The 1930s French Christian Philosophy De

7/21/2019 The 1930s French Christian Philosophy De

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-1930s-french-christian-philosophy-de 1/11

1

The 1930s French Christian Philosophy Debates:Relevance, Present Condition, Brief History and Main Positions

by Gregory B. Sadler, Assistant Professor,Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Ball State University at Indiana State Prison

(Presentation made at UI of C. Draft: not to be quoted from or cited without author =s permission. Copyright 2007 by Gregory B. Sadl

To start by lifting a concise opening line from the Jesuit Gerald McCool, A[a] general discussion of Christian

philosophy would be a very large topic indeed.@1 Even the topic I intend to narrow it to, the 1930s debates about Christian philosophy, carried out largely among French Roman Catholic philosophers, has spawned, as one important participant in thdebates would later remark, Aan immense literature, which will not be easy to command.@2 Even to adequately understand full range of the more important positions articulated in the course of the debates requires not only study of a large, thoughmanageable, number of books, articles, and conference proceedings, most of which remain at present untranslated, but also present a considerable amount of leg-work, following out bibliographical leads, methodical, often fruitless, digging throughstacks of journals, and acquiring texts that have become relatively rare. Given these possible practical deterrents, beforediscussing the current state and prospects for study of these debates, perhaps it would be best to explain why the 1930sChristian philosophy debates merit attention. After addressing these two matters, I will give a very brief overview of thehistory of the debates, and then outline some of the main features of the positions of the debate =s most important participant

The Relevance of the 1930s Chr istian Philosophy Debates . Let me concede from the beginning that there are some philosophical viewpoints, traditions, and communities whic

will regard the debates as of no philosophical interest or value, lacking relevance to their current research projects andinterests, unintelligible when translated into their own particular philosophical idiom. The debates might be exiled to the provinces of Philosophy of Religion or to the History of Philosophy, regarded by some as unimportant areas of philosophy.Alternately, since the debates were about Christian philosophy, forms of thought taking part in, or at least the fruits of, a lontradition regarding religious faith, doctrine, revelation, and tradition as simply incompatible with philosophy, the debates co be written off from the start as non-philosophical. It is also important to recognize that the investment of time, energy, andstudy required these days to acquire and maintain their research specializations will practically preclude many philosopherstheologians, and historians from taking much more than a polite collegial interest in the 1930s debates.

In a pluralistic philosophical setting, a place might be set aside for a broad though underdefined category of Christia philosophy, and the 1930s debates could be relegated there. In this view, suggested recently by the late Joseph Owens andderived from his reinterpretation of Gilson=s and Maritain=s positions in the debates, Christian philosophy can be regarded aanalogous to all the other philosophies bearing adjectives, e.g. Marxist philosophy, Existentialist philosophy, Greek philosophy, Analytic philosophy, each of them a broad type of philosophy historically conditioned in their development by basic interest and backgrounds of those engaging in them.3 Christian philosophy, which could be further divided intoCatholic philosophy, Lutheran philosophy, Reformed philosophy, and so forth, would then be the kind or style of philosoph philosophers happening to be Christian would develop, study, and pass on to new generations. This would, however, simpskirt the question why Christian philosophy and the 1930s debates should be of any interest to those not already working in,considering entrance into that field. Again, there are practical aspects that must not be overlooked. Even for philosopherswho are practicing and believing Christians, study of Christian philosophy in general could be, and is by many, regarded as bad career choice, a way of placing oneself in an intellectual ghetto, isolated from one=s peers and colleagues by one=simprudent choice of philosophical problems, texts, figures, research projects, and even language.4

One might make a case for the importance and relevance of the debates by noting that among the debates interlocutowere numbered many of the brightest and most productive minds on the contemporary French philosophical and theologicalscenes. The case might also be argued by pointing out that discussions and even smaller debates about Christian philosophhave continued to arise, and that at least some of these are informed by at least some of the viewpoints articulated in the 193debates. Both of these might be done rather quickly by providing a list of prestigious names. From the debates: EtienneGilson, Jacques Maritain, Maurice Blondel, Gabriel Marcel, Joseph Maréchal, Henri de Lubac, Yves Congar. From morerecent discussions: Adriaan Peperzak, Joseph Owens, Ralph MacInerny, Jean-Luc Marion, Alvin Plantinga, Paul Ricoeur,Germain Grisez. The trouble is that this really amounts to name-dropping, which may serve some purpose if it attracts thoswho recognize those names to an interest in the topic, but which is always a hazardous gamble. Consider one=s possiblemortification if the names one invokes do not evoke any recognition, let alone interest, in the audience one sought to impres



2

Of course, the debates, as I will argue, provide considerable interest simply from a historical perspective. Theyengaged a broad portion of French intellectual life for half a decade, and a full history of the debates, which has yet to bewritten, would be a significant contribution both to the history of Continental philosophy and the history of Christian philosophy. They could present a considerable interest to historians as well as philosophers for another important reason,namely that two of the key issues the debates turned on were the adequate and proper interpretation of the history of Christiathought, and the very relevance of history to the problem of Christian philosophy. Accordingly, some of the participants incommentators on the debates, quite a few of them historians of ideas in their own right, articulated quite sophisticatedreflections on the discipline of history itself. This points towards another reason why the historical interest of the debates c

raise their contemporary relevance. For many who work in the history of philosophy or in the history of ideas more broadlythe goal and motivation is not simply to better understand a past intellectual milieu, to reconstruct a past system of ideas, to penetrate the thoughts of a past thinker simply for their own sake, but to dialogue with the past, to derive from it and tounderstand what may be of value in the present, even what may make better sense of the present.

