Chapter I

The Background to the demand for India's Partition and

British Policy 1935-40

INTRODUCTION

The partition of India assumes a sigt:ificant place in the history of South Asia. Since it is woven in a complex net of historical forces it re rnai ns an enigma to the present generation. The Lahore Resolution passed by the All India Musli1n . . League on 22 nd March, 1940 is generally regard-eel as the demand made for India's partition.

Why was such a demand made at all ? Was this resolution intended to really divide India or was it. a bargaining point for the Muslims to have a better position if.l an all - lpdia arrangement. What .role did the British.government play in making the Muslim League enunciate such a demand ? Can Indian National Congress exoner.ate itself fro1n the charges of driving the Muslim League to make such a radical demand ?

The present study is undertaken to answer sorne of the above questions· and analyse the com­plexity of the subjec~ which continues to haunt today. Its 1nulti - faceted .dimension cap be under­stood by reviewing some of the major works that has appeared si~ce independence -partition of

- India. The growth of Muslim separatism can be

ex P.lained · as a consequence of the reality faced by the Muslitns iri their min~rity provinces ( UP, Bihar, Bombay) not only among the educated classes towards the available job·oppor~unities but n1ore mnong the landlord class to the reality of losing their privileged position once British rule cornes to an erid: On the other, in the provinces where Muslims were in majority (Bengal, Punjab

- . . and Sindh)-it was a reaction to the unitary form of

· governn1ent that would jeopardise their dorninant po~ition after the· British departure. 1

There is an another view which says that when colonial masters doled out the benefits of offi.ce, M uslirns lagged behind in terms of education and en1ployn1ent. As a result, they feared associating thetnselves with the mainstream nationalism spearheaded by the Indian National Congress. The resultant isolation fomented separatist tendencies an1ongst Muslirns. 2

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Muslitn separatism is viewed as a product of gn1up rnobilization to defend its dwindling posi­tion. Musli1ns, as a result, wanted to tnove into their own d~stinct way. They tried to foi'ge inter­regional alliances which could satisfy them alone:~

The uneven economic develop1nent, itnperial interest aqd constraints of electoral politics widened the gl;llf between the comrnunities. Not withstanding the fact, within each cornmunity the divisions were quite wide and deep. This was con­cealed through highlighting the syrnbols of com­nlunal solidarity. Muslim separatisrn developed,

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1 'Ni. Mujeeb," The Partition of India in Retrospect", in CH Phillips and M.D Wain Wright "The Partition of India:Policies and Perspective : 1935-47" ( ·George Allen -Unwin Ltd, London, 1972).

2 W. W Hunter, Indian Musalmans,( DeihL l ndological Book house , Ed.3 , I 969).

<..

.\ Paul Brass ; Language Religion and Politics in North India; Muslirn Separatism and United Provinces, (Delhi, Vikas, I 974) ..

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as a resu It this a1tificial sense of "Islamic brother­hood'.~

The colonial rule had set into motion two par­allel forces; one of regionalism and other of par­ticularisnl. They were in the fonn of reiigion, eth­nic con11nunities; caste and kinship group. On the . top of this social diversity, British rule created· an over all administratiye system in India. It helped in ~:olidifying the in-group cohesion of different nationalities which crystallised into the demand for partition.5

.

When coercion could no tnore retnain the i nst rtunent of colonial pol icy,B ritish governtnent introduced quasi- parliamentary institution in order to extend the existing system of control. In the process ef constitutional reforms, there was politics of union, association and collaboration. This led to the growth of client- patron relation­ship between the Indians and the Raj. Its climax was gripped by s'uspicion and mistrust; Congre.ss against the British, Muslitn League against the Co1~gress.This culminated into partition of India.('·

I ' -----------------------------~ Moin Shakir; Jinnah and Muslim Separatist Movement, edited by Asghar Ali Engineer : The Role of Minorities in Freedom Struggle( Ajanta Publication 1968). =' Khalid Bin Sa:)'eed : Politics in Pakistan; The N antre and Direction of Change( Prager Publication, ·New York 1980) " A nil Seal :The Emergence of Indian Nationalism (Cambridge 1968). ·

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. A'nother view says that gradual devGlu-tion of power by the Briti~h government opened the way to struggle for office. It intensified the ri \·airy ~unong the groups competing. The poi-sot leu social relationship resulted into partition of the sub- continent. 7

B.R Tomilso~ thinks that the origin of the par­tition of lndia must be sou~ht in the events of . . '-'

1934-39 and not those between 1945-47. The elec-tions for provincial legislative assetnbly in 1936-37 was the real turning point. Since then, social and econotnic changes contributed in a big way to. the political mobilization in the country. British governn1ent thereafter found it difficult to main-'- . . ta in· its dotninant position in India. x

According to R. J Moore, British policy from I 0 17 to 1940 sought social stabil.ity by aligning the1nselves with the Muslitn,.landed tnagnates of the North India. Muslims were given con1munal distinctiveness in electoral arrangements and n1ajor share ofpdwer through communally divid­ed provinces. British· government encouraged the princes with similar promises to strengthen their sphere of control. However the devolution of po,v'er through the Act of 1919 and 1935 exacer­bated the dualities in the India political system. ·

7 EWR Lumby : Nationalistn, Conltnunalism and Partition : The British in India, Imperialism or Trusteeship( Liton Massachusetts, 196~). x B.R Totnlinson :The End of Raj :The Indian National Congress and the Raj: The Penultimate Phase ( London; MacMillan 1976).

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which led to the partition of India.') The British Government's self interest was eco­

nornic and strategic. It's policy progressed to the point of offering Indian National Congress inde­pendence ·under the influence of three broad . pre111ises. One-was the develop1nent of public opinion not only in Engla11d but also in America \vhich was apathetic to the continuance of the Raj. Second was the growth of Indian political consciousness and the third was the natural evolu­tion of i tnperiali~m itself. w

There is a significant study which suggest that Jcn1ocracy and imperialisn1 are incotnpatible to each other. The cotnmitment to devolution of po\ver in 1919 helped the British governn1ent n1aintain its· heg~mony thn)ugh constitutional n1anipulation. Rural areas were favoured. an alliance ~ith the Muslims of Punjab where they fon11ed the majority·was struck. The depressed classes were given the co~nmunal award. When even the combined support of these groups were insufficient then the princes were brought into the forefi·otH. The Government of India Act of 1935 gave the provinces more power.However further recession of British control was combated by an A 11-lndia Federation .which collapsed in 1939. After this~ when British Governtnent opened the

') R. 1 Moore : ~he Crisis of ~ndia's Unity , 1917-40 (Oxford University Press, Delhi~ 1974). '" H. V Hodson: The Great Divide (Autchison , · 1962).

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question of devolution of power ( in 1945) it hL'Catne victim of its own gatne. They were left \vith no option then to divide India.''

R.J Moore in another exposition says that India's independence after the war was resisted by the Linlithgow as Viceroy's political thinking could not go beyond Ind~anising the Executive C uu nci I with no real responsibi I ity for the admin­istration. He wanted to constitute a similar kind of central government like Britain but nursed the

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~unbition that British posture shall be anti-detnoc-r~ni c after· the war. t:! •

About the Cripps proposal, Moore says that its long tern1 plan was to bali1nce the forces of India's unity against those of division. However its short tenn provision gave incentive for opening the floodgate of partition. After the failure of the Cripps Mission the issue of transfer of power went into the background as there was a consensus bet ween Pri'me Minister Churchill, Viceroy Lin Iithgow, and Secretary of State L.S Atnery to seule down _for authoritarian rule. They· wanted to con11nit to some .vague assurances that would in1ply a constitutional schetne in order to attract India coll~borators. The British government's short tenn tactics fructified the idea of Pakistan. 1.' . .

11 David Page: Prelude to Partition ; The Indian Muslims and Imperial System of Control 1920- 3? ( New York, 1982). '2 R 1 Moore : The Crisis of India's Unity 1917-1045( Oxford University Press, Delhi). u R.J Moor.e : Churchill , Cripps and India 1939-45 ( Oxford University P_ress , Delhi 1979).

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The regional dynamics in the Muslim ·1najority and n1inority provinces suggest that the objective differences between the two co1nmunities were JH lt so n1arked to fu~l separatist tendencies. It. was cornpetition from the increasingly assertive Hindu revival is1n, imperial systen1 of control and the fear of the Muslim elite of the Ul!ited provinces to prutect their dominant position led to forge a dis­ti net identity of the Muslin1s. They 1nanipulated divisive historical and cultural sy1nbols which appealed to a large section of the community. This \Vas the 1naiH cause of distinct identity formation· an1ongst the Muslin1s. 14

. ,_.

