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Technology as a Bargaining Power: Japan’s Possible Future Diplomatic Tool

1. Introduction: Japan has struggled with energy self-sufficiency ever since the beginning of industrialization. Even though Japan is the third largest world economy, it lacks domestic production of commodities, such as fossil fuels. In order to sustain its economy, the country has to import a significant amount of natural resources (Graph 1 and 2). In fact, Japan is currently the world's largest importer of LNG, second largest importer of coal and the third largest net importer of oil.i Due to the volatility of the oil price and resource supply from abroad, the Japanese government has aimed for diversification of both suppliers and energy resources. Despite the policy of energy diversification, Japan’s energy mix is not diversified efficiently. While fossil fuels supply 70-80% of Japan’s energy, crude oil accounts for approximately 40% of Japan’s energy mix (Graph 3). Moreover, Japan relies on 70-80% of its oil import from the Persian Gulf (Graph 4). The reduction of CO2 emissions and import dependency had driven Japan’s energy policy to pay special attention to nuclear energy. Currently, Japan holds 54 nuclear reactors that supplied approximately 30% of Japan’s electricity in the late 2000s. However, the historic earthquake and tsunami caused significant damage to Fukushima Daiichi on March 11, 2011. This disaster has forced Japan to replace a part of nuclear power with fossil fuels temporally and increased Japan’s dependency on the Persian Gulf (Graph 5). In order to secure its national interests over natural resources, it is appropriate to recommend foreign policy utilizing Japan’s advanced technology as a bargaining power against other states to secure natural resources and gain market share. This paper at first discusses the Sakhalin-II project in the Russian Federation to demonstrate the needs of technology as a bargaining power to strengthen Japan’s economic and energy interests. The paper later highlights some of the Japanese technology that Japan could use as leverage, such as methane hydrate and algae. At the end, this paper explores which division of the Japanese government can conduct or collaborate to conduct such a policy. 2. Why Do We Need Technology as a Bargaining Power? Japan needs to gain a strong control over the private sector and regulate the leakage of technology to foreign firms and other states in order to maximize resource acquisition around the globe. While the Japanese government intends to secure natural resources abroad, it can suggest the private sector guidance through METI but cannot control or support it fully for its national interests at this point. This

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limitation actually led Japan to the failure of strong control over natural resources in the Sakhalin Island, which is said to contain 14 billion barrels (2.2 km³) of oil and 96 trillion cubic feet (2,700 km³) of gas.ii Japan participated in the Sakhalin-2 project, an oil and gas development in Sakhalin Island, Russia (Picture 1). Though Russia is reluctant to invite foreign investor in oil/gas reserves to secure its political interest and maintain its monopoly, the Sakhalin is one of the most challenging regions to extract natural resources in Russia; the cold weather can freeze the sea over the winter and increase risk to the drilling rigs.iii In addition to harsh weather, Russian companies have to work off-shore in the Sakhalin. In order to extract natural resource and export LNG from the Sakhalin, the Soviet Union actually allowed Japanese companies to explore the Sakhalin in 1975.iv After the Cold War, Russia signed Production Sharing Agreement (PSA), contract signed between governments and resource extraction companies over distribution of the extracted resource from the country to each entity. For the Sakhalin II project, Shell, Mitsubishi and Mitsui signed PSA and developed Russia’s first LNG facility on the southern Sakhalin since these firms are experienced with technology and project to extract oil and gas in such a harsh environment.v The Sakhalin II project was the first and only PSA project without Russian partner.vi In total, this project cost $20-22 billion.vii In 2000, Shell shared 55% of equity from this project; Mitsui held 25%; and Mitsubishi owned 20%.viii Mitsui was eager about this project and commented on the potential of the Sakhalin; “Utilizing rich natural resources in the Sakhalin, we would like to found a rigid system of Japan’s long-term (30 years and beyond) energy supply from the Far East.”ix While foreign private sectors ran the Sakhalin II project, the Russian government protected its interests over the Sakhalin by suspending the project for its environmental harm in 2006.x As the Sakhalin-II project was conducted under harsh weather, the suspension of the project could cause risk associated with the increase in construction fee as well as duration of construction.xi As a result, Shell had to add Gazprom as a partner and offered 50% equity of the project to Gazprom in December, 2006.xii Mitsui and Mitsubishi also had to agree with the Russian government to accept Gazprom as a partner. Shell lost its share from 55% to 27.5%, while Mitsui lost from 25% to 12.5%; Mitsubishi lost from 20% to 10%.xiii While Gazprom had to pay $10-11 billion (50% of the entire $20-22 billion project), Gazprom paid only $7.45-8.45 billion.xiv As a result, Gazprom secured gas reserves that foreign private firms extracted by non-existent technology in Russia. While Gazprom gained a great benefit, Shell, Mitsubishi and Mitsui had to share a burden of the remaining