All of this said, there are many for whom the issue or problem of Christian philosophy is relevant. Those who arelikely to sense its importance are those who have realized, whether by metaphilosophical reflection and critique, in the coursof their philosophical practice, or through adopting the views and theses of other philosophers who hold this view, that philosophy is never reducible to a set of techniques or methods, carefully circumscribed problems or objects of study, or evto a dominant school or tradition, but that, even if only implicitly, doing philosophy involves something more comprehensivand reflexive. Most likely, these will be either practicing and believing Christians, or those who while not belonging to aChristian community discern something in and are attracted to Christian thought. About the latter, Adrian Peperzak recent

wrote, putting it well: AA Christian who philosophizes cannot avoid the question of what philosophy has to do with confessiand living the Christian faith. . . Our question accompanies the entire thought-life of any Christian philosopher who is serioabout both the philosophical and the Christian aspects of his or her existence. The question must constantly be posed,clarified, and analyzed in new ways.@5

The question has indeed been addressed in a variety of new ways, as perusal of the recent literature discussingChristian philosophy indicates, but, with some notable exceptions, among which I would include Peperzak, recent discussiohave not made radically new and original contributions to understanding the issue going beyond those of the 1930s debates.Quite frankly, a significant portion of the Anglophone literature, and even some Francophone literature, is markedly philosophically inferior in comparison with the better literature of the debates, and the cause of this is quite often that theseauthors have only superficial or very partial knowledge of the debates, in some cases none at all. The 1930s debates possetheir perennial importance precisely because the issues raised by Christian philosophy were never before and have never sin

been examined, discussed, meditated upon and debated to the same depth, in as much detail, with as much originality andscope of thought, with as much deliberate focus, and with the inclusion of so many differing perspectives as they were in theFrench debates.

I envision four main fields of contemporary scholarship that will be particularly interested in studying and setting thown developing thought in dialogue with the many voices of the 1930s French Christian philosophy debates. First, thoseworking explicitly within the Catholic intellectual tradition can always benefit from renewed contact with portions of thattradition that may have been neglected. Second, there is a longstanding and growing body of Protestant (particularlyReformed Protestant, but also Anglican and Wesleyan) scholarship on the issue of Christian philosophy, with forums in philosophical and theological journals, the Society of Christian Philosophers, and other more denominational societies. Thirthere is Anglophone scholarship in the field of Continental philosophy, which can assuredly benefit by a more comprehensivview of 20th century French philosophy, realizing, for instance, that the recent Atheological turn of phenomenology@ not only

represents nothing radically new, but also has intellectual roots in a broader context of French philosophy, roots often excisin its transplantation to Anglophone soil. Fourth, there is the wider field of those working in disciplines such as philosophyreligion, history of religion, and religious studies.

The Present Condit ion of the Debates

Literature As mentioned previously, several impediments to study of the debates currently exist, impediments that would a

fortiori render teaching courses about the debates, whether at a graduate or undergraduate level, rather difficult. Theseimpediments can be divided into four categories: translation; bibliography; availability of documents; and systematic andunbiased introductory overviews of the materials. All of these, of course, reinforce each other. Casual students of thedebates, lacking access to or even knowledge of many of the documents, or the linguistic capacities to easily read them, quit



3

understandably rely on overviews of the debates that ignore or misrepresent not only portions of the debates, but the majoritof the debates. From some of the available Anglophone literature, it would be very easy to draw the conclusion that thedebates took place only between Gilson and Bréhier or Gilson and Van Steenberghen, with Maritain brought in on Gilson =sside. The reality is that there were quite arguably two different rationalist positions and at least seven major Catholic positions articulated during the debates, and by my count over 50 Francophone interlocutors between 1931-35.

At present, with the exception of most of Gilson=s, Maritain=s, and Marcel=s contributions, the key documents of thedebate remain untranslated, and this leads to two deleterious consequences. The first is a sort of vicious circle, in which it easily assumed that, if the documents were of any merit, they would already be available in translation, and since they are no

so available, they are not studied, and their merits remain unrealized except by those who do not require translations. Thesecond is that Gilson=s and Maritain=s positions are fairly well known, and their rather partial interpretations of the debates auncritically accepted, the effect being ignorance of the other positions critical of their own, most particularly Blondel=s, butalso those of Sertillanges and Van Steenberghen. Adding to the problem for potential researchers is the already mentionedincompleteness of bibliographies on the debates, and the difficulties in acquiring many of the documents. Lastly, but of keimportance for those who would be initiated into, or commence on their own, study of the debates, the few overviews availaare rather selective, some quite clearly biased. What would be needed are systematic overviews that do justice to thecomplexity of the issues and the plurality of perspectives in the debates.

My current research project aims to remedy this current unfortunate situation. Over the last several years, myactivities have focused primarily on the first three impediments. I would not claim at this point to have a fully comprehens bibliography on the debates, let alone the broader topic of Christian philosophy, but I would hazard that it is presently the m

complete one available. Generating the bibliography is a fortunate side-effect of tracking down and assembling a library othe Christian philosophy literature, in some cases by photocopying, in others purchasing, source documents. Gaps in existi bibliographies have been filled in part by what one might call facetiously the philosophical equivalent of detective work,following out leads that yield other leads, methodically searching through decades of particular journals, looking around in books shelved contiguously with other known sources.

Perhaps of more interest, I have been translating documents from the debates, beginning with the most essential onefrom the first phase of the debates and I am near to sending out a book-length manuscript with a historical and thematicintroduction to the documents. I intend to continue translating the debates= documents with the aim of eventually making aor as many of them as is feasible, available to the Anglophone philosophical community. As a related project, I also intendeventually to translate documents comprising a later, but related debate about Christian philosophy taking place amongFrancophone Reformed Protestants in the 1940s and 50s. In addition to the translation work, my current plans include two

book-length studies. One of these will provide a full intellectual history of the 1930s debates. The other will attempt to shthat Gilson=s, Maritain=s, and Blondel=s positions on Christian philosophy are complementary to each other, rather thanconflicting, as they believed.

