Textual Understanding and Scriptural Sufficiency

8/6/2019 Textual Understanding and Scriptural Sufficiency

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TEXTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND THE SUFFICIENCY OF SCRIPTURE:

AN ENQUIRY AND PROPOSAL REGARDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DOCTRINE

As a species of human knowledge, the progressive development of Christian doctrine is affected by the

finitude of human understanding, the unique character of its subject matter notwithstanding. The pages

of Church history are littered with the fragmented remains of theological luminaries once regarded asparagons of truth. The reality of development within human knowledge should thus serve as a humble

reminder to those wishing to shore up the perceived shortcomings of the doctrine of others. The

presence of development within the history of doctrine is truly a double-edged sword. While doctrinescan surely be improved upon, we must not forget that the improvements of today often become the

liabilities of tomorrow.

It is in this chastened spirit that we introduce the subject of our current discussion. The doctrine of the

sufficiency of scripture is at least by name a relatively recent arrival upon the theological scene.One searches in vain for direct mention of it in the historic creeds, or even in many of the most well-

known confessions of faith.1 Even today, only one major work of systematic theology devotes an entire

chapter to this doctrine.

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Only a handful of monographs have been written about the sufficiency ofscripture, and few of them contribute in a significant way to the development of the doctrine.3 Lastly,

virtually none of the major journals in biblical and theological studies have featured full-length articles

on the topic in the past 20 years.4 The only era in recent Church history in which the doctrine of the

sufficiency of scripture steps to the forefront was during the Reformation, in the form of theReformation claim ofsola scriptura. In the interest of placing our current contribution in its proper

historical context, we will begin our discussion there.

Although the conflict that precipitated the Reformation took place on a variety of fronts (frustrationwith Roman Catholic excesses, German nationalism, abuses of papal authority, the role of the

magisterium in religious affairs, etc.), the Reformers were more or less unified around some expression

of the principle ofsola scriptura. Indeed, in its historical context, the claim ofsola scriptura was

primarily an objection to Roman Catholic appeals to church tradition, alongside and equal to scripture,as an alternative source of doctrinal authority. The Reformation claim ofsola scriptura was thus a call

to return scripture to its rightful role as the only final authority in matters of doctrine and practice.

For the sake of our current discussion, a key distinction must now be made between scriptural

sufficiency andsola scriptura, for the two are not identical. Specifically, it seems as though the claimofsola scriptura rests upon, and is thus dependent on, the doctrine of the sufficiency of scripture.

Scriptural sufficiency provides the doctrinal support upon which the theological claim ofsola scriptura

can stand.

As the Church entered the modern era, a subtle shift began to take place. During the period of the

Reformation, scriptural sufficiency found competition with the tradition of Roman Catholicism. As the

modern era began to get underway, however, scriptural sufficiency found itself vying for its status as

the only final authority amidst authorities (both secular and religious) outside the institutional church.Although the authority ascribed to scripture by institutional Catholicism in doctrinal disputes did not

correspond to the authority it actually wielded, at least the Catholic Church stopped short ofdenying

the truth status of the gospel story contained in and communicated by scripture. With the onset ofModernism, however, a host of extrabiblical traditions (i.e., science, history, personal experience, etc.)

began to assault the Churchs belief in the veracity of the unique content of scripture.5


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Regardless of whether the Reformation doctrine ofsola scriptura (and scriptural sufficiency, by

implication) was subsequently co-opted by modernist concerns, the result was a doctrine that

increasingly buttressed the claims of the gospel found in scripture from outside attack. We must

remember, however, that this was not a completely ill-fated or misguided endeavor. Insofar asmodernism actually posed a threat to the epistemological priority of scriptural authority, the doctrine of

the sufficiency of scripture, as such, was a warranted theological response. The gospel brooks no rivals,

and thus scriptures singular capacity to bear divinely authoritative witness to the gospel story must bedefended in the face of all other competing paradigms of reality.

At least two observations can be made from our brief foray into Church history. First, it seems as

though the content of scripture and, secondarily, the capacity of this content to function in a particular

manner, are both involved in the doctrine of scriptural sufficiency. This is an important observation,because it highlights various points of contact between the doctrine of the sufficiency of scripture and

other doctrines, specifically the doctrine of revelation and the doctrine of biblical authority. During the

Modern era, both biblical authority and the doctrine of revelation were directly challenged bycompeting authorities external to the Church. Likewise, the Catholic Churchs elevation of church

tradition to the level of scripture undermined biblical authority and obscured the doctrine of revelation.6

Unfortunately, however, this is the point at which confusion often enters. It would be easy to assume

that sincesola scriptura was a claim regarding the capacity of scripture to function in a finallyauthoritative manner, scriptural sufficiency should therefore be related primarily to biblical authority,

and only secondarily to the doctrine of revelation.7 This is unhelpful, however, not least because it

predisposes the doctrine of scriptural sufficiency to imbalance from the outset. Any doctrine ofscripture whose theological moorings are not explicitly found in the doctrine of revelation will suffer

from arrested development.8 The doctrine of revelation is the nexus of all other doctrines of scripture,

and thus enjoys pride of place in theological formulation. The doctrinal developments of the Protestant

Reformation, for instance, would likely have taken place along more helpful lines if discussion hadexplicitly centered on bringing greater clarity to the doctrine of revelation.

The second observation regarding our survey of Church history is that the manner in which the doctrine

of the sufficiency of scripture is expressedby the Church changes from one era to the next. Themeaning of the doctrine of the sufficiency of scripture to the Reformers was different from the meaning

of scriptural sufficiency to Christians living in the modern era, and is likewise different from what it

means to present-day Christians. The Reformers didnt fight the same battles as Christians who lived in

the Modern era, and neither do we. Because our local context shapes the various avenues in which weexpress (and defend) our doctrines, those doctrines come to mean something different to us than they

may have to others in a different context. There may be a relatively large degree of continuity in

meaning, but this does not preclude the presence of potentially significant differences, as well.

One significant difference between present-day Christians and those who lived during the early Modernera (as well as the Reformers) is that our current culture often operates as though there were no final

authorities whatsoever. This is a far cry from the context of both Modern-era Christians and the

Reformers. Our task is much greater than defending the sufficiency of scripture against attacks fromrival traditions who claim final authority status. The task currently before present-day Christians is to

uphold scriptural sufficiency in a context that privileges no tradition as a final authority.9

In light of these observations, the ensuing discussion will attempt to give an account of scriptural

sufficiency that is both explicitly coordinated with its moorings in the doctrine of revelation, anduniquely meaningful to people within our present-day context. Obviously one could take this


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meaning. Our point-of-departure will be Ricoeurs theory of the surplus of meaning. In his own words,

the surplus of meaning simply means that a text means all that it can mean.10 Simple though it may

be, it seems immediately at odds with conventional evangelical expressions of textual meaning. The

Chicago Statement on Biblical Hermeneutics, for example, explicitly affirms that the meaningexpressed in each biblical text is single, definite, and fixed.11 But how can a text like the Bible mean

all that it can mean if its meaning is single, definite, and fixed?

Before we can answer this, we will need to briefly retrace our steps and survey the disciplinary

landscape of philosophical hermeneutics in order to gain the best vantage point from which to considerthe problem posed by textual meaning to biblical interpretation. At the conclusion of this survey, we

will outline Ricoeurs theory of the surplus of meaning and highlight the manner in which it is relevant

to our current study on scriptural sufficiency. We will then end this segment of our discussion byconsidering the claims of E. D. Hirsch and his author-focused literary theory. Ricoeur and Hirsch were

both chosen because they represent two distinct approaches to textual meaning that have been

influential in biblical hermeneutics.

The tradition of philosophical hermeneutics within which the contribution of Paul Ricoeur belongs hadits inception in the thought of Martin Heidegger.12 Indeed, Martin Heidegger represents the continental

divide separating the present-day discipline of hermeneutics from its modernist origins. By adapting the

phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (detrimentally, some suggest), Heidegger singlehandedlytransformed the playing field by shifting the discipline of hermeneutics into the realm of metaphysics.

