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The Ability of Independent State Security Actions

With Respect to the United Nations Security Council

Marcus P. Williamson

December 2008

Introduction, Definitions, and Outline

Introduction

The actions taken by allied actors in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 have posed

many questions as to the role of the United Nations in the post Cold War international

relations. The possibility of unilateral measures superseding the role of the United Nations

Security Council has been brought to the forefront of global security in the 21st Century. This

concern brings us to the question postulated by the heading given to #6 of our Term Paper

Essay Titles „[d]id the allied interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 undermine

the Security Council‟s role or do they reflect the fact that major powers will always pursue

their own security interests irrespective of international regulation of the use of force?‟

This question‟s importance is undisputed in determining the abilities of individual

actors and the role that the United Nations (UN) is able to play according to international law.

If there is no ability for the UN to act in security situations that are applicable to individual

states, then the UN limited to acting in a confined aptitude. If individual players did act

outside their defined abilities than consequences to those actions should be addressed by the

„international community‟. The conclusions that are reached here will show that the actions

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taken in these specific instances were within the bounds defined by the international

regulation of the use of force, and did so without undermining the United Nations Security

Council‟s self-defined role while protecting their own national security interests.

Definition of Terms

In investigating this question, three terms must be defined. They are: 1) the role of

the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 2) major powers, and 3) international

regulation on the use of force. Each will be looked at in turn, and the definitions provided

will be the basis for understanding as they are used throughout the paper.

The role of the UNSC is defined in this respect by many different citations all sourced

from the United Nations Charter (UNC, 1945), the first of which will be mentioned here, but

others will be discussed at length later in this essay. The first aspect of this definition comes

from Chapter VII of the UNC (Ibid.) which states „The Security Council shall determine the

existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make

recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and

42, to maintain or restore international peace and security (Article 39).‟ While

straightforward in its declaration of the right to determine what is and is not an aggressive

action or a breach of international security, one important note is that the UNSC is not

allowed to delegate this power to another actor, be it a nation, state, collective security group,

or other (Sarooshi, 1999: 33). Maintaining this power is limited to actions taken by the UN

as well. As it will be discussed later in the second section of this discussion, the role of

independent actors plays a significant factor in determining the answer to this paper‟s

premise.

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The second term that must be quantified is that of a „major power‟. This ambiguous

term is not limited to individual states, but could range from large multi-national corporations

to collective security groups. In order to help classify what a major power is for the purposes

and limitations of this discussion, a major power will include nuclear states as outlined by

Coate, et Al. (1997: 26) for the purposes of military superiority and collective security groups

such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but will not include economic

groups such as MNCs (Multi-National Corporations) or the European Union. While these

economic groups are major powers, the restrictions of this essay force the discussion to be

limited to only military powers. Further investigation into the ability of economic powers

needs to be developed, but will not be mentioned here.

The final term that will be defined for the purposes of this essay is that of

international regulation on the use of force. UNC Chapter VI (1945) brings about the initial

grounds for defining this by stating that „[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the

inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a

Member of the United Nations (Article 51)‟ and „[s]hould the Security Council consider that

measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it

may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore

international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and

other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations (Article 42)‟.

This recognition by the UNC allows for individual members of the UN to act under their own

accord under self-defense actions. While this becomes confused when regarding the Chapter

VII ability of the UNSC to define what its own abilities are in certain situations, further

discussion of this term will occur later in this paper to aid in clarifying this issue.

Understanding the Post-Internationalism Approach

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Post internationalism is a theory presented by James N. Rosenau in his book

Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (1990). The ideals listed

in this work specify the essential tenants of post internationalism. They are: the shifting

continuity of international relations (p 67), the issues with fixed theories that only work in the

current established international system (p 21), the rising power of SFAs (sovereignty free

actors) (p 114), and the development of relations between groups of all sizes and levels

internationally (p 141).

Again, due to the limitations of this essay, a full discussion of this theory is not

possible. While the inferences of this idea are clearly displayed here, the specifics are not.

This essay is not meant to be an introduction of this approach, but merely a superficial

application of it. Using this supposition will help to apply the ideas that are discussed within

the framework of the hypothesis due to the fact that the military engagements mentioned

were not direct wars by a state against a state, but rather actions of a allied group of states

against SFA groups. This shifting policy is not limited to these two engagements, but does

present itself as specific examples of modern conflict around the globe.

Outline

The question that is posed as the premise for this essay is did the allied interventions

in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 undermine the Security Council‟s role or do they

reflect the fact that major powers will always pursue their own security interests irrespective

of international regulation of the use of force? The evidence that will be presented

throughout the body will come to the resounding conclusion no. Investigating the UNSC‟s

delegation of state security to individual security collectives and individual nations, we will

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find that Regional security groups come first for defense. While the UNSC‟s role is not

undermined in any way, it is limited in the actions that it may take in certain situations. The

ability of these sovereign groups has a higher ability though international law than the UN,

and will always act first before the UNSC has the opportunity to act upon a situation.

