Telecomunications and Broadcast Atty. vs Gma Network

8/10/2019 Telecomunications and Broadcast Atty. vs Gma Network

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Baguio City

EN BANC

G.R. No. 132922 April 21, 1998

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF TE PILIPPINES, INC. !"#

GMA NET$OR%, INC., petitioners,vs.TE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

MENDO&A, J.:

In Osmea v.COMELEC, G.R. No. !""!, decided #arch !, $$%,1

&e upheld the validity of ' (b) of R.A. No. **+* &hich prohibits the

sale or donation of print space or air tie for political ads, e-cept to the Coission on Elections under '$, of B.P. No. %%, the /nibusElection Code, &ith respect to print edia, and '$", &ith respect to broadcast edia. In the present case, &e consider the validity of '$" ofB.P. Blg. No. %% against clais that the re0uireent that radio and television tie be given free ta1es property &ithout due process of la&2that it violates the einent doain clause of the Constitution &hich provides for the payent of 3ust copensation2 that it denies broadcastedia the e0ual protection of the la&s2 and that, in any event, i t violates the ters of the franchise of petitioner G#A Net&or1, Inc.

Petitioner 4elecounications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an organi5ation ofla&yers of radio and television broadcasting copanies. 4hey are suing as citi5ens, ta-payers, andregistered voters. 4he other petitioner, G#A Net&or1, Inc., operates radio and televisionbroadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under a franchise granted by Congress.

Petitioners challenge the validity of '$" on the ground () that it ta1es property &ithout due process

of la& and &ithout 3ust copensation2 (") that it denies radio and television broadcast copanies thee0ual protection of the la&s2 and (!) that it is in e-cess of the po&er given to the C/#E6EC tosupervise or regulate the operation of edia of counication or inforation during the period ofelection.

The Question of Standing

At the threshold of this suit is the 0uestion of standing of petitioner 4elecounications andBroadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (4E6EBAP). As already noted, its ebers assert aninterest as la&yers of radio and television broadcasting copanies and as citi5ens, ta-payers, andregistered voters.

In those cases2in &hich citi5ens &ere authori5ed to sue, this Court upheld their standing in vie& of the 7transcendental iportance7 of theconstitutional 0uestion raised &hich 3ustified the granting of relief. In contrast, in the case at bar, as &ill presently be sho&n, petitioner8ssubstantive clai is &ithout erit. 4o the e-tent, therefore, that a party8s standing is deterined by the substantive erit of his case orpreliinary estiate thereof, petitioner 4E6EBAP ust be held to be &ithout standing. Indeed, a citi5en &ill be allo&ed to raise aconstitutional 0uestion only &hen he can sho& that he has personally suffered soe actual or threatened in3ury as a result of the allegedlyillegal conduct of the governent2 the in3ury fairly is fairly t raceable to the challenged action2 and the in3ury is li1ely to be redressed by a

favorable action.3

#ebers of petitioner have not sho&n that they have suffered har as a result of the operation of '$" of B.P. Blg. %%.


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Nor do ebers of petitioner 4E6EBAP have an interest as registered voters since this case doesnot concern their right of suffrage. 4heir interest in '$" of B.P. Blg. %% should be precisely inupholding its validity.

#uch less do they have an interest as ta-payers since this case does not involve the e-ercise by Congress of its ta-ing or spending

po&er.'

A party suing as a ta-payer ust specifically sho& that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal e-penditure of oney

raised by ta-ation and that he &ill sustain a direct in3ury as a result of the enforceent of the 0uestioned statute.

Nor indeed as a corporate entity does 4E6EBAP have standing to assert the rights of radio andtelevision broadcasting copanies. 9tandingjus tertii&ill be recogni5ed only if it can be sho&n thatthe party suing has soe substantial relation to the third party, or that the third party cannot asserthis constitutional right, or that the eight of the third party &ill be diluted unless the party in court isallo&ed to espouse the third party8s constitutional clai. None of these circustances is herepresent. 4he ere fact that 4E6EBAP is coposed of la&yers in the broadcast industry does notentitle the to bring this suit in their nae as representatives of the affected copanies.

Nevertheless, &e have decided to ta1e this case since the other petitioner, G#A Net&or1, Inc.,appears to have the re0uisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radioand television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforceent of '$" of B.P. Blg.

%% re0uiring radio and television broadcast copanies to provide free air tie to the C/#E6EC forthe use of candidates for capaign and other political purposes.

Petitioner clais that it suffered losses running to several illion pesos in providing C/#E6EC 4ie in connection &ith the $$" presidentialelection and the $$: senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even ore should i t be re0uired to do so again this year. Petitioner8sallegation that it &ill suffer losses again because it is re0uired to provide free air tie is sufficient to give it standing to 0uestion the validity of

'$".(

Airing of COMELEC Time, a

Reasonable Condition for

rant of !etitioner"s

#ran$hise

As pointed out in our decision in Osmea v. COMELEC, '(b) of R.A. No. **+* and '$ and '$" of the B.P. Blg. %% are part and parcel ofa regulatory schee designed to e0uali5e the opportunity of candidates in an election in regard to the use of ass edia for politicalcapaigns. 4hese statutory provisions state in relevant parts;

R.A.%o.&&'&

9ec. . !rohibited #orms of Ele$tion !ro(aganda.) In addition to the fors of electionpropaganda prohibited under 9ection %: of Batas Pabansa Blg. %%, it shall be unla&ful;

--- --- ---

(b) for any ne&spapers, radio broadcasting or television station, or other ass edia, or anyperson a1ing use of the ass edia to sell or to give free of charge print space or air tiefor capaign or other political purposes e-cept to the Coission as provided under9ection $ and $" of Batas Pabansa Blg. %%. Any ass edia colunist, coentator,announcer or personality &ho is a candidate for any elective public office shall ta1e a leaveof absence fro his &or1 as such during the capaign period.


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*.!.*lg.++, -Omnibus Ele$tion Code.

9ec. $. Comele$ s(a$e. < 4he Coission shall procure space in at least one ne&spaperof general circulation in every province or city2 !rovided, ho/ever,4hat in the absence ofsaid ne&spaper, publication shall be done in any other aga5ine or periodical in saidprovince or city, &hich shall be 1no&n as 7Coelec 9pace7 &herein candidates can

announce their candidacy. 9aid space shall be allocated, free of charge, e0ually andipartially by the Coission aong all candidates &ithin the area in &hich the ne&spaperis circulated. (9ec. +:, $=% EC).

9ec. $". Comele$ time. < 4he coission shall procure radio and television tie to be1no&n as 7Coelec 4ie7 &hich shall be allocated e0ually and ipartially aong thecandidates &ithin the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. >or this purpose,the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby aended so as toprovide radio or television tie, free of charge, during the period of the capaign. (9ec. +*,$=% EC)

4hus, the la& prohibits ass edia fro selling or donating print space and air tie to the

candidates and re0uires the C/#E6EC instead to procure print space and air tie for allocation tothe candidates. It &ill be noted that &hile '$ of B.P. Blg. %% re0uires the C/#E6EC to procureprint space &hich, as &e have held, should be paid for, '$" states that air tie shall be procured bythe C/#E6EC free of charge.

Petitioners contend that '$" of BP Blg. %% violates the due process clause)

and the einent doain provision*

of the Constitution by

ta1ing air tie fro radio and television broadcasting stations &ithout payent of 3ust copensation. Petitioners clai that the priarysource of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air tie to advertisers and that to re0uire these stations to provide free airtie is to authori5e a ta1ing &hich is not 7ade minimis teporary liitation or restraint upon the use of private property.7 According to

petitioners, in $$", the G#A Net&or1, Inc. lost P"",+$%,:*. in providing free air tie of one () hour every orning fro #ondays to>ridays and one () hour on 4uesdays and 4hursday fro =; to %; p.. (prie tie) and, in this year8s elections, it stands to loseP:%,$%,%:. in vie& of C/#E6EC89 re0uireent that radio and television stations provide at least ! inutes of prie tie daily for the

C/#E6EC 4ie.8

Petitioners8 arguent is &ithout erit, All broadcasting, &hether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the governent. Air&ave

fre0uencies have to be allocated as there are ore individuals &ho &ant to broadcast than there are fre0uencies to assign. 9A franchise isthus a privilege sub3ect, aong other things, to aended by Congress in accordance &ith the constitutional provision that 7any such

franchise or right granted . . . shall be sub3ect to aendent, alteration or repeal by the Congress &hen the coon good so re0uires.71+

4he idea that broadcast stations ay be re0uired to provide C/#E6EC 4ie free of charge is notne&. It goes bac1 to the Election Code of $= (R.A. No. *!%%), &hich provided;

9ec. +$. Regulation of ele$tion (ro(aganda through mass media . < (a) 4he franchise of allradio broadcasting and television stations are hereby aended so as to re0uire each suchstation to furnish free of charge, upon re0uest of the Coission ?on Elections@, during theperiod of si-ty days before the election not ore than fifteen inutes of prie tie once a&ee1 &hich shall be 1no&n as 7Coelec 4ie7 and &hich shall be used e-clusively by theCoission to disseinate vital election inforation. 9aid 7Coelec 4ie7 shall be

considered as part of the public service tie said stations are re0uired to furnish theGovernent for the disseination of public inforation and education under their respectivefranchises or perits.

