T.H. Marshall, Jurgen Habermas, citizenship and transition in Eastern Europe

World Development, Vol. 21, No. 8, pp. 1313-1328,1993. Printed in Great Britain.

0305-750X/93 $6.00 + 0.00 0 1993 Pergamon Press Ltd

T. H. Marshall, Jurgen Habermas, Citizenship and Transition in Eastern Europe

NICK MANNING* University of Kent, Canterbury

Summary. -This paper begins with a question about the nature of social responses to economic and political change in Eastern Europe. It examines the nature of citizenship and its associated rights, particularly the debate centered on the model originally suggested by T. H. Marshall, and the factors associated with welfare state development in industrial societies that have been identified through comparative quantitative analysis. Moving to a closer focus on the nature of social order and the crisis that has occurred in Eastern Europe, it considers the ideas of Jurgen Habermas and the place of social movements in these, and reviews different models of social movements in the transition from state socialism, using evidence from Estonia, Russia, and Hungary. Finally there are some comments on the relationship between social movements and the future of posttransition societies.

1. INTRODUCTION

‘If we are to understand the social responses and political change in Eastern-Central Europe, we need empirical evidence in the areas of social need, economic capacity, and political will. This paper is concerned with the possibility for people to articulate their needs, and to make these felt within the legitimate political system. Crucially the latter is conceived to include activities beyond the measuring of preferences in periodic elections, and the closed world of the political lobby. The countries have been chosen to represent a range of political and economic liberalization: Estonia, Hungary, and Russia. The political means, social movements, have been chosen to represent an intermediate level of social organization between the private world of the house- hold with its particular mechanisms for coping, the public world of the protest or riot, and at the other extreme the world of institutionalized politics.

Empirical research is by definition suffused with theoretical assumptions. This paper will therefore begin with some of the theoretical ideas that justify the focus for the empirical research project of which it is a part. Sections 2, 3 and 4 will examine several questions about the conditions surrounding the existence of social rights in industrial society, and thus the prospects for social rights in Eastern European societies. Initially this will cover the current debate over

the idea of citizenship in modern industrial societies, and the mechanisms through which social rights have been established and defended. In section 3, a further debate about the origins of welfare state expenditure in industrial societies is examined to ascertain the factors which we might expect to be important determinants of social expenditure in the future. Section 4 focuses more directly on the bases of social order and the nature of the crisis in Eastern Europe, again as a guide to the constellation of social forces we expect to affect future social provision. The final sections then address the development of social movement activities before, during and after the transition in Eastern Europe, and discusses the prospects for state and civil society relationships in the future.

The project itself seeks to compare the emergence, survival and success of social movements along three dimensions. First is the comparison between three different social movement con- texts in Eastern Europe which have exhibited differential rates and styles of political liberaliza-

*This paper was given to the University of Oxford/ Central European University Conference on Social Responses to Political and Economic Transformations in East-Central Europe, Prague, May 1992. The work is part of a project financed by the ESRC. I would like to-acknowledge the work of my colleagues in the UK, Chris Pickvance, Katv Pickvance, and Sveta Klimova. and our many colleagues in East Europe.

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tion. Second is the comparison between different substantive types of movement, which are expected to illustrate different modes of organization, different motives for membership involve- ment, and different relations with their political context. Third is the comparison between West- ern theory and experience, and new developments in Eastern Europe.

The significance of social movements lies in their role as a link between citizen actions and the newly emergent party systems of Eastern Europe. A major question concerns the changing bases of social order during the build up to political transition, the crisis of transition, and the attempted stabilization of the post-transition period. The project will also pursue other theoretical questions central to the Western literature such as the level of grievances, the origin of resources used by movements, the role of intellectuals and experts, the extent of public support, and the reaction of official agencies.

2. CITIZENSHIP IN TRANSITION: FROM PRIVILEGE TO SOCIAL MOVEMENT

Novel, important and true ideas are rare. Such ideas which are then developed into a coherent theory are even scarcer. T. H. Marshall is one of the very few to have had at least one such idea, and to develop it. That is why it is important to understand and to improve upon his theory of citizenship (Mann, 1987, p. 339).

The origins of the desire in Eastern Europe for far reaching changes lay in three problems. First, and paramount, was the slowdown in economic growth during the 1970s. Second was the erosion of the popular legitimacy of the state. Third was the fear of a decay in family and community life. While the specific expression of these interconnected problems varied in different countries, in general they severely threatened the enjoyment of even the limited civil, political and social rights previously enjoyed by citizens in Eastern Europe. Thus the starting point for this paper is the question of developing a model that can encompass the experiences of Eastern Euro- pean citizens leading up to and following the transition from state socialism. In the classic formulation of the sociological model of citizenship by Marshall (1963), there was little possibility of generalization to Eastern Europe. In the last few years, however, this has become possible through a renewed theoretical debate about citizenship, although a debate still conducted with almost no reference to Eastern Europe at all.

The classic formulation of citizenship rights in

industrial society by Marshall contained three elements. First was the legal constitution of citizens as of equal standing in relation to the law. Second was the access of all citizens to, democratic apparatus for the exercise of political power over the state. Third was the provision of sufficient means for all people to engage in full social participation. The coexistence of these civil, political and social rights, which he argued amounted to the conditions necessary for full citizenship, seemed to Marshall to be both an historical description of the development of industrial societies, and the necessary precondi- tion for their continued existence.

Marshall was at pains, however, to point out that these rights did not exist without tension. Ironically the development of citizenship rights had occurred alongside capitalism and its associated inequalities. In particular the limitation of political rights to the formal exercise of voting rights resulted in the juxtaposition of multiple inequalities in the economy and in family life, with political interventions that attempted to mitigate these inequalities through social and other policies. Moreover he argued that the best condition for the successful development of industrial societies was to maintain a balance between the economy and social rights. Too much economic freedom would undermine the long-term stability of the economy through the loss of political legitimacy and the breakdown of social reproduction. Too much political and social intervention on the other hand would stifle the dynamic growth of the economy, upon which everything else depended. In sum, Marshall argued that a balance between economic growth via capitalism, political empowerment through democracy, and social integration/participation sustained through social policy was both historically and theoretically necessary for the sustained achievement of any one of these goals.

