Tenure and housing market analysis Church Street

Tenure and Housing Market Analysis for the Church

Street Ward in the City of Westminster

or

How to close the ‘Rent Gap’ in a Social Housing-‐

dominated central London Area by Stealth

Achim von Malotki 2015

1

The Church Street ward Map 1 depicts the Church Street ward in the City of Westminster as located north of Marylebone Road, to the south of Regent’s Canal, west of the tracks leading to Marylebone Station and east of Edgware Road.

Map 1: The Church Street ward with its housing estates (City of Westminster 2014: 2) Based on the latest population figures the ward has 11,962 residents (City of Westminster 2014: 1). At the time of the Census 2011 it was the most densely populated ward in London with 264.7 people per hectare (UK Data Explorer website). As such, and with its almost complete absence of terraced homes, it may be considered the very antipode of suburbia. The housing in Church Street forms a stark contrast to its affluent adjacent neighbourhoods. Arguably, the built environment corresponds with a massive social divide across what are minuscule spatial distances. Church Street itself, in the centre of

2

the ward, is home to Westminster’s largest street market, lending the area a social and commercial focus. The built environment is dominated by social housing as shown by Figure 1, placing it within the upper decile of all London wards in that category (UK Data Explorer website).

Figure 1: Social housing in Church Street, Westminster and London overall (as

percentage of all tenures), left column Census 2001, right column Census 2011 (ONS Neighbourhood Statistics website)

As Figure 2 demonstrates, socio-‐economically the population of Church Street stands in stark contrast to the City of Westminster as a whole.

57.1

28.9 26.2

55.8

25.9 24.1

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Church Street Westminster London

3

Figure 2: Socio-‐economic status, Census 2011 (omitting full-‐time students) (ONS

Neighbourhood Statistics website) Church Street is one of the most ethnically diverse wards in England, ranked in the top 0.3% according to its Simpson Diversity Index Score (GLA 2011) with a particularly strong presence of Arabs. 62% of Church Street residents are from non-‐white ethnic groups, and 53% were born outside of the UK (City of Westminster 2013). For more on housing tenure, ethnicity, income, etc., see Table 3, p. 17. In terms of multiple deprivation it ranks within the highest category of all London wards (see London.gov.uk website). Due to housing allocation policy there is a strong representation of the disabled and other people with special needs. As Figure 3 shows, life expectancy is approximately ten years lower than for Westminster overall.

4

Figure 3: Life expectancy from birth (City of Westminster 2014: 13) The Church Street ward is about to undergo a programme of urban regeneration called the Futures Plan. It is a housing-‐led programme that aims to create mixed tenure-‐developments which in turn are intended to generate “mixed communities” (City of Westminster 2010: 51) in this area hitherto characterised by a high concentration of social housing. Tenure analysis and house price data To assess the question of housing affordability, the distribution of housing tenures in Church Street was analysed -‐ followed by an examination of how the housing market plays out in the regeneration area with price-‐paid-‐data obtained from the Land Registry. Tenure analysis Of the ward’s 4,719 residential properties (Ward profile 2014), CityWest Homes (CWH) alone managed 3,030 or 64.2% at the end of 2014. These are divided into two ‘villages’ within the ward. CWH kindly provided the tenancy data required for a comparison over

5

time (Village Manager Survey, CWH Central Area Management – and data obtained from CWH again for 2014). The most powerful vehicle for neighbourhood change in the UK since 1980 has been the change of tenures due to the Right to Buy, the sale of council-‐owned homes to sitting tenants (Kearns & Mason 2007: 664). In London, as in many other British cities, the sale of council homes was by far the greatest contributor to the growth of home ownership (Forrest et al 1996: 128). The Coalition government ‘reinvigorated’ the Right to Buy by increasing the discounts on the sale price to tenants to up to 70 percept or £102,700 in London boroughs (see Gov.uk Right to Buy website) to incentivise sales (Harrison et al 2013: 16). In addition to the discount, many Right to Buy owners traditionally put down only a small deposit, leaving them with the largest relative gains of all acquirers of home ownership (Hamnett 1995: 266). The size of the discount matters, as the experiences of 2005/06 showed, when Right to Buy sales plummeted after the discount had been reduced (Wilcox 2008: 5). As demonstrated by Table 1, until 2011, when the Futures Plan was conceived, the properties CWH manages in the ward had been overwhelmingly tenanted, with only 27 percent leaseholders, far lower than the 44 percent in Westminster overall at the time. However, as depicted by the same table, within just three years this has changed. 259 council homes for rent have been lost – more than the Futures Plan will deliver as ‘affordable’ homes. Meanwhile in Westminster overall there has been hardly any shift at all, with the latest figures showing 45.1 percent leaseholders, 54.9 percent tenants (data obtained from CWH). Note also that in the adjacent management ‘villages’ of Marylebone and St John’s Wood there has been almost no change at all of leaseholds whose share was already high in 2011.

