Every company faces a learning dilemma:the smartest people

find it the hardest to learn.

Teaching Smart PeopleHow to Learn

by Chris Argyris

Any company that aspires to succeed in tbetougher business environment of the 1990s mustfirst resolve a basic dilemma: success in the market-place increasingly depends on learning, yet mostpeople don't know how to leam. What's more, thosemembers of the organization that many assume tobe the best at learning are, in fact, not very good atit. I am talking about the well-educated, high-pow-ered, high-commitment professionals who occupykey leadership positions in the modem corporation.

Most companies not only have tremendous diffi-culty addressing this learning dilemma; they aren'teven aware that it exists. The reason: they misunder-stand what learning is and how to bring it about. As

a result, they tend to make two mistakes in theirefforts to become a learning organization.

First, most people define learning too narrowly asmere "problem solving," so they focus on identify-ing and correcting errors in the external environ-ment. Solving problems is important. But if learning

Chris Argyris is the fames B. Conant Professor at the Har-vard graduate schools of business and education. Hismost recent book. Overcoming Organizational Defenses,was published by Allyn and Bacon in 1990. Among hisprevious HBR articles are "Double Loop Learning inOrganizations" (September-October 1977) and "SkilledIncompetence" (September-October 1986).

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is to persist, managers and employees must also lookinward. They need to reflect critically on their ownbehavior, identify the ways they often inadvertentlycontribute to the organization's problems, and thenchange how they act. In particular, they must leamhow the very way they go about defining and solv-ing problems can he a source of problem.s in itsown right.

I have coined the terms "single loop" and "doubleloop" learning to capture this crucial distinction. Togive a simple analogy: a thermostat that automati-cally turns on the heat whenever the temperature ina room drops below 68 degrees is a good example ofsingle-loop learning. A thermostat that could ask,"Why am I set at 68 degrees;" and then explorewhether or not some other temperature might moreeconomically achieve the goal of heating the roomwould be engaging in double-loop learning.

Highly skilled professionals are frequently verygood at single-loop learning. After all, they havespent much of their lives acquiring academic cre-dentials, mastering one or a number of intellectualdisciplines, and applying those disciplines to solvereal-world problems. But ironically, this very facthelps explain why professionals are often so bad atdouble-loop learning.

Put simply, because many professionals arealmost always successful at what they do, they rarelyexperience failure. And hecause they have rarelyfailed, they have never learned how to learn fromfailure. So whenever their single-loop learningstrategies go wrong, they become defensive, screenout criticism, and put the "blame" on anyone andeveryone but themselves. In short, their ability tolearn shuts down precisely at the moment they needit the most.

The propensity among professionals to behavedefensively helps shed light on the second mistakethat companies make about learning. The commonassumption is that getting people to learn is largely amatter of motivation. When people have the rightattitudes and commitment, learning automaticallyfollows. So companies focus on creating new organi-zational structures-compensation programs, per-formance reviews, corporate cultures, and the like -that are designed to create motivated and committedemployees.

But effective double-loop learning is not simply afunction of how people feel. It is a reflection of howthey think - that is, the cognitive rules or reasoningthey use to design and implement their actions.Think of these rules as a kind of "master program"stored in the brain, governing all behavior. Defensivereasoning can block learning even when the individ-ual commitment to it is high, just as a computer pro-

gram with hidden bugs can produce results exactlythe opposite of what its designers had planned.

Companies can learn how to resolve the learningdilemma. What it takes is to make the ways man-agers and employees reason about their behavior afocus of organizational learning and continuous im-provement programs. Teaching people how to reasonabout their behavior in new and more effective waysbreaks down the defenses that block learning.

All of the examples that follow involve a particu-lar kind of professional: fast-track consultants atmajor management consulting companies. But theimplications of my argument go far beyond this spe-cific occupational group. The fact is, more and morejobs-no matter what the title-are taking on thecontours of "knowledge work." People at all levels ofthe organization must combine the mastery of somehighly specialized technical expertise with the abili-ty to work effectively in teams, form productive rela-tionships with clients and customers, and criticallyreflect on and then change their own organizationalpractices. And the nuts and bolts of management -whether of high-powered consultants or service rep-resentatives, senior managers or factory technicians- increasingly consists of guiding and integrating theautonomous but interconnected work of highlyskilled people.

