Thayer South China Disputes Impact on Southeast Asian Security: What Lies Ahead

8/3/2019 Thayer South China Disputes Impact on Southeast Asian Security: What Lies Ahead

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The South China Sea Disputes and Their Impact on

the Security Environment of Southeast Asia:

What Lies Ahead?Carlyle A. Thayer

Paper to workshop on

Political and Security Implications of the South China Sea Dispute

cosponsored by the Center for Asia Pacific Area Studies, Academia

Sinica and the EastWest Center, Taipei, Taiwan

January 1213, 2012


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The South China Sea Disputes and Their Impact on the Security

Environment of Southeast Asia: What Lies Ahead?

Carlyle A. Thayer1

Introduction

This paper is concerned with the reemergence of sovereignty and territorial disputes in

the South China Sea from 2007 to the present, the impact of these disputes on the

security environment in Southeast Asia, and likely future developments. This paper is

divided into five parts. Part 1 sets out the background to the current South China Sea

disputes. Parts 2 and 3 present a review of how Vietnam and the Philippines,

respectively, have attempted to manage these disputes. Part 4 discusses United States

engagement with Vietnam and the Philippines. Part 5 offers an assessment of how

South China Sea disputes are likely to affect regional security in the coming years.

1. The Reemergence of South China Sea Disputes (20072011)

Sovereignty claims and territorial disputes in the South China Sea reemerged as a

regional security issue in 2007 and became especially heated in 2010. Before reviewing

these developments it is important to make a distinction between sovereignty and

sovereign rights. With respect to the South China Sea sovereignty refers to claims over

land features. Sovereign rights refers to claims over maritime jurisdiction, especially

territorial waters, and natural resources such as oil, gas, fish, and minerals.

Between 2007 and 2011 four major issues arose that intensified South China Sea

disputes: Chinese attempts to restrict the operations of foreign oil companies in

disputed waters claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines; Chinas unilateral imposition of

an annual fishing ban; claims to extended continental shelves; and U.S. military survey

activities in Chinas Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Chinese Actions Against Foreign Oil Companies

In January 2007, the Vietnam Communist Party Central Committees fourth plenum

resolved that a Maritime Development Strategy to 2015 should be drawn up to

integrate Vietnams coastal economy with the resources located within Vietnams EEZ.

Vietnamese economists estimated that by 2020 the maritime economy would

contribute to 55% of GDP and between 5560% of exports. At the end of the year

Vietnamese sources reported that China had acquired a copy of this confidential

document and on this basis began privately to approach foreign oil companies to advise

them not to assist Vietnam in the development of its off shore hydrocarbon resources.

1Emeritus Professor, TheUniversity of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy,

Canberra. Email: [email protected].


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At the same time Chinas National Peoples Congress announced the establishment of a

new Sansha administrative unit with responsibility over the Paracels islands, Spratly

archipelago, Macclesfield Bank and adjacent waters. This action provoked

unprecedented antiChina student protests in Hanoi.

In the first half of 2010, ships belonging to Chinas Fishery Administration and Chinas

Maritime Surveillance were involved in three major incidents involving foreign oil

exploration vessels operating in disputed waters. In the first incident Chinese ships

threatened to ram an oil exploration vessel operating in Reed Bank area in the

Philippines EEZ. The vessel was forced to cease operations and leave the survey area.

The other incidents involved Chinese ships cutting the cables of two seismic survey

vessels in Vietnams EEZ. These three actions were extremely provocative and prompted

diplomatic protests by both Manila and Hanoi. It has since been revealed that other

cablecutting incidents took place as early as 2008 in Vietnams EEZ but were not

publicized.

Chinas Unilateral Fishing BanFor many years China has imposed an annual fishing ban from May to August in South

China Sea waters located north of twelve degrees north latitude. In 2008, China began

aggressively targeting Vietnamese fishing crews. Chinese state vessels chased them

from the area. In other instances Vietnamese fishing craft were boarded by Chinese

authorities who seized the Vietnamese fishing catch and impounded valuable items such

as tools, radio communications equipment, and GPS systems. Vietnamese fishermen

reported occasional rough handling. In other incidents Chinese authorities impounded

the Vietnamese fishing boats and held their crew captive until payment of a hefty fine.

In more extreme cases Chinese vessels rammed and sank Vietnamese fishing craft. A

few fatalities have been reported.

Despite Vietnamese protests China continued aggressively to impose its annual fishing

ban in 2009 and 2010. In 2011, however, China changed tactics. Chinese state vessels

formed a cordon and pushed back Vietnamese boats that tried to enter waters claimed

by China.

Claims to Extended Continental Shelves

The United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set May 2009 as

the deadline for states to make claims to continental shelves that extended beyond the

200 nauticalmile (nm) EEZ. Vietnam and Malaysia made a joint submission, and

Vietnam issued a separate submission. Both China and the Philippines protested. Chinatook the matter further by appending a map containing nine dash lines forming a u

shape around the South China Sea. While the ninedash line map was not new (it had

been issued by the Republic of China in 194748), this was the first time that the

Peoples Republic of China officially tabled the map in support of its claims to the South

China Sea. The nine dash lines cut deeply into the EEZs of the littoral states and

encompassed an estimated eighty percent of the South China Sea.


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China justifies its claims to the South China Sea on the grounds of historic rights. The

precise nature of Chinas claim has not been clarified officially. Subsequent statements

by Chinese officials indicate that China may be claiming sovereignty over the land

features and adjacent waters. Under international law land features may be divided

into islands entitled to a 200 nm EEZ or rocks, which are not. Since China submitted the

ninedash line map to the UN its civilian maritime agencies have vigorously sought toassert Chinese jurisdiction within these lines. This led to a growing number of incidents

(including those described above) involving the Philippines and Vietnam. In February

2011, for example, a Chinese Peoples Liberation Army navy (PLAN) warship fired

warning shots at Filipino fishermen and drove them from the area. Later Chinese ships

dropped off construction materials on a reef claimed by the Philippines in apparent

violation of the 2002 ChinaASEAN Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China

Sea (DOC) prohibiting such activity. The Philippines claimed that China was guilty of at

least six major transgressions against its sovereignty in the first half of 2011 alone.

U.S. Military Survey Activities in Chinas EEZ

In March 2009 a major incident took place between Chinese ships and vessels and the

USNS Impeccable in waters off Hainan Island. The Impeccable was engaged officially in

what the United States Navy calls military survey activities. The Impeccable was

operating within Chinas EEZ. The U.S. argues this is a legal activity under the terms of

the United Nations Convention Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China argues to the contrary.

China has passed domestic legislation requiring prior approval by foreign warships.

Further, China argues that the U.S. was not acting in due regard to Chinas interests.

The Impeccable was dispatched to the waters off Hainan Island to gather information

and possibly monitor the activities of Chinese submarines, including nuclear submarines,

operating from the recently constructed Yulin Naval Base in Yalong Bay. Hainan lies onthe northwest extremity of the South China Sea. The Impeccable incident was one of a

number of similar incidents that have taken place between Chinese ships and aircraft

and U.S. military survey ships operating in Chinas EEZ. The tensions produced by these

incidents have affected SinoAmerican relations and spilled over to affect each countrys

behaviour in the South China Sea.

2. Vietnams Management of South China Sea Disputes

Since the normalisation of diplomatic relations in 1991, Vietnam and China have

developed what they term a comprehensive strategic partnership. Both sides were

quickly able to resolve land border issues and demarcate the Gulf of Tonkin, including a joint fishery area. A Joint Steering Committee chaired at deputy prime minister level

oversees all aspects of a growing bilateral relationship.