A Bri ef H istory of the Debates Commentators on the debates almost unanimously fix the official commencement of the debates in the March 1931

meeting of the Société française de Philosophie, but, as usual for important intellectual debates, their groundwork was previously laid, specifically in the relations and previous clashes between the thinkers who would become involved, in theirongoing and for many of them longstanding research into the issues raised during the debates, and in the increasing prevaleof use of the term AChristian philosophy.@ Here, noting a few connections must suffice. Blondel had been discussing the possibility of Christian philosophy for more than three decades, developing his philosophy of action, regarded by many as aexample of Christian philosophy, influencing a number of Thomists6 and drawing attacks by many others, including Jacque

Maritain, who clashed publicly with Blondel both in the 1920s and during the 1930s debates. Etienne Gilson, a formerstudent of the rationalist Léon Brunschvicg, had been immersing himself for decades in study of Medieval philosophy, producing works on Thomas, Bonaventure, and Augustine prior to the debates. In the years just prior, rationalists and a ranof Catholic philosophers debated matters connected to the issue of Christian philosophy in the Société française dePhilosophie, most notably in the 1928 AThe Debate about Atheism@ Session, involving, among others, Brunschvicg,Blondel, Gilson, Marcel, and the Bergsonian Edouard Le Roy, and the 1930 session on AThe Problem of God andPhilosophy,@ involving Le Roy and Blondel.

Meanwhile, some of the debates= participants were publishing works indicative of their positions. The rationalistEmile Bréhier had been progressively bringing out his History of Philosophy, a key section of which appeared as an extract



4

1927, key because in it he argued that the Patristic age produced no Christian philosophy, a claim he would generalize. 7 thasame year, Brunschvicg published Le progrès de la conscience dans la philosophie occidentale. Gilson brought out his Introduction à l = étude de Saint Augustin in 1929, just in time for the barrage of publications on Augustine in 1930, the 1,50year anniversary of his death. These included pieces by Blondel, Gilson, and Maritain, in which each of these thinkersdiscussed AChristian philosophy@, and in one of which Blondel explicitly criticized Gilson, leading to an correspondence between them ultimately productive only of misunderstanding..

Bréhier presented his thesis, now developed at length, that Aone can no more speak of a Christian philosophy than oChristian mathematics or a Christian physics,@8 at a set of conferences in Belgium in 1928. And at this point, the Marin

Mersenne of the 1930s, Xavier Léon, founder of the Société française de Philosophie and of the Revue de Métaphysique et Morale, assumes a pivotal role in the story. As he narrates during the 1931 S.f. P. session, Gilson and Brunschvicg againcrossed lances in his office, leading Léon to suggest a session debating the value of Thomist philosophy. Gilson preferred debate be broadened to the topic Athe notion of Christian philosophy,@ and include both Bréhier and Brunschvicg on therationalist side, against Christian philosophy. Maritain would assist Gilson arguing for Christian philosophy. As mattersturned out, Blondel, who had been nearly blind, and worked by dictation since the mid 1920s, could not attend, butcontributed a letter, in which he both presented his own position and severely criticized Gilson =s. Both Gilson and Bréhierhad criticized Blondel in their contributions, and it was clear from the start of the debate, at least to French observers, that inaddition to the rationalist positions, there were at least two main Catholic positions that, at least according to their main proponents, Gilson and Maritain on one side, Blondel on the other, were in conflict with each other.

A number of articles and books addressing the issue of Christian philosophy began to appear, starting in 1931 and

continuing into the mid-30s. In 1932, Gilson published The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, Maritain his Essay on Christia Philosophy, and Blondel Le problème de la philosophie catholique, further developing their positions and their mutualcritiques.

Five other distinguishable main Catholic positions would be articulated between 1932-33:

1) An Augustinian position, represented by Michel Souriau;

2) A Neo-Scholastic position, noted earlier by Gilson among others, represented by Fernand Van Steenberghen, Lé Noël, and Pierre Mandonnet, O.P., which held that there could not be any Christian philosophy in a rigorous sense;

3) Positions developed by a range of philosophers who viewed Gilson and Maritain =s positions as compatible with o

complementary with Blondel=s position. These included Régis Jolivet, Bruno de Solages, Aimé Forest, Henri deLubac, and most importantly,3a) Gabriel Marcel, and3b) Antonin de Sertillanges, both of whom developed positions quite arguably constituting further distinctive Catho positions.

Despite Brunschvicg publishing additional works in this period, the rationalists made no effective response to their Catholicinterlocutors.

Two additional conferences took place, the first in November 1932, and the second in September 1933. The 1932one involved the Société d=Etudes Philosophique de Marseille, centered on discussion of Blondel =s Le problème de la philosophie catholique and given his condition was actually carried out largely by correspondence. The 1933 one was the

Second Day of Studies of the Société Thomiste, and included a host of philosophers and theologians, among which wereseveral of the Neo-Scholastics who thought there could be no Christian philosophy. The articles continued to appear througthe 1930s, but by around 1935, the second phase of the debate had drawn to a close. Commentators began to speak about tdebate in the past tense, and the main interlocutors had moved on to other, though related projects. The debates would nowenter into a new phase, revisited on occasion by scholarship, giving rise to or being referenced in smaller discussions from tito time, and supplying background to a different French Reformed Protestant Debate nearly two decades later.