How Professionals Avoid Learning

For 15 years, I have been conducting in-depthstudies of management consultants. I decided tostudy consultants for a few simple reasons. First,they are the epitome of the highly educated pro-fessionals who play an increasingly central role inall organizations. Almost all of the consultantsI've studied have MBAs from the top three or fourU.S. business schools. They are also highly commit-ted to their work. For instance, at one company,more than 90% of the consultants responded in asurvey that they were "highly satisfied" with theirjobs and with the company.

I also assumed that such professional consultantswould be good at learning. After all, the essence oftheir job is to teach others how to do things different-ly. I found, however, that these consultants embod-ied the learning dilemma. The most enthusiasticabout continuous improvement in their own organi-zations, they were also often the biggest obstacle toits complete success.

As long as efforts at learning and change focusedon external organizational factors-job redesign,compensation programs, performance reviews, and

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leadership training - tbe professionals were enthusi-astic participants. Indeed, creating new systems andstructures was precisely the kind of challenge thatwell-educated, highly motivated professionalsthrived on.

And yet the moment the quest for continuous im-provement turned to the professionals' own perfor-mance, something went wrong. It wasn't a matter ofhad attitude. The professionals' commitment toexcellence was genuine, and the vision of the com-

Professionals embody thelearning dilennnna: they areenthusiastic abaut continuousimprovennent - and often thebiggest obstacie to its success.

pany was clear. Nevertheless, continuous improve-ment did not persist. And the longer the continu-ous improvement efforts continued, the greater thelikelihood that they would produce ever-diminish-ing returns.

What happened? The professionals began to feelembarrassed. They were threatened by the prospectof critically examining their own role in the organi-zation. Indeed, because they were so well paid (andgenerally believed that their employers were sup-portive and fair), the idea that their performancemight not he at its best made them feel guilty.

Far from being a catalyst for real change, such feel-ings caused most to react defensively. They projectedthe blame for any problems away from themselvesand onto what they said were unclear goals, insensi-tive and unfair leaders, and stupid clients.

Consider this example. At a premier managementconsulting company, the manager of a case teamcalled a meeting to examine the team's performanceon a recent consulting project. The client was largelysatisfied and had given the team relatively highmarks, but the manager believed the team had notcreated the value added that it was capahle of andthat the consulting company had promised. In thespirit of continuous improvement, he felt that theteam could do hetter. Indeed, so did some of theteam members.

The manager knew how difficult it was for peopleto reflect critically on their own work performance,especially in the presence of their manager, so hetook a number of steps to make possible a frank andopen discussion. He invited to the meeting an out-side consultant whom team members knew andtrusted-"just to keep me honest," he said. He also

agreed to have the entire meeting tape-recorded.That way, any subsequent confusions or disagree-ments about what went on at the meeting could bechecked against the transcript. Finally, the manageropened the meeting by emphasizing that no subjectwas off limits - including his own behavior.

"I realize that you may believe you cannot con-front me," the manager said. "But I encourage you tochallenge me. You have a responsibility to tell mewhere you think the leadership made mistakes,just as I have the responsibility to identify any I be-lieve you made. And all of us must acknowledge ourown mistakes. If we do not have an open dialogue,we will not learn."

The professionals took the manager up on the firsthalf of his invitation but quietly ignored the second.When asked to pinpoint the key problems in theexperience with the client, they looked entirely out-side themselves. The clients were uncooperative andarrogant. "They didn't think we could help them."The team's own managers were unavailable andpoorly prepared. "At times, our managers were notup to speed before they walked into the client meet-ings." In effect, the professionals asserted that theywere helpless to act differently - not hecause of anylimitations of their own but because of the limita-tions of others.

The manager listened carefully to the team mem-bers and tried to respond to their eriticisms. Hetalked about the mistakes that he had made duringthe consulting process. For example, one profession-al objected to the way tbe manager had run the proj-ect meetings. "I see that the way I asked questionsclosed down discussions," responded the manager."I didn't mean to do that, but I can see how youmight have believed that I had already made up mymind." Another team member complained that themanager had caved in to pressure from his superiorto produee the project report far too quickly, consid-ering the team's heavy work load. "I think that itwas my responsibility to have said no," admitted themanager. "It was clear that we all had an immenseamount of work."

Finally, after some three hours of discussion abouthis own behavior, the manager began to ask the teammembers if there were any errors they migbt havemade. "After all," he said, "this client was not differ-ent from many others. How can we be more effectivein the future?"

The professionals repeated that it was really theclients' and their own managers' fault. As one put it,"They have to be open to change and want to leam."The more the manager tried to get the team to ex-amine its own responsibility for the outcome, themore the professionals bypassed his concerns. The

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best one team member could suggest was for thecase team to "promise less" - implying that therewas really no way for the group to improve itsperformance.