4he provision &as carried over &ith slight odification by the $=% Election Code (P.. No. "$*),&hich provided;

9ec. +*. COMELEC Time. < 4he Coission ?on Elections@ shall procure radio andtelevision tie to be 1no&n as 7C/#E6EC 4ie7 &hich shall be allocated e0ually and


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ipartially aong the candidates &ithin the area of coverage of said radio and televisionstations. >or this purpose, the franchises of all radio broadcasting and television stations arehereby aended so as to re0uire such stations to furnish the Coission radio or televisiontie, free of charge, during the period of the capaign, at least once but not oftener thanevery other day.

9ubstantially the sae provision is no& ebodied in '$" of B.P. Blg. %%.

Indeed, provisions for C/#E6EC 4ia have been ade by aendent of the franchises of radio and television broadcast stations and, untilthe present case &as brought, such provisions had not been thought of as ta1ing property &ithout 3ust copensation. Art. II, ' of theConstitution authori5es the aendent of franchises for 7the coon good.7 hat better easure can be conceived for the coon goodthan one for free air tie for the benefit not only of candidates but even ore of the public, particularly the voters, so that they &ill be fully

infored of the issues in an electionD 7?I@t is the right of the vie&ers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, &hich is paraount.711

Nor indeed can there be any constitutional ob3ection to the re0uireent that broadcast stations give free air tie. Even in the nited 9tates,there are responsible scholars &ho believe that governent controls on broadcast edia can constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversityof vie&s and attention to public affairs to further the syste of free e-pression. >or this purpose, broadcast stations ay be re0uired to give

free air tie to candidates in an election.12

4hus, Professor Cass R. 9unstein of the niversity of Chicago 6a& 9chool, in urging refors in

regulations affecting the broadcast industry, &rites;

Ele$tions. e could do a lot to iprove coverage of electoral capaigns. #ost iportant,

governent should ensure free edia tie for candidates. Alost all European nationsa1e such provisions2 the nited 9tates does not. Perhaps governent should pay for suchtie on its o&n. !erha(s broad$asters should have to offer it as a $ondition for re$eiving ali$ense.!erha(s a $ommitment to (rovide free time /ould $ount in favor of the grant of ali$ense in the first instan$e. 9teps of this sort &ould siultaneously proote attention topublic affairs and greater diversity of vie&. 4hey &ould also help overcoe the distortingeffects of 7soundbites7 and the corrosive financial pressures faced by candidates in see1ingtie on the edia.13

In truth, radio and television broadcasting copanies, &hich are given franchises, do not o&n the air&aves and fre0uencies through &hichthey transit broadcast signals and iages. 4hey are erely given the teporary privilege of using the. 9ince a franchise is a ere

privilege, the e-ercise of the privilege ay reasonably be burdened &ith the perforance by the grantee of soe for of public service.

4hus, in 0e 1illata v. Stanle2,1'a regulation re0uiring interisland vessels licensed to engage in the interisland trade to carry ail and, for this

purpose, to give advance notice to postal authorities of date and hour of sailings of vessels and of changes of sailing hours to enable the totender ail for transportation at the last practicable hour prior to the vessel8s departure, &as held to be a reasonable condition for the stategrant of license. Although the 0uestion of copensation for the carriage of ail &as not in issue, the Court strongly iplied that such service

could be &ithout copensation, as in fact under 9panish sovereignty the ail &as carried free.1(

In !hili((ine Long 0istan$e Tele(hone Com(an2 v. %TC,1)

the Court ordered the P64 to allo& the interconnection of its doestic

telephone syste &ith the international gate&ay facility of Eastern 4eleco. 4he Court cited () the provisions of the legislative franchiseallo&ing such interconnection2 (") the absence of any physical, technical, or econoic basis for restricting the lin1ing up of t&o separatetelephone systes2 and (!) the possibility of increase in the volue of international t raffic and ore efficient service, at ore oderate cost,as a result of interconnection.

9iilarly, in the earlier case of !L0T v.%TC,1*

it &as held;

9uch regulation of the use and o&nership of telecounications systes is in the e-erciseof the plenary police po&er of the 9tate for the prootion of the general &elfare. 4he $%=

Constitution recogni5es the e-istence of that po&er &hen it provides;

9ec. *. 4he use of property bears a social function, and all econoic agentsshall contribute to the coon good. Individuals and private groups,including corporations, cooperatives, and siilar collective organi5ations,shall have the right to o&n, establish, and operate econoic enterprises,sub3ect to the duty of the 9tate to proote distributive 3ustice and to intervene&hen the coon good so deands (Article II).


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4he interconnection &hich has been re0uired of P64 is a for of 7intervention7 &ithproperty rights dictated by 7the ob3ective of governent to proote the rapid e-pansion oftelecounications services in all areas of the Philippines, . . . to a-ii5e the use oftelecounications facilities available, . . . in recognition of the vital role of counicationsin nation building . . . and to ensure that all users of the public telecounications servicehave access to all other users of the service &herever they ay be &ithin the Philippines at

an acceptable standard of service and at reasonable cost7 (/4C Circular No. $F"+%).ndoubtedly, the encopassing ob3ective is the coon good. 4he N4C, as the regulatoryagency of the 9tate, erely e-ercised its delegated authority to regulate the use oftelecounications net&or1s &hen it decreed interconnection.

In the granting of the privilege to operate broadcast stations and thereafter supervising radio and television stations, the state spends

considerable public funds in licensing and supervising such stations. 18It &ould be strange if it cannot even re0uire the licensees to renderpublic service by giving free air tie.

Considerable effort is ade in the dissent of #r. ustice Panganiban to sho& that the production oftelevision progras involves large e-penditure and re0uires the use of e0uipent for &hich hugeinvestents have to be ade. 4he dissent cites the clai of G#A Net&or1 that the grant of free airtie to the C/#E6EC for the duration of the $$% capaign period &ould cost the copany

P:",!%,, representing revenue it &ould other&ise earn if the air tie &ere sold to advertisers,and the aount of P*,*,%:, representing the cost of producing a progra for the C/#E6EC4ie, or the total aount of P:%,$%,%:.

4he clai that petitioner &ould be losing P:",!%, in unreali5ed revenue fro advertising is based on the assuption that air tie is7finished product7 &hich, it is said, becoe the property of the copany, li1e oil produced fro refining or siilar natural resources afterundergoing a process for their production. But air tie is not o&ned by broadcast copanies. As held in Red Lion *road$asting

Co. v. #.C.C.,19&hich upheld the right of a party personally attac1ed to reply, 7licenses to broadcast do not confer o&nership of designated

fre0uencies, but only the teporary privilege of using the.7 Conse0uently, 7a license perits broadcasting, but the license has noconstitutional right to be the one &ho holds the license or to onopoli5e a radio fre0uency to the e-clusion of his fello& citi5ens. 4here isnothing in the >irst Aendent &hich prevents the Governent fro re0uiring a licensee to share his fre0uency &ith others and to conducthiself as a pro-y or fiduciary &ith obligations to present those vie&s and voices &hich are representative of his counity and &hich &ould

other&ise, by necessity, be barred fro the air&aves.72+

As radio and television broadcast stations do not o&n the air&aves, no private

property is ta1en by the re0uireent that they provide air tie to the C/#E6EC.

ustice Panganiban8s dissent 0uotes fro 4olentino on the Civil Code &hich says that 7the air lanestheselves 8are not property because they cannot be appropriated for the benefit of any individual.87(p. :) 4hat eans neither the 9tate nor the stations o&n the air lanes. Het the dissent also says that74he franchise holders can recover their huge investents only by selling air tie to advertisers.7 (p.!) If air lanes cannot be appropriated, ho& can they be used to produce air tie &hich thefranchise holders can sell to recover their investentD 4here is a contradiction here.

As to the additional aount of P*,*,%:, it is claied that this is the cost of producing a prograand it is for such ites as 7sets and props,7 7video tapes,7 7iscellaneous (other rental, supplies,transportation, etc.),7 and 7technical facilities (technical cre& such as director and caeraan as&ell as 8on air plugs8).7 4here is no basis for this clai. E-penses for these ites &ill be for theaccount of the candidates. C/#E6EC Resolution No. "$%!, '*(d) specifically provides in this

connection;

(d)Additional servi$es su$h as ta(e3re$ording or video3ta(ing of (rograms, the (re(arationof visual aids, terms and $ondition thereof, and $onsideration to be (aid therefor ma2 bearranged b2 the $andidates /ith the radio4television station $on$erned. o&ever, noradioJtelevision station shall a1e any discriination aong candidates relative to charges,ters, practices or facilities for in connection &ith the services rendered.

It is unfortunate that in the effort to sho& that there is ta1ing of private property &orth illions of pesos, the unsubstantiated charge is adethat by its decision the Court perits the 7grand larceny of precious tie,7 and allo&s itself to becoe 7the people8s un&itting oppressor.7 4he


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charge is really unfortunate. In 5a$6son v. Rosenbaun,21

ustice oles &as so incensed by the resistance of property o&ners to the

erection of party &alls that he &as led to say in his original draft, 7a statute, &hich ebodies the counity8s understanding of the reciprocalrights and duties of neighboring lando&ners, does not need to invo1e the(enalt2 lar$en2of the police po&er in its 3ustification.7 oles8s

brethren corrected his taste, and oles had to aend the passage so that in the end it spo1e only of invo1ing 7the police po&er.722

ustice

oles spo1e of the 7petty larceny7 of the police po&er. No& &e are being told of the 7grand larceny ?by eans of the police po&er@ ofprecious air tie.7

iving #ree Air Time a 0ut2

Assumed b2 !etitioner

Petitioners clai that '$" is an invalid aendent of R.A. No. =":" &hich granted G#A Net&or1,Inc. a franchise for the operation of radio and television broadcasting stations. 4hey argue thatalthough ': of R.A. No. =":" gives the governent the po&er to teporarily use and operate thestations of petitioner G#A Net&or1 or to authori5e such use and operation, the e-ercise of this rightust be copensated.