Nevertheless, the South China Sea has proved an intractable issue. Vietnam still insists it

has sovereignty over the Paracel Islands that China seized in 1974. China refuses to

discuss this issue. Both continue to maintain competing sovereignty and territorial

claims over the Spratly Islands. In 2011, Vietnam attempted to manage security tensions


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with China through bilateral discussions, public reaffirmations of sovereignty, the

dispatch of special diplomatic envoys, and selfhelp defence modernisation.

Bilateral Discussions

During 2011, Vietnam managed growing security tensions in the South China Sea

through continued bilateral discussions with China. Vietnam hosted five major Chinesedelegations and arranged for sideline talks between defence ministers at the Shangrila

Dialogue.

In April, Vietnam received Senior Lieutenant General Guo Boxiong, Vice Chairman of

Chinas Central Military Commission, who came at the invitation of General Phung

Quang Thanh, Minister of National Defence. General Guos visit was primarily concerned

with longstanding joint patrols between their respective navies. In April 2006, China

and Vietnam commenced biannual joint naval patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin. By June

2011, a total of eleven joint patrols had been conducted. 2 At the conclusion of the most

recent patrol, Vietnamese navy ships made their second port call to China (the first took

place in June 2009).3

The PLAN has made three port visits to Vietnam in November2008, December 2009 and October 2010 after a hiatus of seventeen years.

Immediately following Guos visit, Vietnam hosted a bilateral meeting of the heads of

the government delegations on border negotiations at deputy minister level (1819

April).4

China and Vietnam agreed to commence bilateral discussions on maritime issues

back in December 2008 with first priority given to developing a set of fundamental

guiding principles as a framework for settling specific issues. These confidential

discussions began in early 2010 and seven sessions were held by July 2011. At that time

a Vietnamese spokesperson noted that the two sides reached preliminary consensus

on some principles and that the eighth round of discussion would be held later in the

year.5

The first highlevel meeting after the May cablecutting incident took place in June on

the sidelines of the Shangrila Dialogue. It involved an informal meeting of defence

ministers Phung Quang Thanh and Liang Guanglie.

In August, China and Vietnam held their 2nd DefenceSecurity Strategic Dialogue in

Beijing. China was represented by Lt. General Ma Xiaotian, vice chair of the PLA General

Staff, and Vietnam was represented by Lt. General Nguyen Chi Vinh, Deputy Minister of

National Defence. In September, China and Vietnam held the fifth annual meeting of

their bilateral Joint Steering Committee in Hanoi. China was represented by State

Councilor Dai Bingguo who met with his counterpart Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen

2Margie Mason, Vietnam and China hold joint naval patrol amid spat, Associated Press, June 21, 2011.

3Vietnamese naval ships wrap up visit to China, Quan Doi Nhan Dan Online, June 27, 2011.

4Vietnam, China talk borderrelated issues, Vietnam News Agency, April 18, 2011.

5Vietnam, China agree to resolve sea dispute through peaceful means, Vietnam News Agency, 3 August

2011.


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Thien Nhan. Also that same month, China hosted a visit by the head of the VPAs

General Political Department and member of the Central Military Party Committee,

General Ngo Xuan Lich.6

The exchanges of these delegations served to compartmentalise the South China Sea

dispute and prevent it from spilling over and negatively affecting the broadbased

bilateral relationship. More specifically, these bilateral discussions served as a form of

reassurance that force would not be used to settle territorial disputes in the South China

Sea.

Reaffirmations of Sovereignty

In early June, Chinas cablecutting incident coupled with cyber attacks on two hundred

Vietnamese websites provoked an antiChina nationalist outcry in Vietnam on the part

of students, intellectuals and retired officials. In JuneAugust they staged eleven public

antiChina demonstrations over a twelveweek period before the government banned

them.

On 9 June, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung responded to growing domestic pressure

by making an unusually robust public statement in defence of national sovereignty.

Dung said: We continue to affirm strongly and to manifest the strongest determination

of all the Party, of all the people and of all the army in protecting Vietnamese

sovereignty in maritime zones of the country. Dung also reaffirmed Vietnams

incontestable maritime sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos.7

On the

same day, President Nguyen Minh Triet, visiting Co To island off Quang Ninh province

near the China border, stated that we are ready to sacrifice everything to protect our

homeland, our sea and island sovereignty.8

Vietnam has always been extremely circumspect in its public commentary on relationswith China. The public statements by Prime Minister Dung and President Triet were

virtually unheard of. But no action was more calculated than Vietnams unprecedented

public announcement that it would conduct livefire naval exercises on 13 June in the

waters near Hon Ong Island.9 Hon Ong Island is located approximately forty kilometres

off Quang Nam province in central Vietnam roughly opposite the Paracel Islands and

removed from the two cablecutting incidents. The first phase of the exercise involved

coastal artillery, while the second part of the exercise involved missile corvettes firing

their deck guns. Reportedly, antiship missiles were also fired from Sukhoi jet aircraft. 10

6Doan can bo chinh tri quan su cap cao nuoc ta tham Trung Quoc, Vietnam TV, September 18, 2011.

7Agence France Presse, Vietnam PM says sea sovereignty incontestable, June 9, 2011.

8Deutche PresseAgentur, Vietnams top leaders add fire to South China Sea dispute, June 9, 2011.

9Bao Dam An Toan Hang Hai Mien Bac [Northern Maritime Safety Corporation], Ve viec ban dan that

tren vung bien Quang Nam, So 107/TBHHCT.BDATHHMB, June 9, 2011, http://www.vmsnorth.vn.

10Reported by a confidential Vietnamese military source to the author.


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Vietnams Foreign Ministry characterized these exercises as a routine annual training

activity of the Vietnam navy.11 Whatever the gloss by government officials, Vietnams

livefire exercises were undoubtedly conducted to signal Vietnams resolve to defend its

sovereignty against further Chinese interference. The livefiring exercises were also

widely viewed as a response to Chinas conduct of a massive naval exercise in the

northern reaches of the South China Sea earlier that month.

On the same day that the livefiring exercises were announced, Prime Minister Dung

underscored the seriousness of Vietnams resolve by issuing a decree on emergency

military service that included provisions for the conscription of persons with special

skills needed by the military.12 The decree served two purposes. First, it assuaged

growing domestic pressure for the government to stiffen its response to China. Second,

it was another demonstration of resolve in response to Chinese assertiveness.13

Special Diplomatic Envoys

In January 2011, the Vietnam Communist Party elected a new leadership at its eleventh

national congress. An indication of the importance of Vietnams relationship with China

was signalled when Nguyen Phu Trong, the new Secretary General, dispatched special

envoy Hoang Binh Quan to Beijing. Quan met with President and General Secretary of

the Chinese Communist Party Hu Jintao and inter alia extended an invitation to Hu and

other Chinese party and state leaders to visit Vietnam. In return, Hu extended a

reciprocal invitation to Secretary General Trong to visit China.14

After the second ablecutting incident, Vietnam dispatched its second special envoy to

China, deputy foreign minister Ho Xuan Son. Son held discussions with his counterpart

Zhang Zhijun. Significantly, Son was received by State Councillor Dai Bingguo. According

to a joint press release issued on 25 June:

The two sides emphasized the necessity to actively implement the common perceptions of the two

countries leaders, peacefully solving the two countries disputes at sea through negotiation and

friendly consultation; employing effective measures and working together to maintain peace and

stability in the East Sea [sic].

They also laid stress on the need to steer public opinions along the correct direction, avoiding

comments and deeds that harm the friendship and trust of the people of the two countries.

