Taylor_Europe Divided Left_2009

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P O L I T I C S A B R O A D

E uropes divided Left

ROBERT TAYLOR

E urope has plunged into its severesteconomic recession since before the SecondWorld War, with rising unemployment, plantclosures, and a credit crunch as the financialsystem falters. The political challenge this setsfor the European Left looks daunting and iscomplicated by the growing divisions and rival-ries inside its own ranks, as still small but in-creasingly significant radical socialist left partiesare emerging in many European countries.These parties, complete with populist appeals,threaten the capacity of mainstream socialdemocracy to renew itself.

To know modern history is to know the con-sequences of a divided Left for Europeandemocracy. Darkening times have not been themost propitious for the advance of socialism.During the 1930s, it was the authoritarian Rightthat benefited far more from the consequencesof economic slump than the Left, with the riseof virulent nationalisms and hostility to demo-cratic values. Only in Social Democratic Swedenand briefly in Popular Front France and Spaindid the forces of the Left secure effective politi-cal power in government.

A primary cause of the Lefts catastrophic de-feat in that dismal decade lay in the bitter ideo-logical chasm that grew wider between theforces of Soviet communism and social democ-racy. The sinister role of the German Commu-nist Party in the final months of the Weimar Re-public, especially in its tactical willingness to

ally with the Nazis to destroy democratic plural-ism and its ferocious repudiation of the Social

Democrats as social fascists, was of crucial im-portance in ensuring Hitlers fatal triumph in1933. During the Spanish Civil War, the Com-munist Partys campaign of terror against theultra Left weakened republican solidarity at acrucial moment, to General Francisco Francosmilitary advantage. Even in France, the work-place militancy of the Communists in the tradeunions did much to undermine the PopularFront government of Socialist Lon Blum in1936-1937, a coalition that the Communistleadership refused to join. Genuine unity on theEuropean Left was always difficult, if not im-possible, after the Russian Revolution split apartthe international labor movement.

The bitter conflict between socialism andcommunism during the cold war after the 1940sensured long periods of right-wing power acrossmuch of Western Europe outside the Nordic re-gion. Powerful communist parties in France andItaly weakened the wider Left fatally. The fall ofthe Berlin Wall and the implosion of the SovietUnion in 1990 may have destroyed the old-stylecommunist parties on the continent, with theirsubservience to Moscow. But it did not make iteasier to bring the splintered forces of the dem-ocratic Left together in any meaningful way.

The current crisis of mainstream socialdemocracy is in part due to the surprisingtenacity and advance of more radical move-ments to its left. It is true that the growth ofsuch political groupings in many European

countries does not so far threaten to bring aboutany dramatic transformation, but their exis-


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tence as a challenge on the left is already weak-ening social democracys electoral prospects.These socialist left parties are a growing threatto the mainstream Left because they are neithersectarian nor under the thumb of externalforces but are developing ideologies and pro-

grams popular among a growing number of vot-ers who may previously have backed socialdemocracy.

T his is most apparent in Germany,where the Social Democrats in the ruling GrandCoalition have been losing ground among theironce core bases of electoral support. Die Linke orthe Left Partyfounded in 2007has rapidly be-come the third-largest party in the country. Bothin opinion polls and electoral results at the re-gional and city level, Die Linke backers outvotethe neoliberal Free Democrats and the Greens. Inthe 1990s, the then Party of Democratic Social-ismthe renamed party that had run authoritar-ian East Germany for forty yearswas widely re-garded as a pathetic and fading remnant for oldcomrades in the East who were the main victimsof unification. But today Die Linkea coalition ofthose former Communists and left defectors inthe West from the revisionist Social Democratshas established a following across much of Ger-many that suggests it appeals to a broadeningstratum of the German electorate.

Nor is the advance of a credible radical social-ist left confined to Germany. In the Netherlands,the Socialist Party is now the third largest in thecountry. At the November 2006 general election,its representation in the Dutch Parliamentclimbed from nine to twenty-five seats, and asmany as 18 percent of Dutch voters backed theparty at the polls, not far behind the proportionvoting for the mainstream Labor Party.

In Norway the radical Left even sharespower in a center-left government. It is truethat in the September 2005 elections the Social-ist Left Party won only 8.8 percent of the votesand fifteen seats in the Norwegian Parliament.This was a less impressive performance than itachieved in the 1989 and 2001 general elec-tions. But the current Norwegian Labor admin-istration needs the Socialist Left Party in itscoalition along with the Center Party in order togovern. As many as six cabinet posts are held by

Socialist Left members, including the crucial fi-nance, energy, environmental, and education

portfolios. In other European democraciesno-tably in Portugal, Spain, Denmark, and Swe-denthe radical Left also has a small but signif-icant presence in Parliament. They cannot bedismissed as fringe parties.