4he cited provision of. R.A. No. =":" states;

9ec. :. Right of overnment. < A special right is hereby reserved to the President of thePhilippines, in ties of rebellion, public peril, calaity, eergency, disaster or disturbance ofpeace and order, to teporarily ta1e over and operate the stations of the grantee, toteporarily suspend the operation of any station in the interest of public safety, security andpublic &elfare, or to authori5e the teporary use and operation thereof by any agency of theGovernent, upon due copensation to the grantee, for the use of said stations during theperiod &hen they shall be so operated.

4he basic fla& in petitioner8s arguent is that it assues that the provision for C/#E6EC 4ie constitutes the use and operation of thestations of the G#A Net&or1, Inc., 4his is not so. nder '$" of B.P. Blg. %%, the C/#E6EC does not ta1e over the operation of radio andtelevision stations but only the allocation of air tie to the candidates for the purpose of ensuring, aong other things, e0ual opportunity,

tie, and the right to reply as andated by the Constitution.23

Indeed, it is &rong to clai an aendent of petitioner8s franchise for the reason that B.P. Blg. %%, &hich is said to have aended R.A. No.

=":", actually antedated it.2'

4he provision of '$" of B.P. Blg. %% ust be deeed instead to be incorporated in R.A. No. =":". And,indeed, '+ of the latter statute does.

>or the fact is that the duty iposed on the G#A Net&or1, Inc. by its franchise to render 7ade0uatepublic service tie7 ipleents '$" of B.P. Blg. %%. ndoubtedly, its purpose is to enable thegovernent to counicate &ith the people on atters of public interest. 4hus, R.A. No. =":"provides;

9ec. +. Res(onsibilit2 to the !ubli$. < The grantee shall (rovide ade7uate (ubli$ servi$etime to enable the overnment, through the said broad$asting stations, to rea$h the

(o(ulation on im(ortant (ubli$ issues2 provide at all ties sound and balanced prograing2proote public participation such as in counity prograing2 assist in the fun$tions of

(ubli$ information and edu$ation2 confor to the ethics of honest enterprise2 and not use its

station for the broadcasting of obscene and indecent language, speech, act or scene, or forthe disseination of deliberately false inforation or &illful isrepresentation, or to thedetrient of the public interest, or to incite, encourage, or assist in subversive or treasonableacts. (Ephasis added).

It is note&orthy that '+ of R.A. No. *!%%, fro &hich '$" of B.P. Blg. %% &as ta1en, e-presslyprovided that the C/#E6EC 4ie should 7be considered as part of the public service tie saidstations are re0uired to furnish the Governent for the disseination of public inforation andeducation under their respective franchises or perits.7 4here is no reason to suppose that '$" of


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B.P. Blg. %% considers the C/#E6EC 4ie therein provided to be other&ise than as a publicservice &hich petitioner is re0uired to render under '+ of its charter (R.A. No. =":"). In su, B.P.Blg. %%, '$" is not an invalid aendent of petitioner8s franchise but the enforceent of a dutyvoluntarily assued by petitioner in accepting a public grant of privilege.

4hus far, &e have confined the discussion to the provision of '$" of B.P. Blg. %% for free air tie

&ithout ta1ing into account C/#E6EC Resolution No. "$%!FA, '" of &hich states;

9ec. ". rant of 8Comele$ Time.8< Every radio broadcasting and television stationoperating under franchise shall grant the Coission, u(on (a2ment of just $om(ensation,at least thirty (!) inutes of prie tie daily, to be 1no&n as 7Coelec 4ie7, effective>ebruary , $$% for candidates for President, KiceFPresident and 9enators, and effective#arch "=, $$%, for candidates for local elective offices, until #ay $, $$%. (Ephasisadded).

4his is because the aendent providing for the payent of 73ust copensation7 is invalid, being incontravention of '$" of B.P. Blg. %% that radio and television tie given during the period of thecapaign shall be 7free of charge.7 Indeed, Resolution No. "$%! originally provided that the tie

allocated shall be 7free of charge,7 3ust as '$" re0uires such tie to be given 7free of charge.7 4heaendent appears to be a reaction to petitioner8s clai in this case that the original provision &asunconstitutional because it allegedly authori5ed the ta1ing of property &ithout 3ust copensation.

4he 9olicitor General, relying on the aendent, clais that there should be no ore disputebecause the payent of copensation is no& provided for. It is basic, ho&ever, that anadinistrative agency cannot, in the e-ercise of la&a1ing, aend a statute of Congress. 9ince '"of Resolution No. "$%!FA is invalid, it cannot be invo1ed by the parties.

La/ Allo/s #le9time for !rogramming

b2 Stations, %ot Confis$ation of

Air Time b2 COMELEC

It is claied that there is no standard in the la& to guide the C/#E6EC in procuring free air tie and that 7theoretically the C/#E6EC can

deand all of the air tie of such stations.72(Petitioners do not clai that C/#E6EC Resolution No. "$%!FA arbitrarily se0uesters radio and

television tie. hat they clai is that because of the breadth of the statutory language, the provision in 0uestion is susceptible of

7unbridled, arbitrary and oppressive e-ercise.72)

4he contention has no basis. >or one, the C/#E6EC is re0uired to procure free air tie forcandidates 7&ithin the area of coverage7 of a particular radio or television broadcaster so that itcannot, for e-aple, procure such tie for candidates outside that area. At &hat tie of the day andho& uch tie the C/#E6EC ay procure &ill have to be deterined by it in relation to the overallob3ective of inforing the public about the candidates, their 0ualifications and their progras ofgovernent. As stated in Osmea v. COMELEC, the C/#E6EC 4ie provided for in '$", as &ell asthe C/#E6EC 9pace provided for in '$, is in lieu of paid ads &hich candidates are prohibited tohave under '(b) of R.A. No. **+*. Accordingly, this ob3ective ust be 1ept in ind in deteriningthe details of the C/#E6EC 4ie as &ell as those of the C/#E6EC 9pace.

4here &ould indeed be ob3ection to the grant of po&er to the C/#E6EC if '$" &ere so detailed asto leave no roo for accoodation of the deands of radio and television prograing. >or &erethat the case, there could be an intrusion into the editorial prerogatives of radio and televisionstations.


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0ifferential Treatment of

*road$ast Media 5ustified

Petitioners coplain that B.P. Blg. %%, '$" singles out radio and television stations to provide free air tie. 4hey contend that ne&spapers

and aga5ines are not siilarly re0uired as, in fact, in !hili((ine !ress :nstitute v.COMELEC,2*

&e upheld their right to the payent of 3ust

copensation for the print space they ay provide under '$.

4he arguent &ill not bear analysis. It rests on the fallacy that broadcast edia are entitled to the sae treatent under the free speechguarantee of the Constitution as the print edia. 4here are iportant differences in the characteristics of the t&o edia, ho&ever, &hich3ustify their differential treatent for free speech purposes. Because of the physical liitations of the broadcast spectru, the governentust, of necessity, allocate broadcast fre0uencies to those &ishing to use the. 4here is no siilar 3ustification for governent allocation

and regulation of the print edia.28

In the allocation of liited resources, relevant conditions ay validly be iposed on the grantees orlicensees. 4he reason for this is that, as already noted, the governent spends public funds for theallocation and regulation of the broadcast industry, &hich it does not do in the case of the printedia. 4o re0uire the radio and television broadcast industry to provide free air tie for theC/#E6EC 4ie is a fair e-change for &hat the industry gets.

>ro another point of vie&, this Court has also held that because of the uni0ue and pervasive influence of the broadcast edia,7?n@ecessarily . . . the freedo of television and radio broadcasting is soe&hat lesser in scope than the freedo accorded to ne&spaper

and print edia.729

4he broadcast edia have also established a uni0uely pervasive presence in the lives of all>ilipinos. Ne&spapers and current boo1s are found only in etropolitan areas and in thepoblaciones of unicipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are lo&incoe asses &ho find the cost of boo1s, ne&spapers, and aga5ines beyond their hubleeans. Basic needs li1e food and shelter perforce en3oy high priorities.

/n the other hand, the transistor radio is found every&here. 4he television set is alsobecoing universal. 4heir essage ay be siultaneously received by a national orregional audience of listeners including the indifferent or un&illing &ho happen to be &ithin

reach of a blaring radio or television set. 4he aterials broadcast over the air&aves reachevery person of every age, persons of varying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons ofdifferent I.L.s and ental capabilities, persons &hose reactions to inflaatory or offensivespeech &ould he difficult to onitor or predict. 4he ipact of the vibrant speech is forcefuland iediate. nli1e readers of the printed &or1, the radio audience has lesser opportunityto cogitate, analy5e, and re3ect the utterance.3+

Petitioners8 assertion therefore that '$" of B.P. Blg. %% denies the the e0ual protection of the la&has no basis. In addition, their plea that '$" (free air tie) and '(b) of R.A. No. **+* (ban on paidpolitical ads) should be invalidated &ould pave the &ay for a return to the old regie &hereoneyed candidates could onopoli5e edia advertising to the disadvantage of candidates &ithless resources. 4hat is &hat Congress tried to refor in $%= &ith the enactent of R.A. No. **+*.e are not free to set aside the 3udgent of Congress, especially in light of the recent failure ofinterested parties to have the la& repealed or at least odified.