In recent years, the globalization of economic and political relations, and the political chal- lenges mounted to the traditional provision of social rights via the welfare state, have thrown doubt on aspects of this model, and have stimulated new debates about citizenship. Criticism of Marshall’s model have raised a number of questions: about its anglocentrism (Mann, 1987); about its logical and empirical relationship to a person’s membership of a society (Goodin, 1988); about the way in which social and political debates are conducted in terms of essences and principles (Hindess, 1987); about the kind of struggles and conflicts which have historically enhanced citizenship rights (Turner, 1986, 1990, 1991); and about its relative neglect of the material experience of citizenship in favor of

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normative ideals (Harrison, 1991). Together these raise three problems which have lead to the reformulation of the model of citizenship to the point where we can usefully apply it to Eastern Europe.

First is the problem of generalizing the model beyond the English industrial setting in which Marshall formulated it, limited in both space and time. In an important development, Mann (1987) points out that Marshall only ever referred to England in his discussion of citizenship, and demonstrates a further four examples of a relatively stable accommodation of the tensions between a ruling group’s economic strategy, and the integration of citizens through the protection of personal freedoms. These are social reformist, authoritarian monarchist, fascist, and state socialist. Through these examples he builds a convincing case for situating the English experience in its particular political history, and hence for replacing the evolutionary functionalism im- plicit in Marshall with an extended model which balances both domestic political drama and the effects of geopolitical circumstances, particularly the effects of war.

Thus in a brief passage on Eastern Europe, he argues that social rights tended to overshadow, and arguably precede, civil rights, as the favored ruling group strategy for the incorporation of citizens. It is also manifestly the case that the experiences of Estonians or Hungarians cannot be at all clearly understood without reference to WWII. Mann’s paper nevertheless emphasizes the institutionalization of class conflict as the common core within the five types of ruling class strategy. With the decline in the strength of organized labor, however, and the growth of single issue politics it is clear that citizens are also concerned about the environment, about gender, about race, about religion, and so on. Marshall’s model is thus in need of even further extension, not only geographically, but in terms of the history of the substantive issues that are in contention.

Mann’s reformulation has itself been further developed by Turner (1990). His argument, that Mann’s emphasis on ruling class strategies still neglects some crucial aspects of citizenship, turns out to be of great relevance to the Eastern European case. First is the relative neglect of the realm of the “private.” Here Turner includes the experience of religious tradition and beliefs, and ethnic and racial identity. For example, Catholic corporatism compared with Protestant neutrality have had significant effects on citizenship development respectively in France and Denmark, and ethnic (“nationalist”) divisions all over the world are increasingly challenging the unitary

citizenship/nation state political community. Second is the neglect of citizenship struggles from below (for example, social movements), in contrast with a view of citizenship as a privilege handed down by ruling groups. This latter point will be discussed at length below. Using these additions, Turner (1990, p. 200) suggests a simple typology of citizenship rights, including some tentative examples (see Table 1). It is an interesting question as to whether Eastern European countries can be placed collectively or individ- ually on this typology, and in which direction they would see themselves travelling both ideally and in reality. A task for another paper would be to lay out an historical, comparative, and contemporary map such as this one for Eastern European citizenship, and hence the nature and mix of civil, political, and social rights that are now emerging in the post-transition phase.

The second problem with Marshall’s model is its normative emphasis. He describes the sequen- tial unfolding of rights of different kinds to the point at which full citizenship has been achieved. But this ignores the great variation with which such rights are actually exercised in civil society. This is particularly the case for Eastern Europe, where the lived experience of citizens over the last 20 or 30 years has increasingly separated from the official state view of a citizen’s rights (Shlapentokh, 1989). In a penetrating and ex- haustive analysis of Marshall’s model, Goodin (1988) examines the extent to which there is a clear relationship between being a citizen (being a member of a community) and securing social policy entitlements. This relationship he argues could be either logical (the one entails the other), or empirical (the one is commonly associated with the other). He proposes a model which gives rise to four possibilities (see Table 2).

In cell A, welfare rights necessarily imply community membership, and in cell B, community membership necessarily implies welfare rights. Goodin points out that both A and B are

Table 1. A typology of citizenship rights

Location of Rights

public space

private space

Source of Rights

privilege from demands from above below

passive revolution democracy (UK) (FRANCE)

authoritarian liberal democracy pluralism (? EEurope) (USA)


Table 2. Community membership and welfare rights

welfare leads to community leads to community welfare

logical empirical

A B C D

the main cases argued by Marshall, who moves between both A and B and suggesting that they are interdependent, but particularly favoring B. Goodin’s approach is to argue that these proposi- tions must hold true for all cases if they are issues of logic, and proceeds to look for and find the single exceptions that he argues are sufficient to disprove them (in the case of A, benefits given to foreigners who are not also granted community membership, and in the case of B, ancient Athens where community membership did not entail rights). He thus concludes that the normative ideal set up by Marshal1 should be set aside in favor of the empirical contingencies of cells C and D.

Perhaps, Hindess (1987) has argued, the mode of analysis is wrong. His point is that the fierce debates that have surrounded social policy in recent years have been seriously misspecified. They have too often been couched in the model of state versus market, in much the way that Marshall acknowledged that the social rights of citizenship were in chronic tension with economic inequalities in the “hyphenated” society of democratic-welfare-capitalism.

The fault lies in an overeagerness to reduce the social phenomena in question to some essential characteristic, which is assumed to permeate and determine the structure and processes involved. Even the “consensus” view that the welfare state is an agreed compromise between the state and the market, and the criticisms now routinely made about the fragility of that consensus by all shades of opinion, share a conceptualization of the major relevant components as exhibiting essential characteristics which determine the way in which for example the state or the market operate, regardless of circumstance. The features are simply read off from the initial definition.

Where political processes are included in analyses to capture the uncertainties of particular social policies, Hindess suggests there is a lamen- table tendency to make judgements not in terms of the historical circumstances prevailing, but in terms of some normative principle, such as freedom or equality. While of course these are used in political debate, they lead to highly simplified social analysis, and to policy recom-

mendations which are naive in the sense that they have any realistic chance of concrete expression.

Markets do not always lead to uncontrolled inequalities, he argues; plans do not always lead to coercion and inefficiency. State, market and principle all exist in particular institutional conditions, and in conjunction with a variety of other concerns, interests and objectives. Hence good analysis of social policy, while acknowledging that states, markets and principles may indeed suggest tendencies and possibilities, should pay more attention to what is actually happening, framed in a good grasp of historical developments. Hindess, however, goes no further in discussing what those historical circumstances are, or how we can use them to improve our analysis of social policy, citizenship, or any particular society. Nor indeed does he retain sufficient room for the widely agreed observation that markets and plans do nevertheless tend to operate in quite distinct ways, or that concerns for equality tend to give rise to different decisions than concerns for efficiency.

