The Air Superiority Battle in the Middle East, 1967-1973
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Transcript of The Air Superiority Battle in the Middle East, 1967-1973
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The Air Superiority Battle i n the Middle East, 1967-1973
Clarence E. Olschner, 111, MAJ, W A F U.S. Army Command and General STaff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
Final report 9 June 1978
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
A Master of Military A r t and Science thesis presented t o the faculty of the U.S. Army Couunand and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
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MASTER OF MILITAQY ART AND SCIENCE
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE
N a m e o f candidate a Title of thesis The Air Superiority Battle in the Middle East, 1967-1973
, Research Advisor , M e m b e r , Graduate Faculty Member, Consulting Faculty
11978 by , Dir ctor, Master of Military A r t and Science.
Thc opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the v i e w s of either the U . S . Army Command and G e n e r a l Staff College o r any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoinq statement.)
ii
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ABSTRACT
THE AIR SUPERIORITY BATTLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1967-1973 by M a j o r Clarence E. Olschner, 111, WAF', 103 pages
This paper is an historical study of the strategy,
tactics, and weapons employed by Israel, Egypt, and Syria in
the battle for air superiority from 1967 through 1973. The
study is developed chronologically beginning with the 1967 W a r ,
through the W a r of Attrition, and ending with the cease-fire
in the 1973 War. It has been compiled f r o m an extensive re-
view of unclassified, primarily secondary, unofficial sources.
The paper concludes that, in a mid-intensity war with
modern air forces and air defense forces:
1. The achievement of strategic, tactical, and/or
technological surprise can significantly influence the battle
for air superiority.
2, Missiles have demonstrated the capability t o
significantly influence the air superiority battle in surface-
to-air, air-to-air, and air-to-ground operations.
3 . Air superiority can be achieved over the modern
battlefield only by defeating both surface-to-air and air-
t o - a i r capabilities of the enemy.
4, The achievement of air superiority over the battle
area requires the combined efforts of air and land forces of
which long range artillery may be the most effective weapon
for the suppression of surface-based air defenses.
iii
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ASKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to say thank you to those who gave
generously of their time and talent to make this thesis
possible. Dr. Kenneth Werrell provided excellent guidance
and assistance throughout the y e a r . COL T o N. Dupuy (USA,
Ret.) kindly answered numerous questions and made available
several unpublished resources. LTC Roger K. Taylor (USAF)
offered insight on the employment of airpower which was
most helpful. Mrs. Marilyn Slack has provided expert typing
assistance. Finally, I thank my loving w i f e , Donna, without
whose prayers and support this paper could not have been
writ ten.
iv
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TAEILE O F CONTENTS
Page
A P P R O V A L P A G E . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ii
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i v
LIST O F TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v i i i
INTRODUCTION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ix
I. T H E 1 9 6 7 W A R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0THE ISflA?3LI WAR PLAN 1
4SURPRISE ACHIEVED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6
THE IAF' VERSUS JORDA.. AVD SYRIA . . . . . . 10
TOTAL LOSSES ON 5 JUNE 1967 . . . . . . . . 11
A I R ACTIVITY ON 6 JUNE 1967 . . . . . . . . 11
TOTAL LOSSES, 5-6 JUNE 1967 . . . . . . . . 12
AIR ACTIVITY 7-10 JUNE 1967 . . . . . . . . 12
OBSERVATIONS ON THE 1967 WAR . . . . . . . 14
E.NDN0TES 160 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
THE IAF ATTACK ON EGYPT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
II. BETWEEN TWO WARS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
THE BEGINNING O F THE WAR O F ATTRITION . . . 20
AIR POWm I N THE WAR O F ATTRITION . . . . . 21
0 0 0THE CONSTRUCTION O F THE SAM UMBRELLA 24
IsRmLr VIEW OF THE UMBRELLA . . . . . . . 25
DEVELOPMENT O F THE EGYPTIAN AIR DEFENSE
FORCE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
V
-
Page
PREPARATION OF THE EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE . . . . 31
REBUILDING THE smrm AIR FORCE . . . . . . . 33
SUMMARY O F THE INTER-WAR PERIOD 0 0 0 0 0 33
ENDNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
111. THE 1973 BATTLE FOR AIR SUPERIORITY . . . . . . 39
THE ISRAELI CONCEPT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
THE I S R A E L I DECISION TO NOT PRE-EMPT . . . . 41
THE ARAB STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
THE COORDINATED ATTACK . . . . . . . . . . . 45
OVER THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. 6 OCTOBER 1973 . . . 46
TECHNOLOGICAL SURPRISE 0 0 0 a a a 0 0 48
0 .IAF TACTICS AND LOSSES. 6 OCTOBER 1973 . 49
MOUNT HERMON.. ANOTHER SURPRISE . . . . . . . 50
GOLAN SUMMARY. 6 OCTOBER 1973 . . . . . . . . 50
OVER THE SINAI. 6 OCTOBER 1973 . . . . . . . 50
SUMMARY OF THE AIR BATTLE. 6 OCTOBER 1973 . . 54
rm PRIORITIES ON 7 OCTOBER 1973 . . . . . . 54
COUNTERAIR STRIKES .AGAINST AIRFIELDS
BEGINNING 7 OCTOBER . . . . . . . . . . . 56
IAF ATTACKS ON EGYPTIAN BRIDGES . . . . . . . 58
I A F DIRECTLY CONFRONTED SAMS. BEGINNING
8OCTOBER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
WEAPONS AND TACTICS USED AGAINST SAM SITES . 59
COUNTERMEASURES .AGAINST SAMS . . . . . . . . 62
STRATEGIC BOMBING I N SYRIA BEGINNING
9 OCTOBER 2973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
THE EGYPTIAN OFFENSIVE. 14 OCTOBER . . . . . 63
Vi
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Page
COUNTERING EGYPT'S SAM UMBRELLA, 16-24
65OCTOBER 1973 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
E.AF RESPONSE TO THE ISFIAELI CROSSING . . . . 65
SUMMARY OF' THE 1973 AIR SUPERIORITY BATTLE . 66
E N D N O T E S 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 72
I V . OBSERVATIONS .AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . 79
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0SURPRISE. . 79
80CONCLUSION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
80MISSILES. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
81CONCLUSION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
81SURFACE-BASED AIR DEFENSES 0 0 0 0
82
COMBINED ARMS FOR A I R SUPERIORITY . . . . . 83
CONCLUSION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CONCLUSION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 83
BIBLIOGRlLDXY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 85
vii
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LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1 0. Air O r d e r of Battle. 5 June 1967 0 . 3
2. I A F Losses Against Egypt on 5 June 1967 ... 9
3 . Aircraft Lost 5-6 June 1967 . . . . . . . . . 12
40 Air Order of Battle. 6 October 1973 . . . . . 34
5 . 1973 Aircraft Losses by Type . . . . . . . . . 68
60 1973 Aircraft Losses by Cause . . . . . . . . 68
7. 1973 Aircraft Losses by Time Period . . . . . 69
80 1973 Combat Sorties and Loss Rates . . . . . . 69
1973 I A F Air-to-Air Kills by Weapon . . . . . 69
viii
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Air superiority in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War is of
particular interest to the military tactician today because
this battle f o r the air was intensely fought with some of
the most modern weapons and tactics in the world. The
intensity, complexity and duration of this battle contrasted
sharply with the relatively simple and quick manner in which
the Israeli A i r Force (IAF) gained air superiority in the
1967 War. To understand the conduct of the 1973 War it is
essential to examine the development of the air battle in
the 1967 War and the War of Attrition.
This paper is an historical study of the strategy,
tactics, and weapons employed by Israel, E g y p t , and Syria
in the battle f o r air superiority f r o m 1967 through 1973.
The study is developed chronologically beginning with the
1967 War, through the War of Attrition, and ending with the
cease-fire in the 1973 War. It is appropriate here to say
a few words about data.
This study has been prepared from unclassified,
primarily unofficial, secondary sources. Because of the
limited information available on Syrian participation in the
w a r , greater emphasis has been given to examining the battle
on tho Egyptian front.
ix
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The study of an air superiority battle revolves around
the destruction of aircraft and how they were destroyed.
While different sources seldom agree on the air order of
h t t t t l c at t h c start of a war, t.here is greater difficulty in
(3etcrmining how many aircraft were lost during a war and,
further, how they were lost. Few, if any, participants in
a war can afford to accurately reveal their own losses, but
each side makes claims about the opponent's losses. Some
claims are conservative, some are optimistic, and some are
exaggerated for reasons which are easy to understand.
Since the Arab-Israeli dispute is far from settled,
it is not surprising that none of the participants has
opened its records for examination.
A number of books and articles have been written by
Israeli and, m o r e recently, by E g y p t i a n political and
military leaders. These provide good information on the
course of the war, but they generally omit details on their
own losses. Most of the data on Israeli losses must come
from the m a n y military analysts who have contacted unofficial
sources in Israel. Unfortunately, very few western writers
have had access to unofficial sources in the Arab countries,
and their reports usually cover Israeli rather than Arab
losses.
This author has attempted to select the data on
Israeli losses which is most consistent with the course of
the war; the data on Arab losses, as explained, has been
limited primarily to that reported by Israel.
X
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With the passage of time and hopefully the resolution
of this conflict, one can hope that all participants will
reveal more of the information which will enable a true
picture of the war to emerge.
Xi
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CHAPTER r
On 5 June 1967 Israel launched a combined air and
land attack against three of her neighbors: Egypt, Jordan,
and Syria. Israel initiated the fighting after consider-
able preparations for war by both sides. On 7 April 1967
there was a serious clash between Syrian and Israeli fighters
in which six Syrian MIGs were shot down.' Between 14 and
16 May, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan mobilized their armed
forces, and the Egyptian Army began a buildup in the Sinai.