The case team members were reacting defensivelyto protect themselves, even though their managerwas not acting in ways that an outsider would con-sider threatening, Even if there were some truth totheir charges-the clients may well have been arro-gant and closed, their own managers distant-theway they presented tbese claims was guaranteed tostop learning. With few exceptions, the professionalsmade attributions about the behavior of the clientsand the managers but never publicly tested theirclaims. For instance, they said that the clientsweren't motivated to learn but never really present-ed any evidence supporting that assertion. Whentheir lack of concrete evidence was pointed out tothem, tbey simply repeated their criticisms morevehemently.

If the professionals had felt so strongly about tbeseissues, why bad they never mentioned them duringthe project: According to the professionals, even thiswas the fault of others. "We didn't want to alienatethe client," argued one. "We didn't want to he seenas whining," said another.

not enough to talk candidly. Professionals can still find themselvestalking past each other.

The professionals were using their criticisms ofothers to protect themselves from the potentialembarrassment of having to admit that perhaps theytoo bad contributed to the team's less-than-perfectperformance. What's more, the fact tbat they keptrepeating their defensive actions in the face of themanager's efforts to turn the group's attention to itsown role shows tbat this defensiveness had hecomea reflexive routine. From tbe professionals' perspec-tive, they weren't resisting; they were focusing onthe "real" causes. Indeed, they were to he respected,if not congratulated, for working as well as they didunder such difficult conditions.

The end result was an unproductive parallel con-versation. Both the manager and the professionalswere candid; they expressed their views forcefully.But they talked past each other, never finding a com-mon language to describe what had happened withthe client. The professionals kept insisting that thefault lay with others. Tbe manager kept trying,unsuccessfully, to get the professionals to see bowtbey contributed to the state of affairs they were crit-icizing. The dialogue of this parallel conversationlooks like this:

Professionals: "The clients have to be open. Theymust want to cbange."

Manager. "It's our task to helpthem see that change is in theirinterest."

Professionals: "But the clientsdidn't agree with our analyses."

Manager: "If they didn't tbinkour ideas were right, bow might wehave convinced tbem?"

Professionals: "Maybe we needto have more meetings with theclient."

Manager: "If we aren't adequate-ly prepared and if the clients don'tthink we're credible, how will moremeetings help?"

Professionals: "There should hebetter communication hetweencase team members and man-agement."

Manager: "I agree. But profes-sionals should take the initiative toeducate the manager ahout theproblems tbey are experiencing."

Professionals: "Our leaders areunavailable and distant."

Manager: "How do you expect usto know that if you don't tell us?"

Conversations such as tbis onedramatically illustrate tbe learning

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dilemma. The problem with the professionals'claims is not that they arc wrong but that they aren'tuseful. By constantly turning the focus away fromtheir own behavior to that of others, the profes-sionals bring learning to a grinding halt. The man-ager understands the trap but does not know how toget out of it. To learn how to do that requires go-ing deeper into the dynamics of defensive reason-ing-and into the special causes that make profes-sionals so prone to it.

Defensive Reasoning and theDoom Loop

what explains the professionals' defensiveness?Not their attitudes about change or commitment tocontinuous improvement; they really wanted towork more effectively. Rather, the key factor is theway they reasoned about their behavior and thatof others.

It is impossible to reason anew in every situation.If we had to think through all the possihle responsesevery time someone asked, "How arc you?" theworld would pass us by. Therefore, everyone developsa theory of action-a set of rules that individualsuse to design and implement their own behavioras well as to understand the behavior of others.Usually, these theories of actions become so takenfor granted that people don't even realize they areusing them.

One of the paradoxes of human behavior, however,is that the master program people actually use israrely the one they think they use. Ask people in aninterview or questionnaire to articulate the rulesthey use to govern their actions, and they will giveyou what I call their "espoused" theory of action.But observe these same people's behavior, and youwill quickly see that this espoused theory has verylittle to do with how they actually behave. For ex-ample, the professionals on the case team saidthey believed in continuous improvement, and yetthey consistently acted in ways that made improve-ment impossible.

When you observe people's behavior and try tocome up with rules that would make sense of it, youdiscover a very different theory of action - what I callthe individual's "theory-in-use." Put simply, peopleconsistently act inconsistently, unaware of the con-tradiction between their espoused theory and theirtheory-in-use, between the way they think they areacting and the way they really act.

