Technology Development, Design and Utilization …Design Specific/IRIS/Presentations/2011... ·...

Technology Development, Design and Utilization

Features of IRIS (OVERVIEW OF THE IRIS PROJECT)

prof. Marco E. Ricotti

Politecnico di Milano, Department of Energy, CeSNEF-Nuclear Engineering Division

Vienna, 05 october 2011

Technical Meeting on Options to

Enhance Energy Supply Security

using NPPs based on SMRs

IAEA, Vienna, 3 – 6 October 2011


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

2 Foreword:

Small-Medium Modular Reactors?

An hazardous proposal up to few years ago:

Economy of scale penalty

Potential interest but limited to: emerging countries-markets (low financial

availability, electrical grids not interconnected or/and not developed) +

S-Kor + RUS

Recently, a change of perspective occurred even in the largest nuclear

countries: USA (DoE programme on SMRs, to support US industries &

economy), France.

Main reasons of interest:

Reduced financial

and construction

risks

SAFETY


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

3 Small-Medium Modular Reactors ?...

IRIS

mPower

SMART

COMMUNIQUÉ

Le Président de la République a réuni lundi 21 février 2011 le Conseil de Politique Nucléaire.

…

En outre, le ministre chargé de l’Energie, avec l’appui du CEA et des autres administrations concernées, conduira un

groupe de travail chargé d’étudier les aspects techniques, juridiques, et économiques des projets de

réacteurs de faible puissance (100 à 300MW).

FlexBlue


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

4 IPWR-SMRs in the generations’ evolution

IPWR SMRs


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

5 The IRIS (International Reactor Innovative &

Secure) project: history & development

Growing interest on the project: at 2009, 20 partners from 10 countries

Key italian contribution

2010: Westinghouse decided to abandon the initiative, to develop its own alternative design (aiming at getting DoE funding)

The IRIS project kept on going by Italy-Croatia-Japan partners, mainly for large scale testing (SIET)

Westinghouse, MIT, Oak Ridge Nat.Lab. (UCBerkeley)

Ansaldo Nucleare, Politecnico di Milano,

Univ. di Pisa, Politecnico di Torino, ENEA,

Mangiarotti Nuclear, Maire Tecnimont, ATB Riva Calzoni

Rolls Royce

CNEN research center, NUCLEP Industries

ENSA Industries, Empresarios Agrupados

Univ. of Zagreb

Tokyo Inst.of Technology

Lithuanian Energy Institute

ININ research center

EESTI Energia


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

6 History of IRIS

2000

2010

09/09/1999, kick-off meeting at MIT:Westinghouse, MIT, UCBerkeley, POLIMI


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

7 Original Team and assignments

INDUSTRY Westinghouse USA Overall coordination, core design, safety analyses, licensing,

commercialization BNFL* UK Fuel and fuel cycle Ansaldo Energia / Ansaldo Italy Steam generators design Ansaldo Nucleare / Camozzi / Mangiarotti Italy Steam generators fabrication ENSA – (ATB Riva Calzoni) Spain – (Italy) Pressure vessel and internals NUCLEP – (ATB Riva Calzoni) Brazil – (Italy) Containment, pressurizer (Rolls Royce) UK Control rod drive mechanisms LABORATORIES ORNL USA I&C, PRA, desalination, shielding, pressurizer CNEN Brazil Pressurizer design, transient analyses, desalination ININ Mexico PRA, neutronics support LEI Lithuania PRA, district heating co-generation ENEA - SIET Italy Testing, integral facility, seismic, shielding UNIVERSITIES

Polytechnic of Milan Italy Safety analyses, shielding, thermal hydraulics, steam generators design, internal CRDMs, economics, bio-fuel co-generation

MIT USA Advanced cores, maintenance Tokyo Inst. of Technology Japan Advanced cores, PRA, seismic University of Zagreb Croatia Neutronics, safety analyses University of Pisa Italy Containment analyses, severe accident analyses, neutronics, CFD,

seismic Polytechnic of Turin Italy Source term, thermal hydraulics (Georgia Institute of Technology) USA Advanced core designs; shielding; dose reduction POWER PRODUCERS AND ARCHITECT ENGINEER COMPANIES (Bechtel)* - SAIPEM, Maire Tecnimont (USA) - Italy BOP, AE (TVA)* USA Maintenance, utility perspective Eletronuclear Brazil Developing country utility perspective (Empresarios Agrupados) Spain AE (Esti Energia) Estonia Smaller country/grid utility perspective


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

8 UP TO 2010,

IRIS: REFERENCE SMR DESIGN FOR US DoE


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

9 The IRIS approach

Driven by simplicity to ensure safety and economy

Uses proven light water technology

Implements engineering innovations, new solutions,

but does not require new/breakthrough technology development

SAFETY ECONOMY

SIMPLICITY


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

10 IRIS Three-Tier Safety

Safety-by-Design™

-Aims at eliminating by design possibility for accidents to occur,

-at reducing probability of occurrence for remaining accidents,

-at reducing consequences.