On 28 May the Israel Defense Forces ( I D F ) also began to
mobilize. The next day Egyptian President Nasser requested
that the U.N. observers withdraw f r o m the Sinai, and he 2ordered the G u l f of Aqaba be closed to Israeli shipping.
On 23 May Israeli Premier Eshkol termed the blockade m a n
act of aggression against Israel"; a week later he appointed
Moshe Dayan as defense minister. The threats, maneuvering,
and buildup of forces continued through Sunday, 4 June, when
Iraq joined the defense alliance recently formed by Egypt,
Syria, and Jordan. On the same day, the Israeli cabinet con-
cluded that Israel could best survive a w a r against this 3Arab alliance by striking the first blow.
THE IsRm.m WAR PLAN
Seizing the initiative and taking the battle into
L
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2
enemy territory at the earliest opportunity had become
o f f i c i a l Israeli doctrine under the direction of Israel's
first defense minister, David Ben-Gurion. Churchill wrote,
"Because of the small size of Israel and the concentration of
her population, the Israelis know that they can never afford
to let their own country be the battlefield . . ..11 4 The main objective of the Israeli plan was to reopen
the Straits of Tiran, and it assumed that Israel would have
only 48 hours before the U.N. and the great powers imposed a
cease-fire, To accomplish the objective, the Israelis
planned to quickly destroy the Egyptian Air Force and to
thrust the Israeli Army into the Sinai supported by the IAF'
as soon as it was available,5
The Egyptian Air Force (Em) (Tabla X ) posed the
greatest threat to the IN; it therefore had to be the first
targe t o
Surprise was critical to the I A F plan; they had to
catch the EAF on the ground before they could launch against
IsraeL. F r o m their bases in the Sinai, the EAF could be
over Israel's cities and airfields in less than ten minutes,
a n d their TU-26 "Badgerff bombers could reach Israel f r o m the
fartherest corner of Egypt.
Ex-IAF Commander, Ezer Weizman, stated that the IAF'
developed the plan and the capability f o r a pre-emptive
strike over a period of ten yearsO7 Another source reported:
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-- --
--
3
6TABLE 1
AIR ORDER OF B.ATTLE, 5 JUNE 1967
JORDAN ISRAEL
Fighter-
Bombers :
su-7 Mirage 92 MIG-21 Super Mystere 24 MIG-19 Mys tere 82 MIG-15/17 0-uragan 55 Hunter -
T o t a l 358 253
Bombers :
Tu-3.6 30 Vauto u r 24 1~-28 43 -0
Total 73 24
SAMS : 160 0-- 50 950 143 550
NOTES: All the SAYS possessed by Egypt at this time were S A - ~ S , Israel also had 60 Magister trainers which had a light ground attack capability,
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4
The whole of the IAFfs operational training syllabus over the past f ive years or more had been based on the assumption that a large-scale pre-emptive strike might one day have to be made on airfields in Egypt and the other Arab countries. Five bombing ranges in the Negev had be n specially designed to simulate enemy targets !3 0 0 0 .
In 1.965the IAF began a routine of launching large
flights of fighters early each morning and sending them
west into the Mediterranean. The E D responded with a
sizeable "dawn patrol'f of MIG fighters, but after several
months these flights became a standard practice rather than
a response to IAF activity. The presence of large flights
of IAJ? aircraft north of Egypt had become routine and were
no longer a cause for alarm in Egypt. The Egyptian dawn
patrol would land about 0830 hours; the pilots then had
breakfast and prepared f o r the d a y b training,9
The IAF, therefore, selected 0845 hours as the
optimum time to attack. At this time, there were a minimum
of EAF aircraft on alert; the morning fog over the four
bases along the canal had usually lifted; and m a n y of the
EAF commanders would be caught enroute to their offices
(because the normal workday began at 0900). This time also
anticipated the great physical strain the IAF'pilots would
experience in the first two days of the war, By attacking 10at 0845 the Israeli pilots could sleep until 0400.
As the first wave of I A F fighters departed Israeli
airspace at 0825 hours on 5 June 1967, there were two
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5
factors which nearly preve.nted the IAF from achieving the
all-important element of su.rprise.
The first was the flight of a twin-engine IL-14
flying command post of the Egyptian A i r Force, which was
carrying Egyptian Air Force Commander, General Sidki,
Egyptian Chief of Staff General Alner, and a Soviet A i r Force
brigadier general, the advisor to the E.AF. The IL-14 took
o f f at 0805 so that Generals Sidki and h e r could personally
a s s e s s the Sinai situation. When the Ilyushin reached the
eastern Sinai and turned south, the Israeli generals watching
it on radar breathed a sigh of relief. Had the plane turned
north toward Gaza, the occupants would probably have seen
the first wave of IAF' fighters enroute to their targets. 11
The second f a c t o r was t he Jordanian radar station at
A j l u n which saw the Israeli fighters and at 0838 hours sent
a warning message to Egypt. A recent directive by the
Egyptian War Minister, Shams-al-Din Badran, however, required
such messages be routed through his office enroute to the
A i r Forcc. This delay prevented the message from reaching 12 the EAF before the Israelis did .
f With these t w o favorable breaks, the IAF did the rest.
They maintained absolute radio silence and penetrated beneath
the Egyptian radars by flying over the water and land at
30 to 50 feet. Good fortune, extensive planning, preparation
and training, ,.and disciplined execution resulted in the
achievemsnt of complete surprise. I 3 4
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6
THE I A F ATTACK ON EGYPT
A t 0845 hours Cairo time (0745 in Tel Aviv) on
Monday, 5 June 1967, the first wave of Israeli fighters
simultaneously struck nine of Egypt's nineteen airfields.
Minutes later, the morning fog lifted over Fayid airfield
on the canal, and it was immediately struck. The first wave
consisted of one or two flights of four for each of the ten
bases. These aircraft had a maximum of ten minutes over
their targets before the arrival of the next wave. The
second and third waves struck at 0855 and 0905 hours and
expanded the attack to include the remaining six bases in
northern Egypt . Then there was a thirty minute respite
before the first wave returned. In this manner, nine waves
in three hours destroyed the greater part of the EM'. That
afternoon the three bases in Southern Egypt (Hurghada, Luxor, 14
a n t i ! RasBanas) were hit by the "Vautour" light bombers.
The IAF capitalized on the element of surprise by
first attacking the runways, thereby trapping most of the
Egyptian aircraft on the ground. The majority of the
attackers hit the runways with 500 or 1,000-pound bombs while
about 40 percent employed the French-designed "concrete
dibber.ff This bomb had retrorockets which slowed it
immediately after release and pointed it straight down; then
another rocket drove it into the concrete where a timer
exploded it moments, minutes, o r hours later. It produced
a hole one t o two meters deep, and the delay fuse produced a
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7
difficult problem f o r runway repair c r e w s , This bomb also
allowed the attackers to remain at low altitude instead of
"popping uptr several thousand feet f o r a conventional dive
bomb attack. 15
The initial bombing pass by the Israelis was made at
about 500 knots. Subsequent passes, f o r firing cannon and
rockets, were flown at minimurn effective speed. Although
this slow speed increased I@ losses to A4 guns, it also
increased Israeli accuracy, target identification and damage 16assessment.
The EAJ? had no hardened shelters for their aircraft,
but some were parked in revetments. Nonetheless, the
accurate strafing of the IAF enabled them to fire inside
these revetments. In this manner, a l l 30 of the T U - ~ ~ S ,
the IAFb highest priority target, were destroyed at Cairo
West airfield by the first and second waves. Accurate
strafing also accounted f o r most of the second-priority
M I G - 2 1 s . These proved to be particularly susceptible to
f l r o ; they burst into flame after relatively few hits by
1730-mm cannons.
To insure the success of the attack upon Egypt the
IA??had confidently concentrated almost all of the fighters
in its offensive, holding back only 22 interceptors for air
defense. On this day, the IAF a l so did not fly any escort
missions, and mrther ordered the pilots not to engage in
air-to-air combat unless they were intercepted during their
ground attack. 18
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8
Egypt had interceptors on alert at the end of a number
o f .ruriwayy:;, but tkic attack came so swiftly that only t w o
fli.[;htr; of four MIG-22s each got airborne. These aircraft
shot down t w o IAF' aircraft engaged in ground attack before
all eight of them were shot down. Twelve MIG-21 and eight
MIG-19 interceptors also got airborne froa the southern base
of Hurghada. They flew over 200 miles north and engaged 16
Mirages in a dogfight over Abu Sueir. Four of the MIGs were
shot down, others were destroyed while landing on torn-up
runways, and a few got down safely, The only other aircraft
reported to have been airborne during the attack were four
unarmed Egyptian trainers and the flying co.mand post. 19
Lieutenant General Mohamrllad Fahmy later related the
inadequacy of Egyptian air defense to stop this attack:
Enemy aircraft approached at low altitudes, making use of the gaps in our radar field, which was still being established. In addition to the limited number of our available antiaircraft missile units, they were not de- signed f o r engagement of low altitude targets, at which height all enemy air raids were carried out. Thus the enemy air force was confronted only by the limited, old- fashioned anti-aircraft artillery which dated back to World War 11. It was not capable of dealing efficiently with modern aircraft which had speed and maneuverability. Nevertheless, AA units did shoot down a number of enemy aircsBf t . But this had no effect on the results of the war.
Table I1 shows the losses by cause, f o r the IAF' in
490 sorties against Egypt on the first day. The l o s s of
19 aircraft amounts to 3.9 aircraft l o s t per 100 sorties, or
an attrition rate of approximately 4 percent.
Of the l.3 Israeli aircraft shot down by AAA three were
hit on their initial bombing pass; the other ten were knocked
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9
TABLE rI2l
IAF LOSSE3 .ArAINST EGYPT ON 5 JUNE 1967
Air-to-air.