The question is whether the concept of citizenship can be rescued in terms of its utility for the analysis of specific political and social history. In order to do that we must specify the manner and circumstances in which citizenship has been experienced, so that we can identify those processes in Eastern Europe and hence augment our knowledge of events there with a theoretical guide to their significance. Harrison (1991) argues that such experience of citizenship rights is always a contingent matter, and that social divisions within civil society lead to the substantive exclusion of many groups from the rights which they formally enjoy. He draws attention particularly to ethnic minorities, but also men- tions the effects of gender and class. Such a list could be expanded, as Turner (1991) does, to include the expansion and contraction of substantive rights over the course of the life cycle; others might include disabled people (Williams, 1992), and so on.

The third problem with Marshall concerns the process through which citizenship rights are gained or lost. If previous analysis has erred in the direction of essentials and principles confer- red from above, we need to look for a way of moving toward a more detailed historical appre- ciation of social change. As we noted above, Turner (1986, 1990, 1991) has suggested that we should examine citizenship not as a category so much as a process of struggle from below. Thus the political struggles that have accompanied the expansion of civil, political and social rights may help us to assess not the nature of the end in view


but the direction in which events seem to be traveling.

Turner discusses in detail the circumstances under which particular rights have been established, their contingent character, and the processes through which they are now changing in notable ways. In general he argues that the movement of European societies from feudal through early industrial to modern times has resulted in the progressive expansion of the groups which have gained a place in the social category “citizen” and been taken out of the category “nature”: poor men, women, children, some pets, and now aspects of the natural environment (through environmental movements).

Again in general he argues that this expansion has been from the particular to the universal, in the sense that the exclusion of particular persons (or things) from the rights of citizenship appears increasingly irrational as those persons are able to demonstrate their common interests with existing citizens. Thus the modern expression of this process as the critique of capitalism via the welfare state is merely one moment in the long term, which is already being joined by the worldwide growth of environmental concerns - the next point to which this restless political boundary between nature and society is moving.

Lest this sound like a curiously old-fashioned optimistic and evolutionary model, it is important to remember the point of Turner’s argument and its relevance here - that is that these changes are contingent on political and social struggle, and of course are therefore reversible in principle. He suggests that the development of social rights, as Marshall termed the cutting edge of the citizenship process in the modern era, can be traced to four distinct areas of social conflict: class struggles, war, migration, and egalitarian idoelogies.

Rights become established, in the case of the first two processes, through conflicts which strip away traditional structures of hierarchy and power. Turner classifies class struggle as an internal conflict in which, as Marx realized, capitalism’s progressive edge dissolves old categories, thus clearing the way for claims of common identity among all members of the labor market. The collective claim by the labor movement for inclusion within the rights of citizenship is probably the most widely studied process of the establishment of social rights, which has widespread crossnational empirical verification (O’Connor and Brym, 1988; and others - see next section). Turner suggests however, that external conflict (i.e. war) is also a significant, though relatively unappreciated, stimulus to the

erosion of category boundaries between the excluded and the included. One of the reasons for its relative neglect is the difficulty of including it in crossnational empirical analysis. It is also the case, however, that war-time changes, such as the entry of women into paid labor in large numbers, are more easily reversed than those achieved by the labor movement.

Migration and ideology, per se, are less significant. In the case of the first, this is because the opportunity for establishing new societies (e.g. Australia and the United States) was a unique opportunity, now closed. While these societies were, Turner argues, able to begin afresh without the impediments of old categories, and to that extent are truly modern in the way that, for example, Japan and the United Kingdom are not, this cannot be the case in general. As for egalitarian ideology, it is necessary to establish its concrete expression in institutional change, and this has been historically through the labor movement. Its other major vehicle, religion, has also been relatively neglected in the conventional social analysis of citizenship, but has some empirical support in Western Europe, where Catholicism has been associated with social policy expansion (Wilensky, 1981). Religion however, may also be of particular significance in the present changes taking place in Eastern Europe, and it needs to be assessed as a potentially important part of such analysis.

By way of illustration, we could summarize Turner’s argument in a simple model of these factors as a guide to the relative extensiveness of conditions conducive to social rights in the United States, the United Kingdom and Eastern Europe (see Table 3).

Following Turner’s suggestion that the first two factors are the most powerful, we can see that the United States has not experienced the kind of conditions that might result in more extensive citizenship development. By contrast, the United Kingdom appears to be better placed in this respect, with Eastern Europe in the most favorable situation. Whether we can in any sense rank order these societies in terms of welfare

Table 3. Conditions favorable to social rights in the United States, the United Kingdom and Eastern Europe

class (& other) struggles war migration ideology

USA X

UK X X

EEurope x x X


effort (as is frequently done in empirical analyses), we can see how different, in terms of Turner’s categories, have been the sources of category erosion in favor of social rights. Indeed, Eastern Europe looks to have a favorable set of circumstances. Yet as we noted at the beginning of this paper, economic, political and social developments since the 1960s had begun to erode the civil, political and social rights of Eastern European citizens.

In order to avoid the kind of criticism made by Hindess, that for example there is something “essential” about class struggle or war that inevitably leads to the extension of social rights, we must specify in such a model as this the nature of the struggles that these opportunities make possible. Here Turner moves to a discussion of social movements in stressing the contingent nature of such rights which can be lost. This is a crucial process at the present time in Eastern Europe, and merits greater attention than Turner provides in his analysis; it will be discussed further below.

3. DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL POLICY

A disturbing implication of the argument so far in this paper is that while the effective establishment of citizenship rights depends upon the active pressure of politics from below, this was not strongly in evidence in the early build up to the transition in Eastern Europe. This may imply either a stubborn passivity within the population, or the absence of political opportunity. The difference is quite crucial for the prospects of establishing citizenship rights after the heady days of the immediate transition, and particularly the social rights we associate with the effective welfare state commonly part of Western Europe. We can illustrate this by turning to another set of debates in the Western literature about the growth of welfare in the West. In contrast to the citizenship debate, this has been a case of highly empirical work, using relatively quantitative methods of analysis.

The crucial question is whether welfare state “effort” has resulted from economic imperatives, such as human capital investment, or from democratic pressure. Clearly if it is only economic growth that has been crucial, the prospects for social rights in Eastern Europe may look much weaker. There have been three types of study.

