The Application of Fam-ily Therapy Concepts toInfluencing Organiza-tional Behavior

Larry Hirschhorn andTom Gilmore

© 1980 by Comril University.0001-8^2iB0/2501-0018$00.75

We wish to thank Dr. Maria tsaccs of thePhitade^ia Child Guidance Clinic for herassstance both during the interventionand in writing the arttde. We ^so wantto thank the anon^nous ASQ reviewerstor thar he^ful advice.1

For orgaTKzations, see Emery and Trist0965), Katz and Kahn 0966), MHIer andtMce 0967^. Husa 0975), and Mderfer0976). In hffraly ther^iy, see Haley{1963), Watdawick, Beavin, and Jackson(1967), Bateson 0972), Minuchen (1974),Guerin 0976), Matey 0976), andWatztawidc and WeaUand 0977). Millerand RioB 0367:103-126) describe waiton fam^ busmesses in which they m-fitom ttw tw»ions resutting from ^ eoverly} of fwraty and organizational sys-tems and th9 need to darify the distinc-tive Feqtrirements that each rec^ires.

The following article reports on the application of princi-ples of "structural famrly therapy," a particular farnily-therapy framework, to an actual case of a planned inter-vention in a social agency. In the context of organiza-tional intervention for change, our effort can be clas-sified, in Alderfer's terms, as focusing on the problems ofreiatedness at the group level, using both process andcontent as focal points. Following structural family-therapy guidelines, we examined the agency from a de-velopmental perspective, identified the coalitional struc-tures that maintained the agency in its dysfunctionalsituation, and organized tasks for agency members thatcould heip them experience their situation and dilemmasin a new and more productive fashion. The logic andmeaning of some tasks were readily apparent, others hada more paradoxical quality. We succeeded in swne areasand failed in others. Our failures sugg^ed that the suc-cessful transfer of family-therapy techniques to organiza-tional intervention is contingent on understanding fourdifferences between them: first, the politics of organiza-tional life is more complex than the politics of family Hfe;second, a member's exit from an organization is easierthan a member's exit from a family; third, it is harder tocontrol the timing of organizational intervention; andfourth, the formulation of developmental tasks may bemore difficult for organizations than for families. By ad-dressing these differences, however, we can learn moreboth about organizations and about theories of interven-tion.*

Increasingly, organizations seek heip from third parties tocope with problems and crises that result from changes intheir external and internal environments. These outsidersbring explicit or implicit theories to their work that guidewhat data they look for, how they interpret the data, andv hat technologies they select for intervention (Tichy andHornstein, 1974). This article explores, through an action re-search project, the possible contributions — in theory, diag-nosis, and intervention — of structural fannily therapy to or-ganizational change.

Family theorists and therapists and organizational theoristsand consuttants share many concepts. Each field has beenprofoundly influenced by theoretical developments in generalsystems, cybernetics, and communications. Each is inter-ested in the confluence and combination of the forces forchange and the forces for stability (homeostasis). Both havedeveloped system-theoretic conceptions of work and eachhas developed a rich tradition in the application of theory tointervention. In each field the shift to an open-systems per-spective has led to new appreciations of the power of con-texts or the environment to shape the internal dynamics ofthe system under study.' This common ground is not sur-prising, for both families and organizations are based onhierarchies, must manage their boundaries with the widersociety, integrate task and sentient systems, navigate devel-opmental transitions, and provide members with core iden-tities. In each, members must articulate multiple roles(parent-spouse, boss-subordinate-peer). Both are governedby implicit and explicit njles.

March 1960, volume 25 t8M(toinisfrative Sdence Quarteily

JMN'fic'tion of Fatnfly TiMrapy Ciwic«|rtt

Stiuctural family therapy is only one vari-ant of family therapies that has devel-c^jed in the past twenty-five years.Guerin {1976) gives a brief history offamily therapy and reviews severalthK)retical ctasafications: he identifiesstructural family therapy as banging tothe systems versus the psychoanalyticgroup of family therapies. Within thesystems category he identifies s^tB^therapy (Hatey, 1976), which focuses onthe presenting syrr^toms; structurat fam-ily therapy {MHTUchen. 1974), which hasa broader concern with boundaries, struc-ture, and develt^ment; and Bowen's(1976) family-systems theory, which is acompwehwifflve system-based theory ofemotional dysfunctions. Although wegrounded our woric specificaity in struc-t u ^ tamBy therapy, we thmk that cwefuJstudy of famity theory and the rs^ «Hjldhave significant irr^iact on many of theprt^Jtemattc intervention issues inoiganizations.

There are significant differences as well as similarities be-tween families and organizations. People choose organiza-tions but are bcxn into families. Exit is more complex andthe entanglements run deeper in families. The passage oftime plays a different role in the developmental crises offamilies and organizations. The ratio of task to sentient ex-perience is higher in organizations than in families.

Alderfer's (1976) review of organizations' change processeshelps us to situate our own conceptualizations and interven-tions. He argued that various strategies for change can befirst characterized by the type of human needs that moti-vate the change: existence — the inputs necessary for sur-vival, money, supplies, etc.; relatedness — mutual relationwith significant others; growth — challenge and stimulation,utilizing one's potential. He then identified the intact unitparticipating in the change effort: the individual, the group,or the organization. Alderfer discussed each of the resultingnine possible categories in this framework in terms of theoutcomes on boundary permeability and on mutuality of rela-tionships. He argued that optimal permeability — neither tooopen nor too closed — is associated with high mutuality,that is a two-way exchange of relevant ideas and feelings.

The organization we worked with had, in Alderfer's terms,overly diffuse boundaries, characterized by poor articulationof roles and responsibilities, and low mutuality, characterizedby a high degree of withholding relevant positive and nega-tive information from one another. Consequently, we devel-oped a strategy, focused at the group level on problems ofrelatedness, that aimed at clarifying boundaries arid increas-ing relevant communication.

Alderfer noted that consultants may develop strategies thatfocus either on the processes of group life (e.g., how con-flict is handled, how decisions are made), on the contents ofthe organization's problems, or on some combination of thetwo. In developing our framework for intervention, we de-signed a strategy that was primarily problem-focused butused process-oriented interventions when such interventionhelped clarify the underlying issue. In summary, our inter-vention was focused at the group level, addressed issues ofrelatedness, and used change strategies that addressed or-ganizational problems as they were felt and articulated by itsmembers.

Alderfer's analysis allows us to situate our intervention inthe context of organizational-change theory and practice.However, in developing our intervention, we drew on theoryand practice from famity therapy. In particular, we drew on afamily therapy developed by Minuchen (1974) (in closecooperation) with Braulio Montalvo.* This article reports on acase of consulting in which we (in conjunction with threeother team members) applied a family-system model to aproblem of organizational change.