What's more, most theories-in-use rest on thesame set of governing values. There seems to be a

universal human tendency to design one's actionsconsistently according to four basic values:

1. To remain in unilateral control;2. To maximize "winning" and minimize "losing";3. To suppress negative feelings; and4. To be as "rational" as possible - by which peo-

ple mean defining clear objectives and evaluatingtheir behavior in terms of whether or not they haveachieved them.

The purpose of all these values is to avoid embar-rassment or threat, feeling vulnerable or incompe-tent. In this respect, the master program that mostpeople use is profoundly defensive. Defensive rea-soning encourages individuals to keep private thepremises, inferences, and conclusions that shapetheir behavior and to avoid testing them in a trulyindependent, objective fashion.

Because the attributions that go into defensivereasoning are never really tested, it is a closed loop,remarkably impervious to conflicting points of view.The inevitahlc response to the observation thatsomebody is reasoning defensively is yet more de-fensive reasoning. With the case team, for exam-ple, whenever anyone pointed out the professionals'defensive behavior to them, their initial reactionwas to look for the cause in somebody else - clientswho were so sensitive that they would have beenalienated if the consultants had criticized them or amanager so weak that he couldn't have taken it hadthe consultants raised their concerns with him. Inother words, the case team members once againdenied their own responsibility by externalizing theproblem and putting it on someone else.

In such situations, the simple act of encouragingmore open inquiry is often attacked by others as"intimidating." Those who do the attacking dealwith their feelings about possibly being wrong byblaming the more open individual for arousing thesefeelings and upsetting them.

The very success ofprofessionals ot educotionhelps exploin the problemsthey have with learning.

Needless to say, such a master program inevitablyshort-circuits learning. And for a numher of reasonsunique to their psychology, well-educated profes-sionals are especially susceptible to this.

Nearly all the consultants I have studied have stel-lar academic records. Ironically, their very success ateducation helps explain the problems they havewith learning. Before they enter the world of work.

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their lives are primarily full of successes, so theyhave rarely experienced the embarrassment andsense of threat that comes with failure. As a result,their defensive reasoning has rarely been activated.People who rarely experience failure, however, endup not knowing how to deal with it effectively. Andthis serves to reinforce the normal human tendencyto reason defensively.

In a survey of several hundred young consultantsat the organizations I have been studying, these pro-

IPeople who rarely experiencefailure end up notknowing how to deal wifh it.

fessionals describe themselves as driven internallyby an unrealistically high ideal of performance:"Pressure on the job is self-imposed." "I must notonly do a good job; I must also be the best." "Peoplearound here are very bright and hardworking; theyare highly motivated to do an outstanding job.""Most of us want not only to succeed but also to doso at maximum speed."

These consultants are always comparing them-selves with the best around them and constantly try-ing to better their own performance. And yet theydo not appreciate being required to compete open-ly with each other. They feel it is somehow inhu-mane. They prefer to be the individual contributor-what might be termed a "produc-tive loner."

Behind this high aspiration torsuccess is an equally high fear offailure and a propensity to feelshame and guilt when they do failto meet their high standards. "Youmust avoid mistakes," said one. "Ihate making them. Many of usfear failure, whether we admit itor not."

To the extent that these consul-tants have experienced success intheir lives, they have not had to heconcerned about failure and theattendant feelings of shame andguilt. But to exactly the sameextent, they also have never devel-oped the tolerance for feelings offailure or the skills to deal withthese feelings. This in tum has ledthem not only to fear failure butalso to fear the fear of failure itself.For they know that they will not

when professionals don't do their johsperfectly, they zoom into a "doom loop."

eope with it superlatively - their usual level ofaspiration.

The consultants use two intriguing metaphors todescribe this phenomenon. They talk about the"doom loop" and "doom zoom." Often, consultantswill perform well on the ease team, but because theydon't do the jobs perfectly or receive accolades fromtheir managers, they go into a doom loop of despair.And they don't ease into the doom loop, they zoominto it.

As a result, many professionals have extremely"brittle" personalities. When suddenly faced with asituation they cannot immediately handle, theytend to fall apart. They cover up their distress infront of the client. They talk about it constantlywith their fellow case team members. Interestingly,these conversations commonly take the form of bad-mouthing clients.

Such brittleness leads to an inappropriately highsense of despondency or even despair when peopledon't achieve the high levels of performance theyaspire to. Such despondency is rarely psychological-ly devastating, but when combined with defensivereasoning, it can result in a formidable predisposi-tion against learning.