6

Table 1: Tenure status of CWH-‐managed properties in the Church Street ward 2014 in comparison with 2011 (in brackets)

*185 homes of HA Genesis managed by CWH, not eligible for Right to Buy. Data of November 2014 compared with November 2011 (Source: 2011: Village Manager survey conducted by author; 2014: CityWest Homes, Central Area Management upon request)

The number of leaseholds particularly in the Church Street ‘village’ within the Church Street ward shot up, increasing its share by almost 10 percentage points – almost closing the gap to the Westminster average. While the large and compactly built Lisson Green estate stayed behind, here also the share of leaseholds rose significantly. In 1988 Forrest & Murie identified Right-‐to-‐Buy-‐sales to be highest in localities where existing proportions of owner occupiers were high and council tenure low (ibid: 145), which had a polarising effect insofar as socio-‐tenurial differences between localities were aggravated by the policy, with large compact housing estates showing much lower take-‐up of this statutory right. This could well explain the stark differences in the percentage of leaseholds between affluent Marylebone and St. John’s Wood on one hand and the Church Street ward on the other still in 2011, as shown in Table 1. Those who exercised their Right to Buy in the past remained in their properties for some time, with the median period reported to be 16 years (Fenton et al 2013: 374). Indeed, as van Ham et al (2013: 131) confirmed much more recently: few of the first Right to Buy purchasers stated that they wished to move on in the near future and many expected to stay in their home for the rest of their lives, valuing non-‐monetary factors (such as liking

7

where they live) more highly than monetary considerations. They declared no wish to sell even if a market price was offered (Balchin et al 1998: 74). Buyers in the more affluent areas above stayed put as owner-‐occupiers rather than becoming absentee landlords, unlike in the Church Street ward, where in 2011 the majority of lessee homes was let to other people. However, with the rapid price increases seen particularly in the inner London housing market over the past years, the turnover-‐rate of these homes originally allocated on grounds of need entering the property market as a commodity may well accelerate (Fenton et al 2013: 375). Importantly, in 2003 a report published by the Association of London Government found that a large number of tenants in London exercise their Right to Buy where and when a regeneration scheme is announced (ibid: 4). Anticipation matters: if an area is destined to receive inward investment and a rise in its popularity is expected, sitting tenants will be encouraged to buy (Murie 2014: 422), causing in-‐situ change of the neighbourhood. In housing economics it is well established that any investment that will make the area ‘nicer’ – be it amenities and attributes like a much embellished public realm – will be capitalised by the housing market into house prices or private market rents (Cheshire 2012: 18). Particularly in times of a febrile housing market it may take not more than just anticipation of these things to come to cause this effect. It is not just tenants whose anticipations matter: already in 2003 the Association of London Government concluded from the evidence that the Right to Buy system is open to abuse: “private companies have been offering cash incentives to tenants to move out so that the property can be rented out privately at market rates” (ibid: 3). Locations in Church Street featured prominently among those targeted by such practices in a BBC-‐broadcast Inside Out: London on 12.1.2015 titled “Fraud fears over London housing right-‐to-‐buy sales” (see BBC website). The tenant formally sells the property to the company at the end of the five-‐year period within which the discount would have to be repaid if sold earlier. Rather than encouraging owner-‐occupation, the home does not only become privatised, it becomes re-‐commodified by being turned into a tool for capital gain. The Association of London Government report (2003: 5) warned: “with private sector tenants more transient than council tenants, community sustainability and stability may be reduced rather than increased as envisioned with owner occupation”. The assumption that the Right to Buy would permanently expand homeownership and bring with it all its supposed social and financial benefits may simply not materialise if formerly publicly owned (hence non-‐commodity) housing enters the private rental sector through the commodification process (Sprigings & Smith 2012: 58). Futures Plan community participants were assured by council officers that CWH had made significant improvements to its Right to Buy process to give anti-‐fraud and money