We believe that family therapy can make a distinctive con-tritxition to organizational change in five areas.

(1) )n the organizational-change literature, many interventionsare not responsive to crisis situations in which the clients

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perceive neither the time nor buffering to engage in diag-nosis and reflection. Argyris and Schon (1978a) map dys-functional systems and engage the clients in discoveringboth that they lack the requisite skills and that they areunaware of this deficit. To develop both the client's aware-ness of the dysfunctional patterns and the new skills tochange them the interventionist must slow down the (earn-ing process, decompose its various aspects, and support theclients during their experiences of initial failure and frustra-tion (Argyris and Schon, 1978b). The aim is to increase theorganization's capacity to learn, and particulariy to deveiopnew norms and vaiues.

When faced with an authentic developmental challenge, theissues of survivai may dominate and require attention priorto the building of the organization's capacity "to doubie-loopteam." Other organizational-change strategies, such as pro-cess consultation (Schein, 1969) or Alderfer's (1977) long-term intergroup intervention directed at improving communi-cations, assume a basic level of organizational health as amatrix within which the organization can make improve-ments in selected areas.

(2) The preponderance of organizational-change strategiesare based on a belief that change follows insights producedby a diagnosis. VVe suspect that in many cases the processis reversed, that insights follow new experiences (oid behav-iors in new contexts, or vice versa). The motivation for de-veloping and maintaining new behaviors may have comefrom some initial restructuring intervention that breaks astalemate and yields new experiences (Hirschhorn, 1978).

(3) Structural family therapy can help link process and taskapproaches to intervention. A directive therapist sets a taskthat may restructure a family and alter communication pat-terns. Rather than choosing between the roles of processconsuitant and substantive expert, an interventionist canspecify tasks that are substantiveiy responsive to the organi-zation's situation yet put its members into new reiationships.

(4) Structurai family therapy can help clarify the role of theintervenor. In the organizational literature there is a tensionbetween too-active or too-passive approaches in joining andworking with clients. In the former, the intervenor risksoverfunctioning with little client ownership of the resuits ofthe work. Much of technicai consulting suffers from thisproblem, as the burgeoning literature on implementation-failure suggests. In the latter case, the consultant becomestoo marginal, especially in times of crisis, when the clientsblame him or her for not helping. The role of the therapistin stnjctural family therapy is actively to direct or coachmembers within the family system rather than inappropri-ately assume family responsibilities.

(5) As Bennis (1969) notes, a rationalistic bias pervadesorganization-change strategies. However, in response to therationalism, Bennis speaks of the need for emotional andvalue elements to develop commitment to change. Implicitis a rationaf-emotional continuum. Here, we are more inter-ested in a rational-irrational or paradoxical continuum. Peoplemay undertake change for one set of reasons and later dis-cover other nr>ore powerful and perhaps contrasting reasons

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Applieaiion of FonWIy Tlnrapy Concapts

that support the change. Family theory and therapy open upsome new strategies using metaphor, paradox, and play.

Thus, in this article we offer a contribution to the field oforganizational change by borrowing theory and practice fromfamily theorists and therapists.' We agree with Alderfer(1976) that technology of change has grown faster thantheory. Family theory and therapy offers both theory andintervention strategies that logically follow from the theory.It thereby offers an opportunity to reconnect theory andpractice in an economical yet powerful way.

This article is divided into three sections. The first presentsa brief overview of structural family therapy; the secondpresents the analysis of our case in structural family-therapyterms; and the last describes the main outlines and impactof our intervention.

The question can be legitimately asked.)s structural family therapy effective?While extensive research on the impactsof family therapy (based in experimentalor quasi-experimental design) has yet tobe undertaken. Minuchen fias shownthat structural family therapy can cure apsychosomatic disease such as anorexianervosa. Structural family therapistsbegin with the assumpticn that such adisease represents a symptomatic re-sponse to family dysfunction and theneiiminate the cisease symptom by re-structuring family communication and ac-tion sequences (see Minuchen.Rossman, and Baker. 1978). The thewet-ical founctetion of family therapy has alsobeen tested. For example, a group oftherapists and researchers showed thatstress levels (nneasured by free fattyacids in the blood) fell and rose in differ-ent family members as the therapistshifted between and imbalanced particu-lar family coalitions (Minuchen, Rossman.and Baker, 1978: 45-50). While evidenceis still primarily based on case stuctesand clinical experience (oftwi supportedby videotape documentation), aridquasi-experimental studies have not beencarried through, experience to date givesus confidence that structural famitytherapy can be affective.4

For the use of dev^opmental f ramevrorkin organizational interventicHi see Chin(1969).

STRUCTURAL FAMILY THERAPY: A SCHEMATICOVERVIEW

Structural family therapy is based on two theoretical con-cepts as discussed by Minuchen (1974: Chap. 5). First,every family can be described in terms of a set of coalitions.These coalitions shape the patterns of communicationwithin the family and determine the degree and quality ofinvolvement of each family member within it. Moreover,these coalitions are governed by homeostatic rules. If agiven family member attempts to break a particular coalition,other family members will respond in such a way as topreserve it. This gives family structure its stability.

Second, coalitions can be either functional or dysfunctionalrelative to the tasks that the family faces. Family tasks aredetermined by the life-cycle stage of the family and thecritical life-stage transitions of its members. Thus, most typ-ically, a family enters a period of crisis when a shift to anew life-cycle stage precipitates a new set of tasks which inturn challenge the relevance and effectiveness of the oldcoalitional patterns. As the coalitions become increasinglydysfunctional, they produce symptomatic behavior in particu-lar family members. These members then become the"identified patients" of the family, expressing the obsoles-cence of the old coalitions and the resulting destructivenessof the governing homeostatic behaviors.

These two principles of structural stability and develop-mental change operating together can produce symptomaticbehavior.* The role of the therapist is then to restructurecoalitions by changing the governing rules so that new coali-tions can emerge that are more appropriate to the new task.

