LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES VS QUEZON CITY

G.R. No. 144104             June 29, 2004

FACTS:

The Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity which owns a parcel of land in Quezon City.  Erected in the middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center of the Philippines.  The ground floor is being leased to a canteen, medical professionals whom use the same as their private clinics, as well as to other private parties.  The right portion of the lot is being leased for commercial purposes to the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.  The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying. Aside from its income from paying patients, the petitioner receives annual subsidies from the government.

Petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from realty taxes amounting to about Php4.5 million, predicating its claim as a charitable institution. The city assessor denied the Claim.  When appealed to the QC-Local Board of Assessment, the same was dismissed.  The decision of the QC-LBAA was affirmed by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, despite the Petitioners claim that 60% of its hospital beds are used exclusively for charity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Petitioner is entitled to exemption from realty taxes notwithstanding the fact that it admits paying clients and leases out a portion of its property for commercial purposes.

HELD:

The Court held that the petitioner is indeed a charitable institution based on its charter and articles of incorporation.  As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether out-patient or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government, so long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution.

Despite this, the Court held that the portions of real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.  (strictissimi juris) Moreover, P.D. No. 1823 only speaks of tax exemptions as regards to:

        income and gift taxes for all donations, contributions, endowments and equipment and supplies to be imported by authorized entities or persons and by the Board of Trustees of the Lung Center of the Philippines for the actual use and benefit of the Lung Center; and

         taxes, charges and fees imposed by the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof with respect to equipment purchases (expression unius est exclusion alterius/expressium facit cessare tacitum).

Luzon Stevedoring Corp v Court of Tax Appeals GR No L-30232, July 29, 1988 

FACTS:Luzon Stevedoring Corp imported various engine parts and other equipment for tugboat repair and maintenance in 1961 and 1962. It paid the assessed compensation tax under protest. Unable to secure a tax refund from the Commissioner for the amount of P33,442.13, it filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals. The CTA denied the petition as well as the motion for reconsideration filed thereafter. Hence, this petition. 

ISSUE:Is the Corporation exempt from compensation tax? 

RULING:No. As the power of taxation is a high prerogative of sovereignty, the relinquishment of such is never presumed and any reduction or diminution thereof with respect to its mode or its rate, must be strictly construed, and the same must be couched in clear and unmistakable terms in order that it may be applied. The corporation’s tugboats do not fall under the categories of passenger or cargo vessels to avail of the exemption from compensation tax in Section 190 of the Tax Code. It may be further noted that the amendment of Section 190 of Republic Act of 3176 was intended to provide incentives and inducements to bolster the shipping industry and not in the business of stevedoring, in which the corporation is engaged in. 

Thus, Luzon Stevedoring Corp is not exempt from compensation tax under Section 190, and is thus not entitled to refund. 

LUTZ VS ARANETA

Facts: Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as Sugar Adjustment Act was promulgated in 1940 “to stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its preferential position in the United States market and the imposition of export taxes.” Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, under Sec.3 of the Act, alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff’s opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action has been dismissed by the Court of First Instance. 

Issue: Whether or not the tax imposed is constitutional. 

Held: Yes. The act is primarily an exercise of the police power. It is shown in the Act that the tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. 

It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that “inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.” 

The funds raised under the Act should be exclusively spent in aid of the sugar industry, since it is that very enterprise that is being protected. It may be that other industries are also in need of similar protection; but the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of “all or none.” 

PHILEX MINING CORP. v. CIRGR No. 125704, August 28, 1998294 SCRA 687

FACTS: Petitioner Philex Mining Corp. assails the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Court of TaxAppeals decision ordering it to pay the amount of P110.7 M as excise tax liability for the period from the 2nd quarter of 1991 to the 2nd quarter of 1992 plus 20% annual interest from 1994 until fully paid pursuant to Sections 248 and 249 of the Tax Code of 1977. Philex protested the demand for payment of the tax liabilities stating that it has pending claims for VAT input credit/refund for the taxes it paid for the years 1989 to 1991 in the amount of P120 M plus interest. Therefore these claims for tax credit/refund should be applied against the tax liabilities.

ISSUE: Can there be an off-setting between the tax liabilities vis-a-vis claims of tax refund of the petitioner?

HELD: No. Philex's claim is an outright disregard of the basic principle in tax law that taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance. Evidently, to countenance Philex's whimsical reason would render ineffective our tax collection system. Too simplistic, it finds no support in law or in jurisprudence.  To be sure, Philex cannot be allowed to refuse the payment of its tax liabilities on the ground that it has a pending tax claim for refund or credit against the government which has not yet been granted. Taxes cannot be subject to compensation for the simple reason that the government and the taxpayer are not creditors and debtors of each other. There is a material distinction between a tax and debt. Debts are due to the Government in its corporate capacity, while taxes are due to the Government in its sovereign capacity. xxx There can be no off-setting of taxes against the claims that the taxpayer may have against the government. A person cannot refuse to pay a tax on the ground that the government owes him an amount equal to or greater than the tax being collected. The collection of a tax cannot await the results of a lawsuit against the government.

