemicist and as a dogmatic theologian should not be an occasion for surprise. Feuerbach has by no means monop- olized this question, and there is nothing in the theology of the Word that would forbid or inhibit the most intense involvement and concern with the question of man. Thus, both Feuerbach and the theology of the Word (and for that matter many other possible formulations) can be and, indeed, are deeply involved in the question of man. But this is not to say that there is no difference and, indeed, a vast and fundamental difference between them. The difference lies in the viewpoint from which each pro- ceeds to deal with the question of man. Feuerbach deals with the question of man from the viewpoint of man, while the theology of the Word deals with the question from the viewpoint of God, i.e., revelation. This difference in viewpoint is all-important and fully accounts for the supposed change in Barth's evaluation of man. When Barth is led "into a kind of nay-saying about man," he is the polemicist who is saying "no" to that man who is seen in the context of the Feuerbachian viewpoint, i.e., the viewpoint of man himself. And when Barth is "exalting the human status," he is the dogmatic theologian who is saying "yes" to that man who is seen in the context of the viewpoint of the theology of the Word,




i.e., the viewpoint of God's revelation. It is not that Barth is at one time saying "no" and at another time saying "yes" to the same man. This, indeed, would have constituted a change in Barth's evaluation of man. But Barth is saying "yes" and "no" not to the same man but to two different men, one as viewed in the light of God's revelation, the other as viewed in Feuerbach's anthropological reduction. Thus, here again, the change is not a change in Barth's polemical strategy against Feuerbach, but a change in the role that Barth assumes. As a polemicist Barth is dealing with man as seen by Feuerbach, and the evaluation of this man was and always remained "no." As a dogmatic theologian Barth is dealing with man as seen in the theology of the Word, and the evaluation of this man is and always was (at least po- tentially) "yes." 7

As regards the first innovation, it is admittedly not of substantial importance. It does not really concern any issue involved in the confrontation between Barth and Feuerbach. It is strictly a question concerning Barth's historical scholarship and interpretation. The most that one can say, therefore, is that Barth's understanding of the historical background to Feuerbach has undergone a change. Furthermore, the change here is not a switch to an opposite alternative as it is in the above two innovations, i.e., a switch from an anthropocentric to a theocentric position or from a negative to a positive attitude towards man. It is actually an extension, a broadening of Barth's historical interpretation. The change consists, therefore, of an addition to, and not a substitution for, Barth's earlier position, since understanding Feuerbach as the culmination of an internal development within theology in no way contradicts or removes the understanding of him as the necessary consequence of a theology which allowed itself to be pushed into the "theological corner" by the Enlighten-

'Indeed, the fact that Barth in his relation to the question of man changes from a negative to a positive attitude accords well with our explanation that the change is a change in role. The polemicist is basically negative in his approach. Since he comes to challenge and destroy, he will be characteristically a "nay-sayer." On the other hand, the dogmatic theologian, since his task is to build and affirm, is basically positive in his approach. This basic over-all difference in approach between the polemicist and the dogmatic theologian (i.e., the first being generally negative, while the latter is generally positive) is reflected here specifically with regard to the question of man.




ment and modern secular cultural awareness. But even this change of addition - while in no way can it be taken as a change in Barth's polemical strategy against Feuerbach - would seem to betray the change in Barth's role vis-a-vis Feuerbach. The change betrays a shift from an interpretation formulated in cate- gories of general Western cultural history to one which is formulated and guided by a more specifically theological interest. Thus, Barth the polemicist, guided by the Feuerbachian frame of reference, would, indeed, be more likely also to understand Feuerbach's historical background in terms of the interaction of theology and general cultural awareness. On the other hand, Barth the dogmatic theologian, guided by the strictures of his theology of the Word, would be more disposed to look inwardly within the realm of theology itself for his understanding and interpretation of Feuerbach's theological position. Furthermore, the structure itself of the first interpretation betrays the polemicist's approach. It pits two areas, i.e., theology and modern secular cultural awareness, against each other, thus introducing a dialectical give-and-take. It is presented in terms of critique and withdrawal, attack and surrender. Consequently, the basic un- derlying note is one of negation. The structure of the latter interpretation, on the other hand, is basically positive and expository, reflecting the approach of the dogmatic theologian. It deals exclusively with one area, i.e., theology. It presents a straight line of development, merely unfolding and spelling out what was implied all along. But be this as it may, in the last analysis, we must remind ourselves again that in this case Barth is, strictly speaking, neither a polemicist nor a dogmatic theologian but an historian, and as such this innovation, whatever its merits be, is really not to our point.

