By KURT FISCH)I~R

THE BALKAN CALDRON

The el'llnl" rOl/-lltJelMi. wilh n",d lollow1ng "p". lite willadrmMl oj 1M Gef'mtlJltI""ie.t Jrw" aM gt"Mttr pari oj 11M &Ukmt Pera1"",IIt1 MIle flMlIM Bolka,. "tal. bocki.ralo 1M 1'.nMl·igM oj po4il~(ll illkrUl. The JotlO""Ilg ""lAdy prow/u /I cowen' piclur,of 1M con/'lling develop,"e,,'" i,. ,h", conter oj Europe. .4.. rfl9Ord. lhe cOnMq"encuof havillg cOlne under Allied cotllrol. Ihe Balkan Pe'I"ao1I1d4 U even more 'nleruting,ltall IMly, t'nlJtce, or Belgi",.. ~. 0,01119 10 i'" IlllOf1'O'P1tieal. elAnogmph-ieGl,and It~alJwINre., it 00,.. ,n (I ((!tlJt. becq~ a.t 4 ",.,wr ."'0,. oj Kflrope.

Table IPBOPOIlTJON or TRADI: WITH Glun.ANT, IXCL11DlKO

AVlITIU4

(in per cent)r,,1IJIMU EzporlIt

1929 1937 1938 1929 1937 1938Bulgaria 29.8 lilU 51.1J 42.4 47.1 58.9Greece 10.5 21l.7 30.3 211.7 S2.7 40.2Bunga~' 33.2 44.2 40." ·12.1 40.1 <M.tRumania M.II :)7.4 3ll.S 37.0 26.0 26.:\Turkey 17.iJ 43.7 47.1i 13.8 38.5 44.1YIIgoaiavia 33.0 42.7 39.4 24.1 311.2 42.0

During the two years 1941 and 1942 togeth.er, in the midst of war, Germany's trade with80utheastern Europe waa aetive to the tone ofalmost 300 million mar!cs, while her balance ofpaymf'lIt8 was paaaive. Tbis meaus tbat the

poHtieally and economically, juat baftly man­aged to drive out Bolshevism (Hungary andBulgaria) or fought another war (Turkey) toeliminate foreign (Greek) elements from theirterritory and create a new national order(Kemal Atatnrk). Finanoially, most of theBalkan states had to depend on France andEngland, and the depreuion of the earlythirties revealed the weoknetl8 of theireconomic structure.

THX REICH A:sn THE BALKANS

Although the elimination of the in8uence ofVienna and Berlin in the Balkans had been oneof the Great War aima of the AIliea, the Reich.linked through' German aettlen and v&riOWIeconomic and cultural tiee with BOutbeuteroEurope. remained one of its moet importanttrading partners. With the rehabilitation ofthe Reich, this partnership Wall rapidly strength­ened on a BOund blUlis of giv.e-and-take. For­eign-trade statisti08 show Greater Germany(exoluding the Protectorate) to have .n inthe lead by a wide margin prior to World WarII.

SITUATED at the periphery of the greatRuman, Frankish, Byzantine, and Otto·man Empirell, the Balkan Penirumla wufor centuries veiled in a twilight. With

its rugged mountainll, unnavigable riVeI'lI, andclimatic oontrutB, it hu been the ecene ofcountless invallioos, migratiOllll, wan, religiousconflicts, tribal feuds, mlUl8 mauacrell, andfierce re~Uionll. Many different races havemixed here, and the profuaion of tonguellcompetetl with a dazzling variety of cults andcreeds. The few comparatively big statesfounded in the past by the Bolgara, Croab, andSerbs were short-lived, although they laterserved all a spur to national aIIpirationa. Evenduring the period of emerging nationaliam,during the .gradual di8integration of Turkiahrule, the Balkall8 remained an arena for foreigninflueneea.

Although national independence, nominal orreal, eventually took shape (Greece 1830,Rumania and Serbia 1878, Bulgaria 10(8) theBalkan nations were slow to progft!8II, u thevarious lItate&-none too proIIpeJ'0U8 after fivehundred years of v&88&lage-wuted theil"energies in endlC88 wan. After the GreatWar, the situation was hardly improved. TheParis peace treaties of HH9/20, concluded underAllied IJUpervision, only accentuated existingantagonisms. Externally, tho division into thetwo camps of victors and vanquished waH keptup through a redistribution of territory which('reated formidable new minority problems.InternaUy, the heneftciariett of the treaties foundthemselve!4 taxed to the limit by the attemptedassimillltion of their heterogeneous acquiBit.ions,under the strain of whioh democratic rule gavewny to autocracy (King Alexander in Yugo­slavia, King Carol in Rumania) or to an au­thoritarian regime (Metaxaa in Greece). Thevanquished, on the other hand, hard pre88ed

66 THE XXth CENTURY

Balkan states were getting more goods fromGermany than they were !:lending there and,moreover, being allowed long terms of paymentfor their purchases.

