TGV Project, Portuguese Railways and Transport Policies

TTTGGGVVV aaannnddd PPPooorrrtttuuuggguuueeessseee RRRaaaiiilllwwwaaayyysss,,, CCCrrriiitttiiicccaaalll AAAnnnaaalllyyysssiiisss

AAAppppppllliiicccaaatttiiiooonnn ooofff TTTrrraaannnssspppooorrrttt PPPooollliiicccyyy

MMMIIITTT PPPooorrrtttuuugggaaalll ––– IIISSSTTT

TTTrrraaannnssspppooorrrttt PPPooollliiicccyyy aaannnddd IIInnnssstttiiitttuuutttiiiooonnnsss

2009/04/10

Francisco Furtado

Occupy and Connect, Part II – Francisco Furtado Page 1

Table of Contents

Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 2

Impacts and Stakeholders ....................................................................................................... 2

Base Scenario, Strategies and Realities .................................................................................... 3

Country...................................................................................................................................................... 3

Transportation .......................................................................................................................................... 4

Railways .................................................................................................................................................... 6

High Speed, the “triumph of the will” decision making paradigm? .......................................... 8

Freight and Logistics.................................................................................................................................. 9

Connection to Europe ............................................................................................................................... 9

Information Gaps and Disconnections .................................................................................................... 10

Oeste Station ....................................................................................................................................... 10

Connection to Alcochete Airport ........................................................................................................ 10

Cost benefit Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 11

Business Model ....................................................................................................................................... 11

Triumph of the will? ................................................................................................................................ 11

Alternative Approach ............................................................................................................ 12

References............................................................................................................................. 13

Sites ......................................................................................................................................................... 13

Documents .............................................................................................................................................. 13


Introduction

The aim of this report is to assess the on going Portuguese high speed project (TGV), and to

evaluate the decision making process led by the Portuguese Government. The impact of this

project will be looked, not as a particular venture detached from the context, but as a part of a

broader Transport policy measure1. Further more, as an even wider process, since this is a

major public investment decision, that should be considered taking into account how it is

integrated with the global objectives set for the country.

We will start to identify what are the main stakeholders in the game, and the main features to

assess the impacts of a program like this. After that we will make an overview of the country,

transportation and railways strategy and realities. Than we will take the TGV project and

evaluate it according to the impacts mentioned and taking into account the broader scenario we

described and analysed. We will end by presenting an alternative approach to what is being

done.

Due to space and time constrains, some issues, like the pricing schemes, were not directly

tackled, but overall the most determinant problems were addressed.

Impacts and Stakeholders

Who are the stakeholders at stake here? First and foremost2, the Portuguese Citizenry. The

State, the institution that expresses the collective will, manages the common goods and can

also act as an arbitrator between particular disputes. Industry and Commerce are also

stakeholders, like the citizenry they are not an homogeneous group, still like the citizenry, they

will be the ones to pay and collect the benefits from the project3. The particular Operators and

Suppliers4 of the infrastructure and service, they are part of the Industry/Commerce, but their

interests are much more closely connected with the project. Trade Unions of the directly

involved companies, and the wider Union Confederation, as representatives of the Workers.

Finance (big banks) also plays a crucial part, they will provide (or better, manage and collect a

fee for it) the capital necessary, and then receive a rent for their services. The Ports, Airports,

Road concessionaires, are also players since they manage services/infrastructures that will be

impacted by this. Last but not least the European Union and Spain are stakeholders to single

1 In a Program logic, not a project logic

2 From the author of the report point of view, this will be agreed by the general experts also, although there is always a huge gap between statements and reality. 3 At least it’s in their behalf, and for their good that the Project is being advocated. I don’t remember hearing “The TGV is good because it will provide the Banks with a steady and granted income for the next 40 years”. 4 By operators we mean the consortiums that will be selected for the PPP. The suppliers are providers of high value special equipments/technologies like Alstom or Siemens, they can also be part of the “Consortiums”.


out, the EU finances a big share of the project and looks to it as a part of a broader European

network, Spain is directly involved in the project, and is already building is share of it (the line to

Vigo, and the one Badajoz-Madrid).

And what Impacts should we consider, and what how to assess them? We will consider the

fallowing:

• Supply(Industry) Efficiency/Productivity – increase the output/input ratio of the system,

decrease overall costs of the system, denser use of equipment and infrastructure,

improvement of the Operators balance sheet (subsidies and charge fees manipulation

should not come to this equation5);

• Demand(Users) Efficiency – decrease of travel time, increase in frequencies, adequate

capacity, improved comfort and security.