Several M ain Positi ons of the Debate in Summary So, what were the main positions of the debates? Here, of course, those positions cannot be presented in their entiret

only in the broadest of terms. And, I must apologize for mentioning and perhaps raising interest in some of these figures



5

whose positions, in order to be brief, I will not discuss, in particular Souriau, Sertillanges, or Marcel, nor the other philosophers who argued for the compatibility of Gilson, Maritain, and Blondel=s positions. Nor will I discuss fideist positions against Christian philosophy. Instead, I will discuss the views of the two rationalists, Bréhier, Brunschvicg, twoneo-Scholastics Mandonnet and Van Steenberghen, then those of Gilson, Maritain, and finally Blondel Before doing this, important aspect of the problem of Christian philosophy must be highlighted, an aspect that many of the debate =s participanand commentators noted, but which Etienne Borne perhaps expressed best: Athe response that the philosopher brings to this problem, the very way in which he defines and opposes its terms will depend right at the start on the idea of philosophy hemakes for himself, of what I will, by convention and to be brief, call his reflexive philosophy.@9 Another, perhaps morefamiliar term would be Ametaphilosophy@. Paul Gilbert sharpened the point: AActually, to raise the question of the meaning

the expression>Christian philosophy

= is to interrogate the meaning of reason

@.10

The rationalists are important, for they are representative not only of views prevalent in their time, but of other positions that would for similar reasons reject the possibility of Christian philosophy. Likewise the neo-Scholastics=s positions are more broadly representative, a stand-in for Catholic or indeed other Christian views that, as a matter of princor of practice, likewise reject Christian philosophy=s possibility. As an interesting side-note, some neo-Scholastics had become quite interested in the Phenomenological movement, and several of them employed what they regarded as a rigorou phenomenological perspective during the debates to provide further argument for their views.

From the rationalist viewpoints, the fundamental reason why there could be no Christian philosophy was that theyregarded Christianity, or indeed any religion, as at its base and in its essence irrational, and philosophy as something purelyrational and intrinsically autonomous. We should note that rationalist conceptions of reason and philosophy are not always

compatible with each other. This was in fact the case in the debates, since in Bréhier =s view philosophy, which he identifiewith what he regarded as the essence of ancient philosophy, Ainvestigate[s] the rational, consequently immovable and fixed,order which is in things. The universal Logos or Intelligence is only the metaphysical realization, the projection of this needis, set up within the ideal, the very order that the sensible world realizes more or less imperfectly. @11 Brunschvicg, on theother hand, developed a idealist view of reason and philosophy wedding Spinoza with Hegel, willing to acknowledge that philosophy and rationality itself originally emerge from a religious background, but regarding the philosophical sublimationreligious thought as the progressive realization of rationality. As he put it, Afaith, insofar as faith, is only the prefiguration, sensible symbol, the approximation of what properly human effort will be able to set in full light.@12 Brunschvicg went so faduring the S.f.P session as to maintain, appealing to Piaget=s theories of child development, that what philosophers prior to t17th century, in particular Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas and their followers, called Areason@, was reason in a childlike,immature, yet to be developed state, so that there was no genuine philosophy prior to the 17 th century. Clearly, ifBrunschvicg=s views about reason were correct, Bréhier =s could not be.

Bréhier =s argument ran along these lines: Christian philosophy could be understood in two possible ways. It could philosophy judged acceptable by some sort of religious authority, a Amagisterium@. Or, there could be a historical case wheChristianity has made some sort of positive philosophical contribution. Then, he posed the remainder of a dilemma. In thefirst way, philosophical reason would have been subjected to some outside control, no longer be autonomous, and therefore longer be philosophy. As to the second way, he conceded that if such a case could be found in history, there would be aChristian philosophy, but he flatly denied that there were any such cases. In his historical interpretations, anything genuine philosophical, for instance in Augustine or in Aquinas, was really just philosophy they took from Plato or Aristotle dressed in Christian clothing. Everything else in their work was in fact Christian, and thereby not philosophy. In his maincontribution to the debate, Bréhier aimed at comprehensiveness, discussing Augustine and the Church Fathers, Aquinas, 17century Rationalism, 19th Century Traditionalism, Hegel, and finally Blondel, claiming to demonstrate in each case that no possible contender for the title of Christian philosophy was genuinely philosophical or genuinely Christian at the same time

Brunschvicg=s approach was more nuanced and complex. He famously conceded AI would not recognize myself inwhat I think and what I feel if the entire movement of Christianity had not existed,@ and he reframed the question as one ofasking whether a specifically Christian philosophy exists. He then distinguishes three possible relationships between philosophy and Christianity for a particular philosopher. One could be a philosopher first and then a Christian, in which casone=s philosophy is not Christian philosophy, simply philosophy. Alternately, one can be a Christian first and then a philosopher, but then it is not really Christian philosophy. Instead, as in Pascal=s case, Aif his Christianity has truly taken possession of the entire man, it is by uncovering for him a way of philosophizing that is not that of philosophers.@ The thircase, which Brunschvicg attributes to Malebranche, but applying equally well to Blondel, he says would produce a Christian philosophy. This would take place when the philosopher realizes Athat philosophy ends up only posing problems, entanglin



6

itself in difficulties. The clearer a consciousness it will have of these problems, the deeper it will sound the abyss into whicthese difficulties throw philosophy, the more it will be persuaded that only Christianity =s own solutions will satisfy philosophical problems.@ (76) At this point, however, philosophy ends, and something else, unassimilable by philosophy begins

The Neo-Scholastic Pierre Mandonnet is fairly representative of an approach to the issue at the same time seeminglycommonsensical and based on a certain interpretation of Thomism, which rigidly distinguishes philosophy and theology.Philosophy begins from and remains within the range of principles, experiences, and inferences accessible to an unaidednatural reason the same in the believer as in the unbeliever, leading him to argue: ABy right, consequently, there is no Christ

philosophy; and if you leave behind even the word>reason

=, you enter into the domain of faith, and you can no longer makeyour self understood except among believers.@13 Some of the claims he made seemed almost taken from the pages of the

rationalists, for instance :ACertainly Christianity has transformed the world, but it has not transformed philosophy. @ And:ACertainly Christianity has been a considerable factor of progress in humanity, but not progress of a philosophical order. @

