Tense and Truth Conditions

Michelle Beer

Received: 30 December 2008 /Revised: 24 April 2009 /Accepted: 8 June 2009 /Published online: 27 June 2009# Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2009

Abstract The B-theory of time holds that McTaggart’s A-series of past, present, andfuture is reducible to the B-series of events running from earlier to later. Accordingto the date-theory—originally put forth by J.J.C. Smart and later endorsed by byD.H. Mellor—the truth conditions of tensed or Asentence-tokens can be given interms of tenseless or B-sentences and, therefore, A-sentence-tokens do not ascribeany A-determinations of pastness, presentness, or futurity. However, as NathanOaklander has argued, the date-theory does not provide an adequate analysis of theontological truth conditions of irreducible A-propositions. I show that the co-reportingtheory—which holds that for every A-sentence-token there is a B-sentence that differsin sense but reports the same event or state of affairs—escapes the objectionsOaklander has addressed against the date-theory.

Keywords McTaggart . Tenseless theory of time . B-theory of time . Nature of time .

Tenseless facts . Tenseless states of affairs . A-series and B-series . Date-theory

A central issue in the philosophy of time concerns the ontological status ofMcTaggart’s A-series of past, present, and future. The B-theory of time denies theexistence of irreducible A-determinations of pastness, presentness, and futurity andholds that time consists of nothing more than the B-series of events running fromearlier to later.1 Earlier versions of the B-theory have usually been based on alinguistic analysis of a tensed or A-sentence (a sentence which is not freelyrepeatable in that propositions expressed by its tokening on successive occasions candiffer in truth-value) and have claimed that tokens of A-sentences are translatable bytenseless or B-sentences (freely repeatable sentences which describe B-relations.) IfA-sentences or their tokens can indeed be translated into B-sentences, then they do

Philosophia (2010) 38:265–269DOI 10.1007/s11406-009-9213-5

1The distinction between the A-series and B-series was first introduced in McTaggart (1908).

M. Beer (*)Department of Philosophy, Florida International University, Miami, FL, USAe-mail: beerm@fiu.edu

not ascribe any temporal determinations over and above B-relations of successionand simultaneity.

More recently, however, B-theorists have granted that A-sentences and theirtokens cannot be translated by B-sentences without loss of meaning but neverthelesshave denied that this entails the existence of irreducible A-determinations.According to the new B-theory, A-sentence-tokens and the propositions expressibleby tokening A-sentences do not ascribe any irreducible A-determinations, since theyhave truth conditions that can be expressed by tokening B-sentences. One version ofthe new B-theory—originally put forth by J.J.C. Smart and later endorsed by D.H.Mellor—involves a date-analysis of the truth conditions of A-sentence-tokens andholds that for every A-sentence-token there is a B-sentence that gives its truthconditions and makes a reference to a B-relation between the date or time at whichthe sentence is tokened and the event or moment reported.2 Smart writes: “When aperson P utters at a time t the sentence ‘Event E is present,’ his assertion is true if,and only if, E is at t. More trivially, when P says at t ‘time t is now,’ his assertion istrue if, and only if, t is at t, so that if P says at t ‘time t is now,’ his assertion isthereby true.” (Smart 1980, p. 5) Thus, on this date-analysis,

(1) “Event E is occurring now,” tokened at t, is true if and only if t is the time atwhich E (tenselessly) occurs.

Since, according to the date-theory, the truth conditions of A-sentence-tokens canbe given in terms of B-sentences, proponents of the new B-theory have concludedthat tokens of A-sentences or the propositions expressible by tokening A-sentencesdo not ascribe any irreducible A-determinations.