Maceda v MacaraigFacts:The petition seeks to nullify certain decisions, orders, ruling, and resolutions of the respondents (Macaraig et. al) for exempting the National Power Corporation (NPC) from indirect tax and duties. Commonwealth Act 120 created NPC as a public corporation. RA 6395 revised the charter of NPC and provided in detail the exemption of NPC from all taxes, duties and other charges by the government. There were many resolutions and decisions that

followed after RA 6395 which talked about the exemption and non-exemption from taxes of NPC.

Issue:Whether or not NPC is really exempt from indirect taxes

Held:Yes. NPC is a non-profit public corporation created for the general good and welfare of the people. From the very beginning of its corporate existence, NPC enjoyed preferential tax treatment to enable it to pay its debts and obligations. From the changes made in the NPC charter, the intention to strengthen its preferential tax treatment is obvious. The tax exemption is intended not only to insure that the NPC shall continue to generate electricity for the country but more importantly, to assure cheaper rates to be paid by consumers.

SSS vs. Bacolod CityGR L-35726, 21 July 1982Second Division, Escolin (J): 5 concurFacts: The Social Security System (SSS) is a government agency created under RA 1161. In pursuance of its operations, SSS maintains a number of regional offices, one of which is a 5-storey building occupying 4 parcels of land in Bacolod City. Said building and lands were assessed for taxation. For failure to pay the realty taxes thereon, the city levid upon said properties. SSS sought reconsideration on the ground that SSS is a government-owned and -controlled corporation and is exempt from payment of real estate taxes.Issue: Whether SSS property in Bacolod City is tax-exempt.Held: The distinction whether the government-owned or controlled corporation exercises ministrant or proprietory function is of no relevance as the exemption does not relate to legal fees but on realty taxes. The Charter of Bacolod City does not contain any qualification whatsoever in providing for the exemption from real estate taxes of lands and building owned by the Government/ It is axiomatic that when public property is involved, exemption is the rule and taxation is the exception. PD 24, amending the Social Security Act of 1954, has already removed all doubts as to the exemption of the SS from taxation (Section 16).

Villegas Vs. Hiu Chiong 86 SCRA 270No.L-29646November 10, 1978

Facts: The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any

person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be engaged in any kind of trade business or occupation within the city of Manila without securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and for other purposes. 

Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance. 

Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. 

Held: It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable aliens generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation. 

While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval or disapproval of application is regulatory in character, the second part which requires the payment of a sum of 50.00 pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure. 

Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human right of the people in the Philippines to engaged in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within it's territory, once an alien is admitted he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. Also it does not lay down any standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance or denial of an alien employment permit fee.

Villegas vs, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao HoGR L-29646, 10 November 1978En Banc, Fernandez (J):4 concur, 3 concur in result, 1 took no partFacts: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic and consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance programs of the government and another country, and members of religious orders or congregations) to procure the requisite mayor’s permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty for the violation of the ordinance is 3 to 6 months imprisonment or a fine of P100 to P200, or both.Issue: Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax.Held: The ordinance’s purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider difference in situation among aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, part-time, rankand- file or executive.

[ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Further, the ordinance does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers. ]

Victorias Milling Co. vs. Municipality of VictoriasGR L-21183, 27 September 1968En Banc, Sanchez (J): 9 concurFacts: Ordinance 1 (1956) was approved by the municipal council of Victorias by way of an amendment to 2 municipal ordinances separately imposing license taxes on operators of sugar centrals and sugar refineries.The changes were: (1) with respect to sugar centrals, by increasing the rates of license taxes; and (2) as to sugar refineries, by increasing the rates of license taxes as well as teh range of graduated schedule of annual output capacity. Victorias Milling questioned the validity of Ordinance 1 as it, among others, allegedly singled out Victorias Milling Co. since it is the only operator of a sugar central and a sugar refinery within the jurisdiction of the municipality.

Issue: Whether Ordinance 1 is discriminatory.Held: The ordinance does not single out Victorias as the only object of the ordinance but is made to apply to any sugar central or sugar refinery which may happen to operate in the municipality. The fact that Victorias Milling is actually the sole operator of a sugar central and a sugar refinery does not make the ordinance discriminatory. The ordinance is unlike that in Ormoc Sugar Company vs. Municipal Board of Ormoc City, which specifically spelled out Ormoc Sugar as the subject of the taxation, the name of the company herein was never mentioned in the ordinance.