Thus, the three innovations introduced in the nineteen-fifties in Barth's treatment of Feuerbach seem, in our view, to indicate clearly a change in Barth's role vis-a-vis Feuerbach. Barth's role in the nineteen-fifties is that of a Barthian dogmatic theologian.28

'Indeed, if any further indications for this change of role is needed, one can cite the fact, as professor Glasse rightly observes, that Barth's whole treatment of Feuerbach in the nineteen-fifties is cast in the form of surveying, asserting and affirming rather than that of challenging, arguing and negating. Surely, this is a form which may correspond to the role of the dogmatic theologian but most




But if Barth in the nineteen-fifties is no longer the polemicist but the dogmatic theologian, then he cannot be involved in an authentic polemical confrontation with Feuerbach qua theologian. For there can be no real point of contact between Barth the dogmatic theologian and Feuerbach the theologian on which an authentic polemical confrontation can be built. An authentic polemical confrontation would require of one of the parties to provide the issue and the ground of the confrontation and of the other party the ability to adopt this ground and then proceed to challenge the issue. But the role of the theologian can meet only the first requirement and not the second. It can provide the ground and the issue, but it cannot truly challenge and negate, nor can it adopt any ground other than its own, i.e., other than the ground of the religious tradition it undertakes to interpret. The role of the theologian is to interpret, not to argue and polemicize. His intention is positive, not negative. Thus, while the juxtaposition of two theologians may well present two contra- dictory positions, it cannot result in a true polemical confrontation, i.e., in a give-and-take, attack and defense. There is no one to initiate the polemic nor, indeed, to carry it out by providing the necessary element of attack and negation. If we do have, therefore, a true polemical confrontation in the nineteen-fifties and Barth has assumed the role of the dogmatic theologian, then Feuerbach must be implicated in this confrontation in a different role from that of the theologian.29

That this is indeed the case can be seen by the issue that underlies the confrontation of the nineteen-fifties. The issue here is no

certainly not to that of the polemicist. Furthermore, professor Glasse very keenly raises and pursues some of the problems that these innovations in Barth's position may imply (see, for example, ibid., 85-87). The interesting thing to note, however, is that these problems impinge internally upon Barth's theological position, not upon his response to Feuerbach. In other words, even the problems that these innovations may suggest are problems regarding Barth qua the dogmatic theologian, not Barth qua the polemicist.

~ Indeed, why should the Feuerbach implicated in the nineteen-fifties be Feuerbach the theologian? And why should Barth continue to polemicize? Has Feuerbach qua theologian not been overcome already in the nineteen-twenties? Have Barth's polemics against Feuerbach (seeing that these polemics are directed exclusively against Feuerbach qua theologian) not been concluded successfully in the nineteen-twenties? But if the answer is yes, as we have tried to show above, then what is the point for Barth in the nineteen-fifties to polemicize again against Feuerbach the theologian?




longer Feuerbach's thesis of the humanization of God - a thesis which, as we have shown above, can be put forth only by Feuer- bach qua theologian, since it is by its very formulation and claim a positive interpretation of a religious tradition. The issue in the nineteen-fifties is Feuerbach's thesis of the illusionist projection. This thesis, however, is no longer theological. It is a philosophical-psychological thesis,31 for it is grounded not in a religious tradition, or, more specifically, in the Christian tradition, but in modern, man-centered cultural awareness, or, even more precisely, in one of its more distinct manifestations, i.e., psychology. In this thesis Feuerbach no longer undertakes to interpret from within the content of a religious tradition but to explain and evaluate from the outside the origin and mechanism by which a certain phenomenon of human culture is produced. The phenomenon is the pervasive belief in the independent existence of a being which transcends man and nature. The explanation claims that such a being is brought into existence by the human projection of its own attributes, which are then hyposta- tized, thus forming the conception of an independent, transcendent being possessing these attributes. The evaluation, quite clearly, must reject the phenomenon by denying any independent reality to such a transcendent being. The notion of any transcendent, independent reality is illusory.