• Social and Economic leverage – the capacity this Project will have to leverage gains not

just for the directly involved (users and operators) but for the Citizens at large and general

Industrial and Commercial agents.

• Sustainability – Are we delivering adequate goods/services while reducing the total amount

of inputs and harmful wastes produced (from a social and environmental point of view,

emission of CO2 is a good measure)

• Connection to Europe and Atlantic – To what degree are connections to Europe and the

Atlantic (threw the Ports) improved?

• Integrated view – This is not quit an impact, but it is key that all the above are fully

weighted, and more than that, every major project should be implemented fallowing a more

broader strategy. Is this the case?

Base Scenario, Strategies and Realities

Country

For the last decades the country strategy as been closely aligned with the EU, the modernizing

and development of the infrastructures as been largely funded and conditioned by the EU, and

also the regulatory framework (from environmental to commercial) as been largely driven by the

EU directives. The country aspires6 to become an open market economy directed to exports,

with an increasing share of know how and industry in Information Technologies. Renewable

Energy and Sustainable transportation also have become buzz words.

5 Even if they are justified under many circumstances, subsidies should not go in for this accountancy purpose. 6 It would be more correct to say that this is the ruling elite sermon to the populace. If it is the general public will, or even the ruling elite guide line for action is very questionable…


K m Million E uros

Inves ted B efore

this Government 2734 7675

Inves ted by this

Government 2359 3872

Total 5093 11547

S ource: MOPTC and R AVE

New Motrorways and Higways done threw PPPs

Although this is not plain mythology, and some steps have been taken, the fact is that the

country larger industry is Construction. The State (namely in transportation, especially in roads),

first directly, than threw the Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), as heavily invested in the

provision of infrastructures. Besides the benefits brought by the use of these new infrastructures

this provided also7 financing to big Construction Companies/Banks8 and jobs for the population,

giving fuel to the whole economy. Actually this has been the main driver of the Portuguese

economy in the last 20 years (much more than exports or IT technologies…). This policy

became known as “Política do Betão”. The PPPs are very appealing tools and its use is being

spread not only to roads, but rail, logistic platforms, ports, airports, health care, and “whatever

moves”… It provides the State an instrument to increase debt with no limits while presenting the

populace some accomplishments. For the privates (especially finance) it delivers a steady

secure income in the long term9. Portugal adopting the “good student” paradigm towards the

European Union as actually been pushed by the EU in this direction too, this was the way the

Portuguese State eagerly embraced the EU commandment to open the market for public

obligation goods and services (PSOs), and European funds available were mostly to be applied

according to this model and towards these infrastructure investments...

In a way Portugal as become, more then an open market, a “rent economy” were private

companies/banks provide and manage low competition goods and services, for fixed rents paid

by the state. What more could big Finance ask?

Needless is to say that besides distorting general Portuguese Economy10 and Society this

“rentist model” also as deeply affected the way Transportation policy and public investment are

decided.

Transportation

7Mainly? 8 Big construction companies are either owned by banks, or own big shares of banks. 9 Since most of this PPPs concern PSOs these arrangements leave the State completely captured, it contracts privates to provide natural monopoly goods, and services essential to the population. The way to make this politically acceptable both for the privates and the citizenry was on the one hand pay the privates for the “availability” and not the usage, this way caring the commercial risk. On the other hand most of the times the users of the services don’t pay the price that cover the cost, so the State takes the burden. 10

An important data to bear in mind is that the country is in an economic freeze/depression for the last 8 years.

Picture 2 - Density of Road(Motorways) vs Rail: Source EU Table 1 - Investments in new Roads threw PPPs


The 3 pictures shown now, illustrate the

statements made above. They also

make a good introduction to a more

detailed analysis of the strategy for the

transportation sector and reality of it.

The current Government includes

Transportation policies under the

“Mobility and Communications” umbrella,

in the XVII Constitutional Government

Plan, and in the Great Options for the Plan 2005-2009, Mobility and Communications are

included in the “Sustainable Development” chapter (together with the energy, agriculture,

sea/fishing and tourism sectors). Five key guidelines are provided on those documents:

Increase quality of life (comfort, time travel, security…); Requalify Urban Mobility; Promote

respect for the environment; Decrease total costs (intermodality, more efficiency…); Integrate

the Iberian, European and Transatlantic networks.