As a continental power intent upon buildingup European economic collaborat.ion, Germanywas deeply concerned in the political stabilityof southeastern Europe. Hence she supportedall efforts at smoothing out differences. AtGermany's instigation, the one-!:lided ethno­graphical di\risions resulting from the GreatWar were mitigated during the post-Munichperiod by anum bel' of settlements, viz., theFirst Vienna Arbitration of November 2, 1938,fixing the Hungarian-Slovakian frontier; theincorporation of Carpathian Ruthenia in Hun­gll.ry on March 18, 1939; the Second ViennaArbitration of August 30, 1940, readjusting thethorny Transylvania problem; and the Bulga,rian­Rumanian Agreement of Craiova of September7, 1940, on the Dobruja question (see mapand Appendix). Considering the comparativelyyoung nationalism in southeastern Europe andthe overlapping of divergent interests whichtook recourse to a bewildering aggregation ofethnographical, historical, economic, strategic,geopolitical. and other arguments aH the casewould fit, mediation and counsel was an odiousbusiness. The entangled state of affairs per­mitted of no patent solutions. One Germanmeasure, the repatriation of German-speakinggroups (44,371 from northern Bucovina, 55,250from southern Bllcovina, 90,050 from Bessara­bin., 14,511 from Dobruja), stimula.ted an ex­change of population between Bulgaria. andRumania; and Germa.ny's agreements withHungary and Rumania on the treatment ofGerman minorities suggested another pathtoward the solution of the galling minorityproblem, the main evil of the states of south­eastern Europe.

In order to foster politica.\ stability, the Reich

Emancipation 01 the Balkan nationslrom '1'urkl~h rule

undertook substantial military liabilities suchas its guarantee of Rumania's independenceamI integrity of August 30, 1[140, in additionto the promise of military assistance to allsignat,ories of the Tripartite Pact (i.e., amongthe southeastern European states: Hungary,Rumania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Croa,tia). Therefusal of tbe Soviet demands voiced byMolotov during his visit to Berlin inNovember 1940 concerning Rumania, Bulgaria,and the Dardanelles, when acquiescence mighthave bought Stalin's good will, proved tbatGermany was in earnest about her obligations.

The successful Balkan campaign in thespring of 1941, which had been provoked bythe Yugoslavian coup d' fla.t, gave the Reichan opportunity to utiliz.e its victory for furtherreadjustments. Croatia, who had often kickedagainst her Serbian overlords, and Montcnegmbecame independent states; and H ungar), andBulgaria-who had not participated actively inthe fighting-were beneficiaries of frontierrectifications the object of which was t,oeliminate as much friction as pos;;ible.

As aU the states of southeastern Europe areeconomically very much alike, being chieflyengaged in agriculture (nearly 80 per cent ofthe population) and possessing valuable minerntresources, there is no interstate trade worthmentioning (see Appendix). Their economy is,however, well supplemented by the Reich.A series of bart-er agreements not only freedthem from erratic and often ruinous world­market prices, as Germany was paying on abasis consistent with production costs, butalso-by the contracting in advance of fixedquantities at fixed prices-resulted in intensifiedproduction and thus in a higher national in­come. The Reich's scientific resources wereput at the disposal of its southeastern partnersin trade. They received breeding cattle forimproving domestic stock as well as improvedseed for their customary crops and for newlyintroduced ones. On the basis of experiment,carried out in Germany and on the spot, novelmethods of production were suggested. Germancapital investments were directed so as t<>expand production, for which a. receptivemarket was guaranteed, and were to be repaidin kind, in contrast to investments by theWestern powers made for cash dividends.which had the effect of draining the nationaleconomies.

The economic agreement between the Reichand Rumania of March 23,1939 (see Appendix),illustrates the German ideas. It was all themore remarkable as it was concluded at a timoof preponderantly Western influl'ucc in Bucha­rest, only three months after the assassinationof Cotlreanu, arrested leader of lobe pro-GermanIron Guard, in his cell and the. ubseque/lt massshooting of his followers, and a few days priorto Britain's guarantec of Rumania's indepcnd·ence.

THE BALKAN CALDRON

Table II

61

RUMAJliU'S DEFECTION

wit,h Bulga.ria·s diplomatic relations with theUSSR.

TERRITORIAL CllANGU IN SOUTIlEASTERNEUROPE BETWEEN 1938 AND 19"

