International Water Resources AssociationWater International, Volume 32, Number 1, Pg. 1-15, March 2007

© 2007 International Water Resources Association

The United Nations Watercourses Convention Ten Years

Later: Why Has its Entry into Force Proven Difficult?

Salman M.A. Salman, Member IWRA, Lead Counsel, Legal Vice PresidencyThe World Bank, Washington DC, USA

Abstract: After about 27 years of extensive preparatory work and formal and informal deliberations, theUnited Nations General Assembly adopted on May 21, 1997, by a large majority, the Convention on the Law ofthe Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. The adoption of the Convention was hailed as a majorbreakthrough and as an historical moment in the evolution of international water law. However, ten years after itsadoption, the Convention has not yet entered into force. This article reviews the history, basic features and statusof the Convention, analyzes the reasons for the reluctance of states to become parties to it, and examines its roleand prospects.

Key words: Dispute settlement, equitable and reasonable utilization, International Law Commission,regional economic integration organization, Watercourses Convention.

Introduction

The United Nations (UN) General Assemblyadopted on May 21, 1997 the Convention on theLaw of the Non-Navigational Uses of InternationalWatercourses (UN Watercourses Convention, orConvention). That approval followed about twenty threeyears of extensive preparatory work by the InternationalLaw Commission (ILC), and lengthy deliberations bythe Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly,as well as the General Assembly itself, that lasted forabout three years. Furthermore, the work of the ILCdrew from rich legal literature in the field. A numberof declarations and resolutions on internationalwatercourses, accompanied by detailed reports, havebeen adopted by two scholarly non-governmentalorganizations - the Institute of International Law (IIL),and the International Law Association (ILA).

The first such declaration was issued by theIIL in 1911, under the title "International RegulationsRegarding the Use of International Watercoursesfor Purposes Other than Navigation," also knownas the Madrid Declaration. This was followed by the

IIL "Resolution on the Utilization of Non-MaritimeInternational Waters (Except for Navigation)" (theSalzburg Resolution) in 1961, and the resolution on "ThePollution of Rivers and Lakes and International Law"(the Athens Resolution) in 1979. On the other hand, theILA started working on international watercourses in1956 when it issued "A Statement of Principles uponwhich to base Rules of Law Concerning the Uses ofInternational Rivers," also known as the DubrovnikStatement. The Statement was followed in 1958 bythe New York Resolution that dealt with the principleof reasonable and equitable sharing of the waters of adrainage basin. This principle was further discussed andelaborated by the ILA at the Tokyo meeting in 1964.The work of the ILA culminated in the "Helsinki Ruleson the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers" thatwere issued in 1966 (ILA, 1966). The Helsinki Ruleswere the first comprehensive set of rules dealing withinternational watercourses, and have been widelyaccepted as representing customary international waterlaw (Bourne, 1996). It should, however, be noted thatthose declarations and resolutions have no bindingeffect per se. This is because they are neither signed nor

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The United Nations Watercourses Convention Ten Years Later: Why Has its Entry into F orce Proven Difficult?

ratified by states. Their authoritative guidance stemsfrom the expertise and respectability of the members ofboth organizations.

In addition to the work of the IIL and ILA,mention must also be made of two conventions adoptedunder the auspices of the League of Nations. Thefirst is the "Convention and Statute on the Regime ofNavigable Waterways of International Concern," alsoknown as the Barcelona Convention, adopted in 1921.This Convention deals mainly with issues related tonavigation. The second convention is the "ConventionRelative to the Development of Hydraulic PowerAffecting More than One State," also known as theGeneva Convention, adopted in 1923. This Convention,as its title indicates, is quite limited in scope. Althoughboth Conventions are still in force, they have little, ifany, legal or practical relevance and usefulness (Berber,1959).

In parallel to the above, there have been alarge number of bilateral and multilateral treaties, aswell as judicial and arbitral decisions, on internationalwatercourses. As such, the ILC had considerableliterature on international watercourses to start from,and indeed, it has acknowledged that, as will bediscussed later.

Discussion of this extensive body of work isbeyond the scope of this article. Instead, this articleconcentrates on the UN Watercourses Convention. Itstarts with discussion of the early work of the UN oninternational watercourses and the preparatory work ofthe ILC that resulted in the draft Convention. The articlealso reviews the provisions of the Convention, analyzesthe reasons for the reluctance of the states to becomeparties to it, and examines the influential guidance ithas provided, as well as its prospects.

The United Nations Early Involvement withInternational Watercourses

The UN started paying attention to the issue ofinternational rivers in the late 1950s. In 1959, the UNGeneral Assembly adopted Resolution 1401 (XIV),which called for initiation of "preliminary studies onthe legal problems relating to the utilization and useof international rivers with a view to determiningwhether the subject is appropriate for codification."

The Resolution requested the Secretary General of theUN to prepare and circulate to the member states areport containing: (i) information provided by memberstates regarding their laws and legislation in force onthe matter; (ii) a summary of existing bilateral andmultilateral treaties; (iii) a summary of decisions oftribunals, including arbitral awards; and (iv) a surveyof studies made by non-governmental organizationsconcerned with international law.

Consequently, a report, entitled "Legal ProblemsRelating to the Utilization and Use of InternationalRivers," was completed and presented to the GeneralAssembly in April 1963 (United Nations, 1963). VolumeI of the report was divided into two parts. The first partdealt with information provided by member statesregarding their legislation on international waters, andthe second part dealt with general conventions, as wellas bilateral and multilateral treaties in Africa, America,Europe and Asia dealing with international waters. Vol-ume II of the report included two parts which dealt withinternational judicial decisions, as well as studies carriedout by national and international non-governmentalorganizations. Such studies included the early workcarried out by the ILA, and the IIL. The report predatedthe Helsinki Rules on International Rivers issued by theILA in 1966.

The report was widely circulated, butittook sevenmore years before the General Assembly would returnto the issue of international watercourses. On December8, 1970, the General Assembly adopted Resolution2669 (XXV) entitled "Progressive Development andCodification of the Rules of International Law Relatingto International Watercourses." The Resolution referredto the earlier Resolution 1401 of 1959, and to the reportthat was produced as a result thereof, and underscoredthe facts that: (i) water, owing to the growth ofpopulation and to the increasing and multiplying needsand demands of mankind, is of growing concern tohumanity; (ii) the available freshwater resources ofthe world are limited; and (iii) the preservation andprotection of those resources are of great concern to allnations. The Resolution noted the legal problems relatingto the use of international watercourses, and the fact thatsuch use is still based on rules of customary law. TheResolution asked the International Law Commission(ILC) to "take up the study of the law of the non-

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navigational uses of international watercourses with aview to its progressive development and codification."It also requested the Secretary General of the UN tocontinue the study initiated under Resolution 1401 inorder to prepare a supplementary report on the legalproblems relating to utilization and use of internationalwatercourses. It is worth noting that Resolution 2669used the term "international watercourses" as opposedto the term "international rivers" used in Resolution1401. The term "international watercourses" is moreinclusive than "international rivers" because it includeslakes and groundwater, in addition to rivers. Thisindicates a clear progress in the global understandingof international waters issues.