Indeed, prior to Heideggers contribution, the hermeneutical enterprise was generally characterized by

attempts to formulate the process of understanding a text or text-analogue. Schleiermacher, widelyregarded as the father of modern hermeneutics, suggested that the act of interpreting a text required the

subject to experientially reproduce the mindset the original author embodied when he actually

produced the text. After accomplishing this, the interpreter could then experience the authors thoughts

more truly and deeply than the actual author did, and thus achieve a correspondingly deeperunderstanding of the text.13

Wilhelm Dilthey expanded upon Schleiermachers thought by incorporating subsequent insights from

both Hegel and Kant. In Diltheys opinion, however, the object of interpretation was not restricted totexts, but was extended to anything related to the human sciences. Anything that was considered

geistliche, or related to the human Spirit, was within the realm of hermeneutics. This was a direct

function of his desire to buttress the empirical viability of the human sciences against rising criticism

and competition from the natural sciences. Dilthey insisted that while the objectivity of scientificconclusions in the realm of the natural sciences rested on their ability to explain natural phenomena,

objectivity in the human sciences could be grounded in the understanding one could gain into the

human Spirit. As long as the human sciences could in some manner be grounded in a methodology thatproduced some form of objective knowledge, then they could be trusted in their own right. With regard

to texts, interpreting a text was a matter of discerning the particular manner in which the human Spirit

was represented in the mind of the original author when he produced the text.

Ultimately, Diltheys bifurcation of historical understanding and scientific methodology did not bearthe weight of subsequent scrutiny. Vanhoozer, among others, notes that while Dilthey was right to

treat human action as qualitatively different from natural events, he erred by orienting the human

sciences towards subjective consciousness rather than inter-subjective communication.14 By the timeMartin Heidegger arrived upon the scene, however, an alternative attempt to account for the

significance of expressions of human intentionality had arisen in the form of Husserlean

phenomenology.15


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Much discussion has centered on the nature of Heideggers appropriation of the phenomenology of

Husserl. Although Heidegger was a student of Husserl, he did not share Husserls desire to retreat into

a reworked version of epistemology that privileged human consciousness over all other phenomena. As

Palmer points out, Heidegger was profoundly uneasy about Husserls willingness to trace allphenomena back to human consciousness, that is, to transcendental subjectivity. 16 Simply put, while

Husserl saw in phenomenology a means of reestablishing philosophy as a legitimate player in the

scientific enterprise, Heidegger regarded the scientific quest for objective knowledge itself as littlemore than a pipe dream. According to Heidegger, even phenomenology modernitys latest great

hurrah was embedded in historicality, and is hence intrinsically hermeneutical.

Although a complete outline of Heideggers hermeneutical philosophy is beyond the scope of this

paper, it is possible to highlight a few major themes that are relevant to our current discussion. Perhapsthe most central theme in Heideggers work is his redefinition of the term understanding. While both

Schleiermacher and Dilthey conceived of understanding as a capacity belonging to the interpreting

subject, Heidegger conceives of it as part of the fundamental makeup of the interpreting subject. ForHeidegger, understanding is an ontological reality, a precondition of the hermeneutical task.

Specifically, it is the innate ability of the interpreting self to conceive of multiple ways-of-being in the

particular lifeworld which one inhabits. In the words of Palmer, it is simply a mode or constituentelement of being-in-the-world.17

The nature of Heideggers recasting of the concept of understanding is perhaps best understood in

relation to his concept of world and worldhood. And Heideggers concept of world is perhaps best

understood in contradistinction to the Cartesian paradigm. World is neither that which an isolated selfencounters outside of himself, nor is it even that which a conscious mind attributes to his external

surroundings. For Heidegger, world is hence not ontic, but ontological. According to Palmer, world

is not the whole of all things but the whole in which the human being always finds himself already

immersed, surrounded by its manifestness as revealed through an always pregrasping, encompassingunderstanding.18

The final concept, and perhaps the most significant of Heideggers thought, that we will mention is his

concept ofDasein, or being. In a sense, we have saved the most significant concept withinHeideggers thought for last, because his intellectual project is a giant quest to uncover the question of

Being. His first attempt to describeDasein is to consider the nature of its existence. But when

Heidegger speaks about existence, he is not referring to something that is found in the world at large.

This means that, significantly, there is no one-to-one correspondence between world and thingswithin the world. To equate world with things in the world would be to attribute existence to such

things. But Heidegger so definesDasein that it alone is capable of existence. Rocks and trees and

planets are not instances ofDasein, and hence do not exhibit existence, but exhibit vorhandenheit, orpresence-at-hand. Heidegger pragmatically defines anything that does not exhibitDasein as

equipment (das Zeug).

These technical definitions of world and existence are fundamental to Heideggers contribution to

hermeneutical theory. That which is within the world, but which lacks Dasein is best describedfunctionally as present-at-hand. This includes, among other things, texts. In other words, Heidegger

regards texts as equipment because they exhibit a presence-at-hand that is oriented towards a

particular purpose, that of relating an item of communication to a particular situation.

The work of Heidegger is significant for our current discussion on the sufficiency of scripture becausehe was the first to suggest that the meaning of a text, such as scripture, was not something merely to be


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grasped by an independent subject, but instead was something encounteredby an interpreting subject.

If Heidegger gave the nascent discipline of philosophical hermeneutics its new orientation, however, it

was his student, Hans Georg Gadamer, who first charted its course in detail.

For the most part, Gadamer was content to build upon the pioneering work of his teacher. For purposesof our discussion, we will focus on his use of Husserls concept of horizon. According to Thiselton,

Husserl insisted that all the beings given in ones world stand within the intentional horizon ofconsciousness.19 Gadamer recognized in Husserls notion of horizon a concept that was readymade

to illustrate the nature of human understanding.

Specifically, Gadamer made extensive use of Heideggers (and Husserls) practice of relating meaning

within the context of various horizons. In Gadamers own words, a horizon is not a rigid frontier,

but something that moves with one and invites one to advance further.20The meaning of a text,therefore, must somehow be understood from within the horizon it inhabits at any given time. Many

have described the process whereby interpreters achieve understanding, but we will quote Treiers

summary:

Reading a text is like having a conversation: the text speaks and we respond, or we ask aquestion for the text to answer. Negotiation must occur between the horizons of the text and

the reader in regard to what the subject matter of the conversation will be. When the negotiation

is successful, a fusion of horizons results: there is overlap somehow between what the text

addresses and what the reader seeks or applies in an existential situation.21

One must, however, not assume that full diplomatic relations, to continue the metaphor, are in place

between the two horizons. Treier and Gadamer both remind us that we do not simply leap from our

horizon back over the intervening history and into the authors horizon or the texts original context.22

Horizons are sovereign states, so to speak, that jealously guard their boundaries.

This brings us to Gadamers concept of tradition. According to Thiseltons analysis of Gadamer,

tradition is best understood as something that constitutes [the interpreters] horizon of meaning.23

The horizon one inhabits is hence bound up with ones tradition. When interpreters approach a text,therefore, they do so as members of a particular tradition. Given the sovereign status of textual

horizons, Gadamer is adamantly opposed to any attempt to impose wantonly ones own tradition upon

the horizon of the text.

It is worth mentioning at this point that just about anything can play a significant role in shaping aparticular tradition. Relatively broad influences include the historical era during which one lives,

together with relevant cultural, socio-economic forces active within ones horizon at any given

moment. But seemingly inconsequential events may also play an unexpectedly large role in traditionformation if future events during the passing of time imbue them with added significance. The latent

significance of such events often belies their otherwise innocuous appearance.

Many have suggested that Gadamers traditions possess an unwarranted privilege, and are thus

inevitably and unavoidably incommensurate, given the programmatic role they play in hismethodology. There seems to be a lack of a clear arbiter between warring traditions. Despite

maintaining that critical methods are of use in determining textual meaning, he seems to be quite wary

of saying that they mustbe used if one wishes to derive proper meaning from texts.