13 AAA 0 SAM
2 Flew into the ground.
2 O w n ordnance o r targetexplosion.
I UnknownI
down while making their second, third, or fourth pass. 22 r t
should also be noted that the IAF did :not lose any aircraft
to the Egyptian S.A-2 SAMs. The S A - 2 was ineffective below
3,000 feet; and, when fired at aircraft above that altitude,
it was defeated by a hard descending turn into the missile.
The SAMs w e r e not considered important enough to even be
atkackcd. on the first day.23
Dur ing the afternoon of 5 June the IAF attacked radar
sites in Egypt and claimed the destruction of 23 including
all 16 of the radars in the Sinai. 24 Before sundown the IAF
returned to most of the airfields in northern Egypt and hit
the runways with delay-fuse bombs to deter repairs during
the night. 25 With the 493 sorties flown against Egypt on
the first day the I A F claimed the destruction of 254 of the
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10
E A P s 358 combat aircraft, most of them on the ground. 26 On
this day the IAF also dealt crushing blows against Jordan
aric I S y r i a,
THE IAF VERSUS JORDAN AND SYRIA
Late on the morning of 5 June, the Syrian A i r Force
damaged the oil refinery in Haifa Bay and some dummy air-
craft on the airfield of Meguiddo. Of the three Syrian
M I G s which attacked Meguiddo, two were shot down and the
other crashed, Shortly after noon, three Jordanian Hunters
produced some injuries and damage in the city of Natanya
bcfo rc being intercepted and driven off. 27 The I A F response
was quick.
Monday afternoon the IAF' directed the majority of their
aircraft against the airfields of Jordan and Syria. In a
brief series of raids on Aman and Mafraq airfields, the I A F
clcstroyed all of Jordan's corn twenty-one Hawker .c
I l u n t c r s . (Jordan quickly borrowed three more from Iraq.)
Simultaneous at tacks on five Syrian airfields destroyed 60
of Syria's 127 combat aircraft. At this point, Syria with-
d r e w the remainder from the battle area and relinquished air
superiority over the Golan Heights. 28
The 1A.F claimed the total destruction of the Jordanian
A i r Force with no Israeli losses. The attack on Syria was
also impressive but not without a price. Robert Jackson has
recorded the air battle in Syria:
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Anti-aircraft; firc was heavy and several Israeli
a . i rcrafl, wor'(s sho I; down including t w o Mystcrcs, destroyedov(;.r ~ ~ a r r i x ; c u ~ ~ , f l i g h tAnol-hcr MysL-crc was jumpcd by a of MIG-XYs, which shot it; down as it was attacking targets on the ground; the M I G s were hemselves shot down byMirages a few minutes later, 25
The only other important counterair action on 5 June
w a s the destruction o f the powerf'ul Jordanian radar at Ajlun.
This was accomplished at noon by a flight of four Super Mys teres. 30
TOTAL LOSSES ON 5 JUNE 1967
The f i n a l score f o r 5 June was approximately 388 Arab
aircraf t destroyed versus about 23 IAF' aircraft lost for a
ratio of 27 to 1,
AIR ACTIVITY ON 6 JUNE 1967
Except f o r some Magister trainers ancc a few Tautours ,
there was little IAF support f o r the Israeli Army on 5 June.
On 6 June, however, the priority was reversed, and the
I : : rao l%{;round forces received heavy support in the Sinai
and on thc wcst bank of the Jordan, On Tuesday, the IAF
also flew some missions against airfields in Egypt and
Iraq.33-
A lone Iraqi TU-16 bombed the city of Natanya on
Tuesday morning; as the TU-16 exited the target area it was
knocked down by accurate AA fire. The IAF' retaliated by
attacking the Iraqi airfields of Habbaniya and Hotel Three.
Enroute to one target, eight Mirages were jumped by eight
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12
I raq i H u n t e r s ; this resulted in the l o s s of three Mirages
TOY o n l y o m Tluntcr. On t hc p o u n d , howt7vm7, tlic IAF dcs-
k o y c d n i n e MIG-22s, four H u n t e r s , and t w o IL-14 transports.32
Table III shows the aircraft lost by t y p e after two
d a y s of conflict. About 23 of the Arab aircraft were lost in
thdz air; ths rest w e r e destroyed on the ground.
TABLZ 11133
LOST 5-6 JUNE 1967
Egypt Jordan Syria
Iraq
Arab Total:
Israel 26-n
Includes 7 Magister trainers used f o r ground attack.
AIR A C T I V I T Y 7-10 JUNE 1967
After the airstrikes on the Iraqi a i r f i e l d s on
6 June, the I A F enjoyed almost unchallenged air superiority
f o r the remaining four days of the war. Diring this time
the I A F was able to devote most of its sorties to ground
support . As a result, approximately two-thirds of the total
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IAF sorties flown during the war were in support of the
ground forces . On the 7th and 8th the IAF' used the recently
captured airfield of El Arish to f l y nuxerous missions
attacking Egyptian armor in the Mitla Pass and on the road
from B i r G i f g a f a to Ismailiya. On the 8th the I@ attacked
a well defended column of Egyptian tanks near Kantara; here
the deadliest AA fire of the war downed five Israeli air-
craft in a couple hours. 34
Tns air battle against Egypt had been won on Monday,
but it continued through Wednesday. In a last desperate
attempt to assist the hard-pressed Egyptian A r m y , the EAF
f l e w their remaining MIGs (and a few borrowed f r o m Algeria)
in close air support. Most of them were engaged by the I A F
which claimed 14 k i l l e d 2n air-to-air combat and no Israeli
losses.35
On the 9th and 10th the IAF strongly supported the
Israeli A r m y assault on the Golan Heights. In this campaign
thc IN;' silenced a number of AA guns by exploding proximity-
fuscci bombs directly over the sites. Thereafter, the IAF
was heavily committed to the task of destroying the concrete
bunkers and fortifications on the Golan. In spite of con-
centrated bombing, most of these positions were overcome
only when the Israeli infantry assaulted them.
When the cease-fire went into effect Saturday, 10 June,
the I A F had made a significant and critical contribution to
the Israeli victory. 36
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0%
OBSERVATIONS CIN Ti33 1967 WAR
In six days of warfare the Israelis claimed the
destruction of 452 A r a b aircraft . Of these, 32 were downed
in some 50 dogfights. The IAF admitted losing 26 aircraft
in the first two days, but have not released a figure f o r
the entire w a r . Jackson indicated the IAF lost 40 aircraft
and had another 10 so badly damaged that they could be used
only for parts. In a more recent book Zeev Schiff stated 37the I A F lost 45 aircraft in this war.
The I A F dsny losing any aircraft in air-to-air combat,
but their use of the term ffair-to-airfl must be clarified.
Their use of this term does not include I A F aircraft which
were ffjumpedtfin the process of an air-to-ground mission.
Tne I A F acknowledged two such losses over Egypt , another is
reported over Syria, and three more w e r e l o s t when the Iraqi
Hunters jumped an IAF s t r i k e flight on the second d a y . 33
For the most part, this was a missileless war. The
IAF pilots credited the Egyp t i an S.A-2 missiles with only one
ffpossibleff The 2%kill. .-...1 1
tive. envelo2e or,,.out-maneuvered, 5 ,, itL after it GW*was&=d. Theser 4 ... < 3 ,, . 1 - . - . . A I .
results compare favorably with the U.S. experience over North
Vietnam. During 1967, 59 S.A-2 missiles were fired for each
U. S. aircraft downed. 39 The IAF did n o t employ missiles in either a.-f-to-al_tr
s < %A&.L.QlL?,
were w- n. Cannon was also the most effective weapon
h l S W -.n.v.--*.
-
because of these factors (not in order of precedence):
1, IAF' achieved comglete surprise.
2. IAF' concentrated its forces on the primary
objective.
IAF prepared f o r years f o r that explicit mission.
Egyptian aircraft were not sheltered,
5. Egyptian airfields were not well defended.
60 The S.A-2 missiles were ineffective below 3000 feet,
Unlike the Egyptians, the air forces of Jordan, Syr ia ,
and Iraq w e r e not surprised, but they were no match for the
IAF', They w e r e to3 small and their airfields w e r e also
unprotected and p o o r l y defended.
Thc parformmce of the IAI? in t he 1967 Mar has been
I;(>r~nc;d a classic employment of airpower. The developacnt
and training of t h i s force for a specific mission, the long
range efforts to achieve surprise, and the advantages of
striking the first blow are but a few o f the lessons to be
drawn f r o m this war. Many nations have studied this war,
but no one studied it harder than the Arab participants,
especially the Egyptians. They learned the lessons well,
and they began to prepare f o r the next war,
-
END.NOTES
'Military Balance 1967-1968 (London: The Inter- national Institute f o r Strategic Studies, 1967), pp. 51-52,
2Randolph Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, The Six D a y War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), pp. 76-77; Ezer W~izman, On Eagles' Wings (New York: MacMilIan Publish-ing Coo, Inc., p. 210.
3Roderick MacLeish, The S u n Stood Still (New Y o r k : Atheneum, 1967) , p. 83.
4Walter Laqueur, Confrontation: The Middle East and World Politics (New Y o r k : Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Coo, 19741, p. 9 2 ; Quote is f r o m Churchill, p. 62.
'Claude Witze, "Kiss in the Desert" Air Force Magazine, J u l y 1967, p. 8 ; Wsizman, pp. 215-216,
%ohn Andrews, COL. (USAF, Ret. ), Historical Evalua-tion and Research Organization, Interviewed on 3 and 4 May 1978.
'William Stevenson, Zanekl A Chronicle of the Israeli A i r Force (New York: .The Viking Press, 19711, p. 331.