About sevenyears afterthe issuanceof Resolution2669, the Secretary General of the UN completed andsubmitted in March 1977 a report entitled "Register ofInternational River Basins." The report was discussedin May of that year by the Committee on NaturalResources of the UN Economic and Social Council.The Register indicated that the number of internationalrivers was 214. It showed the riparian countries and thebasin area of each international basin. It also indicatedthe share of each riparian country, as well as the totalarea of the country falling within the international basin.Indeed, the Register was quite comprehensive and itsinformation fairly detailed (United Nations, 1977a).

It should be added that the Register was issueda few days before the UN Water Conference that washeld in March 1977 in Mar del Plata, Argentina, whereshared water resources were widely and extensivelydebated. One of the recommendations of thatConference was that the work of the ILC on the law ofthe non-navigational uses of international watercoursesshould be given higher priority in the work programof the ILC, and be coordinated with other internationalbodies dealing with the development of internationallaw of waters with a view to the early conclusion ofan international convention. The Conference alsorecommended that, in the absence of bilateral andmultilateral agreements, member states should continueto apply generally accepted principles of internationallaw in the use, development, and management ofshared water resources, and should take note of theuseful work of the non-governmental and other expertbodies on international water law (United Nations,

1977b). However, as discussed below, it would takeseventeen more years, following the issuance of theabove recommendation, before the ILC would be ableto agree on, and recommend, a draft convention to theUN General Assembly. Actually, the complexity of theissues related to shared waters surfaced even at the Mardel Plata Water Conference, and the participants in thatmeeting got a taste of such complexities. There was noagreement during the Conference on what term to usewhen referring to a watercourse, parts of which are indifferent states. Although the Report of the Conferenceused the term "shared water resources," a footnote,repeated twice, clarified that "this term has been usedonly for uniformity of the text and its use does notprejudice the position of the countries supporting theterms `transboundary waters' or `international waters'in any of the problems involved."

Work of the International Law Commission

Pursuant to Resolution 2669 of 1970, theILC started working on the topic of internationalwatercourses in early 1971. The ILC is a UN bodycomposed of legal experts nominated by states, electedby the United Nations General Assembly, and taskedwith the codification and progressive development ofinternational law. The task was clearly a complex one.It took 23 years, five rapporteurs, and fifteen reportsbefore the final draft articles of the Convention wereagreed upon by the ILC. A number of issues provedcontroversial and complex even for the membersof the ILC. Such issues included definition of theterm "international watercourses;" transboundary

Ra ^. ll Sa.tidY.arKearney First report 28th session, 1976

Schwabe) First report 31st session, 1979Second report 32nd session, 1980Third report 34th session, 1982

Evensen First report 35th session, 1983Second report 36th session, 1984

McCaffrey First (preliminary) report 37th session, 1985Second report 38th session, 1986Third report 39th session, 1987Fourth report 40th session, 1988Fifth report 41st session, 1989Sixth report 42nd session, 1990Seventh report 43rd session, 1991

Rosenstock First report 45th session, 1993Second report 48th session, 1994

Final draft Articles 46th session, 1994

Table 1:The Special ILC Rapporteurs and Their Reports.Source: Watts (1999).

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The United Nations Watercourses Convention Ten Years Later: Why Has its Entry into F orce Proven Difficult?

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groundwater; the status of existing watercoursesagreements vis-a-vis the Convention; the relationshipbetween the principle of equitable and reasonableutilization and the obligation not to cause significantharm; and the procedures and mechanisms for disputesettlement. Differences on those issues were finallyresolved, and a draft Convention was agreed upon bythe ILC and submitted to the General Assembly in 1994.Table 1 shows the different rapporteurs, the reports theyprepared, and the ILC sessions and years during whichthe reports were discussed.

The draft Convention prepared by the ILCwas deliberated thereafter by the Sixth Committee ofthe UN (the Legal Committee), convened as WorkingGroup of the Whole (the Working Group). Thereafter,on May 21, 1997, following lengthy discussion of theILC draft, as amended by the Working Group, the UNGeneral Assembly passed Resolution 51/229 adoptingthe Convention. One hundred and three countries votedfor the Convention, and three against (Burundi, Chinaand Turkey), with 27 abstentions; while 52 countriesdid not participate in the voting. Subsequent to the vote,Nigeria and Fiji (which did not vote), and Belgium(which abstained), informed the Secretariat of the UNGeneral Assembly that they had intended to vote for theConvention (United Nations General Assembly, 1997).This would have brought the number of the countriesvoting for the Convention to 106, and decreased theabstentions to 26.

The Convention was opened for signature onMay 21, 1997, and remained open for three years,until May 20, 2000. By that time only 16 states hadsigned the Convention. Although signature closed onMay 20, 2000, states can still become parties to theConvention by acceding to it. This means that they canhave the Convention approved or accepted throughtheir constitutional process without having it signed.The Convention needs 35 instruments of ratification oraccession to enter into force. As of this year, ten yearsafter its adoption, the Convention has yet to commandsufficient ratifications to enter into force. It has onlybeen ratified or acceded to by fifteen states, a numberfar short of that required under the Convention, asdiscussed later.

An Overview of the Provisions of the Convention

The Convention is based largely on the ILAwork, particularly the Helsinki Rules which were issuedby the ILA in 1966, and to some extent on the work ofthe IIL. The Convention itself recognizes "the valuablecontribution of international organizations, bothgovernmental and non-governmental, to the codificationand progressive development of international law inthis field." The Convention also recalled the existingbilateral and multilateral agreements regarding the non-navigational uses of international watercourses.

The Convention is a framework conventionthat aims at ensuring the utilization, development,conservation, management and protection ofinternational watercourses, and promoting optimal andsustainable utilization thereof for present and futuregenerations. As a framework convention, it addressessome basic procedural aspects and few substantiveones, and leaves the details for the riparian statesto complement in agreements that would take intoaccount the specific characteristics of the watercoursein question. Such agreements can adopt or adjust theprovisions of the Convention.