(0 From CztclloAlo\'alda to Hunlmf)' by Flnt Vlmna Arbi­tration 2. \ 1.38. (l1) .'1'0111 CucllOlllonlkla to UUIlltlU'Y, 18,3.30,(IU) fo ItAly iA.3lI; ~n8UtUWd u IlIllct'",ndellt .tate allerlIl1dOldlo'. surrendrr In September Ill~3, (IV) .'rom Polandlo 810vakla br. O"o"a0-8lo\'ak Asreement 21.1 1.311. (V) Touasil by So\" et-ltullumlAn AllrOOlllent 27.6AO; relnrorllOl1ltedIn It umallia after outbreaJ< 01 G mUUl-So\'let war 2l!.Il.U.(VI) ~'rom IllllllanJa 10 H'UlIlAry by SI'<'Ond \'Iellll.. Arbitration~O.S.~O. (V II) .'1'0111 Rumania 10 DulllIrla by Bulgarian:Rumanian Asreemenl 01 Cralova, 7.11.~O, (VOl) ."1'001 YUill>­.Iavla and Orcooc Wlda }llIlllArian admlnlJolruUon allrr German1laJkan Campaign \lJ.l1. (IX) ~'l'Om YUl108la\1 under Ilu"ll'U'­IllJl adllllnJ.oLraUoo alter Genmlll I\llll;Dn (uopalgn 10·11.(X) From \'UII0l1&\1I Int'O!'JlOraloo 10 Ilelel. alter tJermanBalkan CamJl&lgll IlI·H. (Xl) .'1'0111 YUIl""IJ"'la InrorJloratedIn Jtaly IlII.,r German 1laJkan Ca",pal/ln I041. (XII) CroaUa.,.. ~n.tltuloo lrom YUlioolll\1a alter Oenul\n Balk.." CAm­pallO 1~1. (XlU) 8t'rbla, .. nl<.'On.UlUled lrom YU/lO@1avlaalter Gennan Balkan CamllllJllJ\ 1141. (XlV) ~tontenewo, lromYugoslavia to HOIIN! 01 !!a\'U)' aller G~nJllUJ IJalkau l ampalgn1lJ.l1;~ tltuted as Indepelldent IlIAle aller &1I0Il110's lU­render In 8t'l'lemher 11143. (XV) Oablllll14. Irom \'UIlOlla,1a toJuly alter Uerman lIalkan Cnrnpalllll \\}41; 1000t'ther ..1lh Fhllnn~'i);a.poraled In Croatia ..Iter lladowllo·. surrender 10 Se\'WlInber

On August 23, 1944, three da.ys alter thebeginning of the Soviet offensive between theCarpathians and the Black Sea, the treason ofKing Michael of Rumania became known.One of the reasons contributing toward thistreason Wl18 probably the latent tension betweenHungary and Rumania, one of the unfortunatelegacies of the past, which the Reich had beenable to restrain but not yet to efface. MarshalIan Antonescu, who had stout.ly adhered to hispro-Axis policy and refused to give in to theSoviets, was removed by a ruse, and a newgovernment was set up beaded by GeneralConstantin Sanatescu, after Prince Barbu Stirbcihad in t.he spring of 1944, during 0. trip toTurkey, el:ltablished the first contact betweenthe Rumanian opposition and the l(rcmlin.An armistice was concluded in Moscow onSeptember 12, the signatories being on the onohand the USSR, Great Britain, and the USA,and on the other Rumania (see Appendix).

Rumania was now to become virtually partof the Soviet Union, retaining no 8embJal~ce ofsovereign rights. Quite lUiid from the factthat Rumania bad to continue fighting, he hall

0,13.5

USSRl,"porl8 Export..

0.0-& 0.02.5 0.3

0.01l0,13.9

ALLIED AIMS

Moscow, in the footsteps of Tsarist imperial­ism, and London meanwhile continued the oldgame of power politics in southeastern Europe.On June 26, 1944, the Soviets presented Ruma­nia with an ultimatum demanding the ccssionof Bcssarabia and northern Bucovina, withwhich Rumania was forced to comply. In­cidentaUy, although Be88lU'abia. had once beenRUBBia.1] territory, this had never been theCllllC with Bucovino.. In the spring of 1941,Stalin Wl18 one of the wirepullers in the Yugo­slavian COltp d'&t instigated by Great Britain,who had previously busied herBClf in Greece.In the ensuing hostilities, both Yug08lavia andGreece were left in the lurch. It must berecalled in this connection that southeasternEurope has no vital interests linking it witheither Great Britain or the USSR. This isperhaps best illustrated by foreign-trade/ltatistica.

."LIAlf J'OJU:I0N TRADE WITH BIUTUN .un> TBE USS.IN 1\138 (in per cent)

DritainImporU Erporl8

Bulgaria 7.9 4.8Greece 13.0 8.3Yugoillavia 8.3 9.liRumania 82 11.1Turkoy 11.2 3."Hungary 6.0 R.O

In the years that ensued, both Moscow andLondon had to confine their activities to or­ganizing and arming bands in Greek and formerYugoslav territory and supporting emigrantgovernmcnts and committees, with 0. markedantagonism soon making itBClf apparent betweent.he groups supported by the Soviet-s and thosesupported by the British. When politicalopportunism made it advisable to DowningStreot to please the Kremlin, the Chetniks underGeneral Mihailovich were abandoned and Tito's"National Committee for tho Liberation ofYugoslavia." gained ascendancy over KingPeter's refugee government, In Greece theradical "ELAS" ("Greece") partisa.lls and"EAM" (Enaion Amyntikon JletQpon= UnitedDefenlW Front) group-the latter being Ll. com­bination of the Communist party with theUnion of Popular Democrats (known &S the"ELD"), tho Socialist Union, and some minorgroups-were at loggerhends with the "EDES"(Ellenike Demokratike En()sis Synterilikon=Grcek Democratic Union of Conscrvatives) withits Western 8ympathic8.