Evidently, the religious conception of God as a transcendent, independent being is the instance par excellence against which the thesis of the illusionist projection can be lodged. As such, the thesis of the illusionist projection is most intimately linked with religion. But it is linked in a different way from the thesis of the humanization of God. While the latter is an interpretation of religion, hence standing within the religious circle and having a positive, expository intention, the former is a critique of religion launched from within the human circle and having a negative polemical intention. Clearly, therefore, while the Feuerbach who

'?This thesis belongs fundamentally to the area of the philosophy of religion, if the determining factor is the use to which it is put. Its formulation, however, belongs quite clearly to the area of the psychology of religion. This close inter- twining between the philosophy and psychology of religion is typical of Feuerbach, whereby his philosophy of religion is built on and formulated in terms of the psychology of religion.




puts forth the thesis of the humanization of God is Feuerbach qua theologian, the Feuerbach who puts forth the thesis of the illusionist projection is Feuerbach qua the philosopher of religion.

But if the Feuerbach implicated in the nineteen-fifties is Feuerbach qua the philosopher of religion and the Barth implicated here is, as we have shown, Barth qua the dogmatic theologian, then the possibility of an authentic polemical confrontation between the two is reopened. For, Barth as the dogmatic theologian provides the object against which Feuerbach as the philosopher of religion can launch his critique.31 Indeed, only in terms of these roles can a true confrontation between Barth and Feuer- bach take place in the nineteen-fifties.

The way, however, in which Barth and Feuerbach are implicated in the confrontation of the nineteen-fifties is the exact reverse from the way in which they are implicated in the confrontation of the nineteen-twenties. In the nineteen-fifties the initiator and polemicist is no longer Barth but Feuerbach. Barth now represents the party that is challenged precisely as Feuer- bach did in the nineteen-twenties. But this means that we cannot expect nor demand of Barth to answer Feuerbach in the nineteen-fifties in the same way as we demanded of him to answer Feuerbach in the nineteen-twenties. In the nineteen-twenties, when Barth is the initiator of the confrontation and the polemicist, we could justly demand that he answer Feuerbach on Feuer- bach's ground and in Feuerbach's terms. Since he is the one to attack, he must invade his opponent's territory if he wants to claim victory. But how can we place the same demands on Barth in the nineteen-fifties, seeing that it is now Feuerbach and not Barth who launches the attack? Why, indeed, should Barth adopt Feuerbach's ground? Barth has his own ground and in terms of his role in this confrontation has every right to base his position on it. Thus, Barth is quite justified in considering

'1Indeed, the Barth-Feuerbach confrontation comes most forcefully to the fore, as professor Glasse rightly observes (ibid., 88), at the point where Barth in the process of expounding his dogmatic theology comes to deal with the question of "whether the life of Jesus Christ really reveals God, or whether in our confession that he is Light, Truth, and Word, we ourselves are merely attributing these to him." Obviously this is the point at which Feuerbach's challenge of the illusionist projection would arise.




Feuerbach in the nineteen-fifties from his own theocentric vantage point. And from this vantage point, from the vantage point of the "manifest radiance of God," Feuerbach's challenge simply evaporates. It simply does not arise.

Professor Glasse charges Barth with treating Feuerbach "in passing," with "losing contact with the standpoint of his opponent," and consequently criticizes Barth's response for not conforming "to its canons of justification." 32 The description of the case is right enough; but is the criticism, in view of our analysis above, justified? Is it not, in terms of the roles involved in the confrontation of the nineteen-fifties, Feuerbach's task to establish contact with his opponent? After all it is Feuer- bach here who polemicizes with the thesis of the illusionist projection against Barth. Should not the canons of justification require the polemicist to establish contact with his opponent? And since Feuerbach does not do that, why criticize Barth for treating Feuerbach "in passing"? Should we not rather criticize Feuerbach for failing to adopt his opponent's grounds, thus estab- lishing contact and validly advancing his polemics against him? The fact that Barth's ground, i.e., the theocentric ground, "ap- peals so exclusively to its own theological circle," 33 which is so small and limited to begin with, is incidental and immaterial to the argument here. In terms of the analysis of the structure of the confrontation and the roles implicated in it, such considera- tion is, indeed, immaterial. The reality of our age could have been the reverse. Most people could have shared Barth's theocentric ground rather than Feuerbach's anthropocentric ground. Would we have then not said that Feuerbach as the polemicist must challenge Barth on the latter's ground, thus fully, and as a matter of course, exonerating Barth for not adopting the Feuer- bachian ground?