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$2.55- 3.55 billion. Since the Sakhalin belongs to Russia, it is difficult for Japan to influence the Sakhalin II project. However, Japan could have supported both Mitsubishi and Mitsui in this project by suspending technological assistance, as Russian engineers have little experience in LNG plant. Even though Gazprom and Russia pressured Shell, Japan could have conducted policy to negotiate with Shell over the issue through the two Japanese firms and not provided specific information about facilities to Gazprom. Although the Russian government wants to secure its control over the reserve in the Sakhalin, it is impossible for Russia to extract natural resources and export natural gas without equity and technology from these firms. Even though Russia had advantage in this case, it was worth an attempt at that time. Especially since energy security is a pivotal of part of Japan’s national interest, Japan should have influenced Mitsubishi and Mitsui to maximize possibility to secure benefit and natural resources in the Sakhalin. Given the urgency of Japan’s energy demand, Japan cannot afford to repeat tragedy like the one from the Sakhalin II project. In order to strengthen its power abroad and its market share, Japan has to restrict the leakage of new technology and utilize it for its national interest and market share around the globe. The next section discusses such technology including methane hydrate and algae biofuel. 3. Japan’s Advanced Technology (1) Methane Hydrate Though Japan’s mainland lacks a substantial amount of natural resources, Japan’s maritime and its neighboring area are said to contain a large amount of methane hydrate (Map 1). This methane-hydrate is also said to be present near these three disputed areas. This substance is methane trapped within a crystal structure of water, forming a solid similar to ice. It also is called methane ice and fire ice for its characteristics of burning in the air and leaving only water.xv When 1 cubic meter of methane hydrate is resolved, 160~170 cubic meters of methane gas are produced under 0o.xvi Since methane gas is a new form of natural gas, methane hydrate can contribute to the energy future of Japan and the world. Owning to its urgency to reduce dependency on resource imports, Japan has accomplished significant research in this field. According to Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC), Japan has started its fundamental research since the early 1990s.xvii METI also publicized Japan’s plan on methane hydrate in

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2001.xviii JOGMEC, Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) and other organizations have collaborated each other to improve methane hydrate to economically feasible and marketable through “Methane Hydrate Resource Development Research Consortium” (MH21).xix Accomplishments at Phase 1 (2001-2008) include assessment on environmental impact, production technology and decomposition.xx During this phase, MH21 also discovered methane hydrate around the eastern Nankai Trough (Map 1). This plan also focuses on Sandy layer pore-filling methane hydrate, since there is a possibility that the existing technology for conventional oil and gas can be applied for this type of methane hydrate.xxi During this phase, Japan also succeeded in decomposing methane hydrate under the layer and extracting only methane hydrate from underground by de-pressurizing method (Picture 2). Japan tested this method in harsh cold weather of the northwestern Canada and demonstrated the effectiveness of this method; it is the first successful case in the world.xxii Koichi Kitazawa states that it is also possible to extract methane hydrate by turning it into sherbet, although there is no such conventional technology yet.xxiii MH21 has started its Phase 2 since 2009 and hopes to accomplish off-shore production by 2015.xxiv The goal includes off-shore production test, commercial demonstration of technological challenges, the discovery of economic and efficient extraction method, further investigation of methane hydrate present in the water around Japan, assessment method on environmental impact through off-shore production, as well as further research on potential economic safety of off-shore methane hydrate in Japan’s maritime.xxv Phase 3 or the final phase aims to commercialize methane hydrate in 2018 by previous studies from Phase 1 and 2.xxvi While Japan has conducted research on methane hydrate, other countries also have invested in this technology as well. In this regard, it may seem that Japan will not be the most experienced in this technology. However, it is likely that Japan will be as such in the near future. For instance, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) also announced its successful testing in extracting methane hydrate by injecting a mixture of CO2 and nitrogen into the formation.xxvii This technique was developed through laboratory collaboration between the University of Bergen, Norway, and ConocoPhillips.xxviii The DOE collaborated with ConocoPhillips and JOGMEC to conduct the test.xxix As the DOE asked for JOGMEC for this test, it demonstrates that the U.S. credits Japan with advancement in this particular technology. In this respect, Japan has leverage in this field at this moment.