The ideologies and programs of these left

parties reveal common features that transcendnational differences. What unites them all is ageneral hostility to neoliberal capitalism, to theworkings of the unfettered free market, deregu-lation and privatization of the public sector, lowtaxes, and low public spending that has charac-terized much of the mainstream politics of theWestern world since the age of MargaretThatcher and Ronald Reagan. The utter rejec-tion of the American economic model is reflect-ed in their ideological manifestoes. In Novem-

ber 2008 the parties of the European left mettogether in Berlin and agreed on a joint pro-gram for this summers European Assemblyelections that emphasized that crucial point.The parties blamed the perceived evils of neolib-eralism on the hegemonic power of the UnitedStates and spoke of irresponsible political andeconomic elites in Europe pushing ahead withhazardous capitalism and uncontrolled mar-kets at the expense of the people.

The most emphatic declaration of hostility toneoliberalism has come from Die Linke , which isthe most influential political party in the pan Eu-ropean socialist Left. Neoliberal capitalism meansdismantling democracy, its own ideological man-ifesto asserts, and it speaks of the barbaric char-acter of the American modelin its alleged com-mitment to inequality, exploitation, and degrada-tion not only in Europe but across the world andinside the international institutions such as theWorld Trade Organization, the World Bank, andthe International Monetary Fund. We want toensure that capitalism is not the last word in thehistory books, Die Linke declares. In the classicMarxist tradition of the Gotha and Erfurt pro-grams of nineteenth-century German socialdemocracy, the manifesto paints a sweeping anduncompromisingly bleak picture of the existingglobal economic order. Events since last autumnhave tended to vindicate those who always re-garded the existing economic system as inherent-ly unstable and inequitable. The current crisis hasgiven the European socialist Left a grand narra-tive to justify its existence.

Most of the radical left parties in Europeemerged from the wreckage of the old commu-



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nist parties or in earlier breakaways from them.Now they are united in their rejection of Soviet-style politics. Die Linke in Germany denies it holdsany residual ties or sympathy with past authori-tarian practices: We reject any form of dictator-ship and Stalinism as a criminal abuse of social-

ism, its ideological manifesto seeks to reassure.The European radical-left critique of neolib-eralism is combined with an apparently strongcommitment to democratic social and collec-tivist values. In its 2008 Berlin declaration, theParty of the European Left called for the cre-ation of a social, peaceful and solidarity basedcontinent based on sustainable development,on a strong state sector, a strong regulation ofexisting financial institutions, and a halt to mar-ket solutions.

Ambitiously, Die Linke claims to be a newparty the like of which there has never beenseen in Germany before, as it seeks to bring allprogressive forces together from the feministmovement, environmental groups, anti-racistand anti-fascist bodies, and those who campaignfor peace and disarmament. Far from being aparty built on the Leninist principles of demo-cratic centralism, Die Linke insists on its plural-ism and tolerance and commitment to justice,freedom, solidarity, and internationalism. Theparty claims to champion the rights and needsof individuals, which, it argues, can only be ad-vanced through collective action by a democrat-ic state. Its self-declared ambition is to challengeneoliberalism through the creation of a credibleand idealistic alternative. In some respects itlooks and sounds like the Independent SocialDemocrats, who were formed in the First WorldWar and lasted until the early 1920s.

Radical left parties elsewhere in Europeshare similar and often utopian aspirations forthe creation of societies and economies basedon equality, solidarity, and freedom. But like DieLinke they also have to function in parliamen-tary democracies with often elaborate propor-tional electoral systems that require compro-mise and accommodations. As a result they can-not afford to remain uncompromising in theirwider appeal. They need to balance their abso-lutist and purist ends with a resort to pragmatichorse trading in Parliament. The socialist leftsmay repudiate neoliberal capitalism in trench-ant language and attack social democrats for ap-

peasing free market forces, but they have towrestle with all the familiar difficulties of politi-

cal systems that represent a plurality of partiesand traditions.

In its 2008 manifesto, the Party of the Euro-pean Left argued that the radical groupingsformed a counter power and a designingforce to what it saw as the neoliberal consen-

sus that it argued covered mainstream socialdemocracy as well as the center right. It spokeof the need for a new synergy that could in-fluence the wider politics of the center Left andcalled for common struggles both in parlia-ments and on the streets.