Than for each mode Rail, Road, Air, Sea, plus the Metropolitan Areas (Lisbon and Porto)

subsection, specific priorities are set. The Great Options for the Plan gives more detail, and

besides setting the guidelines it has a chapter listing the Public Investment Priorities.

Intermodality, Sustainability, Security and an Integrated approach are all key words, in the great

options of the plan it’s even stated that less pollutant modes should be promoted increasing

supply and giving benefits for the users. High Speed Rail is given top priority, it is seen as an

emblematic and modernizing endeavour that encompasses all the guidelines and priorities set

by the government. It is like a project that single handed provides and fallows all the objectives

that are set (intermodality, efficiency, connection with Europe, etc…).

Fallowing the guidelines presented in these broad documents11 The Ministry of Public Works

Transport and Communications(MOPTC), as developed specific strategic guidance for

Railways, Airports, Ports and Roads(the National Road Plan). In addition it also developed the

Portugal Logistic Plan, were the key are several hubs/platforms for freight that provide a friendly

intermodal interface. Still between the general government strategy and each mode particular

strategy there is no document, like a “Strategic Plan for Transports”12, which hinders the

concrete implementation of a intermodal and integrated approach to the development of the

sector…

11 Great Options and Government Plan 12 Or “Sustainable Mobility” if you like best…

Table 3 - Rail network extension (km): Source EU


As for reality it should be mentioned that mobility issues in Metropolitan Areas/Cities have been

addressed13 (both in the infrastructure/services and Institutional fronts). Information and Data

are also shared and easy to assess14. But as can be seen in table 1 and 2, the allocation of

resources doesn’t “exactly” fit the mentioned goals.

In a nut shell, the broad goals and guidelines seam correctly placed15, but coherence is lacking

since there is a gap between the Government strategy and each Mode strategy. The TGV

seams to be a Program-Project that aims implementing all the government strategies in an

integrated way. Still, inertia from previous established and ongoing projects is very strong, as

can be seen from the investment made in Roads and mobility for the Metropolitan areas. The

PPPs business model obsession16 heavily distorts the decision making and the actual

implementation process. It focus attention and resources towards a particular mega projects

logic, more than in a program approach that can, and should, integrate several small (and some

big if necessary) different Modes projects. It also hinders a more flexible approach since for

economy of scale reasons and due to the contractual complexity it ties down the State to large,

rigid projects in a much stronger way then if the state would directly lunch and manage itself the

program(s).

Railways

Regarding Rail, the MOPTC as produced a document intituled

Strategic Guidelines for the Rail Sector, still it’s very far from being

a structural long term plan17 like the National Road Plan, a very

detailed tool that is published and regularly updated in the Diário

da República.

This plan attempts to provide a comprehensive framework towards

the recovery and development of the Portuguese rail network. It

proposes such things as to define a hierarchy for the rail lines18 or

to close the net to form a closed grid. But it’s more a list of things

to do (and are already being done) than an actual plan of action.

There are several plans to do or to conclude: The Director Plan for the National Rail Network;

The Plan to migrate from Iberian to European Gauge; Strategic Plan for the Oeste Line and

13 Development of the Metro networks, improved interfaces, integrated ticketing, improvement of the commuter train lines… One should say there is some natural inertia that promotes continuous investment in these fields… 14 Just go to the MOPTC site, de SIMOPTC site (information system of the MOPTC) or the RAVE site… 15 Although some guidelines like, “increase quality of life”, seam over generalist and subjective. 16 The Logistic Plan current situation is a good example of what happens when the government tries to direct private investment towards investments with uncertain demand/return, that are not secured by State rents. Although it looks a good idea, it looks like it was set up in a rather voluntarist way. 17 That actually frames the investment in roads and is fallowed by governments even when the power exchange hands… 18 Like what already exists for roads in the Road Plan…

Picture 4 - Rail lines in Operation


Cargo Movements (Road and Rail) 1000 Tons

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

300000

350000

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

Total Rail

Studies for the Tua, Tâmega, Vouga and Corgo lines, to develop with the Municipalities were

those lines are.