Van Steenberghen, who admits Mandonnet Acaused a scandal by his wild opposition to the idea of a Christian philosophy,@14 can be said to have been Christian philosophy=s strongest neo-Scholastic opponent. His main complaint wthat the term AChristian philosophy@ was fundamentally misleading. Being Christian could assist philosophers to work oa true philosophy, which, A[t]o the degree that it is true. . .is necessarily compatible with Christianity, open to Christianity,utilizable by Christianity and by theology; its content will be able to partially coincide with that of revelation. But a philosophy will never be >Christian= in the formal and rigorous sense.@ The attempt to make it so, in his view, led simply tomixing up philosophy and theology: AWe suffer much more from the confusion of philosophy and theology than from their

isolation. Quite often, our philosophy is already only too Christian, in the sense that it integrates elements borrowed fromrevelation or from theology, without assimilating them according to the demands of its rational methods.@15

Turning to several of Christian philosophy=s proponents, it is important at the start to note the plurality of their positions. Commenting at the end of the debates, Henri de Lubac famously quipped: AAccording to Maritain, Christian philosophy is not and does not want to be strictly Christian. . . .Christian philosophy according to Gilson, is no longerChristian. . . As to Christian philosophy according to Blondel, it is not yet Christian. @16 While these are clearlyoversimplifications, de Lubac does single out essential traits distinguishing these three positions. From the very start of thedebates, a plurality of positions for Christian philosophy existed. Also important to note, these main positions not only presented a genuine plurality of Christian philosophies, each of them also thematizes the pluralism inherent to Christian philosophy.

Gilson=s responses to Bréhier are particularly important. His seizing the horns of Bréhier =s dilemma head-on signathe beginning of the drubbing he would give him in their open debate. First, he argues that the Catholic magisterium does actually historically function in the simplistic way Bréhier assumed. Second, he maintains that it is an open question whetheChristianity has made any positive historical contribution to philosophy, a question that has to be explored by actually studythe philosophers and philosophies that are candidates for being Christian philosophy. In Gilson=s view, itself the culminatiof decades of study of medieval philosophers, there are and have been historically existing Christian philosophies. Moreimportant to Gilson, however, is determining the nature of Christian philosophy.

His views could be encapsulated in three formulas: reason=s concrete reality in the philosophizing subject;Christianity=s fertilization of philosophical thought; and, Christian philosophy=s prime embodiments being in Medieval philosophy, specifically in Thomism. This last part of his position would become more pronounced in the years after thedebate, so that his Elements of Christian Philosophy is simply an exposition of Thomistic philosophy. During the early yea

of the debate, he regarded the Augustinian credo ut intelligam and the Anselmian fides quaerens intellectum as definitions Christian philosophy, but even then, while acknowledging Augustine=s and Thomas= philosophies to be philosophies of theconcrete, philosophies that attempt to extend themselves to and make their thought adequate to all of the real, he did not regthem as of equal philosophical adequacy and rigor: ASt. Augustine always seeks notions comprehensive enough to embrace concrete in its complexity. St. Thomas always seeks notions precise enough to define the elements that constitute theconcrete. In a word, the former expresses the concrete, the latter analyzes it.@17 Gilson criticized Blondel=s long-articulated position, setting him under the Augustinian rubric and charging him, along with Bergson of preferring the vague and irratioconcrete to philosophy properly culminating in concepts. He would also target a caricature of the Blondelian position as ondefining Christian philosophy as Aa philosophy open to the supernatural,@ for in his view, A[i]f it is to deserve that name thesupernatural must descend as a constitutive element not, of course, into its texture. . . but into the work of its construction. @

1



7

In Gilson=s view, like those of the others in the debates, if Christian philosophy was to be possible or even historicalattested, the forms of thought brought under its label would have to be genuinely philosophical, Asystems of rational truths.@He integrates this demand into one of his definitions: AIf there exist philosophical systems, purely rational in their principland in their methods, whose existence is not explained without the existence of the Christian religion, the philosophies thatthey define merit the name of Christian philosophies.@20 Gilson holds these philosophical systems to have been nourished bAa revelation generative of reason,@21 so that as he says in another passage, Aall Christian philosophy will be traversed,impregnated, nourished by Christianity as by a blood which circulates in it, or better put, as a life that animates it. One wilnot be able to say that here the philosophical ends and here the Christian starts; it will be integrally Christian and integrally

philosophical, or it will not be at all.@

The rationalists rejected Christian philosophy=s possibility largely because of too narrow conceptions of rationality,and an a priori commitment to religion=s fundamental irrationality. The Neo-Scholastics rejected its possibility of because intheir view Christianity could have only an extrinsic relation with philosophy. Any reasoning with a closer, intrinsic relationwould no longer be philosophy, but rather theology, crossing a line one must not blur. Gilson argued that there could be anintrinsic relation between Christianity and philosophy, and he located this in the actual locus where philosophy takes place aexists, in the philosophizing subject. As he rightly notes, philosophy and religion are abstractions, and can be united in aconcrete subject. And, Aonce this philosopher is also a Christian, his reason =s exercise will be that of a Christian=s reason , i.not a reason of a different type than that of non-Christian philosophers, but a reason that labors under different conditions.@2

These conditions will include something that is, at least at first, non-rational, i.e. religious faith, but as Gilson points out, theis there is no A pure@ philosophy or philosopher in which reason would not coexist with matters that are irrational or yet to be

made rational. And, unless there is some failure of nerve or misconception of the relations between Christian faith andreason, A[w]hat is peculiar to the Christian is being convinced of the rational fertility of his or her faith and being sure that thfertility is inexhaustible.@

Maritain developed a position clearly consonant with his friend Gilson=s, and in their views equally opposed not onto the rationalists and to the Neo-Scholastics, but also to Blondel, 23 who Maritain accused of failing to make necessarydistinctions and thereby Atransfer[ing] to the heart of a philosophy what holds true for an apologetics@

24, i.e. already assuminfaith from the start, therefore engaging in theology, and of going beyond recognizing the insufficiency of philosophy toconstruct a philosophy of insufficiency, rejecting the Aadequacy of concepts. . . for reaching reality.@25 Maritain=s positiondevelops through distinguishing between the nature or essence of philosophy and the concrete state in which philosophy isfound and develops in actually existing human subjects. From his Thomist perspective, understanding the nature of philosopdepends on understanding its specific acts, and this in tern depends on understanding the nature and range of their objects.