This description is abstract. We can best clarify these princi-ples through a simple example. The daughter of a lowermiddle class family is about to enter college. She says sheis eager to leave but as the first day of the fall semesterapproaches, she becomes increasingly moody and sick. Sheeats poorly and contracts a succession of ailments. Finally,she loses her appetite and her weight drops dramatically.The mother is deeply worried and takes her to the familydoctor, who recommends psychiatric help for the daughter.Observation produces the following diagnosis:

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The concepts of enmeshment (overly cfif-fuse) and disengagement (inappropriatelyrigid) come from Minuchen (1974: 54)and anchor a continuum of boundary clar-ity. Alderfer's (1976) concept ot boundarypermeability seems r^ated particuiarly inthat health and adaptability are as-sociated with the middle range. In bothinstances thffl"e are two systempathotogi^ that recfuire cfifferent direc-tions of change. Alderfer's suggestionthat one must first move from exces-sively open to excessively closed beforebecomif^ optimatiy open parattels Hatey'sidea that often one must first go fromone malfunctioning system to a Afferentmalfunctioning system before reachinghealth (Haley, 7976: 133).

( l i The coalition. The nnother and daughter are very close("enmeshed") and the father is peripheral.* He is preoc-cupied with his one-man business and has been generallyunavailable. We can niap this coalition in the following way:

M-D where the hyphen signifies a link andP the divisor signifies an internal

boundary within the system(2) The developmental challenge. If the daughter leavesfor college, the mother will lose her. This will throyv themother face-to-face with the father, and she has iittle con-fidence that they can form a new relationship in their com-ing "empty nest." Similarly, the father fears that, while hewas a good provider, he cannot possibly meet the emotionalneeds of his wife any longer. The old coalition worked rea-sonably well for the family launching stage, when the fatherhad to work hard to give his wife and daughter a precariousmiddle-class existence. He received emotional rewards fromhis wife even though they grew apart because: (a) his wife,who feared that she would slip back into the poverty of herchildhood, appreciated his capacity to make money, and (b)his wife found emotional gratification in the relationship shehad with her daughter. Similarly , though he was distantfrom his wife and daughter, he was sufficiently unsure ofhis capacity to be intimate that he welcomed the chance tobecome peripheral on the grounds that he had to work hardto provide for his family. Thus, on balance the relationshipbetween father and mother was stable. The gains out-weighed the losses. We find it helpful to demonstrate thisbalance with a gain-loss matrix. (This is not done by familytherapists, to our knowledge, but is consistent with theirapproach.)

If we let the letter in each square represent the strength ofeach loss or gain, the homeostatic strength of the systemcan be expressed as:

a + t> + c is grater than d -f e + fand perhaps c < f

(3) The homeostatic response. As the daughter is about toleave home, both mother and father become very anxious.The anxiety expressed through many behaviors communi-cates to the daughter that she is indispensible to the stabil-ity of the family.

(4) The symptomatic result. The daughter becomes sickand excessively thin so that she will not leave home. In this

Father

Mother

Daughter

Gains

Good provider,role/ retreat from intimacy(a)

CScree mother-daughterrelationship,economic security(b)

Keeps family together(c)

Loss^

Peripheratity

(d)

Distance from hustend

(el

Can not grow up

(f)

. Matrix of 0tff» and lo«Mt.

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AipfOkai^ha of F u i ^ T^wapy Cono ;>ts

An anonymous reviewer fett t f ^ t thisframework is based on the "medicalmode)" of jst^iem generation. Thiscr i^ue is an important one and a r^ iy isnecessaiy. Briefly, the medcal modelpresumes that problems are dysfunctionsand that dysfunctions Be wthin the unitexperiencing them. An anti-medralmodel presumes that prcWems cannotbe described as cSseases or dysfunctionsbecause their genesis lies in the broadercontext that estabdsfies the parametereof activity for people who experience theproblems. Thus, an unemployed personsuffering from hypertension is not sick.Rather, the disorganized relationship be-tween the person and the job marketcreates the problem. His or her sicknessis a symptom of a problem at the bound-ary between himself or herself and thecx)ntext. We believe that famify therapyembraces both sides of the argument.On the cme side, the family becwnesproblematic when its relationship to itscxtntext is disturbed; this is the devel-opmental focus. On the other, thetherapist treats the family, not the con-text. Similarly, individuals have symptomsbut the therapist views the symptom asbehavior produced by the family as awhole even though it resides in a particu-lar person.7

We are using the term paradoxical injunc-tion to cover a set of prescriptionsbroader than that of the classic^"double-bind statements." though histor-ically paradoxical injunctions were seenas strict negations of double-bind state-ments. For the original formulations ofdouble-bind theory as well as paradoxicalinjunctions, see Bateson (1972: 177-201). Thus, for example, a woman canr>otsay no to others. The group therapistforcefully instructs her to say the word"no" (with force of eff«;t) toal! mem-bers of the group. If she follows thetherapist she will learn to say no; if shedoes not, she must forcefully say no tothe therapist. The injunction breaks herdeadiock. This class of if^unctions can beconsidered part of a more genera! set ofi^framtr^ injunctior^. In the examplegiven in the text, the injunctions arebased on a set of assumptions consistentwith the pathological system. Yet if theyare frtlowed, they will lead to experi-ences that negate those assumptions.IBut if they are not followed, no "bind"surfaces except insofar as failure to fof-tow lewis the family member thrtwghtherapeutic maneuvering to "r^ect" theassumptions of the path(^ogicai system.)The injimctJons reframe the assumptiwisso that they can be made consistentwith new. mcwe satisfying behaviors.Readers interested In paradox and re-framing interventions should sro Ha\ev(1963), Watztawidc, Beavin, ^ K 1 Jactcson(1967), Watzlawick. Weaktand. and Fisch(1974), Bandter and Grinder (1975), andHaley (197^^. A review of the double-t»ndoonc^t can be iound in Berger li97B}.

way she assures her mother that their relationship will bepreserved and that the father can remain peripheral. Note,however, that there are three critical features of thesymptom: (a) the symptom is a homeostatic response topreserve the stability of the o\6 coalition; (b) the symptomrepresents a drastic escalation in the intensity of thehomeostatic response to counter the power of the new taskenvironment; and (c) the symptom is a double communica-tion, communicating the desire to preserve the old coalitionbut also the new costs or losses associated with the oldcoalition. The system thus appears pathological for the firsttime, and the symptomatic member communicates his orher contradictory wish to both preserve and change thefamily function. In this sense, the symptom also expressesthe latent flexibility of the system, its capacity to change.

The following diagram summarizes the structural family-therapy model of family crisis.'

i

Oldcoalition

V (2)

\

New taskenvironment indevelopmental

challenge

/ The1 therapeuticI space

Homeostatic

(1)

\ —

/

FamilycrisisA (5)

ISymptomatic

behavior

(3) (4)

. Structural family tiiovpy model of family crisis.

The Theory of Intervention

Although there is no encoded theory of intervention, ourreading, observation, and interviewing suggest that the fol-lowing three principles are basic:

(1) Select, from careful theoretical formulations as well asobservations, a new appropriate coalitional structure.

