Teacher Unions and Student Performance: Help or Hindrance?

Teacher Unions and Student Performance: Help

or Hindrance?

NAEN 33rd Annual ConferenceClearwater, Florida

Presentation by Randall W. Eberts

W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research

“Never before in recent history have the public schools been subjected to such savage criticism for failing to meet the nation’s educational needs”

John Chubb and Terry Moe, Politics, Markets and America’s Schools, 1990

“Teacher unions have become crucial forces in deciding how public education should be run in the U.S.”

--Wall Street Journal

“The most important outcome of teacher unionization is its effect on the way public policy is made.”

--Myron Lieberman

Teacher Unions Some of the strongest attacks on

public schools are reserved for teachers’ unions

Discontent with public schools in general and teacher unions in particular have fueled interest in a variety of reforms

Vouchers

Charters

Teacher“Pay for

Performance”

School Accountability

SystemsState Curriculum

And Testing

Questions What do we really know about the effect of

unions on student achievement? Are they a help or a hindrance?

If collective bargaining produces a standardized workplace, how does that affect the rapidly changing field of education?

How do reform/school improvement proposals affect student achievement? How do unions figure into these efforts?

Is union reform consistent with educational reform?

Why These Issues are Important to You? Collective bargaining agreements, through negotiated

rules and regulations, establish school policy Important to understand how collective bargaining

agreements may affect educational policy and school outcomes

Important to know how negotiations can produce win-win outcomes for teachers, students, administrators, boards

With pressure to reform schools and increase student test scores, and the reality of unions, ways must be found to harness the power of teacher unions to improve schools

Are Teacher Unions the Problem or the Solution? Divided public perception of teacher unions Asked whether teacher unions helped, hurt,

or made no difference in the quality of U.S. public education Helped 27% Hurt 26%

Made no difference: 37% Didn’t know 10%

Phi Delta Kappan/Gallup Poll, 1998

Your Views? How would you respond? If you categorically favor unions and you

see them as beneficial, then my talk will not entirely support your views

If you categorically oppose unions and you see them as detrimental, then my talk will also be disappointing

My view Unions are here and they can be a positive

force in educational reform Unions have both positive and negative

aspects Many union preferences and negotiated

contracts are consistent with improving student achievement, but some are not

Unions need to act as partners not adversaries, be more flexible, and encourage teachers to be more innovative in meeting the needs of each student

Basis for My View View districts not as either unionized or not, but

look at the characteristics of each type of organization to understand what works and what does not (open up the “black box”)

Consider how different organizational forms (e.g. collective bargaining provisions) affect student outcomes

Believe that a successful school environment requires that teachers participate in the decision-making process but that they also recognize that education is risky and that empowerment to make decisions requires accountability in the outcomes

Purpose To share my research and that of

others to provide insights into union/nonunion effects

Explore evidence of the effects of current reform efforts

Explore the role of unions in current school improvement and restructuring initiatives

What is Collective Bargaining? Process by which teachers and administrators

agree on a set of rules and regulations that govern working conditions and determine compensation

“Web of rules” can affect every dimension of the workplace and educational outcomes Define rights and duties of teachers to particular

assignments Govern compensation Establish disciplinary sanctions for failure of teachers to

achieve certain standards Provide for teacher participation in restructuring the

workplace

Background Teacher collective bargaining came about

with public employee collective bargaining Wisconsin was the first state to allow public

employee collective bargaining in 1962 By 1978, 61 percent of classroom teachers

resided in states that permitted formal collective bargaining in education

Today, unions represent 66 percent of the nation’s elementary and secondary teachers

“When we reinvented our association in the 1960s, we modeled it after traditional, industrial unions. Likewise, we accepted the industrial premise: Namely, that labor and management have distinct, conflicting roles and interests ...that we are destined to clash ... that the union-management relationship is inherently adversarial.“

Robert Chase, President, National Education Association, Before the National Press Club, February 5, 1997, Washington, D.C.