Airing si1nilar view about the Musli1ns of the '-

united Provinces, Aparna Basu says that Muslin1s in UP were mo1:e advanced then their Hindu

counterpart in many aspects of life like education, c1nploynient and wealth. It is they who assertively warited to defe'nd their do!ninant position. This resulted in the growth of Musli1n separatism. 15

The situation in Muslin1 majority pr?vinces has its own story. In Punjab the colonial impact on the different communities and its distinct relation vis­a vis the British government led to the growth of the r'nove1nent for Pakistan.The squabbling within the local po~er potent and the political realign­n1et1t

~~ Francis Robinson : Separatis1n A1nong Muslin1s; The Politics of United Provinces Musli1ns 1870.,.1920~ Vikas, New Delhi 1975). '=' :'\:parna Basu :Growth of Education and Muslin1 Separatis1n 1919 - 1939 in B.R Nanda's Essays in Modern Indian ·History ( Delhi I ?80).

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of the elite led to the gro\vth of Muslim League's influence in Punjab. The regional power dynamics e\acerbated by the war tin1e difficulties transcend­ed the provincial politics above urban and rural i 111 crest. This resulted in the collapse of the inter­corntnunal alliances in Punjab. Thereafter the tri­utn ph of Mt,Islim League in the 1946 elections vi n­d i cated the case for Pakistan.)()

It was between 1938-42 that the Muslim League was able to strike ground in Sindh. The

'-' . '--

catalyst being the tnosque-temple issue called Manzilgah there. After this it was a contest

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between Sindhi nationalisn1 and the all- India poli-tiL·s of the Muslitn League. The s'ervices of the indigenous religious elite was effectively utilised by the Mus lim League to wean away support of the Sindh nationalist to lay claitn for Pakistan. 17

The period fro1n 1917 to the Government of India Act of I 935 created genuine hope for Bengali Muslims to come to power.Their prospects of becon1ing rulers ·of the state was kin­dled when the B'engali peasantry were enfran-. chi sed. Since, the interests of the peasants and the feudal lords ran counter to each other, the poJ.itics in the state got' polarised .. In a series of political son1ersaults Muslim League could hold sway

I<• David Gilmartin : Empire and Islam, ·Punjab and the Making of Pakistan ( Oxford University Press , Delhi 1989) Also see Ian Talbot : Punjab and the Raj 1849-1947( Manohar Publication, New Delhi I 088). . . 17 -Sara Ansari : Sufi Sain:ts and State Power : The Pii·s of S i ndh 1843-194 7 ( Cambridge 0 ni versity Press 1992 ).

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under the .Fazlul Haq ministry. It was between the pcri.od of 1937_- I 94 I' that they entrenched thetn­sclves in the province which was to have an i 111 portant bearing on the formation of Pakistan. 1x

' Whig "approach of historiography .extols the achieven1ents of British policy in India. It goes on to say that when faced with the prospect of total adrninistrative collapse, British decided to leave India. The r~sponsib\]ity \vas handed over then tl1r( n1gh hasty settlement. It was at a high price of bloodied and divided secession. Suspicion linger­ing that literally British washed their hands through cut and run from Indian. 1

!) .__.

Son1e ·historian ~ee British policy as short. tern1 self:... serving constitutionalistn. The Act of 1919 and 1935 as well as other'reforn1 process were not geared to bring some prede.tern1.ined end but to preserve the substance of the British rule in India. When ever Raj was threatened of withdrawal it struck new. ~olla.borative arrangement. Though India detnands were not accepted in totality but they were definitely accommodated to ensure

Is Shiela Sen: Muslim Politics in Bengal 1937-47 (New Delhi 1976 ) 1'1 Perci v~~l Spear : A History of India , Vol 2 also

SL'L~ .R J Moore :The Transfer of Power; An Historiographic Survey, S.outh Asia, ix. ( 1986) and Collection of Essays inCH Phillips and M D WainWright (eds) opcit l.

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~~ working relationship. :w

The Can1.bridge s~hool of historiography see th\~' subject as group of cotnpeting elite prepared to u lllaborate in return of iricreased opportunities of e\crcising patronage and power. Successive at ten1pts were made by the British government to . rnaintain the basis of their control through mea·ns

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of constitHtional dea.Is. There developed som~ kind of working relationship between nationalisrn and irnperialism in the Indian subcontinent. 21

The exponent of the orthodox. Indian school see cnrnn1unalism deriving considerable rnillage when British changed their policy to rule by consent rather than by c~llusion. The recognition of the l\11 uslin1 League as a counterpart or possibly as c< Hmterpoise to the India National Congress, installation of separate electorate, recognition of

20 See J A Gallagher, The Decline, Revival and Fall of British Ernpire, in A. Seal (eds) The Ford Lcc.tures. Lind Other .Essays( London 1982) P G Rob, The Governn1ent of India an Reform: Policies Towards Politics and Constitution, 1916-llJ27(London 1976), Carl Bridge, Hold!ng India to En1pire, The British Conservative Party and the 1935 Constitution ( New Delhi, 1986) .

21 The Catnbridge School is represented by J A Gallagher. q Johnsol! and Anil Seal. This cynical an:tlysis has been dubbed as "Animal Politics" by T. Raychaudhuri; The Hi'storical Journal, 22. 3 ( llJ79).

10

J i nnah after 1937 as the sqle spokesman are fre­quently cited as examples of divide and rule poli­cy of the British government. The expop.ents por­trav Pakistan as culmination of British-Musli1n

.I . . ')') Intngue.--The historiographer frotn Pakistan, view parti­

tion as an as~ertion o,f Muslim nationality unable to reconcile in the role of a religious minority due to fear cultural death and religious· apo~tasy. They go on to say that the two communities were two nations~ distinguishable ever since the time of Muslin1 invasion and separatable at the time of British departure fro.m India. 23

•

The issue of partition is diagnosed in terms of environn1ental tension, trends of synthesis and antithesis in various political, cul.tural and reli­gious fields by a Pakistani historian. It says in this subcontinent co-existed together two . civilizations, twQ ways of life which underwent n1utual attraction and repulsion. The colonial rule aggravated these tensions and each community

22 The orthodox. Indian opinion is represented by . R C Majutndar: History of Freedo1n Movement of India B.N. Pandey: The Break-up of British India, Bip~ln Chandra: Communalism in Modern India and B R N and~t:Essays in Modern Indian History. 23 I H Quereshi: The Muslim Community of Indo­Pak Subcontinent ( Renaissance Publisl;ling House, Delhi, Reprinted 1985).

1 l

then found it difficult to adjust itself no.t only to the ne\v ruling power but to its language, values and norn1s. The net result was n1utual cotnpetition · f< H. econotnic and political advancement under for­ei ~n rule.~~

The seeds of Muslim separatism is highlighted to be ~nherent in the socia'l economic changes set into n1otion by the British rule in. the nineteeilth century lndia.The great rebellion of 1857 was one answer to this , the more complex one was the events leading tq 1947.25

In India, the idea of Muslim nationalism start­ed with a relatively small group which reflected a c< )herent intellectual life.· The ideals of a cultural u11ited cotntnunity and of a socially consistent so~iety was· perc~i ved by this nucleus. In this ideal J\lluslitns were goaded by th~ir historical and cul­tural background. This laid the foundation of sepa­rate. nationalism whi'ch was more subjective than territorial, tnore psychological than political.u; :

Within Pakistani historiography there are some critical writings which suggest that the qemand for partition was an elusive concept because it preced­ed the designation and and demarcation of the

:!~ Aziz Ahmed: Studies in Islamic Culture in Ind.!. a( Clarendon Press, Oxford, I 964 ) .. :!:; S M Ikram:Muslim Civilization in India (Colun1bi~t Univ_ersity Press , 1965) 21

' K K Aziz: The Making of Pakistan; A study· in Nationalistn (Cheateu and Windus London, 1967).

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territory of Pakistan. It is probably the only exanl­plc of an instant 11ationalis1n created by the nlagic­\V~Ind of religion disregarding the tradition, geog­raphy local cust9111 and even the con11non colonial ho11dage. It was an elitist nationalistn whose fail­urL~ to con1ptomise with the popular nationalistn coilrpelled to take recourse to mass mobilization. The overwhelmin~ Muslin1 tnasses did ·not share

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any difTereiit ch?racteristic of race, language and . cui ture. The ideology of Pakistan was a product of political frustration of the Muslim elite. lt had no inte.llectual content and was just a tool of political expediency. 27

•

An alternative paradign1 suggests that partition w~c" a n1ovement in which diverse Mu~lim groups fron1 different regions, representing different social strata and interests allied in pursuit of a n1aterial objective. At the centre of this was a coalition of. Muslin} saloriat whose overriding interest lay in the creation of Pakistan.2x

Modern researches undennine the separatist ideology inherent in the tnarch of history. They try to highlight the subject as a n1ore r~cent phenotne-· non. The treatment of the theme is now being · done with· a view to see the interplay of Briti~h, Cot1gress and Muslim strategies during the last decade of the British rule 'in India.

l7 Salee1n M M Quereshi : Pakistan Nationalism Reconsidered( Pacific Affairs 1972) 2s 1-hHnza Alavi : Pakistan and lslan1 : Its Ethnicity and Ideology( Mainstrean1. 1987).