(2) Propose to the family that they undertake a set of tasksthat will enable them to experience the new patterns ofbehavior implied by the new coalitional structure.

(3) If such tasks are to be accepted by the family they(generally) can not directly confront the old homeostatis re-sponses. Such a direct confrontation will probably only in-crease the resistance capacities of the old system. Instead,such tasks should allow members to express their old re-sponses within new contexts that consequently change theresponses' communicational meaning and impact. Suchtasks are called "paradoxical injunctions."^ Let us applythese principles to our example.

(1) The new coalition. Clearly, mother and father should bebrought together and daughter should experience herself

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appropriately as a "child" (i.e., she is not a confidante andequal to her mother) and also as a person increasingly capa-ble of separating herself from her family. In mapping termswe want to move from:

toF D

where I signifies a boundary between two systems

Figura 3. Desirad coalition ttviwformations.

(Note then that we posit two kinds of boundaries, an inter-nal one that separates famity members within a single fam-ily system and an external one that separates the familysystem from actors who do not participate in family coali-tions.)

(2) The tasks. The homeostatic strengths of the family ex-pressed as resistance to change are: (a) the daughter's be-lief that if she leaves, the family will fall apart; (b) themother's fear that her husband has nothing to offer; and (c)the father's fear that he has nothing to offer and that whenalone with his wife he will find that she holds him in con-tempt. Based on these resistances, the therapist formulatesthe following task (among several). The daughter mustinteract more with the father. He instructs her to help thefather in his business by going there several days a week inthe afternoons. At the same time, the therapist asks themother to advise the father on interacting with the daughterwhen the mother and father are alone. With this task thetherapist hopes to: (a) weaken the mother-daughter rela-tionship while stilt keeping the daughter in the family; (b)bring the father in from the periphery and closer to themother by having the father increase his capacity to interactwith the daughter; (c) change the daughter's patterningwithin the family without violating her homeostatic assump-tion that she is central to the family — that is, define herrole as one of helping the father; and (d) allow the motherto see that the father has the capacity to relate, and givethe father confidence in his capacity to relate.

This task thus employs the homeostatic resistances butplaces them within a new context so that new experiencescan emerge. The daughter believes that she is central at thesame time that she is learning to move from the mother.The father becomes less peripheral yet is permitted to re-main on the periphery; that is, the restructuring takes placeon his turf, the business. Finally, the mother (who has themost to lose here) can relieve her anxiety over losing herdaughter to the degree to which she sees the father hasthe capacity to be intimate. (This could complement tasksthat would directly bring the mother and father together.)This consequently paradoxical task can be framed withparadoxical injunctions. Thus the daughter can be told, "Yourfather is old, why don't you help him?" The mother can betold, "Your daughter's illness is placing a great burden onyou. Your husband should help -^ let him spend time withthe daughter in the store."

These injunctions confirm the reality of the old structurebut. If followed, are likely to produce experiences that imbue

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It can be seen from this example thatstructural family therapists focus their ef-forts to produce behavior change ratherthan insight- Yet at the same time, suchtherapists must be process sensitive. Inany family session, the family reveals itsstnjcture and patteming to the therapistby the sequences of communications itproduces (who interrupts whom, in whatorder family members speak, whospeaks for whom, etc.). Moreover, thetherapist can uncover these patterns byasking the family to enact a behavior(such as, "Tell your child to play quietlyby herself in the corner over there"), andby observing the resulting sequences ofcommunications and actions. Thetherapist can produce behavior changethrough one of three modes. He or shecan (1) intervene and disrupt statMtizingbut dysfunctional sequences, (2) reframethe communicational paradigm thatunderlies these sequences through an in-junction or relabeling maneuver, or (3) tellthe family about the meaning of theirsequences. The first changes behaviorwithout produdng insight (though insightmight follow later), the second changesfamily members' perspecti\«s withoutnecessarily providing insight into theirprior assumptions, the third gives thefamily direct insight. Clearly, the skilledtherapist v/\\\ use any of these threetods whenever he or she deems themto be a w ^ f t s t s - The goal of all inter-venticBTS remains, however, behaviorchange. For a useful discussion of theethical issues of change without sharingthe cBagnoas, sea Haiey (1976: Chap. 81.

AfH^GStion of F a n ^ Therapy CofiG«|its

the old structure with new behavioral realities. In this waychange is produced by using the strength of resistancesthemselves to reframe the family members' reality.*

THE METHOD APPLIED TO AN ORGANIZATIONALINTERVENTION

The Case

A social-welfare agency had grown in size from 45 profes-sional staff to 90 in about five years. Its resource base thenstabilized and there were no new staff additions. Moraleamong the middle managers was very low. They complainedthat the Executive Director was indecisive and untrustwor-thy. They felt that they were pooriy supported by theExecutive Director even though they faced very difficuitprobiems of caseioad management in their branches. Theyargued that people in the fancy "downtown" center took onthe most interesting cases and left the chronic, dull ones tothe branches. Many felt stuck in their present career ieveiand resented functioning as managers rather than profes-sionals. The staff had similar views of the agency. They feltoverloaded, ignored by "downtown"; they complained thatthere was little esprit de corps; they did not particularly re-spect their branch managers; and they felt most decisions,particularly those concerning salary and personnel transfers,were made arbitrarily. They were very tied into the rumormill, feeling there was no other way to get information. Ingeneral, most felt that the agency was stalemated in unend-ing vicious cycles and "games without end." After a majorconfrontation with a community group, which symbolized tomany the deep vulnerability and fragility of the agency (aconsequence of the lack of leadership and good manage-ment), our consultation team was hired to help with thegenera! problems of management.

The Developmental Challenge

After a historical analysis of the agency and interviews withmany of its members, we hypothesized that the agencyfaced two interrelated developmental tasks. On the onehand, the administrative structure had not changed in stepwith the growth of the organization. The Executive Directorhad been adept at mobilizing resources for growth butproved less adept in managing a large and complex organiza-tion. Moreover, he had not hired a program planner or aprogram administrator. Instead, he had developed a highlydysfunctional relationship with the Acting Deputy Directorwhich was one reason for the underdeveloped administra-tive unit. In short, the agency had not yet found an appropri-ate structure with which it couid consoiidate the conse-quences of its historic growth. This was the reason for itsincreasing inefficiency.