The two sides agreed to speed up the tempo of negotiations so as to early sign an Agreement on

basic principles guiding the settlement of sea issues between Vietnam and China, and boost the

11Margie Mason, Vietnam plans livefire drill after China dispute, Associated Press, June 10, 2011.

12Agence FrancePresse, Vietnam signs military order amid tensions, June 15, 2011. The Decree also

listed eight categories of exemptions.

13BBC News AsiaPacific, Vietnam bolsters military stance amid China marine row, June 14, 2011.

14Voice of Vietnam News, Chinas Hu Jintao invites Nguyen Pho Trong, February 19, 2011.


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implementation of the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the East Sea (DOC) and followup

activities so that substantial progress will soon be achieved.15

In October Vietnam made the first move. Secretary General Trong visited Beijing for

discussions with his counterpart. Both party leaders then witnessed the signing of the

Agreement on Fundamental Principles to Guide the Settlement of Sea Disputes. The

agreement committed both parties to seek mutually acceptable fundamental andlasting solutions to searelated disputes. In the interim, the two sides shall actively

discuss provisional and temporary measures without affecting each sides positions and

policies, including the active consideration and discussion on cooperation for mutual

development [hop tac cung phat trien] The two parties also agreed to speed up

negotiations to demarcate the waters forming the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin and

actively discuss cooperation for mutual development in these waters (emphasis

added). The agreement also specified if the disputes involve other countries, the

consultations shall include all other parties concerned.

In December, Vice President Xi Jinping made an official visit to Hanoi and met with all of

Vietnams top party and state leaders. Xis visit was primarily a get to know you visit ashe is widely viewed as Hu Jintaos heir apparent. Both sides stressed the importance of

the comprehensive nature of their bilateral relationship and focused on such major

issues as trade, educational and youth cooperation, and partytoparty ties. As for the

South China Sea, the two leaders reaffirmed past commitments to refrain from the use

of force, respect each others interests and settle the dispute through international law.

SelfHelp Defence Modernisation

Vietnam has embarked on a program of modernizing its armed forces, particularly its

naval forces. In some respects Vietnam is implementing its own antiaccess/area denial

strategy to cope with Chinas military build up. For example, in 2009, Vietnamannounced it would procure six conventional diesel powered Kiloclass submarines from

Russia. These are scheduled to be delivered in 2014. The submarines are expected to be

equipped with seaskimming 3M54 Klub antiship missiles with a range of 300

kilometres.16

In 2011 Vietnam took delivery of four additional Su30MK2 multirole jet fighters that

are expected to be equipped with the Kh59MK antiship cruise missile with a range of

115 km. Vietnam currently has on order sixteen more Su30MK2 jet fighters.17 Vietnam

took delivery of two Gephardclass guided missile frigates armed with Kh35E antiship

missiles with a range of 130 km and two Svetlyakclass missile Patrol Boats.18 Vietnam

15Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Viet NamChina joint press release, June 26,

2011. http://www.mofa.vn/en.16

The author would like to thank Robert Karniol for an advance copy of his Vietnams Strategic

Challenge, The Straits Times (forthcoming).

17Russia to supply Vietnam six submarines in 2014, Thanh Nien News, July 3, 2011.

18Russia exports aircraft to Vietnam, The Voice of Russia, June 22, 2011; BBC, Hai quan Viet Nam nhan

tau chien Nga, August 24, 2011; Russia delivers second coastal missile system to Vietnam, InterfaxAVN


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also officially launched its first indigenously built gunship.19 In October, while on a tour

of the Netherlands, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung reportedly gave his approval for

the purchase of four Sigmaclass corvettes, two of which are slated for construction in

Vietnam.20

Vietnam has beefed up it landbased coastal defences by acquiring its second Bastion

landbased antiship ballistic missile system. Vietnam reportedly has also acquired

Extended Range Artillery Munitions a ballistic missile effective beyond 150 km from

Israel. In October 2011, during President Truong Tan Sangs visit to New Delhi, the local

media reported that India was prepared to sell Vietnam its BrahMos supersonic cruise

missile.21 President Sang requested Indian assistance in four areas: submarine training,

conversion training for pilots to fly Sukhoi30s, transfer of medium sized patrol boats,

and modernisaton of port facilities at Nha Trang.22

In November 2011, Vietnam announced a $3.3 billion defence budget for 2012, a

reported rise of 35% over 2010.23 According to IHS Janes Vietnams annual naval

procurement budget increased by 150% from 2008 to U.S. $276 million in 2011. The

navy budget is projected to rise to $400 million by 2015.24

3. The Philippines Management of South China Sea Disputes

The Philippines approached the management of South China Sea disputes with China

from an entirely different geostrategic setting than Vietnam. Although both Vietnam

and the Philippines are members of ASEAN the similarity ends there. The Philippines

does not share the dense crosscutting network of party, state and military ties with

China that Vietnam has. The Philippines navy is run down and extremely weak and the

air force does not possess fix wing combat aircraft. The Philippines, however, has a long

standing Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with the United States which offers a measure of

deterrence.

President Benigno Aquino III assumed office in June 2010 and quickly had to confront

increased Chinese naval activities in the Philippines EEZ. Philippines sources report that

Chinese naval activities stepped up noticeably in the fourth quarter of 2010 and that at

military news agency, October 11, 2011; and BBC, Nga giao tiep hai tau tuan tra cho VN, October 25,

2011.

19BBC, Viet Nam tu dong tau chien, October 3, 2011.

20

BBC, VN dam phan mua 4 tau chien cua Ha Lan, October 18, 2011.21

Robert Johnson, India is Preparing To Sell BahMos Supersonic Cruise Missiles to Vietnam, Business

Insider, September 20, 2011.

22Sandeep Dikshit, Vietnams plea put South Block in a predicament, The Hindu, November 9, 2011.

23Trefor Moss, Chinese Aftershock, The Diplomat, November 26, 2011.

24Agence France Presse, China tensions stoke Vietnam naval ambitions, The Economic Times, November

14, 2011.


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least six major incidents involving violations of Philippine sovereignty took place in the

first half of 2011.

During 2011 the Philippines sought to manage its dispute with China through five

mechanisms: diplomatic protests, bilateral discussions, reaffirmation of the alliance with

the United States, force modernization, and launching a new major diplomatic initiative.

Diplomatic Protests

The Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs has vigorously protested each and every

Chinese intrusion into its waters and airspace by delivering Notes Verbales to Chinese

officials in Manila. The contents of these diplomatic notes have been made public via

the press.

In addition, on April 5, 2011 the Philippines upped the ante by submitting a letter to the

United Nations formally restating its claim to sovereignty over the Kalayaan Island

Group (KIG), adjacent waters and geological features including relevant waters, seabed

and subsoil.25

This action immediately provoked a response by China. On 14 April, Chinalodged a Note Verbale with the United Nations accusing the Philippines of infringing

Chinese national sovereignty by invading and occupying islands and reefs in the

Nansha [Spratly] Islands.26 In early June 2011 President Aquino threatened to raise

Chinese intrusions with the United Nations. According to Aquino, We are completing

the data on about six to seven instances since February. We will present it to [China]

and then bring these to the appropriate body, which normally is the United Nations.27

A review of public reporting on diplomatic exchanges between the Philippines and China

does not reveal a single instance where China took the Philippines protest seriously or

even offered to look into or investigate the matter. In all instances, China rejected out of

hand diplomatic protests tendered by the Philippines. The facts contained in Filipinoprotests were dismissed as fabrications or the result of Chinese enforcement of their

legal jurisdiction in Chinese waters.