Industrial Style BargainingPrinciples of Industrial

Bargaining Interests of labor and

management at odds Standardized practice

is desirable

Similarly skilled workers are interchangeable and should be treated alike

The Factory Model of Schooling

Administrators set policy and teachers comply

Instruction is delivered uniformly to large groups of students

Teaching force is undifferentiated

Johnson and Kardos,in Conflicting Missions, Loveless (ed.), 2000

Contract Provisions Compensation, including fringe benefits Working Conditions

School calendar and working hours Class size Supplementary classroom personnel (e.g., aides)

Employment Protection Assignment Transfers Promotion Reductions in force

Contract Provisions Professional Services

Inservice and professional development Instructional policy committees Student grading and promotion Teacher evaluation Performance indicators

Grievance Procedures Student Discipline and Teacher Safety

Pupil exclusion from classroom

Teacher Pay and Benefits Pay: Teachers covered by collective

bargaining earn 8-12 percent more than teachers not covered Union factory workers typically earn 8-

10 percent more than nonunion ones Benefits: significant effect of the

number of contract items on fringe benefits, more so than for pay

Working Conditions Paid time for instructional preparation is 4

percent greater for unionized teachers Student-teacher ratio (class size) is

between 7-12 percent smaller in union districts In our national sample of elementary schools,

17 per teacher in union districts versus 19 per teacher in nonunion districts

Workplace Standardization Unionized districts are less likely to rely on

specialized instructional modes Students studying math in unionized schools

spend: 42% less time with a specialist 62% less time with an aide 26% less time with a tutor 68% less time in independent, programmed study

Low- and high-achieving students are in larger classes in union schools than in nonunion schools

Employment Protection With smaller class size, union districts

employ more teachers, even in the face of higher pay and more costly fringe benefits

Limitations on class size and reduction in force provisions protect teachers from employment loss in union districts

Increased pay, better fringe benefits, improved working conditions, a more regulated standardized workplace, and protections against loss of employment

Suggest higher costs in union districts

Union districts spend from 8-15% more per pupil than similar nonunion districts

Cost of Instruction

Web of Rules More complex bargaining agreements

raise expenditures per student and affect the internal allocation of funds

Contracts with more bargaining items: Increase instruction costs/pupil Increase benefit costs/pupil Increase teacher salary costs/pupil Reduce other discretionary expenditures/pupil No effect on class size No effect on administrative expenses

Effect on Student Achievement Are there union “productivity”

effects that offset the higher cost of union districts?

First, look at what impacts student achievement, as measured by standardized tests

Next, look at the effect of unions on the educational process

Resources (Class size)

Student Attributes

Time

Mode of Instruction

Teacher Attributes

Administrative Leadership

What Affects Student Achievement?Top school-based inputs from our study,

accounting for other factors Time teachers spend in instruction Time teachers spend in preparation Time principals spend assessing and evaluating

educational programs Total experience of principals as administrators and

as teachers Total experience of teachers Teacher/student ratio (class size)Student economic status and childhood experience are

big factors, but they are not school inputs

Educational Factors The effects of various attributes on student

achievement differ by union or nonunion district Key attributes, such as class size and

instructional and preparation time, have less of an effect in union districts than in nonunion ones

May have to do with differences in class size (union districts already have smaller classes) or in the way instruction is organized (fewer specialized classes in union districts)

Suggests that union and nonunion districts use educational inputs differently

Unions and Student Achievement Unions have only a modest effect on

student achievement Even with major differences between union

and nonunion districts in the effects of key educational factors

The effects of individual factors net out Average student test scores slightly

higher in union districts 1-3 percent higher on standardized math test 3.3 percent higher as a percentage of average

gain from pretest to posttest

Collective Bargaining: Impact on Student Achievement

Estimated Differential

Unit of observation

Outcome

1.0% (3.3% gain)

Individual elementary

Standardized pre-, post-test

1.0% Individual high school

12th grade math

1.4% Individual high school minority

12th grade math

6-8% State SAT and ACT

4.4% State Graduate rates

2.3% School district Drop-out rates

Why the Union Effect on Student Achievement?