In the iuterval between the spring campaignof lV41 and t.hc Soviet advance in the summerof 1944, tho Balkan countries had little to feelill the WilY of direct effects of the war exccptfor Allied air raids on some of thc major cities,Although Bulgaria was a. signatory to theTripartite Pad and bound to Germany by amilitary alliance, thc l~eich did not interfere

THE XXth CEl\"T{;RY68

to tIo so under orders of the Soviet High Com­mand. AU her ci\'il authorities WE're held toobey Soviet instl"Uctions, just as her entireeconomic sy t.em was plac('d lI:1conditionallyat the disposal of the Red Army. Runmniajlromised to re-establi:;h the t"conomic rights ofAllied citizens, which involn~d tho ~uspension

of the nationalization of important n:lturnl re­.sources that bad been effected during the pastf·w year:- and opening them up again to foreignexploitation. he had to restore the ci,-ilrights of people who had lost them for acts·Ol.DlUitted against the common wcal, and to

rescind the laws governjng the position of the.Jews. Theaters, movies, radio, prcss, andliterature had to be subject('d to the control ofthe Soviet Command. Jn addition to payingan indemnity of S 5300 million in kind plusdamages to 'oviet, Britifih. and US pr'ivuteinterests. she has to bear the cost of Sovietoccupation and of all Soviet operations carriedout from Rumanian territory again t othercountries.

E,en the re-incorporation of Tmnsyh'l\niu, towhich the clique around King Michael has)Jointed as justification of its policy, was con­ceded only with resen"ation·. Ct"I'taill ad­ditional terrru later revealed though not con­tairll'd in the armistice add the fillishing touchesto the picture of a. nation cOlllpltltely under;'oviet control: the Rumanian railwuy gauge ist.o be changed to the Soviet standard; herf"reign policy i' to be conducted under the!!upen'ision of t,hc Red Command' . he is toredeem all Illt"fms of payment issued by UlC•'O\'iets; Rumanian workers ure to be placedat ~Ioscow's disposal for labor in the :So\'iptL' nion.

The Brit ish press waxed enthusiast ie OVN

t he lIlildn~'s of these term:,. alld Reuter andAssociated Prt> extolled this armist ice as amodel for !ilimilar agrE.'elllcnts in the future.Yet Britain aJllI the USA had few benefits toxpect as partners of the USSR,. US military

police arriving by air in order to take a handin Rumania were promptly evict.ed by the Redforces. American oil companies with largo in­Vl"Stments in the Ploesti fields tried in vain toend representat.ives there to invest,igate con­

ditions. When London and Washington in­quired at the KrE'mlill as to what had beenoone with cl'rtllin of their installations whi(:hhave disappeared from PIQCl;ti. thE' 'ovieL'>replied that the major part of the installationsr'moved to the Soviet Union had been Germanproperty. Even the American representativesill the Allied Al'mi.<;tice COlllmission in Rumaniawere reCused permission to inspect t.he oil tieldR.

While thousands of people were being nr­rested and prosecuted. some of the more prolU­inent men were handed o\"er to the So.ietsas "war criminals." The I anateRCu go"ern­ment was replaced in December by tht" cabinetof General K Ratescll.

BULGARB FOLLOWS StTTT

Their country's t'Olte-fou may have com­mended itself to some Rumanians because theSoviets had invaded Moldavia and becausethere was at least a chance of regaining a partof northt"rn and eastern Transylvania previous­ly ceded to Hungary. But tilt' government of:Bulgaria, the next. victim of the Red Hood,could advance no excuse. howt'ver lame. for itsdefection. The country had derived sub­stantial benefits from its adherence to theTripartite Pact, and Gt'rmany had helped toreintegrate a Greater Bulgaria as nearly inaccordllnee with ethnographical principle/; asthe mosaic of peoples in southeastern f<:uropecould permit. Her territory as delimited bythe Treaty of Neuilly had been increasedby 47 per cent (see Appt"nrlix). On theot.hcr hand, Bulgaria hud contributed verylittle to the Axi~ war effort; she was onlvnominallv at war with Great Britain andAmerica: her active share in the struggle notexceeding dE'fense against Anglo-American &irraid::!.

The dt'ath of King Boris on August 21'{. 1!J43,had robbed the country of a ruler' who l~om­

manded respect bot.h at home unci abroad, ata time when the nation needed unit,- morethan en'r. A regency council. consisting ofPremier l"iloff. War ~1ini8terMichoff, and Princl'Cyril, which tried to continue tho hLte ruler'spolicy, appointed a new cabinet under Boshiloff.This cabinet resigned in .May Hl44, Turkey tI

yielding to the Allies being one of the cau:;cs,and was !iucceeded by thc Bagria.lloff govern­ment. For some time prior to the crucialmonth of August 1944, this gm-ernment hadordered various mea/,lurcs contrary to the spiritof the country's alliance with the Reich. Atthe cncl of August it took the plunge llmidellpatched emissaries t.o Cairo to nE'gotinte allarmistice while proclaiming Bulgllrul':; neu­t.rality.