The approach to the discussion will include an investigation into the difference

between humanitarian and security actions, with specific regard to the UN‟s shifting role in

such actions since the end of the Cold War. That discussion will be followed by an

investigation into the role of „post-internationalism‟ as presented by J.N. Rosenau. Through

this process, we will see that the ability of the UN to perform in security situations is limited

to actions against states and not the all important role that sovereignty-free actors (SFAs) are

portraying in modern international politics.

Security in the Post-Internationalist World

The UN has had a shifting definition with regards to its role in peacekeeping since

1992. With the combined effects of the end of the Cold War and UNOSOM, The tendency

has tended toward humanitarian interests, and shifted from the original outline of state

security in the global setting (Murphy, 1996: 284). This has presented a new look at the task

outlined in the UNC (Article 2) and brought about the implications given in the treaties

formed during and following WWII defined throughout Chapter V of the UNC. Looking at

this shift through a post-internationalist view, it will become clear that the current situation of

state security is legally protected not by the UN, but by individual states and collective

security agreements.

The UN‟s Shifting Humanitarian Role

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Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated in 1999 that humanitarian concerns

will take precedence over state sovereignty, thus shifting the ability of the UNC away from

protecting states to defending individual persons (Miller, 1999). These main factors have led

to the UN‟s limited role in military actions. Without the express demand for a humanitarian

intervention, there is no legal precedence established for force. The actions taken by

UNOSOM in 1992-93 have provided the tipping point in the situation. While deliberately a

humanitarian action, the difficulty of securing the situation militarily allowed for individual

nations to withdraw their military support. The ability to do this without the major power

balancing threat provided a shocking reality for planners within the UN structure. Unable to

require nations to commit troops to individual actions, the constraints of acting in the era at

the „end of history‟ proved to be anything but.

The UN mission to continue working through Article 51 of the UNC (Ibid.), the use

of force has been delegated to individual states or collective security groups is a member of

the UN is attacked by an outside force. This limitation of the use of force has left the ability

of the UN and its member countries to be perceived as victims waiting for an attack. Without

„first-strike‟ capability, the ability for preventative measures to be enacted by state-actors is

limited. The threat that comes from surrounding predatory players who can prey on others

that are confined by the inability to legally act unless attacked first.

Continuing through Article 42 (UNC, Ibid.), the UNSC has the right to „pass the

buck‟ as it were when committing to the actual conflict. With „permission‟ from the UNSC,

and individual state or security collective can engage in military conflict legally. While this

statute reads as a pro-state security measure, the threat that now exists with possible

engagements with SFAs promotes a legal problem. State on state action has been reduced in

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the latter half of the 20th

Century, but this new arena of conflict has stranded the UN in its

actions due to the limits of its own charter.

Fenton (2004) continues with this thought. Through the „norm of non-intervention‟

that has been the accepted action of interstate engagements provides the basis for the UNC (p

6). Due to the limits that it introduces to specific situations, the UN role has been steadily

selective over the past 20 years. With UN military actions now specifically targeting post-

conflict and humanitarian civil confrontations, the role for state security measures has been

left to individual nations. The most capable of which are major powers.

UN General Assembly resolutions 2625 (1971) and 61 (1986) have outlined the threat

considered by international sovereign states. These dictate that the UN condemns terrorist

actions, and will allow for individual states to act within their own best interests to contain

the threat posed to them. While these resolutions were introduced at a time before the global

security shifted its focus towards these actors, they have been applied to modern conditions.

This has led to the ability to portray any enemy as a „terrorist‟ combatant, and lead to global

identification of small groups as terrorist organizations, after which they can be legally

engaged under the premise of state security.

The ability for states to act within their own self interest is also contained within the

tenants of the UNC. Under Chapter V, major powers are able to act in their own self interest.

Outlining the abilities of the five permanent members of the UNSC, Chapter V also

specifically states actions that major powers may impose. Among these are: armament

limitations on individual states (Article 26) and a rather vague implication of superiority on

international issues (Article 24). This specifically gives major powers the right to not only

act independently, but also influences the UN in need specific actions. While previously

checked by global balance, this check has been relatively eliminated. While the uni-polar

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hegemony that now exists is most likely transitionary (Mittelman, 1996: 233), the current

situation that it presents is a concern for major powers to act within their own interests.

Understanding that the most potent threat to states are SFAs, the ability for a nation to

act in their own interest under the auspices of state security takes precedence. These means

are within the realm of international law, and a topic that the UNSC is willing to allocate to

individual players and security groups for their initial action until a humanitarian need can be

established.