What are they? Maritain responds: AIn the realm of the real, created and uncreated, there is an entire order of objects from-their-very-nature [de soi] accessible to the human mind=s natural powers.@ In principle, any human intellect, any humsubject, Christian or non-Christian, employing their unaided and purely natural reason, would be able to discover these objeand even attain and systematize knowledge of them, and this would be Aa from-its-very-nature natural or rational knowledge

In its essence, philosophy would be no more Christian than it is non-Christian, Anot dependent on Christian faith, inobject, its principles, or its methods.@27

The essence, however, is an abstraction, and like Gilson, Maritain takes rationalists and neo-Scholastics to task forignoring this. As philosophy and philosophers concretely exist, in their concrete states, they can be Christian or not.Philosophy develops differently as a habitus in a determinate subject or, more broadly in what Maritain calls a regime.Christian philosophy will then be philosophy developed in a Christian regime, philosophy in a Christian state. Christianity c

be an integral part of making full or fuller exercise of the possibilities inherent in philosophy=s essence concretely realizableAs Maritain observes,@From this viewpoint of the state, or conditions of exercise, it is clear that, in order to acquire in us itsfull normal development, philosophy demands many rectifications and purifications from the individual, an ascesis not onlyreason, but of the heart, and that one philosophize with one =s entire soul just as one runs with one=s heart and one=s lungs.@28

How, determinately, does philosophy develop differently in a Christian state? Maritain speaks of Aobjectivecontributions@ and Asubjective reinforcements or Astrengthening@ [confortations]. Christianity has made and makes objectivcontributions to philosophy in several ways. It leads philosophy towards what natural human reason could have, but did noactually, discover on its own, objects that Aought to be in some way implicit, whether it be in the most virtual way, inhumanity=s philosophical treasury.@29 And, even when dealing with supernatural mysteries, by being the Ahandmaid@ of



8

Christian theology, philosophy learns much by A being led along paths that are not its own@, by being Ain proximity totheology.@30 Subjectively, as Maritain says, A[t]he very experience of philosophy was renewed by Christianity.@31 TheChristian subject is oriented and affected differently than the non-Christian one. Their habitus of philosophy is able to entinto Asynergy and vital solidarity,@ Adynamic continuity@ with other habitus, particularly that of theology, and grace produceshealing of our wounded nature, correcting Athis disorder and the obstacles it creates@, freeing one from Amanifold futilities aopacities. . . .a mote of self-love on the eye of reason@

32

Blondel articulated yet another position on Christian philosophy, different in very fundamental ways from thosediscussed so far, the rationalist positions, the neo-Scholastic positions, and Gilson and Maritain=s Thomist positions identify

Christian philosophy with historical forms either found in or carried out through reinterpretation of Medieval thought.Blondel, from the very beginning of his philosophical career, argued that Christian thought could not afford to disregard thedevelopments, the contributions, and the legitimate demands of modern thought. De Lubac=s characterization, that forBlondel Christian philosophy is not yet Christian, is to some degree correct, for Blondel did regard Christian philosophy in istrongest sense as a project yet to be worked out, not as a permanent philosophical achievement which could be applied andrelied upon uncritically, which was, in his view, what Gilson, Maritain, and others who regarded Medieval philosophy, particularly Thomism, as Christian philosophy, and as philosophies that could satisfy, rather than ignore or misconstrue thenew demands put to philosophy by modernity.

Since his criticisms of Gilson parallel the main features of Christian philosophy as he articulates it, they provide auseful starting point. Blondel charged Gilson with engaging in two main errors in his construal of Christian philosophies:conceptualism and historicism. Under the first expression, he targets the presupposition that philosophy must terminate in

concepts and systems of concepts and take this as its fundamental goal and measure of adequacy, the view that A philosophicdoctrines, as diverse as they may be, aim in sum at closing themselves up into closed, sufficient, and exclusive systems; thessystems organize themselves and terminate in concepts, and all that does not succeed in being raised into concepts repulses philosophy.@33 Under the second, Blondel attacks the presupposition that the issue of Christian philosophy can be resolved bgoing to and appealing to History. This signals a double danger. On the one hand, in Blondel=s view, if history is done,faithful to the demands integral to history as a discipline, it cannot grasp the supernatural, revealed data, dogma, faith, thereligious life and experience, because it necessarily naturalizes or rationalizes them, turning them into something simplyhuman, modifying the objects of its research, Aforcibly stripping them of their supernatural originality.@34 On the other hand philosophy uncritically attempts to both respect the integrity of the supernatural and assimilate it, it imports somethingirrational into itself, and becomes unphilosophical. As he characterizes this, Awanting to integrate in itself dogmas, ideas,ascetic practice, mystical experiences which come to it from outside. . . by the very care not to alter the supernatural characteof Christian data,@ philosophy Aintroduces into its flesh a foreign body.@35