-Eliminates systems/components that were needed to deal with those

accidents.

Passive Safety Systems

-Protect against still remaining accidents and mitigate their consequences.

-Fewer and simpler than in passive LWRs.

Active Safety Systems

-No active safety systems are required.

-But, active non-safety systems contribute to reducing the probability of

CDF (Core Damage Frequency).

IMPROVES SAFETY WHILE SIMPLIFYING DESIGN


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

11 IRIS: integral solution for primary system

Integral solution allows for:

elimination of external piping and components,


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

12 IRIS: integral solution and reduced size

containment



adoption of a compact containment

reduce NPP dimensions




IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

13 IRIS Design Features

Integral PWR module 335 MWe,

Safety-by-DesignTM approach

Long Life Core (~4 years, no

maintenance outage within it)

8 helical-coil steam generators

(compressed tubes, no crud: no Stress

Corrosion Cracking)

8 axial flow fully immersed primary

coolant pumps (low P, no leakages,

no maintenance, self-cooled, already

used at 500°C in chemical industry)

Internal Control Rod Drive

Mechanisms (no penetrations/leakages,

no Rod Ejection Accident)

Integral Pressurizer (high prz volume /

reactor power ratio, no sprays)

CDF 10-8 event/r y (internal+seismic)


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

14 IRIS: Containment Vessel integrated into

Safety Strategy

Pressure Suppression Containment,

spherical, steel, 25 m diam.

Design Pressure 15 bar (rel.)

Suppression Pool limit peak pressure

to 9 bar (rel.); water injection by gravity

in case of LOCA

Self-limiting LOCA due to containment-

RPV pressure equalization

Heat-sink: external air cooling of steel

shell rejects heat to atmosphere

Auxiliary building seismically isolated

Containment Vessel and Safet Systems:

international patent Westinghouse-

POLIMI


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

15 IRIS: Safety-by-Design™ implementation

IRIS Design Characteristic

Safety Implication Accidents Affected Condition IV Design

Basis Events EEEffffffeeecccttt ooonnn CCCooonnndddiiittt iiiooonnn IIIVVV EEEvvveeennnttt

bbbyyy IIIRRRIIISSS SSSaaafffeeetttyyy---bbbyyy---DDDeeesssiiigggnnn

Integral layout No large primary piping Large break Loss of Coolant

Accidents (LOCAs)

Large break LOCA EElliimmiinnaatteedd

Large, tall vessel

Increased water inventory Increased natural circulation Accommodates internal Control Rod Drive Mechanisms (CRDMs)

Other LOCAs

Decrease in heat removal various events

Control rod ejection, head penetrations failure

Spectrum of control rod ejection accidents

EElliimmiinnaatteedd

Heat removal from inside the vessel

Depressurizes primary system by condensation and not by loss of mass Effective heat removal by Steam Generators (SG)/Emergency High Removal System (EHRS)

LOCAs

LOCAs

All events for which effective cooldown is required

Anticipated Transients Without Screen (ATWS)

Reduced size, higher design pressure containment

Reduced driving force through primary opening

LOCAs

Multiple, integral, shaftless coolant pumps

Decreased importance of single pump failure No shaft

Locked rotor, shaft seizure/ break

Loss of Flow Accidents (LOFAs)

Reactor coolant pump shaft break Reactor coolant pump seizure

EElliimmiinnaatteedd

DDoowwnnggrraaddeedd

Steam generator tube rupture


High design pressure steam generator system

No SG safety valves Primary system cannot over-pressure secondary system Feed/Steam System Piping designed for full Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure reduces piping failure probability

Steam generator tube rupture

Steam line break

Feed line break

Once through steam generators

Limited water inventory Feed line break

Steam line break

Steam system piping failure Feedwater system pipe break



Integral pressurizer Large pressurizer volume/reactor power

Overheating events, including feed line break

ATWS

Fuel handling accidents UUnnaaffffeecctteedd


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

16

AUX. T.B.

BLDG.