Re7uirement of COMELEC Time, a

Reasonable E9er$ise of the

State"s !o/er to Regulate


9/30

;se of #ran$hises

>inally, it is argued that the po&er to supervise or regulate given to the C/#E6EC under Art. IFC, '+ of the Constitution does not includethe po&er to prohibit. In the first place, &hat the C/#E6EC is authori5ed to supervise or regulate by Art. IFC, '+ of the

Constitution,31aong other things, is the use by edia of inforation of their franchises or perits, &hile &hat Congress (not the

C/#E6EC) prohibits is the sale or donation of print space or air tie for political ads. In other &ords, the ob3ect of supervision or regulationis different fro the ob3ect of the prohibition. It is another fallacy for petitioners to contend that the po&er to regulate does not include thepo&er to prohibit. 4his ay have force if the ob3ect of the po&er &ere the sae.

In the second place, the prohibition in '(b) of R.A. No. **+* is only half of the regulatory provisionin the statute. 4he other half is the andate to the C/#E6EC to procure print space and air tie forallocation to candidates. As &e said in Osmea v. COMELEC;

4he ter political 7ad ban7 &hen used to describe '(b) of R.A. No. **+*, is isleading, foreven as '(b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air tie to politicalcandidates, it andates the C/#E6EC to procure and itself allocate to the candidates spaceand tie in the edia. 4here is no suppression of political ads but only a regulation of thetie and anner of advertising.

--- --- ---

. . . hat is involved here is siply regulation of this nature. Instead of leaving candidates toadvertise freely in the ass edia, the la& provides for allocation, by the C/#E6EC of printspace and air tie to give all candidates e0ual tie and space for the purpose of ensuring7free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.7

ith the prohibition on edia advertising by candidates theselves, the C/#E6EC 4ie andC/#E6EC 9pace are about the only eans through &hich candidates can advertise their0ualifications and progras of governent. #ore than erely depriving their 0ualifications andprogras of governent. #ore than erely depriving candidates of tie for their ads, the failure ofbroadcast stations to provide air tie unless paid by the governent &ould clearly deprive thepeople of their right to 1no&. Art III, '= of the Constitution provides that 7the right of the people to

inforation on atters of public concern shall be recogni5ed,7 &hile Art. II, '* states that 7the useof property bears a social function ?and@ the right to o&n, establish, and operate econoicenterprises ?is@ sub3ect to the duty of the 9tate to proote distributive 3ustice and to intervene &henthe coon good so deands.7

4o affir the validity of '$" of B.P. Blg. %% is to hold public broadcasters to their obligation to see toit that the variety and vigor of public debate on issues in an election is aintained. >or &hilebroadcast edia are not ere coon carriers but entities &ith free speech rights, they are alsopublic trustees charged &ith the duty of ensuring that the people have access to the diversity ofvie&s on political issues. 4his right of the people is paraount to the autonoy of broadcast edia.4o affir the validity of '$", therefore, is li1e&ise to uphold the people8s right to inforation onatters of public concern. 4he use of property bears a social function and is sub3ect to the state8s

duty to intervene for the coon good. Broadcast edia can find their 3ust and highest re&ard in thefact that &hatever altruistic service they ay render in connection &ith the holding of elections is forthat coon good.

>or the foregoing reasons, the petition is disissed.

9/ /RERE.


10/30

%arvasa, Cor this purpose,


11/30

the franchise of all radio and television stations are hereby attended so as to provide radioand television tiefree of $hargeduring the period of election capaign.

Pursuant to 9ection $" of BP %%, respondent C/#E6EC on #arch !, $$% passed Resolution"$%!FA, the pertinent provision of &hich reads as follo&s;

9ec. ". Grant of 7Coelec 4ie.7 < Every radio broadcasting and television stationoperating under franchise shall grant the Coission, upon payent of 3ust copensation,at least thirty (!) inutes of prie tie daily, to be 1no&n as 7Coelec 4ie,7 effective>ebruary , $$% for candidates for President, KiceFPresident and 9enators, and effective#arch "=, $$%, for candidates for local elective offices, until #ay $, $$%.

9ection $" of BP %%, insofar as it re0uires radio and television stations to provide Coelec &ithradio and television tie free of charge is a flagrant violation of the constitutional andate thatprivate property shall not be ta1en for public use &ithout 3ust copensation. hile it is inherent in the9tate, the sovereign right to appropriate property has never been understood to include ta1ingproperty for public purposes &ithout the duty and responsibility of ordering copensation to theindividual &hose property has been sacrificed for the good of the counity. ence, 9ection $

Article III of the $%= Constitution &hich reads 7No private property shall be ta1en for public use&ithout 3ust copensation,7 gives us t&o liitations on the po&er of einent doain; () the purposeof ta1ing ust be for public use and (") 3ust copensation ust be given to the o&ner of the privateproperty.

4here is, of course, no 0uestion that the ta1ing of the property in the case at bar is for public use, i.e. to ensure that air tie is allocatede0ually aong the candidates, ho&ever, there is no 3ustification for the ta1ing &ithout payent of 3ust copensation. hile Resolution No.

"$%!FA has provided that 3ust copensation shall be paid for the ! inutes of prie tie granted by the television stations to respondentCoelec, &e note that the resolution &as passed(ursuantto 9ection $" of BP %% &hich andates that radio and television tie beprovided to respondent Coelecfree of $harge. 9ince the legislative intent is the controlling eleent in deterining the adinistrative

po&ers, rights, privileges and iunities granted,3

respondent Coelec ay, at any tie, despite the resolution passed, copel television

and radio stations to provide it &ith airtie free of charge.

Apparently, 9ec. $" of BP %% 3ustices such ta1ing under the guise of police po&er regulation &hich cannot be validly done. Police po&erust be distinguished fro the po&er of einent doain. In the e-ercise of police po&er, there is a restri$tionof property interest to proote

public &elfare or interest &hich involves no copensable ta1ing. hen the po&er of einent doain, ho&ever, is e-ercised, propertyinterest is appropriated and a((lied to some (ubli$ (ur(ose, necessitating copensation therefor. 4raditional distinctions bet&een police

po&er and the po&er of einent doain precluded application of both po&ers at the sae tie in the sae sub3ect.'

ence, in the case

of Cit2 of *aguio v. %A?ASA,(

the Court held that a la& re0uiring the transfer of all unicipal &ater&or1s systes to NAA9A in e-change

for its assets of e0uivalent value involved the e-ercise of einent doain because the property involved &as &holesoe and intended forpublic use. Property condened under the e-ercise of police po&er, on the other hand, is no-ious or intended for no-ious purpose and,conse0uently, is not copensable. Police po&er proceeds fro the principle that every holder of property, ho&ever absolute and un0ualifieday be his title, holds it under the iplied liability that his use of it shall not be in3urious to the e0ual en3oyent of others having an e0ualright to the en3oyent of their property, nor in3urious to the rights of the counity. Rights of property, li1e all other social and conventionalrights, are sub3ect to reasonable liitations in their en3oyent as shall prevent the fro being in3urious, and to such reasonable restraitsand regulations established by la& as the legislature, under the governing and controlling po&er vested in the by the constitution, ay thin1

necessary and e-pedient.)

In the case of Small Lando/ners of the !hili((ines :n$. v. Se$retar2 of Agrarian Reform, &e found occasion to note that recent trends sho& aingling of the police po&er and the po&er of einent doain, &ith the latter being used as an ipleent of the forer li1e the po&er of

ta-ation. Citing the cases of *erman v.!ar6er*

and !enn Central Trans(ortation Co. v. %e/ @or6 Cit28

&here o&ners of the Grand Central

4erinal &ho &ere not allo&ed to construct a ultiFstory building to preserve a historic landar1 &ere allo&ed certain copensatory rights toitigate the loss caused by the regulation, this Court is Small Lando/ners of the !hili((ines, :n$. case held that easures prescribingretention liits for lando&ners under the Agrarian Refor 6a& involved the e-ercise of police po&er for the regulation of private property inaccordance &ith the constitution. And, &here to carry out the regulation, it becae necessary to deprive o&ners of &hatever lands they ayo&n in e-cess of the a-iu area allo&ed, the Court held that there &as definitely a ta1ing under the po&er of einent doain for &hichpayent of 3ust copensation &as iperative.

4he petition before us is no di fferent fro the aboveFcited case. Insofar as 9ee $" of BP %% read in con3unction &ith 9ec (b) of RA **+*restricts the sale or donation of airtie by radio and television stations during the capaign period to respondent Coelec, there is ane-ercise of police po&er for the regulation of property in accordance &ith the Constitution. 4o the e-tent ho&ever that 9ec $" of BP %%andates that airtie be provided free of charge to respondent Coelec to be allocated e0ually aong all candidates, the regulation

e-ceeds the liits of police po&er and should be recogni5ed as a ta1ing. In the case of !enns2lvania Coal v.Mahon,9ustice oles laid


12/30

do&n the liits of police po&er in this &ise,7 4he general rule is that &hile property ay be regulated to a certain e-tent, if the regulationgoes too far, it &ill be recogni5ed as a ta1ing.7

hile the po&er of einent doain often results in the appropriation of title to or possession of property, it need not al&ays be the case. It isa settled rule that neither ac0uisition of title nor total destruction of value is essential to ta1ing and it is usually in cases &here title reains&ith the private o&ner that in0uiry should be ade to deterine &hether the ipairent of a property is erely regulated or aounts to acopensable ta1ing. A regulation &hich deprives any person of the profitable use of his property constitutes a ta1ing and entitles hi tocopensation unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to perit the regulation to be 3ustified under the police po&er. 9iilarly, a police

regulation &hich unreasonably restricts the right to use business property for business purposes, aounts to ta1ing of pr ivate property andthe o&ner ay recover therefor.