8

laundering processes much more prominence. However, there seems to be little incentive for councils to identify Right to Buy abuse cases as the practice is not illegal and there is little that boroughs can do to prevent it (Association of London Government 2003: 7) Local authorities rarely have the resources to track which Right to Buy purchases involve subsequent sublets to companies (ibid: 4). Recipients of means-‐tested benefits like Housing Benefit are not excluded from exercising their statutory Right to Buy. According to Westminster council, 22 per cent of Right to Buy sales had been to people in receipt of housing benefit at the time of application. At time of completion of the sale, 11 per cent still were (see Douglas, Inside Housing 2014). With 69 per cent of Westminster council tenants and 75 per cent of Registered Social Landlord tenants in Westminster in receipt of housing benefit (Westminster City Council 2011), therefore even this fact is no barrier – all the more creating an incentive for property investors. These have offered rewards of up to £100,000 to tenants if they buy their homes from the council under the Right to Buy scheme and then hand it to over to them to be resold (see Mclennan: West End Extra article 22.8.2014). Home ownership has traditionally been seen as a source of capital gains. But nowhere does this seem quite as evident as in the buy-‐to-‐let sector built on the re-‐commodification of formerly publicly owned housing stock. At least 36% of all homes sold by councils across London are now let by private landlords. (Copley 2014: 1). The price-‐paid-‐data obtained from the Land Registry Data were obtained for Greater London overall, the boroughs of Camden and Westminster combined, for properties in the Church Street ward, and – as a subgroup of the latter – for properties in Church Street that were formerly part of the council housing stock. Table 2 indicates the absolute figures for each reference area each year for which data were obtained. For 2014 house prices were calculated until the cut-‐off date of 31.10.2014 (‘YTD’ = year to date).

Table 2: Absolute figures (N) of price-‐paid transactions for area per year.

Figures 4 and 5 give an indication of the development of median house prices for former council-‐stock properties in Church Street and for homes in the Church Street ward

9

overall in comparison with Westminster and Camden and with London overall. House prices of Figure 5 are calculated as rises relative to where they were in the year 1999, which is used here for indexation. Median house prices were chosen instead of average ones to subdue the distorting effect of prime market properties clustered primarily in just five postcode areas within St. James, Belgravia, and Knightsbridge.

Figure 4: Median house prices in comparison since 1999 (from 1999 to 2011 two-‐year-‐intervals,

since 2011 annually; YTD: ‘year to date’)

10

Figure 5: Development of median house prices (index 1999=100; YTD: ‘year to date’)

11

Note that the line graphs of Figures 4 and 5 are accurate for the years 1999 to 2011 only insofar as calculations were made for two-‐year-‐intervals – so the connection between the two measurements only give a rough impression of the trend for this time but do not supply precise figures for the years in between for which house prices were not calculated. All prices only refer to transactions between private parties. Right to Buy-‐sales at a discount from the local authority are not included. As we can see from Figure 5, in comparison with 1999 and relative to the original investment made, ex-‐council homes in the Church Street ward offered the best returns for 2014 – leaving both Westminster & Camden and London overall behind. Homes in the Church Street ward overall (that include ex-‐council properties) start to outperform in relative terms both Westminster & Camden and London overall early on, from 2001 consistently until 2014. No particular effect due to the inception of the Futures Plan, which would have left its mark since 2011, is visible. Figure 5 gives a good impression about the potential profit to be made when former publicly owned dwellings, purchased at a discount, are resold on the open market. Note that at the time when the Right to Buy transaction takes place, not only does the discount benefit the buyer, but homes also tend to be undervalued (Association of London Government 2003: 6). Condensing the Right to Buy figures of Table 1 for Church Street with the information provided by Table 2 and Figure 4, the following prognosis is hereby made: After the five year period has passed during which a proportion of the discount can be reclaimed, a considerable proportion of Right to Buy sales will feed through into the price paid figures and the number of former council homes arriving on the housing market will rise considerably. From Figure 4 it becomes obvious that house prices in Church Street, including those formerly part of the publicly owned stock, are out of reach for but a few of the ward’s residents. According to the GLA’s household income estimates for 2014, the estimated mean annual household income for Church Street is £31,134, the median annual household income merely £19,572 (see GLA 2014). The ratio of ex-‐council homes prices for 2014 versus local annual household income would hence be 13.4, with regards to the median annual household income a staggering 21.3. For homes overall in Church Street the ratios would obviously be higher still. In other words: if they do not already own a home, the vast majority of Church Street residents has effectively been priced out of their own neighbourhood. This will be even more the case for any new-‐built private housing in the area, likely to be priced at well above median local house prices of the existing stock. One of the key policy aims, to enable upward tenure mobility for those currently in social housing into more market-‐oriented tenures or into home ownership