In July, the Philippines stepped up their diplomatic campaign by proposing that the

Philippines and China take their territorial dispute to the UNs International Tribunal for

the Law of the Sea for arbitration. This proposal was raised by Foreign Secretary Albert

25Philippine Mission to the United Nations, Letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, 11

00494, No. 000228, New York, April 5, 2011. The KIG contains nine geological features: Balagtas (IrvingReef), Kota (Loaita), Lawak (Nanshan), Likas (West York), Pagasa (Thitu),, Panata (Lankiam), Parola

(Northeast Cay), Patag Island (Flat Island is also considered a part of the Spratlys) and Rizal (Commodore

Reef).

26Teresa Cerojano, Beijing counters Manilas UN protest, says Philippines started to invade Spratlys in

1970s, Associated Press, April 19, 2011.

27Johanna Paola Poblete, Philippines preparing issues for UN about China intrusions, Business World,

June 2, 2011.


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Del Rosario in his discussions with Chinas Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi in Beijing that

month.28

Bilateral Discussions

Filipino officials repeatedly raised their concerns about incidents in the South China Sea

when they hosted discussions with Chinese officials. For example, Chinas Defence

Minister, General Liang Guanglie paid an official visit to the Philippines from 2125 May

for talks with his counterpart Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin. At the end of their

discussions the two ministers issues a joint statement that stated:

both ministers expressed hope that the implementing guidelines of the 2002 Declaration of Conduct

would soon be finalized and agreed upon, that responsible behavior of all parties in the South China

Sea issue would help keep the area stable while all parties work for the peaceful resolution Both

ministers recognized that unilateral actions which could cause alarm should be avoided.29

After President Aquino assumed office he received an invitation to pay an official state

visit to China. The visit was reportedly postponed because of rising tensions over

territorial disputes in the South China Sea. When ASEAN and China adopted theGuidelines on the DOC in mid2011 the way was now cleared for Aquino to visit Beijing.

He made his official visit from 30 August to 3 September at the invitation of President

Hu Jintao.

The joint statement issued at the conclusion of their talks indicated that economic

issues featured prominently. For example, Aquino reportedly garnered US $1.3 billion in

new investments. The joint statement only made reference to the South China Sea at

the bottom of the list of topics discussed (point 15 of 17 points):

Both leaders exchanged views on the maritime disputes and agreed not to let the maritime disputes

affect the broader picture of friendship and cooperation between the two countries. The two leaders

reiterated their commitment to addressing the disputes through peaceful dialogue, to maintaincontinued regional peace, security, stability and an environment conducive to economic progress.

Both leaders reaffirmed their commitments to respect and abide by the Declaration on the Conduct

of Parties in the South China Sea signed by China and the ASEAN member countries in 2002.30

On Aquinos return to Manila he revealed that President Hu Jintao supported an

implementing agreement for a South China Sea Code of Conduct. According to

Aquino, this was very significant, because before it was just a general statement of

principles. Now theres a desire to really put in the implementing rules and

regulations.31 Nevertheless, President Aquino continued to press for a multilateral

South China Sea Code of Conduct and agreement on demarcating the precise maritime

areas in dispute.

28Bloomberg News, U.S. Joint Navy Drills Inappropriate: China, July 11, 2011.

29ABSCBN News, China, PH agree to hold regular talks on Spratlys, May 23, 2011.

30Joint Statement of the Philippines and China, Beijing, September 1, 2011, reprinted in Inquirer Global

Nation, September 7, 2011.

31China Wants Binding S. China Code: Aquino, Bloomberg News, August 31, 2011.


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Reaffirmation of the U.S. Alliance

Chinese assertiveness in waters claimed by the Philippines immediately raised the

question of whether or not the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between the Philippines

and the United States could be invoked in the event of conflict between China and the

Philippines. The Philippines therefore sought a clear commitment by the United States

while Washington sought to avoid entrapment.

Article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty (Article III) only provides for consultations in the

event the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either of the Parties

is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific. In the case of armed attack,

Article IV declared the parties would act to meet the common dangers in accordance

with its constitutional processes. Finally, Article V of the MDT stated an armed attack

on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan

territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the

Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific. The point needing

clarification was whether island territories such as the KIG acquired after 1951 were

included.

The Philippines and the United States hold a strategic dialogue known as the Mutual

Defense Board which meets three times a year. The Board meeting is followed by a

meeting of the Security Engagement Board which has responsibility for implementing

the MDT. This latter meeting is cochaired by the Chief of the AFP and Commander U.S.

Pacific Command. The most recent meetings were held in August 2011 with the

convening of the 53rd Mutual Defense Board.

Force Modernisation

In 1995 the Philippines passed into law The Armed Forces Modernization Act with theaim of modernizing the AFP in fifteen years with a total fund of Pesos (P) 331 billion. The

Philippines Congress failed to follow through and the AFP was starved of funds and its

offshore military capabilities deteriorated markedly.

In 2011, in response to Chinese assertiveness in its EEZ and Kalayaan Island Group, the

Philippines drew up a new defence strategy focused on both internal security operations

and external territorial defence. The Aquino Administration allocated P11 billion to

support force modernisation of the AFP. Of this figure P8 billion will come from the

proceeds of the Malampaya Natural Gas and Power Project. The remaining P3 billion will

come from the AFPs current modernisation fund to purchase two offshore fast patrol

boats, longrange maritime aircraft, surveillance and communication equipmentincluding air defence and coastal radars.

32Starting in 2012, the government will

implement a fiveyear modernization program totalling P40 billion (or P8 billion

annually).

32Jon Grevatt, Philippines to invest USD183 million in defence of Spratly Islands, Janes Defence Weekly,

March 30, 2011.


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In March 2011, AFP Chief of Staff General Eduardo Oban announced plans to upgrade

Rancudo Air Field on PagAsa island.33 The following month the Philippines announced

the commencement of a new U.S. training program for its naval forces to enable them

to better carry out their mission of providing security for oil exploration activities in

West Philippines Sea.34

In May, a Philippine navy study recommended the acquisition of

submarines as a deterrent against future potential conflicts.35

In August 2011, the Philippines took delivery of the former U.S. Coast Guard Weather

Endurance Cutter Hamilton (rechristened BRP Gregario del Pilar). After commissioning

in December, the BRP Gregorio del Pilarwas placed under the operational control of the

Naval Forces Command and assigned to operate in the West Philippine Sea with the

mission of protecting the Philippines EEZ.36 The ship is expected to be fitted with more

modern radar systems and consideration is being given to equip it with antiship

missiles. The Philippines expects to take delivery of a second Weather Endurance Cutter

and three new Taiwanmanufactured MultiPurpose Attack Craft in 2012. The

Philippines also expects to procure a third Weather Endurance Cutter.37

The Philippines officials have floated a wish list of new equipment including: coastal

radar, longrange patrol aircraft, strategic sea lift vessels, offshore patrol boats, naval

helicopters, air defence radar, six jet trainers, surface attack aircraft, antiship missiles,

and a submarine.38

In September 2011, immediately after President Aquinos state visit to Beijing, he

announced that 4.95 billion pesos (US $118 million) would be allocated to top up the

defence budget.39 These funds were earmarked for the purchase a naval patrol vessel,

six helicopters and other military equipment in order to secure the Malampaya project

located in disputed waters off the coast of Palawan.