13

The first work in this direction suggest that the British and the Congress drove the Musli1ns on the

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question of sharing power to 1nake the de1nar~d for p~trtition of India. This den1and crystallised in the C ~ Hlgress ruled provinces ·from 193 7-39. All through the thirties, British gove~·n1nent gave tacit support to the Muslim league. This is borne by then Viceroy, Willingdon's eagerness to tilt the b~tlance in favour of the 1vluslims. British govern­Ill Lilt was pleased with the Muslim League's draft ot" Lahore Resolution as they wanted to use .I i 1111ah. as an effective barrier against the

'-

c 1()

( >ll gress.-'-

Another' view point supports the san1e I i11e of a r g utn e 11 t. B r i i i s h r u l e de I i berate I y b u il ~ u p Jinnah's prestige at an all India level for the war

/ p ll rv 0 s e s'. s e c ret aT y 0 f s tate L s A Iller y a n d Linlithgow de'cided after March 1940, that there

'- . .

shall be no return to the Act of 1935. At the beginning of 1942 Linlithgow could n?t find any e n.t h u s i as tn for P a kist a n a n1 o 11 g the M u s I i 111 League leaders. It was only after the assurances given through Cripps Mission that Muslim League strcngthen~d the popular base in its majority prov'inces.- Since then, the Muslim League consis­tently built the movement to lay clai1n for the eslablishtnent of Pakistan.-'0

:!'J Uma Kaura: Muslims and Indian Nationalis1n 1028-40( Manohar Publication New Delhi 1976) . .

-'0 .\nita l11der Sigh: Origins of the Partition of lnJia 1<)36-47( Oxford U1·1iversity Press. Delhi 1987)

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Ayesha Jalal argues that Lahore Resolution was a llcW strategy aaopted by the Musliln League to deny its permanent minority status and seek parity wirh the Congress.The v~gue wording was delib­er;ttely done so that some constitutional settlen1ent ctn be 1nade later on. Jinnah, the Muslim League's

~

soic~ spokesman ·acted as a rnediator between . provinces and the centre to win safeguards for M uslin1s i'n the centt'allegislature. His basic aim

'--

W~lS to unite the autonomous Muslim majority provinces under a federating centre and seek safe­guards for the Muslims in the minority provinces . J aJ al argues that Lahore Resolution shotdd not be

'--

accepted on the face value as it was only a bar-gaining point. 31

•

It has been argued that in order to understand l\!1 uslin1 League's demand for parity vis-vis the Congress one has to delve deep into Islan1ic ideol­ogy which ~aw political soci'eties as a mosaic of fixed representation in an evenly balanced politi- . cal assen1bly. The notion of League- Congress· parity actually emerged much 1nore vividly in the c< )LJrse of cons.titutional negotiations. It transcend­ed to. political parity between Muslim League and the Congress and then to cotnmunal parity between Muslims and the Hindus. It was further raised to an ideological parity between Muslin1s and the non- Muslims. 32

.\1 .\yesha Jal-al: The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah; rvl uslirn Leagu~ and the De1nand of Pakistan ( c~unbridge 1985) :I:! F'arzana Sheikh:Muslim Political, Representation in Colonial India: The Making of Pakistan,Moderrl · Asian Studies Vol.23 , 403, I 988

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There was a tacit understanding in United Pro~1 i nccs ( wh!ch ex'tended to other provinces) that a coalition tninistry should be formed with C ~ mgress and the Muslin1 Leabo-ue J. oining together.

~ ~ ~

\Vhcn the Congress won absolute tnajority in the c kctions of 1937, this understanding was ignored and the condition put forward was Muslitn League should tnerge its'elf with the Congress.Henceforth, C\ H1gress under Nehru, adopted an " in1perious altitude". It went beyond."contemptuous words" and Muslin1 Leagues offer was treated with dis­cbin. Nehru, in his correspondence with Jinnah, us..:d language which Jinnah described as" arrogant and 111 iIi tant". Even after the rebuttal by the Congress :Tinnah did· not n1ade den1and for parti­tion· of India. He appealed to Gandhi for the nationalist solution to the 'problem faced by the c< n.1ntry. Gandhi, to this ,"cried to God for he I p. "Henceforth, Jinnah braved himself to organ­isL· the"inherent power of the Muslitns." The next opportunity cam.e with the Liaquat-Desai pact. Pcrhapi~. the comn1unal in1passe might have been brnke.n if this was implemented in good faith. The repudiation by Bhulabhai Desai of any such pact put itn end t.o the hope of repairing the datnage d nne i n I 9 3 7. 33

•

A' tnonograph points out the lapses of the C(mgress .. Obsessed by a strong desire to impose nurh i ng short qf one' party rule, Congress reftised to acknowledge India's plurality. attetnpted to side track the communal probletn, rejected the act of

-'-' H.M Seervai :Partition of India; Legend and Reitlity ( Emene1n. Bombay 1989) . .

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I ll~~5 without atten1pting to delve into its merit,the n'l.usal to fo1·m coalition 1ninistry compounded the pr'. >hle1n. In tune with its_ overall behavior was the rejection of the proposal brought by Sir Stanford Cripps in 1942.The Quit India resolution was ill .i udged .These offered sufficient excuse for J i nt~ah · to tnustcr support for Pakistan. In the final count, C\mgress took several erroneous decisions which

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p~l vcd the way·for partition of India.-q The unsealing in 198g of thirty pages or so of

Ahul Kalam Azad's autobiography,"India Wins Frcedotn", has added a certain poignancy to the speculation that it was Congress rather than the !VI uslin1 League .which divided India.

·rhe present day research seems to have wide ned its horizon io include within its fold not on I y the study of popular attitude and actions but to ~tlso ques_tion the very concept of wh~lt consti­llill~ a "cotnn1unity" and a "nation." The etnphasis is now tnore on how actually the two has been· pcrcei ved. by the n1a~ses. J:-

·'-' 13.8 M ishra, The Unification and Division of India (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, I ~><)0). .

J:- Such studies are done by Sutjana Das: Conlinunal Riots in Bengal 1905-194 7 ( Oxford J<)71 ). Saundra 'B Vreitage: Collective Action in C( ltntnunity .and Public Arena; The Emergence of C o~rununalism in Northern India( Oxford, 1990). C~tyanender Pandey:The Construction of Cunltnunali·sm in Notth India(Oxford 1990). Ian 'Ldbot: Crowd iri the Pakistan Movetnent (Jout:nat· or Conltnonwealth History).

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The above review of literature throw sufficient I ight on the complex polit·ical equation of India's partition. Works by Hunter. Hod~on. Lun1by pro­vide a deep insight of the topic but in the light of the new sources. have now aged. The study by D~tvid Page covers the period till 1932, while that of B.R Totnilsori deals with the period 1934-39. R J fVloore's "End Games of an En1pire" and AK C:Jupta's "Myth and Reality; The Struggle For FrLedon1 of India". covers the last two years of B ri ti sh rule: U rna Kaura's book stops at 1940 but along with Ayesha Jalal and Anita Inder Singh'.s works. narrates the interplay of divergent political fon.:es at work.

Seervai and B. P Mishra's book head- long . '-

attacks Congress lapses on the partition of India. It fai Is to take cognizance of the fact that as a repre­selltative of Indian nationalism, Congre.ss had its

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own lin1itation to project its secular and national character.

Not all of the nutnerous work on the subject provide a fuil understanding of the historical dcveloptnent preceding the partition of India. .

Farzana Sheikh's contention that the. Muslim League saw political grouping as a tnosaic of fixed· representation disregards the importance ·of social and political (orces which determined ~he poli·tical aspirations among the Muslitns.

Paul Brass thesis fails to· highlight the inadequa­cies of the Muslim League's suc~ess in different social and econotnic conditions. Within the rvi uslinl tnajority provinces, the response to the

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dcrnand for Pakistan differed. There the nature of . provincial politics largely tnade it depend on the local fact<~rs. It had little in corn1non with the all-. . India strategy of the Musli1n League.