This WIlS hv no means in 3Cl·onlance withMoscow's de8ire~. Under th(-' Kremlin's prE'S­sure, Britain 8.11d t,he USA informed thc Bulgar­ian commilltlioner who had requc:sted recogni­tion of his country s Jl(·utralit.) that a decisionon this question could be made only in agree­ment with the Soviet Union. The Bagria.noffcabinet. resigned. But. although the newlyformed l\furavieff government was even mort"IIbmissi,'c, the Sm'iet nion, not to ue outdone

by its allieR, declared wl\r on &pt, m bel' .J.Sofia answered with an immediate I"('(I"e"t foran arm JISt ice, atthe sallie time sP\'Ning diplomat"io relations with Germany on September (j andtwo dn.,vs later rlcclaring war on her. Thlls theBulgarian GovE'l'Ument gave away the country'indt'pendence and it.<" newly won territories t.oboot, without. actually gaining peace. It ae­ePopted BoL-;he\-ist occupation and the sub­ordination of the Bulgarian Ann.)" to Soviet.

THE BALKAN CALDRON

comm&lld, under which, for the first timeduring the present conflict, it was made to fight.

Meanwhile, Stalin was in no hurry to concludean armistice. He first presented terms to theAnglo.Americans which were to secure exclusiveSoviet domination of Bulgaria and the long­desired BCCC88 to the Aegean Sea. In thm latterrespect, the British were particularly sensitive.It took almost two months to arrive at anunderstanding, and unless ChurchiU had flownto Moscow it might have taken even longer.The comprorni86 solution saved the face of theAnglo-AmericILDfl, but in actual fact it repre­sented a concession to Stalin. It'or, althoughBulgaria was asked to evacuate Macedonia andThrae(', there was no word mentioned as towhat formations were to replace these troop~,

nor about thc Soviet forees which, by the endof Scptember, wcre reported to have enteredwe tern and ea.'cltern Thra(·c. It was only nowthat tho Georgieff government, whieh had!lucceed(.'(1 the Muravieff cabinet on SeptemberIJ b) a I 'oviet-mallipulatcd cnu'P d'etat, waswked to despatch delegatcs to Moscow. ThcILrmistit:c, similar to that concluded with Ru.mania, but lea ving aU territorial questions open,Wail signed on October 28.

nder Red pressure, the Sovietization of thatcOlmtry WILS fostered by every possi ble means.The admini~tl'ation wa.s purged, and potentinlleaderH against the regime were arrested. InoppoRition to the policy purllued in Sofia, aNational Bulgarian Government WI18 formedabroad under Professor Zankoff, one-time Pre­mier of Bulgaria who, during his tenure of officc(llJ2:l. ;lU), had succeeded once bcfore in banningthe Boishevit'lt threat from his country. Inmid-Novembcr the organizn.tion of "BulgarianForccf! of Liberation" waf! announced in a proc­lamation adJrf'.ssed to all Bulgarilu)f! residingin Germany, Slovakia, Hungary, northern Italy,and Croatia.

ORJo:EK CONF(;SJO~

The evacuation of Greece by the GermanArmy Illellnt t he beginning of a. new phase forthat country, too. Here it was not Soviet butBritish troops which foUowed on the heels oftho Reich di,·isions. We have already men­tioned that thero was a rift among thc pro­AJlied Greeks. so much so that the Germansne,"er had any serious difficulty ill maintainingorder during their occupation of Greece.Troubll" had alJ;o been brewing in Grcek emigrantcircles. The Communist·inspired mutiny of(;rook Mailo!'s n.t Alexandria during April, whichhad to be quelled by force, was symptomat.ic ofthe undorgrollnd st.ruggle going on uetwf'cnMoscow nnd London. Early in April, t.hoT 'ollderos Cabin I. resigned and was replacedby Colonel Sophoclf's Vcnizclos, former NavyMinister, as Premier. At the' end of the sarnomonth, t,he premicTlihip changed handli again,going to George Pllpltndreou, who made an

attempt to form a. government embracing allparties. At the end of May there was a newreshuffle, following which Colonel Venize.l08 tookthe vice-premiership. Despite their clamoring,the ComnlUnists were at that time not yetineluded in t.he government. It was only inAugust that another reshuffle resulted in fivemembers of the EAM organization being giventhe ministries of Agriculture, Finance, 'om­munications, Economics, and 4bor.

At the end of August, i.e., before the Sovietdeclaration of war on Bulgaria, demands wervoiced by the Greek exile government forfrontier revisions at the expense of Bulgariaand for an Allied occupation of that country.The Sovietll considered this a thrust at theirown aims. Subsequent discussionll of territorialadjustment.s continued this game of move andcountcrnlOve such as Tito's proposition of l.L

Macedonian Atate Ilnd the GJ'C(:k Premier'g pleafor the ceK..,ion of a part of southern Albaniaand 1I0uthern Bulgaria (catlt Rumelin). Be·hind it all litood the grim struggle betweenthe Kremlin and Downing Street f r theexpansion of their Mpheres of power.