The alternative Blondel counterposes to these is what he calls an Aopen philosophy@or more technically, a A philosopof insufficiency.@ This would be a philosophy that would recognize the necessity of concepts, of abstraction, of philosophisystems and methods, and that would not, as his opponents frequently charged his philosophy with, simply start from andremain in unanalyzed and non-conceptualized religious experience. It would, however, be a philosophy that does not concfrom itself or lose sight of philosophy=s always limited role, condition, and adequacy. He asks: AYes or no, philosophicaldoctrines, at whatever degree of development they make it to, can they, should they aim at being sufficient. . . at providingthemselves. . . all the light and all the strength necessary for thought and life, so that they would be, even under theirtransitory form, the provision for the journey and the supreme explanation?@36

Philosophy is always at risk, even more so than ever in modernity in Blondel=s view, of fundamentallymisunderstanding its autonomy, mutilating and truncating itself thereby in the process, becoming untrue to itself, less

reflective, less self-critical than it ought to be, but also less receptive and attentive to what concretely conditions the action o philosophizing, of thinking. One of the greatest temptations for philosophers is the assumption that only philosophy can raarticulate, and resolve genuinely philosophical problems, and correctively that what cannot be fitted into the concerns,approaches, methods, or even terminological idioms of philosophy is unintelligible, nonsense, uninteresting, of no philosophical significance. A radical critique of philosophy opens the question whether A by reason, by duty, constitutionalif one can talk in this way, must philosophy end up, whatever may be the level of its development, in recognizing how it isnormally incomplete, how it opens in itself and before itself an open space prepared not only for its own ulterior discoveriesand on its own ground, but for the lights and the contributions whose real origin it is not and cannot become? @

37

If Blondel had stopped there, then Maurice Nédoncelle =s unfortunate interpretation of his position as culminating in



9

A pious agnosticism@ would be the correct one. I mention Nédoncelle only because of the deleterious effect a historicalaccident has had, namely his Is There a Christian Philosophy? being translated into English while Blondel=s actual writingsChristian philosophy remained untranslated. The consequence has been that his incorrect interpretation has been uncriticalaccepted as a faithful one, leading quite understandably to neglect and even complete ignorance of Blondel=s actual positionAnglophone scholars writing on the issue of Christian philosophy. How does Blondel=s philosophy of insufficiency go beyond this? Three features of his position can be briefly noted here: the nature of the Aopen space@; the historicalcontributions of Christianity and Christian philosophies; further development of philosophy in relation to Christianity once ground has been cleared by philosophical critique

Blondel employs a variety of terms for this central concept of anAempty space

@: a

Agap coming from above,

@ Afissurand it corresponds to Aneeds [of reason] that nature does not satisfy, an unfulfilled, always naturally unfulfillable and yet

incoercibly yearning for fulfillment.@38 Philosophy opens, as he notes, Ain itself and before itself an empty space prepared nonly for its own ulterior discoveries and on its own ground, but for illuminations and contributions whose real origin it is noand cannot become.@39 He adds that A[t]he empty space. . . . not a chimerical fiction, projection of restlessness, sickness of soul. It has, if one may say it, contours to discern, a reason for being to meditate on and to render rationally admissible, anattractive and imperious character.@40 And, if and when this opened empty space turns out to be filled determinately by grac by the Christian supernatural, by the guest, philosophy can engage Christianity and be transformed in the process.

From the perspective opened up by a philosophy of insufficiency, Christianity=s historical contributions to thedevelopment of philosophical thought and past Christian philosophy can be rightly viewed, even assimilated by current philosophy in modernity. As Blondel notes, Anot everyone has the need to pass through this dominating problem. But, for

the philosopher who wants to and ought to take account for him or herself of metaphysical possibilities, rational demands,moral legitimacies and obligations, the problem that we have tried to articulate seems inevitable. And, it is to the degree thone has resolved it in an explicit or an implicit way that the history of these philosophically Christian efforts gain their usefumeaning, their subordinate value, their preparatory role, their salutary usefulness.@41 Far from rejecting the historically give past of Christian thought, Blondel even goes so far as to invoke Athe continuity of Tradition,@42 and exhibits himself at workdoing this when he articulates the empty space in terms of St. Thomas = Summa Contra Gentiles treatment of a Adesire for thdivine vision, possession, and beatitude, a desire by which every intellect is essentially belabored, but which, at the sametime, remains inevitably >inefficacious= without the gratuitous aid of the supernatural gift.@43

Blondel also outlines the possibilities for Christian philosophy beyond a philosophy of insufficiency, possibilities thhe himself realizes in his other works and philosophical engagements, and most particularly in the yet untranslated Tetraolog published throughout the 1930s. One of these possibilities is a Asort of mixed philosophy,@a A philosophy of the possible

connections. . .between the essential possibilities or necessities and the realizable contingencies@. The empty space is inreality occupied, so we can ask: A by what method, to what degree, with what profit, does reason=s gaze bear upon the secretguest and indicate the welcome to make him, the cooperation to give him?@

44 Even more concrete would be a Areal philosophy@, a philosophy aiming to be fully extended to the real, or as he would later call it, an Aintegral philosophy@. Thiwould be philosophy that examines the concrete states of human beings in light of a philosophical appropriation of Christiandoctrine: Athanks to the Christian teaching and by reason of the states in man determined by the positive offer, by thewelcome, by the refusal or the employment of supernatural gifts, natural operations can be strengthened, enriched, repressedor transformed in a way that, while ungraspable directly insofar as they proceed from divine graces, nonetheless offerconscious aspects and a field of investigation for a deepened psychology and a metaphysics of spirituality.@45

Those are, at least in outline, several of the more important positions on Christian philosophy brought out in the course of th1930s French debates. Each of them retain their present-day adherents, and remain of contemporary pertinence to the

continuing interest and ongoing discussions about Christian philosophy. As with any philosophical issue of perennialimportance, as well as with thinkers of seminal and enduring significance, there remains much more work to be done instudying, reappropriating, interpreting, meditating and reflecting on, and translating the many voices, and even the echoes, othese discussions, dialogues, commentaries, and conflicts.