I t i s e q u a 11 y d i f f i c til t to e x p I a i n Franc i s Robinson's view that reli~.dous ideology was not

L ' c.....,..;_,

just the 1nanipulation of Islatnic symbols but a genuine influences of Musli1n leadership. He does not explain the existence and influence of the eli verge range of Muslim opinion on the process of identity formation. It suffers fro1n the i nadequa­cics that n1uch depended. on the nature of the colo­ni~d rule which shaped the socio-econo1nic condi­tion of the country. Pakistan's histography is, by and large, a cut and ·

paste art of writing history. In order to prove the asniration' of Muslin1 nationalisn1 as different·frotn

' . those of the Hi'ndu's, Paki~ta·n's historiographer propounds historical , cultural and civilizational eli vide. Howev~r, there are so1ne exceptions.

Ayesha Jalal's thesis is unable to resolve the atnbiguities displayed by Jinnah stand on Lahore Reso,lution.She ~ails it as a bargaining point, how-

. ever4 Jinnah made no effort to refute the idea that he did not imply a se'parate homeland for the M uslirn~. While there remains a considerable dis­agreeJnent whether Jinnah was ever fuliy cotnmit­ted to Pakistan or he was reluctantly forced to etnbrace it at the end , there has been no dispute that his advocacy of.the Musli1n cause not on_ly cotnplicated the' India Question', it also changed tt.

So far;. historical writings on the ~ubject have con­centrated on parleys of high politics and the

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factious struggle for power and political leverage by the top leadetship. The explanations put for­\vard are divide and rule policy pursued by British ~uv~:~rnn1ent- Congress inability to conciliate with '- . J in nah and the Muslitn League in the e.tnergi ng p( )\ver structure- historical roots of Muslim nation­alisrn- interplay·of various factors etc. But there is an increasing need tore- evaluate son1e of these prcn1ises and refute those stereotypes which have blocked our mental makeup.

This dissertation " The' Demand for Partition and British Policy : 1940-45 "confines itself to the study of political developn1ent in the background or World War II and stops at the failure of the Sitnla conferenc~. However, it was during this period that Muslim LL'ague transformed 'itself from ignominy to a for-1n1dable force in the Indian politics. The growth of .!VI uslin1 Le~gue's influence at the provincial level and the dichotomy of the all- India polirics is high-:­lighted in this dissertation. The cornposition of.

. ·. l\11 usliri1 pppulation all over India and the advan­tage they had qy virtue of their being in a majority was ,hot uniform in all the Muslim provinces. Regional grouping consequently appeared more advantageous to the provincial Muslim.elite. The !VI uslin1 League's ability to undermine the provin­cial parties and the process of the eventual break­clo\vn of cross c6tnmunal alliance in Punjab and Bengal acquires a special attention. Also, the role of 13ritish policy in the et:nergence and consolida­tion of Muslim League at provincial as .well as all­India level has acquired main .focus. Congress

20

attitude vis-a-vis the Muslim League has also ' ~

ht'e!l subjected to a very careful exatnination: Lastly. in the debate b~tween separatist or bar­

ga i ni st. l his dissertation vouches for the bargain-~ ~

i ng theory. It is because Pakistatl'detnaryd was very nebulous during the period of our study ( ll)40- 45 ), so it can not be castigated as a sepa­r~ttist clcn1and at·its outset. It is expected that the proposed st~dy shall.throw some fresh light ()n

<\'v' sul)ject of partition of India between 1940-45. '" {:j The thrust of this study is on party politics , ~ str~ttegies and counter strategies that were being J bui It up at the national and regional levels in V) Indian Politics. This dissertation avoids any con­r-L jcctural pFemises. It .is a backgrounder to the . \ \ '~ Cabinet Mission and Mountbatten plan, the penul­

- ti 1nate phase in the strugg1e for power in India. l The following pages discuss t.he Governtnent

or India Act of 1935 and lay focus on the British -=t_ proposal of an" All India Federation". It high­

lights, how Briti~h govermnent reluctantly strove to 1 nake the Federation W~)rk and after two years or gingerly activity, the idea of Federation was dropped. The· e-lection of 1937 and the resultant coalition controversy' and. Muslim grievances report are by no\v well- known. It was during 1937 -39 that the M uslin1 ~eague transformed itself into a force to be 1:eckon with. The following pages recapitulate the British, c·ongress a11d Musli tn strategy as a background to the Lahore Resolution of 1940.

L-

THESIS 954.0359

M8966 De

1111111111111111111111111 TH7582

. ~~

v, l{L{)l..\ rtJ45'~~4o

21 t-J6

The decentralization of the state structure and gradual devolution ·of power led to the dev.elop­n1etit of autonomous provinces within a federal structure in India. This einerging trend was given constitutional legitimacy by introducing provincial auton.otny through the promulgation of Govern1nent of India Act of 1935. 36

The democratisation of Indian politics brought a decisive change in the struggle for power. Muslims became aware of their position under the ne\V fratnework initiated by the Government of India Ace 9f 1919 and 1935. The steady devolu­tion of power catne to weigh overwhelmingly against the Indian Muslims. It is precisely because of this, the Government of India Act, of 1935 is taken as the focal point to· the emergence of the dernand for India's partiti~)n. 37

J(, For the above exposition see David Page Prelude to Partition ; The Indian Muslims and the . Itnperial. System of ControL 1920-32, New Delhi, 1982, PP '32. Also see, Anil Seal: Emergence of Indian Nationalism, Competition and Collaboration in the Late Nineteenth Century; Catnbridge ·1968, PP 268. 37 RJ Moore's premise in Crisis of India's Unity is partition was as a result of politics from 1917-40. Utna Kaura in Muslim and Indian Nationalism; The En1ergence of Demand of India's Partition presutnes partition as politics between 1928-30. Anita lnder Singh in The Origins of Partition of India begins her argument since 1935. ·

22

After the deliberations at the three Round Table . . Conferences held in Britain, the Government of India Act of I 935 was prepared by a select cotn-111 i ttee. The whole docutnent consisted of four thousand pages. ·It laid etnphasis on the nature of provincial autonotny and the character of all- India centre. The British government reserved th~ cen­u·al· power. while provinces were given the right of self government through widening of the elec­torate:'x

By the Act of I 935, the objective of the British governn1ent was to keep firm grip over India through inter- ~onnected system of government control. British policy as seen by Linlithgow," was to keep a long view· to hold India to the en1pire, nut to expedite constitutional changes or hurry to hand over control to the Indians. As a chainnan of the joint parlia~entary cotnn1ittee, Linlithgow described the Act of 1935 as· the best way of tnain~ taining British influences in India." -'9

The Act of I 935 ·made provisions for the estab­lishtnent of responsible government in th~ eleven provinces of the British India. It n1ade provis'ion s for the creation of a Federation of India, compris­ing both the British provinces and the princely states. The federal provisions of the Act was to operate on all subjects except foreig£1 affairs and

. . Jx The Government of India Act of 1935, Schedule I. See Appendix of Gowher Rizvi's: _Linlithgow a n d I n d i a ; . A . study of B r i t i s h p o I icy an d t h .e Political ltnpasse in India 1936-43, London 197g_ .w Linlithgow to Zetland, 21 st December, 1937, Linlithgow Papers. Nehru Men1orial Liqrary, Micro- Fihn. New Delhi.

23

de fence. Howe'ver this w~1s subject to ratification b y t h e P r i n c e I y s tate s a n d t h e M u s I i rn s of lndia.The representatives of British ln9ia were to be elected while that of the Princely states were to be nominated by the rulers. The Princely states had 40 per cent representation in the Upper House and 33.3 p~r cent .in the Lower House. The iVIuslin1 representatives were to be chosen by the iVI uslin1 members of the provincial legi~lature:~~~

The Act. of 1935 elevated Sindh and the North West Frontier·to the status of full fledged provinces. The Muslim position in the Punjab· and Bengal was protected by the separate electorqte. In Punjab 53 peF cent of the Muslirn majority had secured 50 per cent of the seats, while in Bengal 56 per cent of Muslims got 52 per cent seats. On t h e o t h e r hand , M u s I i rn s i n t h e i r rn i n or i t y provinces received weightages. As a whole Muslim predotn~nance in their rnajority provinces was en1phasised, while in provinces where they vvt~re in 1ninority, they got i1nportance according to their ntunber. Another redeen1ing feature of the . . ~

Act was, for the first time electorates were extend-. '

ed t9 36 rriillio,n (as con1pared to 7 rnillion in 1920) representing 50 per cent the adult popula~ tion of India. 41

The .1935 Act crearly spelled British determi­nation to hold 'India with\n the imperial system of control. Though it was con1mitted to provincial

-'" See the schedule 1 of the Governrnent of India Act of 1935. -'' See Report of the Indian Franchise Committee, 1932 Calcutta, PP 3~.