PHILIPPINE RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC., et al. vs. THE SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTGR. No. 143076. June 10, 2003

Facts: On May 23, 2003, a class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of other electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269 which are members of petitioner Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA). The other petitioners, electric cooperatives of Agusan del Norte (ANECO), Iloilo 1 (ILECO 1) and Isabela 1

(ISELCO 1) are non-stock, non-profit electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269, as amended, and registered with the National Electrification Administration (NEA).Under Sec. 39 of PD 269 electric cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of all National Government, local government, and municipal taxes and fee, including franchise, fling recordation, license or permit fees or taxes and any fees, charges, or costs involved in any court or administrative proceedings in which it may be party.From 1971to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects envisioned by PD 269, as amended, the Philippine Government, acting through the National Economic council (now National Economic Development Authority) and the NEA, entered into six loan agreements with the government of the United States of America, through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) with electric cooperatives as beneficiaries. The loan agreements contain similarly worded provisions on the tax application of the loan and any property or commodity acquired through the proceeds of the loan.Petitioners allege that with the passage of the Local Government Code their tax exemptions have been validly withdrawn. Particularly, petitioners assail the validity of Sec. 193 and 234 of the said code. Sec. 193 provides for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to all persons, whether natural or juridical, except cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938, while Sec. 234 exempts the same cooperatives from payment of real property tax.

Issue: (1) Does the Local Government Code (under Sec. 193 and 234) violate the equal protection clause since the provisions unduly discriminate against petitioners who are duly registered cooperatives under PD 269, as amended, and no under RA 6938 or the Cooperatives Code of the Philippines?(2) Is there an impairment of the obligations of contract under the loan entered into between the Philippine and the US Governments? 

Held: (1) No. The guaranty of the equal protection clause is not violated by a law based on a reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable must (a) rest on substantial classifications; (b) germane to the purpose of the law; (c) not limited to the existing conditions only; and (d) apply equally to all members of the same class. We hold that there is reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to justify the different tax treatment between electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 and electric cooperatives under RA 6938.First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under PD 269 and

those under RA 6938. In the former, the government is the one that funds those so-called electric cooperatives, while in the latter, the members make equitable contribution as source of funds.a. Capital Contributions by Members – Nowhere in PD 269 doe sit require cooperatives to make equitable contributions to capital. Petitioners themselves admit that to qualify as a member of an electric cooperative under PD 269, only the payment of a P5.00 membership fee is required which is even refundable the moment the member is no longer interested in getting electric service from the cooperative or will transfer to another place outside the area covered by the cooperative. However, under the Cooperative Code, the articles of cooperation of a cooperative applying for registration must be accompanied with the bonds of the accountable officers and a sworn statement of the treasurer elected by the subscribers showing that at least 25% of the authorized share capital has been subscribed and at least 25% of the total subscription has been paid and in no case shall the paid-up share capital be less than P2,000.00. b. Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives – The extent of government control over electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 is largely a function of the role of the NEA as a primary source of funds of these electric cooperatives. It is crystal clear that NEA incurred loans from various sources to finance the development and operations of these electric cooperatives. Consequently, amendments were primarily geared to expand the powers of NEA over the electric cooperatives o ensure that loans granted to them would be repaid to the government. In contrast, cooperatives under RA 6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient and independent organizations with minimal government intervention or regulation.Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is germane to the purpose of the law. The Constitutional mandate that “every local government unit shall enjoy local autonomy,” does not mean that the exercise of the power by the local governments is beyond the regulation of Congress. Sec. 193 of the LGC is indicative of the legislative intent to vet broad taxing powers upon the local government units and to limit exemptions from local taxation to entities specifically provided therein.Finally, Sec. 193 and 234 of the LGC permit reasonable classification as these exemptions are not limited to existing conditions and apply equally to all members of the same class.

(2) No. It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the impairment of the obligations of contracts does not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall within the prohibition, the change must not

only impair the obligation of the existing contract, but the impairment must be substantial. Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect a change in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not with respect to non-parties.The quoted provision under the loan agreement does not purport to grant any tax exemption in favor of any party to the contract, including the beneficiaries thereof. The provisions simply shift the tax burden, if any, on the transactions under the loan agreements to the borrower and/or beneficiary of the loan. Thus, the withdrawal by the Local Government Code under Sec. 193 and 234 of the tax exemptions previously enjoyed by petitioners does not impair the obligation of the borrower, the lender or the beneficiary under the loan agreements as, in fact, no tax exemption is granted therein.

NITAFAN VS CIR

Facts: The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office to continue the deduction of withholding taxes from salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and other members of the judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on 4 December 1987.

Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila. They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. With the filing of the petition, the Court deemed it best to settle the issue through judicial pronouncement, even if it had dealt with the matter administratively. 

Issue: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.