1+It is also settled 3urisprudence that ac0uisition of right of &ay easeent falls &ithin the purvie& of einentdoain.

11

hile there is no ta1ing or appropriation of title to, and possession of the e-propriated property in the case at bar, there is copensableta1ing inasuch as the is a loss of the earnings for the airtie &hich the petitionerFintervenors are copelled to donate. It is a loss &hich,

to paraphrase !hili((ine !ress :nstitute v.Comele$,12

could hardly be considered 7de minimis7 if &e are to ta1e into account the onetary

value of the copulsory donation easured by the current advertising rates of the radio and television stations.

In the case of !hili((ine !ress :nstitute v. Comele$,13&e had occasion to state that ne&spapers and other pr int edia are not copelled to

donate free space to respondent Coelec inasuch as this &ould be in violation of the constitutional provision that no private property shallbe ta1en for public use &ithout 3ust copensation. e find no cogent reason &hy radio and television stations should be treated consideringthat their operating e-penses as copared to those of the ne&spaper and other print edia publishers involve considerably greater aountof financial resources.

4he fact that one needs a franchise fro governent to establish a radio and television station &hile no license is needed to start ane&spaper should not be ade a basis for treating broadcast edia any differently fro the pr int edia in copelling the forer to 7donate7airtie to respondent Coelec. hile no franchises and rights are granted e-cept under the condition that it shall be sub3ect to aendent,

alteration, or repeal by the Congress &hen the coon good so re0uires,1'

this provides no license for governent to disregard the cardinal

rule that corporations &ith franchises are as uch entitled to due process and e0ual protection of la&s guaranteed under the Constitution.

ACC/RING6H, I vote to declare 9ection $" of BP %% insofar as it andates that radio andtelevision tie be provided to respondent Coelec free of charge NC/N94I44I/NA6.

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting2

At issue in this case is the constitutionality of 9ection $" of the /nibus Election Code1

&hich copels all broadcast stations in the country

7to provide radio and television tie, free of $harge, during the period of the ?election@ capaigns,7 &hich the Coission on Elections shallallocate 7e0ually and ipartially aong the candidates . . .7 Petitioners contend, and I agree, that this legal provision is unconstitutionalbecause it confiscates private property &ithout due process of la& and &ithout payent of 3ust copensation, and denies broadcast ediae0ual protection of the la&.

In !hili((ine !ress :nstitute, :n$. (!!:)vs. Commission on Ele$tions,2

this Court ruled that print edia copanies cannot be re0uired to

donate advertising space, free of charge, to the Coelec for e0ual allocation aong candidates, on the ground that such copulsory sei5ure

of print space is e0uivalent to a proscribed ta1ing of private property for public use &ithout payent of 3ust copensation.3

4he Court8s a3ority in the present case, spea1ing through the distinguished #r. ustice Kicente K.#endo5a, holds, ho&ever, that the foregoing PPI doctrine applies only to print edia, not tobroadcast (radio and 4K) net&or1s, arguing that 7radio and television broadcasting copanies,&hich are given franchises, do not o&n the air&aves and fre0uencies through &hich they transitbroadcast signals and iages. 4hey are erely given the teporary privilege of using the. 9ince afranchise is a ere privilege, the e-ercise of the privilege ay reasonably be burdened &ith theperforance by the grantee of soe for of public service.7 In other &ords, the a3ority theori5es

that the forced donation of air tie to the Coelec is a eans by &hich the 9tate gets copensationfor the grant of the franchise andJor the use of the air lanes.

ith all due respect, I disagree. 4he a3ority is relying on a theoretical distinction that does nota1e any real difference. 4heory ust yield to reality. I respectfully subit the follo&ing arguentsto support y dissent;


13/30

. 4he 9tate does not o&n the air&aves and broadcast fre0uencies. It erely allocates, supervisesand regulates their proper use. 4hus, other than collecting supervision or regulatory fees &hich italready does, it cannot e-act any onerous and unreasonable(ost fa$toburdens fro the franchiseholders, &ithout due process and 3ust copensation. #oreover, the invocation of the 7coongood7 does not e-cuse the unbridled and clearly e-cessive ta1ing of a franchisee8s property.

". Assuing arguendothat the 9tate o&ns the air lanes, the broadcasting copanies already payrental fees to the governent for their use. ence, the sei5ure of air tie cannot be 3ustified by thetheory of copensation.

!. Air&aves and fre0uencies alone, &ithout the radio and television o&ner8s huongous investentsaounting to billions of pesos, cannot be utili5ed for broadcasting purposes. ence, a forceddonation of broadcast tie is in actual fact a ta1ing of such investents &ithout due process and&ithout payent of 3ust copensation.

6et e e-plain further each of these arguents.

:. The State 0oes %ot O/n Air Lanes;

:t Merel2 Regulates Their !ro(er ;se2

8Common ood8 0oes %ot E9$use ;nbridled Ta6ing.

9ignificantly, the a3ority does not clai that the 9tate o&ns the air lanes. It erely contends that 7broadcasting, &hether by radio or bytelevision stations, is licensed by the governent. Air&ave fre0uencies have to be allocated as there are ore individuals &ho &ant to

broadcast than there are fre0uencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege sub3ect aong other thing . . . to aendent, alteration or

repeal by the Congress &hen the coon good so re0uires.7 '4rue enough, a 7franchise started out as a 8royal privilege or ?a@ branch of the

Ming8s prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a sub3ect.87(

Indeed, &hile the Constitution e-pressly provides that 7?a@ll lands of the public doain, &aters, ineral, coal, petroleu, and other ineraloils, all forces, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or tiber, &ildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are o&ned bythe 9tate,7 it is silent as to the o&nership of the air&aves and fre0uencies. It is then reasonable to say that no one o&ns the. 6i1e the air &e

breathe and the sunshine that sustains life, the air lanes theselves 7are not property because they cannot be appropriated for the benefit ofany individual,7)

but are to be used to the best advantage of all.

Because, as entioned earlier, there are ore prospective users than fre0uencies, the 9tate < inthe e-ercise of its police po&er < allocates, supervises and regulates their use, so as to derivea-iu benefit for the general public. 4he franchise granted by the legislature to broadcastingcopanies is essentially for the purpose of putting order in the use of the air&aves by assigning tosuch copanies their respective fre0uencies. 4he purpose is not to grant the the privilege of usingpublic property. >or, as earlier stated, air&aves are not o&ned by the governent.

Accordingly, the National 4elecounications Coission (N4C) &as tas1ed by la& toinstitutionali5e this regulation of the air lanes. 4o cover the adinistrative cost of supervision andregulation, the N4C levies charges, &hich have been revised up&ards in N4C #eorandu Circular

No. +F%F$+ dated August "*, $$+. In accordance &ith this Circular, Petitioner G#A Net&or1, Inc.,for the year $$*, paid the N4C P",%%,:$ of &hich P",:,==*.! &as N4C 7supervision andregulation fee,7 as borne out by its Audited Consolidated >inancial 9tateents for said year, on file&ith the 9ecurities and E-change Coission. In short, for its &or1 of allocation, supervision andregulation, the governent is ade0uately copensated by the broadcast edia through the payentof fees unilaterally set by the forer.

#ran$hisee"s !ro(ert2 Cannot


14/30

*e Ta6en ?ithout 5ust Com(ensation

In staping unbridled donations &ith its ipriatur, the a3ority overloo1s the t&ofold nature and purpose of a franchise; other than servingthe public benefit &hich is sub3ect to governent regulation, it ust also be to the franchise holder8s advantage. /nce granted, a franchise

(not the air lanes) together &ith concoitant private rights, becoes property of the grantee.*

It is regarded by la& precisely as other

property and, as any other property, it is safeguarded by the Constitution fro arbitrary revocation or ipairent. 84he rights under a

franchise can be neither ta1en nor curtailed for public use or purpose, even by the governent as the grantor, &ithout payent of 3ust

copensation9

as guaranteed under our fundaental la&.1+

4he fact that the franchise relates to public use or purpose does not entitle thestate to abrogate or ipair its use &ithout 3ust copensation.

11

4he a3ority further clais that, constitutionally,12

franchises are al&ays sub3ect to alteration by Congress, 7&hen the coon good so

re0uires.7 4he 0uestion then boils do&n to this; oes 9ection $" of the /nibus Election Code constitute a franchise odification for the7coon good,7 or an 7unla&ful ta1ing of private property7D 4o ans&er this 0uestion, I go bac1 to !hili((ine !ress :nstitute,

:n$.vs.Commission on Ele$tions, &here a unanious 9upree Court held;13

4o $om(elprint edia copanies to donate7Coelec space7 of the diensions specified in9ection " of Resolution No. "==" (not less than oneFhalf page), aounts to 7ta1ing7 of privatepersonal property for public use or purposes. 9ection " failed to specify the intendedfre7uen$2ofsuch copulsory 7donation;7 only on$eduring the period fro * #arch $$: (or " #arch $$:)until " #ay $$:D or everyday or once a &ee1D or as often as Coelec ay direct during thesae periodD 4he e-tent of the ta1ing or deprivation is not insubstantial2 this is not a case of a de

minimisteporary liitation or restraint upon the use of private property. 4he onetary value ofthe copulsory 7donation,7 easured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by ne&spaperpublishers &hether in cities or in nonFurban areas, ay be very substantial indeed. (Ephasis inoriginal)

8Common ood8 0oes %ot 5ustif2 ;nbridled

Ta6ing of #ran$hisee"s *road$ast Time

6i1e the 0uestioned resolution in PPI, 9ection $" contains no liit as to the aount and recurrence of the 7donation7 of air tie that Coeleccan deand fro radio and 4K stations. 4here are no guidelines or standards provided as to the choice of stations, tie and fre0uency ofairing, and progras to be aired. 4heoretically, Coelec can copel the use of all the air tie of a station. 4he fact that Coelec has note-ercised its granted po&er arbitrarily is iaterial because the la&, as &orded, adits of unbridled e-ercise.

