Taylor Russia Ministries, menciona Jose Musse

7/27/2019 Taylor Russia Ministries, menciona Jose Musse

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Russias Power Ministries:

Coercion and Commerce

Brian D. Taylor

Institute or National Security and Counterterrorism, Syracuse University


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RUSSIAS POWER MINISTRIES:

COERCION AND COMMERCE

Bran D. Taylor

Assstant Proessor

Department o Poltcal Scence

Maxwell School o Ctzenshp and Publc Aars

Syracuse Unversty

October 2007

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I grateully acknowledge the support o the Smth Rchardson Foundaton or ths project. I also

thank the Carnege Corporaton o New York or prevous support related to ths project.

I thank Rchard Bodnar and Jekaterna Kalandadze or research assstance, and the overall

project support o Marlene Damond and Kel Perrn o the Insttute or Natonal Securty and

Counterterrorsm (INSCT). I also thank Rchard Bodnar and Rene de Nevers or revewng the

manuscrpt.

The vews expressed heren are mne alone, as are all remanng errors.

Copyrght 2007 Bran D. Taylor

Cover Photo: Bernard Lo/Stockphoto


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Russan Presdent Vladmr Putn has ncreased the power and resources o Russas power

mnstres mltary, securty, and law enorcement agences. He also has empowered many poltcal

alles wth backgrounds n these structures, placng them n mportant postons throughout the

state, and n state-owned busnesses. At the same tme, there reman mportant dvsons between

these agences and among these ocals; they are not a uned group.

The promnent poltcal role gven to the power mnstres has contrbuted to ncreasng

authortaransm under Putn. It has not, however, acheved Putns stated goal o buldng a strong

and eectve Russan state. Ths s because these very same power mnstres are themselves corrupt,

and thus the personal enrchment o state ocals oten takes prorty over accomplshng state goalsCorrupt and necent Russan power mnstres potentally threaten U.S. oregn and

securty nterests, partcularly n terms o nonproleraton and transnatonal crme and terrorsm.

The U.S. should contnue to cooperate where possble wth Russa on mportant securty nterests,

but must be aware o how the commercalzaton o the power mnstres aects ther behavor

and complcates jont projects. Although U.S. nfuence on Russan state agences s mnmal,

engagement wth Russan power mnstres should emphasze more strongly the benets to Russa

o reorms that strengthen the rule o law and mprove publc admnstraton.


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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................................. v

CHAPTER ONE: OVERVIEW OF THE POWER MINISTRIES ....................................................

The Mnstry o Deense and ts Successors ....................................................................................

The KGB and ts Successors ............................................................................................................. 5

The Mnstry o Internal Aars (MVD) ........................................................................................... 7

Other Power Mnstres and Law Enorcement Agences ............................................................... 8

Power Mnstry Budgets: Reversal o Fortune ................................................................................. 0

Power Mnstry Leaders: Stablty n Cadres .................................................................................... 2

CHAPTER TWO: THE SILOVIKI: COHORT, CLAN, AND CORPORATE ACTORS ................. 5

The Slovk Cohort ........................................................................................................................... 6

Slovk Clans...................................................................................................................................... 9

Slovk Corporate Actors ................................................................................................................... 2

CHAPTER THREE: POWER AS A WEAPON: THE RETURN OF AUTHORITARIANISM ...... 25

The Power Mnstres and the Struggle or Power: Crses and Conspraces ................................ 26

The Power Mnstres and the Buldng o Vertcal Power ........................................................... 30

Strengthenng the State: Putns Mxed Record ............................................................................... 36

CHAPTER FOUR: POWER AS A RESOURCE: GUNS AND MONEY ........................................ 42

The Downsde o Putns Approach to State-Buldng: Corrupton and the Weak Rule o Law .... 42

The Commercalzaton o the Power Mnstres ............................................................................ 44

Slovk Clans and Bg Busness ....................................................................................................... 48

Popular Perceptons o the State: Lack o Trust ............................................................................... 5

CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................ 54Implcatons or U.S. Polcy .............................................................................................................. 56

Polcy Recommendatons: A New Framework or Engagng the Power Mnstres ..................... 59


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TABLES AND FIGURES

Fgure : Fragmentaton and Consoldaton o the Power Mnstres, 986-2006 ....................... 2

Table : Man Power Mnstres and Ther Approxmate Sze......................................................... 2

Fgure 2: Natonal Deense and Securty & Law Enorcement Spendng ...................................... 2

Table 2: Average Tenure o Power Mnsters, n Months, January 992 - June 2007 ................... 3

Fgure 3: Mltarzaton o the Russan Elte .................................................................................... 6

Table 3: Federal Dstrcts and Power Mnstry Personnel, Md-2002 ............................................ 7

Fgure 4: Deaths From Terrorsm/Insurgency, Major Attacks, North Caucasus, 2000-2006 ..... 35

Fgure 5: Russa Freedom House Scores.......................................................................................... 37

Fgure 6: Poltcal Stablty/No Volence (World Bank Governance) ............................................. 38

Fgure 7: Government Eectveness (World Bank Governance) .................................................... 39

Fgure 8: Murders per 00,000 Populaton .................................................................................... 40

Fgure 9: Rule o Law (World Bank Governance) ............................................................................ 43

Fgure 0: Control o Corrupton (World Bank Governance) ......................................................... 44

Table 4: Polce Brbes Prce Lst 2002 ........................................................................................... 47

Table 5: Key Slovk n Bg Busness ................................................................................................ 49

Fgure : Trust n the Power Mnstres .......................................................................................... 52


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ABBREVIATIONS

CFE Conventonal Forces n Europe

GDP Gross Domestc Product

GRU Man Intellgence Drectorate (mltary ntellgence)

GUO Man Guards Drectorate

GUSP Man Drectorate or Specal Programs

HEU hghly-enrched uranum

KBR Kabardno-Balkara Republc

KGB Commttee on State Securty

FAPSI Federal Agency or Government Communcaton and Inormaton

FDSU - Federal Road Constructon AdmnstratonFEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FPS Federal Border Servce

FSB Federal Securty Servce

FSIN Federal Servce or the Admnstraton o Sentences

FSKN Federal Servce or the Control o the Narcotcs Trade

FSNP Federal Tax Polce Servce

FSO Federal Guard Servce

FTS Federal Customs Servce

MChS Mnstry o Cvl Deense and Emergency Stuatons

MO Mnstry o Deense

MVD Mnstry o Internal Aars

NCO Non-Commssoned Ocer

NGO Non-Governmental Agency

NKVD Peoples Commssarat o Internal Aars

OAK Unted Arcrat Constructon Corporaton

OECD Organzaton or Economc Cooperaton and Development

OMON Specal (Osobyy) Desgnaton Polce Detachment

OMSN Specal (Spetsialnyy) Desgnaton Polce Detachment

SBP Presdental Securty ServceSSR Securty Sector Reorm

SVR Foregn Intellgence Servce

VV Internal Troops

WMD weapons o mass destructon


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INTRODUCTION

When Russan Presdent Vladmr Putn took power n 2000, strengthenng the state

was hs central polcy goal. As hs second term as presdent wnds down, Putn has

expressed satsacton wth hs achevements n ths area. A key component o Putns

state-buldng eorts has been the ncreased power and promnence o state coercve bodes, reerred

to n Russa as the power mnstres (silovye ministerstva) or power structures (silovye strukturi).

Smply put, power mnstres are those state agences n whch the personnel generally wear

unorms and n whch some people carry guns. More precsely, these bodes are mltary, securty,

or law enorcement bodes that possess armed unts or ormatons. People wth power mnstry

backgrounds are reerred to as siloviki.

Ths monograph provdes an overvew o Russas power mnstres and ther poltcal and

economc role. As Operaton Successor, the eort to elect a Putn loyalst as presdent, moves nto

ts actve phase or December 2007 parlamentary electons and March 2008 presdental electons,

t s mportant to understand how the power and capabltes o these agences have changed under

Putn, and how they mght nfuence Russan development under the next presdent.

The presdent and the central executve, or the Kremln or short, has a much greater ablty

to use the coercve power o the state aganst ts poltcal and economc opponents now than t ddunder Bors Yeltsn. Putn has not been shy about usng ths weapon aganst actors that were seen as

major constrants on the Kremln when he took oce, such as regonal governors and bg busness

tycoons, or olgarchs. Ths recentralzaton drve, n whch the power mnstres played a pvotal role,

has moved Russa n a sharply authortaran drecton. However, ncreasng the power o the Kremln

has produced only very modest achevements n strengthenng the state. I by state strength we mean

the ablty o a state to ensure the relable mplementaton o ts decsons by ts own personnel, then

the Russan state remans very weak compared to other mddle-ncome states.

Although the power mnstres can now be drected by the presdent to mplement

exceptonal decsons much more readly than under Yeltsn, they stll oten al at ther routne

tasks as establshed by law, such as ghtng terrorsm and crme. The major reason or contnued

decences n the perormance o the power mnstres s ther commercalzaton, whch s the

most undamental change n these bodes snce the Sovet collapse. Commercalzaton reers to

the wdespread practce o ocals n these agences makng money by usng state power not to

uphold state or socetal nterests or the rule o law, but to advance the economc agenda o partcular


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actors. Commercalzaton s smlar to corrupton, the use o publc oce or prvate gan, but also

s broader because o the multple ways n whch state power s deployed to advance the nterests o

nter-connected groups o state and prvate actors. Overall, the alure to make serous nroads nto

ghtng corrupton and promotng the rule o law s one o the greatest alures o Putns presdency

when comparng early rhetorc and end-o-tenure realty.