In a recent paper, B-theorist Nathan Oaklander argues that the method of truthconditions underlying the debate between B-theorists and their critics is dubious inthat it is based on the mistaken idea that “a single tenseless truth conditions sentencecan capture the (complete) meaning of A-sentences and represent what exists in theworld that makes A-sentences true” (Oaklander 2003, p. 280). A-sentences andB-sentences obey different rules of use in that the latter are freely repeatable whilethe former are not. Thus no B-sentence—such as the B-sentence on the right of thebiconditional in (1)—has the same linguistic meaning as an A-sentence. NewB-theorists have, therefore, had good reason to abandon the earlier versions of theB-theory which hold that A-sentences or their tokens are translatable by B-sentences.Yet, as Oaklander argues, new B-theorists are mistaken in holding that theintentional meaning or proposition expressed by the use of an A-sentence can alsobe expressed by means of a B-sentence. Oaklander writes: “When I think, ‘It is nowraining,’ or ‘The exam is past,’ what is stated or thought is the intentional meaning itis now raining or the exam is past, but the [intentional] meaning of tensed languageand thought in that sense is not what makes the sentences or thoughts true. Whatmakes them true [on the B-theory] are B-facts such as it is raining at t and the examis earlier than t”(Oaklander 2003, p. 278). For that reason, no single truth conditionsB-sentence—including the date truth conditions given in (1)—can state both theintentional meaning of an A-sentence and the fact that makes it true. Neither theearlier translatability versions of the B-theory nor any of the newer versions based on

2 See Smart (1980) and Mellor (1998).

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the method of truth conditions succeeds in showing that A-sentence-tokens and thepropositions expressible by tokening A-sentences do not ascribe any irreducibleA-determinations.

Smart and other date-theorists might respond by claiming that the intentionalmeaning or proposition expressed by the use of an A-sentence is nothing more than,or reducible to, a corresponding B-proposition. However, there are good reasons forholding that the proposition that it is now raining is not the same as the propositionthat it is (tenselessly) raining at t, or for holding that the proposition that the exam ispast is not the same as the proposition that the exam is earlier than t. For it is clearlypossible to believe that it is now raining without believing that it is (tenselessly)raining at t, or to believe that the exam is past without believing that the exam isearlier than t . Furthermore, on the date-analysis, what makes “It is now t” true, if itis in fact true, is the B-fact that it is t at t. Yet the proposition that it is t at t is not thesame as the proposition that it is now t, since the former is knowable a priori whilethe latter is not knowable a priori.

Oaklander concludes that, in light of his objections to the method of truthconditions put forth by later B-theorists, the problem confronting the B-theory is “toexplain how what is asserted by the A-belief that, say, [the exam] is past can begenuinely (irreducibly) tensed…while claiming that the irreducible A-belief is truein virtue of corresponding to a B-fact”(Oaklander 2003, p. 291). Oaklander goes onto develop his own version of the B-theory, whereby he claims that, whileA-sentences and the beliefs expressed by their use are pragmatically useful inenabling us to get along in the world, A-sentences express subjective contents ormind-dependent propositions which, he claims, are “literally and metaphysicallyfalse.”(Oaklander 2003, p. 292). As a result, on Oaklander’s view, A-sentence-tokensand the propositions expressed by them have no truthmakers and, therefore, do notascribe any A-determinations.

Oaklander’s version of the B-theory may ultimately turn out to be correct.However, while Oaklander’s objection to the method of truth conditions ispersuasive, the B-theorist need not abandon the goal of showing thatA-propositions may have truthmakers that are B-facts. The problem confrontingthe method of truth conditions is that, in using the date-expression “at t” to identifythe context in which the A-sentence is tokened, the date-analysis given in (1) fails tostate the intentional meaning or proposition expressed by the use of the A-sentencein that context. Thus, the date-analysis does not capture both the A-proposition that,say, E is occurring now and the fact that makes it true. As a result, the date-analysisdoes not succeed in addressing the problem that Oaklander says needs to beaddressed by the B-theory, and that is to explain how the A-proposition that E isoccurring now is not reducible to any B-proposition and yet can be made true by aB-fact or state of affairs. In what follows, I shall argue that the co-reporting theoryaccomplishes this very task.

On the co-reporting theory, for every A-sentence-token there is a B-sentence thatdiffers in sense but reports the same event or state of affairs.3 By the event reported

3 See Beer (1988) for an earlier formulation of the co-reporting theory and, for objections to the co-reporting theory, see Smith (1990) and Smith (1993), pp. 49–50.