8Hobert Jackson, The Israeli A i r Force Story (London: Northumberland Press Ltd., 19701, p. 176.
'T. N o Dupuy, COL. (USA, Ret.), Elusive Victory (To be published in the near future), p. 243.
"Navad Safran, From W a r to War (New Y o r k : Pegasus, 19691, p. 321; Churchill, pp. 78-79.
"Jackson, pp. 185-186.
12MG Do KO Palid (India), Return to Sinai (New Delhi : Palit & Palit Publishers, 1 9 7 4 ) , p. 230
16
-
14Robert R. R o d w e l l , "Three Hours - And Six Days," Air Force Magazine, October, 1967, p2a 57-63; Jackson, pp. 177-178.
I6D,a J, F, Reagan, fUir Power O v e r Sinai," Ordnance November-December, 1967, pp. 258-259 a
"Peter B o r g a r t , "The Vulnerability of the Manned Airborn3 Weapon System, If (Part 2), International Defense R e v i e w , October 2977, pa 863; Jackson, p. 187.
18Warren C . Wstrnore, ffIsraelis* A i r Punch Major Factor in Aviation_ W&k & Space Technolom, July 3 , 1967, p. 18; Churchill, p. 82; Safran, p . 324.
*'Yohammad Ali Fabmy, LTG, &History Air Defense -___.- future.Forcem(T0 be published in the near
21Avihu Ben-Nun, LTC, (IAF), "Three Hours in June, If A video-tape available a t UaSa Amy Comxand and G m s r a l Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
2 5 . ~ o ~ w e ~ l ,60.p.
-
18
2YJackson, pp. 193-1953 Safran, p , 328.
29Jackson, p. 195.
30Jackson, p. 295 .
31Jackson, pp. 200-202.
32Wetrnore, p. 18; Safran, 329.
33Jackson, pp. 204-205; Churchill, p. 86. Churchill
differs slightly indicating Egypt l o s t 264 combat aircraft and that the total Arab losses were 416.
36Wetrnore, pp. 18-27; Jackson, pp. 212-215; Rodwell,
P. 62,
37Jackson, p. 263; Zeev Schiff, October Earthquake, Yom Kippur 1973 (Louis Williams, trans.), (Tel Aviv: Univer-s i t y Publishing Projects, Ltd., 19741, p, 263.
38Ben-Nun film; Jackson, p, 195.
-
One of the primary lessons Egypt and Syria drew from
the 1967 W a r was that they must develop the capability to
deny Israeli air superiority over their countries and protect
their air forces and armies f r o m its crippling blows.' With
Soviet assistance they soon began major programs to achieve
. this end.
Jordan was least capable of defending itself against
the I A F , but King Hussein prepared to remain vulnerable
rather than ally his nation with the Soviet Union. Jordan's
rebuilding would again produce a small a i r force, not expec-
ted to seriously challenge Israeli air superiority.2
The Israeli leaders recognized the decisive advantage
which air superiority had given them in the 1967 War and
continued to base their wartime strategy upon its achievement
and o~ploitation.~ One of their first concerns was to
replace the 45 aircraft lost in the W a r with modern aircraft
which would insure their continued dominance of the air.
The Israelis were counting on the receipt of 50 Mirage V
fighters which had been ordered from France in December 1966.
France, however, placed an arms embargo on "frontline
participants" in the Mideast War and remsed to deliver the
Mirages. In early 1968 Israel turned to the United States
-
20
with a request f o r 50 F-4 Phantoms. The United States was
already providing I s rae l w i t h 48 A - 4 Slcyliawlcs on an agreement
reached just before the 1967 War. In December 1968 the
United States agreed to the sale of the F-4s with delivery
to begin i n September 1969. 4
THE BEGINNING OF TH.E W A R OF ATTRITION
On 8 September 1968 Egypt significantly increased the
price Israel would have to pay to continue to occupy the
Sinai. On this day 150 E g y p t i a n artillery batteries fired
over 20,000 shells against Israeli positions across the Suez
Canal. Israel retaliated by shelling the Suez oil refineries
and the cities of Ismailia and Suez. The Israeli bombing of
these civilian targets prompted the Egyptians "to evacuate
some 400,000people from the Canal Zone area. It was evident
that E g y p t was wiZling to pay a substantial price in order
to continue artillery harassment of the Israeli-held east
bankoff In October 1968 the IDF responded to another Egyptian
shelling with commando raids deep into Egypt . From November
1968 to March 1969 light artillery exchanges w e r e fired as
occasional harassment. 5
On 8 March 1969 the Egyptians fired a massive artillery
bombardment on the recently-constructed Bar Lev Line, and
President Nasser announced the beginning of a "Period of
Attrition.f1 Heavy artillery exchanges continued through
April and May 1969 accompanied by commando raids by both
sides.6
-
21
The a r t i l Z e . r y botnbardrnents and raids hit Israel's
w c a k spo b- - rnanpower . At this time I s rae l had approximately
half a million men o f military age while Egypt had some
five million, For each casualty the Israelis sus ta ined , they
felt they had -to produce ten casualties or they were losing
this "War of
The Egyptians, however, had considerably m o r e
artillery on the Suez f ront than did the Israelis. From
their 1967 experience the Israelis believed the I A F could
always concentrate firepower more rapidly than artillery and
at a lower cost in manpower. They, therefore, purchased
planes in lieu of howitzers and considered the aircraft
t t f ly ing artilleryoff As the Israeli casualties approached a
peak of 30 killed and 76 wounded in J u l y 1969, the Israeli
governme,nt decided to use the I A F in retaliation.7
AIR P01dT3H IN THE WAR OF A'ATRITIOTJ
On 20 J u l y 1969 the IAF began a ten-day campaign of
i.nf;eii,si.vc airstrikes on artillery and SAN sites on the west
Tho quick response of the EAF to the I A F strike on
20 J u l y was described by Edgar OfBallance:
Just before dusk on that day the E g y p t i a n Air Force flew out to challenge the Israeli A i r Force seriously f o r the first t i m e since the June War, ASout 40 aircraft (ten MIS-21s and 30 SU-~S)penetrated over 60 miles into the Sinai. Israeli aircraft were scrambled and a number of dogfights took place. Mien it was over the Egyptians claimed to have shot down 19 Israeli planes, but admitted the loss of two of their own, while the Israelis also admitted Losing two planes but cZairned to have brought down f ive Egyptian ones. . . . The startling fact was that the Egyptian A i r Force hag penetrated in such strength so far into Israeli air space.
-
22
O - J C ~t h e n(?.xI: t cn days there were three more majQ3-L-,
a i r brxtl;lcs in wliich the I A F proved that it was still
super ior . Air activity continued, but at a much slower pace,
through August and the first week of September. On 9 September
1969 the I A F changed its priority from artillery to SAJI sites
on the west bank. The EAJ? responded on 23 September with a
202-plane raid into central Sinai where numerous dogfights
developed. Afterwards the IAF claimed 11 kills (eight air-
t o - a i r , two by Hawk missiles, and one by A.4 fire) and ad-
mitted losing one Israeli fighter, The EAF claimed four
(three by combat and one by A4 fire) w h i l e admitting the loss
o f two Egyptian aircraft. lo The I A F continued to attack
missile sites throughout September and i n October expanded
the attacks to SAWS and radars w e s t aLong the mediterranean
coast as far as Alexandria, By the end o f 1.969 the I A F
claimed the destruction of 24 SAI4 sites and 61 Egyptian air-
c ra f t since the 1-96? War; in this time the IAF l o s t 15 air-2 1c r a f t 0.n all f r o n t s .
By January 19'70 the 1 A . F had achieved air superiority
over Egyp t , prevented the Egyptians f r o m developing an air
defense over the Canal, and greatly reduced Israeli casual-
t i e s , but there was no end in sight. The Egyptians continued
to repair and replace the missiles and were gaining con-
siderable combat experience. To further pressure Egypt to
end the War, on 7 January 1970 the 1A.F began to hit targets 12of military significance near Egypt's population centers.
-
23
T h f s s tya teg ic bombing o f mi l i t a ry and i n d u s t r i a l
f,c . i r*/ , ; t ; I,;.: i r i ! : ? I . ( : hcarL (if Egypt put pressu:ir,t?upon Presichxi t
N a s s e r , not to yie ld to the I s r a e l i s , but t o r e t a l i a t e . In
l a t e January 1970 President; Nasser made a secre t t r i p t o
Moscow i n search of lloffensive weapons.lf Instead he received
from the Soviets a pledge t o assist Egypt i n the development
o f a modern and e f f ec t ive a i r defense, l3 I t w a s , therefore ,
the s t r a t e g i c bombing i n Egypt which, more than the 1967 W a r ,
p.rompted the Soviets t o give Egypt the massive ass i s tance
requi red to develop the s t rong a i r defense which faced t h e
T A P i n 1973.
I n March and e a r l y Apr i l 1970 Soviet M I G - 2 1 squadrons
and S.4-3 (SAI4) ba t t a l ions a r r ived i n Egypt, By mid-April
t h e y assumed r e spons ib i l i t y f o r the a i r defense o f the Nile
Valley m d -theDelta , l4 The IAF had s t ruck a t w i l l through-
out Egypt for a l i t t l e over three months; but, when on
27 A p r i l 3.970 they rea l ized the Soviets were f ly ing a i r
defense for Egypt, they abrupt ly ended deep s t r i k e s i n t o
FQ;ypL-. T.hc.reaf.ter, the IAF confined i t s e l f to s t r i k i n g SAM
::ii;os and a r t i l l e r y within a 25-mile wide s t r i p on the west 15bank o f the C a n a l .