The contnued neectveness and corrupton o Russas power mnstres presents

problems not only or Russa, but also or the Unted States. An autocratc, neectve, and corruptRussan state s a less predctable and relable partner or the Unted States. Russas commercalzed

power mnstres create a hosptable envronment or terrorsts, transnatonal organzed crme,

and potental prolerators. Despte the downturn n U.S.-Russan relatons n recent years, the

U.S. has an mportant stake n whether Russas power mnstres are eventually reormed n a way

more consstent wth upholdng the law and servng the people. U.S. nfuence over ths contnued

transormaton s low, but a Securty Sector Reorm agenda stands the best chance o contnued

cooperaton n areas o vtal concern.

Chapter One provdes an overvew o the Russan power mnstres, descrbng the

organzaton and unctons o eleven derent mltary, securty, and law enorcement agences and

ther evoluton snce the Sovet collapse. It hghlghts how Putn reversed the ragmentaton and

upheaval these bodes aced n the 990s, and how they have generally wtnessed ncreasng budgets

and greater stablty n ther leadershp under hs rule.

Chapter Two examnes the rse o the slovk under Putn, argung that the conventonal

story about ths phenomenon has three derent aspects that should be derentated. The rst

approach stresses the ncreased promnence o people wth slovk backgrounds throughout the state

apparatus, the second ocuses on Putns closest slovk alles and ther relatons both wth competng

actons n the Kremln and each other, and the thrd hghlghts contnued bureaucratc battlesbetween the power mnstres. Examnng the slovk and the power mnstres through these three

derent lenses shows that the slovk are not unted, and that the Federal Securty Servce (FSB),

the man KGB successor organzaton, has been the avored power mnstry, not the mltary or the

polce. The rse o the slovk story refects an mportant truth, but a more complcated one than t

appears at rst glance.

Chapter Three dscusses the promnent role o the power mnstres and the slovk n

Russan poltcs. The power mnstres were crucal to Putns successul eorts to weaken the

power o nfuental actors lke the olgarchs and the regonal governors, and they have obvously

been at the center o the ongong war n the North Caucasus. The power mnstres and the slovk

were also alleged to be at the center o promnent crses and potental conspraces, such as the

999 apartment bombngs and the 2006 murder o ormer FSB agent Aleksandr Ltvnenko.

An accountng o the strength o the Russan state shows real mprovements n some respects

under Putn, but also contnued relatve weakness and mportant problems wth power mnstry

eectveness.


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Chapter Four explans Russan state weakness n terms o the commercalzaton o the

power mnstres and the corrupt behavor o ocals rom these agences, whch undermnes the

rule o law. Personal enrchment oten takes prorty over servce to the state or the populaton, both

or average ocals and some o Russas most powerul men. One consequence o these behavors s

contnung lack o trust n state nsttutons, especally law enorcement, by Russan ctzens.

The Concluson revews the most mportant ndngs o the monograph and dscusses

possble changes under Russas next presdent. Although the ablty o the U.S. to nfuence powermnstry development s lmted, the behavor o these agences can have an mportant mpact

on Amercan nterests, ncludng n such spheres as proleraton and terrorsm. Securty Sector

Reorm should be the gudng ramework or U.S. engagement wth Russas power mnstres.


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CHAPTER ONE:OVERVIEW OF THE

POWER MINISTRIES

Frm control over the organs o state coercon was a hallmark o Sovet rule. Three large,

powerul agences represented the core Sovet orce-weldng nsttutons: the Commttee

on State Securty (KGB), the Mnstry o Deense (MO), and the Mnstry o Internal Aars(MVD). Under the control o the Communst Party, they were the ultmate physcal embodment o

Sovet power.

All three agences were key actors n the last years o the Sovet Unon. On multple occasons

personnel and troops rom the power mnstres were deployed aganst natonal and poltcal protests

and dsturbances. The heads o the KGB, MVD, and mltary were three o the coup plotters who tred

to overthrow Mkhal Gorbachev n August 99, whle the oot-draggng and resstance o some o ther

subordnates played a key role n the alure o the putsch. Smlarly, the nactvty o these mnstres n

December 99 permtted the collapse o a powerul mltary empre wthout a shot beng red.

The last years o the Sovet Unon and much o the 990s represented a perod o declne

and ragmentaton or the power mnstres. In addton to the terrtoral dsntegraton o these

structures brought about by the Sovet collapse and the establshment o new state coercve bodes

n the Sovet successor states, wthn Russa these agences were splntered nto multple parts. The

change was most ar-reachng or the KGB, the organzaton that represented the greatest potental

threat to the new poltcal system, but t aected the Mnstry o Deense and MVD as well. The three

core organzatons were dvded nto more than a dozen derent power mnstres n the 990s, but

ths ragmentaton was somewhat reversed under Putn (See Fgure ). Overall about three mllon

people serve n Russas varous power mnstres and law enorcement structures (see Table ).

The Ministry o Deense and its Successors

The Sovet armed orces were the largest n the world, wth approxmately 5.3 mllon personnel n

985. They receved substantal materal support rom the state, wth budgets around 5-25 percent


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Table 1: Main Power Ministries And Their Approximate Size

Ministry of Defense (MO) 1,027,000

Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)Internal Troops (VV)Special Forces (Spetsnaz OMON & OMSN)

821,268200,00027,000

Federal Security Service (FSB)Federal Border Service (FPS)Special Forces units

350,000160,0004,000

Ministry of Civil Defense and Emergency Situations (MChS)Civil Defense TroopsState Fire Service

262,83120,000220,000

Federal Customs Service (FTS) 61,352

Procuracy 53,837

Federal Service for Control of the Narcotics Trade (FSKN) 33,677

Federal Guard Service (FSO) 10,000-30,000

,(#

473 '4# '14 '"14* (60 4#1 (641 .7% '4/1

.0 3BJMSPBE '%46 .$I4

473 '4# '40 (641 .0 .$I4 .7% '4,/

.0 .7%

Figure 1: Fragmentation and Consolidation o the Power Ministries, 1986-2006

Key: SVR=Foregn Intellgence Servce; FSB=Federal Securty Servce; FSP=Federal Border Servce; GUO=Man Guards Drectorate;SBP=Presdental Securty Servce; GUSP=Man Drectorate or Specal Programs; FDSU=Federal Road Constructon Admnstra-ton [became ndependent n 997, not 996, but ncluded as llustratve]; MChS=Mnstry o Cvl Deense and Emergency Stuatons;FSNP=Federal Tax Polce Servce; FSO=Federal Guard Servce; FSKN=Federal Servce or Control o the Narcotcs Trade. Ths gure s notcomprehensve, but t does provde a relatvely accurate depcton o the general trends. Further ssues wll be noted n the text.

Data sources: Military Balance 2007; Russan Federal State Statstcs Servce 2007; Benz 2005; Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 0 November 2006;MChS webste; Lenta.ru, 2 February 2006. Full ctes n endnotes.


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o GDP. Respected at home and eared abroad, the Sovet mltary was a key pllar o state power. At

the same tme, ts undamental uncton was external deense, and or most o the post-World War II

perod t played a mnor and epsodc role n domestc hgh poltcs. Unlke many mltares around

the world, t generally dd not partcpate n domestc securty and law enorcement tasks, let alone

engage n coups.

The collapse o the Sovet Unon brought radcal changes n the ortunes and capactes

o the mltary. Most o the ormatons based outsde Russa were mantaned by the new states.The Russan mltarys sze and budget were cut drastcally, and throughout the 990s there were

requent predctons o ts mmnent collapse. Although t brefy lost control over several armed

structures, t kept ts core components and stll remans one o the worlds largest mltares.

The Ministry o Deense (MO). The Russan Mnstry o Deense s the man successor to

the Sovet armed orces. It was ormed n May 992 and nherted about 2.8 mllon personnel.

Throughout the 990s ths number was cut, levelng o at slghtly more than mllon troops n the

late 990s, the number t remans at today. A key achevement o the early Yeltsn years was brngng

home more than one mllon mltary personnel, and ther amles, rom Eastern Europe and the

Baltc states. The mltary also went through multple nternal reorganzatons. For example, the

man servces and branches were recongured several tmes. Currently, there are three man servces

army, navy, and ar orce and three separate branches strategc rocket orces, space orces, and

arborne orces.

A key ssue or the Mnstry o Deense n the post-Sovet perod has been the ssue o

mltary reorm. Despte the consderable down-szng and multple reorganzatons, crtcs

contend that the Russan mltary remans very Sovet n terms o personnel polces (especally

conscrpton and the very weak NCO (Non-Commssoned Ocers) system), doctrne, and overall

culture. More sympathetc analysts argue that Putn has turned the mltary around ater the vrtualcollapse o the 990s wth an nfux o rubles and a seres o careul reorms, and that recent eorts

to create proessonal NCOs and ncrease the number o contract solders wll ultmately bear rut.2

One o the most mportant changes was the 2004 downgradng o the status and powers o the

General Sta.

In terms o cvl-mltary relatons, one notable contnuty between Yeltsn and Putn s that,

by Western democratc standards, cvlan control s weak because o the small number o cvlan

personnel n the Mnstry o Deense and the lmted role that the parlament plays n deense

oversght, ncludng the budget. It remans to be seen whether the cvlan Mnster o Deense

apponted n February 2007, Anatoly Serdyukov, wll change the pattern o a MO wth a small

number o cvlans and a huge sta o mltary ocers. The appontment o Serdyukov, the ormer

head o the Federal Tax Servce, was certanly a bold move, gven hs lack o any relevant experence

or the job. Serdyukov owes hs rapd poltcal ascent to hs Sant Petersburg background, where he

met Putn n the 990s when Serdyukov managed a urnture store.

For the most part the Russan army has mantaned ts orentaton toward external deense.