IRIS - Schematic of Engineered Safeguards Features

Main Steam Line (1 of 4)

Isolation Valves

Main Feed Line (1 of 4)

Isolation Valves

SG

Make

up

Tank

P/H P/H

P/H P/H

EHRS

Heat Exchanger Refueling Water Storage

Tank (1 of 1)

Start Up FeedWater

Steam Generator

(1 of 8)

FO FO

Suppression

Pool (1 0f 6)

ADS/PORV

(1 of 1)

Long Term Core Makeup

from RV Cavity

(1 of 2)

Steam

Vent

RCP

(1 of 8)

SG Steam Lines

(2 of 8)

SG Feed

Water Lines

(2 of 8)

FO FO

Safety

Valve

Safety

Valve

RV Cavity

Suppression

Pool Gas

Space

Integral

Reactor

Vessel

Emergency Heat Removal

System (EHRS)

1 of 4 Subsystems

DVI

EBT(1 0f 2)

IRIS: Safety systems

LTCS

Long term cooling system (LTCS)

EBT

Emergency boration tanks (EBTs) with direct vessel injection (DVI)

ADS

Small automatic depressurization system (ADS)

PSS

Containment pressure suppression system (PSS)

EHRS

Passive emergency heat removal system (EHRS)


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

17 IRIS: SBLOCA safety strategy

High pressure suppression containment + primary vessel + passive

safety systems coupling:


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

18

Safety strategy-solutions:

International Patent

WEC-POLIMI


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

19

Radial fast neutron flux profile

LOOP PWRs

IRIS

IRIS: Pressure Vessel Embrittlement

eliminated

SG modules Downcomer water thickness (core-vessel): 1.7 m

Fast n flux on vessel: ~105 times less than in current PWRs → “Cold vessel”

External dose practically avoided

No embrittlement, no surveillance

“Aeternal” Vessel

Decommissioning

simplified


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

20 IRIS: Risk-Informed PROCESS

Deterministic safety analysis and PSA calculation during the

development of the preliminary design

DESIGN/SAFETY

ANALYSIS TEAM

PSA TEAM

Providing IRIS

system data (initial)

Incorporation of

changes in design

PSA Procedure

“Risk-informed Design” procedure

Providing IRIS

system data (update)

Identification of high

risk scenarios

Analysis of system/component

reliability

Analysis of

identified sequences

Identification of sequences

requiring analysis

Recommend changes to

improve PSA results


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

21 IRIS: Risk-Informed process – CDF

reduction

1.00E-09

1.00E-08

1.00E-07

1.00E-06

1.00E-05

2003 2004 2005 2006

1.90E-6

2.38E-8

Design development PSA Design development PSA …


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

22 IRIS: auxiliary building seismically isolated

Numerical and experimental study:

120 rubber-steel isolators (High Damping Rubber

Bearings-HDRBs), 1 m diam, 84 mm height

PGA = 0.3 g, isolation frequency = 0.7 Hz

- lateral displacements < 12 cm

- 25% reduction PGA at vessel supports level,

5 times reduction at roof level

HDRB experimental campaign already carried out

50 m

23 m

22 m

21 m

56 m

~ 1 m gap

Ground level

Horizontal Fail-safe System

Flood level

~ 1 m thick

HDRBs


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

23 IRIS: results of the Safety-by-Design™ &

Risk-Informed approaches

Criterion Typical

Advanced LWRs IRIS

Defense-in-Depth (DID)

Redundant and/or

diverse active

systems or Passive

systems

No active systems;

Safety-by-Design™

with fewer passive safety systems

Class IV Design Basis

Events

8 typically

considered

Only 1 remains Class IV

(fuel handling accident)

Core Damage

Frequency (CDF)

~10-5 - 10-7 events

per year

~10-8 events

per year

Large Early Release

Frequency (LERF)

~10-6 - 10-8 events

per year

~10-9 events

per year


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

24 IRIS: EPZ reduction

Risk-Informed approach: No Emergency Planning Zone

Elimination or strong reduction (NPP fences) of the Emergency Planning

Zone

New procedure developed: Deterministic + Probabilistic evaluation of

the EPZ, as a function of the radiation dose limit and the NPP safety

level

Procedure developed within a IAEA CRP; discussed with NRC

US Emergency Planning

Zone: 10 miles

CAORSO site

France Evacuation

Zone: 5 km

IRIS: 1 km


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

Co-generation: Desalination, District

Heating, Ethanol production

25


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

Ethanol + Desalination: Outputs and Energy

Balance

26

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

250,000 m3/d

300,000 m3/d

240,000 m3/d

200 MMgal/y

200 MMgal/y

200 MMgal/y

200 MMgal/y

Exchanged Thermal Power

Ethanol

256 MWth

(10% Surge

capacity) 270 MWe

Ethanol + HP bleeding

385 MWth

(10% Surge

capacity)