The Russians seemed to accept t h i s arrangement by
normally keeping t h e i r a i r c r a f t 25 miles from the C a n a l . O n
30 J m e 1970, however, the inevi tab le confrontat ion o c c u i ~ e d .
Reports o f the incident vary, but here are the e s s e n t i a l
d e t a i l s . The IAi?' employed a favor i te Ifanbush t a c t i c f t o f
-
behind the A - 4 s and at l o w a l t i t u d e (below radar coverage) w e r e
f0u.r o r eight Israeli f igh te r s . Wien -the A - 4 s were i n t e r -
ccpted by a f l i g h t o f Soviet p i lo t ed MIG-2ls, the I s r a e l i
f i g h t e r s shot down four MIG-2lsY killing three o f the p i l o t s .
Neither I s r a e l nor %he Soviet Union publ ic ized the inc ident , 16but some months l a t e r Mrs. Meir confirmed i t had occurred.
TIIF, COIJSTRUCTIOF? 0 LLA 0
%tween A p r i l and June 1970 the I s r a e l i government
had made several public statements that i t did no t want t o
injure any Russ-ians i n Egyp t , but t ha t I s r a e l could not allow
the e rec t ion o f a r n i s s i l e umbrella over the C a n a l . Such an
u i n b r e l l a could pro tec t an Egyptian crossing o f the C a n a l and,
therefore , threatened the secu r i ty o f I s r a e l ' s recent ly
es tab l i shed border. Israel made i t c l e a r tha t the 1A.F' would
bomb any SA-3 s i t e es tab l i shed within 25 miles o f the C a n a l
regardless o f whose so ld i e r s manned them, The Soviets
apparent ly accepted this risk as they a s s i s t ed the Egyptians
i n the prepara t ion o f numerous SA-3 s i t e s i n the C a n a l Zone
17during May and June o f 1970.
On the night of 29 June 1970 SA-3 miss i les were
brought f o r w a r d -to the C a n a l s i t e s and on 30 June a SAM
umbrella came i n t o being over the Canal, I t may have besn
t h i s f a i t accornpli which prompted the Soviet M I G s that day 18to make t h e i r i l l - f a t e d in te rcept o f the IAF Skyhawks.
-
25 The more significant event of the day in the long run
was the establishment of the SAY umbrella, The SA-3 was
much m o r e capable than the SA-2 at low altitude and was not
affected by the ECM pods which the United States had recently
made available to Israel.
During the moiith of July the IA?heavily attacked the
SAM sites in the Canal zone with partial success but at a
substantial price. The IAi? lost 6 aircraft to SAYS between 1 J u l y and 7 August 1970. 19
ISlXAELI VIEW OF THE: UMBRELLA
The political situation was moving toward a cease-
f i r e on tho Suez, and the U.S. Department of Defense advised
Israel that a cease-fire would provide the time required to
develop countermeasures for the SA-3 , 011 the evening of
7 A u g u s t 1970 the cease-fire went into effect. 20
The cease-fire was a welcome relief f o r most Israelis,
but some w e r e concerned with the situation which prompted it,
In the opinion of one Israeli military writer:
The War of Attrition ended when the clash between aircraft and Eg,y-ptianand Russian operated missile batteries resulted in stalemate, While the I A F only had to fight SA--2s o2erated by Egyptians, the planes still enjoyed supremacy, Russian crews, with SA-3 missiles, modern radar equipment and S U z f 3 radar-guided guns, changed the balance of power,
After the cease-fire the United States and Israel
worked together to improve -the Shrike anti-radiation missile
SO it c o u l d d e s t r o y the SA--3 tracking and guidance radar,
-
26
Ily ~ a . r b Z y197.1 thc I A F was co.nfident that with these Shrikes
The growing inventory of F - ~ s , A - 4 s , ECM pods,
Shrikes, and other armaments between 1971 and 1973 kept war-
time expectations of the IAF at a high level.
Since 1967, it was assumed that the A i r Force could, in the event of war, achieve aerial supremacy quickly, serve as the IDF's strategic arm and supply full support to ground forces. Defense plans were based on the Air Force as the major factor. So great was their self- confidence that no other possibility was conceivable. Their success in the War of Attrition, in which the Israel Air Force was the major offensive factor, only served to strengthen the feeling. The missile problem at the end of the War of Attrition was considered a mere episode.23
Not everyone was convinced this was SO. Ex-IAF com-
mander Ezer Weizman was quite concerned about the SAM
umbrella. This is his post rnortem on the War of Attrition:
The Egyptian surface-to-air missile system . . . could have been eliminated in 1970. It would have required scndin in infantry and armor, in addition to the air force.54
In another passage he said:
Throughout the War of Attrition, there were apprehen- sions about the Russians, which was why the ground forces w e r e not used f o r any decisive purpose, and also why the air force attacked here and there, causing the Egyptians-and itself-casualties and damage, but without employing its full strength.
As the war dragged on, without our Army finding a way
to put a stop to it, I,unlike others, became gradually
convinced that this was the first time we were not winning.
I said so countless times: we failed in this war. We
did not conprehend it correctly. When the Egyptians agreed
to a cease-fire, in A-;zgust1970, we interpreted it as an
admission on their part that they couldn't stand our
-
27
hoinbin;r a n y tnore. Without detracting f r o m the great suffer- i ng inflicted on them by o u r air force, I don't have the shadow of a doubt that the Egyptians wanted a cease-fire in o r d e r to move their missile system forward to the Canal, so that it could neutralize o u r air force when their u n i t s crossed the waterway. All this backs up both of my contentions. First, the War of Attrition, in which o u r best s o l d i e r s shed t h e i r blood, resulted in the Egyptians gaining a free hand, over a period of three years, to prepare f o r the great war of October 1973 ; if so, it is no more than foolishness to claim that we won the War of Attrition, On the contrary, f o r all their casualties, it was the Egyptians who got the best of it, Sacond, by our e r r o r s between March 1969 and August 1970, and, subsequently, by our tragic acquiescence when the Egyptians violated t he cease-fire and moved their missiles ahead, we, with our25 own hands, smoothed Egypt's path to the Yom Kippur War.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE EGYPTIAN A I R DEFENSE FOZCE
The erection of the SAY umbrella was the most threaten-
ing, b u t not the only important development in Egypt's air
defense capability. On 23 June 1969 the Egyptian A i r Defense
F o r c e (EADF) became a separate service, co-equal to the
Egyptian Army, Navy, and A i r Force, The EADF commanded the
territorial air defense units and the air defense w i t s which
accompanied the ground forces, It also had operational con-
trol of Air Force fighters on air defense missions as w e l l as
those on air defense alert. 26 The EADF gained considerable
operational experience during the War of Attrition and
meticulously noted every Israeli tactic. The EADF was
organized, trained and equipped f o r only one purpose, to
maintain air superiority over Egyptian territory and forces
in the expected war, The E.ADF knew that Egyptian fighters
did not have the range to knock out the airfields inside
-
28
27
Israel; therefore, they expected that they would have to
withstand the full force of an I A F assault in the next war.
By 1973 the NADF included 280 radar sites, 400 radars,
50 control centers and some 200,000 well trained officers and
men,28 The chain of command ran from E.ADF headquarters to
division, brigade, battalion (equal to a U . S , battery) then
launcher. In operation, the EADF was controlled by a number
of joint command posts at brigade level. The air defense
brigade commander was joined by an air force colonel in a
command post buried deep under reinforced concrete and sand,
A brigade normally controlled eight missile battalions and
110 t o 60 interceptors. Providing radar coverage f o r the
brigade were multiple Russian-made P-35 Barlock radars with 29a range of approximately 200 nautical miles.
The primary duties of the brigade control center were
to detect enemy aircraft and identify them by type, number,
and ECM being employed and to control friendly interceptors,
The brigade commander then directed one or more missile
battalions to engage each enemy flight depending upon its
type and strength. Missile battalion commanders were
additionally authorized to engage any target within their
coverage identified as hostile.30
The S.A-2 battery normally consisted of six single
missile launchers clustered about a control radar, The SA-2
Guideline was propelled by a first stage solid booster and
a second stage liquid sustainer giving it a slant range o f
25-30 miles (40-50 k m , ) , It was designed to attack targets
-
29
up to 80,000 feet. Reported modifications by Egyp.tian
engineers improved the S.A-2fs low altitude capability f rom
a minimum of approximately 3,000 feet down to about 1,500
feet and gave it an optical tracking capability, The missile
carried a 286 pound warhead which could be detonated by
contact, proximity or command.31 The relatively large size
of the missile (overall length of 35 feet) produced some l o w
altitude limitations; if the command guidance quickly
reversed f r o m a turn in one direction to a turn in the
opposite direction, the missile of t en w e n t out o f control
or even broke in half . This was due to overcontrol by the
large control surfaces which were designed to operate in
the much thinner air at high altitude. In spite of its
size, Egyptian missile crews demonstrated the capability
of taking an S.A-2 f r o m its truck transporter and placing
i t on its launcher in less than a minute.32
The SA-3 Goa was a smaller missile (22 f e e t ) with a
better l o w altitude capability than the SA-2. Powered by
a t w o stage, solid fuel motor, it could cover a range of
15-18 m i l e s (25-30 k m . ) and altitudes up to 40,000 feet.
Guidance was reported to be automatic radio command w i t h
semi-active radar homing in the terminal stage.33
Tne SA-6 Gainf'ul was a more modern and sophisticated
l o w altitude weapon than the S A - 3 . Mhile the ground radar
units of the S.A-2 and S.A-3 transmitted on fixed frequency
bands, the supporting radar of the SA-6 switched rapidly
-
3 0
L~cro; ;ss c v o r a l radar bands (betwecn C - b a n d and X-band). The
SA-6 was cornnand guided initially but switched to active
radar terminal homing once these systems acquired the target,
AQ S . A ~battery normally consisted o f f o u r highly mobile,
armored vehicle launchers with three missiles on each
vehicle plus a separate radar and control vehicle. 34
Complementing the S A - 2 , 3 and 6 missiles were two
t y p z s o f AA guns, the s-60 and the ZSU-23-4, and the shou lde r
f i r e d SA-7, The s-60 was a 57 mrn. single-barrel anti-air-
c r a f t gun capable of firing 105 to 120 rounds per minute.