In mid-October, alter the landing of the fir tBritish troops on Greek loIoil, reportl! of theparticipation of these troop in the sl.rc·etfighting between the two ri"ul Greek faction.in the cnpituJ ('oincil!ed with t.he Ilrrivul of th>Oreek exile governmcnt. in Athens from Cairo.The Kovembcr decree ordering thf' l!isbandingof all partisans and the surrender of aU arrnlionly increa"ed the confusion. Although Gl'n­erals Zervas unl! Sarafis. couunanderl! of th'EDES and ELAS respectively, formuUy agreedto the dissolution of their forces, t,he part i~uniidid not comply wit.h the order. In December,ufter the poli('e had fired on demonstrators, theCommunists culled for a general Htrike andstarted an armed uprising against the Govern­ment troops, trying to gain control of thecapital. British troops joined in the battlewhen an ultiml\,tum pre.·entcl! by Generul H.M. Scobie, British Commander in Chief inGreece, had yielded no results. On December8, ChurchiU mude it clear t.hat he had orderel!the clearing b~' force of Athens of all rebeIii ,and that he would persist in this policy. lnthe Rame speech he call·d the men whom,a few months carlicr, he had described a"noble fighters" against the Germans, "crim­inals, robbeI'll, murderers, and gangster -.. 'Meanwhile, the battle in Athens continucdand spread c"en to the province'S.

After the dispatch of Marshal Alexander,Allied Commander in Chief in the Mediter·rancan, to 1\thcnEl, whose m dintion attemptHeame to nought, ChurchiU and Eden flew thereduring Christmas in an effort to halt the civilwar. Moscow's attitude hus been noncommittal,while Edward Stettinius, Cordell Hull's ISU ­

cessor in the US State Department, dcnounc('(1Briti h interference in the "Iiberated countries."

70 THE XXth CENTUUY

By year's end, the only visible accomplishmentof Churchill's visit was a general agreement 00the formation of a regency for King George illthe person of Archbishop Damaskin08, who in·8t:ructed Genoral PlaNtiras to form a newgovernment. But tJlC civil Will' was 8till on.

Meanwhile, a Greek Tntional Committee haabeen formecl on German soil, with HectorTicornikos, Deputy Premier of the last GreekGovernment, and Konstantin Ooulas, the leaderof the Greek National Movement.

TITO IN YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslavia had been founded after the GreatWar with Serbia as the core and with territorialadditions from Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria., 8S

well as the whole of Montenegro. It waa theonly state in southeastern Europe apart from(·zechoslovakill. in which the ruling nationalitywas in the minority. After the German Balkan

ampaign of 1H41: Crontia. Serbia, and Monte­negro were rcconst.ituted as soyereign states.Croatia covered the main portion of the tel"ritory which Yugoslavia had taken over fromAustria and Hungary. The frontiers weredrawn a,s best as they could be according toet hnographical and cultuml considerations; yetit wa~ clear thnt, in this complicated area, itwas impossible to satisfy everyone. Time andpeaceful conditions wero needed for the adjust­ment und healing of ancient sores. The pro­11IlIgl~tiun of the war and the propaganda issuingfrom Moscow and London did not facilitate1·,)J1~()lidat,ion, 1111 the moro !;o a~ Italy hadinsi:iLCd on ccrtain concessions which causedresentment. BnJoglio's surrender permitted arC'adjufltment (Ruch as the incorporation ofFiume Ilnd thc Dulmntiltn coast in Croatia) butould not wipe out a.LI ill feeling.

Partisans WE'rc Rctive in the le~ accessiblepart.s of former lugoslavia from the verystart. They woro supported wit.h arms, am­munition, etc., by the Anglo-Amcrica,ns and the~ovietli, on top of which came the assistancert1llllrred them by MOille tTl\itorous Italiangcnerals. Step by step, the Communist partisan(l·.. tlCI· Tita gnined ascendancy over King Pet.er'sexile government (see 'Pile XXth. Century,April 1944). Ocnernl Mihailovich, who heldthc post of War Minister in the- exile govern.ment for three years, was dismill8Cd by a decreepublish<,d in London on Augul:lt 2G, his postbeing given to Tito. One month later, EnglishIlnd .\merican report.s had it that the Allieswere about to Inod an army on the Albaniancoast. Rut suddtmly no more was heard aboutthis, while a declaration came from Moscow tot he elf ct that the Soviet Oovemment hadrequested anel obtainoo Tito's consent to the('ntry of the Rod Army into Yug08lavia. Itwas obvious: Stnlin had made it clear that\' ugoslavia belonged to his sphere of influence,and that the Anglo-Americans were to keepout. Incidentll.lly, it is significant that the

Kremlin's request was addressed to Tito andnot to King Peter, although Tito merely rankedas the King's Minister of War.