In addition to assistance from the United States, the Philippines has approached bothJapan and South Korea for assistance in force modernisation. For example, in September

2011, during President Aquinos state visit to Tokyo, he and Prime Minister Noda agreed

to strengthen maritime security ties by holding frequent highlevel defence discussions

and by stepping up cooperation between their Coast Guards and defencerelated

33Jaime Laude, AFP to maintain presence in Spratlys, The Philippine Star, March 29, 2011.

34Shirley Escalante, Philippines increase security for oil exploration, Australia Network News, April 28,

2011.

35Katherine Evangelista, Philippines eye submarines to boost navy, Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 17,

2001. The prospect of the Philippines acquiring submarines is very unlikely.

36Navy deploys BRP Gregorio del Pilar to West Philippine Sea, Sun Star, December 23, 2011.

37Reuters, Philippines says will spend $255 min on military helicopters, boats, April 13, 2011.

38Alexis Romero, Submarine for Navy? Noy bares AFP shop list, The Philippine Star, August 24, 2011.

39Agence FrancePresse, Philippines Ups Spending To Guard South China Sea, September 7, 2011.


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authorities. Prime Minister Noda agreed to increase the involvement of Japans Coast

Guard in training their Filipino counterparts.40

Following a visit by South Koreas President Lee Myungbak to Manila in November

2011, President Aquino announced that the Philippines would purchase military

equipment from Seoul. The Department of National Defense reportedly drew up a

procurement list that included aircraft, helicopters, boats and other military equipment.

New Diplomatic Initiative

In response to Chinese assertiveness, President Aquino launched a new initiative calling

for the South China Sea to become a Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and

Cooperation (ZOPFF/C). Aquino explained, what is ours is ours, and with what is

disputed, we can work towards joint cooperation.41 He directed the Department of

Foreign Affairs (DFA) to promote the ZOPFF/C concept through sustained consultations

and dialogue.

According to the DFA, the ZOPFF/C provides a framework for separating the disputedterritorial features that may be considered for collaborative activities from nondisputed

waters in the West Philippines Sea in accordance with international law in general and

UNCLOS) in particular.42 A disputed area, according to the DFA, could be turned into a

Joint Cooperation Area for joint development and the establishment of marine

protected area for biodiversity conservation. Areas not in dispute, such as Reed Bank

that lies on the Philippines continental shelf, can be developed exclusively by the

Philippines or with the assistance of foreign investors invited to participate in its

development.

In July 2011, at the 44th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, the Foreign Secretary of the

Philippines presented his counterparts with a proposal for an agreement on a Zone ofPeace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation in the South China Sea. The ministers took

note of this proposal and referred it to a meeting of ASEAN Senior Officials and legal

experts for consideration.43 The 1st ASEAN Maritime Legal Experts Meeting was held in

Manila from 2223 September and resolved to forward this proposal to the next ASEAN

Senior Officials Meeting in November for consideration. The 19th

ASEAN Summit took

note of these discussions and their recommendations that further study on the

proposal is required, in particular, its legal, technical and political feasibility.44

40Yore Koh, Tokyo and Manila Strengthen Defense Ties with an Eye Toward China, The Wall Street

Journal, September 28, 2011.41

Albert F. Del Rosario, A RulesBased Regime in The South China Sea By: Secretary of Foreign Affairs,

Public Information Service Unit, June 7, 2011.

42Amita O. Legaspi, Palace prepares Spratlys incursions report, GMA News TV, June 3, 2011.

43Brian Padden, ASEAN Maritime Specialists Discuss Guidelines to Resolve S. China Sea Dispute, Voice of

America, September 22, 2011.

44Chairs Statement of the 19

thASEAN Summit Bali, 17 November 2011, Point 149.


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4. U.S. Engagement with Vietnam and the Philippines

United States and Vietnam

Vietnam and the United States conducted their first defence dialogue in 2004 but

defence cooperation developed slowly over the next several years. In June 2008,

Vietnams Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung made a highprofile trip to the United States

where he met with President George W. Bush. Dung also became the first Vietnamese

prime minister since 1975 to visit the Pentagon. In a joint statement released after the

BushDung meeting, both sides agreed to hold annual highlevel talks on security and

strategic issues.

The first Political, Security and Defense Dialogue was held in Washington in October

2008. The dialogue was convened by the U.S. State Department and Vietnams Ministry

of Foreign Affairs and focused on regional security and strategic issues. Also in 2008 the

State Department amended the International Traffic in Arms Regulations to allow the

export of nonlethal defence articles to Vietnam. Three further Political, Security and

Defense Dialogues have been held to date, alternating annually between Washington

and Hanoi.

In 2009, the new Obama Administration signaled its resolve to counter Chinese

pressures on U.S. oil firms to stop assisting Vietnam to develop its hydrocarbon

resources in its EEZ. In July two highranking officials gave testimony to the

Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign

Relations. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Scot Marciel opened his remarks by

noting that the United States has a vital interest in maintaining stability, freedom of

navigation, and the right to lawful commercial activity in East Asias waterways (italics

added). And more pointedly, after reviewing cases of Chinese intimidation against

American oil and gas companies working with Vietnamese partners, Marciel stated, We

object to any effort to intimidate U.S. companies.45

The Administrations policy with respect to harassment of U.S. naval vessels, such as the

USNS Impeccable, was made clear by Robert Scher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of

Defense, who outlined a fourpoint strategy:

In support of our strategic goals, the [Defense] Department has embarked on a multi

pronged strategy that includes; 1) clearly demonstrating, through word and deed, that

U.S. forces will remain present and postured as the preeminent military force in the

region; 2) deliberate and calibrated assertions of our freedom of navigation rights by

U.S. Navy vessels; 3) building stronger security relationships with partners in the region,

at both the policy level through strategic dialogues and at the operational level by

building partner capacity, especially in the maritime security area, and 4) strengthening

45Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scot Marciel, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S.

Department of State before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign

Relations, United States Senate, 15 July 2009.


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the militarydiplomatic mechanisms we have with China to improve communications

and reduce the risk of miscalculation.46

U.S.Vietnam defence relations stepped up noticeably in 2009 when both sides engaged

in several highprofile but largely symbolic interactions and, more significantly, stepped

up defence consultations. In April, Vietnamese military officials were flown out to the

USSJohn D. Stennis, an aircraft carrier operating in the South China Sea, to observe airoperations. In December, Vietnams Defence Minister General Phung Quang Thanh,

repaid the May 2006 visit of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to fulfill a commitment

to exchange ministerial visits every three years. Enroute to Washington, Thanh touched

down in Honolulu to meet with the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command. During his

stop over Thanh was photographed peering through the periscope of the USS Florida, a

nuclearpowered guided missile submarine (SSGN).

Commencing in 2009, Vietnam agreed to conduct voyage repairs on U.S. Military Sea Lift

Command ships. The first repair was conducted on the USNS Safeguardin the port of

Saigon in September 2009. The second and third repairs were conducted on the USNS

Richard E. Byrdat Van Phong Bay and Cam Ranh Bay in March 2010 and August 2011,respectively. A fourth Military Sealift Command ship was reportedly also repaired at

Cam Ranh Bay in 2011 but no publicity was given to its visit.

In July 2010, on the fifteenth anniversary of normalization, Vietnams deputy

ambassador visited the newest U.S. aircraft carrier USS George W. H. Bush in Norfolk,

Virginia, while half a world away Vietnamese local government and military officials flew

out to the USS George Washington (CVN 73) in waters off the central coast of Vietnam.