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China also succeeded in marine geological survey of methane hydrate in the northern slope of South China Sea in 2007.xxx The conduct include drilling, wire-line logging, in-situ temperature measurement, pore water sampling, pressurized and non-pressurized coring, and other matters. China hopes to commercialize methane hydrate from 2020-2025.xxxi Since JOGMEC aims to start this commercialization from 2018, Japan can still take advantage of this technology two to seven years earlier than China. Japan has to commercialize it effectively and create its strong market share in the new global market before China and other states intervene in the market. Once Japan founds market system specifically for this product around the globe, the other states cannot change the norm of the market easily unless their new product is more economically competitive. When methane hydrate is commercialized, Japan can not only reduce its dependency on LNG imports but also will become a leading country with this technology. Since methane hydrate is abundant around the globe relative to conventional oil and gas (Map 2), the fact that Japan is experienced in this technology can also grant Japan leverage for future extraction of methane hydrate and diversification of energy supplies. In addition, it contributes to the reduction of CO2 emissions, as natural gas produces less CO2 emissions than crude oil and coal. Thus, technology related to methane hydrate will be Japan’s comparative advantage around the globe and can serve as a strong political tool against states that aim to extract methane hydrate. (2) Algae Along with methane hydrate, biofuel made from algae can serve as leverage for Japan in the long-term future. Botryococcus braunii is a type of algae that produce C24H48 through photosynthesis.xxxii Since C24H48 is a large compound of hydrocarbon, it can be used as biofuel. Algae can produce biofuels with comparative advantage to the others made from palm, rice and sugar cane. Algae, unlike the other commodities, do not substitute food supply to market.xxxiii Algae can also survive with wastewater and seawater.xxxiv In other words, they can absorb CO2 from polluted regions, such as those near power plants and contribute to the reduction of CO2 emissions through photosynthesis. Algae biofuel can also be produced in much larger quantity than that of the other commodities (Graph 9).Since algae can be converted to hydrocarbon, there is potential to refine algae into other petro-chemical products.xxxv In addition, these algae can be the key to future infinite biofuel production, as long as the sun is present.xxxvi It can also contribute to biotechnology related to photosynthesis.xxxvii Since transportation accounts for approximately 40% of Japan’s oil consumption (Graph 6), high investment in biofuel,