Freight seems like the poor relative… Connection to all main ports, airports and logistical

platforms is mentioned, namely the dedicated freight19 line from Sines to Elvas, to be done in

coordination with TGV. But the details of how this is going to be done are missing.

At some months from the elections none of these plans has yet been disclosed…

Inertia, as stated, plays a big role so what is rolling are interventions in the Metropolitan Areas,

plus the ongoing modernizing of the North and Algarve line. Recently the link connecting the

National “Siderurgia” to the rail network as been completed (also a part of the Strategic

Guidelines…)20. In the meanwhile other lines keep closing: the Tua line, were several

derailments21 occurred, as well as the more recent Tâmega line “blitzkrieg” shut down22.

Even with this schizophrenia going on, the

good news is rail as been regaining users and

market both in passengers23 and freight traffic

in the last years, even when road freight

movements are falling, as can be seen in

Graph 6. Still, rail as a long way to go regarding freight, as seen in graph 5 the start point is

depressing.

Regardless all the above stated, at absolute center stage emerges a bold and revolutionary

project, the Portuguese High Speed Network.

19 This is part of the Trans European transport network priority projects, placed in both 8th and 16

th priority

20 The beginning of operations of a second cargo operator as started to make an impact, very recently CP cargo as also started a

new service with Renfe, Iberlink, which connects regularly Portugal and Spain. 21 Some with several deaths 22 Done on back of the Population in a inexcusable way

23 See the latest, 03-03-2009, INE report regarding Transport Activity.

Graph 5 - Freight: Source Eurostat/INE

Graph 6 - Freight Modal Split: Source Portugal Logístico, MOPTC


High Speed, the “triumph of the will” decision making paradigm?

The Portuguese TGV project is not integrated in broader Strategy for the Portuguese Rail

network, and that Strategy is not a part of a wider Transportation sector strategy, because these

strategies simple do not exist yet.

So the first question to raise is if it is wise to go forward with such a huge investment, 7.1 billion

euros24, without a proper broader plan for rail and transport sector? Not only it’s a huge

investment, but it’s in a fixed infrastructure with little flexibility, so the decisions taken now are to

a great extent irreversible and will condition the Portuguese Rail and Transportation sector for

the next decades. The second question is why weren’t much of the plans, namely the Director

Plan for the National Rail Network, made before, or in parallel with the studies made for the

TGV?? The public presentation of this project was made in December 2005, couldn’t

Refer/Rave assemble a subcommittee to finish those broader Plans? Just the studies for the

third Tagus crossing had a cost of 15 million euros25… Why weren’t some resources mobilized

for such a basic thing?

Portugal instead of having a comprehensive Strategy as a Mega-Project, somewhat

disconnected from the rest of the sector26, that by itself is expected to connect us to Europe, be

the back bone of our logistic system, improve sustainability, have a reproductive effect in our

economy and deliver a more integrated system… Not having a program the government

24 Just for the Lisbon-Madrid and Lisbon-Porto not counting the Third Tagus Bridge

25 Number given by RAVE financial director, at the presentation he gave to the MIT Portugal Transportation group.

26 This is not a line to “Freixo de Espada à Cinta”, Its the biggest investment ever made concerning Rail and Transportation… So we have, we must be demanding!

Graph 7 - Investment for the priority lines

source MOPTC

Picture 8 - Portuguese High Speed Network

Source RAVE


chooses to have a Project that is a program by itself… But will this work? Some key questions

must be addressed…

Freight and Logistics

As stated by RAVE the Lisbon-Madrid line doesn’t have enough passenger demand to justify a

dedicated line for passengers, so we will build a more expensive line (around 15% more… and

we know how these things slide…) that can have mixed use27. But it as a limit of 17 tons per

axis, will it be used for bulk28? Containers? The demand studies requested by RAVE include

that, but they mention that high value, lighter goods, should be the target… And in the mean

while there is the dedicated freight line Sines-Elvas that is also a priority project to be built, will

we have than two parallel lines doing the same? For freight traffic the sines line will have more

capacity and will take 25 tons per axis, couldn’t that line go to Poceirão, then from there to

Elvas, and also serve the Lisbon and Setubal Ports? Or the other way around, couldn’t we have

a nice connection from Poceirão to Sines and the freight from Lisbon and Setubal use the