The Convention is divided into seven parts andconsists of 37 articles. In addition, it includes an Annexon arbitration that consists of 14 articles. The main areasthat the Convention addresses include the definitionof the term "watercourse;" watercourses agreements;equitable and reasonable utilization and the obligationnot to cause harm; notification for planned measures;protection, preservation and management; and disputesettlement.

Article 1 (2) of the Convention asserts thatthe uses of international watercourses for navigationare not within the scope of the Convention, exceptinsofar as other uses affect navigation or are affectedby navigation. It should be noted, however, thatArticle 10 of the Convention states that in the absenceof an agreement or custom to the contrary, no use ofan international watercourse enjoys inherent priorityover other uses. Although it does not mention anyspecific uses, the Article is understood to indicate thatnavigational uses, which had superior status duringthe nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, no longerenjoy inherent priority over non-navigational uses. The

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Article goes further and requires that in the event ofconflict between uses of an international watercourse,due regard should be given to the requirements of "vitalhuman needs." A Statement of Understanding issued bythe Working Group clarified that in determining vitalhuman needs, "special attention is to be paid to providingsufficient water to sustain human life, including bothdrinking water and water required for production offood in order to prevent starvation." Article 10 has beenused, together with other similar provisions in otherinternational legal instruments, by a number of authorsin the field to support the notion of a human right towater (Salman and McInerney-Lankford, 2004).

The Convention defines the term "internationalwatercourse" to mean "a watercourse, parts of whichare situated in different states." It defines the term"watercourse" to include both "surface water andgroundwaters constituting by virtue of their physicalrelationship a unitary whole and normally flowinginto a common terminus." This definition includesonly groundwater that is connected to surface water.It does not include transboundary aquifers thatdo not contribute water to, or receive water from,surface waters. Realizing this lacuna, the ILC issued aseparate resolution recommending that other types ofgroundwater be governed by the same rules laid downin the Convention (Salman, 1999).

Watercourse agreements are dealt with in Article3 of the Convention. The Article indicates that theConvention shall not affect the rights or obligations ofa watercourse state arising from agreements that are inforce. However, the Article asks the parties to consider,where necessary, harmonizing such agreements withthe basic principles of the Convention. Article 3 alsoallows watercourse states to enter into agreements whichapply and adjust the provisions of the Convention tothe characteristics and uses of a particular internationalwatercourse. Furthermore, the Article states that whensome, but not all, watercourse states to a particularinternational watercourse are parties to an agreement,nothing in such an agreement would affect the rights orobligations under the Convention of watercourse statesthat are not parties to such an agreement.

The Convention embraces the principle ofequitable and reasonable utilization, and lays down inArticle 6 certain factors and circumstances that should

be taken into account for determining such equitable andreasonable utilization. Article 6 (1) of the Conventionstates that utilization of an international watercourse inan equitable and reasonable manner within the meaningof Article 5 requires taking into account all relevantfactors and circumstances, including: (a) geographic,hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological andother factors of a natural character; (b) the social andeconomic needs of the watercourse states concerned;(c) the population dependent on the watercourse inthe watercourse state; (d) the effects of the use or usesof the watercourse in one watercourse state on otherwatercourse states; (e) existing and potential uses of thewatercourse; (f) conservation, protection, developmentand economy of the water resources of the watercourseand the cost of measures taken to that effect; and (g) theavailability of alternatives, of comparable value, to aparticular planned or existing use. In this connection, theConvention follows the same approach adopted thirtyyears earlier by the Helsinki Rules, which establishedthe principle of equitable and reasonable utilization asthe guiding principle for international water law, andlaid down certain factors for determining such equitableutilization. In comparing the above factors with thefactors under the Helsinki Rules, it can be concluded thatthe factors under the UN Convention are based largelyon those of the Helsinki Rules. In line with ArticleV of the Helsinki Rules, Article 6 of the Conventionstates that the weight to be given to each factor is to bedetermined by its importance in comparison with thatof other relevant factors. Similarly, the Article clarifiesthat in determining what is reasonable and equitableuse, all relevant factors are to be considered togetherand a conclusion reached on the basis of the whole.

The Convention also deals in Article 7 with theobligation not to cause significant harm, and requiresthe watercourse states to take all appropriate measuresto prevent the causing of significant harm to otherwatercourse states. Agreement on which rule takespriority proved quite difficult, and the issue occupiedthe ILC throughout its work on the Convention. Eachrapporteur dealt with the issue differently, equating thetwo principles, or subordinating one principle to theother. The issue was discussed in the Working Groupwhere sharp differences between the riparian states onthose two principles surfaced. It is worth clarifying in

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this connection that lower riparians tend to favor the noharm rule, as it protects existing uses against impactsresulting from activities undertaken by upstreamstates. Conversely, upper riparians tend to favor theprinciple of equitable and reasonable utilization,because it provides more scope for states to utilizetheir share of the watercourse for activities that mayimpact on downstream states. After a lengthy debateby the Working Group, a compromise regarding therelationship between the two principles was reached.The compromise addressed Articles 5 and 6 (equitableand reasonable utilization) and Article 7 (obligation notto cause significant harm). The new language of Article7 requires the state that causes significant harm to takemeasures to eliminate or mitigate such harm "havingdue regard to articles 5 and 6." Those two Articlesdeal with the principles of equitable and reasonableutilization. As Lucius Caflisch noted "The new formulawas considered by a number of lower riparians to besufficiently neutral not to suggest a subordination of theno-harm rule to the principle of equitable and reasonableutilization. A number of upper riparians thought just thecontrary, namely that, that formula was strong enoughto support the idea of such subordination." (Caflisch,1998). Although the compromise facilitated adoption ofthe Convention by the UN General Assembly, secondthoughts about this compromise started surfacing in theminds of many states, as will be discussed later.

However, notwithstanding this compromiselanguage, the prevailing view is that the Convention hassubordinated the obligation not to cause significant harmto the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.This conclusion is based on a close reading of Articles5, 6 and 7 of the Convention. Article 6 enumeratesa number of factors for determining equitable andreasonable utilization. Those factors include (i) "theeffects of the use or uses of the watercourse in onewatercourse State on other watercourse States," and(ii) "existing and potential uses of the watercourse."Those same factors will also need to be used, withother factors, to determine whether significant harm iscaused to another riparian, because harm can be causedby depriving other riparians of the water flow andthereby affecting their existing uses. Moreover, Article7 (1) of the Convention obliges watercourse states,when utilizing an international watercourse in their

territory, to take all appropriate measures to preventthe causing of significant harm to other watercoursestates. When significant harm nevertheless is causedto another watercourse state, then Article 7 (2) of theConvention requires the state causing the harm to"take all appropriate measures, having due regardto Articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the affectedState, to eliminate or mitigate such harm, and whereappropriate, to discuss the question of compensation."As noted before, Articles 5 and 6 of the Conventiondeal with equitable and reasonable utilization. Assuch, Article 7 (2) requires giving due regard to theprinciple of equitable and reasonable utilization whensignificant harm has nevertheless been caused to anotherwatercourse state. The paragraph also indicates thatthe causing of harm may be tolerated in certain casessuch as when the possibility of compensation may beconsidered. Accordingly, a careful reading of Articles 5,6 and 7 of the Convention should lead to the conclusionthat the obligation not to cause harm has indeed beensubordinated to the principle of equitable and reasonableutilization. Hence, it can be concluded that, similarto the Helsinki Rules, the principle of equitable andreasonable utilization is the fundamental and guidingprinciple of the UN Watercourses Convention.