24

autonotny and the creation of all-India Federation. there \vas no mention of do1ninion status in the Act.

The various provjsions of the Act were serious­ly c'riticised both by the Congress and the Muslitn League. As a nationalist: Mohammad Ali Jinnah protested against the Act and said "Indian's have ju"t two per cent say in the formation of the provincial or Central government while Viceroy through the Goyernors control held 98 per cent control over the atfairs of the· government. Jinnah warned, since the voice of the Indian's would osci I late between the province and the centre it is I i kely to be stifled by the British governtnent." On the other hand, Congress also demanded the annuhnent of the Act of 1935.

fn March 1936, the conservative government . .

appointed Lor~ Linfithgow ·as the new Vicei'oy of InJia. Since then it was left to hitn to take initia­tive in effecting the constitutional changes under the Act of 1935.42

Linlithgow after assu1ning office toyed with the idea of forming an all- India Federation com­prisi'ng British I·ndian Do1ninion and the princely states. The F.ederal Legislative council was to con­si~t of 156 representatives fro1n the British India and I 09 from the princeiy states. The council was suppose to ·have 75 general seats, 6 seats for the schedule caste, 4 seats for the Sikhs. 6 for the

-t:! Rizvi Gowher: Linlithgow and India~ A Stqdy of B r i t i s h Po I icy and poI i t i c a I I tn passe i n I n d i a,

· London l978.pp26-28 25

w n 111 en and 2 9 for the Mus I i rn s. Arnon g the .._

M uslin1 tnajority provinces there were seven seats for BengaL Punjab had 14 ,North West Provinces -L while Sindh had 3 and Blauchistan one.'B Linlithgow recognised the complexities of the

Indian situation and thought that the first step to\vards the working of Federation could be taken only when half 9f the princely states, the Muslitn tna.iority provinces and the Indian Dorninion .vol­unteered ~o accede. He wanted the princely states and. the Indian provinces to federate on their own tenns. While the Indian Dominions were automat­ically would join the Federation, each of the pri neely states were to negotiate their o:wn tenns. "'"'

It was not an easy task for the new Viceroy to wield the heterogeneity of India into the proposed all- India F.ederati.on. B.y the end of 193X, l\!luslin1 League's executive body could discern the itnplications of the Congress catnpaign against the pnnce's notnination'of the candidates. It was detri­nH:~ntal to the Muslims position in all - lndia fratnework. If the candidates were to be electe'd in the princely states than it was apparent that rvi uslirns would not get the support in the central legislature which they i·equired to balance the Congress votes. In such case the. the federal legis­lature would be dominated by the Congress and

-'·' The Governll)ent of India Act, 1935, Schedule I in Gowher Rizvi 's Linlithgow and India. opcit 38. -H S R Ashton : British Policy Towards lndian Slates 190~-1939, Select Book Series Syndicate , New Delhi 1981, PP 168-69.

26

l\·1 us I i n1s .would be in pern1anent n1inority. Hence, .lillt)ah openly denounced the idea of the· all -India Federation as detr.itnental to the Muslin1s in t crest. 4;;

l il the Patna session of the Muslitn League in . . ~

J<:J_~X , Jinnah said "once Congress is sure of their '--'

tna.iority. they would tumble into the Federation as th~_'y had tumbled into the wrecking of the present (: u 11 s t i t u t ion. " He showed hi s resent tn en t and . . expected neither fair play or justice frotn the C\ >ngress. Jinnah advoca.ted for the total abandon-

L ,

lllL'Ilt or the mooted federation as he felt was bound to crack under the stress of cotnpetitive pol~ iIi L~S. 4

('

Viceroy Linlithgow, however felt that n1.aking the ·Federation a viable proposition is in the best interest of the country. He held the view that pro­Ill ul gation of the Federation would lead to eco-

~ '

notnic unity, while constitutional relationship bet ween the princely states and the British admin­istered.province.s would lead to political unity of the country. Linlithgow announced that British poI icy towards constitutional advancement and es[ablishnlent of Federation remains unchanged.47

~

However, Muslitn League from 1938 began to . L ~

dcrnand frc)m the British. a constitutional review de-novo. J innah elaborated that" the events of the

4;; .l~.tn1iluddin Ahn1ea : Speech of Jinnah, Lahore, I '-J60 vo I I; pp. 29 -45.

41' Ibid.

47 t )pcit 42 pp 56- 62

27

past two years had established a permanent doini­n~tlion of Hindu~ over the Muslims. Not only their I i L: property, and hop our were in danger but even thc~ir reli~ious ri2:hts and culture were assailed

'- '--

l'\'Cry day under Congress ruled provinces." He altacked the Congress that it neither represented the upper class or lower class Muslin1s and was nul a national party but only representative of upper caste Hindus.~};

.I i 1inah opened up negotiation with Mahatma Gandhi but latter went i'nto a saintly trance and cried toi'God to show him the divine light to see in d~trkness". In his negotiation with Nehru, Jinnah realised that the latter was entirely divorced frotn the realities whi~h faced India.~·J He was distnayed as 110 Congress leader wanted to talk to him.

It was at this nloment, Jinnah contradicted Nl~hru's contention that ·there existed two forces; Congress and British, and the rest had to line up. () n the contrary, he pronounced that there were four forces; British, Hindus, Muslims and. the Princes in India. 5"

~x ()r1 September 1939 the working committee of the AIML passed the resolution for the constitu­tional review; Jinnah since then· started his tirade against the Congress .Indian Annual Register, Vol ? . 1939, pp 35-36. ~·J Jinnah to Ne·hru , April 1938. Nehru Papers, _N ~~h ru Memorial Museu tn and Library, Micro Fi ln1 , New Delhi. · ='"! ndian Annual Register. Vol 2 , 1939~ opcit 48.

28

0

In ~03X. Jinnah told Kanji Dwarka Das that cl)llgress leaders had very poor understanding about the political forces at work, by alienating the l\1 uslitns they were doing tnore harn1 than any ser­vice to the country. 51

Jinnah. then turned to the British and met the act1ng Viceroy Lord Brabourne to strike a deal. He propsed that Muslim League would support the British ~It the centre, if, in turn. the British accept­ed the League as the only representative organisa­tion of the Muslin1s. According to Lord Brabourne "J in nah ended Lt p with the suggestion that. we (British) should keep the centre as it is and 1nake fri_c_nds w'ith the Muslitns by protecting them in Congress rul"ed provin.ces. If this was clone, rv1uslin1s would protect the British at the centre.52

Later . .Jinnah told the Viceroy Lord ~inlithgow . thal Musli1ns rights and interest could not be safe­~uarcled in a truly federal sche1ne. The British ~ . :governinent therefore should ensure an adequate, equipoise between Hindu and Muslin1 votes to n1aintain baiance between the two cotnmunities. The. Viceroy asked him how he wanted to go by~ Jinn'ah for this had in mind tnanipulati.on of votes and territorial adjustments. The Viceroy then asked Jinnah whether this equipoise could be rnaintained if the ~ritish had left India; to. this, .J i nnah answered that it might be very difficult. He

51 Kanji Ow ark a Das:Ten Years to Freedon1 , Poj)Ular Prakasan, Bombay , 1968. pp 1·09-1 I 0.

_52 Lord Brabourne to Zetland in John L Dundos (ed) Essays, Th~ Metnories of Ian . 1965 pp 140.

29

asked the Viceroy to strengthen his hand as he w;mted son1ething positive to take back to his foi­l< )wcrs . pn)bably a cotnplcte reshaping of the con­stitution. Linlithuow showed his resentrnent and

~ . said "at this stage you want me to tell the British P; 1 r I i a 111 e i1 t to u n do a II those a c h i eve rn e n t for \vhich we had been strivir~g all these years.Further, Linlithi!OW asked Jinnah "if he wanted to turn the .__

Congress rninistries out", "yes,· turn them out at once. nothing else will bring to their senses, their object though you tnay not believe~ is nothing else then to destroy both you(British) and us (l'vluslirns). They will never stand by you. he said"~ Lin Iithgow 'gathered the itnpression that he had upset J i nnah who planned to offer cooperation of the Muslitn. League in return of the abandontnent o t' the federal schetne. 53

British policy at this stage.however was con1tnit­tcd to the establishrnent of the Federation. The

0

Secretary of State, Zetland wrote to the Viceroy that as far as the Muslin1s were concerned " we should stand aside and tell then1. that they can get full justice from His Majesty's Government, but the fact rernains that they can only get concessions fn)n1 Hindus who alone in future were to deliver

d II -I

£!< )() s. :-.. <..-

---------------~-----------

::; ·' N o t e of an i n t e r vi e.w bet wee n J i n n a h a n d Linlithgow, October 5 1939, Linlithgow Papers, N~hru Meinorial Library. Micro Filn1. New Delhi. ·

::;-1 Zetland to Lin I i thgow,N overnber 22, I 939 , · Zet.land 'Papers· Nehru Memorial Museun~ and

Library, Micro Film, Ne~ Delhi. 30

ZL'tland's i1npression was Jinnah's intrigues were tncrely a window dressing, a tactical 1nove to keep hold on the tnilitant section of the Musli1n League. ZL·tland felt that Jinnah's den1and for a federal gu vernn1ent ·with the largest possible n1easure of autono1ny for the federating units was contrary to thL' British policy. Zetland believed that no solu­ti (IJl to the· cotnJnunal prob len1 was possible ti II discussion atnongst Indians themselves takes p.lace and son1e agreen1ent reached. He was of the opin­ion.that l1idia's freedom must be based on the· prin­ciple of demo'cracy and .unity. Britain should be prepared to accept the responsibility of fanning a constitution making body. 33

.