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However, the Chechen wars necesstated a larger role n nternal ghtng than the mltary had

experenced n decades. The de acto deeat n the rst Chechen War, 994-996, was a huge

humlaton or many top ocers. The resumpton o the war n 999, ater Chechen mltant

ncursons nto neghborng Dagestan, was seen as an opportunty or vndcaton by the armed

orces. In act, the derence n perormance between the two wars s oten exaggerated, and the

Russan army has, as Roy Allson ponts out, aled overall to develop a more modern proessonal

counternsurgency operaton.

3

Stll, rom the mltarys pont o vew the second war has been arelatve success.

The Railroad Troops and the Construction Troops. The Sovet Mnstry o Deense

ncluded several components that were ancllary to ts core unctons. These ncluded ralroad and

constructon troops. In the 990s these orces were separated rom the regular armed orces. Some

o them were made ndependent enttes, such as the Federal Road Constructon Admnstraton

(later the Federal Servce o Specal Constructon, or Spetsstroy), and others were absorbed by other

agences. For example, the Mnstry o Atomc Energy, Mnstry o Communcatons, and the State

Constructon Commttee all receved ther own mltary constructon unts.4 In 2004 the ralroad

troops and some constructon unts, notably Spetsstroy, were returned to the Mnstry o Deense.

The motves or separatng these troops rom the Mnstry o Deense, and then returnng

them later, cannot be ound n any plan to dvde the armed orces and thereby render them less

o a threat to the state. Constructon and ralroad troops obvously are not potental praetorans.

Ratonalzng admnstraton also seems an unlkely explanaton or these multple changes and

reorganzatons. Rather, the lkely motve or these steps s economc. Control over constructon

troops consstng largely o dratees provdes a ready source o slave labor or agences that control

t, and ths labor can easly be converted nto money. The commercal value o the power mnstres

s one o the key drvers o ther reorm and actvty. In general, the old Watergate adage ollow themoney serves as an excellent gude to understandng the development o the power mnstres (see

Chapter 4).

The Ministry o Civil Deense and Emergency Situations (MChS). MChS, sometmes known

n Englsh as Emercom, s a great success story. Formed partally on the bass o Cvl Deense troops

o the Sovet mltary, ts closest analogue n the US context would be FEMA, the Federal Emergency

Management Agency. In realty t s qute a derent anmal. Formed n the late-Sovet perod as a

rescue corps, t became a State Commttee or Emergency Stuatons and then a State Commttee

or Cvl Deense and Emergency Stuatons ater takng over the Cvl Deense orces rom the MO.

It was elevated to a mnstry, MChS, n 994. One man, Sergey Shogu, has headed the organzaton

rom the begnnng, makng hm by ar the longest servng mnster n the Russan government.

The core personnel o MChS s gven as 22,83 by the Federal State Statstcs Servce. Ths

number obvously does not nclude the roughly 20,000 personnel n the Cvl Deense Forces,

as well as the 220,000 employees o the State Fre Servce, whch MChS succeeded n ganng

control over n 200 ater years o eorts by Shogu. Even so, the Mnstry has apparently become


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consderably smaller n recent years; prevous estmates put the sze o MChS at 70,000 personnel,

ncludng the Cvl Deense Forces but not the State Fre Servce. Further, the Cvl Deense orces are

to be removed rom MChS by 20 as part o the long-antcpated demltarzaton o the agency.5

MChS s actve both domestcally and nternatonally. Domestcally t s a hghly vsble

presence at the scene o both natural and man-made dsasters. Ths vsblty, and Shogus reputaton

as a competent ocal, have made MChS one o the most trusted government agences. Shogus

popularty made hm a logcal choce to head the new Unty party n 999, and he remans apromnent member o the successor rulng party, Unted Russa.

MChS also played an mportant role n the confct n Chechnya and neghborng regons,

dealng wth reugees and humantaran ad. Despte ths humantaran role, MChS personnel,

many o whom prevously served n the armed orces, wear unorms, travel n mltary vehcles, and

carry weapons. One Russan journalst wryly noted that, gven ts sze and mltarzed nature, MChS

was capable not only o lqudatng emergency stuatons, but also creatng them. Russan expert

Ekaterna Stepanova reers to MChS as a mltarzed humantaran agency, but gves t hgh marks

or ts competent work n the North Caucasus.6

Internatonally t also partcpates n rele operatons ater natural dsasters. Much o ts

nternatonal actvty s done on a commercal bass. For example, MChS has partnered wth the

Ilyushn Avaton Company and the Fre Tranng Center o Peru to provde an Ilyushn-76 arcrat

or emergency response mssons, partcularly reghtng, under the name Global Emergency

Response. Its demnng work n Kosovo was sponsored by the Swss government at a cost o .8

mllon dollars. MChS (under the name Emercom) was also mplcated n the Iraq ol-or-ood

program scandal. Accordng to the report o the Independent Inqury Commttee headed by Paul

Volcker, Emercom receved contracts rom Iraq to trade nearly 900 mllon dollars worth o crude ol

and pad surcharges o more than 9.5 mllon dollars; the surcharges were desgned to rase moneyor the Iraq government outsde U.N. oversght.7

Although Shogu s personally an mportant and nfuental gure, the MChS as an

nsttuton s not a promnent poltcal actor, and t s known to most Russans only through ther

TV screens. Stll, ts relatve competence as a dsaster rele organzaton has arguably contrbuted to

Russan state capacty throughout the post-Sovet perod.

The KGB and its Successors

Although smaller and recevng less money than the armed orces, prde o place among the

power mnstres as a poltcal actor n the Sovet perod goes to the KGB. Its broad domestc and

nternatonal mandate made t a central gure n mantanng Sovet rule at home and expandng

nfuence abroad. The KGB played a key role n the overthrow o one General Secretary (Nkta

Khrushchev n 964), the attempted overthrow o another (Mkhal Gorbachev n 99), and one o

ts own became the top leader o the country (Yury Andropov, rom 982 to 984).


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Estmates put the sze o the KGB at around 500,000-700,000 personnel n the late Sovet

perod. Gven the man role the KGB played n the August 99 coup, as well as ts tradtonal major

role n domestc poltcs, not to menton ts past role n the bloodest epsodes o Sovet hstory,

Gorbachev and Yeltsn decded to break the KGB up nto multple parts. As Fgure shows, o the

three man Sovet power mnstres, the KGB, at least organzatonally, was the most aected by the

Sovet collapse. Separate agences were created or oregn ntellgence, domestc ntellgence and

counter-ntellgence, border protecton, government communcatons, and leadershp securty.

8

The Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). SVRs unctons are relatvely standard oregn

ntellgence work. It s not a partcularly nfuental actor n domestc poltcs, and except or ts

rst drector, Yevgeny Prmakov, the head o the SVR s a generally unknown gure nsde Russa.

Moreover, t s unclear t controls any armed unts t does, t s a relatvely small number o

specal orces. Thus, the SVR, although an mportant oregn polcy actor and typcally counted

among the power mnstres, does not have a large nfuence n domestc poltcs.

The Federal Security Service (FSB). The FSB s the most drect descendent o the KGB and

ts domestc unctons. It was ormed on the bass o the KGB drectorates or counterntellgence,

mltary counterntellgence, transportaton securty, deology and dssent, economc crme, and

survellance. In ts rst our years t was renamed three tmes (Mnstry o Securty, Federal Counter-

Intellgence Servce, Federal Securty Servce), and was declared unreormable by a Yeltsn decree

n December 993, lkely stmulated by the agencys ence-sttng durng the September-October

993 volent showdown between Yeltsn and the parlament. Untl the Putn era no ndvdual served

as drector or more than two years. In contrast, the current drector, Nkolay Patrushev, has been

n ths poston snce all 999. Patrushev s a close Putn ally who shares a KGB and St. Petersburg

background wth Putn.

Despte the turmol o the Yeltsn years, the FSB expanded ts responsbltes and legalmandate throughout the 990s and has remaned a key actor. Current estmates suggest about

350,000 personnel work or the FSB, ncludng the large border guards servce that was autonomous

or most o the 990s but rencorporated nto the FSB n 2003. The elte Alpha and Vympel specal

orces unts are part o the FSB. More mportant than the specc armed unts t commands are the

FSBs broad unctons. It s smultaneously an ntellgence, securty, and law enorcement body. Its

responsbltes nclude counter-ntellgence, terrorsm and extremsm, border securty, economc

crme and corrupton, and normaton securty. In addton to absorbng the Federal Border Servce

(FPS), t also took over many o the personnel and unctons o the Federal Agency or Government

Communcaton and Inormaton (FAPSI) n 2003. The 2003 changes led one knowledgeable

Russan expert, Andrey Soldatov, to conclude that Putn had made hmsel dependent on the FSB by

reducng nsttutonal counterweghts and alternatve sources o normaton.9 Although Soldatovs

concluson s overstated, the FSB was the bg wnner o the March 2003 reorganzaton o the power

mnstres, ganng back key powers and nstruments t had lost n the early 990s.

The Federal Guard Service (FSO). The FSO was ormed based on the Nnth Drectorate o the


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7

KGB, whch was responsble or leadershp securty. Splttng ths uncton rom the rest o the KGB

became an obvous mperatve ater Gorbachevs securty servce partcpated n hs solaton durng

the August 99 coup attempt. The FSO protects the presdent and hs amly, other top ocals,

vstng dgntares, and key government buldngs and nstallatons. The FSO s beleved to possess

two mltary regments and one brgade, ncludng the amous Presdental (ormerly Kremln)

Regment. Estmates o the FSOs sze vary wdely, between 0-30 thousand.

The FSO also ncludes the Presdental Securty Servce (SBP), whch rom 993-996 wasa powerul ndependent servce not subordnate to the FSO (then GUO Man Guards Drectorate).