On the other hand, the agency had to find a new devel-opmental mission for itself. Agency grov^h had provided theprofessionals with a sense of elan, mission, and excitement,but with consolidation, the challenge of growth disappeared.Most were committed to providing quality service to clients,but many felt trapped by the growing familiarity of thecaseload and the lack of novelty in their work. New staffmoved quickiy aiong their learning curve, and after a year or

25/ASQ

so felt either bored or bumed out. If the agency w ^ e tofind new challenges, however, it meant that the ExecutiveDirector had to r^osition the agency within its context —make new links with other institutions and actors In the cityand ptan in a new resource-scarce environment so that newand different opportunities might emerge. In other words,the Executive Director had to face the complex tasks ofcontext management, management at the boundary be-tween the agency and its larger setting, so that he couldposition and reposition the agency within the field of oppor-tunities as the fietd itself changed.

These two tasks were clearly interrelated; the less consoli-dated the agency, the more ineffective it became, the lessable the Executive Director was to develop a new role forhimself at the boundary, and the more he would meddleinefficiently in the details of the organization. Thus, consoli-dation was necessary for development and developmentwas necessary for consolidation.

The Coalitional Structure

The agency had inherited a highly unarticulated organiza-tional structure in which roles were diffuse and boundarieswere indefinite. These past arrangements, however, wereencoded in two powerful coalitions each of which per-petuated the culture of diffuse roles and responsibilities.These coalitions had to be organized if new and appropriateroles were to be developed. The two coalitions were be-tween: (1) the Executive Director (ED), the Middle Managers(MMs), and the outside world, and (2) The Executive Direc-tor (ED), the Acting Deputy Director (ADD), and, later, thenewly appointed Deputy Director (DD).

The ED, the MMs, and the outside world. The MMs andED together formed what we called a vicious circle of in-competence. The ED was pulled between the older realitiesof agency life, when growth as a mission and the size ofthe agency simplified his leadership tasks, and the newcomplexities of directing a large organization operating in ascarce-resource environment. Consequently, he exercisedhis authority over the MMs unpredictabiy, participating inmanagement meetings as an apparent equal at one momentand at other times withdrawing from them and making deci-sions without consultation. The resultant uncertainty led theMMs to demand that the ED become their equal in decisionmaking — this was the former model, with which theywere most familiar. But the ED consequently behaved evenmore unpredictabiy, withholding or releasing informationwithout a clear pattern and without explicit statements tothe MMs about the reasons for his behavior. (For sample,he would not say, "1 will not be able to tell you about fund-ing problems in the coming months because of proprietaryinformation"; he would just withhold the information.) Inthis way he deprived the MMs of a context within whichthey could appropriately interpret and frame his behavior.Yet at the same time the MMs were unabte as a group toimpose their own context on the ED. Their desire for simpleequality contradicted the real pressures of organizational tife.In particular, the task of boundary man^ement r^uired

J h i and authority at the top. Thus, the MMs were in

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Gain

Appfication of FamHy Tbanipy Conespts

a double bind. They wanted clarifying behavior from the EDbut could pose that demand in terms that only furtherobscured their understanding of the ED's behavior. Themore confused they became about the ED's behavior, themore ignorant they became about the realities of contextmanagement. And the more ignorant they became the morethey pushed for a model of organizational functioning thatcontradicted the new but unconsciously felt organizationalrealities.

The resultant bind was evident in their behaviors. The an-grier they became with the ED, the increasingly tess ablethey were to act collectively to change his behavior. Instead,they behaved paradoxically, insisting on the one side thatthe ED was the cause of every problem in the agency, yetsimultaneously arguing that only the ED could empowerthem to become decision makers. Thus, for example, theymade the ED a scapegoat when he appeared at their man-agement meetings, but they complained bitterly that theywere being neglected when he did not attend. In effect,they projected all of their feelings of impotence onto theED, charging him with total incompetence on the one hand,while ascribing total potency to him on the other.

The ED reacted to this vacillating behavior by describing theMMs as incompetent. Consequently, he withheld informa-tion from them, thus making them more incompetent. But,as a result, the MMs sabotaged his decisions and directives(unconsciously, most of the time), thereby making him in-competent. This pushed detail work on the ED that shouldhave been in the domain of the MMs, thus increasing theburden of his own responsibilities (and increasing thechance that he would make errors) and leading the MMs tocomplain that the ED was interfering with the work of theirbranches.

This vicious circle prevented both the ED and the MMsfrom examining the agency's new task environment. Thedyad between the ED and MMs made each incompetentwith respect to the environment. Neither were capable ofconveying a sense of the mission of the agency as a whole.Instead, the MMs retained their capacity to attack the EDwithout seeing any of his actions within more complex ex-ternal contexts and the ED held back his own developmentas an effective director who could develop a long-term mis-sion for the agency.

Thus, the homeostatic responses in this relationshippreserved the diffuse boundaries of the old coatitional struc-tures. There was no clear division of responsibilities be-tween the MMs and the ED. However, since the organiza-tion faced a new task environment, these responses createdsymptoms represented in the growing incompetence ofeach side as seen in Figure 4.

Loss

ED Does not have to confront new tasks and maintains cations Overloaded and undervalued

MMs Preserve image of the old heroic organization Become incompetent,feet vulnerable

Ngura4. Mlatrix of gains and lossas for ED and MMs.

27/ASQ

From

ED-MMs

External WOT\6

ED

MMs

To

ED

MMs

External world - ED

MMs

Figure 5. Map of proposed coaNticm rMtructuring for ED and MMs.

On the basis of our analysis we formulated a two-part strat-egy for breaking the dyad by (1) creating a more appropriatedivision of responsibilities and a hierarchy of authority, and(2) increasing the ED's capacity and authority to operateat the agency's boundary. This restructuring is shown inFigure 5.

The ED, ADD, and DD. The ED and ADD were in a similiarlydiffuse and insufficiently defined relationship. The ADD hadbeen made acting deputy one year prior to our intervention.It was typical of the agency that a permanent deputy direc-tor had not been appointed for that long a period. Since theADD had few defined responsibilities and since he felt hereceived littfe guidance from the ED, he tested his domainand made decisions in those areas where the ED did notreprimand him after the fact. This was, however, a clearlyunstable arrangement. The MMs and other staff sensed thathe had no dearly delegated authority and so when decisionswent against them, they went above his head to the ED.The ED would then intervene on their behalf, undercuttingthe ADD. This led the ADD to be more cautious in his deci-sion making on the one hand or to mobilize support for hisdecisions by going behind the ED on the other. This con-vinced the ED that the ADD was not reliable and so hewould intervene periodically (though without pattern) in theADD's work, making the ADD in turn more cautious andinefficient and tying up the ED's time in detail work. Thus,for example, an MM decided not to send a staff profes-sional to a conference. The ADD intervened and okayed theconference leave; the ED then intervened arxi supportedthe MM's decision. The ADD, however, was incompetent tochange the ED's behavior precisely because he felt uncer-tain in his position within the agency. He felt that if he didnot tolerate the ED's ambivalent gestures and behaviors, hewould not be in any position of authority within the agency.Thus, even though he felt undercut by the ED, he simulta-neously believed that he gained significantly from his specialrelationship with the ED. Looked at homeostatically, the EDpreserved the diffuse relationship to keep himself inappro-

ED

ADD

Gain

Keeps options open about which issuesto get tnvofved in

Hdds a de facto position of authority

Loss

Beconrjes incompetent and overloaded with issuesthat could be delegated to a deputy

(s unprajictably undercut

Rgur* 6. Matrix of gains and tossOT for ED and ADD.