Zctland , in a letter to Linlithgow, elaborated that Britain should call upon the.1najor parties in India to agree to the cornposition to an all-India body that would draft the constitution that should be . . prurnulgated after the war. Zetland proposed that· he would. extract from Jinnah rninimun1 tenns of accon1n1odation for the Muslin1s and then appeal to Ciandhi to agree on then1. There upon he would call 'a dozen or so Indian leaders to agree for s·afe­guards of the min9rities and expansion (?f the Viceroy's executive counci I. He would then announce the protnulgation of the Federation and ~rant India the do1ninion status before the conclu-~ '

s i o n of the war. 5('

33 Zetland to Lin Iithgow~ Novernber 26 I 939, Zetlancl Collections , Nehru Metnorial Museu1n and Library; Micro Film , New Delhi. 5

(' I bid , November 29 1939. 31

The Vi~eroy Linlithgow had no 'doubt that i\tluslin1s were becoming uneasy at what Jinnah described as "Hindu arrogance". He was 1nore·and

'-

lllOre apprehensive of the fate of the Ininorities as large as of 90 million people. According to the Viceroy, the grievances of the Muslims were not essentially religious though it assun1es communal colour due to the fact a cotninunity was in opposi­tion. Li nlithgow felt that it would have ceased to exist if the power sharing was was done with the l\1uslin1 LeagueYn 1937. Though investigation had not borne out to be true, the Viceroy felt that there w:h sotne justification .in Jinnah's allegation of un r a i r treatment to the Mus I i In s i n. part i c u I a r Cnngress governed provinces. 57

'- '-'

Linlithgow viewed Musliin apprehension to. the proposed Federation as they saw future course of Indian pdlitics as t:Inending con1n1unal contest. However, he was convinced that Muslin1s can not sabotage the Federation u'n less they dissuaded suf­ficient nun1ber of princely states fr.om acceding. The Viceroy wa·s nevertheless convinced that an all-India- federation was the only practical line of constitutional advancement in India. 5x

However, as the time progressed there was lit­tle doubt 'that M'usliins would accept the F l:' d e r a t i o n as i m p o ·sed u p o n t h e In . E v e n Sadrudddin.Agha Khan who was active during the

57 Lin Iithgow to Zetland Decen1ber· 4,1939 , .._

Linlithgow Papers, .Nehru Men1orial Museutn and Library, Micro. Fil1n, New Delhi. · sx I bid , December 16, 1939.

32

round table conferences and supported the federal proposaL reported to Linlithgow that. "the sugar h~td con1e out of the pill~ if candidates fron1 the pri neely states were to be elected rather than non1-in:tted hv the nilers, then Muslims would not get

~ ~

tlh~ support. which .they require to balance the C\ HlUress votes in the central legislature."59

~ • L

The growing probability of a Congress dotninated centre ~enerated a corn.~sponding increase in

~ L

l\!1 usl in1 opposition to the all- India Federatiot~. A private letter by the Viceroy Lin I ithgow suggest that " I u~uld not pGssibly realise how greatly the gulf between Hindus and Muslin1s had widened <-

si nee I 93 7. It is since tlicn any cotnmon action, based on the government of India Act of 1935 was essentially undermined." (,u ·

Meeting Jinnah, Linlithgow assured that he would not support any scheme that would produce H i n d u 111 aj o ri t y i n the centra I s t r u c t u r e. A I so, Viceroy's tn'eeting with Sikandar Hayat Khan of Punjab convinced him that Congress n1ajority at the centre would restrict the British c·ontrol over defence and external affairs. 61

After the outbreak of the War, Linlithgow was not very keeo about the idea of the Federation. He thought that a~ceptance of the Congress de'mand

'would involve a very substantial break with their

5" Linlithgow to Zetland February, 4, 1940, Linlithgow Papers,Nehru Memorial Museun1 and Library, Micro Filtn, New Delhi. r.u I bid , February, 14 , 1940. 1" I bid_, February, 16,. 1940

33

' .

acL·c·ptcd policy affect.ing the princes and the ~/luslin1 1ninority who look at His. Majesty's Covernn1cnt for the protection of their legi ti n1ate illlcrest.Though for two years Linlithgow had striven hard to n1ake the Federation work, but war tin1e exi~encies and conviction about its failure, ..._

It' d · to h i 111 t a s u spend e d i t -on S e pte m be r I I , It) 39. (, 2

After the suspension of the federal schen1e, the w () r k i n e com m i tt e e of t he a II- I n d ·i a M u s I i tn ..._

League showed its appreciation by passing a reso­lution. It urged. that, His Majesty's Governtnent shnuld revise the entire problen1 of India's future constitution· in the light of the developtnent that h~ts taken place since 1935. The cotnmittee asked fur an <tssurance that no declaration re.garding the constitutional advance of India should be tnade without the consent of the All- India Mu~litn LA·ague. 11 pleaded ~hat His_ Majesty Governtnent n1u~t create ~sense of security amongst the Wluslitns and take the consent of All India Muslin1 LL·ague which is the sole representative of Muslitn

· 111.d i a.(,_,

Fron1 now onwards, the whole thrust of the M uslin1 Leagues campaign was to deny Congress claim to speak on behalf of the Muslims of India. Ji11nah expressed wit.h conviction that," I have got as 1nuch right to share th~ government as any

~.~ \Var Cabinet : India and the War . Secret War Papers. Memora·nuum by the Secretary of St~te ~

Scp- Dec 1939. (,_\ /\ pp Resolution pas sed by the Working C u tllln it tee of the All Indian Mus I i n1 League ._

September, 18, 1939.

34

Hindu and I must have an equal and effective sh~tre in power." 6~

J i nnah launched a n1assi ve propaganda ccun­p~lign against the Congress in order to seek the unity of the'divided'Muslinl house. 65 Judging the sw IIH! of the Muslim n1asses into the Leagues

~ ~

cllnp and the enhancen1ent of its standing in the ai i- India framework, Congress was cornpelled to

open up negotiation with the M usl i 111 League.(,(, J i nnah now put for~ard the condition to recognise !Vlu~lirn Leagu.e as the only authoritative orgitnisa­tion of the Muslirns. 67 He held discussions with N d11Tr between October 16 -18 in 1939. [t was obvious that the real difference· between the two k~tders lay towards their perception of British rule and the cornmunal problen1 facing India.~t~\

(,.j Jarniludin. Ahrned.: Speeches of Mohn1mad Ali Ji1111ah. Vol2, Lahore 1960. 1'5 Since the victory at Bundalekhand by -elections in 1937. Muslitn Leagues. Carnpaign started on these lines. · (,(, Exchange of correspondence between Jinnah and Bubh~ts Chandra Bose 1937-39 Qui d-e- Azan1 P~tp.ers ~ India Office Library, London. 1'7 A spate of corresponde-nce with Jinnah started , Nehru , Bose and Prasad addressed hitn in concil­iatory tone; Qu.id-e- Azatn Papers f939~ India ()llice Library , London (,x Nehru-Jinnah talks November 1939 ~ AICC, File i'\,, 104. Nehru Metnorial and Library, Micro Fi l1n , New Delhi.