First is the study of economic factors epito- mized by Wilensky’s (1975) cross-sectional analysis for 1966 of factors associated with the development of the welfare state. This pioneer-

ing work used data for 60 countries, including less-developed and state socialist countries. It was found that economic capacity (“level of economic development”), need (“proportion of the population that was elderly”), and administrative momentum (“age of the programme”) explained about 80% of the variance in welfare effort (“social security expenditure”). Political factors were found to be of little relevance.

Second is a direct reaction to this finding typified by Castles and McKinlay (1979) who attempted to highlight political effects by restricting the sample to Western industrial countries. This method was adopted on the grounds that wider samples have such a large range of economic levels and social structures that they crowd out the effects of political factors. This cross-sectional study of “advanced democratic states” for 1974 found that by restricting the sample to a “most similar systems design” (Prze- worski and Teune, 1970, p. 32), political factors such as left-wing mobilization, and the absence of right-wing government, do indeed become predominant, although only about one-half of the variance in their measure of public welfare (“transfer payments, educational expenditure, and infant mortality”) can be explained. Other studies of the period up to the 1970s come to the same conclusion (e.g. Stephens, 1979; Castles, 1982; Van Arnhem and Schotsman, 1982; Cameron, 1984; Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1984; Rice, 1986).

Third has been an attempted synthesis between economic/social structural factors and political mechanisms in an attempt to integrate the previous findings. A notable early example was the study by Hicks and Swank (1984) of the impact of both political and economic “capitalist and working class-linked actors” on changes in direct cash transfer payments for income maintenance during 1960-71 in “rich capitalist demo- cracies.” Economic growth and political actions by both right of center parties and trade unions were the main determinants of transfer spend- ing, explaining 95% of the variance. Similar conclusions about the combination of political and economic determinants are reported in more recent studies in this group (O’Connor, 1988; O’Connor and Brym, 1988; Castles, 1989, Hage et al., 1989; Hicks, Swank and Ambuhl, 1989; Pampel and Williamson, 1989; Schmidt, 1989). In only one of these quantitative analyses, however, are there any data later than 1980, where Hicks, Swank and Ambuhl(l989) cover 1975-82.

There are a number of problems with this body of work. First it has drawn narrower and narrower samples of countries (usually members of Organization for Economic Cooperation and


Development). Second, little of it uses time- series data. Third, there has been a bewildering variety of indicators used for the main independent variables. Fourth, the main dependent variable, welfare “effort,” is poorly specified in theoretical terms. The very number and variety of analyses, however, makes one common conclusion ‘possible, that politics matters to the development of welfare effort, and hence that the prospect for social rights in Eastern Europe can be expected to depend on the development of a vigorous democratic tradition, both within and beyond parliament.

4. ORDER AND CRISIS: FROM ELITE DISINTEGRATION TO SOCIAL

MOVEMENTS

While the debates about citizenship and welfare “effort” have stressed politics from below, the abiding observation of Eastern Europe is that this was not possible under the old regimes until they had begun to disintegrate. The transition has by no means been a simple story of the oppressed rising up. in revolt. Nevertheless, pressure from below did eventually appear, often with some drama. The question thus arises about the relationship between system collapse and citizen revolt, and the role of social movements in this. The key idea here is the role of elites and interest groups in this process.

The nature of the traditional social and political order and its transformation in Eastern Europe has been a matter of particular dispute. Models can be ranged between the strictly totalitarian, and the “suppressed” pluralist (Brown, 1984). In the latter, Eastern European societies consisted of a wide array of pluralist interest groups, vying for political influence, and material advantage. While this view has never made the naive assumption that all groups had the potential chance for advancing their interests, a long list of groups can be assembled from the literature purporting common interests generated by occupational, geographical, managerial, military, technical, ethnic, and other structures (Skilling and Griffiths, 1971). In this model there was an intimate relationship between interest groups and the elite. Indeed the interest groups were really elite factions, themselves created by the growing complexity of the post-Stalin era, which differentiated their material interests in the system and its development, and gave rise to consciously expressed differences.

This approach has been developed enthusiasti- cally by Zaslavskaya (1989, 1990) in recent years to explain the course and fate of perestroika in

the former Soviet Union in the 1980s. Her argument is simply that different groups had different interests in the changes, and would either support or resist change accordingly. Survey research makes this pattern clear: on the whole managers were in favor of perestroika in the late 198Os, while shop floor workers were not (Mason and Sydorenko, 1990). The open ack- nowledgement, however, that there were wide differences of interest has tended to overshadow the analysis of how those interests were actually organized and had effects, if any. Both the interests and the effects of these groups are assumed, or “read off” from changes that have occurred, with little opportunity for any independent corroboration. The articulation of interests by elite factions, and the avenues for political expression (including social movement activities) have as yet been poorly researched. This creates difficulties in the explanation of the relative balance between stability and change in different parts of Eastern Europe.

The gradual development of interests and elite factions since the 196Os, however, was not necessarily seen as the opportunity for the expression of citizen’s rights. For example Konrad and Szelenyi (1979) predicted the arrival of a new dominant class composed of an uneasy alliance of both the old bureaucratic elite, and the new intellectuals - scholars, artists, teachers, en- gineers, physicians. They suggested that there were indeed differences of interest between these intellectual elite groups, but that there was a slow consolidation in opposition to a working class whose interests continued to be suppressed. Change in Hungary, for example, was thus seen to arise out of debates within the elite, rather than reflecting any widespread grievances within the population as a whole. The recent crises were not therefore anticipated in this model.

A second model put forward by Bahro (1978), however, does develop a mechanism to explain change. It, too, located the key groups in society in the intellectual elite. But rather then seeing this development as resulting in the stable consolidation of a new ruling strata, Bahro attempted to identify contradictions within the elite which would in the end lead to system transformation. Indeed he was at pains to suggest that the apparently stability of Eastern Europe in the 1970s was misleading. The main contradic- tion for him was that the intellectual elite, through education and experience, was coming to realize (“surplus consciousness”) that alterna- tives were possible. In particular he argued that there was an alternative to the widespread dependence of individuals on an oppressive social totality (“subalternity”). Thus it would not


be working class demands that would lead to the end of the system, but rather demands arising within that very group charged with developing and managing the system itself.

How did the system collapse so quickly? These models of Eastern European social order give us little clue. Social movements were not a serious factor until the emergence of Solidarity in Poland in the early 198Os, and the early stirrings of environmental movements discussed in more detail later in this paper. An alternative approach is, as with the use of the citizenship debate, to make use of Western crisis theory. We can summarize this in terms of political, economic, and mixed or system crisis models.