28/ASQ

Appfieation of F a n ^ T1wni|yy Ccmo^its

From

ED-ADD

DD

To

ED

DD~ADD

ED

DD

ADD

Figure 7. Map off proposed coalition restructuring off ED, DD, and ADD.

priately involved in detail work, and the ADD preserved therelationship to win whatever authority he felt he couldmobilize within the agency.

The DD. Just at the time of our entry, a new permanentDeputy Director (DD) was hired. Having examined the coali-tional structure, we feared that the strength of the ED-ADDcoalition would sabotage any overt attempts by the ED, theADD, or the consultants to define a centra! role for the DDand a new rote for the ADD. Clearly, in simple power terms,the DD would displace the ADD, and the ADD felt suffi-ciently insecure so that any such change was fraught withdanger for him. At the same time the ED could not be sure(unconsciously) if the DD would fulfill the same role in thediffuse dyad he had found most comfortable. In the firsttwo weeks after the DD's entry we saw evidence of suchunconscious sabotaging action. For example, the DD wasgiven a very difficult assignment on a high-visibility problemin the agency, which almost guaranteed early failure. Simi-larly, the ED did little to clarify for the staff the relativepositions of the ADD and the DD, despite an extensive dis-cussion with the consultants on this issue, and burdenedthe ADD with negotiating a transition with the DD, a taskthe ADD was reluctant to do.

Thus, it seemed to us that we had to use the opportunitypresented by the appointment of the DD to redefine andarticulate the ADD-ED relationship and ensure that theED-DD relationship would be more appropriately structured.This meant breaking the ED-ADD coalition and creating theappropriate hierarchy among the three (Figure 7).

Summary

Our strategy can thus be summarized by combining Figures5 and 7 into Figure 8.

This summary highlights the two interrelated tasks that theagency faced. The agency had to consolidate its structure byarticulating inherited coalitions that were overly diffuse.Simultaneously, it had to redefine its relationship to the out-

From

ED-MMs

External World

ED-MMs

ED-ADD/DD

To

EDMMs

External World-ED

MMs

ED ED

ADD-DD " ' DD

ADD

&inimary off pn^xned coaHtion restructurings.

29IASQ

side world by developing a longer-term planning capability.These two tasks came together in the singular task of ex-tricating the ED from diffuse coalitions and moving him to aboundary-management role.

However, in doing this we faced the power of the homeo-static responses. It was clear that all groups gained from theED'S ambiguous style and consequent over-involvement indetail work. Such over-involvement protected the diffusecoalitions, and though it made everyone increasingly un-happy and incompetent, it simultaneously allowed everyoneto hold onto an image of fomier and simpler reality.Nevertheless the agency had to mature.

THE PROCESS OF OUR WORK AND THEORGANIZATION'S RESPONSE

Introduction

After making our diagnosis, which was developed through aseries of interviews, we began to formulate a broad senseof strategy on the basis of Figure 8 to guide our daily inter-ventions within the organization. These strategies can bestudied by examining the two coalitions.

The ED, the MMs, and the external world. We faced threetasks with respect to this coalition: to disengage the EDfrom the MMs, to disengage the MMs from the ED, and togive each a broadened set of competencies — the ED in(the context of) management, the MMs in operational re-sponsibility at an agency-wide level.

The ED was convinced that the MMs were incompetent,and indeed, within the homeostatic system described, theywere. We thus tried to change his behavior through aparadoxical reframing of his own reality. During a series ofmeetings we agreed that the MMs were collectively in-competent but argued that (a) their incompetence was asource of great strain and burden to him, and (b) he shouldhelp them to become competent. This injunction served (a)to promise him less strain to compensate for the losses hewould experience if he disengaged himself from the dyad,and (b) to permit him to feel that he was still in control ofthe process whereby the MMs became competent. Thus,though he would lose control at the level of control overtheir daily work, he would experience continued control overtheir becoming competent.

We suggested then that to make the MMs competent hehad to let them try things on their own and consequently towithdraw fully from attending their meetings. This recom-mendation in tum complemented our strategic woric withthe ED-ADD-DD coalition, since it then seemed only naturalthat the DD appear at the MMs' meeting as the ED's repre-sentative. This began to define a productive role for the DD,a role that by definition could not be easily sabotaged by theED since the ED had removed himself from the MMs'meetings.

The ED complied with our suggestions; he began to with-draw from the meetings and the DD progressively assumedrespcjnsibiljty for them. But, as is dear from Figure 4, thiswould have been an unstable resolution with a hig h probabil-

30/ASQ

A|i|iie>tion of F w i ^ Thenpy Conceits

ity of regression unless the ED simultaneously could formu-late a new rote for himself.

In one interesting meeting with only the ED, suspecting thathis compliance was hiding incipient mobilization of resist-ance, we spoke to his unspoken anxiety that he was losingresponsibtlity. He immediately answered that he was afraidof being "kicked upstairs." This allowed us to dig moredeeply into the nature of his leadership role in managing therelations with the extemal environment. We argued that hiswork with extemal relations did not mean that he becameinvisible inside the agency. Rather it meant that he becameprogressively involved in the developmental decisionsthrough which the agency redefined its role in the commu-nity and consequently restructured itself internally (to re-spond to the new agendas). Thus, his concern with therelations of the agency to the community would make himhighly visible, internally, but on his own terms, without"fire-fighting" and interfering with operating decisions. Hecould identify his intema! decisions with extemal actions andthereby have them make sense to others as redefining theagency's mission.

This seemed to immensely relieve his anxiety and give hima plausible new perspective on his role. Two months laterhe decided to launch a priority-setting process within theagency. He appeared before a meeting of the MMs, gave abroad outline of why the agency had to set priorities moreself-consciously for the kinds of problems and people it wasserving, and delegated a few MMs to assist him in organiz-ing this process. In addition, we urged him to sit down witheach MM at his respective branch and to go over the rela-tionship of each local office to its advisory council (suchcouncils had been recently mandated by the governingboard). This task placed him in a service role to the MMs,reduced their anxiety about the role and impact of outsidegroups on their duties and responsibilities, and made himvisible without interfering in local, internal operations.