It could engage targets visually o u t to 4 km. or out to 6 km.
when coupled with offcarriage radar.
The ZSLJ-23-4 w a s a four-barrel, 23 mm anti-aircraft
gun system mounted on an armored vehicle. It could engage
targets optically o r w i t h its integral radar o u t to 3 k m .
a n d could fire up to 4,000 rounds per minute. 35
The S A - 7 Grail (Saviet name-Strela) was a shoulder
launched, heat seeking air defense missile, similar to the
U . S , ficcieye missile. I t s m a x i m u m effective range was about
3.5 km. The relatively small size of this missile (4 feet,
6 inches long) severely limited the size of its warhead and
reduced its effectiveness. The SA-7 w a s employed primarily
by the Army to provide organic air defense at battalion and
company level. 36
Each Egyptian Army combat battalion normally had a
Strela platoon, which consisted of six firing teams; a team
-
was two men with one S.A-7. Because central command and con-
trol of these teams w a s not feasible, Strela teams in combat
were directed to fire at any aircraft they visually identified
as hostile. The danger that friendly aircraft could be
mistaken for hostile was a risk the Egyptians were willing
to accept.
Two additional measures taken by the EADF to prepare
f o r an Israeli attack were: first, they had complete air
defense units positioned in reserve near the expected c r i t i c a l
arcas; second, they trained combat repair teams to quickly
repa i r or replace damaged radar and supporting electronic
equipment. These preparations provided Egypt with recovery
capabilities it did not have in 1967 or during the War of
Attrition. 37
PR.EPARATION OF THE EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE
The preparation of the Egyptian Air Force ( E M ) for
t h e 1973 War was comparable to that of the E.ADF. The
rebuilding of the E.AF' after i t s destruction in a967 required
an increase in the number of pilots, planes, and airfields.
Soon after the 1967 War a large nurnber of student pilots
began training at airfields well removed f rom the Saez front
and in the Soviet Union. The Soviets quickly replaced the
aircraft lost in 1967, but: the pilot shortage took years
to overcome. The shortage was in experience as well as
in the number of pilots. Many of Egypt's most experienced
pilots had been killed trying to g e t their MIG-21s airborne
-
32
in t h o f i r s t hour of the 1967 War. (Shortage and inexperience
wcrc - two reasons f o r coinmitting the EA-??only on high priority
missions in the War of Attrition.) 38
From 1968 until October 1973 every combat pilot flew
20 hours per month; heavy emphasis was placed on countering
Israeli tactics observed in 1967 and during the War of
Attrition. In 1970 the Libyans converted Whellus Air Base,
which the US.AF had recently vacated, to a training center
for Arab pilots. Here Egyptian, Libyan and Russian aviators
trained in air-to-ground and air-to-air operations with the
trainer version of the MIG-21, the Nongol, and the Mirages
which Libya had purchased f r o m France.39
Two problems which the EAF w z s determined to overcome
were the lack of airfields and aircraft protection. In 1967
the EAF lost five airfields in the Sinai, and fou r more on
the west bank of the canal were unusable because they were
w i t h i n Israeli artillery range, The E.m, tne re fo re , construc-
t e d twenty new airfields, with at least t w o runways each.
At some bases sections of the nearby highway were reinforced
t o provide emergency landing st r ips , Dispersed about these
fields they constructed hangarettes of reinforced concrete
covered with sand and protected t h e entrance and exit with
massive d o o r s . These shelters were also w e l l vented to
minimize blast effects, In additioii, the EAF' trained and
equipped explosive ordnance teams and r u n w a y repair crews at 40each airfield.
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33
REBUILDING THE SYRICNJ. AIR FORCE
/ / I ( t ( L ) ~ i il f l i t r i ; or thv SM wL1:: : ; i r r i i l L ~ ~ ~ 01..Lo t i i a t tlie
EAJ but; on a smallor1 scale and at a s l o w e r pace. The
Syrians also constructed concrete hangarcttes, multiple
runways, and emergency landing strips; but from 1967 to 1970
t hey concentrated on airfields w e l l removed from the Israeli
border . I C 2 The pace of development increased after A i r Force
General Hafez Assad seized control of the Syrian government
on 18 October 1970. In January 1971 Assad visited Moscow in
scarch of additional weapons; S y r i a soon received substantial
numbers of MIG-~ZS,S U - ~ S , S A M s , and o t h e r equipment.42 It
was not until May 1973, however, -ci-,atthe Soviets made the
commitment to provide the S A F with an air defense system
which could negate Israeli a i r superiority in w a r . The
addition of the SA-6 to the S y r i a n umbrella was completed
in August and September of 1973.43
Egypt, too, received the SA-6 late in the summer of
1973. W i t h these weapons, the air defenses and air forces
of Egypt and Syria were prepared Lo take on t he IAF in the
air superiority battle. The a i r o r d e r of battle as of
6 October 1973 is shown in Table IT/.
SUMMARY OF THE .INTEH--dAR PERIOD
Egypt began the W a r o f Attrition t o extract a high
price f r o m Israel f o r continued occupation of the Sinai.
When the Israelis, ic turn, escalated the war to bombing
-
--- ---
34
TABLE IV
44
.AIR ORDER OF BATTLE, 6 OCTOBER 1973
-_.----I_-_-----___-----
- EGYPT
Fighter-bombers: IiI
su-7 ~ 1 ~ 4 7
130 200
45 120
1 A-4i F-4 MIG-19 60 -- i 1 Super Mystere MIG-21 160
550 -
J
Bombers : 4
TU-16 18 -- Ii Vautour 1 ~ ~ 2 8 4822
Helicopters:
12M I - 6 MI-8 7 0-
82
SAM Launchers:
SA-2/3 800 80SA-6
SA-7 920 1,800
AA funs:
k50ZTJ-23 ZSU-23-4 300
s-60,57 mm 550 1,300
-ISRAEL
150
140
12
50
352
8
8
12
30
50
75
770 212
-
35
ta.rl;c?Ls o u t s i d e Cairo, the Soviet Union was prompted to
j)rnciv i ( I ( : w h a l , 1 3 ~ y j ) / ,laclccd in 2.967-CL m i s s i i l c ! urnbrella stronc
c,nouf:h to challenge Israeli air superiority. By October
1373 the S o v i e t s had provided Syria with a similar, but
smaller, umbrella. These umbreIZas, reinforced aircraft
shelters and strong air base defenses convinced Egypt and
Syria that they were prepared to again meet Israel in the
battle f o r air superiority.
-
CHAPTER I1
ENDNOTES
LTG Mohammad Ali Fahmy (Egypt), A Yistory of the Egyptian Air Defense Force (Unpublished manuscript).
2Analysis of Military Balance (1967 through 1973), [London: The International Institute f o r Strategic Studies).
3Zeev Szhiff, October Earthquake, Yom Kippur 1973 (Louis Williams trans.) (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects Ltd., 19741, pp. 258-2590
4 ~ o b e r tJackson, The Israeli Air Force Story (London: Northumberland Press Ltd., 19701, pp. 221-226.
N o Dupuy (USA, Ret.), Elusive Victory (To be published in the near future), pp. 357-358.
William Stevenson, ZanekI A Chronicle of the Israel i A i r Force [New York: The Viking Press, 19711, p. 71; Edgar OBallance, The Electronic War in the Middle East: 1968-70 (Hamden: Archon Books, 19741, pp. 67-69;MG Chaim Herzog, The W a r of Atonement (Boston: Little, Brown and Coo, 1975), PP. 252-253.
8fiPuY, P. 363.
90tBallance, p. 69.
0 t Ballance, pp. 83-85.
OtBaZlance, p. 86;Dupuy, p. 365.
Strategic Survey 1.973 (London: The International Institute f o r Strategic Studies, 19741, p. 13; OtBallance,
-
37
13MG D o KO Palit (India), Return t o Sinai (New Delhi: Palit & Palit Publishers, 1974), pp. 25-26; OrBallance, p . 106,
16Charles Wakebridge, flElectrons Over Suez, Ordnance, May-June 1972, p. 475; Martin Miller, "The Israeli Air Force," Ordnance, September-October 1972, p. 128; OfBaZlance, p. 122.
z7Stevenson, p. 158; OrBallance, pp. 1l7-1l8.
18Fahmy manuscript; O'Ballance, p. 124.
l g ~ f ~ a ~ ~ a n c e ,pp. 126-127.
"Wakebridge, p. 475; OfBallance, p. 126.
21Schiff, p. 259.
"Schiff, p . 260.
23Schiff, pp. 258-259.
24Ezer Weizman, O n Eagles' Wings (New York: MacMillan Publishing Coo, Inc., 19771, p. 281.
25Weizrnan, pp. 274-275.
2 6 ~ a ~ y manuscript.
27LTG Mohammad Fahmy (E.ADF) in International Symposium on the 1973 October War (Cairo: Egyptian J nistry of War, 1976), p. 87.
28MG 3enjamin Peled (IAF) in Military Aspects of the Israeli A r a b Conflict (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1975), p. 242.
-
--- - -
38
2gRobert Hotz ( e d . ) , Both Sides of the Suez--Airpower in Mideast, Aviation Week and Space Technology (McGraw H i l l Publications, 19751, p. 20.
3~ota, 21.
"Ronald Pretty (ed.), Jane's Pocket Book of Missiles
(New York: Collier Books, 19761, p. 79.
32~otz, 21.
"pretty, p. 74.