There is no better example of how this brittlenesscan disrupt an organization than performance evalu-ations. Because it represents the one moment whena professional must measure his or her own behavioragainst some formal standard, a performance evalua-tion is almost tailor-made to push a professional

into the doom loop. Indeed, a poorevaluation can reverberate far be-yond the particular individual in-volved to spark defensive reasoningthroughout an entire organization.

At one consulting company,management established a new per-formance-evaluation process thatwas designed to make evaluationsboth more objective and more use-ful to those being evaluated. Theconsultants participated in thedesign of the new system and ingeneral were enthusiastic becauseit corresponded to their espousedvalues of objectivity and fairness. Abrief two years into the new pro-cess, however, it had become theobject of dissatisfaction. The cata-lyst for this about-face was the firstunsatisfactory rating.

Senior managers had identifiedsix consultants whose performancethey considered below standard. In

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keeping with the new evaluation process, they didall they could to communicate their concerns to thesix and to help them improve. Managers met witheach individual separately for as long and as often asthe professional requested to explain the reasonsbehind the rating and to discuss what needed to hedone to improve - hut to no avail. Performance con-tinued at the same low level and, eventually, the sixwere let go.

When word of the dismissal spread through thecompany, people responded with confusion and anx-iety. After ahout a dozen consultants angrily com-plained to management, the CEO held two lengthymeetings where employees could air their concerns.

At the meetings, the professionals made a varietyof claims. Some said the performance-evaluationprocess was unfair hecause judgments were suhjec-tive and biased and the criteria for minimum perfor-mance unclear. Others suspected that the real causefor the dismissals was economic and that the perfor-mance-evaluation procedure was just a fig leaf tohide the fact that the company was in trouble. Stillothers argued that the evaluation process wasantileaming. If the company were truly a leamingorganization, as it claimed, then people performinghelow the minimum standard should he taught howto reach it. As one professional put it; "We weretold that the company did not have an up-or-outpolicy. Up-or-out is inconsistent with leaming. Youmisled us."

The CEO tried to explain the logic behind man-agement's decision hy grounding it in the facts of thecase and hy asking the professionals for any evidencethat might contradict these facts.

Is there subjectivity and hias in the evaluationprocess? Yes, responded the CEO, hut "we strivehard to reduce them. We are constantly trying toimprove the process. If you have any ideas, pleasetell us. If you know of someone treated unfairly,please bring it up. If any of you feel that you havebeen treated unfairly, let's discuss it now or, if youwish, privately."

Is the level of minimum competence too vague?"We are working to define minimum competencemore clearly," he answered. "In the case of the six,however, their performance was so poor that itwasn't difficult to reach a decision." Most of the sixhad received timely feedback ahout their problems.And in the two cases where people had not, the rea-son was that they had never taken the responsibilityto seek out evaluations-and, indeed, had activelyavoided them. "If you have any data to the contrary,"the CEO added, "let's talk ahout it."

Were the six asked to leave for economic reasons-No, said the CEO. "We have more work than we can

do, and letting professionals go is extremely costlyfor us. Do any of you have any information to thecontrary?"

As to the company heing antileaming, in fact, theentire evaluation process was designed to encourageleaming. When a professional is performing belowthe minimum level, the CEO explained, "we jointlydesign remedial experiences with the individual.Then we look for signs of improvement. In thesecases, either the professionals were reluctant to takeon such assignments or they repeatedly failed whenthey did. Again, if you have information or evidenceto the contrary, I'd like to hear ahout it."

The CEO concluded: "It's regrettable, hut some-times we make mistakes and hire the wrong people.If individuals don't produce and repeatedly prove

Performance evaluation istailor-made to pushprofessionals into ti^edoom loop.

themselves unahle to improve, we don't know whatelse to do except dismiss them. It's just not fair tokeep poorly performing individuals in the company.They eam an unfair share of the financial rewards."

Instead of responding with data of their own, theprofessionals simply repeated their accusations butin ways that consistently contradicted their claims.They said that a genuinely fair evaluation processwould contain clear and documentahle data ahoutperformance - but they were unable to provide first-hand examples of the unfairness that they impliedcolored the evaluation of the six dismissed employ-ees. They argued that people shouldn't he judged byinferences unconnected to their actual performance-hut they judged management in precisely this way.They insisted that management define clear, objec-tive, and unambiguous performance standards - hutthey argued that any humane system would takeinto account that the performance of a professionalcannot he precisely measured. Einally, they present-ed themselves as champions of leaming - but theynever proposed any eriteria for assessing whether anindividual might be unahle to leam.

