Professionalism in GME: Defining and Measuring Professionalism
Thayer China: Corruption and Military Professionalism
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Transcript of Thayer China: Corruption and Military Professionalism
7/27/2019 Thayer China: Corruption and Military Professionalism
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Background Brief
China: Corruption and MilitaryProfessionalism
Carlyle A. Thayer
October 2, 2013
[client name deleted]
We request your assessment of corruption in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Two of our staff have learned that the case of General Gu Junshan is moving towards
trial and that the case is likely to have greater transparency than previous trials. The
bribery amounts are likely to be huge. Whether or not they go after Gu's patrons,
our assessment is that Xi's anti-corruption campaign is shifting from rhetoric towards
serious action for the first time in decades. Our view also has been that corruption
has been is seriously debilitating.
We request your assessment of our tentative conclusions. And we request your
assessment of whether or not Xi Jinping is serious about fighting corruption in the
PLA and what might it mean for Chinese military capabilities.
ANSWER: China’s leaders all recognize that entrenched large-scale corruption and
the patronage networks they breed are a threat to the legitimacy of one-party rule.
For example, General Liu Yuan was quoted as stating in late 2011, “no country can
defeat China. Only our corruption can destroy us and cause our armed forces to be
defeated without fighting.”
General Liu is a confidant of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi
Jinping who is also chair of the Central Military Commission (CMC).
Since his elevation as party General Secretary and CMC head Xi has set priority on
dealing with “flies and tigers” – low and high ranking officials involved in corruption.Xi Jinping is motivated to tackle corruption for two main reasons – to stamp his
authority on the Chinese political system, including its myriad domestic civilian and
military security and intelligence agencies and the PLA itself, and to address a serious
issue affecting the rule of the CCP. But a balance must be sought between punishing
those guilty of excessive corruption and not upsetting the carefully balanced
patronage networks and destabilizing the party.
In June this year, Xi convened a four-day meeting of the Politburo at Zhongnanhai to
discuss anti-corruption measures. Xi was reported as stating, “efforts to maintain
strict discipline must start at the Politburo.”
Thayer ConsultancyABN # 65 648 097 123
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On PLA day this year, 1st
August, Xi promoted six military officers to the rank of full
general and shortly after promoted eighteen major generals to the rank of lieutenant
general. Of the twenty-four new generals and lieutenant generals, eleven come from
political commands. This is an indication that Xi intends to deal with corruption
within the PLA with a particular focus on promotion based on merit and
professionalism rather than seniority.
In August, General Fan Changlong, deputy chairman of the CMC ordered that senior
military officers disclose information on their personal and family assets, who they
dealt with in their officials capacities and the jobs held by family and relatives. The
following month Xi, as chairman of the CMC, signed off on new regulations
governing the use of official vehicles by army and security officials at garrison
command level.
When corruption becomes excessive and begins to impact on the normal operations
of the party-state, senior party leaders must act. This year Xi Jinping had to confront
this issue in the Bo Xilai case which had ramifications for internal party stability.
Other indications that Xi is serious about tacking corruption may be seen in three
current cases. The first involves the investigation of the role of former head of the
Legal and Political Affairs Committee, Zhou Yongkang. Zhou’s Committee had
oversight of China’s domestic security and police agencies. The current investigation
into Zhou and his patronage network appears to be part of the fall out of the Bo Xilai
affair.
The second corruption case involves Lt. General Gu Junshan, former deputy director
of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Logistic Department. General Liu
reportedly brought information on Gu’s bribery and corruption to the attention of XiJinping. Gu reportedly amassed wealth by selling PLA land and posts.
The third corruption case involves General Xu Caihou who reportedly accepted
bribes from General Gu and promoted his rapid rise in PLA ranks. Xu was a powerful
figure indeed, he was one of three vice chairman of the Central Military Commission
appointed in 2004 and he served as secretary of the Central Commission for
Discipline and Inspection.
What does Xi’s current anti-corruption efforts mean for the PLA? Recall that in
December last year Xi visited a guided missile destroyer that formed part of a naval
detachment that patrolled in the contested waters of the South China Sea. In an
address to naval personnel he linked his China Dream to a strong nation and a strong
military.
During his first three months in office as party leader and chair of the Central
Military Commission he visited several army, navy, air force, space and missile
facilities. In his addresses to naval personnel he urged them to “fight and win wars.”
The PLA’s involvement in commercial affairs, and the development of political
patronage networks funded by corruption, both serve to weaken the PLA as a
modern and professional fighting force. One of the central arguments of academic
literature on civil-military relations is that a military is most professional when it is
tasked with meeting external threats to the state. Military professionalism embracesboth appointment and promotion based on merit and competence in organizing for
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armed conflict. Military involvement in commercial enterprises and patron-client
networks based on corruption detracts from these missions. In the case of General
Gu Junshan, for example, he reportedly advanced his career by providing bribes to
senior generals (and secured his rapid promotion) and he profited by the sale of
army land.
Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “China: Corruption and Military
Professionalism,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief , October 2, 2013. All
background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself
from the mailing list type UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key.
Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officiallyregistered as a small business in Australia in 2002.