Yeltsns che bodyguard and head o the SBP durng Yeltsns rst term, Aleksandr Korzhakov, was

one o the domnant gures n Russan poltcs untl hs dsmssal n 996, and he now serves n the

Duma.

The FSO, lke the FSB, beneted rom the consoldaton o the power mnstres carred out

n 2003. One reason Soldatovs ntal clam about Putns dependence on the FSB s overstated s

that the FSO acqured consderable resources rom FAPSI, and now plays a key role n government

communcatons and normaton securty. It thus provdes a crucal alternatve source o

normaton on domestc developments or the presdent. The current heads o the FSO and the SBP,

Yevgeny Murov and Vktor Zolotov, both have worked wth Putn snce hs days n Sant Petersburg

n the 990s. Although not publcly vsble, allegedly both Murov and Zolotov are nfuental gures

behnd the scenes, and have also resumed Korzhakovs nclnatons to nvolve the FSO and the SBP

n economc and busness matters.

The Main Directorate or State Programs (GUSP). GUSP s a small and hghly secret state

agency ormed on the bass o the KGB 5th Drectorate. Its che ocal uncton s the securty o

strategc nstallatons, most speccally the bunkers bult to sheld the Sovet leadershp n the event

o nuclear war. It also has a coordnaton and moblzaton uncton n the event o major war. Somereports also suggest t has operatonal-analytcal unctons.

The Ministry o Internal Aairs (MVD).

The MVD was n some ways the neglected stepchld o the Sovet power mnstres. In the early

decades o Sovet power t was sometmes nsttutonally joned to the KGBs predecessors, such as

the NKVD, but ultmately t developed as an autonomous nsttuton n the post-Staln era. The MVD

suered n comparson to the KGB and the mltary n terms o status, power, and resources. But the

polce were the ace o Sovet power wth whch ordnary ctzens were most lkely to nteract, and

evdence o pervasve corrupton n the MVD n the 970s and 980s was an mportant ndcator that

Sovet control over coercve orce was weakenng. Moreover, the MVD, despte ts relatvely margnal

status, dd control key bodes rom the pont o vew o domestc securty, ncludng the Internal

Troops.0

Compared to the KGB, the MVD has endured relatvely lttle organzatonal change snce the


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8

Sovet collapse. Although nternally t has experenced some reorganzaton, t was not splt up nto

ts consttuent parts lke the KGB. The one sgncant loss o coercve power and responsblty was

the transer n 998 o the prson servce rom the MVD to the Mnstry o Justce. The MVD controls

not only the ordnary polce (mlta), but also many other sub-unts wth responsblty or varous

aspects o nternal securty and law enorcement. These nclude, or example, the Federal Mgraton

Servce, Road Polce, Specal Desgnaton Polce Detachments (OMON), and multple drectorates

wth specc desgnatons, such as the Department or Combatng Organzed Crme and Terrorsm.The MVD also, despte requent suggestons to make the Internal Troops (VV) autonomous,

mantaned control o ths 200,000 strong organzaton, whch has played a major role n the war n

Chechnya. The current drector o the MVD s Rashd Nurgalyev, a KGB veteran who was moved to

the MVD as Frst Deputy Drector n 2002.

Overall the MVD employs 82,000 personnel, accordng to a 2005 presdental decree.2 For

comparson, the Sovet MVD employed approxmately 3.5 mllon personnel n 988. O ths number

700,000 were mlta, or about polce ocer or every 400 ctzens.3 For a rough calculaton,

assumng that the number o mlta n present-day Russa s 62,000 (total MVD mnus VV), that

rato would now be one or every 228 ctzens, or 437 or every 00,000 nhabtants.4 Ths estmate

most lkely overstates the number o polce n Russa, but the total s not exorbtantly hgh compared

to other post-communst countres or some other developed countres: or example, the ratos per

00,000 nhabtants or Australa (56), the Czech Republc (445), Italy (559), Kazakhstan (464), and

Latva (436) are hgher or vrtually dentcal. Stll, the number exceeds those o many other countres;

any weaknesses n Russan state capacty n the law enorcement sphere are not due to a shortage o

personnel.

One key derence between the MVD and other major power mnstres, such as the MO and

the FSB, s that there are elements o regonal and local control over the polce. Accordng to Artcle72 o the Consttuton, the guaranteeng o legalty, law and order and publc saety and personnel

o judcal and law-enorcement bodes are jont responsbltes o the center and subjects o

the Federaton. Although somewhat decentralzed n the context o Russas power mnstres, n

comparatve terms Russan polcng has hstorcally been qute centralzed or a ederaton. The

ederal element o power mnstry control wll be explored urther n Chapter Three.

Other Power Ministries and Law Enorcement Agencies

The Mltary, the FSB, and the MVD, despte the greater ragmentaton o the 990s, reman the

undamental state coercve agences n Russa. Other organzatons, such as the SVR, the MChS

and the FSO, have managed to carve out relatvely stable and successul bureaucratc nches or

themselves. In addton to these core agences, there are several other organzatons that play an

mportant law enorcement role.

The Federal Service or the Control o the Narcotics Trade (FSKN). The FSKN s a relatvely


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9

new organzaton, ormed n 2003 as part o a larger reorganzaton o the power mnstres

undertaken by Putn. Combatng the drug trade was prevously prmarly a uncton o the MVD.

Putns decson to create a separate agency dedcated to ths task was motvated both by concern

about the escalatng drug problem n Russa, and the prevous necency o the polce n dealng

wth the ssue.

The FSKN was created largely on the bass o the Federal Tax Polce Servce (FSNP), an

organzaton created ater the Sovet collapse to provde some muscle to the state n enorcng taxclams. The FSNP was staed largely by personnel rom the ormer KGB and became amous or ts

so-called mask show rads on busnesses. The FSNP grew to about 53,000 personnel, and t dd

help the state rase revenue, but t was also wdely seen as corrupt.5 When the FSNP was dsbanded

ts unctons and some o ts personnel were transerred to the MVD, whle the bulk o the personnel

(around 40,000) went to work or the FSKN.6 O course, there are doubts as to whether the same

personnel who were accused o corrupton n huntng down corporate tax evaders wll be any

cleaner n crackng down on the drug trade. The FSKN has been headed snce ts oundng by Vktor

Cherkesov, a close acquantance o Putn who shares a background n the KGB and who also hals

rom St. Petersburg. Cherkesov has a reputaton as a hardlner, based partally on hs persecuton o

dssdents n Lenngrad well nto the Gorbachev era.

The Ministry o Justice. The Mnstry o Justce s not a tradtonal power mnstry. Most

o ts unctons, such as provdng legal expertse on laws and decrees and mantanng ocal

regsters o property, poltcal partes, and non-governmental organzatons, do not nvolve state

coercon n any drect sense. However, as noted above, the mnstry does control the prson system,

whch was transerred rom the MVD n 998 at the request o the Councl o Europe, n order to

make the Russan prson system more compatble wth European standards. The Federal Servce

or the Admnstraton o Sentences (FSIN) s responsble or the detenton and prson system thatholds more than 850,000 people. Its personnel wear unorms and have ranks, and are subject to

MVD personnel regulatons. Although the ncarceraton o crmnals s obvously an mportant

state uncton, and the stuaton n Russan prsons leaves much to be desred, the FSIN s not a

crucal domestc coercve agency. The Mnstry o Justce also controls the Bals Servce, whch s

responsble or the enorcement o judcal decsons and orders, ncludng cvl judgments nvolvng

the payment or sezure o money. Bals actvtes oten are guded more by enrchng themselves or

the state than the prvate partes who are seekng compensaton.7 The current head o the Mnstry s

Vladmr Ustnov, who rom 2000-2006 was Procurator General.

The Federal Customs Service (FTS). Other revews o the power mnstres tend not to

nclude the FTS, but t plays an mportant law enorcement role. It employs over 60,000 people and

allegedly also controls small armed unts o up to 0,000 personnel. As a customs agency t deals

wth smugglng o all knds o llct goods, ncludng narcotcs and weapons. The huge volumes

o trade crossng the Russan border obvously provde multple opportuntes or corrupton and

materal enrchment by FTS personnel. The current head o the FTS s Andrey Belyannov, who


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0

served wth Putn n the KGB n East Germany. Ths long-standng lnk to Putn suggests the

mportance o controllng the customs servce.

The Procuracy. The Procuracy s one o Russas most mportant law enorcement structures,

on par wth the FSB and the MVD.8 The Procuracy combnes both executve and judcal branch

unctons but s ormally consdered part o nether branch. It employees approxmately 54,000

people. Although not meetng the ormal denton o a power mnstry because o ts ndependent

status and lack o sgncant armed unts, the Procuracy s closely connected to all o the other powermnstres and ts personnel are rghtly consdered part o the slovk cohort. Peter Maggs, an expert

on Russan legal aars, notes that n realty the Procuracy s closely ted to the executve branch

and oten ullls poltcal orders. The Prosecutor-General snt called a general or nothng, states

Maggs. Its a servce organzed wth a mltary herarchy and unorms and so orth.9

The law enorcement mandate o the Procuracy s extensve. It has two basc unctons:

crmnal prosecuton, and oversght over all government agences to ensure that ther actvtes are

consstent wth the law. Putn once descrbed the Procurator-General as the one who keeps an eye

on whether all ctzens comply wth the law: the prme mnster, the presdent, everyone.20 The

Procuracy, rather than the courts, s oten the rst venue ctzens use to complan aganst abuses

by government ocals. It s also supposed to coordnate crme-ghtng eorts, although ts ablty

to do ths s hampered by bureaucratc competton among the derent bodes. The ablty o the

Procuracy to gve drectons to the FSB, or example, s questonable. Stll, gven the potental power

t welds, t s not surprsng that, despte ts notonal ndependence, the executve branch n Russa s

eager to drect and control ths weapon.