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Paul Ricoeur, for his part, seems to fault Gadamer at precisely this point when he suggests that

Gadamer neglects the impact of the distantiation of texts on the manner in which they are interpreted.

Although Ricoeur essentially agrees with Gadamers description of textual meaning, he does so via a

different route. Ricoeurs understanding of the hermeneutical function of distantiation is derived fromhis basic assumption that the text itself is the dominant hermeneutical problematic. In his own words,

Ricoeur believes that Gadamers antinomy between alienating distantiation and participatory

belonging is unhelpful as a programmatic expression of the hermeneutical problem, and should bediscarded in favor of orienting the discussion around the more fruitful problematic of the text itself.24

Ricoeur develops this perspective by highlighting five criteria of textuality. Taken together, these five

criteria portray texts as entities capable of autonomous activity, in much the same way as Gadamer

attempted. First of all, Ricoeur affirms Saussures distinction between langue andparole by rehearsingthe dialectic of event and meaning. According to Stiver, Ricoeur emphasizes equally the importance

of the event of language and the system of language In Ricoeurs theory of discourse, both

dimensions are irreplaceable.25Meaning is birthed when systems of language are concretized indiscursive events.

Ricoeurs second criterion of textuality extends the concretization of language as discourse to the

further concretization of discourse as writing. Ricoeur classifies writing as a work that is

characterized in three ways. First, it is a discursive sequence that is longer than a sentence. Second, itfollows specific conventions that typically reflect a particular literary genre. Third, works tend to

reflect a particular style. An author imparts to his work a unique configuration which likens it to an

individual26 Again, style is labour which individuates, that is, which produces an individual, soit designates retroactively its author.27This criterion implicitly distinguishes authors from speakers.

Indeed, Ricoeur at times employs terminology borrowed from the arts in his attempt to distinguish

authors from speakers: the author is the artisan of a work of language.28

Ricoeurs third criterion of textuality concerns the critical relationship between speaking and writing.Whereas spoken discourse involves interlocutors who co-inhabit a common situation, written discourse

cuts the cord, so to speak, between authors and their capacity to communicate intended meaning

through texts. What the text signifies no longer coincides with what the author meant29 Again, anessential characteristic of a literary work is that it transcends its own psycho-sociological conditions

of production and thereby opens itself to an unlimited series of readings, themselves situated in

different socio-cultural conditions.30Furthermore, authors are not alone in feeling the effects of the

autonomy of the text. Readers are affected, as well. The task of readers, therefore, is first todecontextualize texts before recontextualizing them in new situations.

The impetus behind Ricoeurs fourth criterion of textuality is the problematic function of reference

within written discourse. Unlike spoken discourse, in which interlocutors discern reference by means of

their recourse to a common situation, texts allow no such luxury. In Ricoeurs own words, there is nolonger a situation common to the writer and the reader31 Instead of a first order reference, readers

must pursue a second order reference that operates at a level more fundamental to the text itself. At

this point, Ricoeur employs Heideggerian existentialism to describe the level at which referenceoperates in texts. Interpretation itself is then understood in terms of this existentially flavored second

order reference: to interpret is to explicate the type of being-in-the-world unfolded in front ofthe

text.32 Such a description, Ricoeur thinks, avoids both Romanticist and structuralist attempts to definethe object of interpretation otherwise. In Ricoeurs own words, what must be interpreted in a text is a

proposed worldwhich I could inhabit and wherein I could project one of my ownmost possibilities.33


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In his fifth, and final, criterion of textuality, Ricoeur directly addresses the problem of appropriation.

Specifically, he describes appropriation as an extension of understanding itself. Henceforth, to

understand is to understand oneself in front of the text. In understanding a text, readers expose

themselves to it and receive an enlarged self from it.34 Ricoeur notes that such an understanding is, atleast in part, a function of the imagination, and hence requires an internal critique which he terms the

critique of ideology. The critique of ideology is the necessary detour which self-understanding must

take, if the latter is to be formed by the matter of the text and not by the prejudices of the reader.

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According to Ricoeur, texts are thus characterized by a surplus of meaning because they are distancedfrom their authors and because they project before readers a theoretically limitless number of worlds.

The distantiation of texts results in their capacity to function autonomously as portrayers of other

worlds. Attempts to limit meaning to the authors intention are not only futile, but shortsighted, as well.Interpretation becomes stultified, Ricoeur thinks, when it is over-preoccupied with linking the meaning

of a text with its authors intention.

At the same time, Ricoeur does not completely do away with the notion of intended meaning. He

simply relocates it: the intended meaning of the text is not essentially the presumed intention of theauthor, but rather what the text means for whoever complies with its injunction. The text seeks to

place us in its meaning36 In other words, once an author produces a text, the work itself embodies itsown intentions, in a seemingly analogous fashion to the author when he produced it. The difference isthat the locus of intentionality somehow resides within the text itself, and not within the mind of the

original author.

Ricoeurs work is relevant to our attempt to provide balance to the doctrine of scriptural sufficiency

because it represents a potential threat to traditional expressions of textual meaning. If the sole objectof interpretation is a transcendent world projected in front of a reader by a text, for example, the

doctrine of scriptural sufficiency is effectively redefined along the lines of a different doctrine of

revelation. Revelation ceases to be an inter-Trinitarian activity and instead becomes merely a textualvehicle through which readers achieve a greater self-awareness through an encounter with another

world the world of a text. In the words of Ricoeur, if the Bible may be said to be revealed this must

refer to what it says, to the new being it unfolds before us.37In response, we might suggest thatScripture is not revelation merely because it says something, but because, in and through it, Godsays

something.

Furthermore, Ricoeur seems overly optimistic regarding the capacity of a text to totally break free of

the horizon of its author so as to be rendered essentially autonomous. Perhaps it would be better torefrain from such categorical statements, and instead refer to a range of continuity/discontinuity

between textual meaning and authorial intent. Particularly gifted authors, for example, may be capable

of communicating in such a lucid manner that only extremely inexperienced readers would misinterpret

them.

These weaknesses notwithstanding, Ricoeurs theory of the surplus of meaning nonetheless gives us

valuable conceptual tools for understanding the riches of textual meaning. In order to grasp the

significance of Ricoeurs work for the discipline of hermeneutics one need only consider the paucity oftextual meaning that would result from a readersfailure to engage the world in front of a text.

Regardless of the degree of continuity between textual meaning and authorial intent, it would certainly

be tragic to neglect the relevance of the world projected by a text in the task of discerning textual

meaning.


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But if this is the case, then what can be said on behalf of scriptural sufficiency? If the textual meaning

of scripture is at least partially located in a world external to the text albeit, construed in significant

ways by the text in what manner does scripture retain its sufficiency? In order for the doctrine of

scriptural sufficiency to remain a viable doctrine for the Church today, it must be able to account forthe capacity for textual meaning to be, at least in part, a function of the particular world projected in

front of a reader by the text, without severing its ties with the doctrine of revelation. For this reason, we

now turn to the author-focused literary theory of E. D. Hirsch.

Hirschs agenda can aptly be represented by his core commitment to maintain a distinction between themeaningof a text and itssignificance. Hirsch employs the Husserlean concept of an intentional object

in his definition of verbal meaning: Verbal meaning is the sharable content of the speakers intentional

object.38If verbal meaning is a fixed object, then it must have boundaries, or lines of demarcation, thatdistinguish it from other entities. And it is the sharable nature of the content of intentional objects

that makes objectivity in interpretation possible.39 Textual meaning is thus a matter of discerning what

an author purports to communicate through his text. To the extent that texts communicate the contentof a specific intentional object, they can be said to communicate meaning.

Thesignificance of a text, however, is a matter of determining the import of a text in relation to a

separate object: significance always implies a relationship, and one constant, unchanging pole of that

relationship is what the text means.40Meaning is fixed and unchanging, while significance isnecessarily changing.