This view has been endorsed by the InternationalCourt of Justice in the Danube case between Hungaryand Slovakia (the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case). Thecase was decided in September 1997, four monthsafter the Convention was adopted by the UN GeneralAssembly. In that case the Court emphasized theconcept of equitable and reasonable utilization when itdirected that "the multi-purpose programme, in the formof a co-ordinated single unit, for the use, developmentand protection of the watercourse is implemented in anequitable and reasonable manner." (ICJ, 1997, paragraph150). The Court did not refer to the obligation not tocause harm.

Other basic obligations under the Conventioninclude the obligation to cooperate through, inter alia,the establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions,and the regular exchange of data and information, andthrough notification of other riparian states of plannedmeasures with possible significant adverse effects.Planned measures are dealt with in Part III of theConvention. This is the longest part of the Convention

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and includes nine articles that address a number ofaspects related to notification of other riparians ofplanned measures that may cause significant adverseeffects. Those aspects include the period for reply;obligations of the notifying state during the periodfor reply; reply for notification, and absence of reply;consultations and negotiations concerning plannedmeasures; procedures in the absence of notification;and urgent implementation of planned measures.

Environmental protection of internationalwatercourses is dealt with under Part IV, Articles 20 to26 of the Convention, entitled "Protection, Preservationand Management" of international watercourses.This part establishes a number of obligations onthe watercourse states, including protection andpreservation of ecosystems; prevention, reductionand control of pollution; introduction of alien or newspecies; and protection and preservation of the marineenvironment. A Statement of Understanding issued bythe Working Group clarified that those Articles imposea due diligence standard on watercourse states.

Article 33 and the Annex to the Convention dealwith dispute settlement mechanisms and procedures. TheArticle lays down a number of methods for settlementof disputes, including negotiations, jointly seekingthe good offices of, or mediation and conciliation bya third party, or use of joint watercourse institutions,or submission of the dispute to arbitration or to theInternational Court of Justice. However, the method forsettlement of a particular dispute should be agreed uponby both parties. The only obligatory method set forthin the Convention is impartial fact finding. AlthoughArticle 33 lays down detailed procedures for such factfinding, it only requires the parties to consider the reportof the fact finding commission in good faith. Similarly,the Convention provides the parties with the option tosubmit their dispute for arbitration in accordance withdetailed rules laid down in the Annex to the Convention,or to the International Court of Justice. Again this is notobligatory, but merely an option.

This overview indicates that the Conventionis basically a framework convention which lays downbasic principles and procedures, leaving the details tothe watercourse states to complement in agreementsthat take into account the characteristics of their specificwatercourse.

Country Region Date of Becoming a Party

South Africa Africa 26 October 1998

Namibia Africa 29 August 2001

Finland Europe 23 January 1998

Norway Europe 30 September 1998

Hungary Europe 26 January 2000

Sweden Europe 15 June 2000

Netherlands Europe 9 January 2001

Portugal Europe 22 June 2005

Germany Europe 15 January 2007

Syria Middle East 2 April 1998

Lebanon Middle East 25 May 1999

Jordan Middle East 22 June 1999

Iraq Middle East 9 July 2001

Qatar Middle East 28 February 2002

Libya Middle East 14 June 2005

Table 2:Parties to the UN Watercourses ConventionSource: United Nations Treaty Series (2007).

Status of the Convention

Almost ten years after its adoption by a majorityexceeding one hundred states, the Convention has notyet obtained the necessary number of instruments ofratification or accession to enable it to enter into forceand effect. As shown in Table 2 below, only fifteenstates are thus far parties to the Convention.

As indicated in Table 2 above, most of theratifications took place in the first three years (1998 to2001), with only four ratifications thereafter. Seven ofthe fifteen states that have ratified or acceded to theConvention are in Europe, six in the Middle East, andtwo in Africa. No country from Asia or the Americasis a party to the Convention yet. Finland, expressingcommitment to, and faith in the Helsinki Rules, wasthe first country to ratify the Convention. It did so inJanuary 1998, eight months after the adoption of theConvention by the General Assembly, and about threemonths after it signed the Convention on October 31,1997. However, it should be clarified that Syria was thefirst country to sign the Convention, which it did onAugust 11, 1997, but it ratified it in April 1998, threemonths after Finland. Germany signed the Conventionin 1998, but ratified it close to nine years later in 2007.

It is worth noting that two of the countries thatsigned and ratified the Convention, namely Lebanon andIraq, did not participate in the voting at the UN GeneralAssembly meeting in May 1997. In contrast, none of thethree countries that informed the Secretariat of the UNGeneral Assembly that they had intended to vote for the

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8The United Nations Watercourses Convention Ten Years Later: Why Has its Entry into Force Proven Difficult?

Country Region Date of Signature

Cote d'lvoire Africa 25 September 1998

Yemen Middle East 17 May 2000

Tunisia Middle East 19 May 2000

Luxembourg Europe 14 October 1997

Venezuela South America 22 September 1997

Paraguay South America 25 August 1998

Table 3: States that Signed but not yet Ratified the UN Watercourses Convention. Source: United Nations Treaty Series (2007).