The Procuracy s also accordng to the Consttuton a sngle centralzed system n whch

lower-level procurators are subordnate to hgher-level procurators(Artcle 29). Ths centralzaton,

however, was undermned n the 990s, wth ncreasng regonal control over procurators. TheProcuracy, or Prosecutors Oce, s headed by the Procurator General (Prosecutor General) o

Russa. The current General Procurator s Yury Chaka, the ormer Mnster o Justce who swtched

jobs wth Vladmr Ustnov n 2006.

Power Ministry Budgets: Reversal o Fortune

The ragmentaton o the power mnstres n the 990s was only one manestaton o the crss

suered by these organzatons durng the Yeltsn era. Another symptom o ther dcultes was

the sharp drop n state nancng compared to the Sovet past. The Sovet Unon prortzed mltary

and securty spendng above all other state unctons, and certanly over consumer desres. Mssles

were more plentul than mcrowaves, tanks than tolet paper. Two key actors led to a sharp declne

o spendng on mltary and securty orces n the 990s. Frst, the government o Bors Yeltsn sel-

conscously decded to drastcally reduce spendng on guns n order to try to rebuld the economy to

provde more butter. Second, the economc depresson that lasted untl 999 gave the government


23/84

lttle choce but to cut back on spendng n most areas.

The drop n state spendng was part o an overall crss o the state. Promnent symptoms

o the problem ncluded the weakness o the state n ulllng some o ts core unctons, ncludng

control over monetary emssons and currency (evdenced by the rse o barter and alternatve

payment nstruments at the local and regonal level), securng prvate property rghts (evdenced by

the rse o the maa and other protecton rackets), and tax collecton. Challenges to central authorty

rom multple regons, most dramatcally n the case o Chechnya, were urther evdence o Russanstate crss.

The mltary, out o all o the power mnstres, suered the most rom the economc

depresson, the weakness o the state, and the sht n government prortes. Durng Yeltsns rule,

rom 992 to 999, the mltary budget was slashed by sxty-two percent. Moreover, the Fnance

Mnstry requently aled to pay out all o the mltary oblgatons n the budget. For example, n

998 actual expendtures were only ty-ve percent o planned allocatons.2 Wth the bulk o a

drastcally reduced budget gong to smply mantanng the armed orces (salary, ood, etc.), very

lttle was let over or orderng new weapons. For example, the Sovet Unon n the 970s and 980s

produced around 3,000 tanks, 500 mltary arcrat, and 0 mltary shps and submarnes per year,

but n 998 t produced not a sngle one o any o those tems. From 992 to 998 expendtures on

weapons procurement declned 20 tmes, and the level o mltary producton ell by 90 percent.22

The rapd growth o the Russan economy snce the 998 economc crss, as well as a sht

n state prortes toward the mltary and securty sectors under Putn, has allowed a consderable

ncrease n the power mnstres budgets n the last decade. Snce 998 the economy as a whole

has grown about 60 percent, buoyed ntally by devaluaton and deault durng the crss, and

subsequently by hgh global energy prces. Deense and securty spendng has grown accordngly.

Fgure 2 shows spendng on Natonal Deense and Securty and Law Enorcement or the Russanstate budget or the perod 997-2007. Natonal Deense ncludes the armed orces and scentc

research n the deense sector. Securty and Law Enorcement ncludes most o the other power

mnstres, ncludng the FSB, the MVD, the Procuracy, MChS, and FSKN. Spendng on deense has

more than doubled snce Putn took power, rom 382 bllon rubles n 2000 to 822 bllon rubles

n 2007 (all gures n 2007 constant rubles). Although Putn has ncreased deense spendng

substantally, he has only succeeded n restorng the budget to the level pror to the 998 economc

crss. Moreover, the budget o the armed orces remans between two and three percent o GDP, well

below the target gure o 3.5 percent set by Bors Yeltsn n the 990s, and a sgncant cut compared

to the Sovet mltary.23

Spendng on the securty and law enorcement sector has ncreased at an even greater rate

n the Putn era. Snce 2000 spendng n the natonal securty and law enorcement secton o the

budget has more than trpled. Moreover, ths ncrease was not smply a return to the pre-998 levels,

as was the case wth deense spendng. In general, under both Yeltsn and Putn the government

has avored nternal securty and law enorcement over external securty. As a share o the power


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2

mnstres budget, mltary spendng has dropped rom 80 percent n 992 to 56 percent n 2006.

The law enorcement organs MVD, Procuracy, and the Mnstry o Justce have garnered the

bggest ncrease. The Procuracy, or example, has ncreased ts budget rom 3 bllon rubles n 2000

to 27 bllon rubles n 2006.24

Overall, spendng on the power mnstres has ncreased substantally under Putn, helped by

rapd economc growth and much larger state revenues. Internal securty has been a greater prorty

than external securty. Gven the domestc stuaton the war n Chechnya, terrorsm, and hgh

crme rates ths ocus makes sense. It s notable, however, that despte Putns eorts n hs second

term to reassert Russas poston as a great power, spendng prortes stll refect concern about

domestc poltcal order.

Power Ministry Leaders: Stability in Cadres

Sovet General Secretary Leond Brezhnev amously pursued a polcy o stablty n cadres,

provdng greater job securty or party ocals ater the murderous Jose Staln and the mercural

Nkta Khrushchev. Putn by temperament seems somewhat smlar to the arch-bureaucrat Brezhnev,whle Yeltsn shared some o the mpulsve characterstcs o Khrushchev. Yeltsns propensty or

sudden rngs o top ocals was most notable wth the multple prme mnsters o hs second

term, but he also requently changed the heads o the power mnstres. For the top our power

mnstry postons head o the FSB, Procuracy, MVD, and MO the average tenure o these ocals

s notceably longer under Putn than under Yeltsn (see Table 2).

:FBS

/BUJPOBM%FGFOTF

4FDVSJUZBOE-BX&OGPSDFNFOU#JMMJPOTPG

3VCMFT

Figure 2: National Deense and Security & Law Enorcement Spending (Constant Rubles)


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3

Table 2: Average Tenure o Power Ministers, in Months, January 1992 June 2007

FSB PROCURACY MVD MO

Yeltsin 14 21 27 35

Putin 94 43 35 71

The derence s most strkng n terms o the FSB: the average drector o the FSB under

Yeltsn served lttle more than a year and hs longest-servng appontment served only two years,whereas Putn has had the same drector (Patrushev) snce he became Prme Mnster n August

999.25 Smlarly, Yeltsn had great dculty ndng a General Procurator wth whom he elt

comortable, and was deadlocked wth the Federaton Councl or more than a year n 998-999

over hs attempt to re Yury Skuratov, whereas Putn kept hs rst General Procurator, Vladmr

Ustnov, or more than sx years beore transerrng hm to head the Mnstry o Justce. Although

there was more stablty or deense mnsters under Yeltsn, the contrast wth Putn and hs rst

deense Mnster, Serge Ivanov, who also served sx years beore beng promoted, s stll strkng.26

The average s somewhat closer or Mnsters o Internal Aars, but even here Yeltsn apponted

our derent people to ths poston n eght years, whereas Putn has only apponted two n almost

the same perod o tme.

The reason or ths derence s clear. Yeltsn lacked condence n hs appontments, havng

ew close acquantances rom the power mnstres. Putn, on the other hand, came rom ths mleu,

and was able to appont people he knew were hs. He put the mltary and the FSB under the control

o Ivanov and Patrushev, both Petersburgers rom the KGB. The polce under Putn have been headed

ether by a St. Petersburg poltcan (Bors Gryzlov), or a KGB veteran (Rashd Nurgalyev). In the case

o the Procuracy, Ustnov ntally was seen as beng backed by the pro-Yeltsn clan known as the

Famly, but Ustnov quckly demonstrated hs loyalty to Putn and even managed to marry hs son tothe daughter o one o Putns top ades, Deputy Head o the Presdental Admnstraton Igor Sechn.

Conclusion

The 990s was a tme o great upheaval or the power mnstres n almost all respects:

organzatonally, nancally, and n terms o leadershp. The Sovet polce state gave way to a new

order n whch the mltary, securty, and law enorcement structures were on the ropes. For the

power mnstres, Vladmr Putn arrved as a savor, promsng to restore the power and status o

Russas orce structures. Putn has delvered: consoldatng the ragmented agences, ncreasng

ther budgets, and entrustng ther management to loyal alles who were granted long tenures. The

power mnstres are back.


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4


27/84

5

CHAPTER TWO:THE SILOVIKI: COHORT,

CLAN, AND CORPORATEACTORS

There s no greater symbol o the ncreased standng o the power mnstres than Vladmr

Putn hmsel. As a teenager Putn was so taken wth the KGB explots he saw on Sovet

televson serals that he tred to volunteer or the agency. Advsed to get an educaton rst,

Putn sgned up or the KGBs avored course o study, law, and was recruted to the agency upon

graduaton. Putn most lkely would have served out hs career n the oregn ntellgence servce

but or the collapse o the Sovet Unon. The event that Putn dubbed the greatest geopoltcal

catastrophe o the twenteth century, roncally, made possble hs meteorc rse rom md-level

ocal to Russan presdent n a sngle decade.