In short, the professionals seemed to hold man-agement to a different level of performance thanthey held themselves. In their conversation at themeetings, they used many of the features of ineffec-tive evaluation that they condemned-the ahsenceof concrete data, for example, and the dependence ona eircular logic of "heads we win, tails you lose." Itis as if they were saying, "Here are the features of

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a fair performance-evaluation system. You shouldabide by them. But we don't have to when we areevaluating you."

Indeed, if we were to explain the professionals'behavior by articulating rules that would have to hein their heads in order for them to act the way theydid, the rules would look something like this:

1. When criticizing the company, state your criti-cism in ways that you helieve are valid - but also inways that prevent others from deciding for them-selves whether your claim to validity is correct.

2. When asked to illustrate your criticisms, don'tinclude any data that others could use to decide forthemselves whether the illustrations are valid.

3. State your conclusions in ways that disguisetheir logical implications. If others point out thoseimplications to you, deny them.

Of course, when such rules were described to theprofessionals, they found them abhorrent. It wasinconceivable that these rules might explain theiractions. And yet in defending themselves againstthis observation, they almost always inadvertentlyconfirmed the rules.

Learning How to Reason Productively

If defensive reasoning is as widespread as I believe,then focusing on an individual's attitudes or com-mitment is never enough to produce real change.And as the previous example illustrates, neither iscreating new organizational structures or systems.The problem is that even when people are genuinelycommitted to improving their performance andmanagement has changed its structures in order toencourage the "right" kind of behavior, people stillremain locked in defensive reasoning. Either theyremain unaware of this fact, or if they do becomeaware of it, they blame others.

There is, however, reason to helieve that organi-zations ean break out of this vicious circle. Despitethe strength of defensive reasoning, people genuine-ly strive to produce what they intend. They valueacting competently. Their self-esteem is intimatelytied up with behaving consistently and performingeffectively. Companies can use these universal hu-man tendencies to teach people how to reason in anew way-in effeet, to change the master programsin their heads and thus reshape their behavior.

People ean be taught how to recognize the reason-ing they use when they design and implement theiractions. They can hegin to identify the inconsisten-cies between their espoused and actual theories ofaction. They can face up to the fact that they uncon-

sciously design and implement actions that they donot intend. Finally, people can learn how to identifywhat individuals and groups do to ereate organiza-tional defenses and how these defenses contribute toan organization's problems.

Onee companies embark on this learning process,they will discover that the kind of reasoning neces-sary to reduce and overcome organizational defensesis the same kind of "tough reasoning" that underliesthe effective use of ideas in strategy, finance, market-ing, manufacturing, and other management disci-plines. Any sophisticated strategic analysis, forexample, depends on collecting valid data, analyzingit carefully, and constantly testing the inferencesdrawn from the data. The toughest tests are reservedfor the conclusions. Good strategists make sure thattheir conclusions can withstand all kinds of criticalquestioning.

So too with productive reasoning about humanbehavior. The standard of analysis is just as high.Human resource programs no longer need to bebased on "soft" reasoning but should be as analyti-cal and as data-driven as any other managementdiscipline.

Of eourse, tbat is not the kind of reasoning theconsultants used when they encountered problemsthat were embarrassing or threatening. The datathey collected was hardly objective. The inferencesthey made rarely became explicit. The conclusionsthey reached were largely self-serving, impossiblefor others to test, and as a result, "self-sealing,"impervious to change.

How can an organization begin to tum this situa-tion around, to teach its members how to reason pro-ductively? The first step is for managers at the top toexamine critically and change their own theories-in-use. Until senior managers become aware of howthey reason defensively and the counterproductiveconsequences that result, there will be little realprogress. Any change aetivity is likely to be just a fad.

Until senior nnanagersbeoonne aware ot the waysthey reason defensivelyany ohange aotivity is likelyto be just a fad.

change has to start at the top because otherwisedefensive senior managers are likely to disown anytransformation in reasoning patterns coming frombelow. If professionals or middle managers begin tochange the way they reason and act, such changes

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are likely to appear strange - if not actually danger-ous - to those at the top. The result is an unstablesituation where senior managers still helieve that itis a sign of caring and sensitivity to bypass and coverup difficult issues, while their suhordinates see thevery same actions as defensive.

The key to any educational experience designed toteach senior managers how to reason productively isto connect the program to real husiness problems.The best demonstration of the usefulness of produc-tive reasoning is for husy managers to see how it canmake a direct difference in their own performanceand in that of the organization. This will not happenovernight. Managers need plenty of opportunity topractice the new skills. But once they grasp the pow-erful impact that productive reasoning can have onactual performance, they will have a strong incen-tive to reason productively not just in a training ses-sion hut in all their work relationships.