Convention (Belgium, Fiji, and Nigeria) is a party to Why Are States Reluctant to become Parties to thethe Convention. Interestingly, two of the countries that Convention?are parties to the Convention, Qatar and Libya, have An immediate question that arises is: whyno surface water to share with other countries, and the have the more than one hundred states that voted forgroundwater they share with other countries may not the Convention in May 1997 been reluctant to sign andeven be covered by the Convention. This is because ratify, or accede to, the Convention? A review of thesuch groundwater has no physical relationship to any various statements made by the different delegationssurface water, and as such is outside the definition of during the discussion of the Convention by the Workingthe term "watercourse" under the Convention. Group and the UN General Assembly (United Nations

Six of the states that signed the Convention General Assembly, 1997), and presentations made by,before it closed for signature on May 20, 2000, have not and discussion with various government officials fromyet ratified the Convention, as shown in Table 3 below. different countries, reveals a number of different, andIn addition to Africa, Europe and the Middle East, the list sometimes inaccurate perceptions and interpretations ofof the signatory countries includes two South American the provisions of the Convention. Those interpretationscountries. One of those two countries, Paraguay, actually and misconceptions have no doubt contributed to theabstained during the voting for the Convention at the slow pace of the signing, ratification of, and accessionUN General Assembly. Venezuela was one of the first to the Convention. Suffice it here to briefly review andcountries to sign the Convention. It did so in September comment on six such areas.1997, four months after the Convention was adopted, The first and most important area of contentionbut is not yet a party. So is Luxembourg which signed is the relationship between the principle of equitablethe Convention in 1997. Tunisia was the last country and reasonable utilization and the obligation not toto sign the Convention, doing so on May 19, 2000, one cause harm. The compromise language regarding theday before the Convention closed for signature. It is relationship between the two reached by the Workingnoteworthy that the list in this Table, like that under Group and discussed above, facilitated the process ofTable 2, includes no country from Asia. approval of the Convention by the General Assembly.

Clearly, there is a great deal of reluctance to Nonetheless, upper riparians still seem to consider thebe a party to the Convention from most of the states Convention as biased in favor of lower riparians because— the ones that voted for the Convention in 1997, some of its specific and separate mention of the obligation notof those that abstained or did not attend the session, to cause harm. This specific and separate reference of theand those that indicated after the session that they had obligation not to cause harm is viewed as equating it withintended to vote for the Convention. the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization. It is

to be noted that the three countries that voted against theConvention (Burundi, China and Turkey), and some ofthose that abstained, such as Bolivia, Ethiopia, Mali andTanzania, are largely upper riparian states. On the other

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hand, a number of downstream states, such as Egypt,France, Pakistan and Peru, also abstained, concernedthat the Convention favors upstream riparians because itsubordinates the no harm rule to the concept of equitableand reasonable utilization. This is basically the positionthat most states took at the Working Group before thecompromise language of Article 7, discussed above,was accepted. Clearly, most of the states that acceptedthat compromise at that time are no longer convincedthat the compromise really serves their interests.

However, as Table 2 shows, those two positionsdo not reflect the unified position of either upstreamriparians or the downstream ones. A number of thecountries that ratified the Convention, such as Iraq,the Netherlands, Portugal and South Africa are lowerriparians. Hence, the perception by the upstreamriparians that the Convention is biased in favor ofdownstream riparians, and vice versa, is, no doubt,one of the main reasons for the stalling of the processof the signature and ratification of, or accession to theConvention.

As indicated before, lower riparians tend tofavor the no harm rule, as it protects existing usesagainst impacts resulting from activities undertakenby upper riparians. Conversely, upper riparians tend tofavor the equitable and reasonable utilization principlebecause it provides more scope for states to utilize theirshare of the watercourse for activities that may impacton downstream states. It is true that the Conventionhas subordinated the no harm rule to the principle ofequitable and reasonable utilization. Yet, this should inno way be viewed as favoring upstream riparians. Theprinciple of equitable and reasonable utilization, whichhas been the guiding principle of international law sincethe Helsinki Rules were issued in 1966, duly recognizes,and is based on, the equality of all the riparians in theuses of the shared watercourse. It further lays downcertain objective factors for determining the equitableand reasonable share for each riparian state, and thosefactors include existing uses.

Related to the view that the Convention is biasedin favor of downstream riparians is the perceptionby upper riparians that the notification process underthe Convention favors downstream riparians andprovides them with a veto power over projects andprograms of upstream riparians. Unfortunately, it is

widely believed that notification is an exclusive rightof lower riparians because only upstream riparians cancause harm to downstream riparians by affecting thequantity and quality of water flows to such downstreamriparians. This belief is actually incorrect and is oneof the basic misconceptions about international waterlaw in general, and the Convention in particular. It isa common mistaken belief among a large segment oflawyers and non-lawyers that harm can only "travel"downstream, and it is not recognized that upstreamstates can also be harmed by activities by downstreamstates. In other words, this mistaken notion is basedon the assumption that only upstream riparians canharm downstream riparians. It is obvious, and clearer,that the downstream riparians can be harmed by thephysical impacts of water quality and quantity changescaused by use by upstream riparians. It is much lessobvious, and generally not recognized, that the upstreamriparians can be harmed by the potential foreclosure oftheir future use of water caused by the prior use andthe claiming of rights by downstream riparians. Forexample, a poor upstream country could be precludedfrom developing the water resources of an internationalwaterway tomorrow if a richer downstream riparian,without consultation or notification, develops it today.This is an important, albeit not widely understood,principle of international water law which establishesa clear linkage between the principle of equitable andreasonable utilization, and the obligation not to causeharm. It should be noted, nonetheless, that there is agradual but growing realization by some countriesof the linkage between the two principles, which is afirst step in understanding the concept of "potentialforeclosure of future uses." For example, Ethiopia, theupper most riparian of the Blue Nile Basin, protestedto Egypt and Sudan when the two countries concludedthe 1959 Nile Agreement that divided the Nile watersexclusively between them. Ethiopia has since beenprotesting most of the projects undertaken by Egyptand Sudan on the Nile because it has realized that thoseprojects potentially foreclose its future uses of the Nilewaters and deprives it of its equitable and reasonableshare of the Nile waters. Moreover, an understanding ofthis concept has been reflected in some recent treaties.The Senegal River Water Charter which was concludedby Senegal, Mauritania and Mali in May 2002, and

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The United Nations Watercourses Convention Ten Years Later: Why Has its Entry into Fo rce Proven Difficult?

which Guinea signed in 2006, enumerates in Article 4 anumber of principles for allocation of the waters of theSenegal River. Such principles include "the obligationof each riparian state to inform other riparian statesbefore engaging in any activity or project likely to havean impact on water availability, and/or the possibility toimplement future projects."