There s an expresson among Russan ntellgence personnel that there s no such thng as aormer agent. Putn hmsel glbly reerred to ths dea n late 999 ater becomng Prme Mnster

and her apparent, tellng an assembly on Chekst Day that the group o FSB personnel assgned to

work undercover n the government has successully carred out the rst step o ther assgnment.27

Snce that tme the number o FSB and other ormer KGB personnel workng n all aspects o

government has ndeed expanded tremendously. The ncreased promnence o personnel rom these

agences throughout government led the Russan socologst Olga Kryshtanovskaya to dub Putns

regme a mltocracy.28 The term used to label people wth power mnstry backgrounds, siloviki,

swept nto general Western usage and became a staple o journalstc accounts.

A key ambguty n the rse o the slovk story s that t s oten unclear who exactly s

rsng: s t the power mnstres themselves, personnel rom those structures, or s t merely a

specc clan n Russan poltcs? It s mportant to dstngush between the use o the term slovk

to reer to a cohort o personnel, a clan n Kremln poltcs, and a group o state mnstres and

organzatons. These three usages I reer to as the cohort, clan, and corporate understandngs o the

term slovk.


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6

Ths dstncton leads to several mportant conclusons. Frst, the expanson o the slovk

as a cohort n government at all levels s clear the only debate s about ts extent and sgncance.

Second, the clan nature o Russan poltcs s clearly an mportant phenomena, but a closer look

shows mportant dvsons between the most promnent top ocals rom the secret servces, who

are oten lumped together as a coherent slovk clan. Thrd, n terms o the power mnstres as

corporate actors, the FSB s dentely the domnant one, ollowed by the Procuracy, whereas the

mltary and polce are relatvely weak poltcal orces under Putn.

The Siloviki Cohort.

Kryshtanovskaya poneered the scholarshp that showed the ncreasng presence o representatves

rom the power mnstres throughout the government. She observed that n the Sovet perod t was

unusual or power mnstry ocers to be apponted to cvlan posts. Qute the reverse, t was not

uncommon or KGB postons around the country to be lled by Communst Party and Komsomol

(Communst Youth League) appontments.

The pattern n post-Sovet Russa has been much derent. Startng n Yeltsns second

term, and contnung wth a much stronger emphass under Putn, a varety o cvlan postons

throughout regonal and ederal government have been lled by securty and mltary personnel.

Kryshtanovskaya shows that ths ncreasng mltarzaton o the elte took place n the ederal

government, both houses o parlament (the Duma and the Federaton Councl), and among

regonal governors (see Fgure 3). Ths mltarzaton took place not only at the top level, but

(PSCBDIFW

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:FMUTJO* :FMUTJO** 1VUJO* 1VUJO**

-FBEFS

(PWFSONFOU

(PWFSOPST

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Figure 3: Militarization o the Russian Elite


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7

also at ntermedate and lower levels. For example, many deputy mnsters n multple non-mltary

agences, such as the Mnstry or Economc Development and the Mnstry o Communcatons,

also came rom the power mnstres.29 More recently, a 2007 survey o the top 00 executve

branch postons showed that about one-thrd o these slots were lled by those wth power mnstry

backgrounds.30

The most notceable expanson o the slovk cohort nto state admnstraton was wth one

o Putns key rst-term reorms, the creaton o seven Federal Dstrcts (Okrugs) n May 2000. TheFederal Dstrcts were gven the unctons o coordnatng the actvty o ederal executve branch

organs n the regons, resolvng dsputes between ederal and regonal bodes, and montorng the

complance o regonal laws wth ederal laws and decrees. Each o the Dstrcts was headed by a

presdental representatve, orpolpred, and ve o the seven ntalpolpreds had backgrounds n the

KGB, the mltary, or the polce. Each presdental representatve had 5-8 deputes, as well as 6-8

Che Federal Inspectors who represented them n the regons wthn the Federal Dstrct (Russa s

desgned as a ederal poltcal system, whch had 89 derent subunts when Putn came to power,

and whch wll have 84 by January 2008 as a result o several mergers). Two years ater the Dstrcts

were created, n md-2002, more than 40 percent o these deputes and Che Federal Inspectors

were slovk (see Table 3). The percentage o slovk n these postons remaned almost exactly the

same n 2007. Most heavly represented among these personnel were the Armed Forces, the FSB,

the MVD, and the FSNP. All o the FSNP ocals started ther careers n the KGB.3

Table 3: Federal Districts and Power Ministry Personnel, Mid-2002

Federal District Deputies with Power MinistryBackground

Main Federal Inspectors withPower Ministry Background

Totals

Central 3 of 8 10 of 18 13 of 26 (50%)

Northwest 4 of 6 7 of 10 11 of 16 (69%)

Volga 1 of 6 6 of 13 7 of 19 (37%)

Southern 2 of 7 5 of 9 7 of 16 (44%)

Urals 1 of 5 3 of 6 4 of 11 (36%)

Siberian 2 of 6 2 of 11 4 of 17 (24%)

Far Eastern 3 of 6 1 of 8 4 of 14 (29%)

Totals 16 of 44 (36%) 34 of 75 (45%) 50 of 119 (42%)


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8

It s worth notng that the rse o the slovk cohort started durng Yeltsns second term.

Yeltsns last three prme mnsters Yevgeny Prmakov, Sergey Stepashn, and Putn had power

mnstry tes, and the Presdental Admnstraton also became populated wth hgher numbers o

slovk. For example, the ormer KGB ocer Nkolay Bordyuzha headed both the Securty Councl

and the Presdental Admnstraton n 998-99. Yeltsn hmsel beleved that socety was yearnng

or a leader who was not only a new-thnkng democrat but also a strong, mltary man.32 Both

Bordyuzha and Stepashn were n some sense audtoned or the role o uture presdent, and oundwantng by Yeltsn, who then elevated Putn. Arguably Stepashn was the one most qualed to be

presdent, havng served n the parlament and three top government postons n the 990s FSB

Drector, MVD Che, and Mnster o Justce. Although Stepashn had been very loyal to Yeltsn,

Putn stood out even more n ths respect, demonstratng ealty both to hs old mentor, St. Petersburg

Mayor Anatoly Sobchak, and hs new boss Yeltsn, partcularly n the namous Skuratov aar,

when compromsng materal (kompromat) was enlsted to orce Procurator General Skuratov rom

oce. Putn became the her apparent.

It was Putns selecton, and then electon, as presdent that ensured the rse o the slovk

as a cohort throughout the Russan government. Two actors, one about the nature o Russan

poltcs and one about Putn hmsel, combned to make such a development not only possble but

lkely. Frst, Russan poltcs tends to be domnated more by what the amous German socologst

Max Weber called patrmonal practces than ratonal-legal bureaucratc norms. Ratonal-legal

bureaucraces are based on mpersonal admnstraton, n whch personnel are recruted and

promoted based on relatvely objectve crtera, such as educaton, examnaton, length o servce,

and perormance. In contrast, n patrmonal bureaucraces personnel are recruted and promoted

based on connectons, amly tes, ethnc background, and other characterstcs not drectly related

to ther ablty to complete ther assgned tasks n an eectve and ecent manner. In short, n theormer you enter and advance based on what you know, n the latter based on who you know.

There s consderable agreement that the Russan government operates more on patronage than

proessonalsm.33 The orgng o allances through marrages between amles s only the starkest

example o the pre-modern nature o much Russan state admnstraton.34

The second ssue, specc to Putn, was hs meteorc rse to the top. In 996 he was a brefy

unemployed Deputy Mayor o Sant Petersburg ater hs patron, Sobchak, lost hs reelecton bd.

Brought to Moscow by a group o government ocals who also came rom St. Petersburg, Putn

clmbed rapdly, so that wthn two years, by the summer o 998, he was the drector o the FSB.

Thrteen months later he was Prme Mnster and on hs way to the presdency. Gven ths ascent,

and Putns lmted tenure n Moscow, he had a narrow crcle o colleagues to draw on n creatng hs

own patronage machne. Perectly naturally gven the nature o the poltcal system, many o Putns

most mportant appontments had a KGB background, a St. Petersburg background, or both. Further

Putns appontments rom the secret servces are lkely to brng ther own tran o ormer colleagues

wth them, creatng a rpple eect throughout the government.


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Does t matter that so many top ocals have backgrounds n the securty servce and other

power mnstres? Ater all, there are many derences among ths large cohort o ocals. The clan

and corporate derences dscussed below, or example, clearly show that ths s not a uned team.

Ths cohort o slovk certanly s not poltcally monolthc. For example, n the 990s every poltcal

party ound army generals to put on ther lst o canddates, rom the democratc-leanng Eduard

Vorobev o the Unon o Rght Forces to the ant-Semtc hard-lne natonalst Albert Makashov o the

Communst Party.

35

Stll, there does seem to be some bass to thnk that such a large cohort o power

mnstry ocals n government servce mght nfuence the nature o the Russan government.

Kryshtanovskaya argues that several eatures o power mnstry culture, such as herarchy, strct

dscplne, and patrotsm, have pushed out more democratc deas and procedures wth the rse o

the slovk cohort. As a general rule people who made ther careers n the power mnstres are more

lkely to be both adherents o a strong state nternally (n Russan,gosudarstvenniki) and o a strong

Russa nternatonally (derzhavniki). In ths worldvew the Gorbachev-Yeltsn era was another tme

o troubles n Russan hstory, when an attempt at lberalzaton led to state weakness and collapse,

and the Putn perod s a tme o consoldaton and state buldng. Ths vew o recent hstory s

hardly conned to slovk t s shared by many Russan ctzens and eltes but t s lkely to be

partcularly strong amongst ths group. Lberal democracy s at best a lower prorty, and more lkely

perceved as a threat to poltcal order and stablty. The desre or control predomnates among

ormer Cheksts, the most mportant group wthn the slovk cohort and the Putn team.36

Siloviki Clans.