International Politics Following 11 September 2001

„We will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the

purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions

will be enforced -- the just demands of peace and security will be met -- or action will

be unavoidable. And a regime [Iraq] that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its

power.‟

-United States President George W. Bush,

Address to the United Nations General Assembly, 12 September 2002

This idea has been presented throughout current United States foreign policy,

particularly in respect to the actions in Afghanistan since 2001 and Iraq since 2003. The

standard previous to this for the United States had been the shifting consideration between

isolationist and participation. Now that consideration has shifted to the thought of

unilateralist verses multilateralism (Anderson, 2004: 36-7). Now commonly referred to as

the „Bush Doctrine‟, this strategy has been implemented not only in reaction to the attacks on

the United States on 11 September 2001, but as a reaction to repeated acts against the United

States for many years (Cooley, 2002: 196). The results of previous engagements through

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Cold War proxy battles had left a strong SFA that had taken its mission abroad, built on the

foundations of what Pakistani Ambassador to the UN Shamshad Ahmad referred to as a

„Kalashnikov culture‟ (Risen and Miller, 2001).

The thought of „4th

Generation‟ warfare has embraced both the tenants of post-

institutionalism and the „Bush Doctrine‟. As international relations shifts from the nation

state status quo that has been in effect since the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648, the

continuous change that is a standard acceptance of many differing theories now must be

adapted to include not just „sub-state actors‟, but SFAs, or sovereignty free actors (Mansbach,

2004: 21).

At the end of the Cold War, the United States redeveloped a policy enacted since the

end of World War II that was devoted toward the idea of multilateral engagements with

problem states. The idea that states could be better influenced through relations by many

member nations, formed typically in collective security groups such as the UN or NATO,

usually was enacted through strict sanctions against organized states that possess formal

governmental leadership. By doing this, the idea of threat could be a deterrent towards actors

that might possibly enact irrational behaviors that endanger outside groups of people. As

stated by the United States National Security Council,

“[T]he first duty of the United States Government remains what it always has

been: to protect the American people and American interests. It is an enduring

American principle that this duty obligates the government to anticipate and counter

threats, using all elements of national power, before the threats can do grave damage.

The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling

the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty

remains as to the time and place of the enemy‟s attack (United States National

Security Council, 2006).”

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Along with the idea of a preventative mission against potential enemies, the United

States has included a stance on promoting democracies in nations that are currently under a

style of unbalanced totalitarian regime. With this, the American government has left the

clause purposefully vague as to be redefined time and time again to fit the needs of specific

situations. With the current war in Iraq against terrorist insurgencies that threaten the

fledgling Iraqi democratic government, the United States has determined to maintain a

military presence in the area in order to ensure the safe development of this pro-American

democratic government. As the theory that fair and impartial democracies are inherently

peaceful toward each other, the hope is that the favorable governments that replace irrational

and imbalances tightly controlled ones will pose a smaller threat towards the United States

and their economic interests in the region.

Preventative war policies that the United States has decided to enact is an

announcement to the world that they are now willing to take on anyone who may stand in

their path. Without the needs of collective security groups, the United States feels as though

a unilateral course of action is the best way to ensure their long term security around the

world. Their role in these groups has long been as the major contributor in arms, supplies,

and manpower to aid in actions that are requested by the UN and others. As such, the

international community has reacted with a level of distrust, particularly by those who are not

in step with the current policies enacted by America. While the lone superpower idea had an

air of potential peace building for the future, the reality is that it has not concluded as such.

The United States will only feel secure as long as the rest of the world matches their vision

for the entire world, and will stand by with force if it is not met.

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Summary and Concluding Thoughts

The military focus of the UN since the end of the Cold War has been on humanitarian

concerns, not those of individual state security. Since the UNSC has allowed for independent

actors to proceed in military actions in both defensive and pre-emptive to ensure state

security against SFAs, there has been the relinquishing of authority to major powers that

allows for them to act in their own self interest without undermining the UNSC. This ability

is not surprising due to the fact that the five permanent members of the UNSC all have

individual nationalistic interests at heart, and desire the ability to keep state security a

domestic issue.

The development of 4th

Generation warfare in the post-international age has brought

about a problem for the UN. While established under the auspices of a global war, the

development of SFA importance in the modern world has made much of the original tenants

of the agreement that established the UN into doubt. This opening for states to act against

smaller groups that have been declared enemy combatants of any major nation has set a

dangerous precedence.

Thoughts on Future Occurrences

Terrorism has become a „catch-all‟ phrase in the modern world that is used to collect

international sympathy and justify military actions taken around the globe. The ability to

define any section of an enemy group as a threat to national security by determining that it is

a terrorist group allows for legal unilateral actions to be committed. The new „red herring‟ of

terrorism has become the scapegoat that permits this to happen.

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While 4th

Generation warfare has established itself as the future of global disorder and

peace threat, the auspices of terrorism are not practical justifications for war (Casus Belli).

The ability for global military action needs to be properly defined. As questioned in the

introduction of this paper, the UN is limited to acting in a confined ability that needs to be

investigated further. The premise of this paper looking at the legal aspects of war engaged

beginning in 2001 and 2003 have been shown as legal, but not within the keeping of the

intent of the law. Allowing for a few independent major powers to act despite the best

interests of global security is a key concern for future plans, and is one that cannot be ignored

when discussing the potential of international peace keeping and conflict resolution.

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