First are political models which have suggested that modern Western states have suffered a revolution of rising expectations about the outputs that governments can secure for key groups in society. This has resulted in an overload of demands that the state cannot meet, with the consequence that society has become ungovern- able - indeed popular belief in the efficacy of politicians has declined along with voting turn- out. This has clear applicability to Eastern European governments in the 1980s which had always claimed that related to their monopoly of power they had a duty to supply welfare, con- sumer goods, employment, housing, and so on to citizens as a “gift of the state.” Since the definition of adequate quantities of these goods and services is subject to debate, particularly among elite sections of society. control over both this definition as well as the physical supply of “state gifts” was politically crucial. This control began to fail in the 197Os, not least because the state became the victim of its own ideology of steadily expanding provision. It was fuelling expectations through slow political liberalization at the same time as its capacity to deliver was shrinking.

Second, economic models start with the simple observation that growth rates in the whole of Europe have been declining since the 195Os, and that in the East the rate of decline itself has been heading toward a point of economic collapse. Some observers consider the reason for this the expansion of employment in “nonproductive” jobs in for example the health, education, military, and bureaucratic sectors, where levels have grown in all industrialized countries, but were notably high and rising in Eastern Europe. A related observation is that as a country’s economy matures, a limit is reached for extensive growth achievable by simple additions of labor and capital. Further growth can only be created through intensive methods such as increasing productivity as a result of technological invest-

ment and greater efficiency. As this takes place, however, growing interdependence and complexity in the economy lead to particular problems in Eastern Europe in terms of the effective proces- sing of the exponential growth of information required for central planning (Ellman, 1989). This information is located at both the periphery of the economy, and in the hands of technical experts, from where it is difficult to retrieve quickly and accurately, not least because it can form the basis of bargaining between the center and the periphery. In the West, the encourage- ment of quasimarkets is seen as the only mechanism for improving these necessary information transactions.

Third have been attempts to develop a more general view of system crisis. While often explicitly functionalist (e.g. Lane, 1987, pp. 221-2X1), shorn of some of its assumptions of stability and consensus, this kind of theory can be useful. For example, Habermas’s designation of a crisis in legitimation in Western societies in the 1970s has much to offer here.

Habermas (1976, pp. 45) explicitly follows Parsons in dividing society into subsystems of economic, and political activity, while collapsing the cultural and social into a common sociocultural system. The whole direction of this analysis, however, is to examine and explain system and subsystem crisis, rather than stability. In his model, the political subsystem is the key “steering” mechanism, guiding economic activity from which it in turn derives “fiscal skim-off.” Simi- larly it provides social welfare support for the sociocultural system in return for mass loyalty. He is concerned to point out however, that this model lacks an “action” dimension which he provides by positing for each subsystem a continuing tension between normative claims to validity and real material limits of each subsystem (legitimate power, economic capacity, etc). It is in the management or eruption of these tensions that the source of crises in the system lie.

Habermas suggests that there are six potential crises in the system. For each subsystem, crisis in the form of tension between normative expectations and material conditions can occur at both the input and the output stage: for example, if economic production falls too far below expectations (economic output crisis), or the motivation to work or to vote fails to induce mass production or mass support’(sociocultura1 output crisis). He suggests, however, that the most important site for crises is the political system. Here output tensions are termed a “rationality” crisis in the sense that the political system can no longer generate sufficient administrative means to steer the economy or to motivate and support social


and community life. This is intimately connected to input tensions whereby the necessary (norma- tively required) inputs to the political system such as mass loyalty and fiscal resources fail, with a resultant “legitimation” crisis.

This latter crisis is, he argues, the key to system failure. Poor economic performance, and a reluctance to work, can continue within many social systems for long periods of time. But once there is mass disaffection from the political subsystem, even the use of terror will only delay the point at which the system breaks down, or is radically transformed. In view of the birth of Solidarity in Poland in the early 1980s the revolutions of 1989 in Central Europe, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Habermas’s model seems to make a great deal of sense.

There is, however, one important problem with it which needs further discussion here. This is a lack of specification, perhaps inevitable in such a general model, as to which are the individuals or groups that become aware of subsystem tensions between normative expectations and material limits. Is it every citizen who loses faith in the government, or evades working? Is it all workers who feel that economic policy is failing, or object to paying their taxes? The originator of this area of debate, Max Weber, said himself:

Naturally, the legitimacy of a system of domination may be treated sociologically only as the probability that to a relevant degree the appropriate attitudes will exist, and the corresponding conduct ensue. It is by no means true that every case of submissive- ness to persons in positions of power is primarily (or even at all) oriented to this belief. Loyalty may be hypocritically simulated by individuals or by whole groups on purely opportunistic grounds, or carried out in practice for reasons of material self interest. Or people may submit from individual weakness and helplessness because there is no acceptable alternative (Weber, 1968, p. 214).

In this tradition, Mann (1970) and Abercrombie,

Hill and Turner (1980) have argued from evi-

dence drawn respectively from survey research and historical research, that most people do not in fact hold consistent views in line with the prevailing normative requirements of the political subsystem (conventional values, or the “dominant ideology”). This kind of consistent belief is peculiarly the property of key influential or ruling groups. It is only they who are required to hold consistent enough values to manage the various subsystems. Moreover, it is they that initially detect the rise of tensions between their beliefs and subsystem material conditions, sig- nalling an impending crisis.

The implication of this amendment is that a

model along these lines is in fact addressing the concerns of local and national elite groups, in the sense that crisis is reached at the point when these groups begin to register their concerns about subsystem failure. Indeed, Mann’s argument that elite or dominant groups are the key level at which value consensus must be main- tained, indicates that internal disagreements within elite groups are the sure sign of crisis. In the absence of alternative parties, or significant social movement activity, a crisis point means these significant groups will be subject to particularly intense pressure and change will be rapid when it comes. This analysis incidentally provides justification for the traditional political science approach to “Kremlin watching.” For example, Rigby (1991) shows clearly the rapid change in elite constitution at points of crisis in the Soviet Union, culminating with the unprecedented thoroughness with which Gorbachev replaced almost 100% of senior national and regional leadership incumbents in the five years following 1985.