Hirsch has adjusted his position in response to critics in an important way since his initial contribution

to the world of hermeneutical theory. He now recognizes that textual meaning involves a degree of

provisionality. Specifically, Hirsch expands it to include exemplary future contents.41This means thathe now recognizes (with a sideways glance at Gadamer) that certain present applications of a text may

belong to its meaning rather than to its significance.42 He feels that this is not incompatible with his

basic dedication to grounding meaning in the original intention-concept communicated in and througha text by its author. Indeed, he remains staunchly convinced that his fundamental position remains

essentially unchanged, namely that a distinction between meaning and significance must be maintained.

Hirschs work represents an important perspective in author-based literary theory. Hirschs new

position suggests that it is possible to ground textual meaning in the authors original intention conceptwithout limitingit to the authorsparticularintention concept. Indeed, one may even go so far as to

suggest that the process of discovering textual meaning is not complete until some degree of

application has taken place, whether or not such application is done with the explicit knowledge of theauthor.43

When we examine these two perspectives together, an undeniable degree of tension suddenly surfaces.

Those in the text-focused camp (i.e. Ricoeur) claim that Hirschs account of interpretation

fundamentally overreaches itself. Likewise, those in the author-focused camp (i.e. Hirsch) suggest thatRicoeur, in so completely cutting off the author from his or her text, is sawing through the limb he sits

upon.

At this point we must suggest that any attempt to reconcile these two perspectives at the level of

general textual meaning will inevitably founder, because texts in general are uniformly characterizedby some degree of discord between the spirit of the author and the word of the author. Even though

human beings are linguistic creatures, none of us employ the tools of language with complete mastery.

Authors may fail to communicate what they intend, may communicate more than they intend (or would


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like to intend), or may even communicate something entirely different from what they intend. As

Hirsch memorably quips, if the author has bungled so badly that his utterance will be misconstrued,

then it serves him right when people misunderstand him.44Even extremely gifted authors cannot

completely guarantee that their texts communicate what they intend. Only a Being who exists outsidelanguage, indeed, who can sufficientlygroundit and underwrite its use, can wield it perfectly.

We must therefore allow our discussion of textual meaning to be informed by a consideration of theunique nature of Holy Scripture. As the product of divine communicative action, scripture is a

singularly unique text, if only because it alone evinces a complete solidarity between the Word and

Spirit of its Author. Any account of general textual meaning that is not adequately coordinated with the

doctrine of inspiration will thus be incapable of reconciling authorial intent with the surplus of

meaning.

This is why Jowetts otherwise helpful clarion call to read scripture in the same manner as one would

read any other text nonetheless puts the cart before the horse.45One cannot eschew the doctrine of

inspiration in accounts of interpretation theory, whether with regard to scripture or any other text.

Indeed, if scripture can in any sense be read as one would read other texts, that is, as a source of someform of determinate meaning, it is because of its inspired character. For all their similarities (and we

can certainly thank Jowett for pointing them out), scripture is nonetheless fundamentally different from

other texts, for its authorship is the result of a divine/human dual-agency.

This fundamental difference between scripture and other texts is the impetus behind Mark Bowaldsrecent enquiry into this aspect of the inspiration of scripture.46 The implications of his study are far-

reaching, and highly relevant to our current investigation into the relationship between scriptural

sufficiency and the textual meaning of scripture. The dual-authorship of scripture reminds us that thespeaker (God) is an authorial agent who is presently speaking in, with and under the reading. Again,

not only is the reading of Scripture unique because the speaking agent (God) is active and present, but

also because it is Godwho is present. To the degree that God is different in nature and action fromhumans[,] Gods speech action will transcend attempts at building or drawing from human

analogies.47

Development within the doctrine of the inspiration of scripture has traditionally taken place in terms of

the interrelationship between the Word and the Spirit in the text of scripture, and this is certainlyhelpful for our current discussion on interpretation theory. Briefly stated, the doctrine of the inspiration

of scripture is an attempt to answer the question, In what manner, if at all, do the Word and Spirit of

God interact such that we can we refer to the text of scripture as Gods self-revelation? The inspirationof scripture, after all, is best understood as a direct implication of the doctrine of revelation. As such,

our attempt to provide shape to the doctrine of scriptural sufficiency will depend in large part on our

ability to highlight the differences between a text like scripture that claims to be the self-revealing word

of God, and other texts.

In order to prevent our discussion from getting mired down in tired debates regarding the inevitable

differences that arise between various accounts of the particular mechanism behind the inspiration of

scripture, we will focus on specific implications of the dual-agency of scripture that most positionsagree on. Furthermore, in the spirit of dogmatic theology, these implications will be presented as

individual theses that can only be fully understood within the context of the intellectual and spiritual

resources of the Christian tradition itself.48


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The revelation of the Word of God in Holy Scripture is a divine word from God in creaturely form . Its

divine associations notwithstanding, Holy Scripture partakes of the nature of the creature. It is a finite

text composed in human language through the agency, at least in part, of human authors. Herman

Bavincks discussion on this subject is worth quoting here at length:

The Word has become flesh, and the word has become Scripture; these two facts do not

only run parallel but are most intimately connected. Christ became flesh, a servant, withoutform or comeliness, the most despised of human beings So also the word, the revelation of

God, entered the world of creatureliness, the life and history of humanity, in all the humanforms of dream and vision, of investigation and reflection, right down into that which is

humanly weak and despised and ignoble. The word became Scripture and as Scripture subjected

itself to the fate of all Scripture.49

This means that there are fundamental similarities between the incarnation of the Word of God in

Christ and the inscripturation of the words of God in the Bible. Perhaps most significantly, both events

took place under the direct intervention of the Holy Spirit. In the incarnation, the Holy Spirit conveyed

the complete divine essence of the second Person of the trinity to the physical body of Mary in such amanner that the pre-existing personhood of Christ came to be embodied within her in the form of a new

human body. In a similar fashion, the Holy Spirit was actively involved in conveying the Word of God

to the human authors of scripture such that a divine work was birthed into existence that testified todivinity while simultaneously partaking of a creaturely nature.

Furthermore, the revelation of the Word of God is ultimately realized in Christ, and only derivatively inHoly Scripture. This does not mean that the Word of God does not address us in and through the text of

scripture. God is, however, revealed in scripture in a qualitatively different manner than he is revealedthrough the earthly life of Jesus Christ. In the words of von Balthasar,

The word of revelation is primarily the son, who speaks of the father through the Holy Spirit.

The word of scripture is primarily the work of the Holy Spirit who as Spirit of the father effects,

accompanies, illumines and clarifies the sons incarnation and who as Spirit of the son,embodies his self-manifestation in permanent, timeless forms.50

Imbalance reigns when we approach scripture as though it somehow gives us unmediated access to

God. All knowledge of God is, in one manner or another, textually mediated, and hence involves a

measure of interpretation.51As an infinite being, God is above and beyond our ability to comprehendhim, given the inevitability of our dependence upon the limitations of human language.

At the same time, however, the revelation of the Word of God in scripture can nonetheless beexperienced in ways that yield personal knowledge of the triune God. The inspiration of scripture is justas much a description of its capacity to be experiencedas a word from God as it is a description of its

spiritual properties. In the words of Karl Barth,

If we have really listened to the biblical words in all their humanity, if we have accepted them

as witness, we have obviously not only heard of the lordship of the triune God, but by thismeans it has become for us an actual presence and event52

whatever is said to us by men always demands of us what Gods revelation in the human

word of Holy Scripture but that alone can actually achieve in relation to us. Gods revelation

in the human word of Holy Scripture not only wants but can make itself said and heard. It can


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become for us real subject-matter, and it can force us to treat it objectively. And as it does so,

the human word in which it is told to us is heard openly and understood without being

mastered53

The reason we can actually experience personal knowledge of God through the human text of scriptureis that it is God himselfwhose Word we find in Holy Scripture. When believing interpreters engage

with the text of scripture, Gods actual presence becomes manifest in such a manner that the event ofunderstanding occurs in a fundamentallypersonaldimension. The understanding that results is

genuinely true, yet incomplete at the same time.