A second way o understandng the nfuence o the slovk n Russan poltcs s based not on thegroup as a cohort o ocals, but as a more narrow clan connectng top Kremln ocals wth

key power mnstry leaders. Understandng the key groupngs and allances at the top o Sovet

poltcs was a key eature o Kremlnology, and remaned equally vtal ater the so-called transton

to democracy. Ths pont was made orceully by the U.S. dplomat Thomas Graham n 995, who,

hghlghtng the patrmonal character o Russan poltcs, argued that under Yeltsn several poltcal

and economc groupngs struggled or power. Graham hghlghted our derent clans, headed by

powerul patrons such as Prme Mnster Vktor Chernomyrdn, Moscow Mayor Yur Luzhkov, State

Property Commttee Head Anatoly Chubas, and Korzhakov, the head o the Presdental Securty

Servce.37

Although the players have changed, the game under Putn remans the same. In hs rst

term, analysts hghlghted three or our key groupngs. There were the letover elements o the

so-called Yeltsn Famly, such as Prme Mnster Mkhal Kasyanov and Che o the Presdental

Admnstraton Aleksandr Voloshn, the slovk, and the Sant Petersburg lberals, a group

sometmes urther subdvded nto the economsts (German Gre and Alekse Kudrn, who head the


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20

two most mportant economc mnstres) and the lawyers (Dmtry Medvedev and Dmtry Kozak,

who n the rst term both worked or the Presdental Admnstraton).

The slovk clearly became the most powerul groupng. Tradtonally, the center o the clan

was sad to be n the Presdental Admnstraton, headed by the Deputy Head o the Presdental

Admnstraton Igor Sechn and Vktor Ivanov, a key assstant to Putn. Both Ivanov and Sechn are

rom St. Petersburg, wth Ivanov havng a dente KGB past and Sechn presumed to have at least

some contacts wth the KGB, gven hs work as a mltary translator n Mozambque and Angola nthe 980s.

The key to the power o the slovk group n the Kremln, other than ther obvous closeness

to Putn, was ther allance wth Patrushev at the FSB. One symbol o ths allance s that Patrushevs

son Andrey s an advsor to Sechn n Sechns capacty as Char o the Board o the state ol company

Rosnet (the connecton o the slovk to bg busness wll be dscussed n Chapter Four). Further, as

noted above, Procurator General Vladmr Ustnov, prevously part o the Yeltsn Famly groupng,

joned the slovk clan. The head o the MVD snce 2004, Rashd Nurgalyev, s also beleved to

be a Patrushev protg. Thus, by the end o the rst term ths clan controlled the three key law

enorcement structures: the FSB, the Procuracy, and the MVD. The power o ths clan was evdent

n the takng down o Russas rchest man, Mkhal Khodorkovsky, n the Yukos aar. The poltcal

vews attrbuted to ths clan are smlar to those that Kryshtanovskaya ascrbes to the slovk cohort

as a whole, statsm and natonalsm.38

One advantage o the slovk as clan approach s that t allows or greater analyss o the

dvsons within the slovk. For example, ormer Deense Mnster and current Frst Deputy Prme

Mnster Sergey Ivanov, one o Putns potental successors, s oten grouped wth the slovk because

o hs KGB and Petersburg background. But Ivanov and Sechn are beleved to be btter enemes. For

example, the scandal n the press over the mutlaton o army prvate Andrey Sychev by other solderson New Years Eve 2006 was sad to be promoted by Sechn and Ustnov as an attack on Ivanov and

hs management o the army. Smlarly, Cherkesov and Patrushev apparently are opponents. Indeed,

Cherkesov was drven to publcly bemoan squabbles between Cheksts, who n Cherkesovs vew

must reman unted or Russa tsel s at rsk, awatng the ate o many Arcan natons practcally

complete annhlaton, plungng nto chaos and multracal genocde.39 Cherkesov s beleved to be

alled wth the head o the Presdental Securty Servce Vktor Zolotov, also a longtme assocate o

Putn rom St. Petersburg (Zolotov was Sobchaks bodyguard).

Dvsons wthn the slovk have become more apparent n recent years or three reasons, all

o them nterrelated. Frst, the successul assault on the Famly elmnated a key common enemy

o the slovk and allowed submerged dvsons wthn ths group to come to the oreront. Second,

the 2008 successon motvates all major elte actons to seek to ncrease ther power. Thrd, Putn

hmsel has obvous ncentves to not let one clan become predomnant, because t would weaken hs

poston as che arbter. Thus, he has made sure to mantan a balance among the derent slovk

actons.


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2

Multple examples o the shtng allances and pre-successon maneuverng are evdent.

Perhaps the most sgncant was removng Ustnov as head o the Procuracy n the summer o

2006, a step wdely nterpreted as a decson by Putn to weaken somewhat Sechns poston.

Ustnovs replacement, ormer Mnster o Justce Yury Chaka, s beleved to be alled wth the Che

o the Presdental Admnstraton, Sergey Sobyann. Reportedly Chaka has also ound a common

language wth Cherkesov, one sgn o whch s the 2007 reorganzaton o the Investgatve

Commttee wthn the Procuracy (dscussed below), a step that Cherkesov has advocated as part oplan to uny all o the nvestgatve servces wthn the law enorcement organs nto one powerul,

ndependent nvestgatve department.40 Further, Frst Deputy Prme Mnster Dmtry Medvedev,

one o the most wdely touted successors to Putn, has been workng to place hs people wthn

the FSB, MVD, and Procuracy. There are also sgns that the Sechn-Vktor Ivanov relatonshp, the

oundaton o the slovk clan, may be under stress. Accordng to the well-normed analyst Vladmr

Prbylovsky, the Petersburg slovk clan has splt nto two man actons. Sechn remans lnked to

Ustnov as well as Prme Mnster Mkhal Fradkov, whereas Vktor Ivanov s alled wth Patrushev

and Duma Speaker Bors Gryzlov. Gryzlov and Patrushev not only went to school together n St.

Petersburg, but sat next to each other n class.4

The odd man out n all o these undercover squabbles s Sergey Ivanov, who s along wth

Medvedev one o the two most lkely successors. Ivanov spent most o the Putn presdency at the

Mnstry o Deense. He brought some ormer KGB alles to the mnstry wth hm, but never ormed

a strong allance wth the unormed mltary, whch remans a mnor player n Kremln ntrgues

anyway. Ivanov has extended hs control over key economc sectors, such as mltary ndustry,

avaton, and nuclear energy. Hs polcy vews, ncludng economc statsm and restorng Russa

as a great power, are consstent wth those o other top slovk, even they reman bureaucratc

compettors. Further, although he seems to lack crucal alles n Moscow, the respected analytcalmagazne Ekspert suggests that he has good tes to power mnstry ocals at the regonal level.42

Fnally, and most mportantly, the key relatonshp or all clans and clan leaders s wth Putn hmsel.

In ths respect Ivanovs poston appears very strong.

Siloviki Corporate Actors.

The thrd way o thnkng about the nfuence o the slovk s not as a cohort or a clan (or group o

clans), but as the corporate bodes that make up the power mnstres descrbed n Chapter One. In

contrast to the socologcal approach o the cohort vew, or the Kremlnologcal methods o the clan

perspectve, seeng the slovk prmarly as a group o corporate actors s consstent wth a tradtonal

bureaucratc poltcs approach. Polcy s seen as the outcome o pullng and haulng between

competng agences.

Lke the clan approach, one vrtue o the corporate perspectve s that t hghlghts potental

dvsons between the power mnstres and wthn the broad cohort o slovk. The power mnstres


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22

do not just represent a bloc o agences unted around ther control over coercve orce they oten

have overlappng jursdctons and are compettors or power and resources. These rvalres are long-

standng. The MVD and the KGB/FSB have hstorcally been mutually antagonstc; Presdent Putn

once remarked, those o us n the Cheka never lked the polce.43 Smlarly, the Red Army resented

KGB montorng and oversght o ther actvtes and loyaltes. These nsttutonal confcts contnued

nto the post-Sovet perod. For example, the mltary greatly resented the nfuence and resources

drected at other power mnstres n the 990s and the presence o multple parallel armes, suchas the Internal Troops o the MVD, the MChS, and the Federal Border Servce (FPS).

These nsttutonal confcts also exst at the mcro-level o everyday nteractons between

ocals rom derent agences. The mltary s largely aloo rom these confcts because t does

not play an nternal role, although the war n Chechnya created many clashes between the army,

the MVD, and the FSB n the North Caucasus. All o them have troops n the area, and operatonal

control has shted between them several tmes, wth the MVD now n charge. In the domestc law

enorcement sphere there are both everyday tensons and mportant cultural derences between

polce, secret polce, and prosecutors. KGB/FSB agents always have consdered themselves the

elte blue bloods among the law enorcement agences (and among state ocals n general),

vewng the average cop as someone overburdened wth unmportant grunt work and requently

corrupt. Polce, n return, see themselves as the real ghters aganst crme, solders who shed

blood whle FSB agents and procurators just st at ther desks. Procuracy ocals, or ther part, see

themselves as the lnchpn o the system, wth everythng dependent on them. Although legally ths

s somewhat true gven ther key role n the crmnal prosecuton system and as the coordnators o

law enorcement, n realty they oten are dependent upon normaton provded by other agences,

the polce n ordnary crmes and the FSB n hgh-prole cases. Moreover, gven the elte status o

the FSB, the ablty o the Procuracy to exercse genune oversght over ts ocals s lmted. Thesecultural derences are long-standng, and reman wth ocals as they clmb the ladder. Good

personal relatonshps .e., do they drnk vodka together? can overcome these derences n some

localtes, but overall the law enorcement structures are hardly a uned team.