Sines-Elvas direct connection? Either way why do we need two parallel lines providing the same

service? If the Sines-Elvas line is build then the TGV should definitely deal with “Postal like”

freight, and in that case why build a mixed use more expensive and inefficient line? And if we

don’t build Sines-Elvas, we will just have the mixed TGV, that in the end is not so mixed and

won’t be able to serve all segments of freight and boost, as repeatedly stated in MOPTC power

points, the Ports of Sines, Lisbon and Setubal movements…

Connection to Europe

This is one of the biggest arguments given… But will we be connected to Madrid or to “Europe”

will any passenger go by TGV to Paris? Or Berlin? Even in TGV this would be at least 9 hours

trip and the ticket just to Madrid is 100 euros… Even the Promoters of the Project don’t raise

this option, so what is the connection to “Europe” we are talking about29?

Freight as much more potential… Having direct freight lines in the same gauge, with same

signalling, from Portugal, to Spain and then France, that is being connected to Europe. If a

Container that lives Lisbon can get to Paris in 2 days that will be highly competitive with a Truck,

and that will surely take lots of Trucks off the roads and deliver a much more sustainable and

efficient transportation service.

Do we need the TGV to have that freight connection? The Sines-Elvas line is estimated to cost

250 million euros, since it shares the same platform with the TGV, not building the TGV would

27 And its not only more expensive to build, also to maintain, and its never as efficient as a dedicated line for passengers or freight…

28 Key sector in rail freight 29 at least in the Atlas that the author of the report knows Madrid and Europe are not the same entity…

Occupy and Connect, Part II

increase the land movement costs of the Sines line, but it would be a margi

would never come to close to double the 250 million number. Now compare to the 2,4 billion the

TGV line costs (Lisbon

Imagine if we: built this freight line; implemented the (not yet presented but announced)

migrate fro

systems and reactivated/built more conventional links to the Spanish lines (that are also

migrating to the European gauge). Wouldn’t these measures actually provided us

adequate and real connection to Europe? And

Information Gaps and

Oeste Station

This station is not presented in the RAVE site, but it was already announced

compensatory measure negotiated with Oeste

Maior, this known European Metropolis, half way

Rainhas… Why!

Oeste line

that narrow

You will see the People aren’t stupid.

Connection to Alcochete Airport

In 30-03

launched, it includes a branch from the main Lisbon

Poceirão to the new Alcochete airport

an integrated approa

30 See http://www.oesteonline.pt/noticias/noticia.asp?nid=18542

31 When one of the TGV

32And again, didn’t RAVE have some leftovers that could be used to actually make the

33 According to a high profile consultant of one of the consortiums session RAVE finance director gave to the MIT Portugal transport group, ANA was unaware of this decision…

Picture 9 - Result for

web page

Occupy and Connect, Part II



TGV line costs (Lisbon


migrate from Iberian to European Gauge




Information Gaps and

Oeste Station




Rainhas… Why!?...

Oeste line32? What would

that narrow-minded, and if they are, why not to make a referendum in all those municipalities?



03-2009 the tender for the Lisbo



an integrated approa

http://www.oesteonline.pt/noticias/noticia.asp?nid=18542

When one of the TGV biggest advantages is being able to go directly to the city centers…And again, didn’t RAVE have some leftovers that could be used to actually make the According to a high profile consultant of one of the consortiums

session RAVE finance director gave to the MIT Portugal transport group, ANA was unaware of this decision…

Result for search "con

Occupy and Connect, Part II – Francisco Furtado



TGV line costs (Lisbon-Madrid)…


m Iberian to European Gauge




Information Gaps and Disconnections




Why isn’t the money that will be spent on this stop used to improve the

? What would serve

minded, and if they are, why not to make a referendum in all those municipalities?



2009 the tender for the Lisbo



an integrated approach? Does this


biggest advantages is being able to go directly to the city centers…And again, didn’t RAVE have some leftovers that could be used to actually make the According to a high profile consultant of one of the consortiums


search "connection with Alcochete Airport" in RAVE

Francisco Furtado



Madrid)…


m Iberian to European Gauge; harmonized the working regulations plus signalling




isconnections





the people of t




2009 the tender for the Lisbon


Poceirão to the new Alcochete airport33. This means that a train that leaves Madrid won’t be

ch? Does this generate


biggest advantages is being able to go directly to the city centers…And again, didn’t RAVE have some leftovers that could be used to actually make the According to a high profile consultant of one of the consortiums


ection with Alcochete Airport" in RAVE

Francisco Furtado




; harmonized the working regulations plus signalling



adequate and real connection to Europe? And with considerable


compensatory measure negotiated with Oeste Region Mayors.