At this point in our discussion, it would be helpful to summarize briefly the preceding steps of our

investigation. First we examined the nature of textual meaning in general by surveying the discipline of

philosophical hermeneutics. We paid particular attention to the work of Paul Ricoeur and E.D. Hirschbecause they both have contributed in significant ways to biblical interpretation. We saw that the object

of interpretation is not limited to the text itself, but involves a consideration of the world projected by a

text before the reader. Furthermore, we also highlighted the capacity of authorial intent to give a

particular shape, through textual means, to the world projected before the reader.

We then examined the doctrine of the inspiration of scripture in order to determine the extent to which

it was implicated in an account of the textual meaning of scripture. Specifically, we highlighted the

divinely inspired character of scripture because it accounts for the most significant difference between

scripture and other texts. We saw that the inspiration of scripture is one way of describing thesingularly unique capacity of Holy Scripture to be the material means by which the Spirit ministers the

spiritual significance of the gospel story to those who encounter it in the text of scripture. Put

differently, what is ultimately significant about the text of scripture is not simply its unique status asdivinely inspired, but the unique manner in which the Spirit uses the divinely inspired text of

scripture in the life of the Church, both corporately as a whole, and individually as interpreters of the

Word.

If our discussion up until this point could thus be characterized by one theme, it would be the capacityof the text of scripture to communicate objectifiable meaning. This is important, because if encounters

with the text of scripture involve meaning that is objectifiable, then it is discoverable, as well. But

meaning is never merely discoveredas an entity purely external to the interpreting subject. In beingdiscovered, meaning is also experiencedas interpreters interact in a dialogue with the text, even if at a

merely superficial level. The remainder of our discussion will therefore involve an examination of two

essential perspectives that inform our understanding of how we experience the textual meaning ofscripture: the role of the Holy Spirit, and the human imagination.

These two perspectives are not unrelated to our previous discussion of the inspiration of scripture. We

saw in our previous discussion that the inspired nature of scripture is fundamentally a function of the

relationship between the activity of the Word and Spirit in a certain process. We saw that this processinvolved the use of human agents to produce a text that mediates Gods saving presence to mankind by

means of telling the gospel story. But the inspiration of scripture is not merely a past occurrence that

has no corresponding present-day reality. The Word of God is not a dead letter, but is living andactive (Heb. ???). The Spirit that bore the human writers of scripture along is the same Spirit who

attends to the words of scripture whenever they are read. He is the Spirit of Christ, and he resides

within all who approach the inscripturated Word of God in faith, expecting a personal encounter with

the living Word who is revealed within it.


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A doctrine of inspiration that is not adequately coordinated with the ongoing activity of both the Holy

Spirit and the human imagination will yield a paltry account of textual meaning. This is because textual

meaning is not merely a matter of discerning the brute facts communicated through the words and

sentences of scripture. Textual meaning is more than mere words and sentences, because the activity ofinterpretation involves more than an interpreter and a text. It is an inter-subjective activity that involves

two subjects (one of whom is divine) who inhabit a common world: the world of the text. In order to

understand more fully the Spirits role in experiencing textual meaning, we must now introduce thediscipline of speech-act theory.

The modern discipline of speech-act philosophy is an intellectual descendent of Wittgensteins ordinary

language philosophy. John Austin, a student of Wittgenstein, built on the work of his teacher and

developed an early form of what is now known as speech-act theory. The title of Austins primary workon the subject,How to Do Things with Words, is an apt description of the primary insight of speech-act

theory.54The essence of communication is the ability to do things with words. With words we make

statements, demands, requests, declarations, promises, and apologies. With words we extendforgiveness, we offer empathy, etc.

Speech-act philosophers after Austin have refined and expanded upon many of his initial insights. John

Searle, for example, describes three specific forms of speech-acts: the locution, illocution, and

perlocution. A locution is the actual propositional content in a statement. An illocution is what thespeaker does in speaking an utterance. Aperlocution is what the speaker actually accomplishes by or

through the utterance itself.55

For example, consider the statement, This man and woman are husband and wife. The propositional

content is a subject (man and woman) linked to a predicate (husband and wife). The speaker is animplied narrator. The action of the statement is that of an assertive. The speaker is asserting a fact in

uttering the statement. With regard to the perlocutionary aspect of the statement, it is unclear exactly

what the statement could be intending to accomplish, beyond simply asserting this particular truth. Insome contexts it could be to clarify an otherwise ambiguous situation: This man and this woman are

husband and wife. It could be to convince someone who is in doubt: This man and woman are

husband and wife.

Now consider the statement, I now pronounce you husband and wife. The propositional content isidentical to the previous statement, although both man and woman are now represented by the

pronoun you, and the speaker is now explicit (I). But the illocutionary stance of the statement is

entirely different. In fact, when uttered in a proper context (by an ordained minister in a church, or by ajustice of the peace), this declarative statement actually creates a new reality. Likewise the words,

You will be my wife, can legitimately be perceived as either a prediction or a demand (You willbe

my wife!).

It is now a relatively straightforward matter to recognize the relevance of the insights of speech-acttheory to scripture. After all, the Church has historically understood scripture to represent the very

words of God. It is His word to His people. At the same time, Christ Himself is the Word incarnate, and

the written Word bears witness to Him. But if Holy Scripture is a word from God, then one can interactwith it at either the locutionary, illocutionary, or perlocutionary level. It must involvepropositional

content, it must purport to do something with its propositional content, and God must have some

intended effect in mind that He will accomplish as a result of the word-act of scripture.56


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When we extend this discussion from the doctrine of scripture in general into the context of the

sufficiency of scripture in particular, it becomes immediately evident that this doctrine requires a great

deal of nuance in order to be a maximally accurate description of the nature and function of scripture.

At the most basic level, we are confronted with the question, For what, exactly, is scripturesufficient? In other words, if scripture is the Wordof God, and if God does something by

communicating this Word, then one way of framing the question is to ask in what manner God is

successful in accomplishing that which he seeks in the communication of his Word.

But the issues are even more complex. Speech-act theory reminds us that texts are characterized byboth illocutions andperlocutions. In other words, it is one thing to claim that the locutions of scripture

sufficiently communicate the Word of God, but it is an entirely different thing to claim that it does so

without recourse to any other manner of divine activity. As we saw in our examination of Word/Spirittheology, the ongoing work of the Holy Spirit is intimately related to the capacity of scripture to reveal

God and the gospel to those who encounter the text of scripture. Materially speaking, Holy Scripture is

the Word of God. But even more importantly, through the Spirit, scripture becomes apersonalWordfrom God to those who encounter him in it. The Word of God as believers experience it in the biblical

textis ultimately the Spirit of God in Christ that addresses us in and through Holy Scripture. This

occurs when readers approach scripture in faith expecting an encounter with the living God. Withoutfaith, readers merely encounter scripture as a dead letter.

The discipline of speech-act theory also gives us our first glimpse of the dangers of viewing scripture

as though it wereself-sufficient. If all scripture is truly God-breathed, then it is impossiblefully to

encounter the text of scripture without also encountering the breath of God the Holy Spirit speakingin and through the text. The goal of gospel knowledge is therefore to be aware of, and thus to

experience, our knowledge of the truth-speaking Spirit as a Person, and not merely as a proposition.

Indeed, herein lies a very real tragedy: many who encounter the divine locutions in the text of scripture

fail to hearthe Spirit address them in its pages. They do not grasp, nor are they grasped by theillocutionary force of what is revealed there.