All the radical left parties in Europe, albeit inslightly different ways, regard themselves as thedefenders of what European social democracyachieved in its postwar golden age. They sup-port strong welfare states funded by high levelsof taxation and they oppose marketization orprivatizing of health and educational services.They demand continuing high state spendingand levels of taxation, controls on capital, andmore egalitarian social policies. They wantstronger state protection for the elderly, the lesswell off, and the sick. They reject workfareschemes to force the unemployed into low-paid

jobs. In a clear appeal to women, they give ahigh priority to comprehensive child-care provi-sion. The radical Left argues that social democ-racy has compromised far too much with ne-oliberalism and abandoned many of its tradi-tional core values through misguided projects ofmodernization.

But their hopes of making any further politi-cal progress depend on establishing closer andwarmer relations with despised social democra-cy. This necessitates a commitment to compro-mise and cooperation with the mainstream Left.Such a strategy has made its most significant

breakthrough in Norway, where the NorwegianSocialist Left Party argues that its tactical aim isto push the countrys larger Labor Party moreleftward, but believes this can be done not sim-ply by agitating on the sidelines but by sharingin the obligations of governance. The inevitableaccommodations that have resulted may troublemany of the partys rank and file. But if theparty hopes to prosper, it must learn to adoptparliamentary strategies that involve a willing-ness to shoulder the responsibilities that in-evitably come from inclusion in governments.Such a move may weaken the purity of the

wider socialist appeal. The Norwegian experi-ence suggests it is a strategy that works.



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In the Netherlands, the Socialists are the mainopposition, while the mainstream Labor Party is apart of the current coalition government. Social-ists denounce the mainstream center Left for itstechnocratic approach to politics and willingnessto compromise with neoliberalism. But the So-

cialists firm advocacy of traditional social demo-cratic values and programs and rejection of whatthey describe as the period of superficiality andpostmodernism threatens Labors long-term po-litical future. Under the slogan first on the Left,the Dutch Socialists may make further inroads atLabors expense. The party displays a surprisinglyhard-headed realism toward racism and Islamismand insists that the Netherlands has to address thedangers of xenophobia by a populist attitude tothe upholding of the rule of law and the need forcultural integration.

In Germany, Die Linke is already in many re-gional and city governments in the east of thecountry and is strong in Hamburg, Hesse, andLower Saxony. But under the leadership of thecharismatic former Social Democratic financeminister, Oskar Lafontaine, who stormed out ofhis old party in 1999, Die Linke is eager to joincenter-left coalitions, although its ideologicalmanifesto argues that it will not compromiseits principles in entering into alliances with oth-ers. For their part, many Social Democrats in-sist that they will not seek or agree to the for-mation of strategic alliances in power with DieLinke , and some argue they would prefer tocontinue in grand coalition with AngelaMerkels Christian Democrats rather than lineup with Lafontaines party.

Such arms-length attitudes by the main-stream lefts in Europe may not be so easy tomaintain in the future. The popular appeal ofthe radical Left could well increase over thenext few years. Its social composition indicatesgrowing support among women, voters underthe age of thirty, those employed in the publicservices sector, and those active in social move-ments who are particularly attracted by the pol-itics of the radical Left. Worryingly for the socialdemocrats in Norway, Denmark, and Germany,there are signs that the radical left parties arestarting to make significant inroads inside thetrade unions, traditionally social democraticstrongholds. Calls for legally enforceable nation-al minimum wages, more labor rights at work,

and generous welfare policies for the joblessresonate with an increasing number of voters

disaffected with social democracy. The radicalLeft can often look modern, tolerant, and opento new ideas while at the same time upholdingtraditional collectivist values. Their parties arguethat they are optimists who offer an exciting al-ternative to the technocratic managerialism of

mainstream social democracy. The Danish So-cialist Peoples Party, with 13 percent of the votein the 2007 election and twenty-three seats inParliament, claims that it is committed to whatit calls popular socialism. Across Europe, theradical Left is taking advantage of the confusionand weaknesses of social democratic parties thatfind it increasingly difficult to offer ways out ofthe economic crisis.

In its commitment to internationalism, theradical Left offers what it believes to be a gen-uine alternative to existing global power poli-tics. Its parties almost all oppose Western mili-tary involvement in both Iraq and Afghanistan.They support the cause of the Palestinian peopleand in varying degrees criticize Israel. Much ofthe radical Left is opposed to the very existenceof NATO as a collective security organization,with the exception of the Norwegian party.There is a clear hostility among them to any useof military force to resolve international ques-tions. The radical Left prefers soft powerthrough the United Nations.