341nsight Team of the London Sunday Times, The Yom Kippur W a r (New Y o r k : Doubleday and Company, 2 9 7 k m 8 6 ; Pretty, p. 680
35R. Do M. Furlong, ffEvolution in Air Defense Require- ments, International Defense Review, June 1974, p. 313.
36~retty,p. 76.
37~~t,,p. 25.
38Wakebridge, p. 473; Miller, P. 128.
39Stevenson, p. 140.
"Herbert J. Coleman, ffIsraeli Air Force Decisive in W a r , " Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 3 , 1973, p. 21; LTG Mahmond Moneim (E.AF) in International Symposium on the 1973 October W a r , (Cairo: Egyptian Ministry of War, 1976), P o 1320
42mPuY, P. 372.
43David Nicolle, "The Holy Day Air War,f1A i r Enthusiast International, May 1974, p. 241; Louis Williams (trans), Kippur (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1973), p. 124.
44C0L John Andrews (USAF', Ret. ), Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Interviewed on 3 and 4 May.
-
CHAPTER 111
THE 1973 BATTLE FOR AIR SUPERIORITY
The IAF gained air superiority in 1967 by an
offensive counterair campaign which destroyed most of the
Arab aircraft on the ground. A i r superiority became a
factor i n the War o f Attrition when Israel decided t o employ
the IAF to match the f i r e p o w e r o f large numbers of Egyptian
artillery. As the 1973 War began, the majority o f Egyptian
and Syrian firepower still resided in their artillery while
more of Israel's firepower was concentrated in its aircraft,
which were considered "flying artillery. rrl Thus, the 1973
battle f o r air superiority was centered upon Israel's efforts
to effectively deliver this firepower, and the k a b actions
to deny the 1A.F this freedom of operation. In the words of
Professor Handel :
I n 1973 the Israelis projected their preoccupation with air superiority onto the Egyptians and the Syrians, and were astonished to discover that the Arabs were content merely to negate Israel's control of t e skies, rather 9than to dominate the skies themselves.
A s we shall see, the battle ranged across the full
spectrum of counter air operations, but the crucial battle
was between Israeli fighter-bombers and Arab surface-to-air
defenses. As it turned out, a critical resource used by
39
-
the IDF against the SAM in 1973 was the ground weapon which
Israeli aircraft had, to a significant degree, replaced--
long range artillery. 3
THE .rsR.mLICONCEPT
Prior to the October War the IAF' did not appreciate
what a difficult, combined arms effort would be required
to suppress the Arab air defenses. As early as 1971 an IAF'
spokesman stated:
We are convinced we have the full answer to missiles. In July 1970, we didn't have it. Now there will be no serious problems. There will be losses, but smaller than those we sustained on the eve of cease-fire [in 19701. This should be proven within the first two or three hours of war. We will overcome the whole system within two or three days.4
Since the 1A.F considered the missiles vulnerable to
a concerted effort, they felt that air superiority would
thereafter be won primarily in air-to-air combat, at which
t h e I A F was clearly superior. In 1973 Israeli Intelligence
estimated that the EAF could not possibly challenge the I A F
in the air for several years. Without a.n effective counter
air capability in the EAF, the IAF believed the Egyptian Army
would be badly defeated if they tried to attack across the
S - ~ e z . This overconfidence and preoccupation with a i r
superiority caused the Israelis to misinterpret the signals
of impending war in early October 1973. 5
On 5 October 1973 there were reports of Syr ian fighter-
bombers moving to bases closer to the Golan Heights. In
-
spite of these and other reports on large scale Syrian and
.Egyptian f'maneuvors, If the Chief of Israeli Intelligence
br ie fcd the Cabinet on the 5th that the probability of war 6was f'Zow,'' As a result of this estimate Defense Minister
Dayan and Prime Minister Meir rejected a proposed mobiliza-
tion of Israel's reserve forces; nonetheless, they accepted
Chief of Staff Elazarfsrequest to place the IAF' on a C Alert, its highest state of readiness.7
The intelligence failure and the decision not to
mobilize were to have a significant impact upon employment
of t h e IAF in the first three days of the war, The mobiliza-
tion process was expected to expand the I D F within 72 hours
from 30,000 to 300,000mene8 A late decision to mobilize
r e q u i r e d the I A F to allocate a larger percentage of its
sorties to ground support until the reserve armor and
artillery units arrived at the front.9
THE ISRAELI D E C I S I O N TO NOT PRE-EMPT
At O k O O on 6 October Prime Minister Meir and Defense
Minister Dayan learned that there w e r e definite indications
that Egypt and Syria would attack at 1800 hours that day,
When the War Cabinet assembled at 0700 hours, General Elazar
advised that the A i r Force w a s ready to make a pre-emptive
strike and suggested 1300 hours, Mrs, Meir, supported by
Dayan, vetoed this suggestion, There appears to have been
at least two considerations against a pre-emptfve strike,
-
42
The first was strictly political. Mrs. Meir agreed with
Dayan that Israel would receive no support from the world
community, not even from the United States, if it appeared
Israel had started another war. lo A second consideration
was their belief that Israel would not be seriously hurt by
allowing the Arabs to strike first. General Elazar later
elaborated on this point. In 1967 he was one of several
leaders who advised Premier Eshkol that Israel could be
defeated if they allowed the Arabs to strike first in a
combined attack. However, on 6 October 1973, he advised
M r s . Meir that " 8 pre-emptive strike is very important from
the military point of view . . but, even if we do not
strike first we shall not lose the war."11
Overconfidence prompted the Israelis to reject the
strategy which had contributed so much to the achievement
of air superiority in 1967. In the words of Eeer Weiarnan:
"In 1967 we launched the first attack because we felt too
weak to withstand an Egyptian first strike; in 1973 we didn't land the first blow, because we felt strong, 4 2
Wnat the targets and effects of a pre-ernptive strike
would have been we can only speculate, but Zeev Schiff, a
prominent military writer in Israel, provided this opinion:
The strike would certainly have caused heavy Arab losses, but would not have prevented their offensive. Since the General Staff were watching the north, the preventive air attack would certainly have been against Syria. The A i r Force would probably have lashed out at missile batteries, headquarters and communications centers. This might have shortened the first stage of the war, but would not have prevented it. The Air Force would probably not
-
43
have sent its planes against Egypt at the same time. So, the canal crossing would have been carried out according to plan. 1 3
General Peled has revealed that after the decision
was made to not pre-empt, the IAF planned to launch a
counterair campaign on the morning o f the 7th. Approaching t
darkness at the expected start time of the war, 1800 hours,
14would preclude effective counterair strikes on the 6th.
When this is considered in conjunction with Mr. Schiffb
statement, the principal elements of IAF' strategy on the eve
of the war appear to have been:
1. Maintain Israelb air sovereignty to protect the
population and the mobilization of the reserve forces.
2. As in 1967, begin the counterair campaign against
Egyptian airfields, but attack the Egyptian SAM umbrella as
well.
3. Sappress the Syrian SAY umbrella to the extent
necessary to a l l o w close air support for the Israeli ground
forces.
Following the War Cabinet meeting, a partial mobiliza-
tion began about 1000 hours on the 6th, and the IAF remained
on alert awaiting the enemy attack. 12;
THE ARAB STRATEGY
The strategy o f Egypt and Syria was strongly influenced
by their respect f o r the capabilities of the I A F . First,
the coordinated attack was designed to force the Israelis to
-
44
divide their air and land forces between two fronts. Sacond,
both Egypt and Syria attacked across the r U l l length of t h e i r
bo rde r s to fbrther disperse Israelrs firepower over "broad
fronts. l6 Third, to prevent the I A F from disrupting the
crossing o f the Canal, the Egyptian plan required this
operation be conducted primarily under the cover of darkness.17
Finally, both Egypt a n d Syria planned to protect their armies
from the I A F by keeping them under the cover of their SAY
umbrellas.z8 For the Syrians, whose SAM umbrella included
numerous highly-mobile SA=6s, their objective was the re-
capture of the Golan Heights. With a lower percentage of
S.A-6s in its umbrella and the Canal to cross, the Egyptian
military objective was limited to a bridgehead of 15-20
kilometers.19
Egypt% ultimate goal was to recover the entire Sinai.
President Sadat recognized the superiority of the I A F outside
Egyptrs S.AM umbrella and knew that the entire Sinai might be
regained only by political, not military, means. 20
Egypt sought to fo rce Israel to negotiate by employing
the same strategy as in the War of Attrition-produce maximum
Israeli casualties. The Egyptian Army would seize a bridge-
head, dig in, and attrit the I D F in the expected counter-
attacks. The EADF would maintain air superiority over the
Egyptian Army and attrit as many Israeli aircraft as possible.
The EAF was to assist the EADF in the counterair r o l e and,
on selected missions, provide close a i r support for the
Egyptian Army. The EAF' was to be used somewhat sparingly
-
45
until the I A F was weakened by the constant hammering of the 21 a i r de f ense umbrella.
Tne S.AF was to be used more aggressively both in air-
to-air and air-to-ground operations. While the EAF normally
provided the second echelon defense behind the SAM umbrella,
the SAF was employed in the midst of their missile screen and
seldom left its protection. They also provided their A r m y 22with close air support on a modest but continuing basis.
THE COORDINATED ATTACK
The Egyptian and Syrian air forces were both heavily
committed to the initial attack on 6 October 1973. The IAI?
received tactical warning of the initial attack when the
radar on top of Mount H e r m o n detected approximately 100 Syrian
aircraft heading southwest f r o m airfields in the vicinity of
Damascus. Some 250 miles southwest of the Golan Heights,
over 200 Egyptian fighter-bombers were flying eastward at
such low altitudes that they were not seen until they crossed
the Canal. 23
24At 1405 hours on Saturday, 6.0ctober 1973, these
Syr i an and Egyptian aircraft began a coordinated attack upon
Israeli positions onthe Golan Heights and in the Sinai desert.