And yet, although in our judgment Barth is formally justified in the way he treats Feuerbach's challenge of the illusionist projection, we cannot leave the matter at that. Substantially the

32 Ibid., 94. Although professor Glasse levels his critique against Barth as such, not distinguishing here between the Barth of the nineteen-twenties and the Barth of the nineteen-fifties, it is clear that this critique would hold true only against the Barth of the nineteen-fifties.

88 Ibid., 95.




question has another dimension, and, indeed, Barth's position has a deeper significance than merely being formally correct. For the fact remains that the anthropocentric view is the expression of modern cultural awareness and as such is the pervasive, public domain on which modern man validates his positions. This is the tremendous strength that Feuerbach's challenge has in our day, regardless whether it is formally properly formulated or not. And it is against this reality that Barth gives his answer - the commitment of Christian faith cannot be grounded in the anthropocentric view. In the anthropocentric domain Feuer- bach's challenge must win the day. If the general, basic view, therefore, of modern cultural awareness is anthropocentrism, then the Christian confession of faith must disengage itself, iso- late itself from general cultural awareness. Only thus can it safe- guard its authentic message from being annihilated by Feuer- bach's challenge. It must remove itself to an island of grace and burn all the bridges that connect this island to the mainland of modern cultural awareness, where the Feuerbachian conflagration is raging, devouring all within sight. The Feuerbachian conflagration cannot be put out at present. But at least there is refuge and security on the isolated island. The Feuerbachian flames cannot reach there, and one can wait, hope and trust for a future day when the Feuerbachian conflagration could be put out on the mainland. For the present the only answer is the isolated island. It is safety at the price of isolation and disengagement.

Evidently this answer is different from the answer that Barth could give to Feuerbach's theological thesis, i.e., the thesis of the humanization of God.34 In the latter case the answer is com-

" Yet the essence of this answer is already formulated in the confrontation of the nineteen-twenties, when Barth is dealing with Feuerbach's theological thesis. For, as was already discussed, in order to overcome Feuerbach's theological thesis, Barth must turn to the man who really knows himself to be a dying and sinful creature. Such a man, however, can be only the isolated "solitary individual." Thus, it is already Feuerbach's theological thesis that exacts the price of isolation from Barth. The confrontation of the nineteen-fifties dealing with Feuerbach's thesis of the illusionist projection merely spells out fully and clearly this position of isolation which has been established already in the nineteen-twenties. This shows the intimate relationship between Feuerbach's two theses, i.e., the theological and the philosophical theses, and the consistency and continuation in Barth's response. This actually is quite understandable, for the real issue which underlies both of




plete, total and final. It overcomes and refutes Feuerbach. Here, however, Barth does not succeed in overcoming or refuting Feuerbach. The Feuerbachian challenge remains. All that Barth succeeds to do is to stop Feuerbach from completely overcoming his position. He succeeds in disengaging himself from Feuerbach's clutches and finding a ground, no matter how isolated, on which he can continue to stand and which Feuerbach cannot pull from under him. In other words, Barth succeeds in postponing the final decision to another day in the future.

The fact that the outcome is a postponement rather than a clear decision in his favor need not actually be as disturbing to Barth's defense of the religious theocentric view as might be supposed at first glance. For the knowledge of the "not-yetness" and the need to wait are of the very essence of this view. It is of the wisdom of this view to know that clear and final decisions are not our possession in the present but our hope for the future. Thus, postponing the decision to a future day is quite in accordance with the basic orientation of this view. Indeed, it is even a kind of victory - not only because Feuerbach is here the one who attacks, and stopping him, therefore, from going all the way should mean a victory of sorts, but much more important because Barth's position has a future, while Feuerbach's does not. From Feuerbach's viewpoint the postponement is final. It is a draw. There is no pointing to a future where the outcome may be re- evaluated. From Barth's viewpoint the postponement is only temporary. It is a draw for the time being, since there is a pointing towards a future where reevaluation is possible. That the outcome of the confrontation is a postponement is, therefore, actually a point in Barth's favor.