One attempt to describe the Spirits manner of addressing interpreters through the text of scripture has

been made by Stanley Grenz and John Franke. In a creative appropriation of both speech-act theory andthe interpretation theory of Paul Ricoeur, Grenz and Franke suggest that the Spirit performs the

illocutionary act of appropriating the biblical text as the instrumental means by which he speaks to

believers.57 Furthermore, they also suggest that the particular means by which the Spirit performs the

illocutionary action of addressing interpreters is through the world-creating function of the text.58

While there is much that is praiseworthy in Grenz and Frankes proposal, there are nevertheless several

problems with it. The most fundamental of these problems is the manner in which Grenz and Franke

misconstrue the illocutionary action of the text. In their concern to uphold a particular notion of the

freedom of the Holy Spirit, their decision to locate the illocutionary activity of the Spirit within theworld projected by the text actually restricts the Holy Spirit. Furthermore, as Vanhoozer points out,

Grenz and Franke tend to construe the activity of the Holy Spirit in terms of brute force, rather than

strategic action.59It is helpful to remember that the Spirit is not restricted by nature from speakingthrough a world in front of scripture. It does seem reasonable to suggest, after all, that he can act

under self-imposed restrictions. Furthermore, if the Spirit solely speaks to reveal Christ, and what we

have in scripture is textually-mediated knowledge of the Word of God, then there seems to be little, ifany, grounds for insisting that the Spirit himself speaks beyond the text of scripture.


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Grenz and Franke are no doubt attempting to redress an unfortunate accommodation of theology to the

vision of modernism. Bernard Ramm recognized one form of this accommo-dation when he suggested

that fundamentalism had an over-inflated scripture principle: fundamentalism in fiercely defending the

Scripture lost the perspective of the instrumental character of Scripture, and gave Scripture anindependent life of its own.60 Ramm suggests that fundamentalists wielded scripture in what amounts

to a sacramental manner, ex opere operato, as it were. Of special interest to us, however, are the words

of Abraham Kuyper that Ramm quotes in the course of his discussion: Not, of course, as though thatBible by itself were sufficient to give to every one who reads it, the true knowledge of God. We

positively reject such a mechanical explanation61

In order to bring our brief exploration of speech-act theory to a close, it would be helpful to recast the

discussion up until this point in terms of the historical development of the doctrine of the sufficiency ofscripture. Specifically, perhaps we can now say that the modernist tendency to bifurcate the contentof

scripture from itsfunction opened the door for a correspond-ing neglect of the role of the Holy Spirit in

the interpretation and application of Holy Scripture.62 Specifically, the Holy Spirit speaks throughscripture by ministering its divinely intended meaning to the hearts of believers in spiritually significant

ways. The Holy Spirit, who is the Spirit of Christ, is also the Minister of Meaning who mediates to

fallen humanity a personal encounter with the Word of God through fulfilling the perlocutionary actionof the text. If the sufficiency of scripture is a matter of the communicated contentof scripture, then it

must also be a matter of the capacity of this content to be the means by which the Holy Spirit

authoritatively directs a spiritually significance experience of it.

In our examination of speech-act theory, we saw one means of resolving the tension created by asurplus of meaning. The Holy Spirit himself, speaking through the Word of God, authenticates the

divinely intended meaning of scripture. He sovereignly bestows His Presence to interpreters who seek

to rightly experience the text. But this is only one side of the resolution. The other side of the resolution

involves the human means by which this is accomplished. Although the Spirit enjoys sovereignfreedom to minister the pluriform meaning of scripture to whomever he wills, whenever he wills, it is

nonetheless true that he does so in and through the human imagination. As we begin our examination of

the activity of the imagination, therefore, we are setting our sights upon the capstone, so to speak, ofour current discussion of the doctrine of the sufficiency of scripture.

Our discussion of the imagination will begin with a brief examination of some relevant psychological

concepts and their related terminology. The discipline of cognitive psychology, although relatively

young, has produced a respectable body of research on the structure and processes of human thought.The currency of this discussion will aid us in our examination and appropriation of the more

philosophical theories of the imagination.

The first psychological concept that we need to examine is memory. Psychologists routinely divide

memory into two types: short-term, or working, memory, and long-term memory, which isparticularly relevant to our discussion. According to Westen, long-term memory comes in many types

and is accessed in a variety of ways. When most people refer to memory, they are thinking about

factual knowledge they possess, or declarative memory. Procedural memory, however, orknowledge of skills, is equally important. Furthermore, emotional memory is also significant for our

current discussion: when people recall events in their lives, they typically recall, and in some cases

reexperience, many of the emotions they felt at the time.63 In an important study, Reisberg and Heuerdetermine that our most vivid memories are typically emotional memories.64


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The second concept from cognitive psychology is the schema. According to Westen, schemas are

patters of thought, or organized knowledge structures, that render the environment relatively

predicable.65 The difference between schemas and memories is subtle because the phenomena they

attempt to describe are related. The concept of memory simply describes the fact that our brainsrecord information regardless of its form (e.g., abstract propositional information, procedural

knowledge, actual experiences, etc), while the concept of schema is a structural description of how

the information contained in our memories is actually organized and stored within our minds. Forexample, many people whose fathers have died can recall positive memories of them while they were

still living. If ones overall experience of his or her father was not characterized by positive

interactions, however, then there is a high likelihood that the persons father schema will reflect this,no matter how many positive father-figures one subsequently encounters.

The third concept is the unconscious. Although the concept certainly did not originate with Freud, he

deserves the credit for making the unconscious the object of sustained examination and observation.66

For the purposes of our discussion, we will briefly explore the significance of the unconscious withregard to both schemas and memories. Specifically, from our study of Freud, we learn that some forms

of maladaptive behavior are driven by unconscious thoughts and memories. These thoughts and

memories have been repressed by our unconscious mind in an attempt to maintain an adequate degreeof functioning in the real world. Freud subsequently identifies the impetus behind this phenomenon

with the sexual drive, a move that is both unwarranted and unnecessary, but the basic insight still

stands. Many people can identify with the experience of suddenly remembering a memory they thought

(or wished) they had forgotten. When these memories are tied to a particular emotional schema, thesubject will often feel as though he or she is re-experiencing the event or circumstance.

Consider the experience of a young, married man in his early thirties who catches a whiff of perfume

that reminds him of a girl whom he had feelings for in his sophomore year of high school. Let us

assume for the sake of discussion that, in high school, the man was an extremely shy, timid person whoeasily became anxious. Even if the young man has now been happily married for 10 years, it is highly

likely that smelling the perfume will remind him (whether consciously or unconsciously) of his

experience in high school, and will hence trigger all the major emotional schemas attached to thatexperience. They may be tempered due to the passing of time, but they are present nonetheless.

The benefit of this brief foray into cognitive psychology is methodological in nature. In our study of

how an understanding of the imagination should influence our doctrine of the sufficiency of scripture,

we are explicitly concerned with both the mechanics of by which we experience the knowledge that isrepresented in our minds, and the qualitative nature of the knowledge itself. Meaning is a matter of

inter-schematic relationships, and our understanding of the imagination will be advanced to the extent

that we are able to describe its activity at the most basic level, the level of memory, schemas, and theunconscious.

As a topic of philosophical interest, one can find discussions on the imagination all the way back to

Plato and Aristotle. [Discuss their contribution; follow-up with a reference to the climax of this

tradition in Aquinas]

Following its development in the work of Aquinas, there has been in recent years a renewal of interest

in the activity of the imagination, and, in particular, the religious imagination. The work of Samuel

Taylor Coleridge in this area has been especially programmatic in modern discussion on the

imagination through the introduction of a more useful taxonomy. Specifically, Coleridge suggested thatthe imagination be distinguished from what he calls fancy. The impulse behind this move was to


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influence. All understanding is historical understanding, and thus subject to the biases and slants of

tradition. Even at the individual level, schematic structures within our minds produce and maintain

these biases and slants, often without our conscious knowledge of them. These mental representations

of knowledge and affect are both informed and formed in large part by the ongoing activity of theimagination as it construes reality according to the paradigm that is most ready-at-hand. The result of

this historicality is that every imagination exhibits a, for lack of a better term, earthy quality that is

directly derived not only from the activities and events that characterize everyday life, but also from thecollected memories that shape human consciousness and identity at both individual and societal levels.