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by a sentence, or by the tokening of a sentence on some occasion, is meant the eventreferred to by its participial nominalization. Thus, if it is now time t, the A-sentence

(2) Hillary Clinton is speaking now

reports the same event as does the B-sentence

(3) Hillary Clinton is (tenselessly) speaking at t,

since the event now referred to by the participial nominalization, “Hillary Clinton’sspeaking now,” involves the same subject instantiating the same property at the sametime as does the event referred to by the nominalization, “Hillary Clinton’s speakingat t.” Moreover, what ascribes truth to a (true) proposition is the event or state in theworld that corresponds to the proposition. Therefore, on the co-reporting theory, thefact or state of affairs that makes an A-proposition true is nothing more than the factor state of affairs that makes the corresponding B-proposition true. The truthmakerof, say, the A-proposition that Hillary Clinton is speaking now, if it is true, is nothingmore than the truthmaker of the B-proposition that Hillary Clinton is (tenselessly)speaking at t.

Unlike Oaklander”s version of the B-theory, the co-reporting theory does notdeny that A-propositions are mind-independent but holds instead that trueA-propositions have truthmakers that are B-facts or states of affairs. The problem,then, for the co-reporting theory is to explain how A-propositions are irreducible andyet do not ascribe any irreducible A-determinations. To account for the irreducibilityof A-propositions, the co-reporting theory appeals to a Fregean theory ofpropositions, which identifies the sense of a sentence with the thought or propositionit expresses. Furthermore, the co-reporting theory grants that the sense of anindexical term varies with the context in which it is used and can be grasped orexpressed only in that context.4 Every time sentence (2) is tokened the indexicalterm “now” has a different sense which can be apprehended only at that time. Thus,if it is now t, sentences (2) and (3) express different propositions by virtue of the factthat the indexical “now” in (2) expresses a uniquely individuating property—theproperty of being now.

While the co-reporting theory grants that moments of time have individualessences, such uniquely individuating properties are not irreducible A-properties thatconfer upon a time the special ontological status of presentness. Just as there areFregean A-propositions that can be apprehended at only one time, there are Fregeanpropositions that can be apprehended at only one place. The spatial indexical “here,”when tokened at different places, has a different sense which can be apprehendedonly at that place, just as the temporal indexical “now” has a different sense whentokened at different times, The sense of “here” thus expresses a uniquelyindividuating property of a place—the property of being here. Yet while the senseof “here” expresses an individual essence, it does not follow that it confers upon aplace any special ontological status of hereness.

The co-reporting theory formulated here neither denies that A-propositions areirreducible nor holds that A-propositions are mind-dependent. Unlike the date-analysis, it does not claim that a single truth conditions B-sentence can capture both

4 See Beer (2007a) and Beer (2007b) for a more elaborate discussion of this point.

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a true A-proposition and the fact that makes it true. Rather, the co-reporting theorygrants the limited accessibility of A-propositions in that it holds that every time anA-sentence is tokened, it expresses an irreducible proposition that can beapprehended only at that time. While the co-reporting theory pays a price ingranting the limited accessibility of A-propositions, it nevertheless shows that anA-proposition is irreducible and yet, if it is true, has the same truthmaker as does aB-proposition.

Acknowledgements An earlier version of the paper was read at the conference, “Time on Trial: OneHundred Years of McTaggart’s Argument against Time,” held at West Virginia University (April 2008). Iwould like to thank the participants at the conference, particularly Nathan Oaklander, Quentin Smith,Jonathan Tallant, and Michael Tooley, for their helpful comments. I am also very grateful for the excellentcomments of an anonymous referee. Finally, I would like to thank my friend and mentor, Richard M. Gale,for the enlightening discussions we have had over the years.

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Beer, M. (2007a). A defense of the co-reporting theory of tensed and tenseless sentences. Philo, 10, 59–65.Beer, M. (2007b). On the individual essences of moments of time. Philo, 10, 69–71.McTaggart, J. E. (1908). The unreality of time. Mind, 17, 457–474. doi:10.1093/mind/XVII.4.457.Mellor, D. H. (1998). Real time II. London: Routledge.Oaklander, L. N. (2003). Two versions of the new B-theory of language. In A. Jokic & Q. Smith (Eds.),

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