Held: NO. Intent to delete express grant of exemption of income taxes to members of Judiciary

The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the generalincome tax applied to all taxpayers. This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the Constitution as approved and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the intent may have been obscured by the failure to include in the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the Court since then has authorized the continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the members of the Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other members of the Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David.

The 1973 Constitution has provided that “no salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax (Section 6, Article XV)”

which was not present in the 1987 Constitution. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII (The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, theirsalary shall not be decreased), negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of “non-diminution” of salaries of judicial officers. 

 Equality of branches of government effected by modifications in provision.

The term “diminished” be changed to “decreased” and that the words “nor subjected to income tax” be deleted so as to give substance to equality among the three branches in the government. A period (.) after “decreased” was made on the understanding that the salary of justices is subject to tax. With the period, the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David is understood not to apply anymore. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income have been reduced in accepting service in government and yet subjected to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet membersand all other employees. 

 Constitutional construction adopts the intent of the framers and people adopting the law.

The ascertainment of the intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. In the case at bar, Section 10, Article VIII is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission. 

CIR v. BPI

G.R. No. 178490 July 7, 2009

Chico-Nazario, J.

Doctrine:

1. The phrase “for that taxable period” merely identifies the excess income

tax, subject of the option, by referring to the taxable period when it was

acquired by the taxpayer.

2. When circumstances show that a choice has been made by the taxpayer

to carry over the excess income tax as credit, it should be respected; but

when indubitable circumstances clearly show that another choice, a tax

refund, is in order, it should be granted. As to which option the taxpayer

chose is generally a matter of evidence.

“Technicalities and legalisms, however exalted, should not be misused by

the government to keep money not belonging to it and thereby enrich itself

at the expense of its law-abiding citizens.”

Facts:

In filing its Corporate Income Tax Return for the Calendar Year 2000, BPI

carried over the excess tax credits from the previous years of 1997, 1998

and 1999. However, BPI failed to indicate in its ITR its choice of whether to

carry over its excess tax credits or to claim the refund of or issuance of a tax

credit certificate.

BPI filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) an administrative

claim for refund. The CIR failed to act on the claim for tax refund of BPI.

Hence, BPI filed a Petition for Review before the CTA, whom denied the

claim.

The CTA relied on the irrevocability rule laid down in Section 76 of the

National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997, which states that once the

taxpayer opts to carry over and apply its excess income tax to succeeding

taxable years, its option shall be irrevocable for that taxable period and no

application for tax refund or issuance of a tax credit shall be allowed for the

same.

The Court of Appeals reversed the CTA decision stating that there was no

actual carrying over of the excess tax credit, given that BPI suffered a net

loss in 1999, and was not liable for any income tax for said taxable period,

against which the 1998 excess tax credit could have been applied.

The Court of Appeals further stated that even if Section 76 was to be

construed strictly and literally, the irrevocability rule would still not bar BPI

from seeking a tax refund of its 1998 excess tax credit despite previously

opting to carry over the same. The phrase “for that taxable period” qualified

the irrevocability of the option of BIR to carry over its 1998 excess tax credit

to only the 1999 taxable period; such that, when the 1999 taxable period

expired, the irrevocability of the option of BPI to carry over its excess tax

credit from 1998 also expired.

Issue:

1. What is the period captured by the irrevocability rule?

2. Whether or not the taxpayer’s failure to mark the option chosen is fatal to

whatever claim

Held:

1. The last sentence of Section 76 of the NIRC of 1997 reads: “Once the

option to carry-over and apply the excess quarterly income tax against

income tax due for the taxable quarters of the succeeding taxable years has

been made, such option shall be considered irrevocable for that

taxable period and no application for tax refund or issuance of a tax

credit certificate shall be allowed therefor.” The phrase “for that

taxable period” merely identifies the excess income tax, subject of the

option, by referring to the taxable period when it was acquired by the

taxpayer.

In the present case, the excess income tax credit, which BPI opted to carry

over, was acquired by the said bank during the taxable year 1998. The

option of BPI to carry over its 1998 excess income tax credit is irrevocable; it

cannot later on opt to apply for a refund of the very same 1998 excess

income tax credit.

2. No. Failure to signify one’s intention in the FAR does not mean outright

barring of a valid request for a refund, should one still choose this option

later on. The reason for requiring that a choice be made in the FAR upon its

filing is to ease tax administration (Philam Asset Management, Inc. v. CIR

G.R. No. 156637 and No. 162004, 14 December 2005). When circumstances

show that a choice has been made by the taxpayer to carry over the excess

income tax as credit, it should be respected; but when indubitable

circumstances clearly show that another choice – a tax refund – is in order, it

should be granted. Therefore, as to which option the taxpayer chose is

generally a matter of evidence.

“Technicalities and legalisms, however exalted, should not be misused by

the government to keep money not belonging to it and thereby enrich itself

at the expense of its law-abiding citizens.”