In August, the U.S. and Vietnam conducted their first naval engagement activities when

the guided missile destroyer USSJohn S. McCain called in at Da Nangs Tien Sa port.47 In

July thefollowing year, three U.S. navy ships the guided missile destroyers USS Chung

Hoon and USS Preble and the USNS Safeguard anchored at Tien Sa port andparticipated in naval exchange activities.48 The terms naval engagement and naval

activities signify that are not naval exercises and involve only noncombat training.

In August 2010, in a significant upgrade of their defence relationship, Vietnam and the

U.S. held their first Defense Dialogue at deputy minister level.49 This meeting focused on

bilateral issues such as MIA accounting, unexploded wartime ordnance, Agent Orange,

and areas for future cooperation such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief,

search and rescue, international peacekeeping and maritime security. The two sides also

46Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Scher, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs,

Office of the Secretary of Defense before the Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 15 July 2009.

47U.S. and Vietnamese sailors interacted in shipboard damage control, a search and rescue

demonstration and an exchange of culinary arts (cooking recipes).

48These activities included navigation, search and rescue training, damage control, dive and salvage

training, and a community relations project involving medical and dental care.

49Carlyle A. Thayer, Vietnams Defensive Diplomacy, The Wall Street Journal, August 2022, 2010, 11.


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exchanged views on Chinas military modernisation. In October 2010, Lt. Gen. Nguyen

Chi Vinh, Deputy Minister of National Defence, visited Washington to discuss U.S.

participation at the inaugural ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting with their eight

dialogue partners (ADMM Plus).

In 2011 the United States and Vietnam entered into discussions to raise their bilateral

relationship to a strategic partnership, a classification used by Vietnam to describe

countries with which it has particularly close bilateral relations. In April, the President of

the National Defense University, Vice Admiral Ann Rondreau, visited Hanoi and offered

scholarship for Vietnamese officers to undertake professional military education in the

United States.

The 4th

Political, Security and Defense Dialogue, held in Washington in June 2011,

discussed peacekeeping operations and training, humanitarian assistance and disaster

relief, counterterrorism and counternarcotics, nonproliferation and maritime security.

The following month the U.S. and Vietnam signed their first formal military agreement,

a Statement of Intent on Military Medical Cooperation (August 1); the Commander of

the U.S. 7th Fleet visited Hanoi (5 August); and the USS George Washington returned to

Vietnamese waters on 13 August. Once again Vietnamese officials were flown out to

observe operations.

U.S.Vietnam defence relations were advanced at the 2nd

Defence Policy Dialogue held

in Washington on 19 September. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence Robert Scher

and Vice Minister of National Defence Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chi Vinh signed the first formal

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on defence cooperation. The MOU included five

priority areas: the establishment of a regular highlevel dialogue between defence

ministries; maritime security; search and rescue; studying and exchanging experiences

on UN peacekeeping; and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The MOU in fact

codified activities that were already under discussion and was primarily a transparency

measure.

United States and the Philippines

Whatever the technicalities of the Mutual Defense Treaty discussed above, Chinese

assertiveness directed at the Philippines served to draw Manila and Washington closer

together as allies. As with Vietnam, the United States employed the symbolism of fly

outs to an aircraft carrier to signal its interests in maritime security. On May 14, 2011,

for example, on the eve of the visit by Chinas Defence Minister, President Aquino and

several members of his Cabinet flew out to the USS Carl Vinson in the South China Sea

as it headed towards the Philippines. The aircraft carrier and its escorts, the USS BunkerHill, USS Shiloh and USS Gridley, were scheduled to make a routine port call and

goodwill visit.50 The fly out by President Aquino was a highly visible and symbolic

reaffirmation of the alliance relationship.

50Christine O. Avendano, Dona Pazzibugan and Jerome Aning, Palace sees no terror backlash against

Aquino visit to ship, Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 16, 2011.


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In June 2011, Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario visited Washington and met with

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and National Director

for Intelligence James Clapper.51 During his meeting with Secretary Clinton she

expressed her concern that recent incidents in the South China Sea undermined regional

stability. They both agreed to consult closely on ways to maintain freedom of

navigation, respect for international law, and unimpeded lawful commerce in the SouthChina Sea.

When Del Rosario visited the Pentagon he delivered a wish list of military equipment

needed to secure the Philippines maritime territory.52

The list reportedly included a

squadron of twelve F16 jet aircraft. Secretary Gates expressed his departments

willingness to strengthen the Philippines maritime capacity. Over the last decade the

Philippines has received more U.S. military assistance than any other country in

Southeast Asia (on average $70 million annually). When Del Rosario met Clapper the

Director offered to enhance intelligencesharing to improve the Philippines maritime

situational awareness.

In July, the U.S. and Philippines navies conducted an elevenday exercise as part of the

annual CARAT series. This particular exercise included maritime interdiction, patrol

exercises and gunnery drills. In October, 3,000 U.S. and Filipino marines conducted a

twoweek series of exercises including a simulated joint hostile beach assault in an area

west of Palawan.

On 16 November Secretary Clinton and Secretary Del Rosario met in the Philippines and

issued the Manila Declaration reaffirming their bilateral ties and defence relations. In

public comments after meeting President Aquino at Malacanang Clinton described the

Philippines as a trusted ally and declared, let me say that the US will always be in the

corner of the Philippines. We will always stand and fight with you to achieve the future

we seek. Later, standing on the deck of the USS Fitzgerald in Manila Harbour, she

stated, We must ensure that this alliance remains strong, capable of delivering results

for the people of the Philippines and the United States and our neighbors throughout

the Pacific.

5. Future Developments

What lies ahead? The future security environment of the South China Sea region will be

influenced by five major overlapping trends. These trends contain both stabilizing and

destabilizing elements. The five trends are: ChinaASEAN discussions on confidence

building measures; increased regional enforcement capabilities; regional force

modernization; ChinaU.S. rivalry; and the evolution of the regional security

architecture.

51Pia LeeBrago, US willing to help Phl get F16 jets, The Philippine Star, December 25, 2011.

52Michael Lim Ubac, Philippines shops for US military gear, Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 5, 2011.


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ChinaASEAN discussions on CBMs

In July 2011, China and the ASEAN member states adopted the Guidelines to Implement

the DOC after seven years of startstop negotiations. Although the DOC was signed in

2002 it was not until 2004 that a Joint Working Group was established to draft

guidelines to implement the DOC.

Since the Guidelines were adopted no major incidents have occurred in the South China

Sea between China and the claimant states. The tensions that marked the first half of

the year have abated. China is set to host the first meeting of the Joint Working Group

to implement the DOC Guidelines in January 2012.53

At the time the original DOC was adopted it was characterized as the first step towards a

more binding Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. With the adoption of the

Guidelines to Implement the DOC ASEAN members have decided to proceed with

drawing up a draft COC. In November 2011, ASEAN Senior Officials commenced

discussions on what activities and projects to include in a code of conduct. According to

an Indonesian official, once agreement is reached the draft COC will be presented toChina to determine what, when, where and how the project would be carried out.

54

On the face of it Chinas discussions with ASEAN member states represents a positive

development that could lead to the adoption of confidence building measures and a

lowering of tensions. However, if China seeks to play on divisions among ASEAN

claimants and engage in a protracted diplomatic game to keep U.S. intervention at bay,

this could arouse suspicions and scupper the diplomatic process.

Increased regional enforcement capabilities

Irrespective of what direction diplomatic discussions take, it seems clear that Vietnam

and the Philippines will continue their oil exploration and development plans byawarding contracts to foreign companies. Both the Philippines and Vietnam will

continue to expand their civilian maritime capacities to exercise jurisdiction in their

EEZs. These developments are likely to be viewed as provocative by China because they

are being carried out in waters claimed by China.