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especially algae biofuel, can reduce Japan’s dependency on oil imports. Despite the aforementioned comparative advantage, technological issues are also present. Since species of algae vary, they produce different types of chemical and require different technologies for each type of algae.xxxviii A large quantity of energy is also essential for the water removal of algae through heat and the destruction of cells through ultrasonic.xxxix Countries, such as the U.S., have conducted research on the improvement of energy efficiency for this production. Options to improve efficiency include bio-technological refinement of algae, as well as further investigation in natural algae with higher production efficiency.xl The U.S. has invested in algae biofuel since 1987 because it experienced oil shortage from the oil crisis in 1973.xli The U.S. Department of Energy also began “National Algal Biofuels Technology Roadmap” in 2010 by investing 24 million US dollars in this research.xlii Australia and England also have conducted research on algae biofuel.xliii Even though these states have invested in algae biofuel, Japan has recently gained comparative advantage in this field. Noboru Watanabe from the Tsukuba University has discovered a new type of algae, aurantiochytrium. Though one alga of this kind produces less C24H48 than the other algae, it can multiply at extremely quick pace.xliv In space of the same size with the same duration of time, aurantiochytrium can produce C24H48 twelve times more than the other algae.xlv While production cost for other biofuels is approximately 800 yen per liter, this algae biofuel costs only 50 yen per liter.xlvi In addition, these particular algae are indigenous only in Okinawa. Even though other countries gain samples of the algae, each type of algae requires new research. It will take time for the other states to commercialize this biofuel. Japanese researchers hope to commercialize the new algae biofuel around 2020.xlvii Since aurantiochytrium exists only in Okinawa and can be mass produced at lower cost than the other algae biofuels, it can not only reduce Japan’s dependency on oil imports from the Persian Gulf, but also may even change the entire market structure of crude oil and biofuel. In this regard, this technology can ultimately turn Japan into biofuel exporter and mass-produce other petro-chemical products. (3) Possible Issues with Technology Even though Japan is superior or highly competitive in the aforementioned technology, other competitors will eventually surpass the marketability of the technology by cost reduction or improvement of quality. For instance, though the U.S. used to be superior in wind installation, China surpassed the U.S. in 2010 by utilizing its cheap labor. In this regard, even technology for methane hydrate and

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algae could be surpassed in the long-run. In order to foster technological progress and preserve its superiority, the Japanese government has to support it through subsidies, supportive regulation, and other forms of coordination. Japan also should conduct policy to coordinate international market for the newly commercialized technology. As Ikenberry argues, it is extremely challenging to change institution once it is built.xlviii In other words, Japan should found this market in the Japanese standard to maximize its market share around the globe. In this way, other competitors cannot sell its new products effectively. Especially since there will be several years of a gap between Japan’s commercialization of methane hydrate and China’s, Japan should take advantage of this opportunity. Japan could do the same for methane hydrate even though it may be more competitive for American and Chinese technological development. Since this section discusses new technologies, such as methane hydrate and algae biofuel, the next section discusses the implementation of policy to use new technologies as bargaining tools from bureaucratic perspective. The next section covers the possibility of collaboration over policy-making between MOFA and METI. 4. Collaborative Foreign Policy over Technology between MOFA and METI: (1) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) MOFA can take an active role in this policy because the securement of natural resources abroad is directly related to foreign policy. According to MOFA Establishment Act, its mission is “to aim at improvement of the profits of Japan and Japanese nationals, while contributing to maintenance of peaceful and safe international society, and, through an active and eager measure, both to implement good international environment and to keep and develop harmonic foreign relationships." In other words, MOFA has to maximize Japan’s national interest in international affairs, while maintaining peace with other states. In fact, MOFA contains bureau and department related to national security and technology. As the acquisition of natural resources abroad is a pivotal part of Japan’s national interest, MOFA also has to take this idea into consideration for its policy. MOFA consists of the headquarter with three departments and ten bureau, as well as 204 official residences, such as embassies and political representatives (Picture 3).xlix Among various departments and bureau, MOFA contains Foreign Policy Bureau (FPB), as well as Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Science Department (DNSD). FPB conducts medium- and long-term foreign policy for national security, terrorism, space and other important matters, whereas DNSD holds its responsibility in the area