These remarks suggest that Eastern European legitimation crises differ from those in the West that Habermas had in mind, since it can be argued that elites occupy a more significant, and hence vulnerable position. Lewis (1984) suggests from an analysis of Central European societies that the singular uosition of the dominant elite based around the party is inevitably vulnerable to two kinds of danger. First is tvnified bv Khrush- chev’s critique zf Stalin. This signalled an unprecedented split in elite ideology, amplified by the use of the press to conduct the debate. This dissensw was quite disorienting, when a key basis for effective political leadership was a monolithic unity, based on an unswerving claim to truth. This is what Habermas would call a rationality crisis in the output of the political subsystem. The second danger is that the exercise of power over the economy and the sociocultural system is very visible, so that any failures in these subsystem outputs (either in material or normative terms) are clearly linked to the elite.

A further difference from Western crises is, however, apparent to the extent that problems in the East went deeper and wider than elite collapse. Parallels with earlier transitions from authoritarianism in postwar Europe, Southern Europe, and South America have of course sprung to the mind of all observers. These parallels however, are limited. The main problem is that Eastern Europe faces a contempor- aneous restructuring of economy and polity, whereas these earlier political transitions took place against a background of relative economic continuity. Some would also add that there is a


parallel third reconstruction of social and domestic life.

These models of crisis pay little attention to life beyond the elite. The revolutions of 1989 and 1991 are a justification of this to the extent that they were marked by elite collapse rather than the overthrow of governments by movements from below. Nevertheless, there was an upsurge of activity outside the corridors of government from the late 198Os, as it became evident that legitimacy was ebbing away from the incumbent elites. The question therefore arises of the relationship between elites and mass/social movements for change.

5. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The foregoing discussion could be taken to justify a focus on social movements as the best area in which to detect the seeds of a new and vigorous democratic tradition. There is clear support for this choice in the discussion of the earlier sections of this paper: the citizenship debate, and in the evidence about the causes of welfare “effort.” The conclusion from the discussion of the basis of order and crisis in the old regime, however, is equivocal in this respect, and can best be addressed through an examination of the evidence we can find about the growth of social movements through the period of the build up to the transition, and in the post-transition phase.

Sociological work on Western social movements has grown substantially, and now contains a number of clearly articulated models addressing the question of where social movements come from, what sustains them, and what effects they have. These questions have given rise to four contending models (Klimova, 1991). In the first, the classical model, social movements are stimulated by grievances felt by those attracted to be members of the movement. The dynamics of the movement are associated exclusively with the internal life of the movement, such as charisma- tic leadership and its routinization. The second model takes a very different focus, suggesting that movements arise because they are organized by people with the resources to do so, who are able to attract and to keep members with selective inducements, and who constitute a peculiarly middle-class industry, in which leaders can create careers, moving between movements. The third changes the focus yet again to consider the external contraints on movements, suggesting that they develop in response to the changing structure of political opportunities. Finally there is a relatively new approach which stresses the

role of movements in generating new public knowledge, for example about environmental consciousness.

Defining what they are has been less extensive- ly discussed, although we have had to face this question squarely as a result of the mechanics of organizing a multinational field work team to find and investigate new movements in Eastern Europe. It is easier to say what they are not than what they are. For example, they are more sustained then specific protests, demonstrations, or riots, yet less institutionalized than political parties. Each of the three main theoretical models in contention draws attention to a key characteristic, which in combination can provide us with a working definition (Diani, 1992, has developed a similar definition based on his work on the Italian ecology movement):

- shared beliefs (sense of grievance) - network of informal interaction (for mar- shalling resources) - collective action (oriented to available political opportunities)

These elements in the definition will be useful when we consider below some different models for explaining the striking pattern of movement activity which has developed in Eastern Europe, and to which we can now turn.

The nature of the political transitions in East- ern Europe, and the place of elites and social movements in them, can be usefully divided into three phases: pretransition, transition, post- transition. We are here concerned, in Haber- mas’s terms, with the political “steering” mechanism. By constrast, changes in the economic or the sociocultural subsystems will be a very drawn-out process, possibly with little boundary in the end between transition and general social and economic change.

Observers of contemporary social movements in Eastern Europe (Tyomkina, 1991; Yanitsky, 1989; Igrunov, 1989; Gyori, 1989; Raudsepp, 1992; Szirmai, 1991) have all confirmed that a typical pattern of social movement development seems to have occurred in all three of our fieldwork sites. This started with the pretransition growth of “safe” movements in the early 198Os, or earlier, usually around environmental issues, and organized exclusively by intellectuals/ scientists. Thus in Estonia, for example, by 1982 there was a widespread national awareness of ecological issues. Similarly in Hungary in the late 1970s and early 198Os, a number of ecological incidents had provoked the state into financing an environmental protection program. By the mid 1980s this growth in awareness became focused in each place on a celebrated, and formative, issue through which the traditional


state structure and its legitimacy was successfully challenged. In Estonia this was the 1987 campaign against phosphorite mining; in Hungary it was the 1988 campaign to stop the building of the Nagymaros dam across the Danube; and in the USSR, the campaigns against the Siberian rivers diversion (1986) and for the protection of Lake Baikal (1987).

Toward the late 1980s this situation mushroomed explosively in the build up to full transition, with myriads of groups, associations, and movements appearing. Although green groups still played a leading role, the focus of this activity had clearly widened to include the whole of the old regime. Again intellectuals were predominant in this early political debate, out of which the new parties would duly emerge. For example survey evidence in Estonia (Jarve, 1989) shows that there was a sharp drop in public concern with the environment compared to the nationality issue during 1985-89, when the Law of Citizen Associations was passed. In Hungary this right had been granted a year earlier, from which point ecological activists began to be sucked into wider political developments. In Russia, in addition to the two big ecological struggles, many local groups in Leningrad and Moscow used ecological and “monument preser- vation” issues in 1986 and 1987 to test the limits of open political activities. These rapidly expanded into “political clubs” (Leningrad) and “social initiatives” (Moscow) in 198748, and then into a popular front in both cities in 1988- 89.

This upsurge was frequently taken by observers in both East and West to be a longed-for reawakening of “civil society.” Within a short space of time, however, often only one or two years, this level of activity subsided in the post- transition period as either political parties developed as alternative vehicles for the expression of these interests, or the cold realization set in that there were deeper “subsystem” difficulties than could be resolved through spontaneous civil action. Democratic forces in each country rapidly fell into division and dispute, and the euphoric notion of a collective civil society, at its height in 1989-91, found that its very identity was dependent on the solidarity of opposition. The membership and level of activity of environmental groups has declined, and their focus returned to specific ecological issues. In the harsh new economic environment, however, the costs not of pollution, but nonpollution, are being more carefully weighed in terms of jobs and production. Moreover, movements around more mundane issues such as property interests, particularly housing, are beginning to emerge in the 1990s.