These two characteristics of the imagination, both its fallenness and its earthiness, are signposts that

point the way to a richer and deeply human understanding of the manner in which the activity of

interpretation actually unfolds. This is crucially important, as far as human interpretation goes. ButChristian interpretation of Holy Scripture has a larger, more grandiose aim. At this point, we must

advance our argument by linking our discussion about the imagination to the previous discussion on the

activity of the Holy Spirit. Patrick Sherry, among others, states this next step quite clearly: the HolySpirit may work through the imagination, as he may work through other mental powers85The

mental faculty of the imagination can be the means by which the Holy Spirit shapes and reshapes the

structures of our minds so that they more accurately represent reality as perceived through theparadigm of holy scripture.

As we stated at the outset of our discussion on the imagination, God typically employs means as he

ministers the meaning of the gospel to human hearts. In the context of the interpretation and application

of scripture, these means invariably involve the human imagination. It is true that the Holy Spirit isultimately the author of all meaning, but this does not imply that the human interpreter is entirely

uninvolved in the process. A disciplined imagination will not content itself with playing a passive role

in the activity of interpretation. It will insist on creatively construing and appropriating the meaning of

the gospel found in scripture in ways that are uniquely significant to its own context, without strayingfrom the scriptural paradigm.

This account avoids the two-fold error of Grenz and Franke of, first, misconstruing the intratrinitarian

nature of the Holy Spirits illocutionary activity, and secondly, failing to designate appropriately theactivity of the imagination in both creating and perceiving the world in front of the text. More

specifically, the human imagination is co-creator with the Holy Spirit of the world in front of the text.

In other words, the imagination doesnt merely perceive the world in front of the text, but actively

construes it according to the reigning paradigm in the mind of the interpreter. Yet, in perceiving theworld in front of the text, the Spirit-led imagination also simultaneously creates it. This creative

activity is not completely autonomous, however, but is instead reliant upon the coordinating activity of

the Holy Spirit speaking in and through the text.

A number of factors are thus in play during the activity of interpretation. From the standpoint of thetext of scripture, both constraints and liberties are paradoxically placed before believing readers who

approach the text in faith. The concursive intent of the divine and human authors of scripture forms a

boundary, so to speak, around the meaning of the text that must not be violated according to merewhim or fancy. Unfortunately, at least from the vantage point of the modern reader, the boundaries are

not always clearly defined. Furthermore, as we saw in our survey of Gadamer, the task of interpretation

is not merely one of simple observation of a transparent text. Texts come to us part and parcel withtheir own tradition, as do interpreters.


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But interpreters are not left entirely to their own devices in their quest to discover and experience the

meaning of scripture. The tradition of the Churchs reception and reading of scripture is a long, Spirited

story that has yet to come to an end. Present-day interpreters of scripture are indeed both the products

and beneficiaries of this tradition. When faithful readers encounter scripture today, they do soexpecting to hear from the Spirit of the Word as he faithfully represents (re-presents) the gospel story

in creative ways that are contextually meaningful. Understanding occurs most fully and completely

when readers are able to use their imagination to gain a glimpse of divine reality through the paradigmof scripture. Indeed, the imagination provides the human mind with the cognitive structures necessary

to make our experiential knowledge of divine reality spiritually meaningful.

When we relate the doctrine of the sufficiency of scripture to our conclusions regarding the activity of

the imagination in the process of interpretation, it becomes immediately apparent that great nuance isrequired. If textual meaning is not only discovered, but also created in a life-altering encounter with the

Spirit speaking in and through the text, in what realm does scriptural sufficiency reign? Perhaps the

best way to answer this question is to revisit our earlier commitment to ground scriptural sufficiencyfirst and foremost in the doctrine of revelation. This allows us to distinguish between the ontological

sufficiency of scripture and the functional sufficiency of scripture. Simply put, the ontological

sufficiency of scripture suggests that scripture is, in its essence, the only source of textually mediateddivine revelation. There is nothing Christians are required to believe regarding God and the gospel that

is not communicated in some manner in scripture.

By contrast, a functional definition of the sufficiency of scripture suggests that it is the only final

authority by which interpreters can judge the degree of world-to-reality fit between the worldinhabited by the interpreter that is perceived in front of a text, and reality as God already knows it. This

secondary doctrine of the sufficiency of scripture is derived from the ontological doctrine of the

sufficiency of scripture, but is completely necessary in its own right if we are to avoid imbalance in our

understanding of scriptural sufficiency. Without it, we demonstrate an inadequate understanding of thenature of textual meaning, an understanding that, ironically, is more modernist than biblical.

Indeed, a doctrine of the sufficiency of scripture that is not coordinated with a balanced account of

textual meaning both as objectifiable, and hence discoverable, as well as dialogical, and henceengaging will focus too greatly on the content of scripture, which invites a corresponding neglect of

the pluriform manner in which the interpreterexperiences the textual meaning of scripture. It is

hermeneutically simplistic to suggest that scripture provides us with all we need to know in order to

experience the truths of the gospel in spiritually significant ways. Spiritual theology produced by thishermeneutical approach will result in fundamentalist kitsch, not faithful kerygma.86

One benefit of distinguishing between the ontological and functional doctrines of scriptural sufficiency

is that it gives readers the space to incorporate extrabiblical perspectives of knowledge into their

experience of the scriptural text. Francis Watson ably argues this thesis in Text, Church and World, atthe conclusion of his chapter on theological hermeneutics:

The sphere of creation-redemption encompasses the whole world, and the indwelling creator

Spirit may also act as the redeemer Spirit, redemptively present in all goodness, justice andtruth. To permit disclosures of goodness, justice and truth originating outside the community to

impinge upon the interpretation of the sacred texts is not to contaminate them.87

The best way to avoid what Watson calls ecclesiological docetism in our treatment of the text is to

not navely avoid the inevitable influence of extrabiblical traditions on our interpretation of scripture.


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Indeed, the secondary doctrine of scriptural sufficiency is of particular relevance here. Given the fact

that extrabiblical traditions inevitably flavor our interactions with scripture, one must possess adequate

theological tools to distinguish the traditions which produce a more savory experience of the spiritual

truths in scripture, from those that yield an experience that is tasteless, and hence worthless.

In retrospect, our discussion of the sufficiency of scripture has attempted to achieve an enormous goal:

to provide a viable account of textual meaning that leaves adequate room for both an ontological andfunctional understanding of the sufficiency of scripture. Along the way, we also explored how this

understanding of the sufficiency of scripture relates to the manner in which believing interpretersactually experience the spiritual truths communicated in scripture, and this particular insight is where

our discussion will end. After all, doctrines themselves are not mere descriptions of spiritual realities;

they are also invitations to experience the significance of the spiritual realities they describe.

If this is the case, however, then the doctrine of the sufficiency of scripture ought to be framed in a

manner that reflects this invitation. Obviously, some doctrines have more significant experiential

components than others; the doctrine of the sufficiency of scripture, for example, has a relatively

significant experiential component. Believing interpreters who engage in an intentional dialogue withthe text of scripture are able to experience it, in varying degrees, as sufficientfor their life

circumstances. Although there are several variables that influence the degree to which an interpreter

will be able to experience the sufficiency of scripture, we will focus on the two that are most relevant toour current discussion: the reservoir of traditions one is able to draw upon while dialoging with the text

of scripture, and ones imaginative capacity.

As we noted above in our discussion on Watsons suggestion regarding extrabiblical traditions, our

actual experience of the spiritual truths of scripture can be enriched by the traditions that we eitherinhabit ourselves, or are at least conversant with. This does not imply, however, that the truths of

scripture are somehow incomplete in themselves, but merely that truth in general is most validated

when it is experienced in the greatest fullness possible. A corollary to this insight would suggest thatinterpreters of scripture will also experience its sufficiency to the degree that they are able to partake of

a wide variety of traditions through which to engage and dialogue with the truths of scripture.

At the same time, as we discovered in our discussion on the imagination, experiencing the significance

of the truths of scripture is more than a matter of becoming conversant in a variety of traditions. If thisis the case, however, then ones experience of the sufficiency of scripture is also related to ones

capacity to use the imagination to actively construe the spiritual truths of scripture through the

paradigms and traditions most significant and relevant to life experience. Paradigms and traditions areuseless without the ability to see reality through them on demand, as it were.