Not so favorable, however, is the fact that the confrontation compels Barth to turn to the "solitary individual," namely, to disengage himself from general modern cultural awareness.

Feuerbach's theses and which really challenges Barth is the issue of anthropocentrism. This is the crux of Feuerbach's position (clothing itself in different garbs in the two theses) and the point at which Barth must overcome Feuerbach. But the only way, in the last analysis, in which Barth can overcome Feuerbach's anthropocentrism is to completely disengage himself from the anthropocentric view (he cannot overcome it by repudiating it), thus safeguarding at least the possibility of his theocentric position.




Feuerbach succeeds, in driving Barth off the mainland, to find refuge on an isolated island. This is certainly not a very happy state of affairs. No wonder that many a Christian theologian is unhappy and uncomfortable to find that the only solution Barth has to offer is refuge on an isolated island with all the bridges to the mainland cut off. After all, we are all, at bottom, children of our general cultural awareness who want to live on the mainland. We want to find there and not on the isolated island a safe niche for our religious confession. It is understandable, therefore, that the urge to rebuild the bridges to the mainland (i.e., revisit natural theology or religious consciousness) is very strong. We want to have our religious confession and we want to have it in the context of our general cultural awareness. This is, of course, ideal and desirable. But is it really possible to have it today without radically changing either the traditional Christian confession of faith or the contemporary cultural awareness? Barth's answer in his confrontation with Feuerbach is no. The answer is not given lightly. It is given because Barth cannot find an alternative course. Before we start rebuilding the bridges, commendable and ultimately desirable as this may be, we had better make sure that we do have an alternative course to offer.

In conclusion we can now briefly summarize our understanding and evaluation of the Barth-Feuerbach confrontation as we have

attempted to present it in this paper. There are two issues involved in the Barth-Feuerbach confrontation which, although grounded in the same basic orientation, i.e., the anthropocentric orientation, are nevertheless distinct and different. They are:

a) the issue of the humanization of God; b) the issue of the illusionist projection. The issue of the humanization of God is formulated in the theological domain, while the issue of the illusionist projection is formulated in the philosophical-psychological domain. These issues implicate Feuerbach and Barth in different roles. The issue of the humanization of God implicates Feuer- bach in the role of the theologian and Barth in the role of the polemicist, while the issue of the illusionist projection implicates Feuerbach in the role of the philosophic critic of religion and Barth in the role of the dogmatic theologian. Furthermore, the issue of the humanization of God is the central issue in the con-




frontation of the nineteen-twenties, while the issue of the illusionist projection is the central issue of the confrontation in the nineteen-fifties. Thus, we have two distinct confrontations between Barth and Feuerbach, and we must keep this distinction clearly in our minds when we come to evaluate Barth's answer to Feuerbach. We actually have two answers to evaluate, for we cannot rightfully expect Barth's answer when given by him as the dogmatic theologian in defense against Feuerbach's philosophic critique to meet the same criteria as the answer given by him as the polemicist attacking Feuerbach's theological interpretation. Applying, therefore, the proper criteria to each answer, we would say that both of Barth's answers are legitimate, although they differ in their strategy and in what they succeed to accomplish. In the nineteen-twenties Barth as the polemicist has to and, indeed, does answer Feuerbach on Feuerbach's ground and succeeds to overcome Feuerbach's theological thesis. In the nineteen-fifties Barth as the dogmatic theologian does not have to and, indeed, does not answer Feuerbach on Feuerbach's ground. Indeed, he cannot. Consequently in his answer he does not succeed to overcome Feuerbach but merely to disengage himself from Feuerbach's critique leaving the final decision for the time being a draw. Since Feuerbach's critique is imbedded in the pervasive orientation of modern cultural awareness, it is only understandable that many of us would not be quite happy with Barth's answer of disengagement. That we should try to formulate a better answer, i.e., an answer on Feuerbach's ground and therefore on the ground of modern cultural awareness, is most commendable. So far to the best of our knowledge a convincing answer formulated on this ground has not been offered.



The Barth-Feuerbach Confrontation

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