At the same time, China will continue to develop and expand its capacity to enforce its

jurisdiction in the South China Sea. China has already announced plans to step up the

recruitment of enforcement personnel and to continue constructing more modern

Fishery Administration and Maritime Surveillance ships. China has so far refrained from

awarding oil exploration contracts within its 9dash line in the South China Sea. the

possibility exists, however, that China could change this policy in response to the awardof new exploration contracts by the Philippines and Vietnam.

53Antonio Siegfrid O. Alegado, ASEAN, China to set ground rules on sea issues in January, Business

World, November 29, 2011.

54Antara, ASEAN ready to discuss continuation of doc with China, November 14, 2011.


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China has constructed a mega oilrig capable of deepwater operations. If this rig is placed

in contested water and protected by armed escorts tensions are sure to erupt and

undermine the diplomatic process.

In sum, greater number of civilian maritime enforcement ships and vessels will ply the

disputed waters of the South China Sea raising the possibility of a clash due to accident,

miscalculation or design. The possibility of incidents will rise during the MayAugust

period when China imposes its unilateral fishing ban.

Regional force modernization

Regional force modernization has and will continue to result in the introduction of

increased numbers of warships equipped with new technologies and weapons systems.

A review of regional force modernization over the last decade highlights the

introduction of new capabilities such as standoff precisionstrike, longrange airborne

and undersea attack, stealth, mobility and expeditionary warfare and, above all, new

capacities when it comes to greatly improved command, control communications,

computing, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks.55

In Southeast Asia the conventional submarine has become the hallmark of naval

acquisitions. China has the largest submarine fleet (more than sixty) and most extensive

plans to expand its numbers including the Type 093 nuclear attack submarine (SSN) and

Type 094Jinclass SSBN. Defence analysts estimate that 86 submarines will be added to

the fleets in the AsiaPacific by 2020 of which thirty will be Chinese.56

Vietnam reportedly will take delivery of six conventional Kiloclass submarines in 2014.

Indonesia, the first country in Southeast Asia to acquire submarines, is now considering

replacing its aging fleet with newer South Korean models. Indonesia reportedly will

boost defence spending by 35% in 2012.57

Singapore has upgraded its submarine fleet to include two Archerclass submarines. The

first of which, the RSSArcher, was commissioned in December 2011.58

Malaysia has acquired two Scorpeneclass submarines. Both the Singaporean and

Malaysian submarines are equipped with Air Independent Propulsion systems.

Thailand is currently considering acquiring its own conventional submarines, while the

Philippines has included a submarine on its wish list of future defence procurements.

Australias 2009 Defence White Paper set out plans to construct twelve new

conventional submarines. Recently, it was reported that visiting U.S. Navy officials have

55Richard A. Bitzinger, A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions,

Contemporary Southeast Asia, 31(1), April 2010, 6364.

56IHS Janes quoted by Sabine Pirone, Chinas Pacific Push Spurs U.S. Spending on AntiSub Warfare,

Business Week, November 25, 2011.

57Step Vaessen, Indonesia to increase military spending, Al Jazeera.net, November 7, 2011.

58Jermyn Chow, RSS Archer submarine now operational, The Straits Times, December 3, 2011.


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repeatedly raised the issue of the lack of availability of Australias troubled Collinsclass

submarines, as well as the lack of progress on Australias planned new class of

submarines. This pressure has prompted the Gillard Government to place the matter

before Cabinet.59

Security analysts warn that expanded submarine fleets may be destabilizing in times of

tension and crises due to the complexities of command and control. In addition, the

proliferation of regional submarine fleets has led Australia, Malaysia, the Philippines,

Singapore and the United States to step up investment in antisubmarine warfare

capabilities. Singapore, for example, reportedly is in the market for four or five P3C

Orion maritime patrol aircraft.60

Finally, new developments in military technology will see the introduction of more

sophisticated aerial and undersea drones and unmanned systems for intelligence

gathering, reconnaissance, surveillance and strike. Mark Valencia has drawn particular

attention to Large Diameter Unmanned Underwater Vehicles, Persistent Littoral

Undersea Surveillance Systems and Modular Floating Bases that can be deployed in the

EEZs of target states. According to Valencia:

The situation is presently beyond international control. Thus continued intrusive probes are

likely to generate frustration and resentment that may translate into the forcible halting of

such intrusions when and if detected. The scale and scope of maritime and airborne

intelligence collection activities are likely to continue to expand rapidly in many countries,

involving levels and sorts of activities quite unprecedented in peacetime. They will not only

become more intensive; they will generally be more intrusive. Indeed stepped up drone

missions may even be considered a prelude to impending warfare. They will generate

tensions and more frequent crises; they will produce defensive reactions and escalatory

dynamics; and they will lead to less stability in the most affected regions, especially in Asia.61

ChinaU.S. rivalry

Chinas development of antiaccess/area denial capabilities beyond the first island chain

has provoked a response by the United States. The U.S. has strengthened its military

posture on Guam, stepped up weapons and equipment sales to the Philippines,

announced the basing of Combat Littoral Ships in Singapore, 62 and negotiated new

access arrangements with Australia to defence facilities near Darwin. Currently, Obama

Administration officials are outlining a new U.S. strategy to pivot military forces from

59John Kerin, Gillard bows to US on submarines, The Australian Financial Review, November 24, 2011.

60

Craig Hoyle, Singapore interested in exUS Navy P3s, Flight Global, December 15, 2011.61

Mark J. Valencia, The South China Sea, Military Activities and the Law of the Sea, Paper presented to

the International Conference on Major Law and Policy Issues in the South China Sea: European and

American Perspectives, cosponsored by the Institute of European and American Studies and the Center

for AsiaPacific Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, October 78, 2011 and Mark Valencia, The

Impeccable Incident: Truth and Consequences, China Security, 5(2), Spring 2009, 26.

62Craig Whitlock, Navys next stop in Asia will set China on edge, Checkpoint Washington, November 18,

2011


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Iraq and Afghanistan to East Asia in coming years. The new Defense Secretary, Leon

Panetta, has indicated that the AsiaPacific will be largely quarantined from defence

budget cuts.

In response to Chinas development of a more modern submarine force, the U.S. has

deployed thirtyone of its fiftythree fast attack submarines to the Pacific and stepped

up its antisubmarine warfare program. Eighteen of the U.S. subs are homeported in

Pearl Harbor; the others are based in Guam.63

The United States has also deployed three Ohioclass nuclear submarines to the Asia

Pacific Indian Ocean region. Each has been modified to carry 154 conventional

Tomahawk cruise missiles. In late Juneearly July 2010, in a calculated demonstration of

naval power, the USS Florida, USS Michigan, and USS Ohio submarines, simultaneously

appeared in Diego Garcia (Indian Ocean), Busan (South Korea) and Subic Bay (the

Philippines), respectively.64 The United States has stationed the fifthgeneration Raptor

aircraft in Hawaii. Finally, the United States is developing an airsea battle concept to

counter Chinas development of areadenial/antiaccess capabilities. The airsea battle

concept is being drawn up to enable the United States to prevail in conflicts where area

denial/antiaccess capabilities are well developed.