12

within newly built homes in the ward (City of Westminster 2010: 12) seems therefore hard to reconcile with the reality of local house prices. There is not only a gap between local incomes and property prices – the gap is also too wide between social and private rents for progression out of social-‐rent housing to intermediate housing to happen as long as rents for that so-‐called ‘affordable’ sector are pegged to market rates (see Arbaci & Rae 2013: 472). With the very considerable median price of £417,500 for an ex-‐council home in Church Street in 2014, any buyer with intentions to let the property as a landlord will have to charge very considerable rents to service a buy-‐to-‐let mortgage and generate a return (Sprigings & Smith 2012: 71). It is certainly much more profitable to enter into deals with sitting tenants to benefit from the discount he or she will enjoy. Murie’s (2014: 421) assumption that those who access a former council property through the market may be “…very similar to those that would have moved in if the property were still in the social rented sector” could possibly apply to sublets by someone who enjoyed the discount – as rents could be lower. For a ‘second-‐generation’-‐landlord who bought the property on the open market this seems unlikely, as the rents required would be too high. Already in December 2012 private household rents in Church Street – albeit being lower than the Westminster average – stood at a median rent for a 1-‐bedroom flat at £375 per week and for a 2 bedroom one at £594 (City of Westminster 2013: 10). Rents would hence be above the Local Housing Allowance (LHA) cap introduced by the Coalition Government. So landlords specialising on lettings to recipients of HLA may be deterred from doing so in Church Street. Additionally a mechanism highlighted by Rowlands & Murie (2009: 242) comes into play: in high-‐demand markets a distinctively higher-‐income group will begin to move in. “This is a form of gentrification following explicit policies of the state to privatise the housing stock and, over an extended period of time, could significantly alter the social make up of neighbourhoods.” (ibid: 242). When commercial landlords snap up property that once was publicly owned not only ownership changes. The neighbourhood will change as well if homes are let at high rents to a transient population (Leary & McCarthy 2013: 582). With two thirds of private renters in London residing in their homes for less than three years (Scanlon et al 2014: 15), the high population churn associated with private lettings may be more damaging still in more deprived neighbourhoods (Bailey et al 2012: 212). Higher turnover leads to lower attachment and it does so primarily by undermining social cohesion (ibid: 228). For the same reason, great attention should be given to who the buyers of newly built properties will be. It is recommended to contractually exclude buy-‐to-‐let investors with no intention to live in the area to avoid above negative destabilizing effects. Private renters may have quite low purchasing power to support the local economy.

13

Renting in the private sector can make you poor after having covered housing costs: In MP Karen Buck’s North Westminster survey 44 per cent of all private renters who indicated how much of their income they spend on rent said that it was 50 per cent or more (Buck 2014: 5). Note that affordability is commonly set at a maximum of 35 percent of total net household income in housing policy (Shelter 2012: 5). 40 percent is the maximum level recommended by the London Development Agency (City of Westminster 2010: 12). Gardiner’s (2014) comprehensive analysis revealed that 12 percent of private renters in London spend more than half their net income on housing costs. Within the lowest income quintile the figure is 29 percent for the UK overall – likely to be much higher in London (ibid: 10). The Right to Buy and the Futures Plan in light of Church Street property prices: identifying the ‘rent gap’ The rates of return for investing in property in Church Street, particularly former local authority homes, suggest that Smith’s (1979) “rent-‐gap” theory applies to Church Street. The rent gap is “… the gap between the actual capitalized ground rent (land value) of a plot of land given its present use and the potential ground rent that might be gleaned under a ‘higher and better’ use (Smith 1987: 462). The definition refers to the value of land separate from any structures or improvements built on it. The value of land is appropriated in economic transactions as ground rent; hence the notion of the "rent" gap. The rent gap is particularly marked in inner urban areas where low-‐income residents occupy prime commercial or residential space and hold down land values, or even prevent the existence of a housing market because of the predominance of publicly owned housing stock (Lupton & Tunstall 2008: 112). Privatisation and re-‐commodification of the housing stock in these areas is “…one means by which the rent gap can be closed, wholly or partially” (Smith 1987: 462). In Smith’s view, the factors on the production side of urban space, the role of capital and collective social actors such as developers and mortgage finance institutions, will operate together on the housing and land market to bring undervalued urban space into use. This happens particularly at times when capital markets view the prospect of investing in urban space as yielding higher returns than they would obtain in other areas of investment. “When capital expansion has no new territory left to explore, so it redevelops, or internally re-‐differentiates, urban space.” (Zukin 1987: 141). The contrast between the disinvested council housing stock and the highly valued land it sits on, creates enormous capital accumulation potential – and is described in the literature as a “state-‐induced rent gap” (Watt 2009b: 235). Above processes are illuminatingly captured by Watt’s scissors-‐metaphor (2013: 102) for state-‐led gentrification: The first blade is formed by rising land values in London, particularly in an