240 MWe

Desalination

520 MWth

208 MWe

Ethanol

253 MWth

(10% Surge

capacity)

110 MWe Desalination

635 MWth

Ethanol + HP bleeding

389 MWth

(10% Surge

capacity)

105 MWe Desalination

506 MWth


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

27 IRIS: experimental campaigns on sg and

safety systems (basic set)

ENEA + Universities in collaboration with SIET labs

(Piacenza)

1. Steam generator helical coil tubes – full scale

2. EHRS passive safety systems – scaled on

power/volume


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

28 IRIS: large scale integral test (licensing)

3. IRIS Integral Test Facility

Full scale in height – temperature –

pressure

Scaled 1:100 in power – volumes

Testing of most accident scenarios

Validation of codes and behavior of

passive safety systems and

containment-vessel coupling

> 700 measurement points, new

instrumentation developed

2010: scaling phase and design phase

completed

2011: site preparation and control room

completed

2012: start construction phase

RWSTAB RWSTC

DW

RV

PSSA RC

LGMSB EBTB

QT

PSSB

EBTA LGMSA

EHRSC

EHRSA,B


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

SPES3 nodalization: Primary, secondary

and RWST

(11/21)


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

SPES3 nodalization: containment (12/21)


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

IRIS R&D on SMRs’ ECONOMICS

Multi-dimensional concept:

QUANTITATIVE FACTORS: Technological + Financials.

Discounted Cash Flow Model captures: Net Present Value, Internal Rate of Return, Levelized Unit Electricity Cost, Pay Back Time, etc.

RISK EVALUATION: uncertainties in the input/output parameters.

Sensitivity to different scenario conditions, different investment strategies

Stochastic distribution of input/output parameters and variance analysis

“EXTERNAL FACTORS”: non-monetary strengths and weaknesses, not fully quantifiable, but relevant for the success of the project.

Typical features of strategic projects

31

Approaches to assess

competitiveness of Small

and Medium sized

Reactors

IAEA-TECDOC-????


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

32 INCAS as a tool for an integrated

evaluation

32

INtegrated model for the Competitiveness Analysis of Small-medium modular

reactors

INCAS conceived for the competitiveness analysis of SMRs vs. LR (IRIS project and IAEA CRP)

Economic parametric model to calculate capital costs

“Economy of Multiples” vs. “Economy of Scale”


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

33 INVESTMENT MODEL: parametric model for

capital costs

33

Factors Factors

j Assumes single unit and same design concept

k Savings in cost for multiple units at same site

l Cost reduction due to learning

m Shorter construction time

n Gradual capacity increase

to meet demand growth

o Cost reduction due

to specific design

Multiple Multiple

Unit Unit

Factors Factors k

m Construct Construct . .

Schedule Schedule

Factors Factors

l Learning Learning

Curve Curve

Factors Factors

n Unit Unit

Timing Timing

Factors Factors

o Plant Plant

Design Design

Factors Factors € €

€ €

€ €

€ €

€ €

€ €

€ € Present Value

Capital Cost

“SMR Design”

Plant Capacity [MWe] 0 300 600 900 1200 1500

| | | | | |

j Assumes single site and same design concept

k Co-siting economies for multiple units on the

same site

l On site learning process

m Modularization and factory

fabrication

n Investment scalability and lower PBT

o Cost saving due to specific design

Multiple Multiple

Unit Unit

Factor Factor k

Multiple Multiple

Unit Unit

Factor Factor k

m . .

S

Factor Factor m

. .

Saving Saving

l Learning Learning

Curve Curve

Factor Factor l

n n Timing Timing Factor Factor

o Plant Plant

Design Design

Factors Factors o

Plant Plant

Design Design

Factors Factors € €

€ €

€ €

€ €

€ €

€ €

€ € Present Value

Capital Cost

“SMR Design”

Constr

uctio

n c

ost

[€/K

we]

Plant 0 300 600 900 1200 1500

| | | | | |

Modularisation


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

34 INVESTMENT MODEL: parametric model for

capital costs

34


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

35

Revenue Model: based on capacity factor (differential between LR and SMR) and

constant electricity price in real monetary terms

INCAS-revenue model could be linked to country-specific forecast models

(electricity price time series)

Financial Model: based on Discounted Cash Flow with cash-transfer mechanism

between successive NPP units

“Construction of a new NPP is financed first with cash flow from operation of

early deployed units (self-financing), then with new debt and equity financing

mix”

“Top-Down” approach (substantial lack of suitable, open data on current SMR projects)