Maior, this known European Metropolis, half way31


the people of the region


-Poceirão section of the Lisbon

launched, it includes a branch from the main Lisbon-

This means that a train that leaves Madrid won’t be

generate synergies?

http://www.oesteonline.pt/noticias/noticia.asp?nid=18542, and MOPTC news

biggest advantages is being able to go directly to the city centers…And again, didn’t RAVE have some leftovers that could be used to actually make the According to a high profile consultant of one of the consortiums that is running for the new airport concession, present at the


ection with Alcochete Airport" in RAVE







considerable lower


Region Mayors. The TGV will have a stop in Rio

between Santarém and Caldas das


e region better? I don´t believe the Mayors are


Poceirão section of the Lisbon

-Madrid line of the TGV departing from


able to stop in the new a

other way around. So someone that

arrives at the new airport that wants to

go Madrid must take a shuttle to

Lisbon and from there take the TGV,

the same for someone in Madrid that

wants to go to the new airport… Is this

, and MOPTC news on the website

biggest advantages is being able to go directly to the city centers… And again, didn’t RAVE have some leftovers that could be used to actually make the Strategic Plan for the Oeste Line?

that is running for the new airport concession, present at the session RAVE finance director gave to the MIT Portugal transport group, ANA was unaware of this decision…

increase the land movement costs of the Sines line, but it would be a marginal increase






lower costs?


The TGV will have a stop in Rio



? I don´t believe the Mayors are


Poceirão section of the Lisbon-Madrid line was

Madrid line of the TGV departing from


able to stop in the new a







on the website

Strategic Plan for the Oeste Line?

that is running for the new airport concession, present at the session RAVE finance director gave to the MIT Portugal transport group, ANA was unaware of this decision…

Page

nal increase and it


Imagine if we: built this freight line; implemented the (not yet presented but announced) Plan to



migrating to the European gauge). Wouldn’t these measures actually provided us with a

This station is not presented in the RAVE site, but it was already announced30






Madrid line was



able to stop in the new airport, and the







Strategic Plan for the Oeste Line? that is running for the new airport concession, present at the


Page 10

and it


Plan to



a more

as a






Madrid line was



irport, and the







that is running for the new airport concession, present at the


Cost benefit Analysis

The cost benefit analysis that were made compare this project with the base case scenario

(current situation), but is the TGV and the current situation the only option we have? Shouldn’t

alternatives be studied and then compared with this project? If this project was compared with a

remodelling and upgrade of the conventional line system, including the dedicated sines-elvas

freight line and remodelled Oeste line, among other projects, were then would we stand?

Besides that some of the assumptions made are, at least, questionable. In all of the studies the

value of time(VOT) saved is an essential parameter, but actually finding a VOT value is a very

controversial subject among the experts, what confidence can we have on those values then?

And is a 5% discount rate a reasonable value? When for a private project the minimum of

minimum is 10%34? It´s a State initiative, but then aren´t the positive externalities already being

counted, like the decrease in travel time, reduction of CO2 emissions and the general effects on

economy?

Business Model

Last but not least, we have the biggest PPP ever being launched (actually the project will be

split in several but each one is huge)… The commercial risk of the private partners is 2%35, so if

the real demand goes bellow the predicted demand studies guess who will pay? So the 38%

financing provided by the cash flow generated by the project (in a 40 years term!) might be an

illusion… We are faced with a SCUT on a Epic scale. So the Private operators of the network,

the suppliers, the constructers and the Banks that will finance the project will surely gain. For

the rest of the stakeholders mentioned the risks are Big...

Triumph of the will?

Although the amount of studies available36 in the RAVE and MOPTC websites seams

impressive, with rigour one is forced to say that this is a project presented, structured, studied

and being implemented in a very voluntarist way, like if with shear will we could produce the

desired results. Actually it looks like the result of a blinding pressure produced by the need to

get the EU funds (22% of the project…) and third party interests, then a structuring project for

the Transportation sector and a leveraged for the Portuguese economy and society. Sometimes

we have to move even if the plan isn’t perfect. Even so, this investment requires such a huge

amount of resources, besides delivering irreversible options, being a fixed/rigid infrastructure,

that the least we must demand is a full explanation of the questions raised. And a reassessment

34 This can vary a bit from Project to Project and there are several contexts, but less than 10%, for a private project is in the absolute majority of the cases not applied. 35 PPPs IN THE ROAD AND RAIL SECTORS IN PORTUGAL, presentation made by the RAVE finance director 36 This is to be praised, it shouldn’t because this should be a standard procedure, unfortunately


of the choices made, taking into account a national strategy for Transportation, and the rail

sector.