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of national security related to science and technology, such as nuclear non-proliferation. International Science Cooperation Division at DNSD focuses on diplomacy related to technology. Though this division focuses on international cooperation through technology, one of the main themes is actually energy and resource security. In order to extract resources, cooperation is necessary. However, the anarchy and asymmetric information of international affairs challenges such cooperation it is also important to find a strategy to compete over resources through foreign policy. In this regard, FPB and/or International Science Cooperation Division at DNSD can create such a foreign policy for Japan’s national interest over natural resources. (2) Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) While MOFA can conduct a coherent foreign policy over the securement of natural resources, it is essential that METI form a regulatory framework over technology of the Japanese private sector, such as methane hydrate and algae biofuel. METI’s policy ranges from industrial/trade policies to energy security and control of arms exports. Though METI, unlike MOFA, does not cover foreign policy, it still plays a pivotal role in internal economic policy and trade policy. As Japan’s technology is relatively advanced to that of other states, Japan needs to pay close attention to the leakage of its technology to other states. In this regard, regulation over Japan’s private sector is extremely important for Japan, and METI is responsible for this area. METI consists of six bureaus, four agencies and other departments (Picture 4). One of the agencies is the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE), which is, as the name implies, responsible for energy and natural resources. The ANRE contains Director-General’s Secretariat, as well as three departments: (1) Energy Conservation and Renewable Energy Department; (2) Natural Resources and Fuel Department; and (3) Electricity and Gas Industry Department. Among the three departments, Natural Resources and Fuel Department is responsible for petroleum and coal policy, while Electricity and Gas Industry Department conducts policy related to electricity and natural gas. Since technology for off-shore resource extraction is directly related to these two departments at the ANRE of METI, it is possible for them to regulate such a technology legally in order to gain more control over business on resource extraction abroad. It is possible to conduct foreign policy to maximize Japan’s national interest over natural resources by strengthening control over the private sector and new technology through collaboration between MOFA and METI, superficially between the

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FPB and DNSD of MOFA and Natural Resources and Fuel Department and Electricity and Gas Industry Department of METI. It is also possible to grant one of them responsibility for this policy. Another possible way to conduct such a policy is to merge MOFA and METI. For instance, South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade is responsible for both foreign affairs and trade. In other words, this ministry, in terms of political role, is the mixture of MOFA and METI. Theoretically Japan could do something similar as well. However, there are obstacles related to the actual implementation of this policy. The next section discusses such issues. (3) Practical Difficulty in Structural Merger While it is possible to conduct such a policy through the collaboration between MOFA and METI, bureaucracy and ongoing volatile internal politics could discourage such a policy. Though both MOFA and METI belong to the Japanese government, they are separate independent institutions within the government.l While MOFA and METI share important roles, such as the control of arms exports, one of them is responsible for one issue area. In fact, METI, according to MOFA, controls Japan’s arm exports.li They do not collaborate extensively for one issue area. In addition, Japanese policymaking is slow. When Japan implements policy, the idea for policy is deliberated in Committees. One party controls this process, when it has majority. When coalition rules, this process has to be under split among coalition members. Afterward, Diet majority passes bills.lii In other words, it takes longer to create policy under coalition members, as it takes time to compromise and reach to one conclusion among the members. While there was no issue about policy making during the domination of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the current Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has encountered difficulty with this bureaucratic process.liii In addition, opposition could slow legislation.liv In this regard, unstable internal politics can prevent the policy from being actualized. Given the structure of the Japanese government and bureaucracy, it is appropriate to give responsibility for this policy to either MOFA or METI rather than to create collaboration between the two or to merge the two into one. (4) State Capitalism (Excessive Political Power over the Private Sector) Even though it is possible to implement this policy, it may be perceived as the beginning of Japan’s state capitalism. Ian Bremmer defines state capitalism as “states that control a share of the country’s wealth to secure their national interests.lv Since this policy intends to regulate Japan’s private sector with advanced technology to secure Japan’s national interest over energy supply, this policy can be considered