6. MODELS OF EXPLANATION

Why has this strikingly similar pattern emerged? There are a number of possible expla- nations. The first returns to Habermas.

(a) First model

Szirmai (1991) has suggested that these movements played an important part in the changing bases of social order in the three transition phases. In each phase it can be suggested that the significance of social movements lay in their relationship to the elite or elite factions. In the first phase they were tolerated, or more often officially sponsored, as a means of identifying problems, and assembling knowledge which the traditional party/state bureaucracy could not be relied on to achieve. In addition they could be used as vehicles for elite faction struggles, and in a more general way they were a useful (though of course also potentially dangerous) adjunct to official ideology about citizen participation.

In the second phase, at the time when a full blown “legitimation” crisis had erupted, the rapid growth of movements served for a time as an alternative avenue for channelling public concerns, mostly about one single overriding problem, the future of the political “steering” mechanism itself. We see here a rapid switch from social movements as conserving the old order to social movements as lubricating the birth of a new political order. Similarly, rather than acting as before as creatures of the elite factions, social movements now served as the spawning ground of new elite faction membership, particularly with respect to the ideas, images, information, and concerns of sections of the population which each faction sought to represent.

In the third phase, where it is appearing, a new, if fragile, political order is settling down. The membership and activities of some social movements have shrunk quite dramatically, and their focus has returned to more mundane issues of specific grievances. Our second main area for study, housing, is now beginning to awaken as new property rights and principles of distribution are debated and implemented. Housing movements are beginning to take off, while environmental concerns fade in the scramble to shore up falling industrial production - even if environ- mentally unsound. To the extent that the new order resembles liberal democracy, it is to be expected that social movements will come to a third kind of relationship with the elite(s), more familiar to the Western literature. Whether this is so is an important question. Thus relationships


between movements, parties, authorities, grievances, resources, intellectuals and so on will be examined carefully.

In sum, Szirmai suggests that while the shape, size, and focus of movements in the three phases was quite different, they were commonly involved as a key mechanism for the maintenance of social and political stability. In short, she suggests that the environmental movements were as much about stabilizing power as they were about the environment.

(b) Second model

The problem with that kind of functionalist model is of course that it tends to assume what it also wishes to explain (the “function” of sustain- ing order). An alternative approach might be to examine the changing bases for social action, that is the interests articulated throughout the three different phases of movement activity, and the changing resources and opportunities available at each stage. Rather than search for order, we can examine the opportunity for expressing conflict (although of course functionalists have claimed this is important for order, too).

If we return to the three elements in our earlier definition, and examine them for each of the three phases, an alternative way of making sense of the pattern emerges (see Figure 1).

The first point to notice is that there is a changing mix of grievances toward which movement activity is directed. Initially environmental concerns are preeminent, but with the regime itself as a very clear, if hidden, background issue. With mass mobilization however, a complete change in psychological orientation takes place:

198%1989 was the peak of the so called “singing revolution” in Estonia. It was characterised by euphoric activation of people gathered on numer- ous large-scale public gatherings on various pohtical and cultural occasions, as well as by strong self- identification as a collective (national) subject. The phenomenon of joyful crowd arousal (the so called agoral phenomenon - see Biela and Tobac- zyk, 1987) could be observed on several occasions, manifested by voluntary participation, publicity,

and mass scale (the size of individual gatherings could reach to 300,000, i.e. about 30 per cent of the whole Estonian-speaking population) Wudsepp, 1992, pp. l-2).

Subsequently, however, with the regime changed, there is a return to a smaller and more discrete focus on green issues, and moreover in a context of cold realism about the costs of environmental improvement.

At the level of resources, a repeated observation is the crucial role of middle-class intellectuals to the movements in the early phase. As mass mobilization occurs, however. this source is overshadowed by the labor and finance available from large sections of the population. This rapid growth in resources for movements is a mixed blessing, since ironically the transformation of this activity into political parties then spirits away many of the original leaders, leaving movements organizationally weakened in the post-transition stage.

Little of this activity could have taken place, of course, without the opening up of new political opportunities. In terms of this third factor, we once again observe the gradual, and then rapid widening of opportunities for political meetings, publications, and open debate. This has not, in contrast to the grievances and resources, shrunk in the post-transition phase, except in so far as politics has become institutionalized as a special- ist activity for professional politicians.

In terms of the debate in the literature between models emphasizing these three different elements as central to explaining social movements, this evidence seems to point to a variation in their significance at different points in the process. The recent emphasis on political structures and opportunities in models of movement growth (Pickvance, 197.5; Bagguley, 1992; SiisiGnen, 1982) has great relevance here. Clearly it was the opening up of political opportunities in the early/ mid-1980s which stimulated the early activity, drawing on an existing yet stable level of grievances and resources. The subsequent decline in activity, however, seems to have been the result of the loss of key personnel resources, and a substantial change in public concerns. Thus it

Figure 1. The bases for social action in the course of the transition in Eustern Europe.


may be that these factors have a varying significance in this particular Eastern European inst- ance depending on the particular phase in the cycle of growth and decline.

(e) Third model

One interesting conclusion that could be drawn from this kind of exercise is that the traditional debate in Western social movement theory, between grievance-driven and resource-driven movements, should not only be more sensitive to the structure of political opportunities, but could reconsider social movements as a kind of “collective thinking” by elites or elite factions. For example Eyerman and Jamison (1991) have argued that in the field of Western environmental and civil rights issues (which have also been particularly significant in Eastern Europe), social movements are most importantly the bearers of new ideas. Since they are occasionally the source of new scientific theories, but more often the site of new ideas in society, the activities of “movement intellectuals” should, they suggest, be a major focus.

Some commentators have particularly stressed the role of intellectuals, Gyori (1989, pp. l&17), for example, describing Budapest as the home of a special concentration of researchers, students, artists, professionals, with a rich network of personal connections. He describes the way in which social initiatives were spawned in the creative lifestyle, and shared values of sections of this group, yet at the same time, due to the “ghetto like” separation of these sections from wider society, he recognizes their potentially weak position, unless they resonate with “wider social developments.” Many other colleagues have independently suggested that intellectuals have been the key site for the new ideas and activities in the early to mid 1980s.