At the macro-level, the 990s was a tme o fux. Yeltsn clearly dstrusted the secret polce,

whch explans the decson to break the KGB nto multple parts, and the requent leadershp

changes at the top o the FSB. Beyond the bg three o the MO, MVD, and FSB, other agences were

able to assert themselves, partcularly ther drector enjoyed close tes to Yeltsn. The most obvous

example here s the enormous power accumulated as head o the Presdental Securty Servce

by Aleksandr Korzhakov n Yeltsns rst term. Ater Korzhakov played a crucal rule n deeatng

Yeltsns opponents n the volent October 993 confct, Yeltsn nstructed Korzhakov to make hs

servce nto a mn-KGB. In 995 Korzhakov made the top ve oNezavisimaya Gazetas well-

known 00 Leadng Poltcans ndex, whch charts the shtng nfuence o Russas poltcal and

economc elte. MChSs Shogu and FPS head Andrey Nkolayev also were both closer to Yeltsn and

arguably more powerul than some drectors o the FSB, such as Nkolay Kovalev (996-998).


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The FSBs power, although already wde-rangng on paper, really began to grow when Putn

became ts head and demonstrated hs loyalty to Yeltsn. Once he became the head o state the FSBs

rse to domnance over the other power mnstres was assured. In 2003, as noted above, t reganed

control over border protecton and some mportant government communcaton unctons. More

mportantly, FSB personnel spread throughout the other power mnstres, a orm o bureaucratc

colonzaton. The most obvous manestaton o ths was the appontment o Ivanov to head the

Mnstry o Deense n March 200 and Nurgalyev to run the MVD n March 2004. Nurgalyev, nact, had been sent to the MVD rom the FSB already n 2002, when he became the Frst Deputy

Mnster o Internal Aars. Ths example can be multpled many tmes over. For example, n

2004 ve o the second-ter postons n the MVD, such as Deputy Mnster or the heads o MVD

drectorates or servces, were occuped by ormer KGB/FSB personnel. Smlarly, n the MO

the Deputy Mnster n charge o cadres came rom the secret polce, as dd the Drector o the

mltary-techncal cooperaton servce. The current head o the Federal Customs Servce (FTS), as

well as several second-ter postons, are also occuped by Cheksts. Ths s also true o the FSKN,

Cherkesovs agency.44

Second n stature behnd the FSB has been the Procuracy, prmarly because o ts wde-

rangng powers and responsbltes. Although n prncple the Procuracy s ndependent rom the

executve branch, t stll largely takes ts drecton rom the presdent, just as t dd rom the Party

durng the Sovet perod. In the early 990s legal reormers sought to lmt the Procuracys extensve

mandate and strengthen the power and ndependence o the courts, but these eorts aled.45

In May 2007, however, a major change n the powers o the Procuracy was ntroduced.46

The unctons o crmnal nvestgaton and oversght o the legal process were separated, wth

the creaton o an Investgatve Commttee located wthn the Procuracy but de acto ndependent.

The head o ths new commttee s not apponted by the Procurator General, but by the FederatonCouncl on the recommendaton o the presdent. The rst head, Aleksandr Bastrykn, went to

law school wth Putn and has worked n both the MVD and the Procuracy. At the same tme, the

other law enorcement structures, ncludng the MVD, the FSB, and the FSKN wll keep ther own

nvestgatve unts the move toward a uned Federal Investgatve Servce was at least postponed,

not rejected altogether. Whether the change wll make the crmnal prosecuton process more

eectve and less corrupt s hotly dsputed, and wll only become clear wth tme. But the reorm

represents a major weakenng o the Procuracy, because, as later chapters wll make clear, the

prosecutoral weapon s o great poltcal and economc mportance n Russa. Sechn allegedly

backed the change as a orm o revenge ater hs ally Ustnov was removed as General Procurator,

and had hoped, apparently n van, to return Ustnov to the Procuracy as the head o the Investgatve

Commttee. Ths reorm also somewhat strengthens the FSB and the MVD, but t s unlkely to be

the last word n the battle or nfuence between the man law enorcement structures.


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Conclusion.

Vladmr Putns presdency has led to a sgncant ncrease n the number o current and ormer

power mnstry ocals occupyng key state postons. But the mage o a monolthc mltocracy

domnatng Russan poltcs ades away once we look nsde the clan poltcs that determne the

major drectons o Russan polcy, or the bureaucratc battles between the varous power mnstres.

Former KGB ocals have beneted the most rom Putns rule, and the FSB has establshed tsel as

the preemnent power agency n post-Sovet Russa, but relatons between these actors reman very

much n fux as the post-Putn successon looms. All actors n ths struggle or power and resources

recognze the mportance o exercsng control over the power mnstres.


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CHAPTER THREE:POWER AS A WEAPON:

THE RETURN OFAUTHORITARIANISM

Power mnstry reorganzatons and battles, and slovk allances and ntrgues, are mportant

not just n themselves, but because control over state coercon has been at the heart o

Russas post-Sovet poltcal development. Promnent examples nclude:

The August 99 coup;

The Sovet collapse;

The October 993 conrontaton;

The Frst and Second Chechen Wars;

The attack on Yukos;

The 2004 Beslan school terrorst ncdent.In all o these epsodes, the role played by the power mnstres has been crucal.

Besdes ther centralty to the major crses o the last two decades, the power mnstres

have also been key actors n the most undamental ongong poltcal and economc changes. In the

poltcal realm, the most sgncant development has been the alure to establsh democracy and the

return o authortaransm. In the economc sphere, the key ssues have been the dstrbuton and

redstrbuton o property and the struggle over economc polcy.

Vladmr Putns central goal, and sel-proessed man achevement, has been rebuldng the

power o the Russan state. In certan respects he s no doubt correct the capacty o the state s

n some ways hgher under Putn than Yeltsn. But the extent o change should not be overstated.

Although Putn has used the power mnstres to weaken the power o the regons, the olgarchs, the

press, and opposton poltcal partes, he has not created state bureaucraces that can relably and

ecently cope wth some o ther core tasks, such as ghtng terrorsm and crme.


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The Power Ministries and the Struggle or Power: Crises and Conspiracies.

Siloviki and power mnstry nfuence at the very top o Russan poltcs s not just a Putn-era

phenomenon. At several key junctures n Yeltsns tenure they played a key role n resolvng the

ultmate ssue o who runs the state. In October 993 nether Yeltsn nor hs key opponents Vce

Presdent Aleksandr Rutskoy (a retred Ar Force General) and Supreme Sovet speaker Ruslan

Khasbulatov commanded much loyalty among power mnstry personnel. Rutskoy and Khasbulatov

could muster only a handul o actual employees o state coercve agences to take up arms on ther

behal. Yeltsn had problems o hs own, wth the Mnstry o Securty largely sttng on the ence,

MVD unts unable to control the pro-Supreme Sovet demonstrators, and the army hopng to avod

any role n the confct. In the end Presdental Securty Servce head Korzhakov played a decsve role

n moblzng troops or the stormng o the Supreme Sovet buldng, the Whte House, and t took a

wrtten order rom Yeltsn to brng n several unts rom the mltary.

In March 996, Korzhakov and hs close ally, FSB head Mkhal Barsukov, almost succeeded

n persuadng Yeltsn to close down the Duma, outlaw the Communst Party, and postpone

presdental electons, scheduled or June o that year. Only the cooler heads o Yeltsns poltcaladvsers, and rsng slovk Anatoly Kulkov (MVD che), averted another potentally volent

showdown or power n the streets o Moscow.

The struggle or power became equally vcous toward the end o Yeltsns second term.

Russas top elte understood that much power and wealth was at stake n the comng successon

n 2000, when a new presdent would be elected. The major confct was between Yeltsn and the

Famly and the Yevgeny Prmakov-Yury Luzhkov allance and ther new poltcal party, Fatherland-

All Russa. Both sdes deployed ther meda assets aganst each other n a no-holds-barred publc

relatons war. But what does the 999-2000 successon have to do wth the power mnstres? At a

mnmum the resumpton o the war n Chechnya n the all o 999 played a crucal role n Putns

soarng popularty. But some observers have suggested a more drect role, argung that there was a

conspracy to propel Putn to the presdency that nvolved kllng hundreds o nnocent ctzens.

The apartment bombings. In early August 999 a group o Chechen rebels attacked the

neghborng republc o Dagestan, hopng to expand the area n the North Caucasus under Islamc

rule and de acto ndependent rom Russa.47 Putn was apponted Prme Mnster several days

later, and made restorng order and Russan control n the regon hs top prorty. In September

the confct escalated dramatcally when apartment buldngs were blown up n Dagestan, Moscow,

and Volgodonsk n southern Russa. The destructon o two apartment complexes n Moscowon September 9 and 3 had a partcularly dramatc eect. The government blamed the attack on

Chechens, and used the reacton to the bombngs to bolster support or a second war n Chechnya.

Subsequently the government tred and convcted several alleged Islamc radcals rom the North

Caucasus, and blamed a group o rebel eld commanders, some now dead and some stll at large, or

organzng the attacks.


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27

Almost mmedately ater the bombngs t was suggested that the government, or elements

wthn the government, were behnd the attacks. The supposed ratonale was to whp up publc support

or a new war n Chechnya, and or the new Prme Mnster and potental presdent Putn. The prmary

evdence or ths conspracy s actually a bombng that dd not take place, n the cty o Ryazan n central

Russa on September 22. A vglant ctzen notced a suspcous car and ts occupants unloadng sacks

nto the basement o an apartment buldng, and called the polce. At rst the authortes clamed

they had averted a terrorst attack, but two days later FSB head Patrushev sad t had been a tranngexercse. Other shy detals, such as whether the sacks

Taylor Russia Ministries, menciona Jose Musse

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