14

area like Church Street so close to the ‘epicentre’ of a very buoyant London housing market, boosted particularly in Westminster by private foreign investors, including those looking for a ‘safe haven’ for their money. In previously social housing dominated areas like Church Street, the Right to Buy comes to the aid of investors as a tool to acquire and appropriate the formerly publicly owned housing stock sitting on such high-‐value land. “The second blade is constituted by the long-‐term running down of council housing both in terms of numbers and quality” (ibid: 102). With regards to the numbers: even at a time when councils are supposed to replace every home lost through the Right to Buy, evidence suggests that in London it actually takes 1.6 Right to Buy sales to fund each new council home, meaning that it is not possible to replace every home lost (Copley 2014: 3) Furthermore, there is no requirement for replacement homes to be the same as those lost. This means that e.g. a four-‐bed social rented home charged at 40 percent of market rent can be replaced by a single room ‘affordable rent’ property charged at 80 percent of market rent (ibid: 3). With regards to quality: the Decent Homes programme may have raised internal standards of council homes, but externally capital investment is needed that Major Works programmes financed from the Housing Revenue Account would not be able to address. The council states this quite explicitly: “We acknowledge that our housing stock requires significant investment if we are to keep up with ever advancing housing standards but are faced with a major shortfall in funding to deliver this.” (City of Westminster 2010: 4). The council – the ‘state’ at local level -‐ has not only invested insufficiently in the existing housing stock. Disinvestment is also evident in the public realm and streetscape. In 2012 public realm and urban design consultants Publica, commissioned by the council summed up their findings by stating: “Overall the neighbourhood fails to meet the high standards that are applied throughout the City of Westminster. Materials are generally low quality and poorly maintained, with little attention to detail and consistency. This increases the isolation of the Church Street area from the surrounding neighbourhoods in Westminster.” (2012: 7). Publica added that poor quality and poorly maintained materials that would be unacceptable in most parts of Westminster are “common in some estates and their surrounding streets.” (ibid: 7). To summarise: the rates of return for investing in property in Church Street, particularly former local authority homes, suggest that the rent gap is currently being closed by privatisation-‐ and re-‐commodification of the hitherto publicly owned housing stock in this area of high land value. A housing market is created where it had previously been subdued due to publicly owned housing stock having been allocated to low-‐income residents at sub-‐market rents. While much of the land may remain publicly owned, neoliberal housing market policy achieves its aim by gradually transferring hitherto publicly owned housing stock into the property market through Right to Buy. It also