We can not predict if the ED's efforts will prove successful.Indeed, at the priority-setting meeting we witnessed thepower of homeostatic behavior. Some of the MMs tried totum the ED into the familiar scapegoat and tried to deny theobvious initiative he had taken in establishing this task.Nevertheless, we believe that we helped the ED establish anew mode! for his own behavior within the agency.

Our work with the MMs proved more difficult. Initially, weintroduced them to general organizational concepts andshowed them how they could analyze the implied distribu-tion of roles and responsibilities within their agency. Buttheir willful incompetence prevented us from formulating aproductive task for them that could in turn give them anagency-wide competence as a middle-management commit-tee. Consistently, they questioned whether in fact they hadthe legitimacy to meet as a group ("Who are we to makeany decisions?"), at the same time that they resented theED's unwillingness to empower them.

We found generally that any direct assault on their obviouslyself-fulfilling and self-defeating behaviors proved ineffective.instead, we aimed once again for a more paradoxical f ram-

31/ASQ

ing of the situation. We agreed v^th them ("Yes, you areillegitimate") arid suggested that instead they view our workwith them as simply "experimental" and "playful," with fewconsequences for them or the agency. This achieved twothings: (1) it prevented them from forcing us to carry theiranxiety about their own competence and legitimacy — we-were progressively becoming overfunctioning consultantstrying to convince them that they had a legitimate role toplay — and (2) it allowed us to break the Gordian knot ("Un-less we are legitimate we cannot act, but unless we act weare not legitimate") by operating within an experimentalmode. We hoped that our maneuver would prove paradoxi-cal, since if they accepted our definitions of the situationand took on tasks in an experimental mode they would infact gain the confidence and competence to feel legitimate.

Early in our intervention we had recommended that the EDgive to the MMs the role of allocating newly-hired profes-sionals to the different branches, since this required thatthey act both as representatives of their own branches andas agency-wide representatives. However, although someparticipated on a committee, the DD took primary responsi-bility and the task lost its salience.

Two months later, however, the agency faced a manpowercrisis when resource constraints and staff turnover created ashortage of professional staff in certain branches. Transfersof staff between branches were cleariy required. In thepast, MMs responded to these situations by pushing the EDto give them additional help without considering the overallagency situation. As a result, they fought each other formanpower, and the ED made decisions that satisfied noone, for no MM got precisely what he or she wanted. Con-sequently, the MMs could blame the ED for the unsatisfac-tory solution. In effect, they took no agency-wide responsi-bility for the solution.

We therefore urged the DD to give the staff-transfer prob-lem to the MMs. The MMs initially resisted (they fearedthat they were being set up to fail), but when the task wasmodified so that they wouid help the ED and DD developlegitimate criteria for transfers, they agreed to cooperate.

The task had a decisive impact on the MMs' awareness ofagency-wide issues. It stimulated considerable lateral com-munication among them as they examined workload statis-tics, and it made them realize that their data base for re-source planning was inadequate. At a second meeting it be-came apparent that without an agency-wide plan that pro-duced criteria for the distribution of staff between thebranches (and the different branches had differentstrengths), there could be no rationale for allocating re-sources within the agency. At this point, they willingly gavethe task to the ED and DD. They realized that they were notbeing blocked by the ED in the exercise of their prerogativesbut rather were hamstrung by a pooriy developed concep-tion of agency priorities. Paradoxically, by failing, the Mfs/lsincreased their competence tp operate in an agency-widesetting. They no longer saw the allocation problem throughthe false polarity of "the ED is a dictator" or "we are allequais with the ED." but rather with a more complex un-

32/ASQ

AppficatkHi off FamKy TYierapy Concapts

derstanding of how responsibilities might be divided be-tween them and the ED, depending on the particular prob-lem at hand. The task gave the MMs a more realistic con-ception of agency-wide dilemmas.

The ED-ADD-DD. This coalition was the most interperson-ady complex situation that we dealt with. Essentially, wewanted to disengage the ADD from the ED and engage theDD and ADD within a new and cooperative team. The mostcritical problems we faced were the ADD's reluctance tolose his special position and, as it tumed out, the ED's de-sire to turn a new leaf and work with someone with whomhe had not established such a dysfunctional relationship.Consequently, the ADD left the team and planned to quitthe agency, though in part he was pushed out by the ED.We faced a problem that is not usually faced by familytherapists. Family members are not fired nor do they quit. Inone way or another they remain always involved in thestructure of the family. Thus, while organizational systemscan be as intense as family systems, they are also muchmore brittle.

Initially, we met with some success in our restructuring at-tempts, A description of one key session with the ADD, theED, and the DD conveys the texture of our work with them.We used a standard process device to generate materialabout the developing relationships among the three ofthem. We asked each to write a set of comments thatdescribed what they wanted each of the others to "domore of," "less of," and "continue to do the same of"(Harrison, 1972). When the three exchanged comments, theforce of the coalition (ED-ADD/DD) came into play. The ADDlooked over the comments of the DD and dismissed themwith, "I have no trouble with these comments," and shiftedhis attention immediately to the ED's comments. The con-sultant intervened here. He blocked the ADD's desire todismiss the DD's comments and instead pushed him to ex-plore them further (in particular, the DD felt that the ADDmight have been freezing him out of certain information anddecisions). At the same time, the consultant literally blockedthe ED's line of vision to the DD and ADD so that physicallythe ADD and DD formed a unit and the ED was relegated tothe periphery.

Consequently, the ADD and DD began a very productivediscussion of their relationship. They spoke of the ADD'srole in training and ensuring agency compliance with gov-ernment regulations, and discussed how tasks might be dis-tributed between the two of them. The discussion then tooka critical tum when, as a result of this discussion, the DDhad the confidence to ask the ADD very directly, "What do

From To

AD

DD

C

Figurs 9. Cor»irftefit's btoddng nmnauv».

33/ASQ

you want to be called? I understand that it is unnerving tocontinue to be called Acting Deputy Director."