Unionized schools are more likely to rely on traditional classroom instruction and much less on specialized modes of instruction If teaching takes place in traditional

classroom, norm of instruction most likely directed toward average student

Smaller classes directed to average student With fewer specialty classes, low and high

achievers tend to receive less attention in union districts than in nonunion districts

Unions and Educational Reform Unions have established rules and

regulations through collective bargaining that are generally consistent with student achievement

Teachers are a key factor in student achievement

Unions represent teachers’ preferences by allocating resources to instruction (smaller class sizes, voice in decisionmaking)

Unions and Educational Reform The CB process has come about through more of

an adversarial than collaborative role Industrial-style contracts narrowly and rigidly

define teachers’ roles, responsibilities, and activities

Allows little flexibility among schools In some instances, administrators as well as

teachers are content to live by rules Public’s discontent with public schools and

perception of union’s lack of innovative approaches calls for reform

“Our challenge is clear: Instead of relegating teachers to the role of production workers -- with no say in organizing their schools for excellence -- we need to enlist teachers as full partners, indeed, as co-managers of their schools. Instead of contracts that reduce flexibility and restrict change, we -- and our schools -- need contracts that empower and enable.”


Desire for Change in Bargaining Approach

Reform Style BargainingPrinciples of Reform

Bargaining Management and

labor share interests and collaborate

Flexibility and site-based discretion are built into contract

Varied roles and status are recognized

The Reform Model of Schooling

Teachers and admini-strators hold joint responsibility for schooling

Governance and instruction are school based

Teachers participate as mentors, curriculum experts, and peer reviewers

Johnson and Kardos,2000

School Reform Current wave of school reform grew

out of 1983 report “A Nation at Risk” Two movements:

Reform existing system• Incentive pay• Accountability systems

Find alternative system• School choice—vouchers, charters

Vast majority of the public still supports reforming existing schools

72% favor reforming existing system

24% favor finding alternative systemPhi Delta Kappan/Gallup PollSeptember 2001

Voucher Referenda California

$4,000 voucher Defeated 70% to 30%

Michigan $3,300 to students in failing districts Defeated 70% to 30%

“The imperative now facing public education could not be more stark: Simply put, in the decade ahead, we must revitalize our public schools from within, or they will be dismantled from without. …The vast majority of Americans …want higher quality public schools, and they want them now.”


Performance Incentive Systems Pay for performance is an incentive system to

hold teachers/administrators accountable for student outcomes

A portion of a teacher’s/administrator’s pay is based on predetermined and agreed upon outcome measures or activities Old Style: Based on subjective evaluations by principals/superiors New Style: Based on outcomes (test scores)

Based on activities (professional development, mentoring,

certification)

Incentive Structure Typically sets aside 5-20 percent of the base

salary for performance pay Some plans offer bonuses above the regular

base salary Other plans start with a reduced base salary

(e.g., 90% of regular base) and offer a maximum performance incentive well above that amount

Individual or group-based incentive programs Programs based on clear, understandable,

observable objectives that are consistent with educational goals

Source: OSBA Negotiator’s Notebook, March 2000

Examples Individual incentive systems

Denver Previous merit pay systems during 70s, 80s

School-based incentive systems Charlotte-Mecklenburg Kentucky Accountability Program; Maryland

School Performance Program Dallas

Source: OSBA, Negotiator’s Notebook, March 2000

Effects of Performance Pay Little empirical evidence on the effects of

performance pay on student achievement Most of the literature on performance pay systems

documents the institutional experiences in districts, not the outcomes Few comparisons of outcomes in schools with incentive

programs and in schools with traditional systems Those experiences, particularly for individual

incentive programs, have been rather short-lived and usually negative A major study of merit-based pay found that most (75%)

merit-pay programs that had been in existence in 1983 and had been studied by the researchers, were no longer operational in 1993.

Performance Pay: Evidence on Successful Practice

Murnane and Cohen (1986) Extra pay for extra work Make everyone feel special (everyone receives) Inconspicuous Teachers help design

Hatry, Greiner, and Ashford (1994) Substantive participation by teachers Ample planning time Substantial proportion of teachers receive award Reward improvement, not just performance Voluntary

Performance Pay: No Evidence of Effect on Student Achievement

“None of the 18 school districts [out of 18 examined] reported significant gains in student achievement. This finding held true even in districts that explicitly targeted and delineated student achievement as a program goal. Where found, improvements in student achievement (test scores) were short-lived and sporadic.”