15

provides a tool in form of the new developments created by the Futures Plan – (viewed by Smith (1979) and Watt (2013) as ‘state-‐led gentrification’) whereby ‘finally’ the value of the land finds its expression in property prices to match – and the rent gap is closed. What do the findings entail for the gentrification-‐debate? In a housing market in which demand vastly outstrips supply there will always be plenty of ‘housing consumers’ to move into areas made accessible to that market, regardless of what particular tastes and preferences consumers may have. In the light of limited supply and few areas of inner-‐London left that have not yet been gentrified (Atkinson 2006: 826), it is argued here that the gentrification literature ought to pay renewed attention to the supply-‐side of housing. Theories of gentrification have – on the whole – integrated the production or supply-‐side of potentially gentrifiable inner city property and the consumption preferences of middle class households seeking inner-‐city locations (see Hamnett 1991). With such scarce housing supply, unaffordable at median incomes, we may simply have to depart from the notion that gentrifier-‐ or consumer tastes and preferences will materialise on the demand side, but will have to adapt to the shrinking supply of what they may be able to afford. Still a few years ago gentrification was conceptually linked to home ownership (see Butler 2001). In the meantime Butler et al (2008: 84) have realized that members of the middle classes who are not on the highest incomes may be restricted to private renting (at least in inner London) and hence “…are forced to trade owner-‐occupation and square metres for the sociability and access of ‘living in the inner city’, albeit in housing where they have no more than six months security of tenure and are liable to permanent exclusion from owner-‐occupation.” Homes on housing estates seemed an option unpalatable to most gentrifiers until fairly recently (see Butler & Robson 2003: 66, Watt 2005: 360). Yet re-‐commodified homes on estates may be left as the only option they could still afford. Hence, rather than focusing on choice, it would be more fruitful to elaborate on how consumer adaptation mechanisms are discursively framed and play out socially and spatially. One certain effect of the Right to Buy is to exclude households unable to pay who could meet their housing needs only through the allocation process – and to open up opportunities for households able to pay to move into the neighbourhood (Rowlands & Murie 2009: 242). This may be gentrification without displacement of existing residents, however it meets Marcuse’s (1985: 206) definition of ”exclusionary displacement”: here the displacement is not physical, but economic in that a household very similar to the former council tenant whose flat has been sold, will be excluded from living where it would otherwise have lived in an area where the housing stock has been commodified

16

(see also Zukin 1987: 136). In other words, the process is effective in displacing the characteristics of the existing population. Lower-‐income populations are replaced by those on higher ones by being priced out -‐ a key marker of gentrification. (Lees 2008: 2457). In future, in Church Street -‐ as already at present in London overall -‐ it will be increasingly difficult for the low-‐income population to access secure, decent and affordable accommodation. Some may argue that the Futures Plan provides a rather ingenious way of funding a regeneration scheme just by capitalising on the land value and rising property prices, making development lucrative for private companies without having to sell the land on which these are going to build. They may add that it comes at a time when central government funds for urban regeneration are simply not forthcoming. Indeed, as Whitehead (2014: 118) noted: “Due to central government policy, schemes that do go ahead are likely to require much higher proportions of market housing, and as long as this government stays in place, this position is unlikely to be reversed”. However, this study concludes in light of above evidence and rent-‐gap theory: Under conditions of advanced neoliberalism, conquering the last bastions of hitherto de-‐commodified social housing stock, particularly through the privatisation and re-‐commodification processes set in motion through the Right to Buy juggernaut, any urban regeneration scheme that claims to create or at least preserve affordable housing may well become undermined and hence in that respect be counterproductive. Neoliberal policy views housing exclusively as a commodity to be traded like any other (see prominently Morton (2012), the Prime Minister’s housing advisor), whereas at the time most of the housing stock in Church Street was built, policy makers considered housing as meeting an existential need -‐ regardless of ability to pay for it. This study argues that the balance of the argument in light of the evidence of above mentioned house price/income and private rent/income ratios has firmly swung behind the latter notion defying the neoliberal one. Without those who would only be able to afford social housing rents with their incomes – be they carers or cleaners -‐ the city would simply cease to function. The ‘right to the city’ (Lefebvre 1996) does not depend on ability to pay. Especially with the contribution above groups on low-‐paid but essential jobs make, they certainly have a ‘right to the city’ – and not just at its margins or periphery.

17

References Arbaci, S.; Rae, I. (2013) Mixed-‐tenure neighbourhoods in London: policy myth or effective device to alleviate deprivation? International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 37 (2), 451-‐479.

Association of London Government (2003) The impact of the Right to Buy – a report. London: Association of London Government.

Atkinson, R. (2006) Padding the bunker: strategies of middle-‐class disaffiliation and colonisation in the city. Urban Studies 43 (4), 819-‐832.

Bailey, N.; Kearns, A.; Livingston, M. (2012) Place attachment in deprived neighbourhoods: the impacts of population turnover and social mix. Housing Studies 27 (2), 208-‐231.

Balchin, P.; Isaac, D.; Rhoden, M. (1998) Housing policy and finance. In: Balchin, P.; Rhoden, M. (eds.) Housing: the essential foundations. London: Routledge, 50-‐104.