Alternative Approach

First, a committee made up by RAVE/REFER, Port authorities, government and the rest of the

stakeholders37 mentioned should be assembled and deliver a comprehensive Transportation

and Rail Strategy, that must include several alternative proposals38, within a pre-defined time-

table. Universities and Students, from several fields, should be heavily involved to help explore

the maximum amount possible of Alternatives39.

These different approaches must be properly compared, the ones that deliver evident returns

should go forward immediately to public discussion and the others should be further studied.

A, as wide and participated40 as possible, public discussion should be done within a pre defined

time table.

The European Union isn’t the boogeyman, neither are “nuestros hermanos”. The European

Directives and funding should be reassessed to maximize their intended effects. A critical, pro-

active and collaborative approach should replace our “good student”(to use an euphemism)

attitude when addressing the EU.

Some basic guidelines should be fallowed: before building mega infrastructures we should

better manage what we already have. Remodelling should be a priority and new construction

should be made with the goal of maximizing the output of existing assets. The third tagus

crossing41, Sines-Elvas freight line, a modular airport with option to expand in Alcochete seam

examples of new construction that give returns, but this should off course be the target of study

and comparative analysis as above mentioned.

If the, likely, conclusion that the TGV is not a priority is reached, we should nonetheless take full

advantage of the studies and initiatives already made, like for instance reserve the TGV lines

corridors for future eventual construction (for instance the platform for the Sines-Elvas line could

be extra dimensioned to allow adding in the future extra tracks of conventional or TGV rail).

Finally our “rentist” economic model and PPP fixation must be reassessed.

37 Representatives from the EU Commission and Spain should be a part of this. 38

Different phasing, different connections, different technologies… 39 Why not promote Master and Phd thesis that are actually useful instead of just working to warm up? 40 This implies not just providing information, but making an active effort to promote discussion 41 why just not Rail? Or built like the 25 of April Bridge with option to expand in the future?


References

Sites

• www.rave.pt

• www.moptc.pt

• si.moptc.pt

• www.ine.pt

• ec.europa.eu/eurostat

• www.refer.pt

• www.cp.pt

• ec.europa.eu/transport/index_en.htm

• www.oesteonline.pt

Documents

• Programa do XVII Governo Constitucional, Presidência do Conselho de Ministros

• Grandes Opções do Plano, Principais Linhas de Acção e Medidas em 2005-2006, Conselho de Ministros

• Orientações Estratégicas Sector Ferroviário, MOPTC, Secretaria de Estado dos Transportes

• Novos Empreendimentos Rodoviários Lançados pelo Governo, MOPTC

• Plano Rodoviário Nacional 1998, Diário da República

• Actualização do Plano Rodoviário Nacional 2003, Diário da República

• O Projecto Português de Alta Velocidade, Eng. Luis Filipe Pardal, Presidente da RAVE/REFER

• El Plan Estratégico de Infraestructuras y Transporte de España, Ministerio de Fomento

• Liberalização do Transporte de Mercadorias - Impacto e Soluções, Eng. Armando Fonseca Mendes, Director CP Carga

• Cost-Benefit Analysis HSL Portugal, Bas Scholten, THR, Ecorys - requested by RAVE

• Análise Custo-Benefício Das Linhas De Alta Velocidade Lisboa-Porto E Lisboa-Madrid, TIS.pt - requested by RAVE

• Actividade dos Transportes, INE

• Estudo De Mercado E Avaliação Socioeconómica E Financeira Da Linha De Alta Velocidade Madrid-Lisboa /Porto, EPYPSA, EXACTO, TSI TECNINVEST

• Portugal Logístico, MOPTC, Gabinete da Secretaria de Estado dos Transportes

• The Trans-European Transport Network, new guidelines and financial rules, European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport

TGV Project, Portuguese Railways and Transport Policies

Documents

Transcript of TGV Project, Portuguese Railways and Transport Policies