35

. I

;\l.IL'r this .. Jinnah told the Viceroy that he had Lti led to 1nove the young Congress leader. c.•) Later in <)ctoher 1939. Jinnah saw Gandhi and told 'hin1 "as long as Congre~s was not prepared to '~ccept l\luslin1 League as the only authentic organisation o( 1 he 1\11 uslims, any settle1nent of co1nmunal issue w:~s unlikely. He said that Musl.i1n League would lh il endorse the Congress Je1nand for the declara­tion of Britain's war ain1s till the solution of the cornn1unal probl,en1 was reached. 711

J i nnah. then turned to the Viceroy and offered slipport for the War effort if Muslim Leagues lead~ cr .... \\'er~ taken into confidence~ He wanted an assurance that no declaration on constitutional ~ltl \·ance1nent should be n1ade without the consent or the all- India Muslim League. 7

'

The C~)ngress Working Comtnittee (CWC). on Sl·p.teJnber 14, 1939'demanded fro1n Britain decla­r(tt ion or the war aitns ~ith regard to detnocracy ~tnd irnperialism. The CWC sought the right of lnd ians to frame the constitution through a con-. . ~

stituent assembly and participate in the war efforts through representatives in the Viceroy's executive council . 72

---------------------------' . . c,•) Note of conversation between Jinnah and Li 1llithgow January 13, l940. Linlithgow Papers. 711 .J i nna h - .Gandhi correspondence; Nove 111 ber Jl)39. Quaid-e -Azatn Pap~rs. India Office Library L( 111don. · 71 Note of conversation between Linlithgow and .._ . .I i 1111ah. J anuary2, 1940, Li nli thgow Papers. 72 Congress and the War Crisis, AICC Files I 04 & . '-

S.Nehru Memorial Museutn and Library,Micro Fi l1n~ New Delhi.

36

The Viceroy Linlithgow issued a statement that dorninion status would be given after the war and Britain would tnodify the Act of 1935 giving full weight to the opinion and interest of the minori"'" ties. 73 This proposal was rejected by the Congress and it caHed upon the resignation of its prov.incial 111 i rii stries.

Decetnber 22, 1939 , the day of the resignation of the Congress tninistdes was. observed by the Mus I i 111 League as 'Deliverance Day' from the tyranny and oppression of the Congress ruler. In Muslim tninority provinces the day was celebrated like festival, special prayers were offered, sweets were distributed, ·houses were illuminated.

-However, it went off on a low key in Muslitn 111'-~iority provinces where tnany educated Muslims thought it to be qnother political stunt. On that day even the schedule caste and the Parses rejoiced with the ]\luslim League.7

"'

By. now, Jinn.ah stopped characterising Muslims as a minority and advoc.ated that Hinduism and Islam represented two civilization, distinct from one ·another in origin tradition and manner of life as were various nations of Europe.75 Jinnah said

7.' Speeches and· Statements of Linlithgow 1936-43. Linlithgow Papet:s. 7"' 'This description on deliverance day is found in NWFP Governer Cunnightn's Diary, dated Decetnber 1·939 at India Otfice Library, London. 75 Jamiluddin Ahmed : Speeches and Writings of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Lahore 1960, pp95. ·

37

M uslin1s had always occupied a special position in the history and now it aspires for an honourable place in the national life, governn1ent .and admin­istration in future India. He rebuked the inlposi­tion of the provincial constitution b~sed on so called parliamentary system of governtnent and said, the experience of the past two years had . . established beyond doubt that it had resulted in the corntnunal majority of the Hindus where Muslin1s econotn ic,. cultural and economic rights were being tran1pled."?6

J i nnah. at this' motnent, did not insist on the patti­tion of India and wanted that a constitution must . be evolved which recognises the existence of two nations. both must share· the governance of their con1mon tnotherland. In evolving such a constitu­tion, Jinnah said that Muslim League was ready to cooperate with the British, the Congress or any other party for the cession of the present enmities and would strive for India to take its rightful place atnongst the·great countries of the world. 77

Till January, 1940, Jinnah was committed to be an Indian nationalist and extolled India as a cotn-111 on n1 o t h' e rIa n d of both M u s I i m s and the Hindus.7x

7(' J ~~miuludin Ah1ned :Speeches and Writing of

Mohan11nad Ali Jinnah , L:ahore 1960 pp 95-96. 77 App Resolution passed by the All India Muslitn League Working Committee, 15~ 17 January 1940. 7s Tin1es and Tide, London. published an article on

January 19 , 1940 , quoting Jinnah to be a nation­ali:·

38

The contradiction in Jinnah's staten1ent was obvi­ou:-- as he was not sure of his ground. It was not

'-

only difficult but i1npossible to wield the whole range of Muslii11s diversity under one ban.ner. Therefore to rally around the Musli1n heterogene­ity. Jinnah harped on two nation theory, which thnLigh. not synonytn with partition had an electri­fying appeal amongst the 'Muslitn In asses.

Den1anding frotn the British government, a res­olution of the all India Muslin1 Leagt1e said that

'-'

during the war if the central and the provincial govern1nents were reconstituted, Muslitn League n1ust seek half of the seats or even 1nore if the Congress was not cooperating. Any British state­lnent about India's con~titutional future should seek prior ~onsultation of the Muslim League and dcrnanded the right to veto any scheme. Further it added that, Jinnah alone would negotiate with the ._.

Congress .and the British. The resolution said that without the c.onserit of th.e Muslim League no Muslin1 n1ember would serve the war cotnmittee. 7

"

In an interview with the Viceroy Linlithgow, Jinnah enutnerated the tenns for· an understanding with the Congress. "Congress to withdraw all opposition to the communal award,Muslim repre..., sentation in the' local bodies to be based on the principles of comtnunal award; separate electorate

· on population strength tq be retained; share of

7') Note of talk between Linlithgow and Jinnah .

January 13-16 1940, Enclosure 2, Linlithgow Papers, Nehru Memorial Museutn and Library Micro Fi I tn , New Delhi.

39

JVI uslin1s in the services, elected bodies and cabi­net to he fixed by a statue; no rneasure to be forced, if two third of the Muslin1 rnember of the a s s e rn b I y o b j e c ted ; M u s I i rn tn a j or i t i e s i n t h e pruvi nces should not be disturbed by any territori­al readjust·ment. oomplete autonorny to the provinces. a weak centre for n1inimum cornmon purposes, Muslim personal law and culture should bl' guaranteed by a statutory provision,Congress fLtg should not 'be flown on public places;lJrdti should be tnade as the national language of India; Van.de -M'atram to be abandoned; Congress should st~>p wrecking· Muslim L:eague and fonnation of coalition rninistries in the provinces." Jinnah insisted that any agreetnent w·ith the Congress should be based on the clear understanding of the history and position of the Muslirn lndia.xo On 25th February, 1.940, Jinnah publically proclaimed th~tt any future constitutional settlernent should rcl:ognise Muslim League to be the only authorita­tive organisation of the Muslims.x'·

L.

After the. outbreak of the war. British objective \V~ts to placate Indian parties· to .tnuster support for. the war effort. Son1ehow, Linlithgow, by now was

----~---------~---------------------------

xu .J innah enumerated the App Resolution passed by the working Committee of the All India Muslirn LLague on Septernber 1939 to the Viceroy in .January 1940. XI.) an1iluddin Ahmed Speeches of Mohtnmad Ali J i 11 nah Lahore, 1960; pp 123

40

convinced that in any sche1ne of India, full weight should be given to the minorities.1c! Since Cong'ress

~ ~

showed its intransigence, Linlithgow tried to. raise tlh~ -status of the Muslim League as counterpoise to the Congress. The Viceroy invited Gandhi, J innah, and the president of the chamqer of princes for consultation and to seek their cooperation in the war effort. Linlithgow's decision confirmed the basic contention of Jinnah that there were four . parties in India and not two as claitned by Nehru in 1937. In his letter to the Secretary of State, Zetland ,

Li nlithgow said; "we may have to go a good deal further tha11 we have done before in giving full . "- (.._...' . weight to the minorities not only due to their .size but also d.ue to the deep cultural division and reli­gio~Js differences". The Viceroy elaborated tlrat the is~uc raised by Jinnah were fundmnental and "we shall have to be extremely careful with its deal­ings."He was impressed by the tena.city of the l\!1 us I i n1s determination, and wished they had an e ff i c i en t public i t y organ i sat i9 n as that of the Congress.x3

L i n I i t h go w be l.i eve d that as Ion g as the Congress failed to strike a compromise with the Muslin1s, it was i1nposslble to meet their demand for self- government. In his speech on January I 0,1940, Linlithgow reasserted Britain's intention ·

s2 British· War Aitn.s : Anexure A , Telegr~phic Su111n1ary of the War Cabinet Meeting ,Linlithgow P~lpers , Nehru Memorial ·Museum and Library. xJ Linlithgow to Zetland, January 20, 1940, Lin Iithgow Papers, Nehru Memorial Museun1 and Library , Micro Fi lin , New Delhi.