At about the same time, Tito notified theUNRRA tha.t its deliverics were only welcomeif they could be distributed by the local au·thoritics. He also asked the Anglo.Americanmilitary mission to lea\'e the country. ExilePremier Subasich, who had gone to Tito'sheadquarters early in November for pUrpose8 ofdiscuS8ion, significantly enough went straighton to Moscow. In his M08eow talks, a provi.sional admini8tration was agreed upon in whichTito would hold the premier8hip while Subasicbwould become regent, thus playing the powerinto Tito's-or Moscow's-ha.nd8. This "UnitedYugoslav Government" has already announcedplan8 of creating a so-called autonomoUllMacedonia within a Yugoslavian federation.Incidentally, King Peter prote8ted against theestablishment of the regency.

Thero has been hardl" anv news about con­ditions in Albania, whi~h h'as been evacuaU'dby the (;crmllnR. Ex.King Zog I, in ('xile inBritain, has applied-as yet in "ain-for per­missioll to return to Albnnia.

M.eanwhile, there are stiU national forces atwork in this corner of Europe which do notintend to become British or Soviet pUppetfl.The Croatian Government, allied to the ll.eich,i~ preparing to defend the ncwly won independ.ence of iMi country, while the National SerbianGovernment under Premier l'iedich and theNational Alhanian Committee under Harnpi arecontinuing to reMitit the llolshevlzation of theirrcspective cowltries.

U>ENTICAL TRE~ 1)

The political developments in Bulgaria, Ru­mallia, and Yugosla,-ia Hince the entry of thej{ed troops show a number of characteristicsidentical in all three countrics.

The IJPrsecutiun dir('ctcd at fir. t against theleading politicians of the period preceding theRed entry is acqui.ring more and more thenature of a spreading wave of terror againstthe majority of the intellectual class. Here thepostulate of Soviet politics is being appliecla.ccording to which it i8 not any given politicaltrend but the representatives of a certainideology which have to be combated. Thispolitical terror is combinecl with extensive ex­propriationfil of the property of all undesirableelements. As Ii result, the latter are ruined.while the state is acquiring a growing reservefund of ostat,es. Since these estates are legallyownerleS8, they wilJ probably be used later forthe cstablishment of "socialist model enter­priscs," similar to the 8ovkhosy in the USSn. intheir economic and political significance 80S thejumping.off places for collectivization.

And aU this is happening at the "desire ofthe people." The Bolshevist occupation au­thoritics are "strictly refraining from allY

THE BALKAN CALDRON '11

interference" and are only being drawn intothis process by the "friendship for the SovietUmon" inspiring the Rumanian, Bulgarian, andYugoslav people8. This sudden affection ofthese nations for the Soviet Union offers theRed occupation authorities the finest opportunityto look after the welfare of the people. Theyare not interfering in the domestic affairs of thecountry, even if they succeed in getting rid of~>ne ministry after another: no, they are only"helping the people to show their friendship tothe Soviet Union."

Nevertheless, this policy is meeting withgreat difficulty. The swing-over in the8e stateshad not been sufficiently prepared; the drivingforees of the new development 80 to speak"among the natives" are still pretty weak, theylack authority and experience. Hence it is upto the Soviets to see that the proper elementsget to the top.

One method employed is the founding every­where of "Societies of the Friends of theUSSR." It ill here that the work of educationis being carried out and the disorganization ofall exillting institutioDll in the country is beingprepared. Moroo\'cr, the Bolsheviks are notappealing directly to the workerll as such, forthe Party no longer believe8 in the Bolshevistmiuion of the proletariat. On the other hand,they are striving for the re-establishment of allrights of the inhabitants, ospecially the grantingof all kinds of "freedom": freedom of the press,of llS.'lembly, of spe<'Ch, etc. In this way, too,('onditions in these countries are being madesimilar to those in the Soviet Union: after all,

we all know that the people of the SovietUnion enjoy "the most perfect liberty anddemocracy." This means that in the name ofthe welfare of the people, in the name of theintimate friendship with Moscow, those penonsconvenient to the Bolshevist authorities maymove in complete freedom and resist all oppoei.tion to themselve8 &8 being crimes against theliberty of the 'people.

Meanwhile, those same Soviet authorities areseeing to it that al1 important poeitions in theeconomio life of thC80 Balkan COWltries arefilled with their own men who marched intoEurope with the Red Army. Tens of thousandsof Soviet technicians, railwaymen, and qualifiedworkmen have been given jobs in this way.Thousands of agitators and propagandis18 inthe USSR suddenly developed an amazingintere8t in learning the Balkan languages. Noliterature except the Soviet or pro·Soviet kindmay be published.

JU8t &8 all the peoples of former RUll8ia wereisolated from the rest of the world after theOctober Revolution of 1917, 80 the Balkanpeoples are now slowly but surely being isolatedfrom the rest of the world, even from theAnglo-American membel'8 of the Allied ControlCommiuions.

\V1108E INTERESTS?