At first, the ADD was quite reluctant to state his desiredtitle (a function perhaps of his reluctance to give a clearstatement of his preferences in front of the ED), but aftersome prodding by the DD and the consultant, he said thatthe title "Program Planner" might best fit his desired re-sponsibilities. The ADD and DD then went on to discussthis, at which point the ED, left out of what was clearly aproblem-solving discussion, agreed generally with the newtitle, but said, " I , too, have some ideas here. I should havesome say on the ADD's responsibilities." The consultantthen tumed to the ED, agreed with him, but added that the"ADD and DD had to work out some of these issues to-gether to take some of the load of decision making off yourshoulders." This seemed to compensate the ED, who thenpermitted the ADD and DD to continue their discussion. Ourrestructuring within the session was thus successful.

We were able to bring the ADD and DD together around thedevelopmental task of defining a new role for the ADD.

As a result of this discussion, a memorandum was laterreleased which defined some of the temporary roles andresponsibilities of the administrative unit (particularly a pro-gram administrator), and then the ADD was listed as Pro-gram Planner.

But the ED and ADD soon made it clear that both wereunhappy with the arrangement. It seemed to us that theADD felt (correctly) that once he was no longer engaged in acomplex and diffuse coalition with the ED, he would pro-gressively lose authority within the agency. He could notfight for position alone. On the other side, it seemed thatthe ED wanted to wipe the slate clean; once the ADD wasno longer tied to him, he did not want to work with theADD. Consequently, the ADD left the team to go to one ofthe branches and said he would shortly leave the agency.We were left to facilitate the breakup, ensuring that aminimum of damage would be done to the ADD'sreputation.

From the point of view of the agency, this was a positivesolution. It released the ED from the potential continuationof a stagnant coalition and also opened up the program-planning position to a member from outside the agency whowould not be ensnared by historical relationships with theED. But the result also demonstrates some of the key dif-ferences between families and organizations and indicatesperhaps some of the limits of applying family theories to them.

Summary

We would rate our work in terms of our restructuring goalsas moderately successful. We pushed the ED to the bound-ary; we were able to cut the ED-MM dyad; we increasedthe MMs' sense of agency-wide issues; and we opened upthe admirwstrative unit to potentially functional coalitions thatwould not share in the historic culture of diffuseness thatwas increasingly hobbling the agency.

Nevertheless, our intervention contained serious flaws andin retrospect we believe that we stumbled upon arKi over

34/ASQ

Bowan's (1^76) concept of triangSng isrelevant here. He argues that a two-person relationship is stable oniy whencafm. As tension increases, a third per-son is involved, often with two sides ofthe triangle comfortable, and one in con-flict Bcwwi argues that famines in stressoften seek cKiteide assistence to %ter-naSze the conf Set. The t he r ^s t can be-come n'af^)ed in the emottoiai fletd. Ob-viou^y, in the kind of maneuvers wedesoibe in the text ft @ essential not to

the foltowing three generic issues in applying family sys-tems concepts to organizational intervention.(1) The problem of the consultant's entry into organizationsis significantly more complex than the problem a therapistfaces in entering a family. Organizations contain more com-plex and diverse coalitions; there are more sources of au-thority and power in organizations than in families; and or-ganizations are more politicized than families. This has threeconsequences for the consultant.

First, it takes longer for the consultant to estabiish his or heriegitimacy to intervene within an organization than it doesfor a therapist to intervene in a family. Structural familytherapists, at least the skilled ones, typically establish theiriegitimacy, presence, and power in the first session.

Second, the consultant is less likely to join completely withall the relevant coalitions within the organization. Thus, forexample, we did not link up with a rebel group of profession-als (who remained covert for some time), which representednonetheless a constructive force within the agency.

Third, insofar as the consultant either fails to identify therelevant coalitions or joins incompletely with them, he orshe can become part of the dysfunctional action sequencesof the organizational system. Both the consultant andtherapist can not become the allies ot any single unit orcoalition within the system. Typically, the structural familytherapist will move among family members, placing stresson first one member and then on another. In this way, thetherapist retains the independent position and his capacity topunctuate homeostatic sequences according to plan. But inorganizations, if critical coalitions or units remain uniden-tified, then the consultant may become part of thesehomeostatic sequences by joining with one set and notanother (e.g., he or she will be implicitly protecting or attack-ing the unidentified coalition; such "protect" or "attack"behaviors will most likely place the consuitant within aireadyweii-defined homeostatic sequences). In Figure 9, we cansee that the consultant had to be the ally of both the ADDand the ED; he had to move between the two of them ifhe was to restructure their relationship. If he did not, hewould be caught between them,' either becoming the allyof one Of the other; or correspondingly the two could tem-porarily unite against him, rendering him dysfunctional.

(2) We faced problems in timing our work with the organiza-tion. Typically, the therapist will contract with the family tocome to a session on a regular basis. We tried to do thiswith the administrative group but did not meet with consist-ent success. Insofar as such a regular schedule of meetingsis not developed, the consuitant gets quickly pulled into thedaily crises of the organization and cannot develop a long-term strategy. Thus, for example, our work with the middlemanagers was constrained by our failure to arrange regularmeetings with them. Similarly, the periodic breakup of ourteam (due to vacations, other assignments, etc.) limitedour capacity to deploy our resources with regularity andconsistency.

(3) It is clear that the power of the consultant in an interven-tion will depend greatly on the prospective tasks (whether

35/ASQ

they are in the form of paradoxical injunctions or not) thatthe consultants give to the different coalitions. This requiresfar greater knowledge than a process consultant needs ofthe substantive content of the organization's work, thewider task environment, and a historical perspective toselect tasks that are authentically developmental.

If we examine the steps of structural family therapy, it isclear that the formulated tasks become the outputs of thediagnosis and mapping stages. Such tasks must: (1) be rele-vant to the organization — speak to real and pressing is-sues; (2) be restructuring in impact — if the tasks are car-ried out, people will experience themselves to be in newcoalitions; (3) be developmental — the tasks must help theorganization learn about the new issues it faces as it movesto a new stage of its existence.

Clearly, it is not easy to choose tasks that meet all thesethree conditions. It is therefore important that consultantsalso see the tasks they propose as concrete representationsof the hypotheses they have about the organization. If theyfail to introduce the tasks, or if the tasks when introducedand completed fail to have a restructuring impact, then theconsultants must reconsider their fundamental hypothesesabout the organization.

In this context, interventions provide a powerful medium forthe analytic understanding of organizations. In our view,theories for intervening in organizations and theories for un-derstanding them are part of a seamless web of thinking.Interventions without theory lead to the use of tools asindiscriminate cure-alls with little testing of the appro-priateness to the specific situation. But theory without inter-ventions can lead to reified understandings and "abstractempiricism" in which the data and the concepts chosen donot engage the authentic life-experience of the organization.We believe that action-research, by embracing both inter-vention and understanding, enriches both.

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