A statute is considered void for overbreadth &hen 7it offends the constitutional principle thata governental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally sub3ect to stateregulations ay not be achieved by eans &hich s&eep unnecessarily broadly and therebyinvade the area of protected freedos.7 (&ic1ler v. Moota, $ 6 ed "d +++ ?$*=@). In aseries of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governental purpose belegitiate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by eans that broadly stiflefundaental personal liberties &hen the end can be ore narro&ly achieved. 4he breadth oflegislative abridgent ust be vie&ed in the light of less drastic eans for achieving thesae basic purpose.1'

In a $*% opinion, the Aerican 9upree Court ade clear that the absence of suchreasonable and definite standards in a legislation of its character is fatal. here, as in the

case of the above paragraphs, the a3ority of the Court could discern 7an overbreadth thata1es possible oppressive or capricious application7 of the statutory provisions, the linedividing the valid fro the constitutionally infir has been crossed. 9uch provisions offendthe constitutional principle that 7a governental purpose to control or prevent activitiesconstitutionally sub3ect to state regulation ay not be achieved by eans &hich s&eepunnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedos.7

It is undeniable, therefore, that even though the governental purpose be legitiate andsubstantial, they cannot be pursued by eans that broadly stifle fundaental personal


15/30

liberties &hen the end can be ore narro&ly achieved. >or precision of regulation is thetouchstone in an area so closely related to our ost precious freedos.1(

As a rule, a statute ay be said to be vague and invalid if 7it leaves la& enforces (in the case, the Coelec) unbridled discretion in carrying

out its provisions and becoes an arbitrary fle-ing of the governent uscle.7 1)

#oreover, the e-tent of the actual ta1ing of air tie is enorous, e-orbitant and unreasonable. In their #eorandu,

1*

petitioners allege(and this has not been rebutted at all) that during the $$" election period, G#A Net&or1 has been copelled to donate P"",+$%.:* &orthof advertising revenues2 and for the current election period, G#A stands to lose a staggering P:%,$%,%:. No&, clearly and ost obviously,these aounts are not inconse0uential or de minimis. 4hey constitute arbitrary ta1ing on a grand scaleO

Aerican 3urisprudence is replete &ith citations sho&ing that 7?l@egislative regulation of public utilities ust not have the effect of depriving ano&ner of his property &ithout due process of la&, nor of confiscating or appropriating private property &ithout due process of la&, nor ofconfiscating or appropriating private property &ithout 3ust copensation, nor of liiting or prescribing irrevocably vested rights or privileges

la&fully ac0uired under a charter or franchise.7 4he po&er to regulate is sub3ect to these constitutional liits.18

Conse0uently, 7rights under a

franchise cannot be ta1en or daaged for a public use &ithout the a1ing of 3ust copensation therefor.719

4o do so is clearly beyond the

po&er of the legislature to regulate.

::.Assuming That the State O/ns Air Lanes,

*road$ast Com(anies Alread2 !a2 Rental Therefor.

6et e grant for the oent and for the sa1e of arguent that the 9tate o&ns the air lanes and that, by its grant of a franchise, it should thusreceive copensation for the use of said fre0uencies. I say, ho&ever, that by reitting unreasonably high 7annual fees and charges,7 &hichas earlier stated aounts to illions of pesos yearly, television stations are in effect paying rental fees for the use (not 3ust the regulation) ofsaid fre0uencies. E-cept for the annual inspection conducted by the N4C, no other significant service is perfored by the governent ine-change for the enorous fees charged the stations. Evidently, the sus collected by the N4C e-ceed the cost of services perfored by it,

and are therefore ore properly understood as rental fees for the use of the fre0uencies granted the.2+

9ince the use of the air fre0uencies is already paid for annually by the broadcast entities, there is nobasis for the governent, through the Coelec, to copel unbridled donation of the air tie of saidcopanies &ithout due process and &ithout payent of 3ust copensation.

In fact, even in the case of stateFo&ned resources referred to earlier < li1e oil, inerals and coal I9CA4I/N of private property.

hat a1es the ta1ing of air tie even ore odious is its e9 (ost fa$to nature. hen the broadcast

copanies ac0uired their franchises and set up their e-pensive facilities, they &ere not infored ofthe iensity of the donations they are no& copelled to give.

Note should be ade, too, of the fact that &hat 9ection $" ta1es a&ay is air tie. Air tie is the7finished product7 after a station uses its o&n broadcast facilities. 4he fre0uency is lust the specific7route7 or 7channel7 by &hich this ediu reaches the 4K sets of the general public. 4echnically,therefore, the &holesale alteration by 9ection $" of all broadcast franchise &ould appear unrelatedto the copelled donations. hile the e-press odification is in the franchise, &hat 9ection $" reallydoes is that it ta1es a&ay the end product of the facilities &hich &ere set up through the use of theentrepreneurs8 investents and the broadcasters8 &or1.

E!:LO;E

By &ay of epilogue, I ust point out that even Respondent Coelec e-pressly recogni5es the needfor 3ust copensation. 4hus, 9ection " of its Resolution No. "$%!FA states that 7?e@very radiobroadcasting and television station operating under franchise shall grant the Coission, uponpayent of 3ust copensation, at least thirty (!) inutes of prie tie daily to be 1no&n as8Coelec 4ie8 . . .7 And yet, even &ith such a 3udicious legal position ta1en by the very agencytas1ed by the Constitution to adinister elections, the a3ority still insists on an arbitrary sei5ure ofprecious property produced and o&ned by private enterprise.

4hat Petitioner G#A is a viable, even profitable, enterpr ise2'

is no arguent for sei5ing its profits. 4he 9tate cannot rob the rich to feed the

poor in the guise of prooting the 7coon good.7 4ruly, the end never 3ustifies the eans.

It cannot be denied that the aount and the e-tent of the air tie deanded fro G#A is huge and

e-orbitant, aounting, I repeat, to over P:% illion for the $$% election season alone. If the air tiere0uired fro 7every radio and television station7 in the country in the agnitude stated in theaforesaid Coelec Resolution "$%!FA is added up and costed, the total &ould indeed be staggering< in several hundred illion pesos.

9ac1ing of undisguised discriination is the fact that in !!: vs. Comele$, this Court has re0uiredpayent of print edia ads but, in this case, copels broadcast stations to donate their end producton a assive scale. 4he siplistic distinction given < that radio and 4K stations are ere granteesof governent franchises &hile ne&spaper copanies are not < does not 3ustify the grand larcenyof precious air tie. 4his is a violation not only of private property, but also of the constitutional rightto e0ual protection itself. 4he proffered distinction bet&een print and broadcast edia is tooinsignificant and too flisy to be a valid 3ustification for the discriination. 4he print and broadcast

edia are e0ual in the sense that both derive their revenues principally fro paid ads. 4hey shouldthus be treated e0ually by the la& in respect of such ads.

4o su up, the Bill of Rights of our Constitution e-pressly guarantees the follo&ing rights;

. No person, &hether rich or poor, shall be deprived of property &ithout due process.2(

". 9uch property shall not be ta1en by the governent, even for the use of the general public, &ithout first paying 3ust copensation to the

o&ner.2)


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!. No one, regardless of social or financial status, shall be denied e0ual protection of the la&.2*

4he a3ority, ho&ever, pereptorily brushes aside all these sacred guarantees and prefers to rely on the nebulous legal theory thatbroadcast stations are ere recipients of stateFgranted franchises &hich can be altered or &ithdra&n anytie or other&ise burdened&ith(ost fa$toelephantine yo1es. By this shortFcircuited rationali5ation, the a3ority blithely ignores the private entrepreneurs8 billionFpesoinvestents and the broadcast professionals8 grit and toil in transforing these invisible franchises into erchandisable property2 andconveniently forgets the gri reality that the ta1ing of honestly earned edia assets is unbridled, e-orbitant and arbitrary. orse, the

governent,28

against &hich these constitutional rights to property &ere in the first place &ritten, prudently agrees to respect the and to

pay ade0uate copensation for their ta1ing. But ironically, the a3ority re3ects the e-eplary observance by the governent of the people8srights and insists on the confiscation of their private property.

I have al&ays believed that the 9upree Court is the ever vigilant guardian of the constitutionalrights of the citi5ens and their ultiate protector against the tyrannies of their o&n governent. I aafraid that by this unfortunate ecision, the a3ority, in this instance, has instead converted thishonorable and a3estic Court into the people8s un&itting oppressor.

ERE>/RE, I vote to GRAN4 the petition and to declare 9ection $" of the /nibus ElectionCode NC/N94I44I/NA6 and K/I.