One simple approach I have used to get this pro-cess started is to have participants produce a kind ofrudimentary case study. The suhject is a real busi-ness problem that the manager either wants to dealwith or has tried unsuccessfully to address in thepast. Writing the actual case usually takes less thanan hour. But then the case hecomes the focal point ofan extended analysis.

For example, a CEO at a large organizational-development consulting company was preoccupiedwith the prohlems caused by the intense competi-tion among the various business funetions repre-sented hy his four direct reports. Not only was hetired of having the problems dumped in his lap, buthe was also worried ahout the impact the interfunc-tional conflicts were having on the organization'sflexibility. He had even calculated that the moneybeing spent to iron out disagreements amountedto hundreds of thousands of dollars every year. Andthe more fights there were, the more defensivepeople became, which only increased the costs tothe organization.

In a paragraph or so, the CEO described a meetinghe intended to have with his direct reports to addressthe problem. Next, he divided the paper in half, andon the right-hand side of the page, he wrote a sce-nario for the meeting-much like the script for amovie or play-describing what he would say andhow his suhordinates would likely respond. On theleft-hand side of the page, he wrote down anythoughts and feelings that he would be likely to haveduring the meeting but that he wouldn't express forfear they would derail the discussion.

But instead of holding the meeting, the CEO ana-lyzed this scenario with his direct reports. The casebecame the catalyst for a discussion in which the

the CEO learned several things about the way heacted with his management team.

He discovered that his four direct reports oftenpereeived his conversations as counterproductive. Inthe guise of being "diplomatic," he would pretendthat a consensus about the problem existed, when infact none existed. The unintended result: instead offeeling reassured, his suhordinates felt wary andtried to figure out "what is he rea/iy getting at."

The CEO also realized that the way he dealt withthe competitiveness among department heads wascompletely contradictory. On the one hand, he kepturging them to "think of the organization as awhole." On the other, he kept calling for actions -department budget cuts, for example-that placedthem directly in competition with each other.

Learning to reasonproductively can beennotional - even painful.But the payoff is great.

Finally, the CEO discovered that many of the tacitevaluations and attributions he had listed turned outto he wrong. Since he had never expressed these as-sumptions, he had never found out just how wrongthey were. What's more, he learned that much ofwhat he thought he was hiding came through to hissubordinates anyway-but with the added messagethat the hoss was covering up.

The CEO's colleagues also learned ahout theirown ineffective behavior. They learned by examin-ing their own behavior as they tried to help the CEOanalyze his case. They also learned by writing andanalyzing cases of their own. They began to see thatthey too tended to hypass and cover up the realissues and that the CEO was often aware of it but didnot say so. They too made inaccurate attrihutionsand evaluations that they did not express. Moreover,the belief that they had to hide important ideas andfeelings from the CEO and from each other in ordernot to upset anyone turned out to be mistaken. Inthe context of the case discussions, the entire seniormanagement team was quite willing to discuss whathad always been undiscussable.

In effect, the case study exercise legitimizes talk-ing ahout issues that people have never been able toaddress before. Such a discussion can be emotional -even painful. But for managers with the courage topersist, the payoff is great: management teams andentire organizations work more openly and moreeffectively and have greater options for hehavingflexihly and adapting to particular situations.

HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW May-June 1991 107

HOW TO LEARN

When senior managers are trained in new reason-ing skills, they can have a hig impact on the perfor-mance of the entire organization - even when otheremployees are still reasoning defensively. The CEOwho led the meetings on the performance-evalua-tion procedure was able to defuse dissatisfactionbecause he didn't respond to professionals' criti-cisms in kind but instead gave a clear presentation ofrelevant data. Indeed, most participants took the

To question someone eise'sreasoning is not a sign ofmistrust but a vaiuabieopportunity for iearning.

CEO's behavior to he a sign that the company reallyacted on the values of participation and employeeinvolvement that it espoused.

Of course, the ideal is for all the memhers of anorganization to leam how to reason productively.This has happened at the company where the caseteam meeting took place. Consultants and theirmanagers are now ahle to confront some of the mostdifficult issues of the consultant-client relationship.To get a sense of the difference productive reasoning

The professional who reasons productively casts a critical eye on herown role in a company's problem.

can make, imagine how the original conversationhetween the manager and case team might havegone had everyone engaged in effective reasoning.(The following dialogue is based on actual sessions Ihave attended with other case teams at the samecompany since the training has heen completed.)