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a form of state capitalism. As state capitalism tends to be associated with non-democracy, such China, Russia and Saudi Arabia,lvi this policy may seem to undermine Japan’s fundamental political feature, social democracy. Even though this policy itself may not turn Japan into state capitalist, this policy may become the beginning of Japan’s state capitalism that manipulates its technology to expand its national interests. Even though this policy may undermine Japan’s democracy in the long-run, the top priority for Japan is “survival” in this anarchy of international affairs. Except American military in Okinawa, Japan does not have a strong bargaining power to restrain other states from harming Japan’s national interests. Japan needs non-violent politico-economic tool, other than American national security. Even though this policy may seem undemocratic, Japan has done contradicted policy making, such as Self Defense Force (SDF) that the Yoshida Parliament founded and was criticized for violating Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, article to prohibit an act of war by the state. As international affairs are highly unpredictable, such an aggressive foreign policy should be considered even though it seems to violate a democratic feature of modern Japanese politics. 5. Conclusion: Japan needs an active foreign policy to intervene and regulate the Japanese private sector abroad with advanced technology, such as methane hydrate and algae biofuel, in order to secure Japan’s energy long-term supply from foreign reserves and exhibit Japan’s political strength in international affairs. This policy may take time to implement under the current volatile domestic politics. This policy may also seem undemocratic, and the new market of these products may be taken over by other competitors, such as China and the U.S. However, energy is the key to Japan’s long-term security. Especially since the Fukushima disaster, Japan has become more dependent on fossil fuel imports from the Persian Gulf and Russia. Japan needs a way to secure its energy supply at any cost. Hopefully, this idea for a new policy will be considered in the long-run.

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Graph 1: Japan’s Oil Production and Consumptionlvii

Graph 2: Japan’s Natural Gas Production and Consumptionlviii

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Graph 3: Japan’s Total Energy Consumption in 2010lix

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Graph 4: Japan’s Crude Oil Imports in 2009lx

Graph 5: Japan’s Crude Oil Imports in 2011lxi

Saudi Arabia

27%

Kuwait 9%

Qatar 12%

UAE 20%

Iran 9%

Russia 3%

Others 20%

Japan's Crude Oil Imports in 2009

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Graph 6: Oil Consumption Mixlxii

Map 1: The Area of Methane-Hydrate around Japanlxiii

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Map 2: Methane Hydrate around the Globelxiv

Picture 1: Sakhalin-IIlxv

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Picture 2: De-Pressurizing Method for Methane Hydratelxvi

Picture 3: Structure of MOFAlxvii

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Picture 4: Structure of METIlxviii

i U.S. Energy Information Administration. "Japan." <http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=JA>.

ii World Investment News, "Sakhalin." <http://www.winne.com/dncountryreport.php?id=182>. iii Goldman, Marshall I. Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. iv Ibid., p.128. v World Investment News. "Sakhalin." <http://www.winne.com/dncountryreport.php?id=182>. vi Goldman, Marshall I. Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. vii Bamberger, Nowell David Beckett. "In the Wake of Sakhalin II: How Non-Governmental Administration of Natural Resources Could Strengthen Russia’s Energy Sector." Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 16, no. 3 (June 2007): p. 669.

viii三井物産, "サハリンへの道が エネルギーの道になる."

<http://www.mitsui.com/jp/ja/business/challenge/1190462_1589.html>. ix Ibid. x Ibid. xi Ibid. xii Goldman, Marshall I. Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. p.129. xiii Bamberger, Nowell David Beckett. "In the Wake of Sakhalin II: How Non-Governmental Administration of Natural Resources Could Strengthen Russia’s Energy Sector." Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 16, no. 3 (June 2007): p. 681. xiv Goldman, Marshall I. Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. p.130. xv JOGMEC. “メタンハイドレート海洋産出試験:プレス説明会資料.” (2010) xvi Ibid. xvii JOGMEC. "J News Web; Methane Hydrate."

Onogi 18 <http://www.jogmec.go.jp/recommend_library/jnewsweb/contents2_02.html>. xviii Ibid. xix Ibid. xx Ibid. xxi Ibid. xxii Ibid. xxiii Kiichi, Kitazawa,日本は再生可能エネルギー大国になりうるか. Tokyo: ディスカヴァー・トゥエンティ

ワン,2012. p. 199- 200. xxiv JOGMEC. "J News Web; Methane Hydrate."