Notes

1 AHow Can There Be Such a Thing as a Christian Philosophy?@ Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Associativol. 54, p. 126.2 Fernand Van Steenberghen, APhilosophie et christianisme: Épilogue d=un débat ancien@, Revue Philosophique de Louvain, vol86. (1988), p. 180.



10

3 Cf. Owen=s Towards a Christian Philosophy (Washington D.C: CUA Press. 1990). There are philosophers who seem to suggethat Christian philosophy need no longer justify itself apologetically, polemically, or critically against other philosophies that effectivelrule it out, in a current contemporary situation of philosophical pluralism (e.g Owens to some extent), or as a result of the Aone-time isha[ving] been effectively, even decisively, disposed of.@ Henry Veatch, AThe Problems and the Prospects of a Christian Philosophy B Tand Now@ The Monist (1992), p. 381. This seems to me unjustifiedly optimistic.4 Owens points this out in the French intellectual scene preceding the debates. This perennial issue was also thematized again twdecades back, in relation to Christian philosophy but not explicitly connected with the Christian philosophy debate, by Alvin Plantingaseminal AAdvice to Christian Philosophers@, Faith and Philosophy, vol. 1 no. 3 (1984). In James A. Keller =s later exchange withPlantinga, AReflections on a Methodology for Christian Philosophers@ (Keller); AMethod in Christian Philosophy: a Reply@ (Plantingaand AMethod in Christian Philosophy: Further Reflections@ (Keller), Faith and Philosophy, vol. 5, no. 2 (1988), these issues of the

professional academic setting (largely Analytic) of American philosophy and Christian philosophy are further discussed.5 Reason in Faith: On the Relevance of Christian Spirituality for Philosophy, p.89.6 For an evenhanded treatment of these Thomists, cf .Emmanuel Tourpe =s two essays: ADe l=acte à l=agir. Une introduction auxthomismes blondéliens@ in Penser l'être de l'action. La métaphysique du dernier Blondel , Emmanuel Tourpe, ed. (Leuven: Peeters. 200and ABlondel et le thomisme : influences réciproques et irréductibles singularités@, in Blondel entre L'Action et la Trilogie. Actes ducolloque international sur les * écrits intermédiaires + de Maurice Blondel, tenu à Rome du 16 au 18 novembre 2000 . Marc Leclec, ed(Brussels: Lessius. 2003).7 AHellénisme et christianisme@, Revue Philosophie de la France et de l = Étranger , vol.103 (1927) p. 35.8 Emile Bréhier, AY-a-t=il une philosophie chrétienne?@ Revue de Métaphysique et de la Morale, vol. 38 no. 2, p. 162.9 Etienne Borne,AD=une >Philosophie Chrétienne= qui serait philosophique@, Esprit , November 1932, p. 335.

10 Paul Gilbert, AActualité d=une philosophie chrétienne@, Raisons Politiques, no. 4, p. 16.11 Bréhier,AY-a-t=il@, p. 139.12 Bulletin de la Société française de Philosophie , session of 21 March, 1931 (abbreviated henceforth as BSfP.), p. 75.13 La philosophie chrétienne: Juvisy, 11 Septembre 1933 (Paris: Cerf. 1933). p. 63.14 Van Steenberghen, APhilosophie et christianisme.@ 15 Van Steenberghen, ALa IIe journée d=études de la Société Thomiste et la notion de > philosophie chrétienne=@, Revuenéoscholastique de Philosophie, vol. 35, p. 554.16 De Lubac, ARetrieving the Tradition: On Christian Philosophy@, Communio, vol. 19, p. 478-506 (1992) p. 495-6.17 BSfP , p. 45.18 The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy (Gifford Lectures 1931-1932) trans. A.H.C. Downes (New York: Charles Scribner =s Sons.

1936), p. 37.19 BSfP , p. 48.20 BsfP ,p. 39.21 BSfP , p. 39.22 BsfP , p. 47.23 Cf. Etienne Gilson- Jacques Maritain Correspondance 1923-1971, Géry Prouvost, ed. (Paris: Vrin. 1991).24 An Essay on Christian Philosophy trans. Edward Flannery (New York: Philosophical Library. 1955), p. 9.25 An Essay on Christian Philosophy, p. 10.26 BsfP , p. 61.27 BsfP , p. 62.28

BsfP , p. 63.29 BsfP , p. 64.30 BsfP , p. 54.31 BsfP , p. 65.32 BsfP , p. 66-7.33 BsfP , p. 88. In relation to Thomism, Blondel would write, softening the intransigence of his earlier critiques in the Letter on Apologetics: ABecause many of Thomism=s interpreters had perhaps lost from view the spiritual drive animating it, this was not a sufficireason to not know it or to forget it myself. What would have been enough to show is that in actuality the then-habitual presentation otheses consisted in a didactic exposition of truths put into the form of and stabilized in a static system, rather than aimed at manifesting mind=s deep dynamism, such as, e.g., book III of Summa Contra Gentiles offers.@ Le problème de la philosophie catholique (Paris:



11

Bloud & Gay. 1932), p. 47.34 BsfP , p. 89.35 BsfP , p. 89.36 BsfP, p. 88.37 BsfP , p. 88.38 Le problème de la philosophie catholique, 135.39 BsfP, p. 88.40

BsfP , p. 90.41 Maurice Blondel, ALe problème de la philosophie catholique@ (Meeting of 26 Nov 1932), Les Etudes Philosophiques Vol. 7, n1, p. 19.42 Le problème, p. 145.43 Le problème, p. 146.44 Le problème, p. 167.45 Le problème, p. 170.

The 1930s French Christian Philosophy De

Documents

Transcript of The 1930s French Christian Philosophy De