The continuing conduct of U.S. military surveys and intelligence gathering activities in

Chinas EEZ will remain a point of friction in their bilateral relations. A serious incident

could occur at any time due to miscalculation, or more likely, during times of political

tensions (such as U.S. arms sales to Taiwan). According to Vice Admiral Scott Swift,

Commander U.S. Seventh Fleet, his prime concern is not the outbreak of a major conflict

but any tactical trigger with strategic implications I do have concerns about a specific

brushup that could result in a tactical miscalculation.65 In sum, regional sea lanes are

set to become more crowded, contested and vulnerable to armed strife.66

Regional security architecture

The East Asian security architecture is currently evolving as a result of the expansion of

the East Asia Summit (EAS) to include the United States and Russian Federation. At the

2011 EAS, sixteen of its eighteen members raised concerns over maritime security

issues. China was the only country to argue that the EAS was not an appropriate venue

for such discusions. Nevertheless, the EAS Chairs concluding summary noted that

maritime security has been established as a legitimate agenda item.

63Oyaol Ngirainki, Guam Gets New Sub Buildings, NavyTimes, July 21, 2010.

64U.S. Posts Pictures of Nuclear Sub in Show of Force, The Chosun Ilbo, July 8, 2010 and Mark

Thompson, U.S. Missiles Deployed Near China Send a Message, Time Magazine, July 8, 2010.

65Stephen Coates, US Pacific commander warns of tactical errors, The China Post, November 10, 2011.

66Rory Medcalf and Raoul Heinrichs, Crisis and Confidence: Major Powers and Maritime Security in Indo

Pacific Asia (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, June 2011), 3 and Sam Bateman, Solving the

Wicked Problems of Maritime Security: Are Regional Forums up to the Task?, Contemporary Southeast

Asia, 33(1), 2011, 1517.


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For the new regional security architecture to be effective there must be some

streamlining of policy advice to the EAS from other multilateral bodies currently active.

For example, there are a number of overlapping arrangements under the auspices of

ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum charged with maritime security and South China

Sea issues:

ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM). In May 2006, ASEAN Defence Ministersmet for the first time and began the process of institutionalizing defence

cooperation on a regional basis. The ASEAN Defence Ministers are now sectoral

members of the ASEAN Political Security Council established under ASEANs Charter.

The ADMM brought under its umbrella what had been separate informal meetings

of the ASEAN service chiefs (army, navy and air and military intelligence) that had

been conducted outside the official ASEAN framework. At the 4th ADMM in May

2010, it was agreed that ASEAN navies would cooperate to patrol their maritime

boundaries.

ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meeting. The prospects of practical cooperation among ASEANnavies do not appear good. At the most recent ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meeting (ANCM

5) in Vietnam in 2011 there was disagreement over a number of issues including the

formal name of the meeting, how often it should meet, conducting joint patrols, and

a proposal for an ASEAN communications protocol when navy ships passed each

other at sea.

ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus). The ADMM was expanded inOctober 2010 to include eight of ASEAN dialogue partners: Australia, China, India,

Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea and the United States. At this meeting it

was agreed that the ADMM Plus would meet every three years with the second

meeting scheduled for Brunei in 2013. The inaugural meeting of the ADMM Plus set

up the ASEAN Defence Seniors Meeting Plus (ADSOM Plus).

ADMM Plus Expert Working Group on Maritime Security. The inaugural meeting ofthe ADMM Plus also established five expert working groups including the ADMM

Plus Expert Working Group on Maritime Security. The terms of reference for the

ADMM Plus Expert Working Group on Maritime Security were only approved in

October 2011. This group will report its deliberations to the ADSOM Plus.

ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF). ASEAN established the AMF in 2010 under the termsof theASEAN Political Security Community (APCS) Blueprint.

67 The second meeting of

the AMF was held in Thailand in August 2011 and proposed expanding its

membership to include dialogue partners in a separate meeting (AMF Plus). TheAMF is focused on a comprehensive approach to maritime issues and has so far not

dealt with South China Sea issues in detail.68

67Hanoi Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN Regional Forum Vision Statement, May 20, 2010, Point

3.

68Chairs Statement of the 19

thASEAN Summit, Bali, 17 November 2011, Points 1417 (Maritime

Cooperation).


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ARF InterSessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ARF ISM Maritime Security). In2009, the ASEAN Regional Forum established the ARF InterSessional Meeting on

Maritime Security and later approved its Work Plan at the 44 th ASEAN Ministerial

Meeting in July 2011.69 The ISM on Maritime Security focuses on information

sharing, capacity building, and training rather than practical activities such as South

China Sea CBMs.

The evolution of the regional security architecture is at a nascent stage and it is unclear

how an expanded EAS will relate to the already existing multilateral security institutions.

On the one hand, the current evolution of the regional security architecture may be

viewed as a positive development since it brings together all the major actors, including

the U.S. and China, at head of state/government level. On the other hand, if China feels

that other external powers are ganging up on it, the EAS process may become

deadlocked. Of the eight dialogue partners, five are either U.S. allies or close strategic

partners (U.S., Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand).

In conclusion, the immediate security outlook for the South China Sea maritime region is

generally positive. China appears committed to working with ASEAN states to develop

confidencebuilding measures under the Guidelines to Implement the DOC. China has

also given indications that it is willing to work with ASEAN member states on a Code of

Conduct for the South China Sea. These discussions obviate the need for the U.S. to

offer to facilitate a diplomatic resolution of these disputes.

There is a risk, however, that ASEAN members states will only be able reach agreement

on the lowest common denominator deal with China. ASEAN as a legal entity has not

adopted an official policy on the South China Sea. It is clear that some ASEAN members

have reservations about the assertive approach the Philippines has adopted. Pressures

are already building up to mark the tenth anniversary of the DOC in ceremonies in

Phnom Penh in November 2012 with the adoption of a largely symbolic (feel good)

declaration. The DOC was originally signed in Cambodias capital a decade ago. A weak

Code of Conduct is unlikely to address security concerns of the Philippines or Vietnam.

In the longer run, the ability of ASEAN member states to present a united front to China

may be hampered by the fact that the ASEAN Chair is scheduled to pass from Cambodia

in 2012 to Brunei (2013), Myanmar (2014) and Laos (2015). Regional security analysts

doubt that these future ASEAN Chairs will be as proactive or effective as the immediate

past chairs Indonesia (2011) and Vietnam (2010). If the Philippines and Vietnam

conclude that their security needs are not being addressed, they may well encourage

the continued engagement of the United States and other external powers to maintain

maritime security in the South China Sea.

69ASEAN Regional Forum, Draft Outline of a Work Plan on Maritime Security: A Template for Discussion,

2nd

ARF ISM on Maritime Security, Auckland, March 2931, 2010; CoChairs Summary of the Third ARF

InterSessional Meeting on Maritime Security, Tokyo, Japan, 1415 February 2011; and 44th

AM/PMC/18th

ARF, Indonesia 2011, Chairs Statement, 18th

ASEAN Regional Forum, 23 July 2011, Bali,

Indonesia, Point 41.


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Underlying conventional security trends are more worrying. China, Vietnam and the

Philippines are increasing their capacities to enforce jurisdiction in waters they claim in

the South China Sea. Sovereignty and sovereign rights are contested in these waters; as

they become more congested the likelihood of a maritime incident increases. Regional

force modernization programmes are already introducing potentially destabilizing

capabilities and military technologies into the region. The proliferation of submarinefleets is a major cause of concern. Finally, continued contestation between China and

the United States for dominance over the waters of the Western Pacific is likely to lead

to friction and possible naval incidents. Chinas impending power shift and a possible

leadership turnover in the United States may make the management of bilateral

relations more difficult. The spillover effects of Great Power rivalry in East Asia will be

quickly transmitted to Southeast Asia and impair the ability of the newly emerging

security architecture to deal effectively with challenges to maritime security in the

South China Sea.

Thayer South China Disputes Impact on Southeast Asian Security: What Lies Ahead

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