<http://www.jogmec.go.jp/recommend_library/jnewsweb/contents2_02.html>. xxv Ibid. xxvi Ibid. xxvii The Department of Energy, "Energy.gov."

<http://energy.gov/articles/us-and-japan-complete-successful-field-trial-methane-hydrate-production-technologies

>. xxviii Ibid. xxix Ibid. xxx The U.S. Department of State, “Fire in the Ice." 7.2 (n.d.): 1-16. xxxi Zyga, Lisa. "China Looks to 'combustible Ice' as a Fuel Source." China Looks to 'combustible Ice' as a

Fuel Source., March 12, 2010. http://phys.org/news187622107.html. xxxii Kiichi, Kitazawa,日本は再生可能エネルギー大国になりうるか. Tokyo: ディスカヴァー・トゥエンティ

ワン,2012. p. 228. xxxiii Agency of Natural Resource and Energy. "藻類由来バイオ燃料の概要." (2011). xxxiv Ibid. xxxv Ibid. xxxvi Kiichi, Kitazawa,日本は再生可能エネルギー大国になりうるか. Tokyo: ディスカヴァー・トゥエンティ

ワン,2012. p. 228. xxxvii Ibid. xxxviii Agency of Natural Resource and Energy. "藻類由来バイオ燃料の概要." (2011) xxxix Ibid. xl Ibid. xli Ibid. xlii Ibid. xliii Ibid. xliv "効率よく「石油」作る藻、筑波大発見 代替燃料に期待、生産コスト１リットル 50円程度." 日本経済

新聞, (Dec. 15 2010). <http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXDASDG14047_U0A211C1CR8000/>. xlv Ibid. xlvi Ibid.

Onogi 19 xlvii Ibid. xlviii Ikenberry, John G. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After

Major Wars. Princeton University Press. 2000. xlix "組織と機構." 外務省. (August 2012). <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/sosiki/index.html>. l Deming, Rust. "How Foreign Policy Is Made in Japan: The Structure and the Players." Japanese

Politics and Foreign Policy. SAIS, Washington D.C. (Oct. 2012). Lecture. li Japan's Policies on the Control of Arms Exports." MOFA. (2012).

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/index.html>. lii Deming, Rust. "How Foreign Policy Is Made in Japan: The Structure and the Players." Japanese

Politics and Foreign Policy. SAIS, Washington D.C. (October 2012). Lecture. liii Ibid. liv Ibid. lv Bremmer, Ian, The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?

Portfolio Trade, 2010. lvi Ibid. lvii "Japan - Analysis." U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). (March 2011). <http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=JA>. lviii Ibid. lix "Japan." U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). (June 4 2012)..

<http://www.eia.gov/cabs/japan/Full.html>. lx "Japan - Analysis." U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). (March 2011). <http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=JA>. lxi "Japan." U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). (June 4 2012).

<http://www.eia.gov/cabs/japan/Full.html>. lxii 資源エネルギー庁 "エネルギー白書：第 2部 エネルギー動向:4．石油製品," (2005)

<http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/topics/hakusho/2005/html/17021440.html>. lxiii 資源エネルギー庁 "エネルギー白書," (2011). lxiv "Huge Natural Gas From Methane Hydrates Process Developed." News and Views for Making and

Saving Money in New Energy and Fuel. (May 3 2012).

<http://newenergyandfuel.com/http:/newenergyandfuel/com/2012/05/03/huge-natural-gas-from-methane-hydrates

-process-developed/>. lxv Gazprom, "Sakhalin II." (2012)

<http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/deposits/sakhalin2/>. lxvi JOGMEC, "J News Web; Methane Hydrate.".(2008).

<http://www.jogmec.go.jp/recommend_library/jnewsweb/contents2_02.html>. lxvii "組織と機構." 外務省. (Aug. 2012). <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/sosiki/index.html>. lxviii "機構図." 経済産業省. <http://www.meti.go.jp/intro/data/a210001j.html>.