For this reason, the World Bank Policy forProjects on International Waterways (Operational Policy7.50), and the way it has been interpreted and applied,requires notification of all riparians, both downstreamas well as upstream, underscoring the fact that harmis actually a two way matter (World Bank, 2001).Indeed, one of the few objections to a Bank-financedproject came from an upstream riparian. The Bank hadplanned financing the Baardhere Dam Project on theJuba River in Somalia in the late 1980s. The Juba Riveroriginates in Ethiopia, and the Ethiopia-Kenya borders,and flows through Somalia before emptying into theIndian Ocean. Both Ethiopia and Kenya were notifiedof the Project by the World Bank on behalf of Somalia.Ethiopia objected claiming that the Project did not takeinto consideration its present and future hydropower andirrigation development. Ethiopia further demanded thatthe two countries should first enter into negotiations fordetermining the amount of water from the Juba Riverthat each country would need. Consequently, the Bankdecided to obtain an opinion from independent experts,as set forth in Operational Policy 7.50. The expertsnoted that Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya have a rightto an equitable and reasonable share in the utilizationof the Juba basin waters, but went on to conclude thatthe Project would not cause any appreciable harm tothe present legitimate rights or interests of Ethiopiaand Kenya. Basically, the experts determined that theamount of water that Somalia would use under theProject falls within its equitable and reasonable share,and as such there would be no harm to Ethiopia. Thisdetermination confirms the close linkage between theprinciple of equitable and reasonable utilization and theobligation not to cause harm. It further clarifies howharm can be a two-way matter.

Similarly, the Convention, and before it theHelsinki Rues, do not limit notification to downstreamriparians, nor grant any state such a veto power overthe projects and programs of other riparian states. The

Convention requires notification in case a project maycause "significant adverse effects" to other riparians,and lays down detailed provisions, including failureto notify. Furthermore, it sets forth procedures in caseof an objection by one or more of the riparian states.In such a case, the Convention requires the parties toenter into consultations and, if necessary, negotiationswith a view to arriving at an equitable resolution of thesituation. The Convention further requires that eachstate must in good faith pay reasonable regard to therights and legitimate interests of the other state.

Accordingly, the Convention, reflectingcustomary international water law, requires notificationof both downstream as well as upstream riparians,only in case a project is expected to cause significantadverse effects on any other riparian, downstream orupstream, and lays down certain procedures in caseof an objection. It does not require notification if theproject is not expected to cause significant adverseeffects, nor does it grant a veto power to any riparianover planned measures of another riparian.

A third issue that has contributed to thereluctance of some states to become parties to theConvention is the manner in which the Convention hasdealt with existing agreements. As indicated earlier, theConvention does not affect the rights or obligations ofwatercourse states arising from agreements that are inforce. Nonetheless, it asks the parties to consider, wherenecessary, harmonizing such agreements with the basicprinciples of the Convention. It also allows watercoursestates to enter into agreements which apply and adjustthe provisions of the Convention to the characteristicsand uses of a particular international watercourse.Furthermore, the Convention states that when some, butnot all, watercourse states to a particular internationalwatercourse are parties to an agreement, nothing insuch an agreement would affect the rights or obligationsunder the Convention of watercourse states that are notparties to such an agreement.

Riparian states that already have agreements inplace believe that the Convention has not fully recognizedthose agreements because it suggests that the partiesmay consider harmonizing such agreements with theprinciples of the Convention. Conversely, riparian statesthat have been left out of existing agreements believe thatthe Convention should have subjected those agreements

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to the provisions of the Convention, and should haverequired consistency between the two. However, a closereading of the provisions of the Convention reveals thatthe Convention recognizes both, the validity of existingagreements, as well as the right of the riparian stateswhich are not parties to such agreements in the sharedwatercourse. The Convention could not have simplyannulled those existing agreements, because such aprovision would have been rejected by most membersof the General Assembly, and would have resulted inchaos in a number of basins. Any number of riparianstates has the right under international law to enter intoan agreement regarding the shared watercourse, butthat right is also subject to the rights of other ripariansin the uses of the shared watercourse. The Conventionhas basically reflected this legal and common senseprinciple. It should be recalled that the Convention is aframework convention that lays down basic principlesthat are to be complemented by agreements betweenthe parties, taking into account the characteristics of thespecific watercourse.

A fourth area of contention is the belief by someriparian states that the dispute settlement provisionsof the Convention are too weak because they do notprovide for any binding mechanism. In contrast, otherriparian states view the fact finding procedures of theConvention as a compulsory method, and argue thatsuch a fact finding method interferes with their sovereignright of choosing the dispute settlement procedures.As discussed earlier, the Convention suggests for theparties a number of methods for settlement of disputes,including negotiations, jointly seeking the good officesof, or mediation and conciliation by a third party, oruse of joint watercourse institutions, or submission ofthe dispute to arbitration or to the International Courtof Justice. The only obligatory method set forth in theConvention is impartial fact finding where the partiesare required to consider the report of the fact findingcommission in good faith.

Thus, the Convention provides a basicmechanism for ascertaining the facts of the dispute,and leaves it for the parties to agree on the method forresolving it from a wide menu of choice. This is quitereasonable given that the Convention is a frameworkone. Yet again, neither side seems to be satisfied withthis compromise.

A fifth area of misunderstanding by some statesconcerns the expanded definition under the Conventionof the term "Watercourse State" to include "regionaleconomic integration organizations." The Conventiondefines "Watercourse State" to mean "a State Party tothe present Convention in whose territory part of aninternational watercourse is situated, or a Party that isa regional economic integration organization, in theterritory of one or more of whose Member States part ofan international watercourse is situated." Furthermore,it defines regional economic integration organizationas "an organization constituted by sovereign Statesof a given region, to which its member States havetransferred competence in respect of matters governedby this Convention and which has been duly authorizedin accordance with its internal procedures to sign,ratify, accept, approve or accede to it." The Conventionallows each such organization to sign and ratify theConvention, thus becoming a party to the Convention.A Statement of Understanding issued by the WorkingGroup clarified that nothing in the paragraph definingthe term "Watercourse State" "could be taken to implythat regional economic integration organizations havethe status of states in international law."

A number of states have misunderstood thoseprovisions of the Convention as allowing membersof one such organization, which are not riparians toa certain watercourse, to become riparians simplybecause the organization has become a member. It istrue that the language of the above quoted paragraphsmay be difficult to follow, but there is nothing in thelanguage of those paragraphs that would allow suchan interpretation. The organization is simply acting inits capacity as a juridical entity, endowed with legalpersonality independent of the member states. It istaking decisions on behalf of that state because thatstate has transferred competence in respect of mattersgoverned by the Convention to this organization. Themere fact that the organization has become a party tothe Convention would in no way mean that the othermembers of the organization would become ripariansto the watercourse in question. Actually, the termregional economic integration organization was addedto the Convention by the Working Group to allowparticipation, in particular, of the European Union(McCaffrey, 2001).