Wherever we look in Allied- and Roviet­occupied southt>sstem Europe, there is Oppretl­sion, mutual distrust, anarchy, starvation,fighting. Torn by two rival powers. neither ofwhich is in the least concerned with the fute of

CARTOON OF THE MONTHBy S.U'AJOU

The Double Trojan Trick

72 THE XXth CENTURY

up its entire territory ami offers few facilitiefor cOIDDlunicat.ionF.l, and at the interstate tradethere during the last prewar year (see Appendix).In Iihort., the Ba,lkan federations rt'cently I·

gested would represent mere addition. notint grations.

Nature herself has sugge ted a olution atlea-st to the economic problem. The Danubewhich form the ouly link among the ·tat ofsoutheastern Europe, also joins that re.giunwit.h ccntral Europe. Thus alt.hough not aunit in its.elf, it is part of a greater unit wh seintegration requires no military, political tll­turnl or e onomie coercion but only the nru·tralizlltion of extraneous forces with aim noteven remotely connected with the rightful in­tere~ts of the Balkan people, In the communsphere comprising central and I«)uthe/\ t.ernEuropc, any cultural or political repres."'ionwould be destructin'; nor could there be illly

sen. e in re trictions being imposed on thodevelopment of /\ny state in a particular field,whether agriculture, industry, or communica·tions, In a ommunity of intC'rest supplr.mentinrr each other as weil as in the a.!' I)fcentral and outheastern Eurnp<'. i would be!\uicidal. Indeed, in their mutual rdati nship,vari ty. inste.ad of being an ob ta 1(', W uldmake for a richer and fuller life.

th peoples themselves southeastern EuropehaR again become what it was for long centurieprior t,o it tortuous emancipat,ion.

It nation are, in tht' name of liberty,democracy, and curity, engaged in an int.er­n inc truggl to help l!CCure British line of

mmunication and Smiet frontiers. No t.er­ritorial demanc1~ are too grotesque to be raised,t.1emant.1s whi ·h compli(,llte a problem not en ilysolved even if only cOl1!'lidering the interests oft 11(' naIl-an peoples,

The conflicting proposals for fe<JerationB ofone kind 01' another equally disrcgard actualBalkan int.eT'ests, In the ca. e of such formerfel1t'rlltion a ~7.echoslo,·ukia or Yugoslavia thestrongest peopl -the Czech and th· • rb.·r 'pectively-usurped the rul contrary t.o the~J1irit of a f(A('leration, Any new foclern tion.',how,' r, would play into the hands of •'t.alin,who "ould maintain his influence wit·hin afC'd'ration by a policy of di?>ide et i1llpera.Ap:lI't from this consideration, a sound fe.f!era­tion would preRuppmle a prevalence of 'harac­terhltics thut bind t,ogether over thotre thatscparate, We have already meutioned thedi"ergenee of ultuml influ IIces hil"t.orical a.g­~{ jution., rllce. languag , and creed. all ofwhich . how a wnden y to a' ert rather than!'ubelue thems Ive, One nced only look at thetopography f outhea tern Europe, which cuts

• • •

By ROU' MAGENER

Dr. ?rarle·IIer, n YO!/II(/ Germr", bU.9illUH t3'u,u/'ivf, arri,.ed in Indio in A "0",'11939. .-I Jew 'It'uhf later the War broke Ollt (l1/(/ he 'cw' ;lIlrrl/ed. IJter "Imost {it'eyoors oj life behilld barbut ,rire, he ,,"tt his frielltJ. H. VOIl Hoee manoouJ. w e.scopeand rooc}, the Ja1X'"ue lillcs in LJ,lrmn.. His pelle/ratillg ca.'1 Oil the mentality ofmen i" prilton campa. ,crifte" dllrillfl a (Jisil 10 ·/umy/wi.;H oj par/iclll"r inlcrcst ato time whe,. mcre ,nuple the I{,Qrld over are beillg kept behind barbed u;ire them Cl'er

before i,. hi tory. I

H C~t:\.l'\lTY has been seized by n strangemania to lock each other up. The ageof world-encompa. 'ing wars ha, madeimpri 'onment a ma :s e:ll.-perien e, mil­

lions of p oplo pending many yeari'! of t.heirlife in foro d" elusion. A. II. maSll phenomenon,t.h' xperiencc of internment repre:cnt aninno\'ation of UUI' century' the fact that onemu t I' kon with increasing probability onhn\'ing to . pend part of one's life in internment'amp is doubtle" a new feature in modernlife expectancy,

Imprisonment i' aile of the most serious

ment.al train human being' ('an inflict UpOIl

each other. But whil> ·verything i" d n' tuprepare thc human being for other gr at tp"t'in life, fOl' hi profession and marriage for dpu t hat home or in the field. impri"onll1l'nt find" himcompletely unprepared. :l\ot only has 11P nutbeen recomm nded to behave in any part.icularway: he does not even have the \'agut'. t id~IL

as to what experieuce arc waiting for himbehind the barbed wire. Hencc internuH'ncome like a bolt from t,he blue and with ;L'orre pomling 'hock t'flect. Ob,'iou Iy th r i"

a gap herc in the sy.'tem of our education.