At the same time, those Israeli aircraft which had scrambled
at the first warning were turning toward the borders to meet
the attackers.
-
46
OVgR 'THE' GOLAV HEIGHTS, 6 OCTOBZR 1973
With MIG-21 interceptors flying top cover, the Syrian
SU-7 and MIG-17 fighter-bombers attacked Israeli armor,
infantry, command posts, and communication facilities through-
out the Golan Heights. A number of these attacks were
reportedly quite effective. Same Syr ian aircraft tried to
penetrate beyond the Golan Heights (which took them beyond
t h e i r SAV umbrella) to bomb targets in the Huleh Valley.
The Israelis state that these were shot down or driven off
arid that no bombs fell on Israel proper, over which the IAF
maintained air superiority.25 Somewhat surprisingly, the
IAF claimed only five Syrian aircraft were downed on the 26first day-all in air-to-air combat.
The Syrian S.AV umbrella was quite active against the
IAF on the first day, as will be discussed later, and the
MIG-21 top cover operated in the same area as the SAMs. Tne
Syr ians relied upon the identification-friend-or-foe (IFF)
system to differentiate between Syrian and IAF aircraft.
Although they did shoot down some friendly aircraft later in
27the war, this system apparently worked well the first day.
From the I A F point of view, the SAYS picked out the Israeli
planes devastatingly well.
Following a massive artillery barrage by 1500 guns at
1405 hours, three reinforced Syrian divisions with over 900
tanks attacked Israeli positions on the Golan Heights held
by 1000 infantrymen and less than 200 tanks.28 At this
-
point the IAF paid the price f o r Israel's late decision t o
mobilize, The I A F tried to provide the firepower needed by
t b c badly outnumbered ground forces without first suppressing
t h e SAM umbrella, An excellent description of the extreme
difficulty faced by the IAF on 6 October is provided by the
Insight Team of the London Sunday Times:
The A-4 Skyhawks played the heaviest ground-at tack r o l e , with Phantoms and Mirages giving air cover, The Israelis' targeting was so precise that tank commanders could call down air strikes, only a f e w yards from their positions. But losses were heavy f o r among the defense screen that the Syrians had moved up to their Golan lines was the latest Soviet mobile anti-aircraft missile, the SAM-6, And Israel had no counter to this: It had never been seen in combat anywhere in the world before, ln the first afternoon, Israel lost thirty Skyhawks and about t en Phantoms over Golan. All to S A M - ~ Sor the devastating flak of the mobile ZSU-23 antiaircraft batteries (also Soviet) which chewed up the Skyhawks if t h e i r pilots dropped to deck level in an effort to beat the S A M s , There w e r e rarely any parachutes . . .. The scale of losses was so clearly insupportable that in mid-afternoon, Chief o f Staff Elaear actually abandoned air strikes over Golan . . ., B u t without air strikes, there was no hope of salvaging the olan front: After a coupleof hours they had to resume. 2s
On their initial response to the Arab attack the IAE'
f'%f;hter-bornbers came in at medium altitudes, confident that
t h c i r JCCM pods (supplemented by more p o w e r f b l ECM on nearby
helicopters), chaff, and flares would suppress the Arab air
defenses.30 But, the Soviet designers of this S&V/AAA U M -
brella were one step ahead of these Israeli countermeasures.
As a result of technological surprise the IAF' was unable to
achieve air superiority over the Golan Heights.
-
48 TECHNOLOGICAL S"i3RPRISE
On 6 October 1973, the S.A-6 was being employed f o r
the first time anywhere in the world, and it was not affected
by the ECM, chaff, o r flares then employed by the IAF', 31 The
Israeli ECM equipment was designed f o r the S.A-2 and S.A-3 and
not f o r the wider frequency band over which the SA-6 m d a r
operated,32 Even if the ECM were effective, the SA-6 could
.have been launched under optical control. 33 Chaff, which
the I A F used extensively, also had to be fftunedff to the proper
frequencies, L e o , cut t o the proper lengths.34 The Israeli
f l a r e s were intended to divert the SA-7; they could not
affect the ffcommand plus semi-active radar homing guidance!'
35of the S A - 6 .
When compared with earlier SAM'S, the SA-6 was faster,
more maneuverable, had a better lowcaltitude capability, and
w a s more difficult to spot, Because the second-stage ramjet
engine burns inside the first stage rocket chamber, the S A - 6
d i d not have the telltale fire plume of the SA-2 and S.A-3. 36
The SA-6 scored a number of kills on I s r ae l i aircraft;
but its greatest contribution to the Arab effort was %end-
ing the Israeli attack planes into their standard high-G
split-S evasive dive to the deck where the ZSLJ-23s chewed
them up. ff37 The ZSU-23-4 radar, like that of the SA-6,
operated over a wide frequency band which was not affected by
Israeli ECM at the start of the war.
The S.A-7 was not of itself a surprise because it
had been used in Vietnam; however, its appearance in the 1973
-
49 War included two new capabilities: filters were added to
counter flare decoys, and it was launched in salvos of four
or eight frommulti-barreled racks on top of armored
carriers. The only weakness of the SA-7 was its small war-
head which damaged without knocking down many aircraft. 38
I A F TACTICS AND LOSSES, 6 OCTOBER 1973
Because of heavy initial losses, the I A F stood down
for about two hours and reviewed t h e i r tactics in an attempt
to find a means of working around the enemy capabilities.
In the last light of the afternoon the IAF resumed close
support over the Golan with minimum altitude tactics. They
approached the Golan at tree-top height in a sweeping hook
over Jo rdan ian territory to attack the Syrian columns in the
flank, then continued in a left turn and egressed to the
southwest. The use of napalm and cluster bomb units (CBU)
minimized the requirement to rrpop-upftfor ordnance delivery.
Minimum altitude, high speed, and a single pass reduced air-
craft vulnerability but increased the difficulties of target
acquisition and accurate weapons delivery. These tactics,
therefore, did not provide as effective close support, but
they reduced the attrition rate and so had to be used until
the a i r defenses could be suppressed.39
In an estimated 281 ground support sorties over the
Golan on 6 October, the I A F lost 30 to 40 aircraft f o r a l o s s
rate of 10-14percent. O The loss rate was highest in the
first hour and a half and decreased with the revised tactics.
-
An estimate of the l o s s rate with modified tactics was
"about one Skyhawk down in twelve sorties" or about 8 per-
41cent,
MOUNT HERMON--ANOTHEX SURPRISE
The Syrians achieved more than technological surprise,
They also took by surprise the important Israeli observation
post on Mount Hermon. Syrian commandos in four MI-8 heli-
copters assaulted the mountain top and overran the 55-man
carrison in a little over two hours on the first afternoon
o:r tho war. In this action the Israelis lost the radar which
looked northeast into Syria and the vantage point from which
air and artillery strikes could have been directed across 42much of the Golan H e i g h t s .
GOLAN S'UMMARY, 6 OCTOBER 2973
To summarize the first day on the northern front, the
S.AF, primarily with surface-to-air weapons, concentrated their
forces and initially achieved air superiority over the
critical area o f the land battle, With revised tactics the
IAF reduced their ?ass rate to a level which was acceptable
only because of the desperate situation on the ground,
OVER THE SINAI, 6 OCTOBER 1973
When compared to the G o l m j there were some distinct
differences in the air battle on 6 October over the Suez;
but the end result was quite similar, The Egyptian aircraft
-
5s
initially penetrated beyond their air defense umbrella to
strike military targets throughout the occupied Sinai but
suffered moderate losses in doing SO. The IAF'maintained air
superiority over the occupied Sinai, but w a s unable to
achieve it within Egypt's air defense umbrella.
Over 200 EAF' aircraft crossed the Canal at 1405 hours
and proceeded at minimum altitude to targets in the Sinai.
These strikes had been well rehearsed against representative
targets erected in the Libyan desert. (This was quite
similar to IAF training f o r the 1967 War.) Priority targets
were the larger airfields in the Sinai (El Meliez, El Arish,
R a s Nasrani, Bir Tamada, Ophira, and Akaba), air defense
batteries, radars, command posts, tank depots, lines of
communication, and artillery. (FROG missiles were fired at
Bir Gifgafa and Tasa bases.) Following the Israeli example
of 1967, the Egyptian A i r Force employed a rocket-propelled 43bomb to crater the runways.
Those Israeli aircraft which did not launch at the
first warning were apparently well protected in hardened
bunkers, but reports on the results of the EAF attack are
limited.
The EAF commander, Lieutenant General Moneirn, later
claimed Egypt had lost only five aircraft while damaging
targets which included six runways, twelve Hawk missile
positions, and two radar stations. 44 Israeli and other
sources claim the EM' lost 16 fighters and 20 helicopters
on the first day. 45 For the fighters this was a l o s s rate
-
52 46of 5-7 percent, While this loss rate was not prohibitive,
: i t was hrifyh considcring tho dement of surprise the E.AF
enjoyed in striking the first blow, It also reflected con-
tinued Israeli air superiority east of the Egyptian SAY
umbrella.
The initial EAF attack disrupted somewhat the IAF*s
support of the ground forces on the Canal, 47 One of the
m c t i o n s of the Bar-Lav Line was to act as a trip-wire to
provide an eight-minute response time for fighters to hit
targets which attempted to c r o s s the Suez C a n a l , but the
first I A F airstrike on the canal occurred 26 minutes after 48tho w a r began.
There was no shortage of targets f o r the IAF.
Eight thousand Egyptian soldiers had crossed the C a n a l in
rubber dinghies, and 20 bridges were being constructed (10
f o r infantry and 10 for vehicles). The first IAI? targets
w e r e the bridges, and second were t