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As discussed earlier, the compromising mannerin which the Convention has dealt with some of theissues discussed above provided the basis for its wideacceptability, and facilitated its adoption by the GeneralAssembly in 1997. Nonetheless, it appeared that mostof the more than one hundred states that voted for theConvention have had second thoughts about signature(and/or ratification), and now have the same thoughtsabout accession to the Convention. Those secondthoughts are no doubt prompted by the above mentionedinaccurate interpretations of the Convention.

Another reason for the reluctance of some statesto become parties to the Convention is the apprehensionabout loss of sovereignty over shared waters. Actually,during the General Assembly discussion of the draftConvention, a few states criticized the Convention forits failure to refer to the sovereignty of the watercoursestates over the parts of the international watercourseslocated in their territory (United Nations GeneralAssembly, 1997). This notion indicates a total failureto comprehend the basic rules of contemporaryinternational water law that have long rejected theprinciple of absolute territorial sovereignty. It is nowgenerally agreed that the "management of internationalwatercourses should be determined less by the traditionalnotion of `restricted sovereignty' than by a positivespirit of cooperation and effective interdependence."(Green Cross, 2000).

It should be clarified that there is no terminaldate by which the Convention must enter into forceand effect. It will do so whenever it attains the requirednumber of 35 instruments of ratification and accession,regardless of how long it may take. It is not unusualfor complex and controversial conventions to take aconsiderably long time to enter into force. The Lawof the Sea Convention took almost twelve years todo so. However, judging from the extremely slowprocess of signature, ratification and accession due tothe misconceptions discussed above, the risk persiststhat the Convention may actually not enter into forcebecause it does not seem that it will attain the requirednumber of ratification and accession instruments.

Role and Prospects of the Convention

Even if the Convention does not receive the

necessary number of instruments of ratification andaccession that would enable it to enter into force andeffect, the Convention has already shown considerableinfluence on multilateral and bilateral water treaties. Ithas also been endorsed by a number of internationalentities as well as by the International Court ofJustice. The fourteen Southern African DevelopmentCommunity (SADC) member countries revised their1995 Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems in2000 to make it consistent with the provisions ofthe Convention. Indeed, most of the articles of theRevised Protocol on Shared Watercourses in theSouthern African Development Community are a copyof the articles of the Convention (Salman, 2001). TheProtocol refers in its Preamble to "the progress withthe development and codification of international waterlaw initiated by the Helsinki Rules and followed by theadoption by the United Nations of the UN WatercoursesConvention." More specifically, the Protocol adoptsthe same definition for the term "watercourse", and laysdown the same factors for equitable and reasonableutilization, and the same procedures for notification.Furthermore, the environmental provisions and thoserelated to management, regulation and installations arelargely a reiteration of those of the Convention. TheProtocol for Sustainable Development of Lake VictoriaBasin (2003), and the Agreement on the Establishmentof the Zambezi Watercourse Commission (2004), bothinclude the same factors for determining equitableand reasonable utilization, as well as provisions fornotification regarding planned measures, similar tothose of the Convention.

The influence and relevance of the WatercoursesConvention has also been underscored by the InternationalCourt of Justice in the Danube case referred to above.In addition to endorsing the principle of equitable andreasonable utilization, the Court confirmed the perfectequality of all riparian States in the uses of the wholecourse of the river, and the exclusion of any preferentialprivilege of one riparian state in relation to the others.The Court further noted that modern development ofinternational law has strengthened this principle fornon-navigational uses of international watercourses"as evidenced by the adoption of the Convention of 21May 1997 on the Law of the Non-Navigational Usesof International Watercourses by the United Nations

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General Assembly." (ICJ, 1997, paragraph 85).It should be added that the Convention was

endorsed by a number of international entities. TheWorld Commission on Dams indicated that "theprinciples embodied in the 1997 UN Convention onthe Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of InternationalWatercourses warrant support. States should make everyeffort to ratify the Convention and bring it into force."(World Commission on Dams, 2000). The World WaterCouncil described the provisions of the Convention assensible and concluded that "Sadly enough, even afterall that time [it took to prepare the Convention], it nowseems unlikely that this Convention will be ratified byenough countries to enter into force." (Cosgrove andRijsberman, 2000). Although the World Commission forWater in the 21St Century referred to the UN Conventionas "weak", the Commission added "Surely, weak as itis, it [the Convention] deserves to be approved if onlyas a first step towards a greater appreciation of theinternational character of water." (World Commissionfor Water in the 215t Century, 2000). The ILA, in itsHelsinki Conference held in August 1996, adopteda resolution on the then draft UN WatercoursesConvention. The resolution took note "with satisfactionof the completion of the work of the United NationsInternational Law Commission on the topic of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses." (ILA,1996). It also took note with satisfaction of the GeneralAssembly resolution convening the Sixth Committee asa Working Group of the Whole to elaborate a conventionon the basis of the ILC draft.

Moreover, a number of experts consider thebasic principles laid out in the Convention such as theprinciple of equitable and reasonable utilization, theobligation not to cause harm, notification and exchangeof data and information, and the provisions regardingprotection of the environment, as reflecting the basicprinciples of customary international water law(McCaffrey, 1998). Thus, even if the Convention doesnot enter into force, it has received broad endorsements,and it is widely agreed that it reflects and embodies thebasic principles of international water law.

Conclusion

The adoption of the UN Watercourses Convention

by the General Assembly on May 21, 1997 marked anhistoric moment in the evolution of international waterlaw. The approval of the Convention came at a time whenwater resources management, whether at the nationalor international level, started facing major challenges,resulting largely from the unprecedented populationgrowth, environmental degradation, urbanization andindustrialization. Those challenges led to the sharpeningof the competing demands of riparian states, and to anincreasing attention to water resources world-wide. Theestablishment of the Global Water Partnership and theWorld Water Council in 1996, and the convening by theWorld Water Council of the four World Water Forumsbetween 1997 and 2006 (in Marrakech, The Hague, Kyotoand Mexico City, respectively), are clear indications ofthis global attention. Those forums underscored, amongother things, the fact that international water can be acatalyst for cooperation as well as a cause for conflict,and emphasized the pressing need for collaborativeaction that the Convention epitomizes. In addition, theConvention has received the endorsements of WorldWater Council, the World Commission on Water forthe 21 51 Century, the World Commission on Dams, andmore importantly, the International Court of Justice.