!urisima, 5


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In the case of Small Lando/ners of the !hili((ines :n$. v. Se$retar2 of Agrarian Reform, &e found occasion to note that recent trends sho& aingling of the police po&er and the po&er of einent doain, &ith the latter being used as an ipleent of the forer li1e the po&er of

ta-ation. Citing the cases of *erman v.!ar6er*

and !enn Central Trans(ortation Co. v. %e/ @or6 Cit28

&here o&ners of the Grand Central

4erinal &ho &ere not allo&ed to construct a ultiFstory building to preserve a historic landar1 &ere allo&ed certain copensatory rights toitigate the loss caused by the regulation, this Court is Small Lando/ners of the !hili((ines, :n$. case held that easures prescribingretention liits for lando&ners under the Agrarian Refor 6a& involved the e-ercise of police po&er for the regulation of private property inaccordance &ith the constitution. And, &here to carry out the regulation, it becae necessary to deprive o&ners of &hatever lands they ayo&n in e-cess of the a-iu area allo&ed, the Court held that there &as definitely a ta1ing under the po&er of einent doain for &hichpayent of 3ust copensation &as iperative.

4he petition before us is no di fferent fro the aboveFcited case. Insofar as 9ee $" of BP %% read in con3unction &ith 9ec (b) of RA **+*restricts the sale or donation of airtie by radio and television stations during the capaign period to respondent Coelec, there is ane-ercise of police po&er for the regulation of property in accordance &ith the Constitution. 4o the e-tent ho&ever that 9ec $" of BP %%andates that airtie be provided free of charge to respondent Coelec to be allocated e0ually aong all candidates, the regulation

e-ceeds the liits of police po&er and should be recogni5ed as a ta1ing. In the case of !enns2lvania Coal v.Mahon,9ustice oles laiddo&n the liits of police po&er in this &ise,7 4he general rule is that &hile property ay be regulated to a certain e-tent, if the regulationgoes too far, it &ill be recogni5ed as a ta1ing.7

hile the po&er of einent doain often results in the appropriation of title to or possession of property, it need not al&ays be the case. It isa settled rule that neither ac0uisition of title nor total destruction of value is essential to ta1ing and it is usually in cases &here title reains&ith the private o&ner that in0uiry should be ade to deterine &hether the ipairent of a property is erely regulated or aounts to acopensable ta1ing. A regulation &hich deprives any person of the profitable use of his property constitutes a ta1ing and entitles hi tocopensation unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to perit the regulation to be 3ustified under the police po&er. 9iilarly, a policeregulation &hich unreasonably restricts the right to use business property for business purposes, aounts to ta1ing of pr ivate property and

the o&ner ay recover therefor.

1+

It is also settled 3urisprudence that ac0uisition of right of &ay easeent falls &ithin the purvie& of einentdoain.11

hile there is no ta1ing or appropriation of title to, and possession of the e-propriated property in the case at bar, there is copensableta1ing inasuch as the is a loss of the earnings for the airtie &hich the petitionerFintervenors are copelled to donate. It is a loss &hich,

to paraphrase !hili((ine !ress :nstitute v.Comele$,12

could hardly be considered 7de minimis7 if &e are to ta1e into account the onetary

value of the copulsory donation easured by the current advertising rates of the radio and television stations.

In the case of !hili((ine !ress :nstitute v. Comele$,13&e had occasion to state that ne&spapers and other pr int edia are not copelled to

donate free space to respondent Coelec inasuch as this &ould be in violation of the constitutional provision that no private property shallbe ta1en for public use &ithout 3ust copensation. e find no cogent reason &hy radio and television stations should be treated consideringthat their operating e-penses as copared to those of the ne&spaper and other print edia publishers involve considerably greater aountof financial resources.

4he fact that one needs a franchise fro governent to establish a radio and television station &hile no license is needed to start ane&spaper should not be ade a basis for treating broadcast edia any differently fro the pr int edia in copelling the forer to 7donate7airtie to respondent Coelec. hile no franchises and rights are granted e-cept under the condition that it shall be sub3ect to aendent,

alteration, or repeal by the Congress &hen the coon good so re0uires, 1'this provides no license for governent to disregard the cardinal

rule that corporations &ith franchises are as uch entitled to due process and e0ual protection of la&s guaranteed under the Constitution.

ACC/RING6H, I vote to declare 9ection $" of BP %% insofar as it andates that radio andtelevision tie be provided to respondent Coelec free of charge NC/N94I44I/NA6.

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting2

At issue in this case is the constitutionality of 9ection $" of the /nibus Election Code1

&hich copels all broadcast stations in the country

7to provide radio and television tie, free of $harge, during the period of the ?election@ capaigns,7 &hich the Coission on Elections shallallocate 7e0ually and ipartially aong the candidates . . .7 Petitioners contend, and I agree, that this legal provision is unconstitutionalbecause it confiscates private property &ithout due process of la& and &ithout payent of 3ust copensation, and denies broadcast ediae0ual protection of the la&.

In !hili((ine !ress :nstitute, :n$. (!!:)vs. Commission on Ele$tions,2this Court ruled that print edia copanies cannot be re0uired to

donate advertising space, free of charge, to the Coelec for e0ual allocation aong candidates, on the ground that such copulsory sei5ure

of print space is e0uivalent to a proscribed ta1ing of private property for public use &ithout payent of 3ust copensation. 3

4he Court8s a3ority in the present case, spea1ing through the distinguished #r. ustice Kicente K.#endo5a, holds, ho&ever, that the foregoing PPI doctrine applies only to print edia, not tobroadcast (radio and 4K) net&or1s, arguing that 7radio and television broadcasting copanies,&hich are given franchises, do not o&n the air&aves and fre0uencies through &hich they transit


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broadcast signals and iages. 4hey are erely given the teporary privilege of using the. 9ince afranchise is a ere privilege, the e-ercise of the privilege ay reasonably be burdened &ith theperforance by the grantee of soe for of public service.7 In other &ords, the a3ority theori5esthat the forced donation of air tie to the Coelec is a eans by &hich the 9tate gets copensationfor the grant of the franchise andJor the use of the air lanes.

ith all due respect, I disagree. 4he a3ority is relying on a theoretical distinction that does nota1e any real difference. 4heory ust yield to reality. I respectfully subit the follo&ing arguentsto support y dissent;

. 4he 9tate does not o&n the air&aves and broadcast fre0uencies. It erely allocates, supervisesand regulates their proper use. 4hus, other than collecting supervision or regulatory fees &hich italready does, it cannot e-act any onerous and unreasonable(ost fa$toburdens fro the franchiseholders, &ithout due process and 3ust copensation. #oreover, the invocation of the 7coongood7 does not e-cuse the unbridled and clearly e-cessive ta1ing of a franchisee8s property.

". Assuing arguendothat the 9tate o&ns the air lanes, the broadcasting copanies already payrental fees to the governent for their use. ence, the sei5ure of air tie cannot be 3ustified by the

theory of copensation.

!. Air&aves and fre0uencies alone, &ithout the radio and television o&ner8s huongous investentsaounting to billions of pesos, cannot be utili5ed for broadcasting purposes. ence, a forceddonation of broadcast tie is in actual fact a ta1ing of such investents &ithout due process and&ithout payent of 3ust copensation.

6et e e-plain further each of these arguents.

:. The State 0oes %ot O/n Air Lanes;

:t Merel2 Regulates Their !ro(er ;se2

8Common ood8 0oes %ot E9$use ;nbridled Ta6ing.

9ignificantly, the a3ority does not clai that the 9tate o&ns the air lanes. It erely contends that 7broadcasting, &hether by radio or bytelevision stations, is licensed by the governent. Air&ave fre0uencies have to be allocated as there are ore individuals &ho &ant tobroadcast than there are fre0uencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege sub3ect aong other thing . . . to aendent, alteration or

repeal by the Congress &hen the coon good so re0uires.7'

4rue enough, a 7franchise started out as a 8royal privilege or ?a@ branch of the

Ming8s prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a sub3ect.87(

Indeed, &hile the Constitution e-pressly provides that 7?a@ll lands of the public doain, &aters, ineral, coal, petroleu, and other ineraloils, all forces, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or tiber, &ildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are o&ned bythe 9tate,7 it is silent as to the o&nership of the air&aves and fre0uencies. It is then reasonable to say that no one o&ns the. 6i1e the air &ebreathe and the sunshine that sustains life, the air lanes theselves 7are not property because they cannot be appropriated for the benefit of

any individual,7)

but are to be used to the best advantage of all.

Because, as entioned earlier, there are ore prospective users than fre0uencies, the 9tate < inthe e-ercise of its police po&er < allocates, supervises and regulates their use, so as to derivea-iu benefit for the general public. 4he franchise granted by the legislature to broadcastingcopanies is essentially for the purpose of putting order in the use of the air&aves by assigning tosuch copanies their respective fre0uencies. 4he purpose is not to grant the the privilege of usingpublic property. >or, as earlier stated, air&aves are not o&ned by the governent.

Accordingly, the National 4elecounications Coission (N4C) &as tas1ed by la& toinstitutionali5e this regulation of the air lanes. 4o cover the adinistrative cost of supervision and


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regulation, the N4C levies charges, &hich have been revised up&ards in N4C #eorandu CircularNo. +F%F$+ dated August "*, $$+. In accordance &ith this Circular, Petitioner G#A Net&or1, Inc.,for the year $$*, paid the N4C P",%%,:$ of &hich P",:,==*.! &as N4C 7supervision andregulation fee,7 as borne out by its Audited Consolidated >inancial 9tateents for said year, on file&ith the 9ecurities and E-change Coission. In short, for its &or1 of allocation, supervision andregulation, the governent is ade0uately copensated by the broadcast edia through the payent

of fees unilaterally set by the forer.