Buck, K. (2014) Private rented sector survey. [Online]. Available from: http://www.karenbuck.org.uk/index.php/news/P30/ [Accessed on 17.8.2014].

Butler, T. (2001) The middle classes and the future of London. Swindon: Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Report number: ESRC-‐EAR-‐L—130251011 [Online]. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10068/545289 [Accessed on 30.11.2013].

Butler, T.; Hamnett, C.; Ramsden, M. (2008) Inward and upward: marking out social class change in London, 1981—2001. Urban Studies 45 (1), 67-‐88.

Butler, T.; Robson, G. (2003) Plotting the middle classes: gentrification and circuits of education in London. Housing Studies 18 (1), 5-‐28.

Cheshire, P. (2007) Segregated neighbourhoods and mixed communities: a critical analysis. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.

City of Westminster (2010) Westminster Housing Renewal Strategy [Online]. Available from: http://transact.westminster.gov.uk/docstores/publicationsstore/wcchousingrenewalreport2010lowres.pdf [Accessed on 12.1.2014].

City of Westminster (2013) Church Street ward profile [Online]. Available from: http://www.westminster.gov.uk/workspace/assets/publications/Church-‐Street-‐2013-‐Ward-‐Profile-‐1375456550.pdf [Accessed on 23.7.2014].

Cole, I.; Green, S. (2011) Mixed communities from vision to oblivion. In: Anderson, I.; Sim, D. (eds.) Housing and inequality. Coventry: Chartered Institute for Housing, 151-‐166.

Copley, T. (2014) From Right to Buy to buy to let. London: GLA, London Assembly: Labour [Online]. Available from: http://tomcopley.com/wp-‐content/uploads/2014/01/From-‐Right-‐to-‐Buy-‐to-‐Buy-‐to-‐Let-‐Jan-‐2014.pdf [Accessed on 11.1.2015]

18

Douglas, D. (2014) London councillors demand inquiry into Right to Buy sales. Inside Housing, 19 August [Online]. Available from: http://www.insidehousing.co.uk/london-‐councillors-‐demand-‐inquiry-‐into-‐right-‐to-‐buy-‐sales/7005232.article [Accessed on 23.10.2014].

Fenton, A.; Lupton, R.; Arrundale, R.; Tunstall, R. (2013) Public housing, commodification, and rights to the city: the US and England compared. Cities 35, 373-‐378.

Forrest, R.; Murie, A. (1988) Selling the welfare state: the privatisation of public housing. Abingdon: Routledge.

Forrest, R.; Gordon, D.; Murie, A. (1996) The position of former council homes in the housing market. Urban Studies 33 (1), 125-‐136.

Gardiner, L. (2014) Housing pinched -‐ understanding which households spend the most on housing costs. [Online]. Available from: http://www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/housing-‐pinched-‐understanding-‐households-‐spend-‐housing-‐costs [Accessed on 23.7.2014].

Greater London Authority (GLA) (2014) Household income estimates small areas. London: City Hall [Online]. Available from: http://data.london.gov.uk/dataset/household-‐income-‐estimates-‐small-‐areas [Accessed on 17.1.2015].

Hamnett, C. (1991) The blind men and the elephant: the explanation of gentrification. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 16 (2), 173-‐189.

Hamnett, C. (1995) Home ownership and the middle classes. In: Savage, M.; Butler, T. (eds.) Social change and the middle classes. London: UCL Press, 257-‐74.

Harrison, B.; Wilson, J.; Johnson, J. (2013) Changes to affordable housing in London and implications for delivery. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.

Kearns, A.; Mason, P. (2007) Mixed tenure communities and neighbourhood quality. Housing Studies 22 (5), 661-‐691.

Leary, M.; McCarthy, J. (eds.) (2013) The Routledge Companion to Urban Regeneration. London: Routledge.

Lees, L. (2008) Gentrification and social mixing: towards an inclusive urban renaissance? Urban Studies 45 (12), 2449-‐2470.

Lefebvre, H. (1996) Writings on cities. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Livingston, M.; Kearns, A.; Bailey, N. (2013) Delivering mixed communities: the relationship between housing tenure mix and social mix in England's neighbourhoods. Housing Studies 28 (7), 1056-‐1080.

Lupton, R.; Tunstall, R. (2008) Neighbourhood regeneration through mixed communities: a ‘social justice dilemma’? Journal of Education Policy 23 (2), 105-‐117.