“Similarly, we found little evidence from other research . . . That incentive programs (particularly pay-for-performance) had led to improved teacher performance and student achievements.”

Hatry, Greiner, and Ashford (1994)

No correlation between test score gains and teachers awarded merit bonuses.

Tulli (1991)

Case Study

Alternative high school in a union district Teachers opted out of contract to pursue

performance pay incentive program Performance based on student retention

and on response to satisfaction survey A retention bonus is paid if 80% or more of

students assigned to class are still enrolled and attending at end of the quarter

Performance bonus if rated 4.65 or above on 5.0 scale

Both bonuses yield 20% of base salary

Evaluation Method Compared students in high school with

performance incentives to students in a similar high school with traditional compensation scheme

Examined outcomes by student and course before and after implementation

Evaluated several outcomes: GPA Attendance Course completion Passing

Evaluation Results Good News: Economic incentives work

Dramatic increase in percentage of completers Bad News: Economic incentives work

Teachers altered instructional style and class content to make courses more interesting and well-liked

Targeted outcome not aligned with school objectives—student achievement

GPA and passing percentages fell• Could be good news if incentives prompted teachers

to retain lower achieving students in class

Why Such Little Success with Individual Incentive Systems?

Teaching does not necessarily lend itself to effective use of individual incentives– a complex process

Multiple tasks/outcomes/stakeholders Team production Difficult to measure all desired outcomes Difficult to include all desired outcomes in

incentive system Not all desired outcomes are aligned

For example, incentives to retain students are not necessarily consistent with raising student achievement as measured by GPA or test scores

Private Sector Incentive Programs Only a small proportion of jobs base

compensation on explicit contracts that reward individual performance Private sector companies prefer to reward

individuals on subjective measures of performance

Or to follow bureaucratic rules that establish job grades and promotion criteria

Sizable number of group-based incentive programs are judged unsuccessful

Accountability Systems Nearly every state has implemented a

school accountability program Content standards that mandate what

students should know and when they should know it

An assessment system that tracks the progress of students vis-à-vis standards

Set of responses by the state that may include financial incentives, penalties, sanctions, or additional resources

Pros and Cons Proponents claim:

By making schools more transparent, they will be forced to improve operations

By presenting teachers with well-defined rules and holding them accountable to goals, teachers will improve

Critics concerned: Teachers will “teach to the test” Standards may hold back more progressive

districts States may be slow to adjust standards to

changing times

School-Based Incentive SystemsKentucky Performance target set for each school that had

10% improvement in test scores over baseline Those schools exceeding the target were given

financial incentives; distribution up to teachers Successful schools

aligned curriculum with state assessment teachers were supportive of accountability

system principals were skilled facilitators

School-Based Incentive SystemsDallas Performance target set on test score gains, adjusted

for factors outside school’s control Each professional staff in “winning” school given

$1,000, nonprofessionals $500 Evaluation finds increases of 10-12% in the pass rate

on standardized tests over other major Texas districts

Also finds the same increase in test scores in the year before the incentive program was implemented Suggests other factors may have affected

results

California Enacted program in 1999

Based on highly specific and comprehensive standards Norm-referenced statewide test Complex series of rewards and punishments for staff

and students Evaluation showed (Betts and Danenberg):

Spurred growth in achievement Testing and related aspects of accountability did not

dilute high school curriculum Has not widened inequality in curriculum between top

and bottom-performing schools

Design for Successful Group Performance Pay System

Goal: to motivate teachers to align their efforts more closely with educational goals

Teacher expectancy Connection between achieving goal and receiving the

bonus Size of the bonus Active support of principals Fairness perception Teacher participation in program design

Consortium for Policy Research and Education (gleaned from educational and private sector practice)

Implementation of Reform an Issue Fall 2000, Philadelphia School District threatened

to strike Both agreed that reforms were necessary but

couldn’t agree on what changes needed to be made

One sticking point was the district’s proposal to tie pay increases to performance and reduce role of seniority

“Pay for performance is necessary to ensure accountability and to give younger more ambitious teachers the ability to get to top salary earlier in their careers.”