While external conditions for movement development are important in the first two models, the relative significance for the influence of intellectuals of “wider social developments” is crucial in this model. Intellectuals are very dependent on the moment when “their time has come ,” since, like grievances, we might argue that there are always plenty of them about. Returning to two of our earlier models of post- Stalinist social order, however, we can recall the unusually key position that intellectuals hold in Eastern Europe. Both the Konrad/Szelenyi and Bahro models stressed that this group were in a commanding position over the social order, and consequently any internal conflicts within the group would have significant consequences.

Once again it is not difficult to see how the remarkable cycle of growth and decay of movement activity already described might be explained by the relative movement of some intellectuals and their ideas from relative isolation to mainstream, typified in the widely remarked career of Vaclav Havel. In particular their position as ideological articulators, or construers of a consistent reality, in the manner of Mann and Abercrombie, et al., earlier discussed, can be seen, for example, in the wide range of policy debates to be found on the subject of the future of social policy (Manning, 1992).

(d) Fourth model

A fourth model has been organized around the notion of civil society. From this point of view, the upsurge in movements was both the reaffir- mation of a simple belief in the indestructability of the human spirit in the face of oppression, and an explanation as to the downfall of the regimes. The analysis rests on a clear dichotomy between the growing problems of statist social and economic development, and the growing strength of nonstate society as it regained more and more areas of autonomy for social action.

There is a great deal of uncertainty about the utility of this concept, chiefly because of its all- encompassing nature. An important aspect however, is the relationship between personal or domestic life and political oppression. Ekiert (1991), for example, suggests that Western scholars have failed to appreciate the burgeoning of domestic freedoms in the post-Stalin era, and that it was here that fertile ground lay for the development of social movement activists. [t was from this base that political society in Eastern Europe was “resocialized from below” during the 1980s.

Once the breakthrough into state transformation occurred in 1989-91, however, the direction and cohesion of an oppositional civil society tends to break down, and the concept loses much of its utility. Offe (1991) has suggested that it might be better to think of three progressively deeper “levels” of politics, concerned at the deepest with “identity,” and moving up through “rules,” to surface “outcomes.” The Eastern Europe revolutions have touched the deepest level of national, regional, and ethnic identity, where there is still a considerable focus of attention. At the same time debate within civil society about the nature of the rules to govern the new system, let alone the new distribution of outcomes that will result is still continuing. Social movements in the post-transition phase are operating in different ways at all these levels.


7. THE POSTRANSITION PHASE

In conclusion, there are a number of points to be made about the new era. The first concerns the relationship of social movements to elites. The case was made earlier that both order and crisis in Eastern Europe have been intimately bound up with elites and elite fractions. More- over, in reviewing different models of the pattern of social movements in the last decade, elites again figured as a central concern. While some observers have been concerned to demonstrate that the cultural requirements for political invol- vement exist among ordinary citizens (Hahn, 1991), it remains the case that elites, their knowledge, recruitment, and resources will continue to be crucial to understanding social movement changes.

The second point concerns the economic difficulties that have accompanied the transition. Hungary is in the best position for future economic development. This is the result of both earlier and more gradual economic liberalization. Current economic indicators suggest that Hun- gary’s debt burden and growth rate do not look catastrophic (Clarkson, 1992). By contrast Rus- sia’s situation does not look good, while Estonia is still in the process of disentangling itself from the consequences of its Soviet past. In fact Estonia has always been used as a kind of economic experiment, which together with its cultural and other links with Scandinavia suggests that the economic future is less bleak (Hiden and Salmon, 1991). Economic reconstruction will thus inevitably cast a long shadow over the political changes with which we are concerned.

A third point merits greater attention. It concerns once again the role of civil society. Great solidarity was generated during the transition. At the same time this gave rise to both a theoretical and political conviction that there should be renewed emphasis on the vitality of the concept of civil society, drawing on the Hegelian binary contrast with the state. This idea stressed the major dialectic in state socialist societies as that between state and civil society. Other divisions both within the state (such as the elite fractions discussed in this paper) and within civil society were less emphasized. There is no doubt that while the state held power this model was a fruitful one in many respects, and enabled a number of useful analyses to be made in the 1980s about the extent of and organization of opposition to authoritarian state rule (Shlapen- tokh, 1989; Goldfarb, 1989).

Such a binary opposition, however, loses its analytical grip should one side collapse. Where would class analysis be if either proletariat or

bourgeoise disappeared? Indeed opponents of such a model have tried hard to document either the disappearance of capitalists (the “managerial revolution”) or workers (the “embourgeoisement thesis”). Similarly, with the collapse of authoritarian state rule in Eastern Europe, the very tension which made the idea of civil society useful evaporates. Indeed the focus on social movements in this paper is in part an attempt to examine the concrete ways in which “civil society” can yet create small islands of solidarity, of opposition to grievances, during and espe- cially after mass opposition to the state has passed.

If we are to reject the idea of an autonomous civil society, independent of opposition to the state, after the transition, we are forced back to the question of what the basis of social order will be in post-transition society. It is not difficult to observe the very rapid dissolution of solidarity, and the rise of divisions - between parties, ethnic groups, regions, and in time no doubt economic classes. This, Hirst (1991) suggests,’ may well endanger the fragile democracy that is emerging. In the absence of a legitimate central authority, dissensus may make not only political but also economic change less effective. For example Yeltsin’s position in Russia is seen as currently crucial to the maintenance of social order.

What are the options? Three spring to mind - nationalism, religion, and the return of a politically legitimate state. The first two have indeed proved to have a limited capacity to stabilize civil society conflicts, for example, by tightly confin- ing to a nationalist definition the basis for citizenship in the 1992 Estonian elections (re- miniscent of the postbellum southern United States), or by a return to religious authority in Poland and Georgia. Yet this kind of stability looks very fragile, and is gained at the cost of exporting potential conflicts elsewhere, as in the former Yuogoslavia.

It seems inevitable therefore that post- transition Eastern Europe will continue to be heavily statist (Weitman, 1992) - indeed it is difficult to imagine any other agency through which civil society conflicts can be resolved, although the relevant administrative capacity of the state at both national and local levels is as yet poor (Rice, 1992). For example, Yeltsin’s government continues to pour money into state enterprises (even into the functionally redundant military), universally condemned as inefficient. At the same time local government has been repeatedly reorganized in Budapest, Moscow, St. Petersburg, Tallinn, to the extent that even local officials and councillors are not sure who has


authority, who owns property, or even which are felt to be in principle issues for the state is parties are legal. Nevertheless the fact that these very clearly expressed by citizens of all kinds.

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T.H. Marshall, Jurgen Habermas, citizenship and transition in Eastern Europe

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