INVESTMENT MODEL: other modelling

assumptions

Design Saving factor: “expert elicitation”, base assumption: lower NPP size enhanced design simplification

O&M and D&D: (dis)economy of scale for SMRs, learning and co-siting economies apply as well

35

Diseconomy of scale and co-siting

economies on D&D costs


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

36

36

NPP deployment strategy: construction schedule and siting

Scenario Specific Data “SUPPORTED CASE” “MERCHANT CASE”

Cost of Debt 5% 7,5%

Financing mix 20% equity

80% debt

50% equity

50% debt

Cost of Equity 10% 15%

Tax rate 35% 35%

Financing scheme Project financing Corporate financing

Overnight construction cost :

standard LWR 1,000MWe

stand alone = 3,000 €/kWe

Reactor-specific data LR SMR

Size (Mwe) 1,340 335

Capacity factor (%) 93% 95%

Design saving factor (%) 100% 85%

Modularisation factor (%) 100% 86,84%

O&M costs (€/MWh) - 1,2 x LR’s O&M costs

D&D costs (€/MWh) - 2 x LR’s D&D annual provision

Fuel costs (€/MWh) - Same as LR’s

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

site#1 LR#1

SMR#1

SMR#2

SMR#3

SMR#4

site

#1

6 7 81 2 3 4 5

4 SMRs versus 1 LR


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

37

37

“SUPPORTED CASE” “MERCHANT CASE”

LR 4SMRs LR 4SMRs

Upfront Equity investment [Debt + Equity, M€] 4,676 3,867 4,665 3,678

Self-financing [M€] n.a. 396 n.a. 569

Total Equity investment [M€] 846 726 2,115 1,729

Total interest expenses on bank’s loans [M€], of which: 1,778 1,337 1,766 1,244

Interests During Construction [M€] 447 236 436 220

% self-financing on total investment n.a. 9% n.a. 13%

LR, MERCHANT CASE 4 SMRs, MERCHANT CASE

Example of deployment scenario:

4 SMRs versus 1 LR


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

38 Conclusions on economics

INCAS conceived as a tool for comparative evaluation of economic performance of SMR versus LR: “Economy of multiples” vs. “Economy of Scale”.

Preliminary results: “scenarios seem to exist where deployment of multiple SMRs may compensate for loss of economy of scale (vs. LR of equivalent power), i.e. economic performance gap reduction”

INCAS ver.1.1 is currently under testing / validation at IAEA-PESS and at JRC-Petten.

Further developments:

from “Top-Down” to “Bottom-Up” approach (SMR design - related costs breakdown)

uncertainties/sensitivity analysis & risk evaluation

external factors & MADM

real options model

38


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

39 The “IRIS Universities”

& Associated Universities:

University of California Berkeley

Ohio State University

University of Tennessee

University of Michigan

Iowa State University

University of Illinois

CIR

TE

N


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

40 Universities’ role in the IRIS project

Students’ collaboration – How:

Within University labs and/or through Company internships

Thesis work (3-6-12 months)

PhD program (6 months-3 years)

Post-graduation period (6 month-1 year)

Formal agreements (students exchange) among U-IRIS;

formal/informal agreements with Companies

>120 students worked on IRIS

500 papers co-authored by students&professors

Professors/permanent researchers involved: >25


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

41 Dimension of the students’ involvement

University Under-graduate Master Doctorate&

post-doc

FER - Univ. of Zagreb 3 1 3

Georgia Tech 2

Massachusetts Inst. of Technology 1 4 1

Polytechnic of Milan (CIRTEN) 1 28 10

Polytechnic of Turin (CIRTEN) 3

Univ. of Pisa (CIRTEN) 28 8 1

Tokyo Inst. of Technology 6 6

Univ. of California at Berkeley 2

Univ. of Tennessee 1 4

Ohio State Univ. 4 1

Univ. of Michigan 6 2

Sub-total 40 63 22

TOTAL 125


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

42 Feedbacks from ten years of SMR R&D

activity

“(re)think different” - a non-bias approach

innovation - no technological jump

international cooperation and team

involve young, talented, motivated people

address all items at the same time (“parallel & loop design”)


IAEA - Vienna

05 October 2011

43 CRITICAL ITEMS

on the path to deployment:

consortium ? (to share endeavour burden, risks, R&D

activities; to prepare for international market)

licensing & testing (especially if PASSIVE safety

systems/features are adopted)

FOAK deployment (in one consortium country, before

entering international market)

What about post-Fukushima?...

Could be SMRs a useful contribution/product to find a “way out”?...

Technology Development, Design and Utilization …Design Specific/IRIS/Presentations/2011... ·...

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