However, despite this wide recognition ofthe challenges facing water resources, and the broadacceptance and endorsement of the UN WatercoursesConvention, the Convention has not yet commandedeven half the number of ratification or accessioninstruments needed to enable it to enter into force. Thissituation is due largely to the reluctance of the statesto be parties to the Convention. Of the more than onehundred countries that voted for the Convention, onlythirteen have become parties. The two other parties tothe Convention did not participate in the voting, buthave signed and ratified the Convention. One countrythat abstained during the voting, signed but has notyet ratified the Convention. The three countries thatindicated their approval of the Convention after theGeneral Assembly vote took place are still to becomeparties, and one country took eight years to ratify theConvention. Of the fourteen African countries thatratified or acceded to the SADC Protocol, only two areparties to the Convention, notwithstanding the fact thatthe principles of the Protocol are largely a reiterationof those of the Convention. This reluctance of states

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The United Nations Watercourses Convention Ten Years Later: W Has its Enyinto Force Proven Difficult?

to become parties to the Convention emanates, as published work includes "Regulatory Frameworks fordiscussed earlier, from concerns that their interests may Water Resources Management — A Comparative Studynot be well served by the Convention. Unfortunately, as (with Daniel Bradlow; Law, Justice, and Developmentthe previous part of this article shows, those concerns Series, The World Bank, 2006); and Chapter 15 of theare based largely on inaccurate interpretations of, and Oxford Handbook on International Environmental Lawmisconceptions about the Convention. on "Ocean and Freshwater Resources" (with David

Water is the most important resource that human Freestone; Oxford University Press, 2007). Dr. Salmankind shares. It is a finite resource, with no alternative, is also the editor of the "Law, Justice, and Developmentand upon which there is total dependence. Close to 300 Series" of the Legal Vice Presidency of the Worldrivers, 100 lakes, and a yet to be determined number of Bank.aquifers are shared by two or more states. About 40% ofthe world population, in more than 140 countries, live Acknowledgements and Disclaimer:

or depend on those shared watercourses. Yet, shared The author would like to thank Charles Di Leva,watercourses continue to remain without a universal Fuad Bateh and Shehan de Sayrah for helpfultreaty in force regulating their use and protection. comments on an earlier draft of this article.The UN Watercourses Convention is a framework The views expressed in this article are those ofconvention which addresses basic substantive and the author and do not necessarily reflect the viewsprocedural matters, and leaves the details to the of the World Bank or any of the institutions withwatercourse states themselves to negotiate and agree which the author is affiliated. Information aboutupon. The provisions of the Convention on those basic the states that have signed, ratified or acceded to thematters reflect a compromising language that takes Convention is current as of end of January, 2007.into account the interests and concerns of all riparianstates. The Convention calls for cooperation on the References:

basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, andmutual benefit in order to attain optimal utilization ofthe international watercourse for the present and futuregenerations, thus laying the general framework formutually beneficial utilization by all the riparians. Nodoubt, the Convention is and will continue to be the mostauthoritative instrument in the field of InternationalWater Law. It is indeed quite unfortunate that after closeto 27 years of preparatory work, and 10 years after itsadoption, the UN Watercourse Convention stands littlechance of entry into force. Clearly, concerted effortsare urgently needed to address the inaccurate interpretationsand perceptions about some of its basic provisions.

About the Author:

Dr. Salman M. A. Salmanis lead counsel with theLegal Vice Presidency ofthe World Bank in Wash-ington DC and is the Bankadviser on water law. Dr.Salman has publishedextensively in the area of ' f

national and international water law. His most recent

Berber, F. J. 1959. Rivers in International Law. London:Stevens & Sons Limited.

Bourne, C. 1996. "The International Law Association'scontribution to International Water ResourcesLaw." Natural Resources Journal, 36: 155-216.

Caflisch, L. 1998. "Regulation of the uses ofinternational watercourses." In S. Salman & L.Boisson de Chazournes (Eds.), InternationalWatercourses — Enhancing Cooperation andManaging Conflict. Washington, DC: WorldBank Technical Paper No. 414, pp. 3-16.

Cosgrove, W. and F. Rijsberman, 2000. World WaterVision — Making Water Everybody's Business.London, UK: World Water Council.

Green Cross, 2000. National Sovereignty and

International Watercourses (Geneva),p.18. Geneva, Switzerland: Green CrossInternational.

ICJ (1997). International Court of Justice, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case (Hungary v. Slovakia), GeneralList No. 92, 25 September 1997.

ILA (1966). International Law Association, Report ofthe Fifty-Second Conference, Helsinki (London

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1967), pp. 447-533.ILA (1996). International Law Association, Report of

the Sixty-Seven Conference, Helsinki (London,1996), p. 416.

McCaffrey, S. 2001. The Law of InternationalWatercourses - Non-Navigational Uses. NewYork, NY: Oxford University Press.

McCaffrey, S. 1998. "The UN Convention on the lawof the non-navigational uses of internationalwatercourses: prospects and pitfalls." InInternational Watercourses - EnhancingCooperation and Managing Conflict (S. Salman& L. Boisson de Chazournes, Eds.). Washington,DC: World Bank Technical Paper No. 414, pp.17-28.

Salman S. 1999. Groundwater - Legal and PolicyPerspectives. Washington, DC: World BankTechnical Paper No. 456.

Salman, S. 2001. "Legal regime for use and protectionof international watercourses in the SouthernAfrican region: evolution and context." NaturalResources Journal 41(4): 981-1022.

Salman S. and S. McInerney-Lankford. 2004. TheHuman Right to Water - Legal and PolicyDimensions. Washington, DC: Law, Justice,and Development Series, The World Bank.

United Nations. 1963. Legal Problems Relating to theUtilization and Use of International Rivers,Report of the Secretary-General, A/5409, 15April 1963.

United Nations. 1977a. Register of International RiverBasins, Report of the Secretary General, E/C.7/71, 11 March 1977.

United Nations. 1977b. Report of the United NationsWater Conference, Mar del Plata, 14-15 March1977, Sales No. E.77.11.A.12.

United Nations General Assembly. 1997. GeneralAssembly Adopts Convention on Law ofNon-Navigational Uses of InternationalWatercourses, Press Release GA/9248, May 21,1997.

United Nations Treaty Series. 2007. Conventionon the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses ofInternational Watercourses. [Online] URL:http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXXVII/

treaty42. aspWatts, A. 1999. The International Law Commission

(1949-1998), Volume Two: The Treaties, PartII. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

World Bank. 2001. Operational Policy and BankProcedures 7.50, Projects on InternationalWaterways. [online] URL: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTSAFEPOL0„contentMDK:20544007-menuPK:1286706-pagePK:64168445-piPK:64168309- theSitePK:584435,00.html.

World Commission for Water in the 21” Century. 2000.A Water Secure World - Vision for Water, Lifeand the Environment. London, UK: WorldCommission on Water, London.

World Commission on Dams. 2000. Dams andDevelopment - A New Framework for Decision-making (The Report of the World Commission onDams). London, UK: Earthscan Publications.

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