#ran$hisee"s !ro(ert2 Cannot

*e Ta6en ?ithout 5ust Com(ensation

In staping unbridled donations &ith its ipriatur, the a3ority overloo1s the t&ofold nature and purpose of a franchise; other than servingthe public benefit &hich is sub3ect to governent regulation, it ust also be to the franchise holder8s advantage. /nce granted, a franchise

(not the air lanes) together &ith concoitant private rights, becoes property of the grantee.*

It is regarded by la& precisely as other

property and, as any other property, it is safeguarded by the Constitution fro arbitrary revocation or ipairent.8

4he rights under a

franchise can be neither ta1en nor curtailed for public use or purpose, even by the governent as the grantor, &ithout payent of 3ust

copensation9

as guaranteed under our fundaental la&.1+

4he fact that the franchise relates to public use or purpose does not entitle the

state to abrogate or ipair its use &ithout 3ust copensation.11

4he a3ority further clais that, constitutionally,12franchises are al&ays sub3ect to alteration by Congress, 7&hen the coon good so

re0uires.7 4he 0uestion then boils do&n to this; oes 9ection $" of the /nibus Election Code constitute a franchise odification for the7coon good,7 or an 7unla&ful ta1ing of private property7D 4o ans&er this 0uestion, I go bac1 to !hili((ine !ress :nstitute,

:n$.vs.Commission on Ele$tions, &here a unanious 9upree Court held;13

4o $om(elprint edia copanies to donate7Coelec space7 of the diensions specified in9ection " of Resolution No. "==" (not less than oneFhalf page), aounts to 7ta1ing7 of privatepersonal property for public use or purposes. 9ection " failed to specify the intendedfre7uen$2ofsuch copulsory 7donation;7 only on$eduring the period fro * #arch $$: (or " #arch $$:)until " #ay $$:D or everyday or once a &ee1D or as often as Coelec ay direct during thesae periodD 4he e-tent of the ta1ing or deprivation is not insubstantial2 this is not a case of a deminimisteporary liitation or restraint upon the use of private property. 4he onetary value ofthe copulsory 7donation,7 easured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by ne&spaper

publishers &hether in cities or in nonFurban areas, ay be very substantial indeed. (Ephasis inoriginal)

8Common ood8 0oes %ot 5ustif2 ;nbridled

Ta6ing of #ran$hisee"s *road$ast Time

6i1e the 0uestioned resolution in PPI, 9ection $" contains no liit as to the aount and recurrence of the 7donation7 of air tie that Coeleccan deand fro radio and 4K stations. 4here are no guidelines or standards provided as to the choice of stations, tie and fre0uency ofairing, and progras to be aired. 4heoretically, Coelec can copel the use of all the air tie of a station. 4he fact that Coelec has note-ercised its granted po&er arbitrarily is iaterial because the la&, as &orded, adits of unbridled e-ercise.

A statute is considered void for overbreadth &hen 7it offends the constitutional principle thata governental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally sub3ect to stateregulations ay not be achieved by eans &hich s&eep unnecessarily broadly and therebyinvade the area of protected freedos.7 (&ic1ler v. Moota, $ 6 ed "d +++ ?$*=@). In aseries of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governental purpose belegitiate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by eans that broadly stiflefundaental personal liberties &hen the end can be ore narro&ly achieved. 4he breadth oflegislative abridgent ust be vie&ed in the light of less drastic eans for achieving thesae basic purpose.1'


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In a $*% opinion, the Aerican 9upree Court ade clear that the absence of suchreasonable and definite standards in a legislation of its character is fatal. here, as in thecase of the above paragraphs, the a3ority of the Court could discern 7an overbreadth thata1es possible oppressive or capricious application7 of the statutory provisions, the linedividing the valid fro the constitutionally infir has been crossed. 9uch provisions offendthe constitutional principle that 7a governental purpose to control or prevent activities

constitutionally sub3ect to state regulation ay not be achieved by eans &hich s&eepunnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedos.7

It is undeniable, therefore, that even though the governental purpose be legitiate andsubstantial, they cannot be pursued by eans that broadly stifle fundaental personalliberties &hen the end can be ore narro&ly achieved. >or precision of regulation is thetouchstone in an area so closely related to our ost precious freedos.1(

As a rule, a statute ay be said to be vague and invalid if 7it leaves la& enforces (in the case, the Coelec) unbridled discretion in carrying

out its provisions and becoes an arbitrary fle-ing of the governent uscle.7 1)

#oreover, the e-tent of the actual ta1ing of air tie is enorous, e-orbitant and unreasonable. In their #eorandu,1*

petitioners allege

(and this has not been rebutted at all) that during the $$" election period, G#A Net&or1 has been copelled to donate P"",+$%.:* &orth

of advertising revenues2 and for the current election period, G#A stands to lose a staggering P:%,$%,%:. No&, clearly and ost obviously,these aounts are not inconse0uential or de minimis. 4hey constitute arbitrary ta1ing on a grand scaleO

Aerican 3urisprudence is replete &ith citations sho&ing that 7?l@egislative regulation of public utilities ust not have the effect of depriving ano&ner of his property &ithout due process of la&, nor of confiscating or appropriating private property &ithout due process of la&, nor ofconfiscating or appropriating private property &ithout 3ust copensation, nor of liiting or prescribing irrevocably vested rights or privileges

la&fully ac0uired under a charter or franchise.7 4he po&er to regulate is sub3ect to these constitutional liits.18

Conse0uently, 7rights under a

franchise cannot be ta1en or daaged for a public use &ithout the a1ing of 3ust copensation therefor.719

4o do so is clearly beyond the

po&er of the legislature to regulate.

::.Assuming That the State O/ns Air Lanes,

*road$ast Com(anies Alread2 !a2 Rental Therefor.

6et e grant for the oent and for the sa1e of arguent that the 9tate o&ns the air lanes and that, by its grant of a franchise, it should thusreceive copensation for the use of said fre0uencies. I say, ho&ever, that by reitting unreasonably high 7annual fees and charges,7 &hichas earlier stated aounts to illions of pesos yearly, television stations are in effect paying rental fees for the use (not 3ust the regulation) ofsaid fre0uencies. E-cept for the annual inspection conducted by the N4C, no other significant service is perfored by the governent ine-change for the enorous fees charged the stations. Evidently, the sus collected by the N4C e-ceed the cost of services perfored by it,

and are therefore ore properly understood as rental fees for the use of the fre0uencies granted the. 2+

9ince the use of the air fre0uencies is already paid for annually by the broadcast entities, there is nobasis for the governent, through the Coelec, to copel unbridled donation of the air tie of saidcopanies &ithout due process and &ithout payent of 3ust copensation.

In fact, even in the case of stateFo&ned resources referred to earlier < li1e oil, inerals and coal I99, 4E IR/NH /> 4E >REE 9PEEC "F! ($$*) (79urelythe state can be an oppressor, but it ay also be a source of freedo . . . In soeinstances, instruentalities of the state &ill try to stifle free and open debate, and the>irst Aendent is the triedFandFtrue echanis that stops or prevents such abuseof state po&er. In other instances, ho&ever, the state ay have to further therobustness of public debate . . . It ay have to allocate public resources . . . to those&hose voices &ould not other&ise be heard in the public s0uare.7)2 CA99 R.9N94EIN, E#/CRACH AN 4E PR/B6E# /> >REE 9PEEC :F: ($$!)(74he idea that threats to speech ste fro the governent is undoubtedly correct,but as usually understood, it is far too siple. 9oeties threats coe fro &hatsees to be the private sphere, and, uch ore fundaentally, these threats could

not be ade &ithout legal entitleents that enable soe private actors but not othersto spea1 and to be heard . . . ?Governent regulation@ ay therefore be necessary.7)

! CA99 R. 9N94EIN, id., at %: (ephasis added).

+ !" Phil. :+ ($:).

: 4he Court said;

Considerable e-penditures of public oney have been ade in the past andcontinue to be ade annually for the purpose of securing the safety of vessels plyingin Philippine &aters. ?ere the Court enuerated any governent facilities to a1e

the coast&ise transportation safe.@ Can it be fairly contended that a regulation isunreasonable &hich re0uires vessels licensed to engage in the interisland trade, in&hose behalf the public funds are so lavishly e-pended, to hold theselves inreadiness to carry the public ails &hen duly tendered for transportation, and to givesuch reasonable notice of their sailing hours as &ill insure the propt dispatch of allails ready for delivery at the hours thus designatedD :d., at ::".

* "+ 9CRA +%* ($$:).


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= $ 9CRA ==, =!+ ($$) (italics by the Court).

% >or e-aple, under the Radio Act (Act No. !%+*, as aended), the governentperfors, inter alia, the follo&ing functions;

9ec. !. 4he 9ecretary of Public or1s and Counications is hereby epo&ered,

to regulate the construction or anufacture, possession, control, sale and transfer orradio transitters or transceivers (cobination transitterFreceiver) and theestablishent, use, the operation of all radio stations and of all for of radiocounications and transissions &ithin the Philippines. In addition to the above heshall have the follo&ing specific po&ers and duties2

--- --- ---

(c) e shall assigns call letter and assign fre0uencies for each station licensed byhi for each station established by virtue of a franchise granted by the Congress ofthe Philippines and specify the stations to &hich each of such fre0uencies ay be

Telecomunications and Broadcast Atty. vs Gma Network

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Transcript of Telecomunications and Broadcast Atty. vs Gma Network