41

to introduce don1inion status; pron1ised to expand the executive council with Hindus and Muslitns as ih tnen1bers.and introduction of a federal constitu­tic'n provided princely states agreed to abide.The ViLeroy's presumption was "the Jnain difficulty in considering constitutional progress was finding shoulders broad ·enough to carry the burden when British were to rei i nquish power." x-t ·

The cons tit uti on a 1 q u est ion now put ~l s ide, Linlithgow ad1nitted that "had Jinnah supported the Congress and jointl'y confronted,the strain upon His Majesty's Government. would have been gr~..~at indeed. By standing against the Congress clain1 to represent whole of India, Jinnah had given hin1 the vqluable help, he added. Therefore I tnay clain1 to have vested interest in his position." When Lond6n policy makers directed the Viceroy to rt~ach an accord with the Indians, Linlithgow

. <-

argued that "so long Congress failed to tneet J\!luslitn's demand it was a tnistake to try 'swap~

: ping horses' or do anything which 1night loose us M u sl i 111 s~tpport. ''xs

In a I e tte r to. the Secretary of State Ze rl and, Linlithgow said that " Britain should refrain frorn action,- stop running after the Congress and wait upon the events".x6 As Congress threatened for launching a civil disobedience 1novement in case

x-t Linlithgow to Zetland on January 28, 1940 , Litllithgow Papers, Nehru Men1orial Museun1 and Li brary.M icro Film New. Delhi. xs Linlithgow Speeches and Staternents 1936-43, Lin Iithgow ·Papers, Nehru Men1orial Museun1 and

· Library , Micro Film, New Delhi. xt. Linlithgow to Zetland,January 30, l940,opcit' 84.

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their den~and for CQmplete independence w~~s not llll't. Linlithgow encouraged Jinnah to con1e out with so1ne positive schen1e. He told him it was ust~ less to seek the support of His Majesty's Cnvern1nent for a party whose policies carries sheer ne~ative connotations.xx Even before the

<--·

outbreak of the ~ar~ Secretary of State, Zetland in Jlr\9 had given the same advice to the UP leaders ......

l<ilaliquzatnan and·Abdur Reh1nan Siddiqui at L~ 111don. x•>

The Musli1n League, by now, had been consider­ing to ev()lve son1e alternative strategy indepen­dently. However~ it deliberately avoided associat~ ing itself whh the numerous schen1es being floated sinc;e one and half years in the country. ·Now Li nl i thgow's prodding a.fter the outbreak of the war. necessitated the spelling of Muslin1s aspira­tions. These events had pron1i sed t~1e Mus I i n1 LL·ague to adopt the famous Lahore Resolution on 22 nd March 1940. Discussion Thl_~ Govern.ment of. India Act of I 935 protnised inLroduction of provincial autonomy before the creation of the Federation of Indian states. As a result, when elections were held in I 937, Congress

<-

was able to form tninistries in eight out of eleven British India provinces of which in five its nlajori­ty was absolute. -----------------~-----------

ss f\ ote of an interview between Linlithgow and .Jinnah February, 6, 1940, Lit.11ithgow Papers, Nehru Memorial Museun1 and Library , Micro Filtn, New Delhi. "" Khaliquzarria~: Pathway to Pakistan mentions about the event pp 205-6

11'1

()11 the conti:ary it was the regional parties and not tht' Muslirn League th~lt gained upper hand in Pun.iab. Bengal and Sindh. BL·fore the provincial elections of 1937, Muslirn

League was a moribund organisation. It had never contested .any electipns and had very little ~~ppeal in the Musli1n .majority provinces. The issues there were rnore local and regional in nature. The ..._

Congress victory and its subsequent denial of any share in power to the Muslim League, through coalition rninistries led to the polarization of poli­tics in India. Further the social, educational and cui tural schemes of the Congress alienated a large scL·tion of the Muslims. Through its mass- contact pr~>gran1111e, Congress tried to estrange the Musl i 111 rnasses frorn their accredited leaders. The n1essage was clear. either Muslirn League

should fold itself or merge with the Congress. oth-~ L . '

erwise accept a permanent inferior position and exc.lusiori from power in the Hindu rnaj-ority provinces a,nd also in ~he proposed all- lndia Federation. The other way was to develop an alter­native strategy to overcorne the di le~ma of per­nlan'ent rninority status. The, problem was compounded when Congress tried to balance· the federal constitution, first by dernocratization of the princely states and then . . st.·eking uniform policies in Congress ruled provinces. The Muslim· Leagues exe~utive body could discern prinanent dotnination of Congress in future India. It felt that the idea of responsible self governrnent based on den1ocratic principals ·was unsuitable to the Mqslim interest and aspirati~)n.

44

J i nnah often reported to have quoted " the fur coat of Canada will not do for the exti·etnly tropical cli­n1ate of India."

Jinah's tnind was groping towards the concept ot' Hindu Muslitn India , where they would wei ld p~trity of power. The.only way to seek equal rights fo1- 1 he Indian Muslims was through showing the . '- '-

pan- Indian solidarity and fight for a dignified set-tlctnent in an all India set-up through the backing o!' fVlusl i n1 tnajodty provinces. .

Henceforth, Jinnah set before hitnself the task ol' reorgatiising the Muslitn League on the inherent pll\Ver of the Muslitns in India. But he had great difficulty tnaking inroads. into the dotnain of the Muslitn dominated satraps. The·Unionist party in Punjab. Krishak Proja Party in Bengal, United Party of Sindh represented the regional identities. The only way how Muslim League could seek entry was through evoking the solidarity of the 1\!1 uslitn brotherhood: Fro1n then onwards. atnbigu­ity and con11nunal plank·became the main weapon

. In J innah's 4rmour. He launched a fierce propagan­da can1paign against the Congress by raising the slogan of" Islam in danger". His whole thrust ·was to deny Congress aq all India representative char­acLCr and tnake them recognise Muslim League as the only authoritative organisation of the Muslin1s.

Seeing a large swing of the Muslitn n1asses '- u '- '

into the Muslim Leagues catnp, Congress tried to address the communal question, but Jinnah insist­ed on recognising Muslim League as the only rep­resentative organisation of the Muslims. It was an itnpossible eemand .for the Congress as it would tantatnount to surrender jts national character.

45

By translating den1ocracy in tenns of mere nlajori­ty. Congre~s side steped the fact India's plural c()Jnposition whose participationwas so vital for the stnooth working of the representative govern­nh~nt. If Congress had given the due share to the !VIu~litn Leagu.e, a settlement was possible within united India. The withdraw) of the Congress from the office

w;ts also one of its biggest n1istake. It put itself in a disadvantage vis a vis the Muslitn League which could not tnanover more freely and lost the influ­ence on the British government which it derived hci ng in the office. .

L-

'The outbreak of the \Var turned the tables in r~IVOUr of Muslim League. Jinnah tnade Musllinl Leagues support dependennt on justice for !VIuslin1s in Cor1gress provinces and a gura~tee that no consitution advance to be n1ade without his approval. ivk~anwhile Jinnah had been trying two fold strat­

egy to enhance the dwindling Muslims position in , . India. ()ne was to put pressure. on the Congress

through communal propaganda and second was to develop alternative strategy to repudiate the per­nlanent 1ninority. status in India. J i 11nah had been relentlessly brooding towards a congeries o"f autonomus soverign states with a fed rated India. He was of the opinion that Indian s u h-con ti nent houses a confederation of three fcdration , Muslitns, Hindus and Princes. Though ~iftcr the outbreak of the war, the idea of fedration w;ts ruled out by Ji_nnah but he was sti II angling for ·son1e sort. of confedration within a Linited lnd ia. His calculation might have been with the

46

rri nces he would hold the balance with Hindustan h~tving cotntnon arrangen1ent for custotns. conl­tnunication, defence, foreign relations and the 111inorities.

After the. outbreak of the war when Linlithgow asked Jinnah to come up with some constructive poI icy. J i nnah drafted the Lahore Resolution frotn the nun1erous schetnes vvhose deliberations were guing on since ·eighteen tnonths in the cout~try~ Though it evoked no response amongst the Congress· circles. Muslitn Leagues in1portance

~ ~

sinc:e the:n grew vis-a.;. vis the British. This was the turning point in the Indiati history. The following pages in the chapter two highlights

the various schemes and analyses the cotnplexities or the Lahore Resolution. It discusses the Cnngress. Briti~h and the provincial reaction to thL' resolution and highlights the August offer. This chapter' lay focus on the Cripps offer, interac­tion of Cripps with vafious political leaders of India and t)is own differences with the Viceroy L i n I i t h go w. F i n a II y, it g a~~ g e s the react i on on Pakistan demand from different leaders of the Muslin1 L.eague.

47