First, the consultants would have demonstratedtheir commitment to continuous improvement hyheing willing to examine their own role in the diffi-culties that arose during the consulting project. Nodoubt they would have identified their managers andthe clients as part of the problem, but they Vk'ouldhave gone on to admit that they had contributed to itas well. More important, they would have agreedwith the manager that as they explored the variousroles of clients, managers, and professionals, theywould make sure to test any evaluations or attribu-tions they might make against the data. Each indi-vidual would have encouraged the others to questionhis or her reasoning. Indeed, they Vk'ould have insist^ed on it. And in turn, everyone would have under-stood that act of questioning not as a sign of mistrustor an invasion of privacy hut as a valuable opportuni-ty for leaming.

The conversation about the manager's unwilling-ness to say no might look something like this:

Professional #); "One of the biggest prohlems Ihad with the way you managed thiscase was that you seemed to heunahle to say no when either theclient or your superior made unfairdemands." [Gives an example.]

Professional #2; "I have anotherexample to add. [Describes a secondexample.] But I'd also like to saythat we never really told you howwe felt about this. Behind your backwe were had-mouthing you - youknow, 'he's heing such a wimp' -hut we never came right out andsaid it."

Manager: "It certainly wouldhave heen helpful if you had saidsomething. Was there anything Isaid or did that gave you the ideathat you had better not raise thiswith me?"

Professional #3: "Not really. Ithink we didn't want to sound likewe were whining."

Manager: "Well, I certainly don'tthink you sound like you're whin-ing. But two thoughts come tomind. If I understand you correctly,you were complaining, but the

108 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW May-June 1991

complaining ahout me and my inahility to say nowas covered up. Second, if we had discussed this,I might have gotten the data I needed to be ahleto say no."

Notice that when the second professional de-scrihcs how the consultants had covered up theircomplaints, the manager doesn't criticize her. Rath-er, he rewards her for being open hy responding inkind. He focuses on the ways that he too may havecontributed to the cover-up. Reflecting undefensivc-ly ahout his own role in the prohlem then makes itpossible for tbe professionals to talk about their fearsof appearing to be whining. The manager then agreeswith the professionals that they shouldn't becomecomplainers. At the same time, he points out thecounterproductive consequences of covering uptheir complaints.

Another unresolved issue in the case team meet-ing concerned the supposed arrogance of the clients.A more productive conversation about that problemmight go like this:

Manager: "You said that the clients were arrogantand uncooperative. What did they say and do?"

Professional #?; "One asked me if I had ever meta payroll. Another asked how long I've been out ofschool."

Professional #2; "One even asked me how old Iwas!"

Professional #3; "That's nothing. The worst iswhen they say that all we do is interview people,write a report based on what they tell us, and thencollect our fees."

Manager: "The fact that we tend to be so young isa real problem for many of our clients. They get verydefensive about it. But I'd like to explore whetherthere is a way for them to freely express their viewswithout our getting defensive.

"What trouhled me about your original responseswas that you assumed you were right in calling theclients stupid. One thing I've noticed about consul-tants - in this company and others - is that we tendto defend ourselves by bad-mouthing the client."

Professional #?.• "Right. After all, if they are gen-uinely stupid, then it's obviously not our fault thatthey aren't getting it!"

Professional #2.- "Of course, that stance is anti-leaming and overprotective. By assuming that theycan't leam, we absolve ourselves from having to."

Professional #3; "And the more we all go alongwith the bad-mouthing, the more we reinforce eachother's defensiveness."

Manager: "So what's the alternative? How can weencourage our clients to express their defensivenessand at the same time constructively build on it?"

Professional #1: "We all know tbat the real issueisn't our age,- it's wbether or not we are able to addvalue to the client's organization. They should judgeus by what we produce. And if we aren't addingvalue, tbey should get rid of us - no matter howyoung or old we happen to he."

Manager: "Perhaps that is exactly what we shouldtell them."

In both these examples, the consultants and theirmanager are doing real work. They are learningabout their own group dynamics and addressingsome generic problems in client-consultant rela-tionsbips. Tbe insights they gain will allow them toact more effectively in the future - both as individu-als and as a team. They are not just solving problemshut developing a far deeper and more textured under-standing of their role as members of the organiza-tion. They are laying the groundwork for continuousimprovement that is truly continuous. They arelearning how to leam. ^

Reprint 91301

HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW May-)uno 1991 109

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