Interpreters with a relatively passive imagination, therefore, will have a less rich experience of the

sufficiency of scripture. Their experience of spiritual truths as they encounter them in scripture will be

impoverished to the extent that they are unable to relate them to the circumstances of their own lives.Furthermore, interpreters who inhabit or are conversant with few traditions possess fewer conceptual

tools at their disposal with which to extend the meaning of scripture into the vast variety of life

experiences that confront them every day. Obviously the Holy Spirit can, and does, help us in ourweakness as he overcomes our human limitations and makes himself understood in the text. But this

certainly gives interpreters little license to be lazy.

The picture of the sufficiency of scripture that has emerged from this discussion so far is of a doctrine

that not only calls us to affirm and obey it, but that also invites us to experience it in increasingly


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13To his credit, Schleiermacher did not intend for this Romanticist goal to eclipse the role of the

various critical methodologies necessary for its attainment. See Thiselton, The Two Horizons: NewTestament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980), 103-7, for a

balanced critique of Schleiermacher.

14Kevin Vanhoozer,Is There a Meaning in This Text?, 220.

15Thiselton suggests that although Heidegger no doubt was heavily influenced by Husserl, it seems

more likely that he developed the system into something so different that he could hardly be classified

in the same category as Husserl (The Two Horizons, 144-6).

16Richard E. Palmer,Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory In Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger,

and Gadamer(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 125.

17Palmer, 131.

18Ibid., 132.

19The Two Horizons, 303.

20Truth and Method(New York: Continuum, 1975), 217.

21Daniel Treier,Introducing Theological Interpretation of Scripture: Recovering a Christian Practice

(Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008), 131.

22Ibid.

23The Two Horizons, 307.

24Paul Ricoeur,Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action, and

Interpretation, ed. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 131.

25Dan Stiver, Theology After Ricoeur: New Directions in Hermeneutical Theology (Louisville:

Westminster John Knox, 2001), 89.

26Ricoeur,Hermeneutics, 136.

27Ibid., 138.

28Ibid.

29Ibid., 139.

30Ibid.

31Ibid., 141.

32Ibid. (emphasis his)


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33Ibid., 142 (emphasis his).

34Ibid., 143 (emphasis his).

35Ibid., 144.

36Ricoeur,Hermeneutics, 161.

37Paul Ricoeur, Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Revelation,Harvard Theological Review, vol.

70, Jan-Apr 77, #1-2, 26.

38Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1967), 219.

39Vanhoozer,Is There a Meaning In This Text: The Bible, The Reader, and the Morality of Literary

Knowledge (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998), 112.

40Hirsch, Validity, 8. Since those who distinguish between meaning and significance typically have

intendedmeaning in mind when they speak of meaning, our current discussion will also employKevin Vanhoozers more helpful taxonomy of intended meaning and extended meaning (Is There a

Meaning, 262).

41Hirsch, 1984, 216.

42E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Meaning and Significance Reinterpreted, Critical Inquiry, 11, 1984, 210.

43Cf. John Frame, The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God(Phillipsburg, N. J.: Presbyterian andReformed Pub. Co., 1987),

44Hirsch, Validity, 233-4.

45Benjamin Jowett, On the Interpretation of Scripture, in The Interpretation of Scripture and OtherEssays (London: George Routledge & Sons, n.d.).

46Mark Alan Bowald,Rendering the Word in Theological Hermeneutics: Mapping Divine and Human

Agency (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007).

47Ibid.

48Cf. the perspective of Herman Bavinck: [The inspiration of Scripture] is not an explanation of

Scripture, nor actually a theory, but it is and ought to be a believing confession what Scripturewitnesses concerning itself, despite the appearance that is against it. Inspiration is a dogma, like the

dogma of the Trinity, the incarnation, etc., which Christians accept, not because they understand the

truth of it, but because God so attests it. (Bavinck, 436)

49Herman Bavinck,Reformed Dogmatics: Vol 1, Prolegomena, John Vriend, tr. (Grand Rapids: Baker,2003), 434.


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50Hans Urs von Balthasar, Word and Revelation: Essays in Theology I(New York: Herder and Herder,

1964), 10.

51Cf. Francis Watson (find citation)

52Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. 1, Pt. 2 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1980), 463.

53Ibid., 471-2.

54J. L. Austin,How to Do Things with Word(Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1975).

55 See John Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

56Reference Vanhoozer inAlways Reforming.

57Stanley J. Grenz and John R. Franke,Beyond Foundationalism: Shaping Theology in a PostmodernContext(Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 74-5.

58Find reference inBeyond Foundationalism.

59Always Reforming ??? As Vanhoozer points out, obtaining the proper nuance in this discussion isa matter of properly parsing the relevant prepositions in and through.

60The Witness of the Spirit(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1959), 125.

61Abraham Kuyper,Principles of Sacred Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1954), 360.

62Cf. Bernard Ramms account of fundamentalism and the testimonium of the Holy Spirit.

63Westen, 270.

64Emotions Multiple Effects on Memory, in Brain and Memory: Modulation and Mediation of

Neuroplasticity, Eds. J. L. McGaugh, N. Weinberger, G. Lynch (New York: Oxford University Press,

1995), 84-92

65Westen, 280.

66Although it should be obvious, I should perhaps mention that appreciation for Freuds basic insights

into the activity of the unconscious does not implicate one in his conclusions regarding the basis of all

neuroses in some manner of deviated sexuality.

67Bibliographia Literaria (???), ???.

68Drama, 281.

69Coleridge, ???.

70Drama, 281.


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71Gregory A. Boyd, See Is Believing: Experiencing Jesus through Imaginative Prayer (Grand

Rapids: Baker, 2004), 72 (emphasis his). Again, it should be obvious that appreciation for Boyds work

in the area of the imagination does not involve a corresponding appreciation, whether tacit or explicit,

for his work on open theism.

72For a helpful, although brief, summary of these recent developments, see David J. Bryant,Faith and

the Play of Imagination: On the Role of Imagination in Religion (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press,1989), 1-5.; and Patrick Sherry, Spirit and Beauty: An Introduction to Theological Aesthetics, 2nd ed.

(London: SCM Press, 2002), 109-14. According to Sherry, Coleridges distinction betweenimagination and fancy has played a particularly large role in the development of the concept of the

imagination. (113)

73Garrett Green,Imagining God: Theology and the Religious Imagination (San Francisco: Harper &Row, 1987), 85.

74Maybe quote Yong here instead of later: The imagination bridges the gap between the self and

other.

75Green,Imagining God, 83-4, italics his. Green elsewhere points out that although this ambiguity

surrounding the knowledge yielded by the imagination results in skepticism from orthodox theologians,it also prevents theology from being co-opted by a liberal natural theology of the imagination. (66-7)

76Green,Imagining God, 67.

77Ibid., 108.

78Ibid., 107.

79Ibid., 123.

80This is John Websters criticism (cf.Holy Scripture: A Dogmatic Sketch, ???, p. ???). Webster alsocriticizes Green for substituting the human imagination in the place of faith. But this unnecessarily

separates the imagination from the influence of faith. The faithful imagination is itself an arm of faith

(cf. Heb. ??? which defines faith in imaginal terms).

81Amos Yong, Spirit-Word-Community: Theological Hermeneutics in Trinitarian Perspective

(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002), 224.


83Paul Ricoeur says that there is a norm-governed productivity to the extent that it may be said to be

guided by a productive imagination at work in the text itself. (Figuring the Sacred: Religion,

Narrative, and Imagination [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995], 145.


85Patrick Sherry, Spirit and Beauty: An Introduction to Theological Aesthetics, 2nd ed. (London: SCM

Press, 2002), 111.


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86Cf. the fundamentalist fallacy according to Richard Lints in The Fabric of Theology: ???

87Francis Watson, Text, Church and World: Biblical Interpretation in Theological Perspective

(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994) 240.

Textual Understanding and Scriptural Sufficiency

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