– Alexis Moore, School District of Philadelphia

Unions and Implementation Unions’ willingness to implement performance pay varies Merit pay (individual teacher) incentive programs were

generally not well accepted by unions, primarily because evaluations were considered subjective and teachers were treated differently

Group-incentive programs have been better received Denver’s two-year pilot was endorsed by unions Several Kentucky unions objected to that state’s plan

Several studies conclude that union acceptance is not insurmountable, particularly if teachers are involved in design and planning and targets perceived to be objective Murnane and Cohen (1986); Hatry et al.

Aligning teacher efforts with education goals is not inconsistent with union preferences, although may not be given top priority in negotiations

Union position Should find standard-based systems

attractive because they promote standardization of the workplace Clearly defined goals and objectives Mandates to adhere to these standards Protected from capricious administrators Can relate negotiated contract provisions

(e.g., class size) to accomplishing standards Not so attractive:

Intrudes on teachers’ autonomy in classroom Dictates curriculum and testing

Alternative Systems School Choice

Private schools Vouchers Charter Schools

Majority opposes allowing students and parentschoose a private school to attend at publicexpense?

Favor: 34% Oppose: 62%Phi Delta Kappan/Gallup PollSeptember 2001

Evidence on Effects of Alternative Systems Private schools

Little or no difference in outcomes of students in private and public schools

Except, African Americans in large urban areas do better in private schools

Vouchers Studies find little overall improvement in test

scores for those using vouchers, except for African Americans

• Milwaukee, Cleveland, several private foundations

Evidence (con’t)

Charter Schools In Michigan and Texas, conventional public

schools outperform charters, except for at-risk students

In Michigan, conventional public schools perform better than non-profit charters, and non-profit charters perform better than for-profit ones

In Arizona, charters outperform conventional public schools

Competition from charters improves student performance in conventional public schools

“We cannot go on denying responsibility for school quality. We can't wash our hands of it and say "that's management's job." School quality -- the quality of the environment where students learn and where our members work -- must be our responsibility as a union.”


New Unionism Both major unions have pursued a

new approach to collective bargaining Greater teacher participation in

decision making More emphasis on student achievement

Proponents argue that only by bringing teachers into process can schools be improved

New Unionism Opponents claim that:

Once shared decision making is included in CB contracts, flexibility is lost and school improvement initiatives are stifled, and attention shifts from what is right for the student to whether school administrators have adhered to the contract

Once teachers have the opportunity to grieve issues, educational policy ends up in the hands of a disinterested third party negotiator

New Unionism Codifying educational policy into CB

agreements without clear evidence of its effectiveness can lead to both disappointment and wasted efforts

It may be difficult to remove ineffective provisions once negotiated into the contract

We still don’t know enough about what works and doesn’t work to negotiate these reforms into contract

Conclusion CB establishes rules and regulations that

influence educational process Unions have both positive and negative aspects CB has slight positive effect on average student

achievement, but a negative effect on low and high achievers

CB increases cost of education Performance pay can work, yet little evidence of

positive effects on student achievement Incentives may have unintended, detrimental

effects, and is difficult to design and implement

Conclusion Many union preferences are consistent with

improving student achievement, yet unions could do more in aligning teacher effort with educational goals

Performance pay focuses teacher effort on educational goals, but schooling may be too complex for success

However, unions need to act as partners not adversaries, be more flexible, and encourage teachers to be innovative in meeting the individual needs of students

In short, need to move toward the reform model of bargaining

Conclusion Unions must step outside the CB contract Recognize that education is a risky

business CB must be adapted to allow teachers to

participate in a proactive attempt to find new ways to educate children

With empowerment to make decisions must come responsibility and accountability

Teacher Unions and Student Performance: Help

or Hindrance?

NAEN 33rd Annual ConferenceClearwater, Florida

Presentation by Randall W. Eberts

W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research

Teacher Unions and Student Performance: Help or Hindrance?

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