What unites them even more in their foreignpolicies is their attitude toward the EuropeanUnion. In Denmark and the Netherlands, the rad-ical left parties have campaigned successfully for aNo vote on referendums on either the euro orthe European Treaty or Constitution. They rejectthe EUs Lisbon agenda, which they insist is com-mitted to a neoliberal program. They want a moresocial Europe of the people and not the

bankers. They argue for greater democratic ac-countability in European decision making andless centralized control from Brussels. They oftencampaign for national solutions to Europe-wideproblems. Above all, they stress what they regardas popular responses to global issues.

The gap between much of the fine-soundingrhetoric and the realities of democratic politicshas always troubled the European Left. InFrance, the dangers of division between radicaland pragmatic tendencies are illustrated by strug-gles within the fractious ranks of the SocialistParty. The bitter leadership contest last fall be-

tween Martine Aubry and Sgolne Royale waspartly personal and partly about whether the



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party would present itself as the anchor of aplural Left as in the past or seek alliance withthe political center. In the meantime, the Trot-skyists of the Revolutionary Communist Leaguehave launched an Anti-Capitalist Party seekingto encompass the more radical Left and draw

support away from the squabbling Socialists. Thisparty hopes to take a place on the French politi-cal map roughly similar to that of Die Linke inGermany. In the United Kingdom the Left is all

but extinctthanks mainly to the consequencesof a first-past-the-post electoral system.

B ut can the new radical Left real-ly forge a partnership or even an understandingwith mainstream social democracy? Just as im-portant, should social democracy treat theforces to its left as a threat to its own position ora catalyst for its own renewal? The answers tothose fundamental questions will determine thefuture political prospects of the European Left.

The first will depend on whether the radicalLeft parties are willing to become pragmatistsand accept the limitations imposed by the na-ture of pluralistic systems of government andrepresentation. This is why the Norwegian ex-perience is of wider importance. Historically,radical left and communist parties have oftenagreed to support center-left coalition govern-ments but without joining them. The hegemonyof social democracy in recent years was helped

by such arrangements with the radical Left inSweden, which provided the necessary votes inParliament while avoiding the responsibilities ofholding office.

But as the more radical left parties becomeabsorbed in the necessary short-term tactics ofparliamentarism, their popular appeal mayweaken among many voters who see them as a

break with the discredited politics of the main-stream Left. Moreover, many social democratsdo not believe it helps their own capacity to re-

build and grow if they are over-tolerant of theforces that threaten to undermine them fromthe radical Left. Their analysis of what theyshould do will depend on whether the radicalleft parties can continue to expand their popularappeal. In the past, social democrats saw thedanger from the radical Left as a communistthreat to their existence. They still believe that

the radical Left represents social forces that can-

not grow successfully. In Germany, many socialdemocrats remain committed to modernizationstrategies for the social market model, and theyview Die Linke as a backward-looking party iden-tified with the failed politics of East Germany.

Economic events may determine the future of

Europes radical Left. If recession turns into de-pression, the political consequences maystrengthen the radical right. Racism and xeno-phobia could return in more toxic forms than inthe recent past. To their credit, the radical Leftsthough with some exceptionshave rejected anyforms of populist appeal that would fuel suchemotions. They remain confident and optimisticin their belief that they have an increasing capac-ity and influence to help in rolling back theforces of neoliberal capitalism. But we are livingthrough a time of flux and unpredictability. Thewider European Left is in crisis. Social democratseverywhere are rethinking their ideas and pro-grams. For the most part, they still remain suspi-cious and doubtful about the nature of the ideo-logical challenge coming from their left. But theyhave no grounds for complacency.

Radical left parties in Europe are helping toenergize democratic politics and to increase pop-ular participation. Ironically, their prospects willdepend on how far their electoral appeals arerooted in the social democratic politics of thegolden age. There is an insoluble dilemma thatlies at the core of Europes radical Left. It needsto appeal to the young, to the new working classof post-industrialism, to those concerned withenvironmental issues, peace, and the rights ofwomen. But it also evokes a nostalgia for the lostworld of postwar Europe, when social democrat-ic values underpinned the growth of welfarestates, collective solutions, and the positive roleplayed by democratic governments in the socialtransformation of society. In looking back as wellas forward, the radical Left may find it difficult toremain intellectually coherent, with negativeconsequences and limitations on its ability tomake any permanent breakthrough on the Euro-pean Left. For the moment, however, the radicalLeft poses serious problems for the future ofmainstream social democracy.

Robert Taylor is associate member of NuffieldCollege, Oxford. He is writing a history of parlia-mentary socialism in Britain.



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