Marcuse, P. (1985) Gentrification, abandonment, and displacement: connections, causes, and policy responses in New York City. Washington University Urban Law Annual -‐ Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law 28, 195-‐240.

19

Mclennan, W. (2014) Claims that millions of pounds are lost as Westminster ‘Right to Buy’ council homes are scooped up by property investors. West End Extra, 22 August, [Online]. Available from: http://www.westendextra.com/news/2014/aug/claims-‐millions-‐pounds-‐are-‐lost-‐westminster-‐%E2%80%98right-‐buy%E2%80%99-‐council-‐homes-‐are-‐scooped-‐prop [Accessed on 23.8.2014].

Morton, A. (2012). Ending expensive social tenancies: fairness, higher growth and more homes. London: Policy Exchange, [Online]. Available at: http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/publications/category/item/ending-‐expensive-‐social-‐tenancies [Accessed on 29.9.2014].

Murie, A. (2014) Housing and neighbourhoods: what happened after the sale of state housing to sitting tenants in England? In: Scanlon, K.; Whitehead, C.; Fernández Arrigoitia, M. (eds.) Social housing in Europe. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 415-‐431.

Power, A. (2007) Neighbourhood renewal, mixed communities and social integration. In: Utting, David, (ed.) Social advancement: a continuing search for change: essays celebrating the work of Richard Best, to mark his retirement as director of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 113-‐127.

Publica (2012) Public realm survey Church Street. London: Publica. Rowlands, R.; Murie, A. (2009) Whose regeneration? The spectre of revanchist regeneration. In: Rowlands, R.; Musterd, S.; van Kempen, R. (eds.) Mass housing in Europe: multiple faces of development, change and response. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 235-‐264.

Scanlon, K.; Fernández, M.; Whitehead, C. (2014) A lifestyle choice for families? Private renting in London, New York, Berlin and the Randstad. London: Get living London.

Shelter (2012) London rent watch: rent inflation and affordability in London’s private rental market [Online}. Available at: www.shelter.org.uk [Accessed on 5.8.2014]

Smith, N. (1979) Toward a theory of gentrification: a back to the city movement by capital, not people. Journal of the American Planning Association 45 (4), 538-‐548.

Smith, N. (1987) Gentrification and the rent gap. Annals of the Association of American geographers 77 (3), 462-‐465.

Sprigings, N.; Smith, D. (2012) Unintended consequences: local housing allowance meets the Right to Buy. University of Glasgow: People, Place and Policy Online 6 (2), 58-‐75.

van Ham, M.; Williamson, L.; Feijten, P.; Boyle, P. (2013) Right to Buy… time to move? Investigating the moving behaviour of Right to Buy owners in the UK. Journal of Housing and the Built Environment 28 (1), 129-‐146.

Watt, P. (2005) Housing histories and fragmented middle-‐class careers: the case of marginal professionals in London council housing. Housing Studies 20 (3), 359-‐381.

Watt, P. (2013) ‘It's not for us’ -‐ regeneration, the 2012 Olympics and the gentrification of East London. City 17 (1), 99-‐118.

Westminster City Council (2011) Affordable rent statement. London: City of

20

Westminster [Online]. Available from: http://www.insidehousing.co.uk/london-‐councillors-‐demand-‐inquiry-‐into-‐right-‐to-‐buy-‐sales/7005232.article [Accessed on 23.10.2014].

Whitehead, C. (2014) Social housing in England. In Scanlon, K.; Whitehead, C.; Fernández Arrigoitia, M. (eds.) Social housing in Europe: Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 105-‐122.

Wilcox, S. (2008) A financial evaluation of right to buy. Cardiff: Assembly of Wales. Zukin, S. (1987) Gentrification: culture and capital in the urban core. Annual Review of Sociology 13, 129-‐147.

Websites BBC Inside Out London (2015) Fraud fears over London housing right-‐to-‐buy sales. BBC News 12 January: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-‐england-‐30541014 [Accessed on 12.1.2015]. Gov.uk Right to Buy: https://www.gov.uk/right-‐to-‐buy-‐buying-‐your-‐council-‐home/discounts [Accessed on 14.1.2015]. Land Registry Price Paid data [Online]. Available from: http://www.landregistry.gov.uk/market-‐trend-‐data/public-‐data [Accessed on 4.12.2014].

Tenure and housing market analysis Church Street

Documents

Transcript of Tenure and housing market analysis Church Street